H-Diplo Forum 2023-1

"Making and Breaking Global Order across the Twentieth Century"[1]
Conference at Leiden University in October 2022

Participants: Maha Ali, Yusra Abdullahi, Poorvi Bellur, Alessandro Iandolo, Ria Kapoor, Emma Kluge, Ismay Milford, Brooks Marmon, Alanna O'Malley, Raphaël Orange-Leroy, Tomoko Takahashi, Pasuth Thothaveesansuk and Muhammad Suhail Mohamed Yazid.

Introduction by Alanna O'Malley, Leiden University

Across the twentieth century, ideas about the global order have sparked a furious debate amongst scholars seeking to understand the order's power dynamics, structures, institutions, organizations, and systems. Much of the discussion has been centered around the nation-state's critical role in shaping the workings of the system of international relations and the horizon of peace and security. There has, however, been an inherent tendency to uphold conventional turning points such as World War I and World War II, the Cold War and the North-South divide, and to focus on conventional actors such as the United States. What happens when we relegate these conventional moments and actors to the background and instead switch the focus to traditionally disenfranchised or marginalized actors of the Global South: to include states, nations, transnational groups, regional organizations, trade union representatives, transnational corporations, activists, agitators, and a host of other non-state actors? This was the guiding question we set out to answer at a conference on "Making and Breaking Global Order across the Twentieth Century" at Leiden University in October 2022.

The conference brought together 30 participants from around the world for a two-day set of discussions which formed the first major event of the project "Challenging the Liberal World Order from Within, the Invisible History of the United Nations and the Global South" (INVISIHIST).[2] This project seeks to transcend the dominant Western perspective in the historiography of the UN, and recover the historical agency of Global South actors. The group, composed of a selection of early and mid-career scholars as well as leading experts in the field, held a wide range of discussions that were designed to deconstruct some of the teleologies and concepts which tend to dominate the literature.

We sought to transgress key moments by identifying other junctures, actors, organizations, institutions, and ideas which played a role in shaping the global order across time and space. We also wanted to probe the

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ways in which the different levels of global order interacted with and within organizations, especially the League of Nations and the United Nations and their associated agencies and systems. Surprisingly, we found that these organizations tended to fade from view as actors brought their issues elsewhere or created their own instruments of representation and expression. Crucially, we also focused on some of these short-lived initiatives that may not have achieved their immediate purpose but which indirectly affected other efforts and political dynamics.

From the conference debates we have assembled a discussion forum with the aim of unpacking some of the assumptions and traditional conceptions underpinning ideas of global order.

In attempting to outline an overview of the role of the UN in global order, we discovered that there are many perspectives, understandings, and interpretations of the organization and its utility or lack thereof. Not only did Global South actors develop the UN, but they also produced an array of alternative norms, systems, and practices that were sometimes complementary to, but more often in conflict with, the liberal internationalism of the Great Powers. The false-starts, intricacies, and dynamics of these interactions as described below, will, we hope, contribute to an expansion of the repertoire of actors, events, and narratives that play featured roles in the history of twentieth-century international institutional and organizational transformation.

Participants:

Maha Ali is a PhD Candidate at the Institute for History at Leiden University. Within her research, she explores the role of Asian states in historically redefining and shaping global political discourse on "development" and "human rights" at the United Nations. Her research is part of the European Research Council (ERC) funded project: "Invisible History of the Global South: Challenging the Liberal World Order from Within."

Yusra Abdullahi is a PhD Candidate at the Institute for History at Leiden University. She is researching the roles of Ghanaian, Zimbabwean, and Rwenzururian activists at the United Nations in establishing the current world order.

Poorvi Bellur is a doctoral candidate in Global History at Princeton University. Her research broadly deals with the construct of political and cultural "solidarity" in the context of the Global South, and the modern historical genealogy of the concept. Her work currently examines global anticolonial solidarities and conceptions of imperialism in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with a focus on the British Empire in South Asia and Egypt.

Alessandro Iandolo is Lecturer in Soviet and Post-Soviet History at University College London. His first book, *Arrested Development: The Soviet Union in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, 1955-1968*, was published by Cornell University Press in 2022.

Ria Kapoor is a Lecturer in History and a fellow of QMUL's interdisciplinary Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences. Her first book, *Making Refugees in India,* is a history of India's idea of the refugee as both that state and the global order transitioned from empire to nation-state. She is now working on a global history of the 1972 Ugandan Asian expulsion, with a particular focus on the replacement of rights with humanitarian action. Ria completed a DPhil in History at the University of Oxford, and has previously held posts at the Universities of Leeds and Manchester.

Emma Kluge is a historian of decolonisation and anticolonial thinking in the Pacific and holds a Max Weber postdoctoral fellowship at the European University Institute. In 2020, she published an article with

the *International History Review*, "West Papua and the International History of Decolonisation, 1961-69," and in 2022 published "A New Agenda for the Global South" in *Humanity*. Emma is currently working on her book manuscript "The Limits of Decolonisation: West Papua and the Politics of Self-determination in the 1960s."

Ismay Milford (Leipzig University Research Centre Global Dynamics) is a historian of twentieth-century East Africa in a global perspective, with interests in Cold War information politics, student activism, and environmental knowledge. Her first book, *African Activists in a Decolonising World: The making of an anticolonial culture, 1952–1966,* was published by Cambridge University Press in 2023.

Brooks Marmon is a Postdoctoral Scholar at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at The Ohio State University and a Research Associate at the University of Pretoria. His first book, *Pan-Africanism Versus Partnership: African Decolonization in Southern Rhodesian Politics, 1950-63* is expected later this year (Springer). He has published numerous journal articles on Zimbabwe's decolonization. His current research explores international dimensions of the Zimbabwe Rhodesia internal settlement. He holds a PhD in African Studies from the University of Edinburgh.

Alanna O'Malley is Associate Professor of International History at Leiden University. She is Principal Investigator of the project "INVISIHIST, Challenging the Liberal World Order from Within, The Invisible History of the United Nations and the Global South" funded by the European Research Council.

Raphaël Orange-Leroy is a PhD Candidate in History of International Economic Relations at CY Cergy Paris University and Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University. In 2021, he was awarded a Fulbright Scholarship to study at George Mason University as part of his doctoral project on the relationship between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) during the 1960s-1970s. His research is an attempt to grasp new perspectives on the diplomatic and intellectual influence of developing countries in global financial and monetary negotiations at the end of the Bretton Woods system. He has recently published two articles, "The Crisis of Development Aid and the Origins of the Debt Crisis," in *Rivista italiana di storia internatzionale* (2020) and "Les traces du Pérou et du Chili sur la scène multilatérale : du groupe andin au nouvel ordre économique international (1968-1975)," *Revue d'histoire diplomatique* (2022).

Tomoko Takahashi is a postdoctoral researcher at Kyoto University, whose research is about the states' pursuit of power in international institutions and its relation to coalition politics and the rhetoric of sovereignty. She especially focuses on China and the Global South. She received her Bachelor of Laws and Master in International Relations at the University of Tokyo, Master of Arts in International Relations with honors from the University of Chicago, and is about to defend her doctoral dissertation at the University of Tokyo.

Pasuth Thothaveesansuk is a fourth year PhD candidate in the history department at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His dissertation examines the history of liberal internationalism in Asia during the twentieth century with a focus on how Asian statesmen thought of and influenced the postwar world order.

Muhammad Suhail Mohamed Yazid is a PhD candidate in History from Trinity College, University of Cambridge. He is also Senior Tutor in the Department of Malay Studies at the National University of Singapore and a former Research Associate at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute). His research interests cover decolonisation and nationalism in Southeast Asia with a focus on Malaysia and Singapore.

1. Was/is the UN really the "heart" of the Liberal International Order? In what ways? Why or why not?

Bellur: It cannot be denied that at the time of its founding, the United Nations, or its predecessor the League of Nations, represented for many people the culmination of a liberal internationalist framework for global politics. However, I think it is important to acknowledge that this framework was imbued with the hierarchies and inherited inequalities of a liberalism that formed the basis of European imperial ideology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Even for those decolonizing nation-states that would come to be part of the 'Global South,' access to the 'heart' of the liberal international order could not be taken for granted, as even by April 1955, only 25 Asian or African independent nation-states were recognized members of the UN. Therefore, for historians to focus on the UN and its ancillaries as the sole locus of liberal internationalist worldmaking serves to erase the ways decolonizing nations navigated a post-imperial world system even as the Cold War binaries began to dominate arenas of global politics. Additionally, for many nations that were emerging from colonial rule, the League and subsequently the United Nations represented the lack of commitment from the colonial powers to the so-called "universal" principles of liberal internationalism when it came to their imperial holdings; the work of Susan Pedersen and Mark Mazower, among others, is a testament to the fact that these organizations were (at their founding moments at least) committed to protecting European colonial interests.[3] Conversely, recent scholarship has demonstrated the ways in which Global South actors stretched, challenged, and harnessed the potential of the United Nations as an arena of liberal international order in order to further their own goals. Insofar as we are discussing the history of liberal internationalism, the UN remains an important arena to examine, but it needs to be placed in conversation with the histories of other organizations and platforms, liberal internationalist and otherwise.

Takahashi: The UN may or may not be the heart of the liberal international order depending on the extent to which states think much of its reputation in deciding whether or not to comply with its norms. For example, UN General Assembly resolutions are currently seen as non-binding norms,[4] but so long as states think much of its reputational consequences and seek to comply to them,[5] such resolutions can stand as influential instruments that harness the power relations between states.[6] While the UN General Assembly stands as a hard case, such reputational significance is obvious regarding the UN Security Council, even for a hegemonic power like the United States.[7] Meanwhile, the so-called "liberal social purposes" of the liberal international order [8] have not always been supported by consensus even among the Western states at the UN. Furthermore, because the number of Global South countries in the UN General Assembly is large, and each state holds one vote, it is not necessarily the voices of the Western states that stand out.[9] Despite these

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[3] See Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

[4] Stephen M. Schwebel, "The Effect of Resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly on Customary International Law," *Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting* 73 (1979): 301–9, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0272503700064934

[5] Rachel Brewster, "Unpacking the State's Reputation," *Harvard International Law Journal* 50:2 (2009): 231–70; George W. Downs and Michael A. Jones, "Reputation, Compliance and Development," in Eyal Benvenisti and Moshe Hirsch eds., *The Impact of International Law on International Cooperation -Theoretical Perspectives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2013): 117-133; Jack L. Goldsmith, and Eric A. Posner, *The Limits of International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

[6] Tomoko Takahashi, *Power Gap-Driven Draft Resolutions: Sponsorship Behavior of China as a Major Power in the United Nations General Assembly*, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Tokyo, 2023.

[7] Alexander Thompson, *Channels of Power: The UN Security Council and U.S. Statecraft in Iraq* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2009).

[8] Matthew D. Stephen, and David Skidmore, "The AIIB in the Liberal International Order," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 12:1 (2019): 61–91.

[9] M. J. Peterson, *The UN General Assembly* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006).

analytics of the UN, in an era where international institutions burgeon as in the regime complex theories,[10] the UN possesses a symbolic role as the epitome of the current order. In fact, China, who seeks to alter the allegedly American-centric order, also indicates the UN as the anchor institution to do so.[11]

Orange-Leroy: The UN has been at the forefront in the evolution of the principles guiding international policies in such ways that Louis Emmerij, Richard Jolly, and Thomas Weiss wondered in 2001 if UN ideas were "Ahead of the Curve?"[12] Throughout its history, the organisation proved to be able to complete and adapt its rules to a changing international context. This is particularly relevant in the case of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which supported new concepts to be applied in international economic relations, such as equity, interdependence, and South-South cooperation. In essence, these concepts translated the G77 interests for a more democratic international community in which the illiberal economic practices of the Global North could be challenged. As John and Richard Toye rightly stated in 2004, a number of UNCTAD original ideas came too soon.[13] Yet, the flowering of projects currently happening in fields such as development finance and regional monetary integration suggest it might be the right time for the kind of approaches made years ago within the UN. In this perspective, the UN has a key role in the international liberal order when considered in the long-term, rather than in the day-to-day management of international events.

Thothaveesansuk: For the Asian actors I have studied, establishing the UN was the heart of the liberal international order they tried to build. It was so because they hoped for a post-war world that included at least a referee, if not a policeman, to govern the rules that states interact with one another—and impose consequences when states do not comply. This is clear especially in the view of Wellington Koo, the Chinese delegate to the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco conferences. As a veteran of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, he saw his work in 1945—representing a sponsoring power and no longer a "second-rate" one shunned to the side—as the world's second opportunity to build a liberal international order. Almost all of his proposals were to prevent a repeat of the calamity that China faced when the League did nothing during the Manchuria crisis. This required an international organization—the United Nations—that would fix the flaws and improve upon the ideals of the League of Nations.

Kapoor: Despite the promise of equality, especially at the General Assembly, the UN remained a forum that was dominated by the usual Western powers, particularly at its inception, and so there are various conventions, like the one on refugees, that actors like those in South Asia remain wary of. That does not mean a disengagement with the UN order or with hosting those seeking asylum, only that these ideas and practices that have the potential to impose realities shaped in the West as universal principles are not accepted but actively challenged, reshaped and resisted. Fundamentally, liberal internationalism itself is being challenged in a way that calls for it to represent the realities of all peoples.

Abdullahi: The liberal international order, according to its theorists, is an "open and rule-based international order,"[14] codified in bodies like the United Nations. Interpretations of what constitutes "open," and ambiguity surrounding what exactly the rules are, can lead to tensions and subsequent challenges to the liberal

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[10] Karen J. Alter and Kal Raustiala, "The Rise of International Regime Complexity," *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 14:1 (2018): 329–49.

[11] Shin Kawashima, "Chinese New Terminology: 'World Order' and 'International Order," in Axel Berkofsky and Giulia Sciorati, eds., *Mapping China's Global Future: Playing Ball or Rocking the Boat?* (Milan: Ledizioni LediPublishing, 2020): 37-49.

[12] Louis Emmerij, Richard Jolly, and Thomas Weiss, *Ahead of the Curve? UN Ideas and Global Challenges*, (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2001).

[13] John Toye and Richard Toye, *The UN and Global Political Economy: Trade, Finance, and Development*, (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2004).

[14] G. John Ikenberry, "The Future of the Liberal World Order,Internationalism After America," *Foreign Affairs* 90:3 (2011), 56-68.

order. Furthermore, while liberal internationalist principles permeate the UN, that does not deter authoritarian states from challenging these principles as they pertain to dissident factions within their own states. Looking at the case of the Rwenzururu Movement, a secessionist movement based in western Uganda, it becomes clear that the consideration of the UN as the heart of the liberal international order is fluid and context dependent. The Rwenzururu Movement arose in the 1960s as the culmination of historical oppression by the Toro people and later the Ugandan government. At a time when the promise of decolonization seemed ever rife at the UN, the movement declared independence and started petitioning the international organization to acknowledge their territory as an independent African nation called the Rwenzururu Kingdom. The Rwenzururian case was not put on the agenda, nor is it clear whether the various UN committees engaged (significantly) with the movement. Nevertheless, the Rwenzururu petitioners steadfastly laid claim to the UN protection in light of the human rights abuses inflicted upon them as an armed struggle developed between the movement and the government. The movement held out hope that the UN would intervene and assume an intermediary role to preserve the security order by halting Ugandan aggression, but to no avail. In the 1970s, the Rwenzururu Movement's view of the UN as the heart of the liberal international order transformed as it alleged that the international body did not represent the interests of all oppressed people. In fact, Uganda's territorial integrity took precedence over the movement's right to liberation from its domination by what it referred to as an "alien colonial force." The Rwenzururu movement thus deduced that the UN was not the ultimate guarantor of world peace, stating that equality and freedom were denied to Rwenzururians while the Ugandan government unabashedly breached both the rules of the human rights order and the security order.

Iandolo: The internationalisms I know better are all in opposition to the UN system and what it represents. Socialists regarded the UN as the embodiment of a Western, liberal, and capitalist global order that they hoped to overcome. Radical actors from Africa, Asia, and Latin America saw the UN as an organization that facilitated the continuation of colonial practices and principles, with the active participation of states that declared themselves anti-colonial.

2. What is "The International"? What happens to issues when they become internationalized? Can you give an example?

Bellur: In defining 'the international' it behoves us to acknowledge that the choice of the term itself will for many centre a specific and scale and mode of historical thinking. There has been a lot of debate amongst historians about the varying valences and functionalities of "international" versus "global" versus "world," a debate rooted in the need to expand beyond the nation-state as the primary unit of analysis in global history. Despite the obvious inclusion of "nation" in the notion of the "international," the critical geographer David Featherstone reminds us that the "internationalized" concepts, individuals, materials, and forces function in hyper localized forms.[15] In addition to the internationalisms-from-above that emerge from a history of international organizations, internationalisms-from-below are equally crucial to historicizing the notion of the "international." For example, in my research on the intellectual history of anticolonial solidarity, solidarity takes on an international quality not just in the intellectual content of pamphlets and newspapers moving between India, Egypt, France, England and Germany in the early twentieth century, but also in the labour required to sustain those networks of solidarity; from the "lascar" seamen responsible for smuggling seditious materials from Europe to the Indian subcontinent past customs officials in Bombay and Aden, to the staff of local printing presses, and vice versa.

Kapoor: "The international" is quite abstract, and the classic definition would be where (representatives of) more than one nation-state would come together—but this does not preclude engagement with individuals, organizations outside of the state machinery like activists or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or other forms of community. To internationalize an issue shifts responsibility—but not always with the desired consequences. India, for example, went to war with Pakistan in 1971 after efforts to secure the international

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[15] David Featherstone, *Solidarity Hidden Histories and Geographies of Internationalism* (London: Zed Books, 2012).

community's support for a political solution to the problem of refugees fleeing East Pakistan; the international community sent aid but in India's view was not addressing the root cause of the refugees' departure in the first place, seeing it is a natural part of the 1947 Partition instead. In contrast, in 1972, the UK was able to "internationalize" the problem of expelled Ugandan Asians who had claims to UK citizenship, either because they held passports or under the terms by which former subjects could acquire nationality after decolonization. It had the effect of watering down citizenship rights, with resettlement and "refugee" status instead becoming an easier pathway for those affected. It also made room for these individuals to approach entities like the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the European Court of Human Rights to claim rights where these had been lost, either by the expulsion from Uganda or in the UK's policies, which indicates the way individuals had the power to participate in this 'international' too.

Thothaveesansuk: In my work, I view "the international" both as a venue where states engage with one another in a multilateral fashion and, perhaps more importantly, as an entity that has the legitimacy to impose checks on sovereign impulses of states. From the Asian perspective, desire for an international arena and entity arose primarily to prevent potential resurgence of imperial aggression—both Western and Japanese—as well as renegade states that harmed the general peace. The Soviet boycott of the United Nations over the Taiwan question allowed for this Asian issue to become internationalized in the early post-war period. In doing so, the UN came closest to fully realizing its Chapter VII powers to take military means to restore and enforce peace when it authorized a multinational force under the UN banner to intervene on behalf of the Republic of Korea. The expansion of this conflict from an intra-Korean one to a global one reflects the ideal of the liberal international order that questions of peace and security anywhere concerned everyone.

Ali: The "internationalization" of discourse on human rights, on the multilateral stage, particularly how the idea of human rights evolved since the formation of the UN, is central to my research. Within my work, I largely view Global South actors through this "international" lens, exploring how they interact, and how they forge and solidify alliances across transnational, transregional and transcontinental boundaries, with the common goal of negotiating increased socio-economic rights for newly independent states. With an increasing number of Asian and African countries attaining (or struggling to attain) independence in the 1940s and 1960s, and embracing the nation-state, the idea of the "inter-national" became even more pertinent. This was particularly true for post-colonial elites who were looking to build South-South solidarity networks based on their common interests of territorial sovereignty, self-determination, sovereignty over natural resources and non-interference. The first Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung (1955) amplified these demands of the Third World, which were later debated and re-negotiated at various other platforms such as United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and UNCTAD. The result of creating new international platforms which considered the demands of the Third World, which made up the majority of UN membership in the 1960s, was that it allowed space for dialogue and an alternative rights discourse which shifted away from the heavily western civil and political rights-centered discussion. These led to some not-so-successful projects at the UN, such as the New International Economic Order (1975), or otherwise more successful ones, such as the Declaration on the Right to Development in 1986, which were a product of collective international action.

Milford: The internationalization of African decolonization made a big difference to the work of activists I have researched. What I mean by internationalization here is that states (especially recently independent states and new UN members) became important patrons for activists from African countries still under colonial rule. When activists gathered in cities like Delhi, Khartoum, Cairo, and Accra in the late 1950s it was partly to put the case for their political campaign (and their political party) to a UN member, whereas previously they might instead have appealed to a metropolitan public to put pressure on the government of a colonial power. The UN was central to this process of internationalization, but the worlds of activism that the process produced were often far removed from the international order that the UN represented: vibrant intellectual hubs that grew in the capitals of newly independent states were political sites of their own. Moreover, "the

international" as a category was not strictly delineated by the cohort of activists I have followed in the 1950s—they often used the descriptor, interchangeably with "world" and "global," to distinguish their own work from campaigns that addressed a metropole-colony space and public.

Takahashi: An issue becomes "international," not because of the location or affiliation of the topic; rather, it is a question of whether states or transnational actors take certain positions on the topic. In other words, the moment when a third-party state consolidates its preferences and advocates them publicly, domestic issues can become the "focal point" for international affairs. To take the argument I made with regard to the disagreement among China and the Global South countries on the acquisition of sovereignty of the decolonizing states, their solidarity hinges on the positions of each state, which in turn can stir the complex relations of states. Furthermore, issues that are taken up in the UN General Assembly are automatically "internationalized," as it urges all states to either come to a consensus or vote on respective draft resolutions. This dovetails with the fact that scholars in the field of International Relations have utilized voting behaviour as the measure of the preferential distance of states.[16]

Kluge: In my work, I tend to stay away from using terms like "the international" since the Pacific Islands I study are generally excluded from academic studies that claim to focus on 'the international.' Instead, I prefer to think of ideas that have international or transnational circulation or issues that cut across multiple regions of the world. The internationalization of the West Papuan campaign for independence is a product both of their persecution, leading them to form diasporas in Papua New Guinea (PNG) and the Netherlands, as well as a deliberate attempt to gain support for their struggle. Alongside hubs in West Papua, PNG, and the Netherlands, West Papuans set up offices in Senegal, Japan, and in New York near the UN, seeking to connect their campaign to the international struggle for self-determination and decolonization. This internationalization of their cause resulted in greater awareness of their struggle particularly in Africa. However, West Papuans were unable to overcome the balance of power at the UN that rested in favour of Indonesia and politics that privileged territorial sovereignty over self-determination. Therefore, their claims for independence were ultimately denied.

3. What do Global South actors want from a Liberal International Order and from the UN? How did the simultaneous pursuit of alternative internationalism(s) exist in conflict, in consonance, or in parallel with Global South engagement with UN?

Bellur: For those of us who do not work primarily on a history of international relations, the first point of questioning raised by this prompt might be the term "Global South actors." Who are we dealing with here? Are independent nation-states or nationalist proto-governments our primary actors, or are they non-state actors and organizations? Even if we were to take the so-called postcolonial nation state of the "Global South" to be a unit of analysis, it is difficult to homogenize the enormous variety of ideological and practical commitments of these Global South "actors" in their engagement with the United Nations, which was but one of several platforms of burgeoning internationalism and visions of "worldmaking."

For the states and proto-states who were recognized by the UN and felt that they had some amount of recourse from the organization, some generalizable concerns shared across the "Global South" included collective security against incursions on their sovereignty, ongoing efforts for decolonization in the face of looming Cold War bipolarity, the protection and development of their economic and diplomatic interests, global disarmament, and the prevention of large-scale armed conflict. However, these actors were of course willing to turn to alternative internationalisms to fulfil those interests, including platforms such as the Comintern, the Afro-Asian solidarity conferences, the Tricontinental, and the Non-Aligned Movement. Of

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[16] Erik Gartzke, "Kant We All Just Get along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the Origins of the Democratic Peace," *American Journal of Political Science* 42:1 (1998): 1–27; Erik Voeten, *Ideology and International Institutions* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2021).

course, beyond the history of state-led internationalisms are the many worldmaking projects undertaken by non-state actors and organizations. From the dismantling of the global "colour line" to the burgeoning networks of feminist internationalism, organizers and activists were often committed to far more radical projects of reimagining global order in the wake of decolonization.

Iandolo: I'm not sure actors from the Global South are supportive of a liberal international order. Those who were/are tend to be closely associated with Western ideas, values, and goals. These are a minority, however. Most Global South actors, whether governments, organizations, or individuals, aspired to a global redistribution of power and resources that was directly opposed to the liberal international order, of which the UN was part. While this was especially true in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, even today representatives from Africa, Asia, and Latin America use the UN as a forum to air grievances and demand change, rather than looking at it a useful and equitable instrument of 'global governance.'

Thothaveesansuk: If we view the establishment of the UN as proxy for the making of the liberal international order, actors whom we might today consider "Global South" were there from the very beginning. They did not necessarily make demands of the liberal international order, but rather sought to build it. In the words of Carlos Romulo, "[o]ne billion Oriental faces are turned pleadingly toward [the UN] for recognition of their human rights."[17] His framing of human rights hinged on Asians hoping to gain equal dignity in the eyes of the international community. He believed that the UN could contribute through not only peace and security, but also social and economic development. Smaller states in both Asia and Latin America also hoped that the post-war order would be based on a more robust and enforceable version of international law. China, a weak sponsoring power, cobbled together an unlikely coalition to push for codification of international law and compulsory jurisdiction of the world court. To enforce such rules, it also proposed a standing force at the disposal of the Security Council, with peacekeeping and peace-making mandates. In other words, the Global South at the San Francisco conference wanted to turn President Franklin D. Roosevelt's 'Four Policemen' into just one policeman—the United Nations. Ultimately Global South attempts in the 1940s fell short as the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union eventually all wanted a more limited version of an international organization. Yet there are traces that remain: independence as the goal for trust territories, various commissions on international law, and the creation of ECOSOC.

Muhammad Suhail, Bin Mohamed Yazid: For dominant political elites from the Global South, the pursuit of a postwar liberal international order was a response to the woes of post-independence regimes as they attempted to guard their newfound sovereignty and fix economic underdevelopment. Even so, political leaders displayed ingenuity in adapting what worked best for them. In my work, I argue that Tunku Abdul Rahman, the founding premier of Malaya and later Malaysia, revitalized his politics through his creative arrangement of Commonwealth liberalism and other strands of internationalism that had currency in the 1960s. The result was a curious project called the "Muslim Commonwealth." This construction did not necessarily challenge the UN sovereignty regime which was hardening in that context. Instead, the Tunku envisioned the Muslim Commonwealth as a supplement, exposing shortfalls in the nation-state system and correcting the persistent imbalance of power and capital between Muslim-ruled states and their non-Muslim counterparts.

Moreover, the project foregrounded the workings of the dyad of what was "international" and "national." The Muslim Commonwealth was a global pan-Islamic project to unite Muslims everywhere. But pan-Islam was only meaningful as an international language in so far as it addressed the concrete problems of the

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[17] Address of Brigadier General Carlos P. Romulo, Resident Commissioner of the Philippines to the United States and Chairman of the Philippine Delegation to the United Nations Conference on International Organization, *Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines* 41: 3 (28 April 1945): 247-251.

national regime, and pan-Islam was only meaningful as a national political language so far as it addressed the concrete problems of the international system.

Orange-Leroy: My perspective on the engagement of Global South actors within the UN draws on my research on the history of UNCTAD and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during the 1960s-1970s. During this period, the UN was used by Global South actors as a platform to challenge and reform the international economic system. At the same time, the UN administration provided original analyses on developing economies which helped governments in building their development strategies, and partly backed the claims made at the diplomatic level by the group of 77 developing countries (G77). This engagement was particularly visible with UNCTAD. For the G77, the goal was to challenge the existing pattern of economic relations in which industrial countries from the Global North (East and West together) benefited more from international trade and capital flows than raw material producers. However, the so-called periphery was never economically homogeneous. Despite recurring claims made by Latin American delegates to universalize their demands, Asian and African countries did not share the same interests. As such the G77 was not a political bloc. It coalesced on consensual topics such as trade preferences for developing countries, the stabilization of raw materials, increased North-South capital flows, and South-South cooperation. Yet, the group was full of tensions and in UNCTAD pushed for economic dependence, independence, or interdependence with the Global North, depending for each actor on national strategies, regional belongings, and political alignments. Despite its loose solidarity, the G77 nevertheless managed to increase its leverage in international negotiations thanks to the UN. In this respect, Getsiva Cayo and I found in a recent article[18] that Peru and Chile, under Velasco and Allende, campaigned together for the G77 to take a "radical" stance during the 1970s international monetary crisis. After UNCTAD III, this allowed for the participation of some developing countries in the talks on the reform of the international monetary system, thanks to the convergence with "moderate" countries such as Mexico.[19]

Marmon: My research on southern African liberation struggles, particularly Zimbabwe's, indicates that Cold War era Global South actors sought an international order marked by coherence, consistency, and genuine collaboration. As the quest for Zimbabwe's liberation accelerated in the 1960s, the United Nations was one of the international bodies to which the anti-colonial nationalists in that territory turned most frequently. However, despite the reliance of African nations such as Algeria and Guinea on the UN as an ostensible ally, there was great distrust of the body. They viewed the role of the UN in handling the "crisis in the Congo" with suspicion. Zimbabwean nationalists were also highly critical of various UN bodies for employing local technocrats that they perceived as being insufficiently supportive of their struggle. Zimbabwe's liberation struggle was highly internationalized, and New York was a key locus of this external activity. However, in my estimation (at least for the Zimbabwean case), activity within Africa (and vis-à-vis the UK, the imperial power) remained paramount. The extent of UN support for Zimbabwean independence was relatively consistent and considerable from the early 1960s. Meanwhile, the activities of senior globetrotting nationalist officials at the UN remained distant cadres from the frontline of the struggle in Africa.

Kluge: In the case of the West Papuan actors that I study, they sought support for self-determination and redress for human rights abuses committed by the Indonesian state. West Papuans, as Pacific peoples, lacked regional allies in forums of international governance in the 1960s because the region remained dominated by colonial and semi-colonial powers. Therefore, their campaigns at the UN happened alongside their pursuit of support for international allies within other forums such as the Organization of African Unity.

Milford: Activists from East and Central Africa who pursued anticolonial activism abroad during the 1950s—the cases I'm most familiar with—saw the UN as one of several possible arenas in which to make

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[18] Getsiva Cayo Durand de Geist et Raphaël Orange-Leroy, "Les traces du Pérou et du Chili sur la scène multilatérale : du groupe andin au nouvel ordre économique international," *Revue d'histoire diplomatique* 1 (2022) : 5-24.
[19] Christy Thornton, *Revolution in Development: Mexico and the Governance of the Global Economy* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2021).

appeals for support for their various campaigns for democratic change and independence. But, as I've argued elsewhere, they were aware that most of the UN's channels were closed to them as colonial subjects, and they noted how readily colonial powers could exploit UN mechanisms.[20] So, they had measured expectations for the usefulness of the liberal international order it represented, even as they continued to cite the UN Charter. This being the case, the simultaneous pursuit of multiple, alternative internationalisms was typical for this generation of activists. Take the example of Ugandan activist John Kale. As a student in Kampala, Kale worked actively with the Soviet-backed International Union of Students. Then, when he set up a Uganda office in Cairo in 1957, he represented the Uganda National Congress (UNC) both in the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation and the All African People's Conference—even as the two organizations and their visions for a post-independence international order competed with each other. When Kale appeared before the UN Fourth Committee in 1958-59, it was as a petitioner on the Belgian Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi (present-day Rwanda and Burundi). Kale's family came from the border region, and only petitions on Trust Territories were accepted. Thus there was no channel for presenting the Ugandan case to the General Assembly in this period—even though the UNC imagined Kale might be able to do so. In his publications, Kale expressed hope that the UN could be transformed by the growing Afro-Asian voting bloc, but this didn't equate to an ideological commitment to the liberal international order that we now associate with the organization.

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[20] Ismay Milford, *African Activists in a Decolonising World: The Making of an Anticolonial Culture, 1952–1966* (Cambridge University Press, 2023), 158-60.