H-Diplo | RJISSF Review Essay 115: Lim on Han, The Ripple Effect11 min read

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One of the major strengths of The Ripple Effect is its context-sensitive deliberation on the multifaceted nature of China’s presence in primarily the Mekong states of Southeast Asia. Unlike other works that focus solely on, say, economics or politics, the book weaves together a broad spectrum of influences, encompassing economic ties, cultural diplomacy, geopolitical maneuvering, and socio-political engagement. This comprehensive approach allows the reader to grasp the complexity of China’s interactions with the nations of Southeast Asia. For example, China’s economic might, while significant, cannot be understood in isolation from its political goals and socio-cultural influence.

The Ripple Effect unpacks several concepts across various social science disciplines. One of these is “soft power,” as conceptualized by Joseph Nye (61).[1] This refers to the ability of a country to shape the preferences of others through attraction rather than coercion. In Southeast Asia, China has actively sought to expand its soft power through cultural diplomacy, educational exchanges, and media influence. The book’s discussion of Confucius Institutes is particularly noteworthy here (see chapter 4). These state-funded institutions, which promote Chinese language and culture, have proliferated across Southeast Asia in recent years. While they are often claimed to be apolitical, the book points out that they also serve a broader geopolitical purpose, helping to project a positive image of China and counteract negative perceptions of its rise. In countries like Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines, Confucius Institutes have become an important tool for China’s soft-power outreach. At the same time, the book also highlights the limits of China’s soft power. In countries where historical grievances and territorial disputes with China run deep, soft-power initiatives have been met with skepticism. Public opinion in such countries remains wary of China’s intentions. For example, Vietnamese policymakers exercise caution in accepting Chinese funding to push critical infrastructure. Although Vietnam publicly claims that it supports Chinese programs like the Belt and Road Infrastructure (BRI), in practice, it does not actively participate in projects within the framework of the BRI.[2] This illustrates the challenges China faces in deploying soft power in a region where its economic and military ambitions are often viewed with suspicion.

One of the most impressive parts of the book is Han’s discussion of the unintended consequences of China’s diplomatic ties with Myanmar, Cambodia, and Thailand in chapter 2. Specifically, it sheds light on the allegations about how Chinese political and economic support has enabled these supposedly illiberal administrations to not only survive, but also expand their clout. In so doing, it dissects common, but not necessarily true, perceptions about China’s role in these countries’ economies and politics. For Myanmar, the book demonstrates that China’s position towards different ruling administrations is generally “fair weather.” While it is easy to highlight Chinese diplomatic shelter towards the junta that came into power in 2021, what tends to be overlooked is China’s support of the democratically elected National League for Democracy government led by then State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi. In particular, when the latter faced international criticism during some of the country’s most serious humanitarian crises in years, it was China—along with Russia—that resisted efforts by Western governments at the United Nations to condemn and even sanction it. Yet, in view of the deteriorating political developments in Myanmar since 2021, the book also raises questions about how China’s strategy of cooperating with all incumbent governments might not necessarily bring about stability in the Mekong region.

Also welcome is this chapter’s equally sharp account of the situation in Thailand, at least since the 2014 coup. For those who are aligned with former Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha (2014–2023), the “China model” is often seen in broadly positive terms.[3] In particular, China’s emphasis on economic growth and social order are qualities that Thais are exhorted to emulate. For some opposition figures, such a rosy portrayal of Chinese governance is merely an excuse by the pro-Prayut camp to justify its continual control of political proceedings.[4] The point is that China has been used by both sides of the political spectrum to advance their agendas. This stalemate seems set to continue following a series of political maneuvers in the aftermath of the recently concluded Thai general election.

In addition, the book’s discipline in keeping a balanced perspective on what is a very diverse discussion, ranging from Chinese consumption patterns to diasporic engagement is admirable. As is common these days, China’s “Going Out” efforts tend to be analyzed in a rather one-sided manner. There is increasingly less space to have a proper debate between the pro and con camps. This can be seen in US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s rather simplistic “if you’re not at the table in the international system, you’re going to be on the menu” call for solidarity to US allies during the Munich Security Conference in early 2024.[5] Take the export of infrastructure, for example. Proponents often claim that Chinese firms can and have supplied much-needed infrastructure to nations which are lacking the resources to build such infrastructure. There is also the belief that Chinese firms offer more relaxed business terms in comparison to their counterparts from the more advanced economies.[6] However, it is just as important to recognize the downside of some of these infrastructure deals. While fears about so-called “debt trap diplomacy” have been blown out of proportion, there are still other negative externalities that must be confronted.[7] Han offers critiques to some of these, especially the environmental and social costs, in chapter 5. Put another way, Chinese-financed undertakings have most certainly generated growth, but some of the poorly planned ones have also caused issues such as environmental degradation and a widening of inequality in the host economies.[8]

Notwithstanding its various merits, some gaps remain in the book. First, there are places in the book where more technical detail would have been welcome. For example, the discussion on how Thailand has in recent years become the de facto Southeast Asian production hub for several Chinese electric vehicle (EV) players (55-60) could have been deepened. The author suggests that one of the key factors behind the EV players’ economic strategy is the Thai-Chinese Rayong Industrial Zone. The project, which was initiated in 2005, is a collaborative effort between Chinese and Thai private firms whose role in the process of industrial upgrading should have been spelled out more clearly. Relatedly, one of the most sobering realities behind EVs is that it is a rather small subset of the entire automobile industry, where the more conventional internal combustion engine vehicles will likely dominate proceedings for at least one more decade. Here, it would be stimulating to read an engagement with other works on the challenges facing Chinese automobile firms in entering Thailand and other parts of Southeast Asia.[9]

Second, while The Ripple Effect provides an excellent account of past and current states of affairs, it arguably does not engage deeply with the future trajectories of China-Southeast Asian relations. Given the rapidly evolving nature of international relations and the unpredictability of global power dynamics, some analysis—not necessarily speculative—would have enriched the book’s contribution. For instance, how might Southeast Asian countries navigate a potential shift in global power if the United States (or other major powers) took a more active role in the region? What are the long-term risks of dependency on Chinese loans and infrastructure projects, particularly in the context of China’s economic slowdown? Moreover, how might domestic political changes within Southeast Asian countries (such as leadership transitions, democratic movements, or authoritarian consolidation) impact their ties with China? Long-term projections are inherently speculative, but they are essential to help us understand the broader implications of current trends. Especially for readers from the policymaking and practitioner communities, the lack of a forward-looking analysis limits the book’s scope.

Taking everything into consideration, The Ripple Effect is an important addition to the literature covering China’s impact on Southeast Asia. It most certainly builds on some of the most contemporaneous works on this topic.[10] The book’s comprehensive examination of China’s economic, political, and cultural reach in the region offers a nuanced, multifaceted perspective essential for understanding the complexities of China-Southeast Asia relations. These range from Chinese efforts to build industrial parks, to promote its socio-cultural identity, to fostering collaboration with various Southeast Asian governments. Its findings are poised to open up new perspectives, providing context-specific insights not easily picked up or explained by standard analysis. For example, it is too simplistic to claim that the Chinese state is promoting a so-called “authoritarian resilience” in certain host states; the reality is considerably more nuanced than such a portrayal.[11] While East Asia-based analysts will find the book valuable, those outside the region stand to gain even more from its thoughtful explanations and interesting insights.

Despite some shortcomings, which are understandable in undertakings of this nature, The Ripple Effect is a valuable resource for the research, policy, and business communities. The book’s organization, grounded approach, and attention to empirics cater to a broad readership, making it accessible to non-specialists. It builds on the author’s multiyear fieldwork, which involved some rather interesting interviews and observations, in the region. In the academic milieu, it can be recommended as essential reading for advanced undergraduate as well as graduate courses in area studies, international political economy, sociology, and related disciplines. As Southeast Asia continues to navigate its complex relationship with China, the book’s timely insights offer a crucial understanding of the opportunities and challenges on the horizon.

 

Guanie Lim is Associate Professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Japan. His latest monograph, The Political Economy of Growth in Vietnam: Between States and Markets (Routledge, 2021), details the catching-up experience of Vietnam since its 1986 doi moi (renovation) reforms. He is also interested in broader development issues within Asia, especially those of China, Malaysia, and Vietnam.