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(*The views expressed here are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of State or the U.S. Government.)*

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On June 10, 1958, Charles de Gaulle, who had just returned to power as the Fourth Republic’s last Prime Minister, met at the Hôtel Matignon with his Foreign Minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, and senior officials for a first formal review of external policy. The meeting focused on two subjects: plans for an East-West summit and the common market and other six-power European institutions. The key European issue was whether to implement the Treaties of Rome on the common market and Euratom. The treaties, which were scheduled to go into effect in January 1959, required members to start removing barriers to trade with member countries and harmonize a wide range of economic and energy policies. Despite France’s dramatic economic recovery in the 1950s, business and political leaders feared exposing French industry to European competition. Thus, even before de Gaulle returned to power, many observers expected that the Fourth Republic would invoke a treaty clause that gave Paris the option to defer import liberalization until the Algerian war ended. During his years out of office, de Gaulle had often criticized supranational projects such as the European Defense Community, and it seemed possible that his government might simply reject the common market treaty in order to protect the France’s economic independence—and its ties to colonial markets.

But the General had other plans. In the June 10 meeting, he declared that his government would honor France’s commitments under the European treaties. On at least this critical point, his government would continue the policies forged by its predecessors. As de Gaulle put it, there were two essential points: the common market—which “in itself is not a bad thing”—and “the political and cultural organization of Europe.” In fact, rather than resisting commercial integration, de Gaulle saw the opening of French markets as a way to spur competitiveness. During the summer and fall of 1958, he vigorously defended the six-power customs union against the British proposal for a wider, more loosely organized, Free Trade Area. In December he pushed through rigorous economic reforms backed by a sharp devaluation, which prepared the French economy to compete in external markets. Thanks to his efforts, instead of clinging to trade barriers, the French government led the effort to create a European market. But if De Gaulle took economic policy seriously, he clearly subordinated it to his overall goal of restoring France’s rank in world affairs. Along these
lines, during the June 10 meeting he noted that if the European Communities took on a truly significant political or cultural role, their headquarters would need to be in Paris instead of Brussels.4

The positions on European questions that De Gaulle adopted in the summer of 1958 illustrate the main theme of Michael Sutton’s fine survey of France’s role in European integration since World War II. According to Sutton, despite dramatic changes within France and the revolutionary transformation of the international system, successive governments in Paris have pursued a remarkably consistent line toward Europe for more than fifty years. Sutton argues that a geopolitical imperative shaped French policy toward European integration, clearly outweighing other considerations such as economic benefit or partisan advantage. Sutton further claims that it was de Gaulle who most persuasively articulated the geopolitical imperative, providing the basic framework within which the French elite has understood the stakes in European integration. Of course, in the decades since World War II many French statesmen have sought to assert French leadership in Europe. But it is de Gaulle’s rhetoric that has exercised the greatest and most lasting influence over how policy-makers pursued the country’s national interest while building Europe.

Sutton’s account covers the most significant negotiations on European integration from early postwar plans for regional customs unions to the abortive European Constitution. Students of France’s role in European politics will find it useful for several reasons. First, it covers the entire period from 1944 to 2007, moving quickly through the postwar decades in order to provide a fuller account of the years since de Gaulle left power in 1969. This chronological emphasis may reflect Sutton’s experience as an observer of French politics and European affairs during much of the latter period, first as an economic analyst based in Brussels and later as a British academic. Second, the book smoothly incorporates diplomatic, strategic and economic issues, inserting concise explanations of technical points at appropriate points in the narrative. Third, although it does not draw on extensive archival research or interviews, it is based on a careful survey of reliable historical studies as well as published primary sources such as official reports, speeches, and memoirs, and its notes provide a good guide to materials available in English and French.

Sutton’s narrative clearly shows that under both the Fourth and Fifth Republics leading statesmen employed rhetoric with Gaullist overtones to frame policies toward Europe. However, the book does not really define the geopolitical imperative that supposedly drove policy nor does it convincingly explain how that imperative determined specific French policies. During the early postwar years, policy-makers sought to restore French power and influence in a world dominated by the superpowers by creating regional institutions

that Paris could steer. Even though the process of European integration often focused on economic arrangements such as the Common Market, it was concern with Europe’s dependence on American security guarantees in the face of the Soviet Union’s military superiority that inspired efforts to create a European bloc. However, in the early 1970s, the emergence of détente between the superpowers, the challenges to the postwar domestic settlements in the liberal democracies, and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system shifted attention toward economic issues. During these years, Paris struggled against the Federal Republic of Germany’s monetary hegemony, which threatened French efforts to modernize industry without endangering social stability. Under the leadership of President François Mitterrand, the French adopted a “hard franc” policy, accepting slow growth and high unemployment to reassert influence over Europe’s economic governance, a strategy that paved the way for the establishment of the single European currency. A third period, ushered in by the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989 and the emergence of the United States as the sole remaining superpower, revived concerns with political developments in Central Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle East. During these years, Paris sought to counter new threats to Europe’s political balance by working toward a common foreign and security policy for the European Union. Thus, during the six decades that followed World War II, the main considerations that drove France’s policy toward Europe shifted from the military balance on the continent to economic autonomy in an era of interdependence, and then to the political dynamics of the European Union’s peripheries.

Analysts can no doubt tie any of these considerations to the balance of power, concerns with France’s standing, and, by extension, geopolitical goals. But it is harder to demonstrate that Gaullist geopolitical conceptions really explained French policy—as opposed to simply setting the parameters for the rhetoric most often used to present policy. In order to distinguish an enduring geopolitical imperative from other considerations that may have shaped France’s policy, it would have been useful if the book had more directly confronted the main interpretations found in the historical literature on Paris’s role in European integration. Thus the book invokes the military-political balance in postwar Europe, but it does not fully engage the debate among scholars including Michael Creswell, William I. Hitchcock, Marc Sheetz and Marc Trachtenberg regarding the specific strategic considerations behind French policy toward an appropriate regional framework for German rearmament. Again, the narrative integrates economic and financial concerns, but it does not explicitly analyze the arguments on the economic drivers of France’s policy on European integration put forward by scholars such as John Gillingham, Frances M. B.

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Likewise, the book acknowledges that Europeanist ideology may have played a role, but it does not directly respond to the path-breaking studies by scholars such as Craig Parsons and Jeff Vanke. This seems unfortunate, since interpretations that focus on French politicians who endorsed Europe as an end in itself rather than as instrument for the pursuit of national interests seem to contradict directly the primacy of geopolitical thinking.

In order to demonstrate that a geopolitical imperative not only informed but determined France’s role in Europe, it would be necessary to investigate the other factors that influenced policy-making. It would presumably prove tedious to undertake a systematic analysis for a fifty-year period. But a general study might nonetheless choose a number of specific episodes for more careful review. Detailed accounts of two or three key incidents could tease out the relative importance of strategic, economic and ideological factors and bolster—or nuance—general claims about the salience of geopolitics. Episodes for closer inspection would include not only periods when de Gaulle and his followers governed but also times when his political opponents held power. In particular one might include case studies of the governments of Guy Mollet and Francois Mitterrand, who as socialists might seem unlikely to have embraced de Gaulle’s geopolitical vision. In this connection, it is interesting to note that both Mollet and Mitterrand entered office with support from center-left coalitions that had won elections on the basis of promises to pursue social and economic reform. Yet both decided to implement European options at the expense of their domestic ambitions. Orthodox geopolitical accounts argue that the Mollet government decided to go ahead with the Common Market in response to the Suez Crisis, which seemed to demonstrate Europe’s weakness. Likewise, Mitterrand may have chosen austerity and membership in the European Monetary System over ‘Keynesianism in one country’ because he was determined to maintain France’s standing vis-à-vis the Federal Republic. Yet some scholars have claimed that Mollet and Mitterrand actually chose European policies that apparently went against their domestic priorities in order to strengthen the French economy in the medium term, which would in turn make it possible to pursue their social and political goals over the longer run.

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8 On the Mollet government’s decision to back the common market, see in particular the accounts in Lynch, *France and the International Economy*, ch. 8 and Milward, *European Rescue of the Nation-State*, ch. 4. For an analyses of the Mitterrand government’s European policies, see Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 269-
concluded that the European market “in itself is not a bad thing”—and was not merely a fig leaf for more fundamental geopolitical concerns.

Overall, Sutton’s book presents a useful overview of France’s role in the “Construction of Europe” that can be recommended to those who are just coming to the subject and which may prove appropriate for classroom use. However, the book does not make an adequate case for the argument that an overarching geopolitical imperative determined French policy toward Europe. A closer investigation of the actual process by which France’s European policy was formulated, at least at key turning points, might demonstrate that geopolitical ambitions did in fact outweigh domestic concerns or ideological goals.

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“W ar,” wrote French President Charles de Gaulle, “gives birth and brings death to nations. In the meantime, it never ceases to loom over their existence.”¹ A grim dictum, no doubt, but from a man who twice saw German armies march across France, and who was born into a country still aggrieved by defeat at the hands of Prussia in 1871, it had much justification. And it was not only de Gaulle, according to Michael Sutton, who feared that war loomed over France. Indeed, all French leaders since 1944 dreaded a resurgent Germany, and their geopolitical calculations meant to assuage this fear offered the “abiding and dominant impulse behind France’s concern with European union.” (329)

Sutton sets his argument against other scholars of European integration, notably Andrew Moravscik, who argue that French policy was driven by motives more economic than geopolitical. (10-11) Sutton grants that some French policies, like support for the European Economic Community (EEC) were narrowly focused on achieving economic gains for France. Nonetheless, he argues that when the full gamut of the institutions of integration are considered it is plain that French policy was motivated more by geopolitics than economics. And, most important for Sutton, when efforts to achieve monetary integration are understood as a French instrument of geopolitical power, the “strictly economic dimension may then have no claim at all to primacy.” (11)

A work of history that runs to 2007 is ‘contemporary history’ indeed. Michael Sutton, who has had careers both as an economist with The Economist Intelligence Unit (of The Economist newspaper group) and Professor (now Emeritus) in Modern History and International Relations at Aston University, is uniquely positioned to bring this account so close to the present day. He offers a synthesis of the scholarship on French policy in the postwar decades. Readers will recognize the influence of John Young, John Gillingham and William Hitchcock in the account of French efforts to restore France’s leadership position in Europe after the Second World War.² Sutton also incorporates the work of French scholars Georges-Henri Soutou, Maurice Vaisse, and Frédéric Bozo, to whom he acknowledges an especial debt. (x) As the narrative continues through to more recent decades, Sutton moves beyond synthesis to chart a “first draft of history” of French policy, gleaned from memoirs, published documents, and contemporary analyses (including Sutton’s own work).

Sutton’s writes vividly and provides instructive aperçus of French officials. This propels a narrative necessarily complicated by diplomatic negotiations, re-written treaties, and the technicalities of monetary policy. Sutton has chosen a thoughtful structure for his book,


dividing it in three: Part One considers the French approach to European integration from 1944 through 1969, emphasizing the geopolitical nature of French policy. Part Two is an account of French policy towards the European Economic Community and its successors, from the 1960s through 2005, and stresses French economic motives. Part Three picks up where Part One left off, and examines issues of power and security – and primarily the move towards monetary integration – from de Gaulle’s departure through to 2007. This partitioning works quite well, allowing Sutton to trace developments of one institution or policy more closely than if he had chosen a purely chronological approach.

In Part One, Sutton points to continuity in French policy, arguing that French leaders across the Fourth and Fifth Republic encouraged or engaged in political cooperation or integration only when it served French geopolitical interests. France’s 1944 Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union, and 1947 Treaty of Dunkirk with Great Britain were aimed at bolstering France against a resurgent Germany. When French concerns shifted somewhat in the late 1940s to the threat posed by Moscow, France participated in organizations designed to rebuild and defend Europe, such as the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

This pattern continued in 1950 with the Schuman Plan, according to which the French Foreign minister called for the joint organization of French and West German coal and steel production. While the path from the Schuman Plan to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) held surprises for France, Sutton is right to emphasize that the impetus of the plan remained, as Jean Monnet wrote, to “solve the German problem” and avoid a war with Germany. (45) In setting up a supranational authority to govern a Western European coal and steel pool, French leaders demonstrated their willingness to sacrifice national control in exchange for national security.

Similarly, after the United States called for the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1950, the French responded to this unwelcome suggestion with a proposal for integration: Why not establish a supranational European army to which the F.R.G. could contribute troops, rather than re-establish an independent German army? Ultimately, the French National Assembly would vote against this proposed European Defence Community (EDC), placing “definite limits to any French surrenders of independence in the cause of European integration.” (73) Nonetheless, the plan for defence integration was motivated by geopolitical goals, and certainly not for the sake of integration itself. Meanwhile, after the EDC was abandoned, German rearmament continued within another cooperative framework, that of the Western European Union.

France continued to be driven by a geopolitical imperative through de Gaulle’s Presidency. De Gaulle’s frustration with Washington and London during the Berlin Crisis led him to meet with Adenauer at Rambouillet in July 1960, where the Frenchman revealed his plan for a political union in Europe that he hoped could challenge American hegemony in NATO. But when the geopolitical goals of this “Union of States” seemed out of reach, this move toward union was abandoned. De Gaulle himself scuttled the Fouchet Committee, established to realize these plans, when it was clear the United States would not accept such an adjustment to the Atlantic alliance. (99) De Gaulle’s hopes for political cooperation that would serve as a lever for French
foreign policy interests were “transmuted” into the anticlimactic Élysée Treaty with the FRG in 1963. (100)

In Part Two, Sutton points to further continuity between the Fourth and Fifth Republic in their policies towards economic integration. Even de Gaulle – a geopolitician whom Stanley Hoffmann ranks alongside Frederick the Great, Richelieu, Pitt and Bismarck – was also motivated by the narrow economic interests of his state. When, in 1958, de Gaulle was again made President, France had already signed the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) the previous year. The EEC, Sutton points out, was not a French idea, nor was it a geopolitical project meant to restrain Germany. Quite the contrary, in fact, it was an attempt to harness other Western European countries to the German economic locomotive chugging full-steam ahead. France was pleased that the EEC was to be intergovernmental, rather than supranational, in nature, and the shining prospect of a Common Agricultural Policy – a boon to France’s agricultural sector – led France to work for its realization. And while de Gaulle might have sabotaged the fledgling Community, he decided instead to capitalize on the economic advantages it provided to France. And so, Sutton writes, de Gaulle’s reasoning on French participation in the EEC “was essentially economic.” (129)

In Part Three, Sutton’s brings his training as an economist to bear upon the thorny intricacies of international monetary diplomacy. Herein lies the crux of Sutton’s overall argument. For in Parts One and Two, he has established a pattern of geopolitical interests dominating much of French policy, except in the case of the EEC. But the case of European monetary integration is a special one, for it is here that France was willing to surrender “what has traditionally been a prime regalian power, namely that of the state’s monopoly issue of currency.” (11) The motive behind this integrative policy, Sutton suggests, is the true bellwether of French motives. And Sutton sees no doubt that French motives were the stuff of high politics -- of geopolitics.

As the Bretton Woods system collapsed in the 1970s, the FRG assumed monetary hegemony in Europe and the Deutschmark came to serve the anchor role previously occupied by the U.S. dollar. This irked the French, who saw monetary arrangements “as having a direct bearing on France’s place generally in the world.” (221-2) From the 1970s on, for essentially political reasons, France sought to mitigate German hegemony by coordinating European monetary policy via an Exchange Rate Mechanism and ultimately Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and a single currency.

Sutton offers two explanations as to why the French considered monetary subordination to be so problematic. First, French leaders came to believe that only by improving the monetary system “could there be a reinvigoration of France’s economic power that would prevent its being overshadowed in Europe by West Germany.” (226) The close relationship of monetary policy to economic policy makes this something of a blurry example for Sutton to hold up as a purely geopolitical motive. But in 1989, French efforts to establish an EMU were given clarity of purpose. With changes looming in the FRG, French President Francois Mitterrand became “even more convinced of the need to pursue EMU for political reasons – that is, to contain

3 Stanley Hoffmann, Decline or Renewal? France since the 1930s (New York: Viking Press, 1974), 285.
German power and channel it in the right direction.” (243) And the right direction was toward Western Europe, with a continued commonality of interest in peace and prosperity.

With German unification, this goal became even more important. A unified Germany, it was feared, might be strong enough to strike out on its own, away from the structures of Western Europe. And so as Europe progressed towards the 1992 Maastricht Treaty that created the European Union (EU), France continued to put further monetary integration at the top of the agenda. Mitterrand believed an integrated monetary policy was more important than any other French goals served by the treaty, including reinforcing the European Council, a move towards a common defence scheme, or bringing other European states in line with French social policy. (270-271) For the rest of the decade, until the single currency was introduced in 1999, Mitterrand and his successor Jacques Chirac showed a “dogged commitment” to Maastricht and continued to believe that the balance of power in Europe was best shaped by a single currency and a European Central Bank. (293) While archival sources for such recent decades are unavailable, Sutton has enough evidence from memoirs and secondary accounts to convince readers that French leaders, especially Mitterrand, remained apprehensive about Germany’s future and crafted their monetary policy on the geopolitical imperative.

Sutton’s scan of the state of integration in 1990s and 2000s shows mixed results for France. In the early 1990s, assertive United States leadership in NATO led France to shift back to seeking European defence cooperation outside of the Atlantic alliance, and mainly with Germany. (268) Still, there remained a “deep-seated feeling in Paris” that the expansion of the European Union eastwards was leading to “a new sort of Mitteleuropa” dominated by the very state France was trying to ensonce in union. (312-313). France eventually agreed to E.U. expansion when it became clear that the CAP would not be threatened. (316). But the expanded Europe was much broader than the Carolingian Europe that France had led into integration in the 1940s and 1950s. More states and more interests made it nearly impossible for Europe to speak with one voice in foreign policy, let alone for France to be the leading voice. And the economic benefits of monetary integration provided “no magic solution” to problems in the French economy. (323) Nonetheless, throughout the decades since the Second World War, relations between France and the F.R.G. witnessed a reorientation from conflict to co-operation so remarkable it would be difficult to overstate, and this, after all, is what Sutton argues was the most important driver of France’s European policy.

Overall, Sutton makes a strong case that French encouragement of European integration was motivated, primarily, by French apprehensions about German resurgence. It would certainly be difficult for a historian, after reading Sutton’s book, to argue that economics were more important than geopolitics in shaping French policy towards European integration. Sutton has succeeded admirably in making his case and presenting an exceptionally lucid account of several decades of complicated political and economic maneuver.

It is a sign of the richness of Sutton’s topic that France and the Construction of Europe presents an effective argument while still provoking more questions. One issue left unsettled is the nature and extent of France’s geopolitical goals in the Cold War era. When the Bundestag insisted that the Franco-German Élysée Treaty feature a pro-American preamble, de Gaulle lamented that the Germans “had been my great hope, [but] they are my great
disappointment.” (109) De Gaulle’s forlorn remark suggests that he saw a value to European political union beyond simply tying down the FRG, and to “raising France’s influence, power, and rank on the European and world stages,” especially vis-à-vis the superpowers. (328) Sutton’s evidence shows how at various times and with varying success, France encouraged the European construction so as to better deter the Soviet Union, defend against encroachment by the United States, and as de Gaulle wrote, make Europe “the arbiter between the Soviet and Anglo-Saxon camps.” (93) Almost in passing, Sutton notes that French efforts in Europe “actually took sustenance from the continuing conflict or rivalry on the European continent between the superpowers.” (199) There seems to be a larger question of the relationship of the Cold War to European integration that requires further investigation.4

The second question concerns the difference between the geopolitical and economic motives that drove French policy. Sutton, who premised his book and structured it to emphasize a split between geopolitical and economic motives, pulls his punch on the last page, writing: “such a division would be both false and artificial.” (329) If this is the case – and there are many excellent works to suggest a close relationship between economics and geopolitical power in history5 – then the connection between the two in postwar France is worthy of sustained examination. Sutton hints at these connections throughout the text: the Schuman Plan developed because of the importance of steel to military strength; de Gaulle was “keenly aware” that his international goals “depended on a strong, growing economy;” and French leaders linked monetary arrangements with France’s standing in the world arena. (45, 129, 222) French leaders throughout this period sought tangible military security and economic advantage, but also the intangibles of influence, rank, and grandeur. From Sutton’s evidence, it seems these three were considered anything but discrete. Students of French policy require a closer explanation, not, as Robert Kagan has argued, of how France moved “beyond power,” but how power in France was recast as a combination of these tangibles and intangibles.6

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5 Paul Kennedy, for example, has traced “the interaction between economics and strategy” over five hundred years as the Great Powers sought “to become (or to remain) both rich and strong,” Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), xv.

dissertation examines the evolution of NATO after the Suez Crisis, and his previous research has been published in the *International Journal, Cold War History, Intelligence & National Security*, and *Canadian Military History*.