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The archive of the Czechoslovak Security Services is a veritable treasure house of information whose exploration is very much a work in progress.¹ It includes much unique source material which demonstrates that after the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968, the Czechoslovak Security Service consistently bent over backwards to assist the KGB and to serve exclusively Soviet interests. Vladimír Černý and Petr Suchý show how the Czechoslovak Security Services succeeded in infiltrating the peace, nascent "green," and antinuclear movements in West Germany, Austria, and other countries. While this finding is beyond dispute, the extent to which these movements were instrumentalized is of course difficult, but not impossible, to measure.²

The main part of Černý and Suchý's study is devoted to Czechoslovak Secret Service activities undertaken on behalf of the Soviet Union to get the peace movement to oppose the NATO Double-Track Decision.³ West Germany (FRG) was the

¹ See the numerous publications by Igor Lukes, for example, Lukes, "Rudolf Slansky: His Trials and Trial," *Cold War International History Project. Working Paper No. 50*. Washington, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2008): <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/WP50IL.pdf>. The Secret Service files provide a basis for the systematic study of how attempts at fleeing Czechoslovakia for Austria across the Iron Curtain were thwarted. The number of people who died in the attempt is almost as high as at the Berlin Wall. Surveillance, betrayals, shootings and deportations were the elements that kept being reshuffled into deadly tragedies. In the background, the strings were pulled by the Czechoslovak Secret Services via their tightly woven networks across Austria. For details, see Stefan Karner, *HALT! Tragödien am Eisernen Vorhang. Die Verschlussakten* (Salzburg: Ecowin, 2013).

² The Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Research on Consequences of War is taking up this particular challenge with its newly launched research project "Die Aktivitäten tschechoslowakischer Nachrichtendienste in Österreich im zentraleuropäischen Kontext 1948–1960. Netzwerke – Operationen – Wirkung" (FWF P-33220 G) [Activities of Czechoslovak Secret Services in Austria in the Central European Context 1948–1960. Networks – Operations – Consequences].

To date, Czechoslovak activities of this kind in Austria have been neglected almost completely by researchers. The project mentioned above, which is sponsored by Austria's Fund for the Promotion of Scientific Research (FWF), aims at a systematic analysis of the activities of the Czechoslovak "stations" [rezidenturas] in Vienna and Salzburg and of their personnel in the first half of the Cold War and will draw comparisons with other important stations of the Czechoslovak Secret Services. Answers will be sought to such key questions as how the secret networks required were formed, maintained and secured; what operational methods were used; and what were their objectives.

³ Of foundational significance: Gerhard Wettig, "Die Sowjetunion in der Auseinandersetzung über den NATO-Doppelbeschluss 1979–1983," in *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 2 (2009): 217–59; Wettig, "Moskau suchte und fand Wege zur

primary target of the Czechoslovak intelligence services (279) and the main idea was “to discredit the political right wing of the FRG and reveal the hegemonic tendencies of West Germany (primarily in relation to France)” (281). While members of the Secret Services took credit for having “inspired and influenced” the demonstrations (285), they were forced to admit “that they had not succeeded in the measures that were focused on either reducing West German hegemony in NATO or exacerbating tensions between the FRG and France” (282). University students were primary recruitment targets “as the best potential candidates for future employment in state institutions” (278).

The authors provide descriptions of a great number of isolated actions. Their highly welcome basic research now needs to be deepened and integrated into the context of the Cold War. It is not enough to focus on the Secret Services. For example, the authors describe in detail disinformation campaigns such as the release of fake news regarding the attitude of U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger toward the Falkland War. The objective had been to deepen the rift between him and Secretary of State Alexander Haig (280). Did this campaign have any impact? We are not told. The authors provide an overview of Czechoslovak activities as they are documented in the archive. This does not tell us whether the strategic effect that was being aimed at in mass mobilisation, demonstrations, etc. was due to the activities of the Czechoslovak Secret Services. There is no knowing whether the peace movement in the West might not have attracted an even greater following had it not been aided and abetted by the Communist regimes.

The authors primarily accessed case files and operational files at the archive of the Czechoslovak Security Services. A welcome addition would be detailed information on the operational methods used, at least in one or two examples, such as on page 280, where the authors detail Czechoslovak attempts to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its NATO allies by recruiting journalists or non-governmental organization (NGO) personnel for their cause, planting disinformation, or even carrying out “false flag” operations. Especially for scholars in intelligence studies, this more detailed information would be very useful and would complete the picture (and maybe even spark new ideas regarding source materials and analysis).

Furthermore, one of the tasks that endures is cross-checking the assessments and results presented in Czechoslovak materials against those of Western counterintelligence files, especially those of the British (MI5 for example) and West-German (BND) governments to appraise this body of information. This is a task that must be left for future research, as these materials have not become available yet.

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Friedensbewegung im Westen,” in: *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 1 (2012): 143–149. Drawing on Soviet sources, Wettig has shown convincingly that the Soviet leadership was determined not to reduce the overkill capacity of its strategy involving SS 20 ballistic missiles. It had identified the peace movement in NATO countries as a potential enabler in this context and tried to get a handle on it by all means available. As Soviet documents prove, the Kremlin freely availed itself of the secret services of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and explicitly also of Czechoslovakia to push this agenda through on both sides of the Iron Curtain.