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Review by Günter Bischof, Center Austria, University of New Orleans

Kerstin von Lingen, a well-established German expert on OSS activities at the end of the war in general and the Nazi surrender in early May 1945 in Italy (“Operation Sunrise”) in particular, has penned the lead essay in the most recent issue of the Austrian *Journal of Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies (JIPSS).* Von Lingen’s essay covers the dealings of American intelligence after the end of the war with the “Sunrise group” around SS-general Karl Wolff who negotiated the surrender on behalf of the SS forces and the German army group in Italy with Allen Dulles, the OSS-chief in Switzerland. Given their service to American intelligence in the secret surrender negotiations in the spring of 1945, the OSS bosses essentially granted Wolf and his chief SS-lieutenants immunity from prosecution and/or soft-pedaled their “denazification.”

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1 The Austrian *Journal for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies (JIPSS)* has completed four years of publication and is a journal that the Anglo-American scholarly community interested in intelligence and security studies coming out of Central Europe ought to be aware of. *JIPSS* is published by the Austrian Center for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies affiliated with the University of Graz and under the able leadership of Siegfried Beer and Martin Moll. Beer for a long time has been the only Austrian scholar seriously interested in intelligence history (particularly the work of the OSS and the CIA in Austria during World War II and the Cold War) and has made a career of it. Moll is a specialist on World War II. The Center actively supports and publishes in the pages of *JIPSS* young scholars interested in intelligence history – and thusly acts as a veritable incubator for talented young historians, eg. *Talentschmiede.* Two ca. 200-page issues appear *per annum.* Articles are published in both English or German. Next to essays on Austrian, German and Central European intelligence history, equal attention is dedicated to American and Russian/Soviet intelligence and spying activity, especially during the two World Wars and the Cold War. In addition, there are regular feature interviews with historical figures in the spy world, as well as a regular “Operator’s Page,” namely practitioners “talking shop” about intelligence gathering and operations. Every volume concludes with a dozen or so book and film reviews dealing with the purview of the journal’s interests. English language studies on the history of intelligence and propaganda are regularly reviewed. *JIPSS* deserves the attention of the Anglo-American scholarly community interested in intelligence, propaganda and security issues.
proceedings; OSS higher ups like Dulles and his chief Bill Donovan shielded what von Lingen calls the “Sunrise group” from persecution for war crimes they quite likely had been involved in or had knowledge of in Italy and elsewhere. This fits well into the larger picture of the American military coopting scores of Wehrmacht generals and intelligence personnel after the war to mine them for their operational and strategic insights in fighting the Red Army. Washington felt such knowledge was needed badly to prepare for fighting the Soviets in the emerging Cold War in Europe and quickly converted the former enemies into allies. Reinhard Gehlen comes to mind as prominent example.2

Karl Wolff is a case in point. He had served as a lieutenant and chief of staff for SS-boss Heinrich Himmler before and at the beginning of the war and was privy to most the dirty secrets of the SS. The Americans interned Wolff and shifted him around among various camps. He served as a witness in the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg but was not put on trial with the other Nazi bigwigs even though he was one of the highest SS officers alive after Himmler’s suicide at the end of the war. Wolff seemed to have threatened to go public about the secret surrender in Italy and thus implicate the Western Allies before their former Soviet allies. The calculated trade-off between Wolff and Dulles was that Wolff got off scot-free while Dulles came across as a capable diplomat and enforcer of his country’s incipient anti-communist consensus in the Cold War, suggesting that he was timber for bigger assignments in the U.S. government. The deal worked for both sides -- Wolff lived in West Germany until his death in 1984 while Dulles became director of the CIA in the 1950s. Dulles and the OSS also shielded a number of Wolff’s high-level SS-lieutenants in Italy, who also were involved in the surrender talks. They were first employed as intelligence operatives by the OSS and CIC in Italy and were particularly useful as reliable anti-communist experts during the contested Italian election of 1948. After that the U.S. intelligence services (CIC etc.) helped them with false identities and made the infamous “rat line” to Argentina and elsewhere available to them to start new lives.3

Von Lingen has told the story of the “conspiracy of silence” among the “old boys” in the OSS about “Operation Sunrise” and the protection of the German negotiators in greater


3 See esp. Gerald Steinacher, Nazis auf der Flucht: Wie Kriegsverbrecher über Italien nach Übersee entkamen (Innsbruck 2008). This academic book was a bestseller of sorts in the German speaking lands and will appear later this year in a revised English version by Oxford University Press under the title Nazis on the Run: How Hitler’s Henchmen Fled Justice
detail before. In this essay, however, she adds a new twist by delving into the context of what the new scholarship on “bugged conversations” of German POWs adds to this story (pp. 8f) and these are important historical sources indeed. German scholars have mined these newly discovered archival treasures in British and American archives prodigiously and added a valuable new twist to POW-research and the search for war criminals. In conversations bugged by the British the old SS hierarchies were still discernible. Wolff did not “volunteer” any information about SS war crimes. He came across as an arrogant Nazi who boasted that his role in the surrender negotiations led to his preferred treatment by the OSS; in a conversation with General Klaps he claimed: “[A]ll the promises which Field Marshall Alexander and Dulles made to me have not only been carried out, but they have done far more than they needed, and far more than I expected, in the spirit of gentlemanly fair play” (pp. 12f and citation 18n42). Dulles carried the notion of the “moderate” SS-man Wolff into the U.S. bureaucracy and thus practically secured immunity for him. This amounts to a cautionary tale of the large lacunae in the denazification process in postwar Germany that amounts to considerable failure—while many Nazi bigwigs slipped through the cracks of the Anglo-American dragnet the small fry suffered considerable hardship.

Von Lingen’s story is a chapter in the Anglo-American paradigm shift in “enemy images” in 1947/1948 from the “brown” to the “red peril,” which is only gaining clearer contours in scholarship now as a major postwar divide. With the outbreak of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War by 1948, anti-communism became a higher priority than persecuting the Nazi detritus. This major paradigm shift is confirmed in another item in this issue of the JIPSS, namely the fascinating interview of Martin Haidinger with the 89-year old Ukrainian-Austrian Jury von Luhovoy about his role in postwar American intelligence in Vienna from 1947 to 1953. Von Luhovoy noted that one day in the daily morning briefings in 1947/48 his CIC-boss noted that “the enemy image” had been switched from Nazis to communists. It was no longer highest priority to root out and persecute Nazis but rather to gather intelligence about the growing Soviet threat in Austria (p. 166). Securing this


5 Leading this effort is Sönke Neitzel and his team of researchers at the University of Mainz. See Sönke Neitzel, Abgehört: Deutsche Generäle in britischer Gefangenschaft 1942-1945 (Berlin 2006), a publication of transcripts of a number of crucial conversations with a long introduction contextualizing and suggesting the importance of this new source material and its contribution towards an understanding of Nazi Germany and its military elites. More recently Felix Römer published an article on the interrogation camp of Camp Hunt outside of Washington, D.C. where many German POWs were interned and their conversations bugged; see his article with 17 appended selections of transcripts of bugged conversations “Alfred Andersch abgehört: Kriegsgefangene ‘Anti-Nazis’ im amerikanischen Vernehmungslager Fort Hunt,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 4/210: 563-598. Based on the bugged conversations of the well-known German writer Alfred Andersch with fellow German POWs, Römer succeeds in effectively deconstructing some of the postwar lies and mystifications Andersch created about his life during the war.
kind of oral history evidence is a valuable service to the scholarly community and appears regularly in the pages of JIPSS. Von Luhovoy passed away soon after the interview.

This issue of JIPSS contains one more item on Austro-American intelligence during World War II. The young Austrian researcher Florian Traussnig presents the fascinating story of OSS-agent Edmund F. Linder. Twenty-year old Linder fled Austria after the Anschluss in 1938 and joined the foreign legion in France. After Hitler's Invasion of France he landed in a Vichy internment camp in North Africa. The British liberated him in 1943. After brief service in the British Army the OSS hired him to work in its “Morale Operations Branch” in Italy. Linder, alias “Eddie Zinder,” got involved in an OSS-black propaganda operation that aimed at undermining the morale of German soldiers in Italy. Linder drew and got into the hands of Wehrmacht soldiers in Italy very explicit sex cartoons that depicted their women and wives at home involved in lesbian relationships and molested by fat Nazi bigwigs. Termed as subversive “can openers of the brain” such cartoons may well have undermined German morale, even though we will never know for sure. Traussnig analyzes Linder’s texts and cartoons from a visual and textual linguistic perspectives and adds semiotic sophistication to the deeper reverberations of OSS black propaganda material. The cover of the issue smartly illustrates Traussnig’s simile of a can opener dressed in elegant and sexy garters and a German helmet opened up like a can next to it.

**Günter Bischof**, a native of Austria, is the Marshall Plan Professor of History and Director of CenterAustria at the University of New Orleans. The American treatment of German POWs during and after World War II has been one of his areas of research and he co-edited 3 volumes on POWs during World War II. For the sake of full disclosure, he serves on the Editorial Advisory Board of JIPSS.