Political observers and the public alike now take as given that American presidents are active participants and policymakers on the global stage. Indeed, as Allison Prasch states, “US presidents have used their rhetorical appeals to exert power, extend influence, persuade audiences to adopt a specific view of the world, and rally the citizenry around a shared set of values or ideals” (4). Yet, a less-asked question is how and why American presidents, and, by extension, the United States, became such involved policy actors on the global stage. Leveraging archival data and five in-depth case studies, Prasch’s The World is Our Stage offers a compelling analysis of how presidents “went global” and how the global rhetorical presidency evolved during the Cold War.
H-Diplo | Robert Jervis International Security Studies Forum
Review Essay 112
Allison M. Prasch. The World is Our Stage: The Global Rhetorical Presidency and the Cold War. University of Chicago Press, 2023. ISBN: 9780226823652
Review by Yu Ouyang, Purdue University Northwest
14 January 2025 | PDF: http://issforum.org/to/RE112 | Website: rjissf.org | X: @HDiplo
Editor: Diane Labrosse | Commissioning Editor: Kevin Grimm | Production Editor: Christopher Ball
Political observers and the public alike now take as given that American presidents are active participants and policymakers on the global stage. Indeed, as Allison Prasch states, “US presidents have used their rhetorical appeals to exert power, extend influence, persuade audiences to adopt a specific view of the world, and rally the citizenry around a shared set of values or ideals” (4). Yet, a less-asked question is how and why American presidents, and, by extension, the United States, became such involved policy actors on the global stage. Leveraging archival data and five in-depth case studies, Prasch’s The World is Our Stage offers a compelling analysis of how presidents “went global” and how the global rhetorical presidency evolved during the Cold War.
A qualitative account of presidential rhetoric on the international stage, The World is Our Stage sits at the intersection of two related and yet distinct literatures. The first is the voluminous literature on presidential rhetoric and the idea of “going public,” which refers to public activities that presidents engage in as they appeal to the public and promote their policies.[1] Works in this area largely focus on how presidents interact with the public and the effectiveness of such strategies.[2] Another set of relevant scholarly literature focuses on assessing presidential travels, with some researchers examining where and why presidents travel to particular locations and others assessing the impacts of presidential visits.[3] One significant contribution of Prasch’s book is successfully merging the two literatures and using archival data to yield insights about how US foreign policy and rhetoric developed and evolved during the Cold War.
In addition to an introductory and concluding chapters, the book contains one chapter that outlines the concept of global rhetorical presidency, which refers to “how US presidents use their rhetoric abroad to extent the United States’ military, political, and psychological influence in various geopolitical regions and nation-states, expand presidential power in foreign affairs, and elevate the United States’ image and position on the world stage” (23), and five additional chapters on the five case studies, respectively. Chapter 2 presents an account of President Harry S. Truman and his attendance at the 1945 Potsdam Conference. In addition to addressing questions relating to his capability and credibility as president of the United States, Truman’s presence at Potsdam also symbolically and substantially impacted US foreign policy during the Cold War. Chapter 3 examines President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his “Good Will” tours. While offering a cautionary tale for later presidents, Eisenhower’s travel to—and absence from—particular places and regions throughout his “good will” tours was a manifestation of US foreign policy priorities during his administration. Chapter 4 details President John F. Kennedy’s trip to West Berlin in 1963. A geopolitically important location during the Cold War, West Berlin offered Kennedy a unique opportunity to not only impact his own image on the international stage, but also to signal the US commitment and resolve against communism. Chapter 5 describes President Richard Nixon and the “Opening to China.” On this carefully crafted trip, Nixon and his team leveraged new communication technologies and network television to present the version of Nixon and US leadership they wished to portray to the rest of the world. As Prasch writes, Nixon’s 1972 visit to China was intended to “simultaneously capture public attention, elevate his presidential image, distract from the quagmire of Vietnam, boost his re-election chances in November 1972, and feed his obsession with controlling the media landscape” (145). Finally, chapter 6 covers President Ronald Reagan’s visit to Normandy on the 40th anniversary of D-Day. The Normandy visit, to a symbolically important location, allowed Reagan, and later presidents, to invoke and connect powerful imageries of the bravery and resolve displayed on D-Day to broader US foreign policy.
As with any excellent work, The World is Our Stage also raises several important questions for future investigations. For instance, how do (or should) presidents balance between domestic and international policy priorities? As pointed out in chapter 2, Truman gained arguably as much domestically, if not more, from the Potsdam trip than internationally. As a largely untested president trying to fill the void left behind by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the stakes were incredibly high for Truman, who had to demonstrate to the American public and other countries that he was indeed capable of serving in the Oval Office. A similar example comes from Kennedy’s trip to West Berlin. As discussed extensively in chapter 4, competing for Kennedy’s time and attention was a potential trip to Birmingham, Alabama, the site of intense marches and protests against racial segregation and Jim Crow laws. Of course, the imageries conveyed and the symbolism invoked in either trip vary considerably, and Kennedy ultimately decided to go to Berlin and “offer a more flattering image of the United States: the triumph of American power and prestige on the Cold War world stage” (123). No doubt the trip elevated Kennedy’s image and status on the global stage, but racial protests and the struggle for civil rights in Birmingham arguably constituted a more significant, historical context, albeit a domestic one.[4] While it is difficult to make direct comparisons across historical time periods and events, it would be hard to imagine a contemporary president making a similar choice and forgoing a domestic crisis in search of an international audience.
Relatedly, what does the global rhetorical presidency look like in contemporary times? Are the insights from Prasch’s well-researched and well-written book largely limited to presidential rhetoric on foreign policy during the Cold War, or are they also applicable to decisions by more recent presidents? For example, consider Eisenhower’s “good will” tours. As Prasch points out, “Eisenhower assumed office at a moment of critical importance, one surrounded by global events that threatened American prestige and international leadership at the dawn of the Cold War” (70-71). How many of the trips were driven by Eisenhower’s own desire for international travel, and how many reflected the necessity to form good geopolitical alliances to stop the spread of Communism during the Cold War?
In other words, given the symbolic importance of presidential travels as representations of US commitment and resolve against Communism during the Cold War, how constrained were American presidents at various, critical junctures in global history? One can argue that global events and developments indeed limited the options available, assuming the goal was to combat the spread of Communism. Prasch hints at this possibility in the concluding chapter, noting that US foreign policy narratives may depend on the person in the White House. For instance, she writes, “Where [President Barack] Obama argued for an open, inclusive global society, [President] Donald J. Trump used his presence abroad to present the United States as set apart—and isolated—from the rest of the world” (217). It is important to note, however, that both Obama and Trump were post-Cold War presidents who operated in hyper-partisan domestic political environments that offered fewer opportunities for cohesion and agreement across partisan divides. Moreover, if one defining component of the global rhetorical presidency is, as Prasch notes, “the penchant for historical firsts” (217), what must future presidents accomplish to demonstrate their foreign policy acumen? Along this line of reasoning then, the standard for successful foreign policy seems to increase for every subsequent president and administration.
Overall, I highly recommend this book. The World is Our Stage reimagines the nature of presidential rhetoric in a global context and offers a compelling overview of how the global rhetorical presidency affected US foreign policy during the Cold War and crafted the boundaries of presidential leadership in foreign policy for later presidents. This is a must-read for anyone interested in the history of the presidency, presidential power, and the Cold War.
Yu Ouyang is an Associate Professor of Political Science and Associate Department Chair at Purdue University Northwest. His research on the American presidency, political rhetoric, and presidential power has been published in journals such as Public Administration Review and Presidential Studies Quarterly.
[1] Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, 4th ed. (CQ Press, 2007).
[2] Andrew W. Barrett, “Going Public as a Legislative Weapon: Measuring Presidential Appeals Regarding Specific Legislation.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 35:1 (2005): 1-10; George C. Edwards, On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit (Yale University Press, 2003); Paul Collins and Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha, The President and the Supreme Court: Going Public on Judicial Decisions from Washington to Trump (Cambridge University Press, 2020).
[3] For the “where and why” issue, see Sylvia A. Ellis, “The Historical Significance of President Kennedy’s Visit to Ireland in June 1963,” Irish Studies Review 16:2 (2008): 113-130; James H. Lebovic and Elizabeth N. Saunders, “The Diplomatic Core: The Determinants of High-Level US Diplomatic Visits, 1946–2020,” International Studies Quarterly 60:1 (2016): 107-123; and Jonghoon Lee and James D. Kim, “Travel to Allies or Adversaries? A Compositional Analysis of U.S. Diplomatic Visits,” Social Science Quarterly 105:4 (2024): 996-1013. For the impact of visits, see Andrew W. Barrett and Jeffrey S. Peake, “When the President Comes to Town: Examining Local Newspaper Coverage of Domestic Presidential Travel,” American Politics Research 35:1 (2007): 3-31; Oasis Kodila-Tedika and Sherif Khalifa, “Official Visits and Foreign Direct Investments,” Journal of International Trade & Economic Development 33:2 (2024): 316-342; and Matt Malis and Alastair Smith, “State Visits and Leader Survival,” American Journal of Political Science 65:1 (2021): 241-256.
[4] For a history of the Civil Rights Movement and Birmingham, Alabama, see Richard Lentz, “Snarls Echoing ‘Round the World’: The 1963 Birmingham Civil Rights Campaign on the World Stage,” American Journalism 17:2 (2000): 69-96; Diane McWhorter, Carry Me Home: Birmingham, Alabama: The Climactic Battle of the Civil Rights Revolution (Simon & Schuster, 2001); J. Mills Thornton III, Divided Lines: Municipal Politics and the Struggle for Civil Rights in Montgomery, Birmingham, and Selma (University of Alabama Press, 2002); and Bobby M. Wilson, Race and Place in Birmingham: The Civil Rights and Neighborhood Movements (Rowman & Littlefield, 2000). For a discussion of the impact of Birmingham and the Civil Rights Movement on American politics and public policy, see Kenneth T. Andrews and Sarah Gaby, “Local Protest and Federal Policy: The Impact of the Civil Rights Movement on the 1964 Civil Rights Act,” Sociological Forum 30:S1 (2015): 509-527; Shane Gunderson, “Protest Actions, Image Events, and the Civil Rights Movement in Birmingham,” American Communication Journal 10:4 (2008): 1-11; and Davi Johnson, “Martin Luther King’s 1963 Birmingham Campaign as Image Event,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 10:1 (2007): 1-26.