At first sight Barbara Keys’ portrait of the ‘emotional’ Henry Kissinger may evoke the caricature of Dr. Strangelove, with his conceit, outbursts of feelings, ill-contained enthusiasm for elitist power, and a fanatic, irrational fascination with hyper-rationality. But this portrait is not so reductive. It shows, if anything, the level of sophistication that analyses of America’s most famous national security advisor and secretary of state have now attained. Keys convincingly confirms the proposition -- so far, suggested by only a handful of studies on policy-making -- that cognition and emotion are not separable but intertwined, for “cognition is profoundly influenced by feelings” and “emotion is often shaped by cognition” (p. 591). Kissinger is the “ideal subject” (p. 592) for this approach because his emotional nature, which historians have tended to discard as incidental or rarely inhibiting his presumed rationality, is now abundantly documented in that treasure of records left by the Nixon administration -- including such personal ones as tape recordings and transcripts of phone conversations -- and complemented by the diary of Bob Haldeman, and the now emerging records of Ambassador Anatolyi Dobrynin.

Keys questions Kissinger’s realism, and she’s not alone. Among recent studies, Jussi Hanhimäki’s biographical account has shown the ‘flaws’ of this balance-of-power architect, particularly in his policies toward the developing world, as he made choices that magnified rather than reduced the burden of those local crises.¹ Mario Del Pero likewise demonstrated that Kissinger’s ‘eccentricity,’ and his ambivalent relationship with the United States’ traditions of messianism, unilateralism, and globalism often marred his realism - and the record here is more revealing about his mishandling of détente in Europe.

and of public opinion at home.\textsuperscript{2} Jeremi Suri, while providing a generally positive assessment of Kissinger’s realism, also highlights his insecurity and social awkwardness as a Jewish émigré whose very cosmopolitanism remained ambivalently adapted to American mainstream society. Suri adds that while personifying the transatlantic dialogue that took shape in the post-World War II era, Kissinger reached power when the “limitations of a transatlantic worldview had [...] become most evident,” especially in Vietnam, and came under “the most virulent public attacks” from “both sides of the Atlantic” as much as from the third world, hindering his realpolitik.\textsuperscript{3} Alistair Horne has illustrated that Kissinger’s romantic, not just rational attachment to détente increased his insensibility toward the realities of economic interdependence in the West and his disregard of those critics who, from the right or the left, thought that the defense of human rights abroad should be a component of U.S. realism.\textsuperscript{4} Barbara Keys’ forthcoming book-length study of this “emotional statesman” promises to be a more systematic inquiry into the many instances in which the consummate realist proved to be not a realist at all. Keys invokes findings in neuroscience to expand our interdisciplinary approach as historians (political scientists are ahead in this sense) to the study of policy-making. This does not exclude a traditional understanding of how national interests were defended: no need to inconvenience either Hans Morgenthau or Sigmund Freud to examine Kissinger; we might strike a middle path rather, measuring Kissinger’s stated purposes against his record, and showing how much his private sphere affected the public one.

To demonstrate that Kissinger was far from being the ‘rational actor’ counterbalancing the unstable Richard Nixon, Keys draws from various instances of how the National Security Advisor evaluated, handled, and related to his favorite secret channel, Soviet Ambassador Anatolyi Dobrynin. The premise is that Kissinger himself considered emotion a major flaw for the realpolitiker, because “to be emotional was to misjudge, to miscalculate, to mistake” (p. 590). Contradictions to that self-styled realism abound. Kissinger’s “bond of affection, trust, and mutual interest” with Dobrynin, Keys suggests, was not only a mere reflection of his “profound attachment to bipolarity”; those sentiments also reveal “reactions to specific events” (p. 594) that were inconsistent with his realpolitik.

Secret diplomacy in itself was exhilarating. Secrecy turns the “commonest thing” “delightful” (p. 603) -- Keys suggests, with the aptly chosen quotation from Oscar Wilde -- and may place fascination with the process above the stated goal. Secrets are hard to maintain, and Kissinger’s “obsessive preoccupation with the secret” (p. 603) was his main mental burden, distracting him from the end result, attracting him to the relationship with the special backchannel Dobrynin more than was warranted by the shared interests of the two nations. Affection and trust toward the like-minded Soviet diplomat led Kissinger to

\textsuperscript{2} Mario Del Pero, \textit{The Eccentric Realist: Henry Kissinger and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy} (Ithaca, 2010).

\textsuperscript{3} Jeremi Suri, \textit{Henry Kissinger and the American Century} (Cambridge, MA, 2007), qtd. p. 90.

\textsuperscript{4} Alistair Horne, \textit{Kissinger: 1973, the Crucial Year} (New York, 2010).
“overestimate the overlap of interests between the two countries and to exaggerate Moscow’s interests in helping the United States with its intractable problems, above all the Vietnam War” (p. 603). Furthermore, this emotional bond, according to Keys, explains Kissinger’s rigid bipolarity, as much as, or in conjunction with, his misconceived intellectual notions of the balance of power. Above all -- and this is perhaps the strongest part of Keys’ argument -- the backchannel “developed its own momentum and generated pulls quite independent of the interests of the countries each side represented” (p. 602)

It was bad enough that Kissinger made Dobrynin privy to secrets he withheld from the press or “most of the rest of the Nixon administration” (p. 603) Kissinger’s self-promotion in the administration through lies and deception (the case of Kissinger’s fabricated invitation from Moscow to pay a visit there before the Nixon-Brezhnev summit is very telling), when assisted by Dobrynin, “left Henry in Anatolyi’s debt” (p. 602)

Emotion worked both in creating a bond [the two statesmen even spent some of their vacations together and “met each other’s parents”! (p. 596)] and in causing resentment, especially for an insecure statesman as Henry Kissinger, whose amour-propre was so susceptible to a relationship that “included a strong current of rivalry” (p. 604). So, no doubt Kissinger suspected Dobrynin as the representative of America’s main enemy. But often the resentment was more personal, as Kissinger felt he had to “appear tough,” (p. 604) when he thought his friend Anatolyi had acted more as a rival, or simply when he felt ‘betrayed.’ The episode of DEFCON III (the defense readiness condition that precedes steps toward nuclear engagement) in the midst of the Yom Kippur conflict is the chief example used by Keys to demonstrate Kissinger’s poor calculation and rash reactions that could have jeopardized the whole détente process. Furthermore, Kissinger’s decision was inconsistent with his previous efforts to prevent the conflict in the Middle East from affecting the dialogue with Moscow. The DEFCON III incident, finally, shows that, for better or for worse, the Soviet backchannel, so conceptually and emotionally exclusive, took priority over other concerns that should have been central to a genuine realist, such as the security of client states in the Middle East, or the consequences of an oil embargo on the Western economies.

Privileging the backchannel with Moscow also meant overestimating Soviet influence over Vietnam. Extricating the United States from that intractable problem was hard enough, but, Keys argues, the personal animosity between Kissinger and the North Vietnamese leader Le Duc Tho made things even worse. Therefore, Kissinger continued to rely on the far more congenial Dobrynin to help him deal with the most “messy problems” there, when in fact, persisting in “more direct routes” (p. 605) would have probably yielded better results.

Keys’ approach and insights can indeed be useful if applied to other self-professed practitioners of balance of power. I have greater familiarity with Charles de Gaulle, a relatively realist statesman who was also profoundly affected by emotions (and sometimes blundered because of his emotions). I found it compelling to compare not just personalities, but national identities, too, when they are profoundly characterized by feelings of humiliation, status, resurgent pride, self-esteem. And yet, in describing feelings of leaders or of the public opinion which they guided, comprehended (as was often the case for de
Gaulle), or ignored, the historian should not become too enthralled by the newly discovered evidence, and commit the fallacy of turning such emotions or considerations of prestige into the prime, if not sole cause of those actors’ or nations’ main decisions. Keys knows better than that. Hastening to qualify her analysis, she invites us not to reduce emotional impulses into the single cause of certain actions, much like realist calculation should not be evaluated as the sole motivation for Kissinger’s policies. The tendency to over-rationalize rationalism has been far more common among those historians who privilege the realist interpretation and indeed sometimes turn it into an almost a mono-causal explanation. Those who analyze the ‘intangibles’ (ideological or cultural constructs, perceptions, and, yes, emotions) are, understandably, more cautious, in part because of the inherent difficulty in assessing and measuring them, and in part because personality traits are even more subject than the ‘tangibles’ to interpretation. So, as Keys suggests, the purpose here is to show how emotions work “in conjunction” (p. 609) with cognitive processes, compounding them, or causing inner contradictions (Kissinger seems to have done both). Indeed, it is important not to mistake complement for contradiction: how emotion complemented cognition with how emotion marred the cognitive process (a point to which I will return later).

I think that Keys’ argument, as is often the case with new interpretations, leaves some specific points unresolved. First, Kissinger here appears not only as emotional, but as naive as well. Was his attachment to the backchannel so unrequited, or was it a mutual thing? How much did Kissinger put his fate or even the fate of the nation in ‘Anatolyi’s debt,’ and how much was the Soviet diplomat also bound to Kissinger’s choices, thus creating the mutual dependence that, from a realist point of view, the American statesman wanted to develop? If the backchannel, as Keys recognizes, had a momentum of its own, the “pulls” it generated were independent of the interests of “each side,” not just the United States. Mutual leverage, especially in the post-Vietnam War years, was not a small achievement.

Second, was emotion so strictly intertwined with a cognitive process favoring bipolarity? It would be interesting to test how exclusive bipolarity was, in terms of ‘emotions,’ too, by verifying to what extent Kissinger’s intimacy with Dobrynin was so ‘monogamous,’ or whether, on a smaller but not so incidental scale, the National Security Advisor reserved a similar treatment to other pragmatist leaders or diplomats, such as Egon Bahr, Zhou Enlai (both mentioned in passing in this article), or Helmut Schmidt and Yitzhak Rabin. I, for one, would still argue that Kissinger practiced a great deal of multipolarity, but instrumentally, with the aim of imposing bipolarity on allies and adversaries; he was never willing to translate multipolarity into its logical consequence: political pluralism. Kissinger’s hierarchy of international power and of friendships was perhaps rigid, and, in itself, was not sufficiently multipolar; in method, if not in its ultimate goal, it was not utterly bipolar. But, in so structuring an international hierarchy of diplomatic contacts, or ‘friends,’ Kissinger followed a (misconceived) realist assumption more than a sentiment. Keys correctly notes that “the only channel that combined personal chemistry and the representative of a superpower was the one with Anatolyi” (p. 604). But this observation seems to qualify more than deny Kissinger’s realism. Keys’ general argument would gain in complexity and nuance by considering other pragmatic leaders (for example, Willy Brandt, Mario Soares, and Aldo Moro) whom Kissinger snubbed because they did not fit his
cognitive or emotional standards – but also because their own multipolarity notions, more than those of other pragmatic European leaders, contradicted his bipolar or ideological sense of equilibrium.

Third, while the DEFCON III incident is perhaps the best example of emotions running ahead of clear thinking, one is left to wonder how much Kissinger’s apparently brash decision was the product of anger, a sense of betrayal, and miscommunication, and to what extent it was also a calculated way to restore discipline and mutual concessions with his Soviet channel (since 1970, in return for U.S. restraint in Israel, which Dobrynin had been requesting, Kissinger had expected, and had specifically asked for, more Soviet help on Vietnam, and by 1973, more Soviet restraint in Egypt). Kissinger may have risked wrecking détente, but so did Moscow’s ambivalence on the whole issue of the Middle East conflict. Also, was the incident partly instrumental in securing an American hegemony in the region and over Arab-Israeli negotiations? In the aftermath of the crisis, Kissinger confided to an approving Mao Zedong – perhaps with some hindsight and as a way to ingratiate himself with the Chairman – that the “strong measure” had been necessary to prevent the Soviets from meddling too much in the Middle East.5

These are problems of the selective use of evidence that still do not detract significantly from Keys’ basic argument about Kissinger’s blunders. It is Keys’ application of her approach and her general conclusion on Kissinger’s realism that I find less compelling. The premise is sound. Keys detects one of Kissinger’s basic contradictions: while believing that realism is equivalent to the cold-hearted calculation of interests, he also displayed a great deal of emotion. But she seems to take Kissinger’s own postulate for granted. Rationalism is an important but not always essential component of realism. There are plenty of examples of realists, including George Kennan, who often lost their patience and vented their frustrations. If we consider Frank Costigliola’s masterful analysis of Kennan’s Long Telegram, we can see how the realist, while following his best intentions of devising a strategy carefully attuned to the nation’s available means and clearly defined interests, could not resist the temptation to use an intellectual, not populist rhetoric, that demonized the enemy, and unwittingly prepared the country for a crusade, not a containment.6 I underline ‘intellectual,’ because Kennan’s rhetoric, while in part meant to satisfy and persuade his audience, was mainly a product of his cognitive process, which, to some


extent, was, as Keys would put it, ‘influenced by feelings,’ but even more crucially was shaped by his knowledge, instincts and ideological and cultural constructs. Those elements clouded his argumentation, allowing leaders in Washington to misinterpret his recommended strategy. But the general consensus remains that his outlook was essentially that of a realist.

Realism, while benefiting from rationalism, follows other tenets, traditionally defined as follows: national interest comes before principle; capabilities and goals should be carefully calibrated, tailoring the pursuit of national interest to the resources the country can afford; moralism and ideology should not suffocate clear thinking; neither the internal practices of a given regime nor considerations of credibility are important, as long as they do not adversely affect national security or the balance of power. While deeply aware of his country’s limits, a realist attempts to transcend them as well, not through universalist aims, which are likely to lead to globalist excesses, but with a targeted diplomacy that correlates local realities to the global framework. The main problem is that Kissinger, while holding such traditional views of realism, did not consistently follow these principles. But emotion was not his main inconsistency. In fact, its compatibility with his realism was more apparent than it may seem at first sight.

Keys shows that rationality and emotions cannot be separated, and that rational calculation is “neurologically impossible,” (p. 591) but then proceeds with an analytical separation of the “cognitive assessments” and “emotional roots” of Kissinger’s “prioritization of U.S.-Soviet relations” (p. 603) He trusted that special relationship so much -- and we can agree on this -- that he ended up exaggerating Moscow’s interest in cooperating with and even assisting the United States. But we can never be sure, as Keys admits, that the emotion was “deeply felt” instead of “feigned for instrumental gain” (p. 593). And how, one could add, can we be certain that emotion, in this case, was not consistently wedded to a realist worldview? Kissinger, no doubt, developed a sincere friendship with Dobrynin. But he also cultivated it, because he thought it was necessary to discipline the bipolar structure of power (it is interesting that Keys describes Kissinger’s conceptual bipolarity as an “attachment,” a word that evokes sentiment, not rigor or instrumentality). That friendship was another way to induce America’s major adversary into international legitimacy, and, regardless of ideology, to encourage it to follow the codes of international conduct. Friendship may also have been developed to help mitigate the ideological dimension (from both sides) that stood against such legitimate conduct. As we know, Kissinger did not mean détente to end the bipolar conflict but to contain the Soviet Union in a less ideological way. I cannot see anything more Metternichian than this calculated friendship.

Kissinger’s brand of realism in fact nurtured a great deal of ideology. His ideological flexibility was only apparent. A secret channel with the Soviet ambassador assisted him not only in harnessing Moscow, but also in preempting ideological heresy in the Western alliance. So what if he kept secrets from allies, while he shared some with the Soviet ambassador? Was that another sign of his emotional misjudgment? Kissinger’s devotion to the secret channel, Dobrynin, was still, in many respects, a reflection of his realist assessment that not the allies, but the United States would manage détente without superseding the basic ideological rivalry. That link between realism and ideology also
followed a Metternichian script – to be sure one that was ill-adapted to most international circumstances of the moment and never truly emancipated from the U.S. traditions of exceptionalist foreign policy.

Essentially, Keys indicates that Kissinger’s emotions and realism were almost always mutually exclusive. Her assumption seems to be that realism, if consistently pursued without emotion, could easily find its right path, while in fact realism, like its opposite, idealism, is a blueprint, subject to miscalculations and inner contradictions. At best, emotion can be seen as a necessary, not a sufficient condition in Kissinger's choices. There were other necessary conditions complementing or tempering his realist judgment: cultural constructs, ideology, his academic background, his experience as a Jewish refugee escaping the Holocaust, and his perhaps exaggerating the fragility of democracy if not defended with strong, somewhat less-than-democratic means, his development of a hybrid role as insider-outsider of American mainstream society, his consequent juxtaposition of European-style realpolitik and American exceptionalism, his odd combination of skill and ineptitude in drawing media attention, his apparent need to base his career on his ability to curry the favor of powerful politicians -- in itself more of a conformist than an iconoclastic trait (and the comparison with the less adaptable George Kennan here would be productive).

But let’s take Kissinger’s expressed emotions at face value. His friendship with Dobrynin was sincere in part because the Soviet ambassador was a fellow pragmatist: elective affinities were at work here. Even more strikingly, that pragmatism came unexpectedly from the usually rigid Cold War adversary (this was perhaps as pleasing and fascinating as, later, Mikhail Gorbachev, that breath of fresh air, was to Ronald Reagan). Kissinger nurtured rivalry and animosity toward William Rogers in part because the Secretary of State was not realist enough. Antipathy and anger could be natural reactions against Le Duc Tho, because, consistent with his realist worldview, Kissinger was disgusted by unrealistically ambitious leaders, or by petty Davids, as he saw them, holding the American Goliath hostage. Kissinger especially didn’t like those leaders because they were not equals, who, nevertheless, had the ‘audacity’ to act as if they were.

Kissinger had a neat view of bipolarity while that bipolarity had instead become quite messy -- hence his likes and dislikes based on whether leaders fit or smeared his bipolar canvas. Legitimate aspirations of smaller powers, client or adversary nations could thus be more easily ignored. This is still realism, if an erroneous one. Hanhimäki, too, criticizes Kissinger for overestimating the Soviet Union, both in its good and bad traits;7 consequently, Kissinger’s realism was defective in its premise, which, while denying the myth of the communist monolith, subordinated most everything to U.S.-Soviet relations, implicitly admitting a monolith way of thinking, and, even more, failing to see that bipolarism was in crisis.

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Kissinger’s realpolitik was incongruous with an era in which soft power figured prominently in the overall global balance: on the surface, realism justified meddling into other countries’ affairs (especially in Europe and Latin America), when those political situations seemed to challenge bipolar stability; in fact, intervention undermined U.S. interests, causing an anti-American backlash in those countries. Even by the most traditional standards of realism as value-free amorality, unilateral interventionism should have been replaced by greater tolerance and flexibility toward those regimes.

Cultural misunderstanding mattered, too; but Keys overlooks this important component linking the cognitive and emotional processes. Kissinger resented Le Duc Tho or Nguyen Van Thieu because of their character, the inherent complications of the Vietnam conflict, and cultural incomprehension. While seemingly understanding how conflicted, rather than monolithic the communist camp was, Kissinger relied on Moscow not only because he could not stand Tho, but also because he assumed that the Kremlin had greater power, and ideological and cultural clout over the Vietnamese communists than it actually did. And even if Kissinger made some ostensible efforts in trying to relate to the Vietnamese or other third world leaders, his strategy remained anchored to his Eurocentric views or triangular diplomacy priorities. Cultural misunderstandings dealt the same blow to Kissinger’s narrow realism as they did to Woodrow Wilson’s narrow liberal internationalism. As Lloyd Ambrosius has noted, Wilson, ethnocentric even in the way in which he promoted his principles of national self-determination, “emphasized global interdependence but neglected to take into account the world’s diversity.”

So did Kissinger’s own notions of interdependence fail to include realistically the world’s increasing fragmentation into multipolarity and multiculturalism.

Finally, the connection between emotion-driven or habit-induced actions should be clarified. Citing a recent article by Ted Kopf, Keys reiterates that the backchannel, having a momentum of its own, formed a pattern in which “habit, not deliberate calculation [began] to govern [Kissinger’s] decision-making” (p. 605). So, was Kissinger’s calculation distracted more by emotion or by intellectual laziness? Of course, we can say a combination of both, and, again, his cultural misunderstandings with several world leaders resulted from his reluctance to leave both his emotional and intellectual comfort zone of like-minded statesmen.

Keys’ intriguing analysis may inspire further questions about the impact of emotions on Kissinger’s foreign policy choices and general conduct. First, for example, Kissinger’s most severe critics may be tempted to adjust the arguments of the sensational literature which depicts him as a war criminal; they may verify whether emotion, matching or superseding realpolitik, partly explains his deviousness or even his brutality. Was that brutality the simple amoral product of realism, or also the immoral offspring of emotion?

Second, would emotion, not realism, in the age of mass communication, better explain why Kissinger invested so much in his media image? Realism, in this sense, was not necessarily

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incompatible with a modern nation so founded on principle, credibility, and mediatic power. But Kissinger, perhaps largely because of his emotions, failed to adapt his Nineteenth century methodology to the new circumstances, and rather subordinated it to them. Emotion entailed a great deal of narcissism, which prompted Kissinger to try to please the public too much. The statesman thus sacrificed substance to vanity. An emotional person, much more than a realist one, cares as excessively as he did about public scrutiny. Del Pero has analyzed this ‘eccentric’ or egocentric trait of Kissinger in its emotional besides intellectual aspects more than Keys gives the author credit for. To make full sense of this phenomenon, the biographer should borrow not only from neuroscience but from sociology as well: Kissinger’s craving for stage and fame, as Suri has shown, were in part the result of his never-resolved ambiguity between the roles of intellectual outsider (often proudly so) and academic and policy-making insider.  

Third, vanity also accounted for the “aphrodisiac” of power. Here, an analysis of intertwined cognitive and emotional processes could yield interesting results indeed. Kissinger sought stability, but, like his boss Nixon, he craved sensationalism as well; and the two are often incompatible. Keys’ extreme case remains that in which Kissinger, always prone to share secrets as a way to strengthen relationships, or to feed his ego, or to serve his feud with Rogers, on more than one occasion showed classified documents, or revealed secrets about America’s allies to his friend -- and adversary -- Dobrynin. Keys in fact suggests that much of this conduct was a matter of ego; but, more plausibly perhaps, Kissinger revealed scoops to his backchannel with the miscalculated aim of strengthening and controlling it, the same way in which he staged scoops with the media in an attempt to impress and guide public opinion.

The same approach used by Keys can also be revealing on the balance (or imbalance) between emotion and realism in other U.S. leaders whose cognitive and emotional processes seem most significantly intertwined, such as Ronald Reagan, or George H. W. Bush. Some contemporary statesmen also seem as ideal subjects as Kissinger. Suffice here a prime example: Nicolas Sarkozy’s coldness toward the lower classes, as has been frequently reported, is compounded by his warmth toward the sophisticated women of his life. He immediately appeared out-of-touch with the country’s economic conditions when, on Election Night, he threw a lavish party, hub-nobbing with the riches. This was to woo not voters, but his estranged and demanding wife, the socialite Cécilia. In fact, he didn’t “give a shit about [Vincent] Boulanger’s yacht” in which he had that night’s bash. 10 But emotion, romanticism, and much of his human frailty overshadowed his stated goal of concentrating on the immediate needs of the country.

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Analysis of emotions can thus be a useful complement, in some instances an important corrective tool for historical assessments of leading policy-makers. For calling our attention to this, Barbara Keys deserves high praise. Her thesis is insightful, elegant, and, following the excellent tradition of the Bernath Lectures, innovative and thought-provoking. The analysis of emotions, however, is best if used with careful attention to other factors, especially when dealing with a complex, multifaceted character as Henry Kissinger.

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