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It has been almost 75 years since the founding members of what was soon to become the United Nations Organization (UN) rejected the concept of the middle power. At the time, a group of UN negotiators had proposed to develop a policy that would privilege a small group of medium-sized states in the election of non-permanent representatives to the Security Council. These self-selected middle powers made no claim to great power status, but they did maintain that they would be called on regularly by the Security Council to play a significant role in world affairs, one that many of their smaller colleagues would be incapable of handling. As a result, they merited differentiated treatment in the selection of Security Council members. The proposal to differentiate the middle powers from the rest of the international community was ultimately replaced in the UN Charter by language that called on member-states to take the capacity of countries to contribute to world affairs into consideration during Security Council elections. Those instructions were never taken particularly seriously.

The middle power project might have failed in 1945, but the idea that there were states that were neither great nor small persisted. Indeed, for much of the rest of the twentieth century, scholars and practitioners regularly examined and invoked the middle power mantra. Certainly, the meaning of the term evolved, and John Ravenhall does an excellent job of documenting that evolution in his introduction to a recent special issue of *International Journal*.² Over time, however, middle power theory grew stale. Indeed, by 2008, even the Government of Canada, once one of its most prominent proponents, seemed averse to its implications.³ Moreover, as Ravenhill rightly notes, by the twenty-first century, a number of what he terms "newly prominent participants [NPPs] in global governance" had emerged on the world stage (501). They, too, were clearly not great powers, but nor did they share the traditional middle power commitment to selfless international citizenship and the preservation of the world order.

For scholars like Ravenhill, the middle power construct has become obsolete, leaving students of non-great power behaviour with an analytical void. Ravenhill cites the Andrew Cooper's work as the inspiration for a new concept for the twenty-first century: the entrepreneurial state. Cooper was for many years a leading voice in the middle-power conversation, defining specific middle power behaviours that had a normative bend. In recent years, however, he has narrowed his view to emphasize "a distinctive power of statecraft" that includes "the demonstration of entrepreneurial and/or technical

¹ Adam Chapnick, *The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 95-114.

² John Ravenhill, "Entrepreneurial States: A Conceptual Overview," *International Journal* 73:4 (2018) [hereafter *IJ* 73:4]: 501-517. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702018811813.

³ Adam Chapnick, "Middle Power No More? Canada in World Affairs Since 2006," *Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* 14:2 (2013): 102-111.

leadership; playing the role of catalyst or facilitator; and placing an emphasis on coalition-building and cooperation-building" (506). Ravenhill builds on that idea by proposing, more simply, that entrepreneurial states be recognized as those "countries that seek to gain the support of others in pursuit of their perceived interests in the international system" (507). Such states cannot achieve their aims unilaterally, nor can they rely on coercion. Rather, they must attract and then mobilize "followers" to support their initiatives (517). The new definition is narrow enough to exclude most of the international community much of the time, yet sufficiently broad to include states as diverse as Brazil, Mexico, Canada, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). For this special issue of *International Journal*, Ravenhill has assembled a group of scholars well-placed to describe the foreign policies of each of these states. He has also convinced Cooper to provide a valuable conclusion. 5

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All of the articles make legitimate contributions to scholarly understandings of entrepreneurial states, but Crystal A. Ennis' study of Qatar and the UAE, and Feliciano de Sá Guimarães's and Maria Herminia de Almedia's focus on Brazil, are particularly noteworthy. Ennis offers the most compelling argument in favour of abandoning the middle-power lens. Neither Qatar, with a population of less than 3 million, nor the UAE, home to less than 1.5 million Emirati, fits the traditional middle power definition. Yet both have proven increasingly activist, and influential, in global affairs. What is more, with Saudi Arabia nearby and its influence ever-present, their success cannot be attributed to regional dominance. Rather, they have combined their relative economic might with strategic ambition to shape international relations, and global governance, in ways that traditional theorists of world power would never have anticipated. The actions of Qatar and the UAE, what Cooper summarizes in his concluding article as "the meshing of foreign policy and economic strategy" (605), are not that far removed from Canada's conduct at the G20 as depicted by John Kirton. 6 It follows that Ennis is right to criticize the tradition among International Relations scholars of privileging the Western world in their construction of theories of power and influence. Her essay does more than any other in the collection to upend traditional thinking about middle powers and to justify Ravenhill's call to recognize entrepreneurial states as a new category of global actors. Ennis's decision to look at both Qatar and the UAE in her article is, however, perplexing. Hers is the only essay to examine more than one state, and grouping the two together seems to undermine her assertion that both merit recognition, individually, as NPPs.

The essay by Guimarães and de Almedia is most notable for its reminder that, no matter how one describes newly prominent participants in global governance, one cannot deny the persistence of a tier of great powers above them. Guimarães and de Almedia analyze two cases of Brazilian entrepreneurship. The country's successful intervention in the 1995 Cenepa War between Peru and Ecuador is contrasted with a failed intervention to check Iranian nuclear expansion in 2010. The authors identify two critical factors that differentiate the success from the failure. Brazil was more effective, they contend, working within its own region where it was easier to exploit relationships it had already developed to pursue what it framed as a mutually beneficial resolution to the Peruvian-Ecuadorian conflict. It was less successful when forced to contend with the influence of the United States in 2010. "The costs of opposing a dominant power can undermine the entrepreneurial power's capacity to cajole new partners," Guimarães and de Almedia explain (519). Ana Covarrubias and Jorge A. Schiavon make a similar observation about Mexico's entrepreneurial challenges, noting "the limits imposed by its vicinity with the

⁴ Feliciano de Sá Guimarães and Maria Herminia de Almedia, "Brazil's Entrepreneurial Power in World Politics: The Role of Great Powers and Regional Politics for Successful Entrepreneurship," *IJ* 73:4: 518-534. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702018810876; Crystal A. Ennis, "Reading Entrepreneurial Power in Small Gulf States: Qatar and the UAE," *IJ* 73:4: 573-595. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702018809980.

⁵ Andrew F. Cooper, "Entrepreneurial States versus Middle Powers: Distinct or Intertwined Frameworks?" *IJ* 73:4: 596-608. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702018809532.

⁶ John Kirton, "Canada's G20 Entrepreneurship," IJ 73:4: 554-572. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702018810861.

United States" (552).⁷ Taken together, these articles illustrate an enduring characteristic of entrepreneurial states (and middle powers): they are second-tier members of the international community, susceptible to influence, if not at times dominance, by states with greater capacity for unilateral, coercive action. Just like middle powers, entrepreneurial states can be understood as much by what they *cannot* achieve on the world stage as by what they can.

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In sum, John Ravenhill has done the scholarly community a service by organizing this thoughtful, provocative collection. There is a case for recognizing entrepreneurial states within the realm of foreign policy analysis, and the flaws in middle-power theory have long become too great to ignore. Apart from Ennis's examination of the actions of two states in a single paper, my only criticism of this special issue concerns the lack of attention to the potential implications of the entrepreneurial analytical lens for contemporary policy practitioners. *International Journal* has traditionally prided itself on bridging the academic-practitioner divide. More attention to this gap from either Ravenhill or Cooper would have been helpful.

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⁷ Ana Covarrubias and Jorge A. Schiavon, "In Search of International Influence: Mexico as an Entrepreneurial Power," *IJ* 73:4: 535-553. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702018811901