// H-Diplo | Robert Jervis International Security Studies Forum

Article Review 158

Mattias E. Fibiger, "Indonesia and the Third Indochina War: The End of Containment." *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 29, no. 3 (2022): 240–270. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/18765610-29030003.

17 May 2023 |PDF: https://issforum.org/to/jar-158 | Website: rjissf.org

Editor: Diane Labrosse | Commissioning Editor: Thomas Maddux | Production Editor: Christopher Ball

Review by Dan McCoy, Northern Illinois University

In this article Mattias Fibiger argues that Indonesia's shift in threat perceptions amid the Third Indochina War replaced deep-seated mistrust of Chinese Communism, alongside apprehension of Chinese hegemony over Southeast Asia, with growing alarm over the groundswell of political Islam in Indonesia. Consequently, Indonesia's revamped threat perception and "reorientation" of its diplomacy precipitated "a shift in the geopolitical orientation" of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Indonesia was a founding member, to reincorporate China into the framework of Southeast Asian regionalism (240). In order to uphold ASEAN institutional viability and cohesion among its member nations, Indonesia tacitly followed Thailand's endorsement of utilizing China as a regional counterbalance against Vietnam during its occupation of Cambodia after Indonesia's chronic attempts to integrate Vietnam into Southeast Asian regionalism after 1975. Indonesian President Suharto's redirection of the New Order's regional diplomacy signified a dynamic emblematic of the wider "decomposition of the Cold War" across Southeast Asia, a colorful phrase found in the work of anthropologist Heonik Kwon that Fibiger employs to situate and undergird his argument (242).[1]

Fibiger labels Indonesia the "*primus inter pares*" of ASEAN, particularly during the latter decades of the Cold War. Indonesia proved to be ASEAN's bellwether at fostering ASEAN intra-cooperation and reaffirming foundational ASEAN principals and declarations, specifically the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), to harness the proxy influence of the Great Powers in Southeast Asia during the Third Indochina War (242). Concurrently, as Fibiger asserts, Indonesia also recognized that a "tacit alliance" with China would not only further politically and economically isolate Vietnam vis-à-vis the Cambodian-Vietnamese War, the largest and most protracted conflagration within the Third Indochina War. It would also enhance ASEAN's future institutional viability, fortify Southeast Asian regional security into the post-Cold War period, and shift national focus (and concern) to the threat that political Islam posed to the Suharto regime (242).

Critical questions surrounding the Third Indochina War continue to vex interdisciplinary scholars partly due to the unobtainability of archival records in ASEAN capitals, which has impeded the ability of historians to answer critical questions of the thorniest of the Indochina Wars (241-242). Fibiger's pertinent questions, like those of other scholars, include: "Was the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia the product of ideological fervor, superpower incitement, national chauvinism, or simple self-defense (241)?[2] Was ASEAN's opposition

[1] Heonik Kwon, *The Other Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 8-9.

[2] Nayan Chanda, *Brother Enemy: The War after the War* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986); Wilfred Burchett, *The China-Cambodia-Vietnam Triangle* (Chicago: Vanguard Books, 1981); Ben Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime: Race,*

to the Vietnamese occupation the result of coherence around a common set of norms or more prosaic balance-of-power calculations (241-242)?"[3]

Fibiger's research included active and defunct periodicals spanning East Asia, the US, and Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia. The article's transnational archival research draws from ASEAN ministerial meetings, the National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia, the Ford Presidential Library, the National Security Council, and the US National Archives. Those who wish to engage the complexities of the Third Indochina War must incorporate a trans-disciplinary approach to widen their methodology. Political science and international relations (IR) scholars including Alice Ba, Amitav Acharya, Michael Leifer, Lee Jones, and Donald Weatherbee have undertaken substantive and innovative research.[4] Pairing the work of the scholars above with eminent Southeast Asia historians, including Ben Kiernan, Cheng Guan Ang, Benedict Anderson, and Odd Arne Westad renders Fibiger's narrative versatile and contextually rich.[5]

Fibiger adds to the historiography of the Third Indochina War by concentrating on the about-face of Indonesian diplomacy and threat assessment, shifting the focus from a regional concern (the People's Republic of China or the PRC) to a domestic concern (ascendent political Islam). Fibiger also addresses ASEAN's maturation as an institution during the Kampuchean crisis, a subject he considers "largely unacknowledged" in the historiography (241).[6] The Third Indochina War is a complex, protracted event that involved manifold actors, with roots, strategic interests, and consequences reaching beyond Southeast Asia. The article's historiographical contribution is its examination of how new domestic threats (political Islam), rather than shifting international threats, changed the New Order's threat assessments and Cold War calculus. Fibiger's emphasis on the rise of political Islam as the emerging threat maximizing the New Order's attention undergirds itself to Kwon's quotation that describes Indonesia's change of mentality as a decomposition of the Cold War mentality.

Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–79 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996); Stephen Morris, *Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture and the Causes of War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); Tuong Vu, *Vietnam's Communist Revolution: The Power and Limits of Ideology* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge (eds.), *The Third Indochina War: Conflict between China, Vietnam, and Cambodia, 1972–79* (New York: Routledge, 2006); Hoang Minh Vu, "The Third Indochina War and the Making of Present-Day Southeast Asia, 1975–1995," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 2020, Ithaca, NY.

[3] Lee Jones, *ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (New York: Routledge, 2009); Ang Cheng Guan, *Singapore, ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict 1978–1991* (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2013); Ralf Emmers, *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF* (New York: Routledge, 2003); Alice Ba, *(Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009); K. K. Nair, *ASEAN-Indochina Relations since 1975: The Politics of Accommodation* (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1984); Tim Huxley, *ASEAN and Indochina: A Study of Political Responses, 1975–81* (Canberra: Department of International Relations, Australian National University, 1985).

[4] Alice Ba, *(Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009); Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (New York: Routledge, 2009); Michael Leifer, *ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia* (London: Routledge, 1989); Lee Jones, *ASEAN, Sovereignty, and Intervention in Southeast Asia* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Donald E. Weatherbee (ed.), *Southeast Asia Divided: The ASEAN-Indochina Crisis* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985).

[5] Ben Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under theKhmer Rouge, 1975–79* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); Ang Cheng Guan, *Singapore, ASEAN, and the Cambodian Conflict 1978–1991* (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2013); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 2006); Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge (eds.), *The Third Indochina War: Conflict between China, Vietnam, and Cambodia, 1972–79* (New York: Routledge, 2006).

[6] Tobias Ingo Nischalke, "Insights from ASEAN's Foreign Policy Co-operation: The 'ASEAN Way', a Real Spirit or a Phantom?," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 22, no. 1 (April 2000): 89-112. 92.

As early as 1966, as Suharto's army crushed the remnants of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), high-ranking military officials, such as Lieutenant Colonel Ali Murtopo, advocated for Suharto to abandon Indonesia's *Konfrontasi* campaign against the creation of Malaysia, which had begun under President Sukarno, and pivot Indonesian foreign policy and regional threat assessment toward the containment of the PRC, which Murtopo "characterized as determined to mobilize Southeast Asia's overseas Chinese communities to expand its influence [through subversion and infiltration] in the region" (243). Chinese Indonesians continued to be targeted for violence after the abortive September 30, 1965, coup because of their purported Communist sympathies for and their support from Beijing. When Communist forces declared victory across much of mainland Southeast Asia in 1975, Indonesia displayed a 'nonchalance' toward the Socialist Republic of Vietnam's (SRV) hegemony of Indochina. Indonesia's impetus to stay attentive to the Chinese regional threat, rather than the Vietnamese regional threat as other ASEAN members perceived, spread from the Indonesian military to Indonesia's premier research institutes, including the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which Murtopo co-established in 1971 (244). Dr. Jusuf Wanandi, CSIS Executive Director during the Third Indochina War, later remarked that for the Indonesian military, "China was the big threat, and Vietnam was an important part of Southeast Asia to keep the balance with China on an even keel" (245).[7]

As an intraregional bloc founded on unity and cooperation, ASEAN "harbored divergent perceptions of threat and visions of regional order" during its first decade of existence (245). Malaysia shared Suharto's concern over Chinese 'subversion' in Southeast Asia but normalized diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1974 (245). Thailand and the Philippines established relations with Beijing in 1975, while Singapore followed Indonesia's lead to diplomatically re-engage Beijing after the freezing of Jakarta-Beijing relations in 1967 (246, 263). That a majority of ASEAN member nations normalized diplomatic relations with the PRC, a nuclear-capable power immediately north of Southeast Asia with a history of aiding Communist movements across the region, in order to "cultivate the PRC as a counterweight to Vietnam" perturbed Indonesia as Suharto, who had been a leading force in ASEAN's creation, regarded ASEAN as "a cornerstone of an indigenous architecture of regional security capable of guarding against foreign-sponsored aggression and subversion" (243, 246). Between the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 and the December 1978 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, Indonesia was the only ASEAN nation, through a "sangfroid" approach, to share Vietnam's concerns and aims regarding Southeast Asian security, inter-state diplomacy, and the regional "threat" that the PRC posed (244, 248).

The SRV's invasion of Cambodia on December 25, 1978, challenged ASEAN's unity, institutional viability, and core tenets unlike any event since its 1967 inception. Thailand suddenly became the 'frontline' state, with the Vietnamese military and Khmer allies battling Khmer Communist and non-Communist factions, alike, including the Khmer Rouge, along the Thai-Cambodian border, the site of a growing refugee crisis in tandem. Now, the Suharto regime had a "vexing" decision to make (250). Indonesia could follow ASEAN policy driven by Thai security concerns, thus upholding Indonesia's vision of ASEAN as a "cornerstone of its vision of an autonomous Southeast Asian regional order," or Indonesia could remain resolute in attempting to integrate Vietnam into Southeast Asia's "regional order" (251). In the early 1980s, Indonesia undertook 'dual-track diplomacy' by staying within ASEAN regionalism via the diligence of Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja on one track, who chaired ASEAN's standing committee in 1979, and engaging Hanoi bilaterally on another track with multiple visits to Hanoi by Indonesian military officials, notably ABRI (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*) Commander Gen. L.B. Murdani. Additionally, CSIS and the Vietnam Institute of International Affairs organized seminars in 1984 and 1985 in Hanoi and Jakarta, respectively, that were attended by select members of the press, academics, and public intellectuals (251).[8]

---

[7] Jusuf Wanandi, *Shades of Grey: A Political Memoir of Modern Indonesia, 1965–1998* (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2012), Kindle location 2112.

[8] Robert O. Tilman, *Southeast Asia and the Enemy Beyond: ASEAN Perceptions of External Threats* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1987), 77; "Indonesia-Vietnam Bilateral Seminar," *CSIS The Indonesian Quarterly* XII, No. 2 (April 1984): 151-260; "Second Indonesia-Vietnam Seminar," *CSIS The Indonesian Quarterly* XIII, No. 2 (April 1985): 153-237.

Nevertheless, the early years of the Third Indochina War deepened divergences in regional threat perceptions and assessments among ASEAN members, especially after the brief China-Vietnam border war in early 1979 when the PRC strove to teach Vietnam "a lesson" (252).[9] The China-Vietnam skirmish emboldened the two ASEAN hardliners against the SRV, Thailand and Singapore, to advocate further to enlist the PRC as a counterweight against the SRV through military aid to the Khmer Rouge and security assurance to Bangkok should Vietnam mount a full-scale invasion of Thailand. Meanwhile, Indonesia and Malaysia exhibited a comparatively "dovish" approach to the SRV (251). The Kuantan Proposal of 1980, which was jointly devised by Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur, proposed to mitigate Vietnam-ASEAN hostilities by calling for Thailand to stop receiving military aid from China, with the Khmer Rouge being the ultimate recipient of that aid, if Vietnam economically and militarily severed itself from its Soviet aid. In the wake of the Kuantan Proposal's across-the-board rejection, Indonesia "ultimately despaired of its effort to bring about a rapprochement between ASEAN and Vietnam" (258). Indonesia then "recoiled itself" to following Singapore's lead in steering ASEAN diplomacy that sought to replace the Khmer Rouge with a Khmer coalition government that was capable of winning support from ASEAN, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and the United Nations (258).

Indonesia, Fibiger succinctly argues, had retreated "from its maximalist position of acknowledging Vietnamese hegemony in Cambodia in exchange for a second-best solution that would give rise to a Cambodian regime that depended upon a multitude of external sponsors rather than the PRC alone" (258-259). Thus, as the Third Indochina War ground on, Indonesia abandoned its efforts to 'contain' the PRC and stayed within the ASEAN diplomacy track, largely due to the 'intransigence' of Thailand and Vietnam in their rejection of ASEAN-Vietnam 'rapprochement' (260). The New Order's "willingness to enter a tacit alliance with the PRC also reflected changing perceptions of domestic and international threat," Fibiger states, with Suharto regarding political Islam as the new "key danger" facing Indonesia (261).

"Communism will not be an urgent problem for at least the next ten years" because "the communists do not have the power to destabilize the country," remarked Jusuf Wanandi and CSIS co-founder and economist Hadi Soesastro in 1983 (262). Rather, the pair believed "extremist groups employing the banner of Islam" constituted the gravest threat to Indonesian security moving forward (262).[10] Alarm bells rang for the New Order following Indonesia's 1977 elections when Muslim political parties under the umbrella of the United Development Party (PPP) won thirty percent of the national vote, "the best-ever showing that an opposition party registered during Suharto's three-decade reign" (261). "Institutional coherence…alongside a broader social cohesion," when large swaths of Indonesian society from student activists to elements within the military fused Islam with long-simmering socio-political grievances, portended the "prospect of an Islamic-student-military axis of opposition [that] represented the greatest threat Suharto had faced in more than a decade holding power" (261, 262). As the Suharto regime shifted its focus and priority to monitoring political Islam, the incentivization for "a diplomatic thaw" with the PRC kick-started (263). In 1985, Suharto agreed to meet with Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xuqian in Indonesia, the first meeting between senior Indonesian and Chinese officials since the severing of diplomatic ties in 1967. Despite botched scheduling that prevented the meeting, renewed interactions between both countries marked "a phase shift" in the New Order's foreign policy (263). Thus, changes in the domestic and international spheres had revised the calculus of the New Order's threat perceptions in a major way as the Third Indochina War weaved its way through periods of military stalemate and diplomatic action/inaction through the 1980s.

Fibiger's essay neatly compartmentalizes and clearly amalgamates the diverse mechanisms that shaped and drove Indonesia in the Third Indochina War. Fibiger carefully disentangles the layered interactions between ASEAN state actors in chronological order while keeping Indonesia as the central actor through consistent elucidation of Indonesia's shifting foreign and domestic policies as the war progressed. Ample scholarship

[9] Adam Malik, *Mengabdi Republik, Jilid III: Angkatan Pembangunan* [In the Service of the Republic, Volume III: The Development Generation] (Jakarta: PT Gunung Agung, 1979), 72.

[10] Jusuf Wanandi and M. Hadisoesastro, "Indonesia's Security and Threat Perceptions," Charles Morrison, ed., in *Threats to Security in East-Asia Pacific: National and Regional Perspectives* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1983), 85.

within the IR community spanning ASEAN constructivists, realists, and sceptics has scrutinized the causations, interstate relations, diplomacy, conflict resolution, and the core norms and principles guiding (and challenging) ASEAN in its attempt to mitigate the Third Indochina War.[11] Fibiger, meanwhile, uniquely examines a lesser-known phenomenon *within* Indonesia, revealing that it fundamentally altered the Suharto regime's core threat perceptions from regional threats (the PRC) to domestic threats (political Islam). Furthermore, Fibiger tethers his unique argument regarding political Islam replacing the PRC as the main threat facing Indonesia to a broader argument that Indonesia's transformative threat perception stemmed from the broader deterioration of the Cold War mentality across Southeast Asia. The one underwhelming feature of Fibiger's attention to the way in which political Islam altered the New Order's foreign-policy focus is the limited discussion of the topic. One hopes for a follow-up article or larger work that dives into the causation, forces, and sociopolitical and socioreligious atmosphere within Indonesia that forcibly shifted the New Order's long-held foreign policy focus prioritizing the threat of Chinese hegemony in Southeast Asia.

One issue with Fibiger's article is that it does not span the entire length of the Third Indochina War, which culminated with the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements that eventually ended the conflict. Fibiger's analysis stops at a period in the Third Indochina War (circa 1985) that most scholars describe as a time of scant diplomatic breakthroughs attributed to glacial stubbornness among ASEAN members, their differing regional threat perceptions, and between ASEAN-Vietnam. Consequently, Fibiger does not discuss the diplomatic legwork that Indonesia mustered, within and without ASEAN as the Association's 'interlocuter,' from 1987 until the end of the conflict. The significance of Indonesian diplomacy from 1987 until 1991 includes Indonesia's hosting of multiple Jakarta Informal Meetings, brokering the 1987 Ho Chi Minh City Agreement between Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and SRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, co-chairing the 1989 Paris International Conference on Cambodia, and many military and academic bilateral summit meetings and conferences between Vietnam-Indonesia for Indonesia to better formulate policy vis-à-vis Vietnam with its ASEAN partners. On a symbolic level, Suharto's 1990 trip to Hanoi marked the first visit of a non-Communist ASEAN nation to Vietnam since 1975.[12] The Indonesian and Vietnamese press reported that the resumption of Indonesia-China state relations in 1990 instilled hope in Hanoi that it, too, could normalize relations with Beijing.[13]

Indonesia not only maintained but bolstered its bilateralism with Hanoi during the conflict. While not automatically dismissing Hanoi's geopolitical trepidations and political aims regarding its Kampuchean occupation like other ASEAN members, Indonesia was instrumental in bringing Vietnam to the peace table when examined through a regionalist lens outside of the United Nations and Great Powers. Due to its adherence to ASEAN's norms and principles including ZOPFAN and TAC (1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation), Indonesia proved the most unique and steadfast of the six member nations (counting Brunei). It maintained a steadfast suspicion of great-power involvement in Southeast Asia, including that of the US, and advocated the strongest for ASEAN to accept the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), a policy that US-backed ASEAN hawks Singapore and Thailand disapproved.

It seems unlikely that PRC Premier Deng Xiaoping's Four Modernizations removed China from Cold War strategy in Southeast Asia. ASEAN skeptics argue that the Soviet-Sino rapprochement and collapse of

[11] Louise Fawcett, "Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 80, no. 3 (May 2004): 429-446, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3569018; David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith, *ASEAN and East Asian International Relations: Regional Delusion* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2006); Michael Haas, *The Asian Way to Peace: A Story of Regional Cooperation* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989); Michael Leifer, *Conflict and Regional Order in South-East Asia* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980); Tuong Van Ly, "The Vietnamese Revolution in the Cold War and its impact on Vietnam-ASEAN relations during the 1960s and 1970s," in *Southeast Asia and the Cold War*, ed. Albert Lau, 174-185 (London: Routledge, 2012).

[12] "Hanoi Hopes Soeharto's Trip to Mean Closer Ties," *The Jakarta Post*, November 19, 1990.

[13] "From China with Friendship," *The Jakarta Post*, November 20, 1990.

Communism in Europe in the late 1980s, not the resumption of Sino-Indonesian diplomatic relations in 1990, proved the major *global* factors that decisively ended the Third Indochina War outside of UN involvement. Indonesia certainly came into a 'tacit' agreement with the PRC during the conflict primarily because the PRC had finally agreed to stop arming the Khmer Rouge, a demand that Jakarta had long made. As early as 1972, one year after the establishment of CSIS, Indonesia viewed the PRC as the most significant strategic threat facing Southeast Asian regional security.[14] This viewpoint still prevailed within CSIS at the end of the Cold War with a multitude of CSIS perspectives admonishing ASEAN to remain vigilant of future tensions perpetuated by the PRC in the South China Sea. Even with the end of the Cold War, Indonesia remained wary of growing Chinese hegemony over the region despite the US "unipolar moment" (264).

Fibiger argues that the Third Indochina War not only contributed to a broader decomposition of the Cold War, particularly in Indonesia, but also eroded the "possibility" of ASEAN being "an autonomous regional order constructed by Southeast Asians themselves" as the PRC more deeply embedded itself into regional affairs with a post-Cold War foresight (264). Fibiger applies a skeptic's view of ASEAN's independent institutional viability when declaring, "ASEAN largely ceased to function as a meaningful historical actor in its own right and instead became a venue for great power competition" (264). A further understanding on why the Third Indochina War eroded not only the Cold War, itself, but also Cold War *weltanschauungen* necessitates "a more precise conceptualization of the Cold War not only as an architecture of international relations defined by the US-Soviet rivalry but also as a series of ideological projects dedicated toward furthering the causes of democratic capitalism or [C]ommunism."[15]

Fibiger does not conclude that the PRC remained a Cold War state after Deng Xiaoping assumed power and initiated the PRC's Four Modernizations, thereby pushing a set of domestic and international policies in contrast with the Maoist era. In this regard, he cites the work of historian Chen Jian in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad's *The Cambridge History of the Cold War Volume III: Endings* and Artemy Kalinovsky and Sergey Radchenko's *The End of the Cold War in the Third World: New Perspectives on Regional Conflict* to support his conclusion.[16] Fibiger will presumably tease out his arguments surrounding the rise of political Islam and why it constituted a pivotal sea change in the New Order's threat perception, while also considering Indonesia's consequential diplomatic output within ASEAN regionalism during the second half of the Third Indochina War, in his forthcoming book titled *Suharto's Cold War: Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and the World*.[17]

Dan McCoy is a History PhD candidate at Northern Illinois University and currently a visiting fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in conjunction with an AY2022-23 Fulbright US Student Research Grant to Indonesia. He holds a BA in history from St. Edward's University and an MA in history, with an emphasis on international relations, from the University of New Orleans. His dissertation research addresses Indonesia's multipronged, multi-actor (state and non-state) diplomatic role and impact within and without the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) during the Third Indochina War with an emphasis on Indonesia's position, influence, and perspectives vis-à-vis Southeast Asian regionalism and Indonesia-Vietnam bilateralism.

---

[14] "Mengenai Asia Pada Umumnja, Asia-Tenggara Pada Chususnja," *CSIS Analisa* II, No. 1 (January 1972): 1-32.

[15] Fibiger expressed this viewpoint via email correspondence with this reviewer. Mattias E. Fibiger, "Faculty-Send a message," email message to Dan McCoy, December 12, 2022.

[16] Chen Jian, "China and the Cold War after Mao," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War Volume III: Endings*, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 181-200, doi:10.1017/CHOL9780521837217.010; Chen Jian, "China's Changing Policies Toward the Third World and the End of the Global Cold War," in *The End of the Cold War and The Third World: New Perspectives on Regional Conflict (1st ed.)*, eds. Artemy Kalinovsky and Sergey Radchenko (London: Routledge, 2011), https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203816745.

[17] Mattias Fibiger, *Suharto's Cold War: Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and the World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2023).