Singapore’s first prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, was one of Asia’s strategic thinkers.[1] He was a prominent political leader and statesman who played a crucial role in transforming Singapore into a prosperous modern nation-state. Washington elites often sought the views and advice of this statesman and global strategist on strategic issues relating to Asia. When President Ronald Reagan began his presidency in 1981, he invited Lee to Washington to discuss strategic matters concerning Asia.[2] As a measure of his influence and standing, when Lee passed away in 2015, former United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger described him as “one of the truly profound global thinkers of our time.”[3]
H-Diplo | Robert Jervis International Security Studies Forum
Review Essay 111
Ang Cheng Guan. Reassessing Lee Kuan Yew’s Strategic Thought. Routledge, 2023. ISBN: 9781000846638
Review by Abdul Rahman Yaacob, Lowy Institute
26 November 2024 | PDF: http://issforum.org/to/RE111 | Website: rjissf.org | X: @HDiplo
Editor: Diane Labrosse | Commissioning Editor: Dan McCoy | Production Editor: Christopher Ball
Singapore’s first prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, was one of Asia’s strategic thinkers.[1] He was a prominent political leader and statesman who played a crucial role in transforming Singapore into a prosperous modern nation-state. Washington elites often sought the views and advice of this statesman and global strategist on strategic issues relating to Asia. When President Ronald Reagan began his presidency in 1981, he invited Lee to Washington to discuss strategic matters concerning Asia.[2] As a measure of his influence and standing, when Lee passed away in 2015, former United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger described him as “one of the truly profound global thinkers of our time.”[3]
Lee Kuan Yew was Singapore’s prime minister between 1959 and 1990, which coincided with the Cold War. After leaving the premiership, he maintained a role in Singapore’s political scene—first as a senior minister (1990-2004) and then as minister mentor (2004–2011). He passed away in 2015 while still a member of Parliament. Ang Cheng Guan’s Reassessing Lee Kuan Yew’s Strategic Thought assesses the Singaporean first prime minister’s perceptions and analysis on critical issues such as relations with major powers, foreign policy and security.
This book is an extension of the author’s previous study, Lee Kuan Yew’s Strategic Thought, which was published in 2013 when Lee was still alive.[4] The author points out in the preface that his research on the first book about Lee’s strategic thought was completed in 2011. However, Lee continued making public statements on strategic issues until his death in 2015. Thus, the latest book contains materials from post-2011 and is structured similarly to the earlier volume. Following a chronological order, Reassessing Lee Kuan Yew’s Strategic Thought provides Lee’s perceptions of strategic issues from the 1950s, when he first came to power into the twenty-first century. This approach offers an appreciation of the evolution of the strategic challenges Lee confronted throughout his political life and understand his views.
The book offers a window on Lee Kuan Yew’s perceptions on foreign policy and various strategic issues that impacted Singapore but may be relevant to other states. The author delves Lee’s thoughts on many strategic issues, such as China, the United States, and Singapore’s relations with Malaysia and Indonesia. The discussion on his views regarding great power rivalry points to the similarities between the Cold War years and the contemporary strategic environment that the world currently faces as the competition for influence across the globe between the United States, Russia and China are heating up.
Comprising nine chapters, including an introduction and conclusion, Reassessing Lee Kuan Yew’s Strategic Thought is divided into two distinct parts which reflect Lee’s political journey from the Cold War to the post-Cold War years. Part 1 covers Lee’s strategic thoughts during the Cold War, while part 2 explores the post-Cold War years.
The introduction dissects the broad spectrum of analysis and perceptions of Lee Kuan Yew. The author points out that for some scholars, Lee is seen as the author of Singapore’s success, as “an intellectual, a pragmatist, a realist and materialist” (4).[5] Others, according to the author, view Lee from a different lens, and describe him as an authoritarian, and “a ‘messianic’ rather than a ‘charismatic’ figure” (15).[6] Here, the author looks at the contestation of narratives on Lee, which he divides into two schools of thought—panegyric and critical—with the former is favored by the state. Ang argues that future literature on Lee will remain contested
Part 1, which consists of three chapters, provides a window into Lee Kuan Yew’s strategic thought during the Cold War. In this part, the author shares Lee’s views on several issues: Singapore’s relations with its two closest neighbors, Malaysia and Indonesia, the British pullout from Singapore in 1971, the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, and the Cambodian conflict throughout the 1980s. It is not surprising that these events are highlighted since they have implications concerning Singapore’s strategic environment.
However, the most discerning takeaway of part 1 is Lee Kuan Yew’s view on great-power competition for influence in Southeast Asia. Lee’s framing of great power rivalry during the Cold War largely reflects the ongoing United States-China rivalry in the twenty-first century. According to Lee, the great powers (China, Russia, and the United States) had interests in Southeast Asia because of the region’s sizable population, minerals and other resources, and critical sea junctions. These factors drive the three great powers to contest for regional influence (47). Similarly, the current contestation between the United States and China for influence over Southeast Asia cuts across the diplomatic, economic and military fronts. So, while the actors have changed over the years, great-power rivalry for influence in Southeast Asia continues. Furthermore, Lee’s argument that during the Cold War Southeast Asian states could not define and defend their collective interests against great powers still rings true today. Many contemporary analysts often point out that ASEAN’s disunity disables its effectiveness in dealing with Southeast Asian crises. For example, two ASEAN member-states, Cambodia and Laos, are perceived as representing China’s interests within the regional organization.[7]
The post-Cold War period is discussed in part 2, which comprises two chapters. Chapter 6 looks at the 1990s, while chapter 7 deals with the twenty-first century. The end of the Cold War in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union a few years later meant the United States was the sole great power, with the world becoming unipolar. But the world remains volatile. The author focuses on key issues and provides Lee Kuan Yew’s view on them during the post-Cold War years. These issues include the role of the United States, China and the middle powers such as India and Japan for regional security. This part of the book also discusses the idea of “clash of civilisations” (127), which argues that culture is the future driver of global politics and conflicts.[8]
Despite the plethora of issues discussed in part 2, the subject of great-power rivalry is still lurking in the background. With nearly three pages dedicated to the subject, chapter 7 hints at the rivalry between China and the United States. Arguably, China-United States relations enormously impact small states such as Singapore. As such, the author set aside more than four pages in chapter 7 to provide Lee’s view on Singapore and the security of small states. Here, we can see Lee’s position on small states’ security remains consistent throughout his political career, from when Singapore gained independence in 1965 to the 2000s. Ang highlights Lee’s speech in 2008, where the latter pointed out that Dubai and Singapore were like shrimps vulnerable to larger powers, saying, “big fish eat small fish and small fish eat shrimp” (147). For those familiar with Singapore’s history and defense strategy, the “shrimp” analogy to describe Singapore is a familiar one that Lee propagated during the Cold War.
Overall, the book provides an overview of Lee Kuan Yew’s thoughts on wide-reaching strategic issues, drawing on his public statements over many decades in power. The author’s approach is to let Lee’s “words to speak for themselves, thus letting his thought then come alive” and shine Lee’s framework on Singapore’s international relations (157). By consolidating Lee’s different public statements throughout his political life and classifying them according to the various strategic issues, the book provides an easy-to-read resource for scholars of Singapore’s history or those who study Lee Kuan Yew specifically.
Yet, the contentious issue regarding the book is the source materials. This book relies entirely on Lee Kuan Yew’s public statements. It is not clear that public statements are sufficient to ascertain a politician’s strategic thoughts. One also wonders why the book does not include archival documents that may also shed light on Lee’s views on specific issues and the motivations behind such views.
Early in the book Ang acknowledges the issue regarding the different sources (and which ones are superior to the others). He points out that “historians these days consider records of what politicians said publicly as inferior to archival documents” (27). To counter this view, the author explains that speech-making is essential in foreign policy, pointing out that decisionmakers spend time designing and delivering speeches. Ang notes that Lee was known to be outspoken. He then provides further justifications in the introduction on why Lee’s public speeches are reliable sources by which to assess his strategic thought. For scholars who have undertaken research on Singapore’s history or Lee himself are aware of Lee’s controversial nature and willingness to convey sensitive messages. [9]
Yet, this stance can be challenged. Public statements alone may not comprehensively reflect a politician’s strategic thought. They are tools that can promote certain agendas and shape public policy.[10] In fact, some declassified documents provide an alternative view regarding Lee Kuan Yew’s strategic thoughts and thus reinforce the importance of archival documents to provide a more comprehensive understanding of Lee. While Singapore’s defense and foreign policy archival documents remain closed, one can easily access relevant documents in Australia, Britain, and the United States.[11] These are reliable sources since Lee regularly engaged verbally or in writing with these three Western powers’ political leaders and diplomats. Records of their interactions or conversations with Lee are valuable materials that can illuminate Lee’s strategic thought.
A case in point is Malaysia and Singapore’s barter trade crisis between October and December 1965, when Malaysia threatened to take military measures against Singapore because of disputes over the latter trade policy. Declassified documents from the National Archives of Australia indicate Lee’s provocative acts against Malaysia during the crisis amplified the ongoing tensions between the two neighboring states. The Australians perceived Lee’s defense minister, Goh Keng Swee, as the more reasonable political figure to deal with the ongoing crisis. Even Goh opined that Lee was “politicising Singapore’s relations with Malaysia, which might cause conflict”, and in one incident, Goh had a row with Lee on the latter confrontational approach with Malaysia.[12] Thus, the Australian archival documents provide an alternative perspective of Lee’s public persona as a strategic thinker in the face of an existential threat to Singapore.
Reassessing Lee Kuan Yew’s Strategic Thought provides a reasonably good mosaic of the Singaporean statesman’s thoughts and behavior. It compartmentalizes Lee’s thoughts on various strategic issues and is a good reference material for scholars of Singapore. Archival materials will, however, add value to the discussions by enabling historians and researchers to corroborate information and provide multiple perspectives on Lee. After all, archival and public materials can contradict or support one another, leading to a more comprehensive and balanced assessment of one of Asia’s strategic thinkers.
Abdul Rahman Yaacob is a Research Fellow at the Southeast Asia Program, Lowy Institute. His research looks into Southeast Asia’s relations with major powers and military modernization. Concurrently, he is an Academic Advisor at the ASEAN-Australia Defence Postgraduate Scholarship Program (AADPSP) at the Australian National University (ANU). He completed his PhD in 2023 at the National Security College in ANU. Prior to commencing his scholarly journey, he spent nearly 18 years as a public official in the Government of Singapore.
[1] Several books and articles have been written on Lee Kuan Yew as a strategic thinker. See, for example, Graham Allison, Robert Blackwill, Ali Wyne, A., Lee Kuan Yew : The Grand Master’s Insights on China, the United States, and the World (The MIT Press, 2012); Eleanor Albert, “Lee’s Lasting Legacy,” Council on Foreign Relations, 20 March 2015, https://www.cfr.org/interview/lees-lasting-legacy.
[2] Singapore/United States Relations—Visit of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, 23 June 1981, A1838, 3024/11/161 Part 4, National Archives of Australia (Thereafter known as NAA).
[3]Henry A. Kissinger, “The World Will Miss Lee Kuan Yew,” The Nation, 27 March 2015.
[4] Ang Cheng Guan, Lee Kuan Yew’s Strategic Thought (Routledge, 2013).
[5] Ang cites this quotation from the work of Alex Josey, Lee Kuan Yew (Donald Moore Press, 1968).
[6] James Minchin, No Man is an Island: A Study of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew, (Allen and Unwin), Chapter 13. Another work on Lee Kuan Yew that the author categorizes as falling into the Critical school of thought is Michael Barr, Lee Kuan Yew: The Beliefs Behind the Man (Georgetown University Press, 2000).
[7] Edgar Pang, “‘Same-Same but Different’: Laos and Cambodia’s Political Embrace of China,” Perspective, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute (2017); https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/ISEAS_Perspective_2017_66.pdf
[8] Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order (Touchstone Books, 2008)
[9] Parag Khanna, “Long Live Lee Kuan Yew’s Lion City”, Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 25 March 2015 https://www.siiaonline.org/long-live-lee-kuan-yews-lion-city/.
[10] Jeffrey Ashley & Marla Jarmer eds., The Bully Pulpit, Presidential Speeches, and the Shaping of Public Policy. 1st ed. (Lexington Books, 2016).
[11] These archives include the National Archives of Australia (NAA), The National Archives (TNA) of the United Kingdom, and the United States’ Office of the Historian database.
[12] Cablegram from Critchley to Canberra, 4 November 1965, A1838, 3006/4/8 Part 2, NAA. See also Cablegram from Pritchett to Canberra, 25 October 1965, A1838, 3006/4/8 Part 2, NAA. For a full reference on the Barter Trade Crisis, See Abdul Rahman Yaacob, “Singapore’s Threat Perception: The Barter Trade Crisis and Malaysia’s Decision to Use Military Force against Singapore, October–December 1965,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 68:1 (2022): 72-89, DOI- https://doi.org/10.1111/ajph.12719.