“It’s the economy, stupid!” While this phrase was initially coined by Democratic Party nominee Bill Clinton’s campaign to emphasize the importance of a struggling domestic US economy in the presidential race of the early 1990s, today, it appears applicable to the international realm as well. For several decades, IR scholars have drawn a separation between the economic and security realms. Concretely, the established “neo-neo synthesis” in IR literature posits that whereas considerations about relative gains characterize the security relations between states, the prospect for absolute gains informs economic interactions. Recent developments in international politics, however, are putting in question the continued relevance of the neo-neo synthesis in thinking about statecraft. China’s growing economy, for instance, was long viewed through the lens of economic opportunity by American policymakers. Today, in contrast, China’s economic rise is increasingly seen by Washington as a threat to (American) firms, workers, and consumers. In a similar vein, narratives about weaponized interdependence – the practice of “leveraging global networks of informational and financial exchange for strategic advantage” – are becoming increasingly popular. More fundamentally, policymakers and pundits have raised questions about the orthodoxies of “win-win globalization,” and the underlying assumption that increased economic interdependence promotes “peace and cooperation by increasing the cost of conflict between states.”
It starts, of course, with the wall. From its earliest moments, the campaign of Donald Trump for the presidency of the United States was predicated on hardening the border between the United States and Mexico, and by extension, between the United States and Latin America—the border where, as Gloria Anzaldúa wrote more than three decades ago, “the Third World grates against the first and bleeds.” Rubbing salt in those borderland wounds, Trump began his campaign with a call to seal the United States off from supposed horrors emerging from the south, rendering ‘drugs’ and ‘crime’ as external threats carried across the border by people themselves deemed ‘illegal.’
Audrey Kurth Cronin’s new monograph, Power to the People: How Open Technological Innovation is Arming Tomorrow’s Terrorists, makes a valuable contribution to the literature on terrorism, technological innovation, and the evolving nature of national security in the twenty-first century. The book deserves to be widely read by scholars and policymakers. Deborah Avant, Boyd P. Brown III, and Jennifer Spindel have supplied us with insightful reviews that interrogate, respectively, the book’s theoretical framework, its historical underpinnings, and its policy implications. Cronin’s response helpfully answers some of her reviewers’ questions and acknowledges where more work is to be done. In my introduction to this roundtable, I do not wish to recapitulate either Cronin’s or her reviewers’ arguments, since they all speak quite ably for themselves. What I do want to do is take a step back and try to illuminate some of the broader issues at play. In short, what does Power to the People tell us about the state of terrorism studies in 2021?
Peacekeeping was born in 1948, in the midst of the American civil rights and anti-colonial movements. The basic thrust of the idea was to resolve violent conflict without resorting to violence. In that sense, peacekeeping is unlike other forms of military intervention because of its foundational principles: consent, impartiality, and the use of force in self-defense (and later in defense of the mandate). These guiding principles continue to anchor peacekeeping today, even if some of the mechanisms and goals have changed over time.
In my 2017 essay I did not venture any predictions about how Donald Trump would behave as president, or the extent to which he would wish (or be able) to re-shape the character of U.S. foreign policy according to his own views. Rather, I focused on the evident public appeal of his call to put “America First,” seeking to explain this and to assess the impact it might have on the character of U.S. foreign policy. I observed that the extensive scope of America’s security commitments went far beyond those needed to safeguard the nation’s core interests of physical security and economic wellbeing and that they were therefore intrinsically vulnerable to domestic criticism, especially whenever they became costly to uphold. The commitments were the product of a broader conception of America’s vital interests as including also the existence of a stable world order in which its values as well as its interests would be respected. That the scale of America’s power brought with it a special responsibility for the maintenance of such a world order had become the orthodoxy governing U.S. foreign policy as a result of the two world wars and it had been solidified during the Cold War. The end of the Cold War had led to a questioning of the justification for these wide-ranging military commitments – by realist advocates of ‘restraint’ as well as by Trump – and, more recently, the lengthy and unsuccessful interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq had created public and political resistance to involvement in further ‘foreign wars.’ This was the background of the apparent political appeal of Trump’s “America First” rhetoric, which was likely to raise doubts abroad about the credibility of U.S. commitments, and thus weaken the country’s capacity to uphold its version of world order.
Donald J. Trump is often viewed as an aberration, or at the very least as someone whose presidency signaled a decisive shift in U.S. politics. A showman with little political experience, he was elected by a narrow margin on the back of “protest votes” by millions disillusioned by the established status quo. Whilst some worry that he will set the stage for other celebrity policymakers, thereby degrading the office of the president, the greater danger is that politics will go on as per normal, but with ever greater legitimacy and space. Politics as usual amounts to the reinforcement of a (post)colonial and capitalist structure, one which Cedric Robinson has so memorably and aptly termed “racial capitalism.”
H-Diplo Essay 359
Essay Series on Learning the Scholar’s Craft: Reflections of Historians and International Relations Scholars
13 July 2021
Making Up My Mind, and Then Changing It
Series Editor: Diane Labrosse | Production Editor: George Fujii
Essay by Steven Aftergood, Federation of American Scientists
When I arrived at UCLA as a 16-year-old undergraduate in 1973, the first Moon landing was still a vivid memory. It seemed to herald wonderful possibilities, and even in retrospect it remains an amazing achievement—something altogether new in human history. Although the astronauts who set foot on the lunar surface were nominally the heroes of the event, the space program was actually the result of a coordinated effort of many thousands of individuals whose efforts were brilliantly harnessed to achieve a common goal. If it was not the moral equivalent of war, it was pretty close.
Culturally, a popular view of the space program was mirrored in the Star Trek TV show of the late 1960s. Setting aside the often-silly operatic conventions of the series, it portrayed space exploration as not only a thrilling means to discovery but as a way to transcend racial, ethnic, and even inter-species conflict.
I was sold. The study of engineering seemed to be a logical way to actualize the promise of the classic science fiction stories (Robert A. Heinlein, Isaac Asimov, Arthur C. Clarke) that I had grown up reading, and to join in the unfolding adventure that was now taking place.
That, of course, proved to be quite naive, and not only because the human space exploration program had already peaked for the foreseeable future. My experience with the university engineering curriculum was more crushing than exhilarating. It was nearly all-consuming, with little time allowed for the liberal arts, let alone social transformation. I have no doubt that engineering can be a realm of enormous creativity and enlargement of spirit but I had trouble finding my way there.
My first engineering jobs involved measuring the electric resistance on the surface of an Army helicopter and assembling laser range finders. These were things that apparently needed to be done, so I did them, but with rapidly diminishing enthusiasm. I left the field to spend three years in Israel, where I studied Talmud in two Jerusalem yeshivot (religious academies) and worked in a physics lab at the Technion-Israel Institute of Technology in Haifa, looking for direction.
I returned to a graduate program in electrical engineering at UC Berkeley but it hardly held my interest. I soon concluded that I had made a mistake. Outside of class I was reading widely and trying to expand my horizons. I remember being captivated by Aldous Huxley’s biography of Père Joseph, the original “grey eminence” behind Cardinal Richelieu, and by Lewis Mumford’s study of Herman Melville. I couldn’t help noticing that while the works of these authors ranged widely and magnificently across disciplines and genres, their own academic credentials were sparse. I couldn’t be them, but I could still hope to get beyond the confined intellectual space I was in.
In the summer of 1981, I left Berkeley and started working with a public interest advocacy group in Los Angeles called Committee to Bridge the Gap. It was led by Dan Hirsch, a Harvard graduate turned community organizer. Like me, Dan was the son of European Jews and I immediately felt a sort of kinship with him. His office was filled with books by Thomas Merton, Daniel Berrigan, Dorothy Day and other challenging authors who were as yet unfamiliar to me. The cultural and ideological boundaries at the time felt unusually fluid and permeable. My first published article would appear in the Catholic Agitator, the free newspaper of the Los Angeles Catholic Worker.
More than anyone I had ever met, Dan created a path in life that embodied his own values and he followed it with persistence and fidelity. I knew that I had a lot to learn from him. I audited a course he taught at UCLA in which the required reading included Alinsky’s Rules for Radicals, Gandhi’s My Experiments with Truth, and Huxley’s Ends and Means. The point was not to indoctrinate students in one or another of these works but to teach them about diverse ways in which one might experience life’s conflicts and respond to them. To me, it was a revelation. I hadn’t solved any problems yet, but I was starting to identify and grapple with them.
At Committee to Bridge the Gap (the “gap” meant different things at various times), we worked on community issues – like remediating a local playground that had been built on a toxic waste dump – as well as on national and international concerns. One project aimed to curtail and eliminate the use of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium fuel in research reactors around the world, including one located on the UCLA campus.
Along the way, I acquired new skills and a kind of education in practical citizenship that had previously eluded me. I learned how to file a Freedom of Information Act request, how to write a press release, and how to prepare a grant proposal. I wrote op-ed pieces, met with members of Congress, drafted legislation, and testified before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and a U.S. Senate Committee. As needed for our work, I learned the rudiments of administrative law, how to model atmospheric dispersion of radioactive plumes, and basic health physics.
At some point we turned our attention to NASA’s Galileo mission to Jupiter, which was scheduled for launch in 1989. It raised safety concerns because it was powered by a sizable quantity of plutonium-238. While this isotope, unlike plutonium-239, is not suitable for fission weapons, it is actually far more radioactive (generating decay heat that can be converted into electricity). The environmental and public health consequences of a launch failure, such as the explosion of the Challenger space shuttle in 1986, could therefore be serious.
I prepared critical comments on the Galileo Environmental Impact Statement and submitted them to NASA. I outlined the history of accidents involving space nuclear power sources, identified gaps in the data relied upon by NASA, and proposed potential alternatives that would reduce some of the risks.
To my surprise, I got a call from the Galileo project manager, John Casani. He asked me to come out to his office at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, where the spacecraft was being assembled, to discuss my comments. While NASA officials didn’t quite know what to say to anti-Galileo demonstrators chanting “What Do We Want?, When Do We Want It?,” it seemed that my objections were presented in a language they could speak.
Over several hours, Mr. Casani went through my comments one by one and explained where he disagreed and where he agreed, and why. Although he was an accomplished engineer who had already managed successful missions to the outer solar system and I – well, I was not – he listened to me attentively and responded to my points with substance and clarity. He did not contend that the Galileo mission was safe in any absolute sense. It wasn’t. But he argued that the potential accident scenarios had been carefully mapped out and that the plutonium generators had been designed with a worst-case scenario in mind so as to minimize the consequences. I was impressed.
I thought it over for a while, and then I did what I would often ask others to do in the future: I changed my mind. I decided that I would not oppose the Galileo mission and that I would even speak out in support of it.
This became a source of friction between some of my colleagues and me. The facts had not changed, so why had I? Had I been corrupted by ‘proximity to power’? Was I acting out some kind of self-gratifying role? I didn’t think so. But I had trouble explaining my change in perspective to their satisfaction. I also couldn’t say that their opposition was entirely wrong. Fortunately, Galileo was safely launched in October 1989 and successfully completed its mission to Jupiter in 2003. I had some difficulty breaking ranks with my own cohort. But it would happen again, and it would become easier. From then on, my choices and my mistakes would be my own.
My work on space nuclear power led me to the Federation of American Scientists, a policy research and advocacy organization that focused on nuclear arms control and other national security policy issues. The president of FAS, Dr. Jeremy J. Stone, was a mathematician who had left that field behind to become a surprisingly influential innovator and advocate in national security policy.
He took a somewhat paternal interest in the professional development of the younger people whom he drew to FAS, including myself. When I started exploring the subject of national security secrecy, he suggested – citing the example of his own father, the writer I.F. Stone – that I write a regular newsletter about it. This proved a useful way for me to present my findings, and to cultivate an audience. Jeremy pressed me to overcome my tendency towards introversion and to go out and interview government officials and others in order to acquire new knowledge. When I gained unauthorized access to classified documents, a rare but repeated occurrence, Jeremy said I could not release them without offering the relevant government agency a chance to justify continued secrecy. He also said that I needed to dress better.
As I focused on reducing official secrecy, some of my advocacy work converged with the interests of historians and other scholars, and with their efforts to improve access to government records. I found that I was most effective when I was able to argue convincingly that greater openness was in everyone’s interests, even if not everyone recognized that at the time. For example:
In 1997 I filed a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit against the Central Intelligence Agency which led to declassification of the total intelligence budget for the first time. In 1999 I filed another lawsuit seeking that year’s budget total as well as the next year’s budget request. The CIA balked at that. The Director of Central Intelligence, George J. Tenet, submitted a sworn declaration stating that such disclosure “reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security in several ways” and I lost the case. But it turned out to be a temporary setback. Nowadays, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issues press releases each year to publicly announce such budget information.
Decades ago, I started systematically gathering and posting reports of the Congressional Research Service on the FAS website. These reports are often highly informative on a broad range of topics, and they are widely used by specialists and by members of the public alike. But Congress refused to make them publicly available online. Finally, a few years ago, following a long campaign by public interest advocates, Congress accepted the reality of the situation and CRS now makes the reports available itself.
Members of the State Department’s Historical Advisory Committee used to meet behind closed doors with government agency officials without reporting publicly on their deliberations. So I went to the State Department reading room in the late 1990s to collect the minutes of those meetings and I posted them online. This initially caused some dismay. But the utility of publishing the meeting minutes was soon accepted, and the Committee has continued the practice on its own ever since.
These and other discrete initiatives were successful, I think, because they implicitly appealed to a shared commitment to an open society.
Some other such efforts of mine have failed, at least up to now. I have advocated for a fixed limit on the duration of national security classification – perhaps 40 or 50 years – beyond which classification would simply expire without any need for formal declassification. This would be a highly productive, zero-cost measure that has nevertheless not gained any traction to date. I have also tried to build support for a public-facing open source intelligence entity that would serve scholars, journalists, and members of the public in a way that would be roughly analogous to the role played by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service during the Cold War. But the CIA won’t hear of it.
What is most worrisome is that the very possibility of this kind of work is jeopardized by the apparent erosion of commonly held values. As a society the United States seems to be drifting farther away from a shared view of what is real and what is true, which makes conventional advocacy quite difficult. The practice of persuasion and other democratic political arts is predicated on the ability to communicate effectively with those who may disagree.
For that reason, I think scholars today have their own special role to play in preserving an open society by carefully marshaling evidence in support of a knowable reality, by upholding the canons of argument, and by insisting on the possibility of “changing one’s mind.”
I would hesitate to offer my experience as a model to others, particularly since my formative years involved numerous missteps and false starts. I also benefited in unplanned and unpredictable ways from meetings with those who would become my teachers. Maybe the lesson to be learned is that some such errors are to be expected and may even be fruitful, and that what seem like wrong turns can nevertheless lead to meaningful destinations.
Steven Aftergood is senior research analyst at the Federation of American Scientists where he directs the FAS Project on Government Secrecy.
 There are many examples but I can still recall Robert A. Heinlein, Citizen of the Galaxy (New York: Scribner’s, 1957); Isaac Asimov, Foundation Trilogy (New York: Harper Collins, 1951-53); and Arthur C. Clarke, Childhood’s End (New York: Random House, 1953).
 Aldous Huxley, Grey Eminence: A Study in Religion and Politics (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1941); Lewis Mumford, Herman Melville (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1929).
 For example: Thomas Merton, Contemplation in a World of Action (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965); Dan Berrigan, No Bars to Manhood (New York: Doubleday, 1970); Dorothy Day, The Long Loneliness (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952).
 I see that the Los Angeles Catholic Worker now has a website at http://www.lacatholicworker.org/ and that it features recent issues of the Catholic Agitator. I do not have a citation for my own contribution to that publication, which must have appeared in the early or mid-1980s.
 Saul Alinsky, Rules for Radicals (New York: Random House, 1971); Mohandas K. Gandhi, The Story of My Experiments with Truth (New York: Public Affairs Press, 1948); Aldous Huxley, Ends and Means: An Enquiry Into the Nature of Ideals and Into the Methods Employed for Their Realization (London: Chatto & Windus, 1937).
 William J. Broad, “Groups Protest Use of Plutonium on Galileo,” New York Times, October 10, 1989, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1989/10/10/science/groups-protest-use-of-plutonium-on-galileo.html.
 See Jeremy J. Stone, Every Man Should Try: The Adventures of a Public Interest Activist (New York: Public Affairs Books, 1999). I memorialized him in “Jeremy J. Stone, 1935-2017,” FAS Secrecy News, January 5, 2017, available at: https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2017/01/jeremy-j-stone/.
 See, most recently, “DNI Releases FY2022 Budget Request Figure for the National Intelligence Program,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, May 28, 2021, available at: https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/press-releases-2021/item/2220-dni-releases-fy-2022-budget-request-figure-for-the-national-intelligence-program.
 See “Report of the Subcommittee on Public Release of Advisory Committee Minutes” in Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, May 24-25, 1999, https://history.state.gov/about/hac/may-1999.
 Steven Aftergood, “A ‘Drop Dead’ Date for Classified Info,” Secrecy News, January 25, 2021, https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2021/01/drop-dead-date/.
 Aftergood, “Improved Access to Open Source Intelligence Urged,” Secrecy News, December 2, 2019, https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2019/12/osint-access/.
To say that debates over “international order” are at the heart of a growing number of scholarly and policy concerns is an understatement. Indeed, at a time when the so-called “liberal international order” that was notionally established by the United States after World War Two is under duress from shifting power dynamics, domestic churn in many of the world’s leading actors, and new technologies and norms (to name just a few factors), scholars have increasingly turned their attention to understanding the causes, course, and consequences of order in world politics. Extending canonical work by the likes of Robert Gilpin and Hedley Bull, this research has fruitfully produced insights into the role of – and limits to – hard power in shaping order, the normative, ideational, and economic factors that can make orders more or less stable, and the sources of change in order. Combined with historical scholarship on particular international orders, the result has been a veritable “third wave” – complementing related work in the 1970s and 1990s-early 2000s – of research on order and ordering activities in international affairs.
Everyone saw the photo of President Donald Trump and Chancellor Angela Merkel glaring at one another during the G-7 summit in Quebec in June 2018. Trump, seated, looked stubborn and impetuous; Merkel leaned forward across the table in stern disapproval. The photo went viral after being tweeted out by the Chancellor’s press chief, Steffen Seibert – an indication that Merkel herself may have approved this framing. Fifteen months earlier, the Chancellor’s staff had publicized more amicable photos of the Chancellor’s visit to Washington, but the gaping rift between the U.S. and Germany was becoming impossible to gloss over. The exceedingly poor personal chemistry between Trump and Merkel was, of course, one major source of tension. Even the President’s attempts at levity, such as when he famously tossed Starburst candies at the Chancellor, came across as sour and ill-tempered. But a broader review of recent U.S.-German dust-ups suggests that the damage was compounded by the “swaggering” demeanor of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and the brusque comportment of the U.S. ambassador to Berlin, Richard Grenell. In their own distinctive ways, all three men trampled on German sensibilities – and all of them put the U.S. on a course toward withdrawing from strategic assets in Germany, a profoundly destabilizing prospect for European security.
Washington’s foreign policy community had a love-hate relationship with President Donald Trump. They hated many of his foreign policy ideas so much that hundreds of Republican former officials and foreign policy experts signed open letters arguing that “he would use the authority of his office to act in ways that make America less safe, and which would diminish our standing in the world.” Trump was indeed at odds with the D.C. establishment on many core foreign policy issues, from NATO funding to his proposed withdrawal from Afghanistan. Many pinned their hopes on the notion that principled appointees like former general James Mattis – the so-called “adults in the room” – could constrain Trump’s worst foreign policy impulses. The 2020 Biden presidential campaign even explicitly cast its foreign policy in terms of ‘restoration,’ that is to say, of fixing the wrongs done by Donald Trump.