A Pact With The Devil: Washington’s Bid for World Supremacy and the Betrayal of the American Promise

Roundtable Review

Reviewed Works:


Roundtable Editor: Thomas Maddux
Reviewers: Robert Jervis, Bruce Kuklick, Doug Macdonald, Jeffrey Taliaferro

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Tony Smith has a strong interest in the role of ideology in political and foreign policy contexts. His five previous books explore different ways in which ideas influence everything from French decolonization and Algeria, the impact of the idea of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” in the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba, the role of the American sense of mission to promote democracy, and the influence of ethnic groups in shaping U.S. foreign policy. Consequently, Smith is very well prepared to explore the latest manifestation of ideas in American foreign policy, the intellectual origins of George W. Bush’s strategy, most specifically the Bush Doctrine of 2002, and the influence of neoliberals in providing the intellectual structure for the doctrine.

Tony Smith is not the first to evaluate the origins and what the author considers the disastrous results of the Bush doctrine in Iraq and elsewhere. Neoconservatives and their beliefs have received increasingly critical attention as the Iraq war dragged on after President Bush announced “Mission Accomplished” on May 1st, 2003. Smith does give far more attention than previous studies to the contribution of liberal internationalists who in the 1990s, with the end of the Cold War, shifted to what Smith defines as liberal imperialist with a minority moving on to liberal fundamentalist jihadism, a messianic division of the world into good and evil and rejection of any challenges to their beliefs.

Smith considers the Bush doctrine, as articulated in the National Security Strategy document of September 17, 2002 and subsequent Bush speeches and White House rationales for the war on terrorism and Iraq, as a serious, ideologically complex statement with disastrous consequences. John Lewis Gaddis in *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* (2004) evaluated the Bush doctrine as an example of grand strategy with a good deal of coherence, although Gaddis indicated several criticisms and reservations on the implementation of the strategy in Iraq as well as the prospects for democracy and U.S. hegemony in the Middle East. Smith and Gaddis agree that the Bush doctrine was not a Karl Rove political *demarche* or a breezy think-piece from the domineering Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Instead, the authors emphasize the integrated nature of the strategy, the extent to which it represents the first comprehensive post-Cold War strategy, and the degree to which it drew on past American experience.

On almost every other aspect of the Bush doctrine, however, Smith and Gaddis are in disagreement, which may reflect their different training, philosophical perspectives, and, perhaps, personalities. The disciplinary perspective of political scientist versus historian contributes to the differences, although a number of Smith’s books have focused on the past, most significantly the liberal internationalism of Woodrow Wilson. Smith also in Chapter Three evaluates the different stages of liberal internationalism from the pre-

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classical stage starting with the American revolutionary leaders to the classic stage under Wilson, to liberal international hegemonism from 1944 to 2000, and, finally liberal imperialism. Smith devotes most of his analysis in chapters four through seven to post-Cold War liberal thinkers on international relations and related topics and their development of democratic peace theory versus established realist theories; on comparative political analysis of political leadership; and to neoliberal support for the Bush attack on Iraq as a manifestation of liberal imperialism, and, a subsequent shift by some neoliberals to liberal fundamentalist jihadism. As a historian, Gaddis looks more to the past for a pattern or tradition to relate to the Bush doctrine starting with Secretary of State John Quincy Adams and moving on to Franklin D. Roosevelt for a different tradition, and, then, to Bush drawing on JQA as the “Father of Preemption, Unilateralism, and Hegemony”. Finally, Smith is a committed liberal internationalist who has reacted with passionate dismay at what he considers the disastrous betrayal of his beliefs by liberals who joined with neoconservatives to make a “Pact with the Devil,” and by Smith’s definition, two pacts including the Bush doctrine and neoliberal support for the Iraq war. (xvi-xvii). Gaddis has been accused of being many things—a revisionist, a post-revisionist, a traditionalist with archives, and now add a neoliberal by association—but he has never exhibited the passionate commitment of Smith in his writings. Gaddis has explored international relations theory in his writings, but he retains a historians’ skepticism on the reliability of any theory on international relations and expresses caution in assessing the likely results of the Bush doctrine and its application in Iraq.2

The reviewers recognize that Smith has made a valuable contribution in exploring the changing emphasis of liberal internationalist views on how the U.S. should advance its belief in the virtues of democracy to other nations. However, they express a range of disagreement with Smith’s thesis on the influence of neoliberals on the Bush doctrine and the U.S. attack on Iraq as well as reservations on Smith’s tone at times and the author’s conviction that the Iraq war is a disaster regardless of what happens going forward. Smith’s response to the reviews is spirited and affirmative of his central thesis and the seriousness of his concerns. Some of the issues include the following:

1.) Is the title of Smith’s book and his identification of two pacts with the devil, the Bush doctrine and neoliberal support for the doctrine’s manifestation in the Iraq war, an example of an excessively polemical tone in Smith’s study? Several of the reviews suggest that the Smith’s development and criticism of neoliberal ideas extends beyond an appropriate and dispassionate analysis to a style and tone of charging, convicting, and condemning neoliberals to the netherworld of the title’s main character. Smith, however, is writing as an engaged liberal internationalist. He considers himself a liberal internationalist who was abandoned by other liberals in the 1990s who ultimately made a pact with neoconservatives and the Bush administration. As Smith notes in his response to the criticism of begin too polemical, “in the case of contemporary liberal internationalism, we are confronted with an ideology that has been made afresh in the invasion of Iraq, with

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threats now against Iran. The Bush Doctrine, that is, is an ideological pronouncement without parallel in American history. Nuance is off the table; ideas have been forged into an instrument of war. The result is that polemic against the ideas so assembled is appropriate indeed necessary, in my opinion.”

2.) How new is the Bush doctrine with respect to its emphasis on the necessity for preemption to address security threats, the necessity for unilateralism to meet challenges, the importance of hegemony to maintain American security, and the related emphasis on democracy as the best long-range solution to the challenges faced by the U.S. in the post-Cold War environment and the promotion of American security? Gaddis, for example, looks to the past for precedence and finds it in the traditions established by John Quincy Adams. In the aftermath of the British burning the nation’s Capitol and White House on August 24, 1814, Gaddis depicts JQA as concluding that the U.S. should defend its security by expanding spheres of responsibilities through expansion vis-à-vis Spain and Indians as well as the unilateral Monroe Doctrine asserting hegemony in the Western Hemisphere with respect to the European powers. Other observers such as Walter Russell Mead advanced four major contributions linked to specific leaders—Hamilton, Jefferson, Jackson, and Wilson—that shaped a foreign policy tradition that influenced the U.S. response to September 11th and terrorism. Smith recognizes the important precedent of Wilson and his expanding commitment to spreading democracy, has written extensively on this subject, and is quite critical of liberal interventionism by Wilson and his successors. However, Smith concludes that “many of the terms of the Bush doctrine have their antecedents in the American foreign policy tradition, just as much of its tone is in touch with religious and nationalist sentiments in this country. But what any accurate account of the doctrine should rather stress is change, not continuity, its boldness and singularity, its break with the past, its ideas that only were born in the 1990s, its relationship to a world situation that was radically new after 1991, and its authorship by a radical elite in this country.”

3.) “Are you now or have you ever been a neoliberal?” A new twist on a Cold War accusation that points to the issue of whether or not Smith has reliably identified the beliefs of neoliberals as they emerged in the 1990s and the significant advocates of a neoliberal perspective. A second related question is whether or not the neoliberals that Smith evaluates supported the war against Iraq. Smith is most interested in the first question and willingly notes, when he has available information, that a neoliberal writer rejected the unilateralism of Bush’s quest for war in Iraq or accepted the attack as necessary to deal with the likelihood that Saddam Hussein held weapons of mass destruction. But Smith is unwilling to give much credit to neoliberals who turned critical

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3 See Smith’s response, p. 9.
4 See Gaddis, Surprise, pp. 10-20.
on Iraq over the flawed assumptions on what would follow the military defeat of the Hussein regime and the mismanagement of the occupation. A significant challenge that Smith faces is that at the same time he develops the shifts in liberal internationalism and assessing the nature and impact of neoliberal ideas on Bush policies, he also introduces leading neoconservative perspectives and individual advocates in order to clarify the different emphases in their ideas and how the two perspectives, according to his thesis, merged on some significant points or how neoconservatives recognized the expedient value of neoliberal theories on the spread of democracy and added them to their existing perspective. Ultimately Smith suggests that neoconservatives and neoliberals differ more on means—unilateral U.S. force vs. multilateralism with major allies and the UN—than on the ends of attacking Iraq and spreading democracy and market capitalism. So there are occasions when Smith uses the ideas of a historian, international relations theorist, or public writer to illustrate the neoliberal perspective when the individual may not be a neoliberal. For example, Smith begins his discussion of liberal democratic internationalism with “The Case of John Lewis Gaddis,” although Gaddis might not recognize himself as a 21st century fellow-traveler of the antecedents of neoliberalism. (56-59) A less ambiguous example is Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, co-editor of the Journal of Democracy, and Senior Adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Bagdad, January-April 2004. Smith develops Diamond’s ideas in depth and continues an exchange with Diamond in other publications. The problem is also evident in Smith’s concluding statement of neoliberal perspectives, “liberal fundamentalist jihadism.” Smith notes that few neoliberals moved to this perspective which he considers mainly a neoconservative perspective, and many of Smith’s examples in this chapter are identified by him as leading neoconservatives—Max Boot, Richard Perle, William Kristol, Robert Kagan, and Paul Wolfowitz. Perhaps Smith should have either introduced more neoliberal examples to support this assertion or considered the possibility that neoliberals never went as far as the cited neoconservatives. (195-237)

4.) How does Smith demonstrate that the ideas advanced by neoliberals in their articles, books, op-ed pieces, and in broadsides from the Democratic Leadership Council and its think tank, the Progressive Policy Institute, influenced Washington policy-makers and the Bush Doctrine? The transmission of ideas and demonstration of their influence is a demanding challenge that other writers and historians have faced without a great amount of historical evidence. Walter Russell Mead, for example, suggests that 19th century traditions are somehow carried forward in the environment, a Frederick Jackson Turner-like creation of an American foreign policy culture, and through national political and intellectual institutions. Gaddis suggests that the response of the Bush administration to September 11th, “whether intentionally or not, has been drawing upon a set of traditions

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that go back to the aftermath of the first attack on Washington 187 years earlier” and the “grand strategy of John Quincy Adams—should be embedded within our national consciousness.” At least Smith surrounds the Bush administration with the writings of both neoliberals and neoconservatives and notes the similarity of their rhetoric with President Bush’s public statements as early as 1999. (14-23) As Bruce Kuklick notes in his review, Smith proposes a “transition belt” or a “transmission belt” that moves ideas from academic thinking to policy positions. (94, 114) As author of *Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger*, the subject of an earlier H-Diplo roundtable, Kuklick evaluated the influence of intellectuals on policymakers from the end of WW II through the end of the Vietnam War and concluded that Cold War scholars and intellectuals ended up groping in the dark and having little impact on policy besides providing a theory or rationalization that policymakers used to explain their policies to the public. Smith seems to reach a somewhat similar conclusion with neoliberals in his suggestion that they provided the intellectual rationale for the pillar of purpose, democratic peace theory that increased optimism about spreading democracy in the Middle East and elsewhere (48-52), whereas neoconservatives provided the pillar of power, the importance of U.S. military preeminence, market economy, and unilaterialism. (4-10) Yet Smith also suggests that, similar to Kuklick’s Cold War intellectuals, the neoconservatives did little more than provide rationales for what policymakers such as Vice President Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and President Bush already believed, and that neoliberals filled their other ear with additional rhetoric about spreading democracy. (42-44). Historians may have to wait decades for access to the records of the Bush administration to explore the preparation of the Bush Doctrine, the role of different individuals and agencies, and the nature of their ideas and contributions to answer some of these questions.

5.) Since the spread of democracy is central for neoliberals and Smith’s study, how do Smith and the reviewers view the promise and drawbacks of this quest? A range of perspectives are advanced, starting with Smith’s self-identification as a liberal internationalist committed to the encouragement of democracy but an advocate of supporting the growth of democracy without the imperialism and use of force by Wilson, Cold War leaders in Vietnam, and, especially the militant efforts of the Bush administration. “What has changed, however, is not so much me as Wilsonianism itself,” Smith asserts in his response, as neoliberals made Wilsonianism “more ideological and imperialist than ever before in its history.” Smith agrees with the examples that Doug Macdonald cites on the appeal of democracy around the world and nonviolent support for indigenous leaders and movements seeking democracy. “The question of my book,” Smith stresses, “is whether this creed can be formulated into a doctrine of state power, then used imperialistically, as the Bush Doctrine most clearly illustrates it can. And when this happens, what then of its proponents?” Kuklick, Jeffrey Taliaferro, and Robert Jervis have more serious reservations about idealistic internationalism from different viewpoints. Kuklick considers the Bush doctrine a familiar example of “claims for American exceptionalism every bit as outrageous as the many ex cathedra statements of George Bush” with many Cold War precedents such as the Truman Doctrine and NSC-68.

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Taliaferro and Jervis apply a realism perspective to Wilsonian internationalism, reaching back to Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, and others who have warned against the dangers of idealistic crusades from the Cold War to Iraq, noting the inevitable contradictions that occur including the push for democracy in the Middle East versus continued aid to autocratic rulers. Realpolitik triumphs over Idealpolitik in Taliaferro's and Jervis' realism perspectives. Jervis suggests that ideas serve as rationalizations for other considerations of security, economic concerns with respect to oil, political success at home, and the corruption of power.

6.) The question of results takes us back to the beginning and some of the inherent differences in the perspective of historians versus political scientists. As Bruce Kuklick notes, historians by discipline look to the past, wait for the results to be clear, and for the documents to be available. Now historians don't always wait, and the Iraq war is certainly an example where many, as Kuklick admits in his own views, share the intensity of Smith's conclusion that the Bush doctrine and the war that flows from it is a disaster. At this stage, Kuklick suggests that "we cannot clearly see what the outcome of this conflict will be, or how historians will parse it." We can document some results such as the demise of Hussein and his regime, the holding of elections and an increased role for the Shiites, the human costs to Americans and Iraqis, the financial costs projected to reach close to 1 trillion before Bush packs up for Texas, and other results. Yet we don't know the final results, what Iraq will be like with respect to the internal relations of Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds, as well as the external relationship of Iraq with Syria, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the impact of the war and Bush doctrine on the larger Middle East and endemic conflicts such as the Israelis versus the Palestinians.

Participants:

Tony Smith earned a B.A. at the University of Texas, an M.A. from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1965, received his doctorate in political science from Harvard University in 1971 and he has been a Senior Fellow at the Center for European Studies at Harvard since 1979. He is the Cornelia M. Jackson Professor of Political Science at Tufts University where these days he gives courses on U.S. Foreign Policy. He is the author of five books, including The French Stake in Algeria (1978), The Pattern of Imperialism (1981), Thinking Like a Communist (1987), America’s Mission: The U.S. and the Global Struggle for Democracy in the 20th Century (1994), Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy, (2000). Smith has also published a dozen articles on the history of Wilsonianism, understood as a perspective making the promotion of democratic government abroad a central focus of American foreign policy.

Robert Jervis is Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics at Columbia University. His most recent book is American Foreign Policy in a New Era (Routledge, 2005), and he is completing a book of essays on the politics and psychology of intelligence. He was President of the American Political Science Association in 2000-01 and in 2006
received the National Academy of Sciences' tri-annual award for contributions of behavioral science toward avoiding nuclear war. He is a co-editor of the Cornell Studies in Security Affairs and currently is chair of the Historical Review Panel for the CIA.

Douglas J. Macdonald is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Colgate University. He has been at Colgate for 20 years in the Department of Political Science, and is a former director of the university’s International Relations Program. He recently spent two years as a Visiting Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College where he carried out research on terrorism in Southeast Asia. He served in the U.S. Air Force from 1967 to 1971, attaining the rank of Sergeant, and was awarded the Air Force Commendation Medal in 1970. His research interests include transnational terrorist networks in Southeast Asia, Islamist ideology, and the region’s institutional response to the New Terror. In 2007, he published “The New Totalitarians: Social Identities and Radical Islamist Grand Political Strategy” for SSI, and is in the finishing stages of a second monograph entitled, “The New Democracies and the New Terror in Southeast Asia.” Macdonald’s doctoral dissertation won the American Political Science Association’s Helen Dwight Reid Award for best dissertation in the field.

Jeffrey W. Taliaferro is an associate professor of political science at Tufts University, where he has taught since 1997. He received his A.B. from Duke University in 1991 and his Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1997. He is the author of Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), which won the American Political Science Association’s Robert L. Jervis and Paul W. Schroeder Award for the Best Book in International History and Politics. His articles have appeared in the journals International Security, Security Studies, and Political Psychology and two edited volumes. He is co-editor (and a contributor), along with Steven E. Lobell and Norrin P. Ripsman, of a volume entitled, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, which is currently under review at a university press. He is writing a book entitled The Primacy of Power: Realism and U.S. Grand Strategies, 1940-present, which is under contract at Routledge. He has recently begun work on another book project that examines the periodic recurrence of preemption and preventive war calculations in the grand strategies of the United States and other great powers. He has held grants and fellowships from the Smith Richardson Foundation, the Institute for the Study of World Politics, the National Science Foundation, and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University.
Tony Smith has written a vehement, stimulating, and important book. In the end, I think it succeeds better as intellectual history than as international history, but even if I am right it can be read with benefit by all students of international relations (IR) and diplomatic history. Those in many schools of thought will not only disagree, but respond with fervor equal to the author’s: Marxists will think he fails to understand the interests that drive U.S. foreign policy; realists will think he misses part of the larger picture (I will return to this below); neoconservatives will accept some of the description but reject the negative judgment, and, most of all, liberals will think their positions (an in a few cases, their individual writings) have been distorted and defamed. The first three groups are such common targets for criticism that they may hardly react, but liberals on the other hand should find the experience challenging.

In a way that is more typical of much international history than of IR, Smith mixes analysis and judgment, including moral judgment.¹ For Smith they are inextricably linked because current U.S. foreign policy is hard to explain by standard rational theories and is leading the U.S. and the world to ruin. In form but not in substance, his book is a bit like Thomas Frank’s *What’s the Matter With Kansas?*² dealing with American politics or the recent book John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt about American foreign policy in the Middle East. Because he believes that the war in Iraq and linked Bush Doctrine are dreadful mistakes, he needs to explain why the U.S. is deviating from any reasonable conception of its self-interest.

Most IR realists strongly opposed the war, arguing that it was unnecessary and counterproductive. Even if Iraq was developing nuclear weapons, the threat could have been contained and turning Iraq into a democracy, although desirable, was not neither necessary nor likely to be possible given the constraints of Iraqi history and society. But realism,

¹ Paul Schroeder and I have explored the differing stances of the two disciplines toward moral judgments in our essays in Colin Elman, and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations* (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 2001).

although popular in the post-World War II academy, never had deep roots in American public or elite opinion, and Smith joins several other scholars in arguing that liberalism, broadly conceived, has always played a large if not dominant role in American foreign policy. This outlook, contrary to realism, is optimistic, believes in solving problems rather than managing them, and most importantly in this context is what Kenneth Waltz would call a "second image theory" in believing that the basic sources of a state’s foreign policy stem from the nature of its regime, not its position in the international system. Woodrow Wilson is the most obvious example, but one finds this thinking before and after him. Many critics of the Bush Doctrine see American foreign policy as being hijacked by the neoconservatives, and although Smith is unsparing in his criticisms of them, his fundamental point is that much of their outlook has a long pedigree and is shared by many contemporary liberals.

Smith sees what he calls liberal democratic internationalism as having proceeded through three stages. "Pre-classical" liberal internationalism flourished in the 19th century, a period when American ideals were tempered by the limits on its power. This began to change at the end of the century and by the time of Wilson turned into “classic” liberal internationalism, which sought “to support the expansion of democratic governments abroad as a way of strengthening national security” (63). This phase involved harnessing American nationalism to the vehicle of liberalism and providing significant leadership and unilateral actions, even if the policies were often ill-advised and did not produce democracies abroad. But isolationism and the limits on American power meant that the policy was often more restrained than was the case after World War II, which witnessed “liberal international hegemonism.” Here the U.S. was much more assertive and supported democracy in West Europe and a few other places, although the anti-communist imperative led it to not only work with dictatorships, but to undermine fledgling but hostile democracies on several occasions. Support for democracy also came in at the end of the Cold War, when Reagan resisted embracing Gorbachev until he embarked on wide-ranging reforms that eventually brought his regime down. Its fall saw the emergence of “liberal internationalist imperialism.” Because the end of the Cold War was seen as stemming at least in part from democratic pressures in the USSR and the states in Eastern Europe and some of the former Soviet Republics seemed on the road to democracy, even before George W. Bush took office liberal ideals and American power were becoming more firmly yoked together and were under fewer restraints.

Although it is the neoconservatives who have had the most publicity, for Smith the sources of liberal internationalism come strongly from the left. It was Jimmy Carter, after all, who put human rights front and center. Even more strikingly, Smith stresses the importance of three key ideas that liberal academics have propagated: democracies do not fight each other (the “democratic peace theory”), the argument that, contrary to earlier research, there are no important pre-conditions that are necessary for democracy to be established, and the normative claim that states have the right and indeed the duty to override other’s sovereignty in cases of extreme human rights violations. While these pillars rested on

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foundations of earlier liberal thinking, they pointed much more strongly to the need to and possibilities of spreading democracy throughout the world. The idea of democracy as a universal value, implicit in much earlier thinking, became more prominent and critics could be dismissed as ethnocentric if not racist. If democracies never fought each other--and this proposition was the subject of an enormous amount of IR research in the 1990’s, most of it confirmatory--then a route if not the route to peace and security was through making countries democratic. The liberal jurists provided the rationale for intervention, with force if necessary, against countries that tyrannized over their own people.

Of course this would be pointless if the new regimes were as bad as the old. So it was important that research on democratization in the 1990’s implied it was not only desirable, but possible. Theories that stressed that democracy was a difficult project, one that required favorable social and economic conditions and generations if not centuries of trial, error, and maturing, were replaced by theories that predicted that democracy could be established when the tyrannical obstacles to it were removed. Democracy then came to be seen as the “natural order,” to take the concept developed in the context of natural science by Stephen Toulmin, meaning that it was what would occur unless something unusual happened to prevent it.4

The neoconservative contribution to this worldview was more political than intellectual, but it did add three elements. First, many in this group argued that America needed a mission abroad to stave off the sort of decadence that had come to characterize Western Europe.5 Second, although democracies did not fight each other, rivalries might emerge unless one of them (i.e., the United States) established its hegemony and so inhibited dangerous rivalries. Third, force was a legitimate tool of statecraft. Although of course prudential calculations were necessary, moral qualms were not and there was no need to worry about unpredictability and unintended consequences following its use.

All of this was in place before 9/11. Although it had obviously not led to adventures like invading Iraq, the U.S. had used force to overthrow dictators in Panama and Haiti and had liberated Kosovo on human rights grounds. Furthermore, although realism remained powerful (but not dominant) in the academic community, neither it nor any other coherent worldview posed a serious threat to the liberal consensus. So contrary to the common claim that September 11, 2001 “changed everything,” U.S. policy grew out of its traditional and established worldviews.

One obvious new element was the greatly heightened sense of threat. Less obvious but equally important was the conception of the “war on terror” as a war of ideas, which Smith

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stresses is superficially similar to Samuel Huntington's well known "clash of civilizations," but is actually quite different from it because it can and must be won by changing others' beliefs and values. Thus Muslim fundamentalists hate us for what we are, not what we do, and, conversely, in the words of Tony Blair, "our ultimate weapon is not our guns but our beliefs" (147). The fact that the U.S. (or the West, to the degree that allies have the appropriate vision and courage) is engaged in such a struggle helps explain why the attacks on domestic critics have been so bitter: no matter how patriotic their intentions might be, those who put forth a different view are serving as a fifth column because they are undermining the struggle on its central front.

With the apparent failure of the war in Iraq, won't this crusading liberalism collapse? Smith doubts it, and indeed fears it may become even more virulent, transforming into "liberal fundamentalism" which in many ways is the mirror image of the Muslim enemy that Bush and his supporters see, perhaps leading to "utopian violence" (209). Overall, then, the U.S. has made "a pact with the devil: the proud assertion that this country had a formula it was prepared to implement by military force for world freedom, prosperity, and peace" (4).

This is a real tour de force, but is it right? I think there is quite a bit to it. The pre-9/11 history is covered very briefly, but I think Smith's general discussion of the phases of liberalism is supportable, and he has previously done in-depth research on many of the episodes in which the U.S. used force to try to establish democracy and has shown how important this impulse has been. The argument that the invasion of Iraq is not an aberration but an extreme example of values and behavior that has characterized the U.S. from the beginning can I think be sustained and stands as the liberal counterpart to the more realist argument for preventive war as a continuing theme in American history developed by John Gaddis. But there are difficulties, of course. I think Smith exaggerates the role of ideas and minimizes the corrupting nature of power. American leaders may not be realists, but realism can explain more than he thinks. Like Gaddis, he is correct to see continuities in American history, but also like Gaddis he is too quick to attribute these to particularly American characteristics because he does not look at the behavior of other countries, which in fact show important similarities to what the U.S. has done.

Before pursuing this line of argument, I want to present some related objections, several having to do with the importance of the motive of democratization in the Bush Doctrine. First, I think Smith exaggerates the degree to which political science in the 1990s concluded that democracy was the natural order. While it is true that much analysis focused on the roles of institutions, guarantees, and coalition-building, all factors that in principle are more subject to change and design than are level of income, social structure,
and ethnic differences, the shift was not complete. Smith is also correct that many analysts and public figures were deeply impressed by the democratic transitions in South Africa, Eastern Europe, and many portions of the Soviet Union. These cheering events were not easily explained by theories stressing pre-conditions and did indicate that democracy could take root in what was previously seen as infertile soil. Neoconservatives were particularly impressed by what happened in the former Soviet bloc; liberals were particularly heartened by South Africa. But while the academic community did move, it did not move as far or with as much unity as Smith implies. Democratic peace theory did indeed get enormous traction in the 1990s, and so Smith is on firm ground in arguing that it was “in the air” and easily absorbable by foreign policy elites. This was not as true for theories arguing that democracy could be readily exported, especially to the Middle East, however.

Furthermore, a degree of measured optimism was perhaps warranted. The earlier view that stressed the preconditions for democracy would not have led us to expect the degree of democratization we have seen in the past two decades.

Second, I am not convinced that the belief that establishing democracy in Iraq would be easy and would transform the Middle East played as central a role in the decision to overthrow Saddam as Smith does. My skepticism is fed by several streams of analysis and evidence. While some of the neoconservatives, especially Paul Wolfowitz, did have a strong commitment to the democratization agenda, this was not true of all of them. There is no evidence that Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Rice saw democratization as the answer to the world’s ills before 9/11. In the run-up to the war they did talk about democratization, but it is far from clear that this was a driving concern. The problem here is that the members of the administration put forward many more reasons for their policy than would have been necessary to reach their conclusion that Saddam had to be overthrown.

To simplify, they professed to see both threat (Saddam’s WMD programs and his links to terrorism) and opportunity (establishing a better regime and transforming the Middle East) even though the war would have been appropriate if either threat or opportunity was high. This is an example of the common phenomenon of “belief overkill.” This makes me suspect that one of the rationales was driving and the other was put forward for the political purpose of maximizing support and the psychological purpose of making the person more comfortable with his or her views. After all, it would have been very stressful to have believed that while Saddam presented a high threat, the post-war situation would be as bad as it has turned out to be. There is massive evidence from psychology that people try to avoid perceiving painful value trade-offs, and there are innumerable cases where this pattern appears in political judgments.8

My argument is compatible with and indeed reinforces Smith’s if it was the perceived opportunity that drove policy. I cannot prove otherwise, but my sense of the debate and my conversations with people on the fringes of policy-making indicate that it was threat

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8 For examples and documentation, see Robert Jervis, “Understanding Beliefs,” Political Psychology 27 (October 2006): 641-64.
that was the more powerful force. This I believe fits with many other cases, as well as with standard psychology. Furthermore, until 9/11 Cheney had argued that Iraq would be hard to rule, let alone turn into a democracy, after a U.S. invasion. Although 9/11 could and I believe did rationally affect his sense of threat, without invoking psychology it is hard to see how it could have led him to change his mind on the prospects for an easy occupation. One obvious reply is that it was the perception of threat that was exaggerated if not manufactured (although this would not explain Cheney’s change), something that looks plausible now that we know that Saddam had put his WMD programs in abeyance. But this is hindsight; intelligence did not have to be pressured into estimating that Saddam had active WMD programs, which was the conclusion of the intelligence services of other countries, even those in countries that opposed the war.

A rebuttal is that the democratization agenda has been prominent after the invasion. Indeed, although Bush and his colleagues have backed off their pressure on countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan, they have done more in this regard than any previous administration, as Smith’s analysis would lead us to expect. Again there is an explanation from political psychology: the fact that it is now clear not only to us but to the decision-makers that the level of threat was not high creates great cognitive dissidence, which can be reduced by an increased commitment to democratization. Thus current beliefs do not show what was believed previously.

None of this is evidence, of course. But we do have a bit. Most importantly, as Smith notes but does not stress (xxxvii, 225), the neoconservatives, far from pushing for democracy, wanted to install Ahmad Chalabi in power. How they developed such faith in him is not entirely clear, apart from the fact that both he and they were opponents of CIA, but what is crucial here is that they pushed for his taking power without any pretense of free elections. Much of the reason, I believe, is that they saw his taking over as a way to rapidly withdraw American forces, which was more important for many Pentagon civilians than democratization in part because their goal of transforming the military and making it smaller required this. On the other hand, Smith can argue that the fact that Bush vetoed Chalabi’s installation shows that he was committed to democracy even if many of his more ideological subordinates were not.

This line of argument leads to a broader avenue of attack. Smith not only talks about the extent to which both liberals and neoconservatives see themselves as engaged in a war of ideas, to a significant extent this is his own perspective, not necessarily on international politics, but on the struggle to control foreign policy. He disputes both realism and Marxism because he sees U.S. foreign policy as being strongly influenced by its democratic ideals. (I suspect that he would agree with the old and important analysis of American

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society and political thought propounded by Louis Hartz in The Liberal Tradition in America.\(^{10}\) Material forces are not unimportant; the transformation of liberalism discussed above was made possible by the growth of American power. But the uses to which this power was put was strongly influenced by the liberal worldview. Liberalism is fairly capacious, however, and by itself did not produce the Bush doctrine. Instead for Smith the academic theories and neoconservative ideas noted earlier were crucial. Thus one purpose of his book is to persuade people that these ideas are flawed and, in combination, pernicious. This is not to say the he has any illusions that his book will single-handedly turn American foreign policy around, but he does see it as part of the war of ideas at home.

The rebuttals are obvious, although their validity is not. A Marxist would argue that liberalism and the Bush Doctrine simply are covers for imperialism that benefits what in the old days we called the ruling class (191-2). In parallel, Marxists and cynics note that now, as in the Cold War, the U.S. is much more prone to push for democracy in countries that are its adversaries than in those that pursue policies it favors. In America’s Mission he explicitly took issue with such economic explanations; here he puts them aside. It was not the business interests that pushed hardest for overthrowing Saddam and, aside from Halliburton and some defense contractors, it is hard to see how they benefited from the war.\(^ {11}\)

I have more sympathy with the second kind of objection that also sees the ideas as more rationalizations than rationales. This is standard realism. As I have argued elsewhere, this approach argues that state’s conceptions of their interests expand as their power does, and that if states, like individuals, are not checked by external restraints they will eventually infringe on others.\(^ {12}\) Expansion by the powerful is as old as human history and has characterized democracies and dictatorships, capitalist economies and pre-capitalist ones, societies that embrace liberalism and ones that reject it. Without academic theories proclaiming the ease of democratization and the virtues of democratic states’ foreign policies, would American policy really have been very different? It is a testimonial to the pervasiveness of liberalism that these theories were so readily accepted: decision-makers at least half believed them before the academic research was done. But without these rationales others might have been found. Similarly, the recent subordination of sovereignty to human rights may have eased decision-makers’ consciousness, but the U.S. and other powerful states had not been slow to violate the sovereignty of smaller ones before.


\(^{11}\) For a realist critique on American foreign policy that sees economic interests as responsible for taking the US in its terrible direction, see Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).

Some of Smith's argument fits with mine. He stresses the hubris and self-righteousness of American policy. The former and perhaps the latter flow more from success and power than from liberalism. They are perhaps particularly unattractive in a liberal society that values tolerance, self-awareness, and respect for others, which is one reason why so much of the current rhetoric is so disturbing. But, at bottom, these characteristics and American behavior are not particularly American. Over-reaching by the powerful would not surprise Thucydides or his heirs. The ideas might be American, but the pattern owes more to Lord Acton: “Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”

In closing, I want to stress what I said at the start: even if I am right, A Pact with the Devil is an important and stimulating book. We and our students will borrow from and argue with it for years to come.
Tony Smith’s articulate and fluently written book has a clearly stated, though often repetitive thesis. The war in Iraq represents at least a disastrous mistake by United States policy makers, evidencing not just misjudgment but also an overweening sense of entitlement and a grotesque belief in the correctness of America’s path. Smith even suggests that the United States may be slipping into a “fundamentalist” “jihadist” position that has “fascistic” overtones in its zealotry and lack of prudence. *A Pact With the Devil* finally argues that while the well known conservative policy analysts associated with the Reagan and Bush White Houses have developed this constellation of obligations, these people have had crucial help from non-conservative intellectuals. The real firepower that has generated the commitments in Iraq has come from theorists of worldwide democracy situated on the left and generally supposed to be devoted to the Democratic Party. Neo Wilsonian purveyors of nation building, global law, and human rights have put forward ideas that conservatives literally highjacked for use in Iraq, and we see the ruinous results every day on the front pages of the *New York Times*.

Smith indeed is most eloquent, if sometimes over the top, in quoting to good effect well known liberal political theorists and political scientists in the 1980s and 1990s about what steps the United States had to take to achieve a responsible, humane foreign policy; *A Pact With the Devil* then juxtaposes these prescriptions with the way conservative ideologues have cashed out the ideas in Iraq. The intellectual history at the heart of the book interpretatively summarizes the work of social scientists who have thought of themselves as opposed to neo-conservatism. Smith’s commentary shows how this work coheres with the set of views he calls the Bush doctrine.

In trying in the above paragraphs to capture the vehemence, passion, and certainty of Smith’s writing, I have not just attempted to give the flavor of the book. I also want to intimate that in my own nightmares about contemporary American diplomacy, I share the author’s feelings of fury and betrayal of the “American promise.” But feelings don’t cut it in scholarship. While we should congratulate Smith on writing designed for a general audience, the book still seems to me to embody the defects of political scientists looking at the world of contemporary international politics.

First, history complexity gets slighted. Why on earth do we think that, as scholars, we can make such Technicolor and definitive verdicts about the war before it is even over? As citizens we surely can work ourselves into a rage about the deficiencies of the Bush regime, certainly if we are Democrats. But as academics searching for understanding, we must surely know that when events recede into the past, their valence changes. We cannot clearly see what the outcome of this conflict will be, or how historians will parse it.

The flattened uncritical version of the history of American foreign policy that Smith advances makes me even more suspicious of the moralistic rush to judgment. As a good internationalist liberal, Smith has defended and still defends the main diplomatic initiatives
that the United States has undertaken in its rise to world power. He wants to position himself as a supporter of the “American promise,” while simultaneously distancing himself from recent policy in the Middle East. Now Smith does not mean *A Pact With the Devil* as a tome for the erudite. It only lightly engages with the heavy literature on foreign policy, and rightly focuses on the outpouring of liberal theorists over the past fifteen years, their observations on current matters in journals of contemporary affairs. At the same time Smith’s text delineates a history of American foreign policy. In fact, he adumbrates the same one in two earlier and more substantive volumes with weightier historical components, *The Pattern of Imperialism* (1981) and *America’s Mission* (1994).

The spread of democracy from the 18th century has been an unalloyed good for Smith. In the United States in the last century the commitments of Woodrow Wilson, the struggle against the Nazis, and the long battle with the Soviet Union in the Cold War have forwarded Enlightenment goals. Smith’s vision does not have much room for irony or ambivalence. Even in his more professional publications, lack of nuance goes together with an absence of the examination of primary sources and only moderate mastery of the secondary historical literature. The resulting history parades before the reader a series of triumphs. Smith, however, also acknowledges that the formulators of Iraq policy have an ideological heritage that joins up with the earlier successes of American diplomacy. Thus, it is crucial for him to maintain that we can still disconnect the beneficial peacekeeping that has gone before from the belligerent interventionism of the present.

Smith’s gestures toward such a disconnect fail. He says that the most recent makers of policy have overstepped the bounds of realism, that they suffer from a unique hubris, that they lack a fundamental ethical balance. But only a selective reading of the intellectual formulations of American policy in the past and, dare I say it, a cartoon version of the diplomatic history, can sustain this perspective.

For the formative period of the Cold War read carefully the Truman Doctrine Speech by then President Harry Truman; George Kennan’s “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”; and the rhetoric of NSC-68 in 1950, authored in part by Paul Nitze. They propound claims for American exceptionalism every bit as outrageous as the many ex cathedra statements of George Bush on Iraq and on the U.S. role in the world that get quoted in *A Pact With the Devil*. Moreover, Smith has no discussion of the adventurism that accompanied some of this rhetoric. He avoids the case of Vietnam, which -- he seems to concede -- falls “within the logic” of American foreign policy (p. 57). An earlier case does just as much harm to Smith’s formulations -- the second part of the Korean War, which does not even get a mention in the book. In the fall of 1950, after achieving the initial purpose of turning back North Korea, the Americans marched to the north of Korea. Ignoring multiple warning of Chinese intervention, the United States dreamt of a rollback of communism, part of the promise of NSC-68. The incursion resulted in an ugly and unnecessary expansion of Asian conflict. It would help Smith in comprehending Iraq to grasp the reckless policy of Secretary of State Dean Acheson.
In short, the history of American “Wilsonian” diplomacy demonstrates more ambiguity than Smith makes out, and I am afraid the Bush Doctrine fits right in with it. Or put it another way: if you don’t like the Bush Doctrine, you should have a hard time swallowing many of the acts of American assertiveness around the world in the last 100 years, and the justifications for these acts.

So, for Smith, history is a batch of examples whose lessons are clear and easily available. They show how good we were then, and how bad we are now. In addition to finding this history teaching dubious, I finally have problems with Smith’s sense of the policy making process. He tells us that a “transition belt” or a “transmission belt” unites academic thinking on policy to the later policy position adopted in Washington. A “conceptual food chain” links intellectuals and diplomats. First formulated and debated in scholarly journals, ideas then get “synthesized for public policy in the United States.” In more popular magazines such as Foreign Affairs or Foreign Policy the most salient thought gets an executive summary before the policy elite consumes the thought in the halls of power (pp. 94, 114). A Pact With the Devil even hints that conservatives on their own could not have provided this elite with the Bush doctrine; they had to have the help of the brainier liberals.

Now I have an inordinate distrust of declarations of influence by intellectuals. Today’s foreign policy may also rely extraordinarily on the authority of professorial experts, though we would not know this for more than a generation when we will be able to subject policy making in Iraq to scrutiny of the extant sources. But no one who has seriously studied original material in grasping the origins and implementation of any foreign policy believes in such a food chain. The belief is foolish, silly. It elevates the role of ideas and academics in foreign policy far beyond what the record will bear. In concentrating on the lucubrations of many of his coworkers Smith may have given us a portrait that many of his colleagues will not like, but he has not shown that their collective output caused policy in Washington.

In A Pact With the Devil Smith laments that some of his liberal scholarly peers have somehow not been able to keep his faith; they have fallen away from his specific brand of Wilsonianism. I believe the book more expresses an unfortunate aspect of the disciplinary standpoint of political science. It is a science that yet revels in making immediate black and white moral judgments -- either those of Smith or of his opponents. And it has a communal arrogance about its relevance to the real world.
Tufts University political scientist Tony Smith is, like many liberal academics, angry over the war in Iraq and the Bush Doctrine that seeks to democratize the Middle East. In fact, he appears to have experienced something of an ideological epiphany as revealed in his new book, *Pact With the Devil.*

The religious overtones of this statement are not an exaggeration. They are not only contained in the title of the book, but in the very first paragraph of his introduction, following a quotation from the bible, Smith expresses concern about facing St. Peter given his previous support and praise of democracy promotion by the United States as evidenced in his 1994 book *America’s Mission* (p. ix.)

In the earlier work, Smith had offered the assessment that the spread of democracy since WWI had largely depended on U.S. power. He believes this no longer. Indeed, he refers to such proactive democratic value projection as a form of mental illness, as a “pathology” of American liberal democratic thought.

In making his new counter-argument, Smith abandons the nuances of *America’s Mission* and utilizes a tone and temper that the late, great French historian Francois Furet called “the dear-sightedness and relentless determination of all who have changed sides.”

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no longer middle ground or mixed results here. It used to be America the Good. Now it is America the Demented.

Smith is not the only analyst who has recently “changed sides” on this question. In 1981, Samuel P. Huntington argued that there was a “significant correlation” between American power and the spread of liberty and democracy. Huntington more recently has apparently become far more skeptical of such a notion. Mark Peceny, an American political scientist, has written convincingly in the past that the American record of democratization, including through military invasion, was better than generally acknowledged in much of the literature on the subject. He, too, now sings a different song. Other analysts, such as American political scientist Robert G. Kaufman and this reviewer, continue to maintain the original, generally positive assessment of the American role in the world, and the necessity and plausibility of the promotion of democratic capitalism as one important aspect of United States foreign policy in the long run. I do not see this as betraying America’s promise, as does Smith, but as keeping it.

Ideologically, this group is all over the lot. Huntington and Kaufman, although on opposite ends of the spectrum on this particular issue, are generally considered conservatives. Peceny’s philosophical viewpoint is difficult to discern from his writings. I am a JFK/Lieberman independent, until the mid-1990s a lifelong Democrat. (I have never been a Republican.) Interestingly, in Pact With the Devil Smith continues to identify himself as a progressive liberal internationalist. Although mentioned occasionally, Realism is not his mode of analysis in condemning proactive democratic value projection, as it is with so many critics of the Bush Doctrine, though he adopts many of the Realists’ criticisms of the policy. This book is a cri de coeur from the moderate left in the American political context, and from a sophisticated analyst who used to see the world very differently. He expends much effort in excoriating his fellow liberals as harshly as many attack the dreaded neoconservatives. As I shall argue below, I believe he does so erroneously and unfairly in places. But, given Smith’s past writings and political positions, this book is far more interesting than a typical Bush-bash. Although I find it fundamentally wrong-headed, it is a book that people of all political and ideological persuasions would profit from reading.

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6 Democracy at the Point of Bayonets (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999).


Smith’s treatment of the liberal triumphalism following the Cold War is often on target. Given the vast changes that followed the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the 1990s seemed like an exciting time for the spread of democracy. This “Third Wave” of global democratization began with the collapse of the Portuguese empire in 1974. In 1983, American political scientist Michael Doyle wrote two seminal articles that gave impetus to the “democratic peace” theory, which Smith takes strong issue with, which holds that democracies are unlikely to fight one another. With the collapse of the USSR, the argument was furthered by Francis Fukuyama’s famous “End of History?” thesis and was accompanied by the development of real world economic globalization and increased talk of an international order made up of market democracies.

In discussing these developments and how they evolved into an alleged “pathology,” Smith’s list of villains is long: John Lewis Gaddis, John Rawls, Thomas Friedman, Bruce Russett, Larry Diamond, Larry Berman, Andrew Moravcsik, and John O’Neal, among others, come in for particular scorn. Indeed, Smith himself would have to be included in that cohort, hence his mea culpa at the start of the book. When discussing liberals he disagrees with he adopts a kind of legalistic tone, speaking of “The Case of Thomas Friedman,” “The Case of Larry Diamond,” etc. that is downright accusatory. In addition, he decries the harsh rhetoric and name-calling of some supporters of the Iraq War, but ends up calling some of them “liberal fundamentalist jihadis” (Chapter 7.) Tone isn’t everything, but it does matter, and the overwrought tone of this book detracted from his polemic in my view.

The novelty of Smith’s argument is that, in contrast to many other critiques of the Bush Doctrine that blame the neocons for the whole thing, Smith blames liberal internationalists equally for enabling the neocons and also for supporting the war in Iraq. Smith seems to join with the Realists in arguing that the war in Iraq discredits all of this intellectual and analytical work on democracy promotion and development. But he is inconsistent on this: he still defends his support for sending troops to Kosovo, stating the difference with Iraq and the Middle East is one of the “magnitude” of the quest (p. xi.) So not all democracy promotion is pathological, just those that fail, are judged too ambitious and of which Smith disapproves. Indeed, despite calling liberal internationalism a “pact with the devil” and a “pathology” in its current form, Smith also declares that liberal internationalism remains a “noble idea” that has been “tainted” by the Bush administration (p. xvii.) He displays similar ambivalence about Bush’s motives, sometimes portraying them as naïve in their simplistic adoption of democracy promotion and sometimes as deeply self-interested to demonstrate leadership or a simple “power grab” to get control over oil.

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His primary evidence for this last claim is that many in the Muslim countries see oil as the real reason for the war. Actually the more common response given is that the U.S. is attacking Muslims to keep them weak. This reasoning is applied to both the Afghanistan (a country that does not have oil) and Iraq wars. ¹¹ For example, after being captured for the 2002 Bali, Indonesia bombing, one of the bombers said the attack, the planning and execution of which preceded Iraq by months, was aimed at Americans and their “associates” in order to “defend the people of Afghanistan from America.”²² But large majorities in many Muslim countries also have strongly negative views against the entire West, not just the U.S., and see Westerners as selfish, arrogant, and violent.¹³ Yet as of June 2005, over two years after the war in Iraq began, 52% of the people living in predominantly Islamic countries had a favorable view of the United States, despite strong disapproval of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In all of the countries of Asia, not just the Muslim countries, but where most of the world’s Muslims live, that figure stood at 74%. In the Middle East, it was 48% favorable and 49% unfavorable.¹⁴ These figures may have changed with the Lebanese War of 2006, but it is not at all clear that long term damage has been done, especially if the outcome in Iraq is generally positive.

But the Muslim world lives in a state of appalling ignorance, aided and abetted in many cases by their illiberal regimes, but even in those Muslim democracies with a relatively free press such as Indonesia and Turkey. When the Pew Foundation asked the question in 2006 in Muslim countries: “Do you believe that groups of Arabs carried out the attacks against the United States on Sept. 11, 2001?” this is how they reported the results:

By wide margins, Muslims living in Muslim countries say they do not believe this to be the case. The least skeptical Muslim nation is Jordan; even there, a majority (53%) says they do not believe Arabs carried out the attacks. The most skeptical nation is Indonesia, where 65% say they do not believe it and just 16% say they do, with the remaining 20% expressing no opinion.

In Turkey, nearly as many (59%) say they do not believe that groups of Arabs carried out the Sept. 11 attacks, while 16% say they did. In 2002, a much bigger share of the Turkish public - 46% - said they believed that Arabs were responsible for Sept. 11, according to a Gallup survey. Roughly four-in-ten Pakistanis (41%) say they do not believe groups of


Arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks, compared with 5% who think they did; 44% of Pakistanis declined to respond.

The Muslim minorities of France, Germany, and Spain are fairly evenly divided over whether Arabs did, or did not, carry out the Sept.11 attacks, while opinion among British Muslims is similar to views in predominantly Muslim countries. By 56%-17%, British Muslims do not believe Arabs were responsible for the 9/11 attacks.15

It is small wonder that there is a widespread belief in Muslim countries more generally that 9/11 was an “inside job” carried out by the CIA and the Israelis as an excuse to attack Muslims worldwide. (It should be noted that there are a good number of vocal Americans who share this appalling ignorance.) How can one reason with people in such denial? How can we not expect them to see virtually anything we do as a plot to destroy them? Should we have done nothing about Afghanistan after 9/11?

Although my evidence is impressionistic and anecdotal, I find Smith’s “the liberals are to blame” thesis unpersuasive. Virtually all of the people I have come into contact with or seen express their opinion on television or in print who would self-identify as academic liberals or “progressives” were strongly against the Iraq war. And some liberal theorists such as Bruce Russett, who is attacked by Smith for enabling intervention by his work on the “democratic peace” theory, have come out strongly against the war, or even unilateral intervention to spread democracy, instead calling for international organizations to take the lead.16 The Bush Doctrine can follow from a “democratic peace” argument, but it doesn’t necessarily do so. Professor Russet and other “democratic peace” theorists haven’t necessarily made a pact with anyone, never mind the devil. Smith’s attempt to debunk the “democratic peace” arguments is derivative and pedestrian; there is nothing new here.

The strength of his earlier work, America’s Mission, was that it put ideas and ideology back into the mix of factors that shape international behavior. Given the triumph of structural neorealism in the 1980s, which downplayed the role of ideology, or even of humans, this represented a needed corrective in the international relations literature. The rise of the popularity of social constructivism in the international relations literature, which portrayed a world far more malleable through human agency than structuralism, created a theoretical backdrop for this development. This was partly because of the remarkable spread of market democracy into areas long thought to be immune to its tenets in Latin America and Asia (though not in Africa and the Middle East for the most part) that led to an assumption among some that the emerging phenomenon could become universal. As Smith himself notes: “Freedom House certified 41 countries out or 150 in the world as

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16 Bruce Russett, “Bushwhacking the Democratic Peace,” International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 6 (2005), pp. 395-408. I would like to thank my colleague Fred Chernoff for bringing this article to my attention.
democratic in 1974; by 2002 that number had reached 121 out of 193, a rise from 27 percent to 63 percent” (p. 129.) Clearly something new was happening. The realist and neo-Marxist cultural relativism of the 1960s and 1970s appeared to be inadequate to explain the emerging world order. (How and why Marxists became cultural relativists is an intriguing question. My own view is that, like their support of nationalism, it was a short term tactic.)

In addition, historians started interpreting the Cold War in new ways with the release of information from the former communist countries and China. It now appeared that the Cold War had not only been a struggle for power, although it was that, but it had also been a struggle between socio-economic and political systems and the ideologies that sustained them.17 Such authors were careful to avoid an ideational determinism such as dominated some early traditional histories of the Cold War, but materialist determinism no longer held sway as it had earlier.

This intellectual ferment was accompanied by international governmental action promoting market democracies at a perhaps unprecedented level. But Smith portrays this development as a mostly if not exclusively American “pathology.” In fact, it was a global phenomenon supported by many older and new liberal states. It cannot, therefore, be seen as an American “pathology” alone.

For example, Smith barely discusses efforts by other liberal and even semi-liberal nations to foster liberalized governance and market economies, which have also had mixed yet real results. The European Union has been active in both Africa and Asia in this regard, especially since the end of the Cold War, and sent troops to the former Yugoslavia to promote democracy and stop the bloodshed.18 NATO has troops in Afghanistan, a prime source of Muslim anger. Although they have not intervened elsewhere militarily, the European policies are based on the assumption of the universality of liberal values. France has unilaterally intervened militarily in Africa several times since 1990, without a peep


from the UN, and often to maintain a given government. Is France “pathological” too? Was the primarily Australian military intervention in East Timor in 1999, though under UN auspices (and which could not have been undertaken without U.S. logistical support), “pathological”? It certainly got radical Islamists angry: one of the 2002 Bali bombers mentioned East Timor as one reason for the bombing attack in that resort area when appearing in court.

This question of Muslim views of the West is part of a larger debate over whether Muslims hate the U.S. because of our policies or our principles. Smith strongly sides with the former position. But a systematic examination of the public statements and other evidence of the Islamist radicals’ viewpoint demonstrates that they hate us for both our policies and principles, as they see them as directly interrelated. They hate and fear our values as much as our power. It is curious that Smith – correctly in my view – takes ideas in the U.S. so seriously, but oddly has so little to say about the ideas of our adversaries.

International organizations have also been heavily involved in democracy promotion. As William Robinson noted in 1996:

Inter-governmental organizations such as the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the European Economic Community established “democracy units” whose functions ranged from local assistance for elections to mechanisms for coordinated international diplomatic pressures against states that threatened to relapse from polyarchic to authoritarian governments. The multilateral lending agencies, including the IMF and the World Bank, have proposed making multilateral aid, bilateral aid, and access to international financial markets in general conditional upon a polyarchic system in the recipient country.

More recently, Ibrahim Zaid, the Malaysian head of the Inter-parliamentary caucus of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), was quoted as saying about the unrest in Myanmar (formerly Burma):

Mr Ibrahim said ASEAN member countries used to said [sic] let Myanmar sort its own problems by themselves.

He said: “Now they have,[sic] you cannot just stand by. You cannot just wait for another massacre, another round of killings, and then we start talking about diplomacy again. This is 20 years overdue.


“I think ASEAN must do something immediately, fly in ministers to talk things over, bring in all the attention of the world community to this problem.”21

Thousands protested in the streets of Manila, Jakarta, Taibei, and Kuala Lumpur to demand liberalization of the Myanmar regime.22 To lay all this complementary political activity - at bilateral, multilateral, and international institutional levels - at the feet of American liberal “pathology” and disrespect for sovereignty is simply untenable. Are we discussing a zeitgeist or a “pathological” delusion? Smith follows Fukuyama’s change of heart and comes out strongly against “voluntarism.” But it has taken a lot of voluntarism at many levels to nurture the movements toward democracy on a global scale. Regardless how one feels about the war in Iraq, it should not be used as an excuse to undermine ongoing voluntarist efforts in other realms. One can attack the means being used and still support the ends and alternative means. Indeed, unlike the Realist view, I believe that is Smith’s position. But that would entail putting the Iraq War in perspective, something he does not do in this book.

Moreover, as Amartya Sen has noted democracy is not as quintessentially Western as Smith and others like to believe:

The Western world does not have any proprietary right over democratic ideas, and so the frequently aired debate on whether or not to “impose” democracy on the non-Western world is itself partly a reflection of Western arrogance.

In his autobiography, Long Walk to Freedom, Nelson Mandela describes how influenced he was, as a young boy, by seeing the democratic nature of the proceedings of the local meetings that were held in his African home town:

“Everyone who wanted to speak did so. It was democracy in its purest form. There may have been a hierarchy of importance among the speakers, but everyone was heard, chief and subject, warrior and medicine man, shopkeeper and farmer, landowner and laborer.”

Mandela’s quest for democracy and freedom did not emerge from any Western “imposition.” The integration of the importance of democracy in the human development approach is a reassertion of the relevance of different elements of human history.23


23 Amartya Sen, “What is it Like to be a Human Being?,” Third Forum on Human Development, Cultural Identity, Democracy, and Global Equity, Paris, France (January 17, 2005), p. 5, at:
We are often told that liberalism has no philosophical basis in the non-Western world. Liberalism had reasonably wide appeal in the non-Western world in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and therefore has historical roots in those areas that are sometimes overlooked. Often borrowed from Western concepts, the ideas were adapted to local conditions and cultural sensitivities, but should be considered liberal nonetheless. In the Middle East, where we are often told there is no liberal tradition, Albert Hourani tells us of:

...[An] Islamic ‘reformism’ which was formulated by Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida: Islamic because it stood for a re-assertion of the unique and perfect truth of Islam, but reformist in that it aimed at reviving what it conceived to be certain neglected elements in the Islamic tradition. [Emphases added.] But this revival took place under the stimulus of European liberal thought, and led to a gradual reinterpretation of Islamic concepts so as to make them equivalent to the guiding principles of European thought of the time: Ibn Khaldun’s ‘umran gradually turned into Guizot’s ‘civilization’, the maslaha of the Maliki jurists and Ibn Taymiyya into the ‘utility’ of John Stuart Mill, the ijima` of Islamic jurisprudence into the ‘public opinion’ of democratic theory, and ‘those who bind and loose’ into members of parliament.24

One should remember that much of this theorizing took place under the Ottomans, not the Western imperialists. It was often identified with nationalism, as in Egypt, but was also ‘liberal in the sense that it thought the welfare of society to be constituted by that of individuals, and the duty of government to be the protection of freedom, above all the freedom of the individual to fulfil [sic] himself and so to create true civilization.’25 This form of liberalism was in competition with other forms of thought, and did not win out. Similar intellectual and political movements took place in China and Japan.26 Few remember today that John Dewey and Bertrand Russell, among many others, were invited by Chinese liberals to teach in China in the 1920s. The global history of liberalism has yet to be written.


25 Ibid., p. 344.

What went wrong? This is a complicated question, but generally the rampant imperialism of the late 19th century convinced many non-Western liberals that the beautiful ideas of the liberal world view were just words. Thus Ghandi’s wry comment when asked what he thought about Western Civilization: “I think it would be a good idea.” China tried to fend off the imperialists. Japan decided to stop emulating Western ideas and start emulating their behavior instead. As Japanese liberal-turned-antiliberal Fukuzawa Yukichi put it:

> We cannot wait for our neighbor countries to become so civilized that all may combine together to make Asia progress. We must rather break out of the formation and behave in the same way as the civilized countries of the West are doing. ... We would do better to treat China and Korea in the same way as do the western nations.  

That is pretty much what they did. We know what happened. After World War II, Japan was induced to adopt a liberal system and the contrast in its behavior could not be more stark.

So much of the failure of liberalism in the non-Western world was not because the ideas were not attractive, or had no philosophical basis, or were inherently at odds with old and venerable cultures, but because Western behavior was at such odds with those ideas when they acted in the non-Western world. It was not because there was too much liberalism displayed, but because there was too little. Though Smith dwells on anger over certain of America’s policies like Iraq (and, as noted, Afghanistan is just as resented in Muslim countries, in Indonesia for example) and support of Israel, he underplays the anger directed at the United States for the containment policy that the invasion replaced, which also cost many, many lives. Or the resentment over U.S. and Western backing of “unrepresentative” governments in the region throughout the Cold War. That anger has grown, but it did not begin with Iraq. And it is an anger that can be directed at both intervention and non-intervention.

It just may be that liberalism is getting a second chance in the era of globalization. Despite its many discontents, the globalization era is showing uneven but real progress in most major areas of development. I have noted earlier Smith’s citation of the dramatic increase in the number of democracies in the world and the efforts of liberal nations, including the U.S., and international organizations to hasten that development. Because of these efforts, global trends in armed conflicts, the number of displaced persons and refugees, and economic prosperity are all in a positive direction.  

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28 See the report of the Center for Systemic Peace of George Mason University, “Global Conflict trends,” (2006), at: [http://members.aol.com/cspgm%20/conflict.htm](http://members.aol.com/cspgm%20/conflict.htm). (Accessed 8/24/07)
base, that contentment could be a clear sign that the globalized economy is changing attitudes in parts of the Third World that seemed hopeless a generation ago when state socialism was in vogue. As the political theorist Uday Singh Mehta has written, “...the world we live in [today] is substantially molded by the triumph of a liberalism with its rationalistic certainties. Moreover, that liberalism remains the dominant framework from within which we imagine modifications on this world.”

Lastly, Smith makes some dubious historical and policy judgments without adequate evidence or even argumentation. He repeats the argument that he made in America’s Mission that American interventions in Central America and the Caribbean in the 1910s and 1920s only led to the rise of tyrants such as the Trujillo and Somoza families (p. 64). But Samuel Huntington has shown that the rise of those dictators – and Batista in Cuba - correlates with the anti-interventionist policies of FDR, not the interventions of the earlier period. As he puts it, the non-intervention of the 1930s was a time of the Good Neighbor and the Bad Tyrant.

Smith labels Iraq “a conflict that has benefited no one involved in it” (p. xxxviii.) Iraq is a tough situation, and has been bungled from the beginning, but surely the Kurds would disagree with this statement, and the “swamp Arabs,” and perhaps some of those who were destined for the wood chippers. When calculating the costs of the Iraq War one must factor in the reasonably estimated costs of containment and letting Saddam stay in power also. That might add some perspective.

Smith also does not seem to recognize that there were changes in attitudes towards democracy promotion within administrations as well as among them. He lauds Ronald Reagan’s consistent promotion of democracy, but one of the first things Reagan did as president, on his first day in office, was to tell the South Koreans that he would not pressure them for reforms as had Jimmy Carter. It was only after the successful removal of his old friend Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines in 1986 that Reagan consistently moved to foster democracy, and did so successfully. Eisenhower only became a reformer after about 1958. Kennedy started off a reformer but backed off with the spate of military coups in Latin America (but he did not back off in Vietnam, South Korea, or Iran.) American presidents have attempted to reform the world when they think they can do so quickly and easily, and become constrained when they find out they cannot. Constraint does not work very well either, and domestic and international pressures tend to lead to new periods of reformism over time.


30 Huntington, American Politics, p. 251.

Smith makes the same mistake with the Bush administration. He dates the president’s reformism from his inauguration, (p. 6) and even before. I have seen no persuasive evidence, and Smith presents none, that Bush, Cheney, or any other major figure in the administration was pushing a generalized democratic reform program prior to 9/11. In fact, there was much talk against nation-building and an unsuccessful attempt to withdraw from Kosovo over the objections of the Europeans. The ideas that were utilized to shape what became the Bush Doctrine may have been floating around, but they became policy only after 9/11 not when George W. Bush took office. Smith’s speculation about Bush wanting to demonstrate “leadership” by democracy promotion from the beginning of his administration does not hold up to scrutiny. It is also useful to note that the president has put his call for universal liberalism in the time frame of generations.

Other scholars have seen more general continuities in the promotion of democracy between the Clinton and Bush administrations than Smith does; 32 Clinton used force in Kosovo, Haiti, and Somalia; Bush in Afghanistan and Iraq. There is a large difference in scope and magnitude of the interventions, to be sure, but they were all in part attempts to spread democracy through the use of force nonetheless.

Smith sees liberalism having gone through various stages until it culminated in its current imperial “pathology.” But liberalism has always had this impulse inherent in its fundamental ideational structure, which is loaded with Enlightenment universals. In his excellent treatment of liberal British thought and the British Empire, Uday Singh Mehta explains the nature of liberal thought:

Liberal theoretical claims typically tend to be transhistorical, transcultural, and most certainly transracial. The declared and ostensible referent of liberal principles is quite literally a constituency with no delimiting boundary: that of all humankind. The political rights that it articulates and defends, the institutions such as laws, representation, contract all have their justification in a characterization of human beings that eschews names, social status, ethnic background, gender, and race.

In the mere fact of its universality, liberalism is not unique. Indeed, the quest for universal principles and cognate institutions attends political philosophy from its Greek inception. But whereas Plato grounds universal claims in a transcendent ontology, liberal universalism stems from almost the opposite, what one might call a philosophical anthropology. What I mean by this is that the universal claims can be

made because they derive from certain characteristics that are common to all human beings.\textsuperscript{33}

These universals cannot be easily overlooked if one considers oneself a liberal. There can be no human rights without accepting that they eventually will apply everywhere. They are, says Mehta, "broad epistemological and normative commitments" to liberals.\textsuperscript{34} This does not lead inexorably to imperialism, though it has at times done so in the past. As Mehta puts it, "... I do not claim that liberalism must be imperialistic, only that the urge is internal to it."\textsuperscript{35}

Liberals would do well to pay heed to Smith's warnings about going too far, too fast, and beware of the imperial temptation. But he overplays his intellectual hand here, in effect throwing out the baby, the bathwater, and the tub, while denying that he is doing so. My reading of history is that since World War II, when the liberal countries, led by the United States, are proactive in the promotion of liberal values things get better for the world incrementally, in fits and starts and steps in all directions, but consistently. International organizations become invigorated and more active. When they are apathetic, demoralized and reactive, things get considerably worse and many people die or are placed in misery. There are costs to liberal inaction also, an issue Smith barely touches upon, and they can be huge. The work of R.J. Rummell suggests that by a six-to-one ratio more people are killed by their own governments than by interstate wars.\textsuperscript{36} Modern liberal states are the best means for preventing this disgraceful bloodshed, though by no means perfect. Democracy promotion and globalization of the world's economies should continue, with added patience and humility and by means short of war if at all possible. Genocides as in the Sudan should be stopped by military action if necessary. If not, we will remain two, three, or four worlds in terms of socio-economic reality and fundamental liberty. Many, many will suffer and die needlessly. And I wonder what St. Peter will say about that.

\textsuperscript{33} Mehta, \textit{Liberalism and Empire}, pp. 51-52.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., p. 25.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., p. 20.

\textsuperscript{36} See his web page, “Freedom, Democide, War,” at: http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/ (Accessed 8/30/07)
More than forty years ago, Hans J. Morgenthau complained that too much of what passes for cutting edge research in political science in the United States hides in “the trivial, the formal, the methodological, the purely theoretical, the remotely historical—in short, the politically irrelevant.”¹ Since then, it has become routine for prominent political scientists in international relations (IR) and comparative politics subfields to call for greater “policy relevance” in the development of research questions and the construction of theories or to criticize the widening gap between the career incentives of the academy and the day-to-day needs of policymakers. This is particularly true among IR scholars who specialize in security studies and United States foreign policy.²

Tony Smith’s *Pact with the Devil* is a provocative book that illustrates how scholarship in the IR and comparative politics, as well as in field of international law, can actually impact the content (if not the actual conduct) of foreign policy. Unfortunately, that contribution has led the United States into its worst foreign policy debacle since the Vietnam War. Smith begins the book with a confession, “When I arrive at

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the Pearly Gates, the question from Saint Peter I most fear will be how, given the evidence from the war in Iraq, I myself could have been so naïve as to put so much intellectual stock into supporting Liberal Democratic Internationalism...(ix).” His examination of the intellectual origins of the Bush Doctrine confirms the continued relevance of two old sayings. The first, attributed to figures ranging from Samuel Johnson to Saint Francis de Sales, is “the road to hell is paved with good intentions.” The second is from the Book of Proverbs, 16:18 (NRSV): “Pride goes before destruction and a haughty spirit before the fall.”

In the months following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the George W. Bush administration articulated a bold grand strategy in a series of presidential speeches culminating in the release of the National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) in September 2002. To effectively confront new dangers emerging from the intersection of jihadist radicalism and technology, President Bush said in his June 2002 commencement address at U.S. Military Academy, America must reject moral relativism, boldly side with the forces of individual liberty, and, if necessary, “preempt” (that is, initiate preventive wars against) states and terrorist groups suspected of possessing or seeking to acquire WMD. It must use its tremendous military and economic power, not just to defend the “Free World” as it did during the Cold War, but instead to expand that “zone of liberty” around the world.

Contrary to conventional wisdom which attributes the so-called Bush Doctrine and the ensuing Iraq war exclusively to the neoconservatives in the Bush administration and on the staffs of The Weekly Standard and the American Enterprise Institute, Smith argues that many of the doctrine’s core elements originated with liberal (or neoliberal) internationalist scholars and activists. Specifically, he identifies three strands of neoliberal IR theory and ideology in the 1990s and 2000s that directly influenced the Bush Doctrine: (1) the democratic peace literature and related efforts to elevate liberal theories of international relations to status of empirical laws; (2) philosophical and international legal scholarship on sovereignty; and (3) comparative political analysis on democratic and economic transitions.

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Of course, the Bush administration sold the 2003 Iraq invasion to the Congress and the American people as a preventive war—a conflict ostensibly launched to prevent Saddam Hussein from acquiring or reconstituting weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However, from the outset, Bush and others were quite clear that “Operation Iraqi Freedom” had grander objectives. By toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime and turning Iraq into a liberal democracy, the U.S. could fundamentally transform state-society relations in the Arab world, eliminate the sources of jihadist terrorism, send a message to other rogue states, and consolidate America’s hegemonic position in the international system. Moreover, the risks of such an undertaking would be relatively low and the benefits would be quite high. Each of those lofty war aims can be directly traced to writings of self-identified liberals in the fields of IR and comparative politics subfields of political science, international law, and journalism in the previous decade.

According to Smith, “neoliberals were the functional equivalent for the Democratic Party of the neoconservatives within the Republican Party, a pro-war faction able to articulate in seemingly persuasive fashion why America’s moment of unrivaled power meant embracing a mission that would echo through the ages for its vision and its courage (p. xvii).” Therefore, prominent liberal scholars such as Larry Diamond, Michael Doyle, Bruce Russett, John Oneal, Paul Berman, Ann-Marie Slaughter, and Andrew Moravcsik, and as well as pundits such as Thomas Friedman, are just as culpable for the ongoing Iraq war as neoconservatives such as Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Lewis “Scooter” Libby, Richard Perle, William Kristol, Robert Kagan, Frank Gaffney, Charles Krauthammer, and James Woolsey. For Smith, the Bush Doctrine is a pact with the devil in two respects: The U.S. succumbed to the temptation to exploit its overwhelming military superiority and the ideological primacy of liberal democracy and market capitalism to dominate the international system for generations to come. And perhaps more tragically, Smith’s fellow liberal internationalists consummated an “unholy” union with the neoconservatives in order to influence the direction of U.S. foreign policy.

In the interests of full disclosure, let me make two admissions before continuing. First and most obviously, Smith and I have been departmental colleagues for the past decade. We have talked frequently about this book project since its inception. I provided comments on several draft chapters and on the complete manuscript. He acknowledges me in the preface as one of several long-time friends (the others being historians Ronald Steel and David Fromkin) who “never had the slightest truck with liberal internationalism” and who saw the “conceits and misuse of this ideology within months of 9/11 (p. xviii).” Therefore, unlike the other contributors to this roundtable, I cannot purport to offer a “detached” scholarly review of A Pact with the Devil.

Second, although Smith and I are colleagues, we have always “agreed to disagree” about international relations theory and the proper role of power versus principle in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. His 1994 book, America’s Mission makes that case that the promotion of liberal democracy aboard has been a recurrent feature of U.S. foreign policy since the
presidency of Woodrow Wilson and efforts to promote democratic governance in other countries have generally enhanced U.S. national security. As a political realist, I have always been deeply skeptical of the sweeping empirical and theoretical claims made by liberal international relations scholars, especially by proponents of the liberal democratic peace thesis and liberal institutionalism.

In the remainder of this review, I advance a single argument about A Pact with the Devil. Despite his stated desire to rescue Wilsonian internationalism from its own excesses Smith, in effect, advances a quintessentially “realist” critique of recent U.S. foreign policy.

Smith argues that, in the wake of the Cold War and the triumph of liberal democracy and capitalism in Eastern and Central Europe, South Africa, and elsewhere, self-described liberal scholars and activists began to adopt a more militant posture in world affairs toward democracy promotion and the protection of human rights. The United States, flush with an overwhelming preponderance of power and yet threatened by the rise of jihadist terrorism after 2001, thus succumbed to the temptations of pursuing hubristic and utopian grand strategic aims and over-estimating the efficacy of military force and the universal appeal of its own ideology. On this point, many realists would agree.

For the past sixty years, realist scholars and pundits have repeatedly warned against what they perceive to be the idealistic impulses in U.S. foreign policy. For example, Morgenthau, while appreciating the mobilization potential of nationalism and ideology, feared the Truman administrations failed to see the Cold War with the Soviet Union as “not a struggle between good and evil, truth and falsehood, but of power with power.” George P. Kennan, the father of containment, observed, “A good deal of our [the United States’] trouble seems to have stemmed from the extent to which the executive has felt itself behold to...what we might call the erratic and subjective nature of public reaction to foreign-policy questions,” in particular the prevalence of the “legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems.” It is no accident that three of the earliest and most vocal critics of the Vietnam War and the Kennedy and Johnson administrations’ “nation building” exercise in South Vietnam were Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Kenneth Waltz. Even Henry Kissinger, a realist who supported the Vietnam War (who escalated the level of U.S. military involvement during his tenure as President Richard Nixon’s national security adviser), later


8 For a recent analysis of Morgenthau, Niebuhr, and Waltz’s opposition to the Vietnam War see Campbell Craig, Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Morgenthau, Niebuhr, and Waltz (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).
lamented, “...America’s journey in international politics is the triumph of faith over experience.” Waltz was extremely critical of the Clinton administration’s tendency to preach to China and Russia about the importance of democracy and human rights, especially given the fact that those great powers already had strong incentives to balance against the United States. More recently, Christopher Layne observed, “…the inclination to universalize liberal democracy puts the United States on a collision course with others who ideologies, institutions, and values differ from America’s...” Likewise, it is no accident that the earliest and most vocal critics of the Bush Doctrine and the Iraq adventure were John J. Mearsheimer, Stephen M. Walt, and Andrew Bacevich.

Successive generations of American realists have recognized that when different administrations (both Republican and Democratic) embark upon campaigns to spread democratic governance to particular states or preach about the universal values of freedom and democracy they invariably expose the United States to what Smith’s and my mutual colleague, Kelly Greenhill, calls hypocrisy costs, “symbolic political costs that can arise when there exists a gap between one’s normative and juridical commitments and one’s demonstrated actions.”

The truth is that the United States has never and will never hold all states accountable to the same standards of international and domestic conduct. Various administrations’ categorization of other countries as fellow liberal democracies or autocracies, whether of the Communist, Islamist, fascist, absolute monarchist, or a military dictatorship variety, tends to change whenever U.S. strategic or economic interests are at stake. It is not surprising that Woodrow Wilson, who as a young political science professor in the 1890s hailed Wilhelmine Germany as model constitutional state, would as later as president come to identify it as the principle threat to international stability and American interests after 1915. Although Wilson took the country into World War I pledging to make the “world safe for democracy” and to end balance-of-power politics, his decision was perfectly consistent with (and explicable through) realism.

Throughout the Cold War, the liberal internationalist rhetoric of Democratic and Republican administrations alike was contradicted by their willingness to find common cause with autocratic regimes in the struggle against the Soviet Union and Communism.

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Washington’s penchant for overthrowing democratically elected (but ideologically unacceptable) regimes in Iran, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Chile, and elsewhere further undermined its credibility. Likewise, the Bush administration’s simultaneous proclamation of a “democracy agenda” in the Middle East in 2005-2006 and its continued support for autocratic rulers such as President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, and President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt are illustrative of hypocrisy costs. Regardless of whether Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, former Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy Karen Hughes, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and the other current or former administration officials actually believe their rhetoric about democracy promotion and the benign motives for U.S. policy, the fact is, hardly anyone in the Middle East or elsewhere does. If the administration’s global war on terror (or more specifically, if its war in Iraq) is supposed to a contest for the “hearts and minds” of Islamic world, the U.S. is already losing.

Smith, however, challenges the view that the Bush Doctrine is simply an updated version of Wilsonian internationalism. To make the case that the doctrine and the role that neoliberal thought played in its formulation represented a radical departure from the past he traces the evolution of liberal internationalism from the War of Independence to the present. He posits five stages in the evolution of liberal ideology: pre-classical (from 1782 to the Spanish-American War), classic (the presidency of Woodrow Wilson), hegemonic (from the defeat of Nazi Germany until the collapse of the Soviet Union), imperialist (academic theory through the articulation of the Bush Doctrine in 2002), and fundamentalist (from 2002 to the present). The pre-classical, classic, and even the hegemonic incarnations of liberal internationalism all shared common assumptions about the United States’ unique role as the first constitutional republic since antiquity, the superiority of liberal democracy to other forms of government, and the shared interests and pacific relations among liberal democracies. However, these incarnations were also cognizant of the limits of U.S. military and economic power. The liberal imperialist phase differs from its predecessors in both the scope of its ambitions and assumptions about the relative ease of democratic transitions. Finally, liberal fundamentalism completely abandons the caution about the ease of democratic transitions and the efficacy of U.S. military power found in previous incarnations. It is global in scope and unlimited in its ambition.

At the same time, Smith admits that it would not have been possible for the U.S. to pursue foreign policies consistent with liberal imperialism, let alone liberal fundamentalism, before the shift from a bipolar to a unipolar international system in 1989-90. For all of the rhetorical excesses and “good intentions” of successive administrations, the fact remains that the multipolar and bipolar international systems of the twentieth century did not afford the United States the luxury to actually pursue such ambitious and lofty aims. Dealing with the threats posed by Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, Japan, and later the Soviet Union always took priority. When push came to shove, as it often did, Realpolitik considerations always took priority over Idealpolitik. Before and during the world wars and throughout the Cold War, anticipated shifts in the balance-of-power, uncertainty about other states’ future intentions, and exogenous shocks tended to slap even the most
idealistic policymakers in Washington back to reality. After the Cold War, however, the United States's overwhelming preponderance of power and the absence of a existential great power threat insulated policymakers from the most dire consequence of pursuing hubristic and short-sided foreign policies—namely, the risk of inadvertent escalation to great power war. Unfortunately for the long-term interests of the United States (and perhaps the rest of the world), there are few signs that the Iraq debacle has slapped the idealists of both the liberal internationalist and the neoconservative persuasion back to reality.

Let me conclude with the following observations. *A Pact with the Devil* is an excellent book that should be required reading for IR and comparative politics scholars, as well as historians of U.S. foreign relations. Smith delivers a devastating indictment of the Bush Doctrine and the intellectual contribution of liberal scholars to it. This book provides both an intellectual history of the Bush Doctrine and the follies of academy in the decade after the Cold War. It has already generated tremendous controversy because the author, a self-described Wilsonian internationalist, has exposed both the hubris of his intellectual brethren and the inherent danger of their ideas.

In raising the above critique, I am not claiming that Smith has become a realist; a charge he would most vigorously reject. Nor do I wish to diminish the originality of his analysis. Indeed, only a scholar as versed in liberal internationalism as Smith could deliver such a devastating indictment of its excesses. However, I will close by saying that in writing *A Pact with Devil*, Smith has moved far closer to my conception of international relations and U.S. foreign policy than he might care to admit.
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this H-Diplo electronic Roundtable. Before taking up the points made by individual reviewers good enough to give serious consideration to my book *A Pact with the Devil: Washington's Bid for World Supremacy and the Betrayal of the American Promise*, let me make some preliminary observations.

My book is on the intellectual origins of the American decision to invade Iraq, ideas which were rather fully formed, I maintain, by the late 1990s. It took the characters in top policy-making decisions in the Bush administration and the attack of 9/11 to convert these ideas in to public policy, but the Bush Doctrine was not quickly thought up after the terrorist attack. Rather, it existed in all its dimensions before George W. Bush ever entered the White House, indeed before he was a candidate for the presidency.

Put differently, the Bush Doctrine (especially as laid out in the National Security Strategy of September 2002, but also as argued in numerous presidential statements from June 2002 and still today) was the most ideologically complex presidential doctrine ever issued. And it was momentous in its consequences, as the attack on Iraq reveals. Hence understanding the logic of this framework for foreign policy is critical if we are to understand why the invasion occurred and how we should think about the future of America in the world in light of this disastrous undertaking.

Robert Jervis is quite right, then, to call my book a contribution to intellectual history, more specifically to the way in which liberal internationalism, or Wilsonianism, as an ideology changed over time and especially after the implosion of the Soviet empire and Union between 1989 and 1991. Liberal internationalism was already robust, to be sure, for the presidency of Ronald Reagan had made it a bipartisan consensus, but it took victory in the Cold War (along with the Gulf War in 1991) for it to become persuasive that it was not so much the degree of power the U.S. possessed that caused it to triumph so much as the style of its power—its appeal to democratic governments and open economies that worked to give it strength across so many dimensions.
Ideology has always been interesting to me. In my first book on French decolonization, *The French Stake in Algeria* (Cornell, 1978), I argued for the existence of a “colonial consensus” that made withdrawal from Indochina and Algeria difficult for Paris. That is, the problems of the French Fourth Republic did not come from its divisions, as we so often heard, but more from its unity (that itself could be traced by most clearly to the thinking of Charles de Gaulle). In a later book, *Thinking Like A Communist: State and Legitimacy in the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba* (Norton, 1987), I looked at the origins and evolution of the idea of the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” the founding argument for the legitimacy of single party rule under communism. The ways ideas come to be structured political arguments was also basic to my books *America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy* (Princeton, 1994), and *Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy*. (Harvard, 2000).

In *America’s Mission* and a series of articles I published on liberal internationalism, I became aware of the ideological cast of Wilsonianism. Still, in comparison with Marxism-Leninism, liberal internationalism was a somewhat thin affair (we might be thankful for that) during the Cold War years. This problem was to be rectified in the 1990s with the collapse of the Soviet Union. As I was among the first to note, Washington’s victory over Moscow was also the triumph of liberal internationalism over proletarian internationalism. That is, the Cold War had been an ideological, as well as a state-centered, struggle, a secular war of religions, if you will.

What then occurred might well have been predicted: their victory in hand, liberal internationalists began to make greater and greater claims for their ideas, formulating them in an increasingly ideological fashion and looking for state power to put them in to practice. While generally sympathetic to liberalism in world affairs, I was nonetheless somewhat taken aback by the self-confidence liberal theory came to acquire. What I was even less prepared for was the way neoconservatives picked up on neoliberal thinking in the late 1990s, the ultimate result being the intellectual origins of the Bush Doctrine well before George W. Bush himself became America’s 43rd president. The marriage of first cousins—neoconservatism and neoliberalism—remains with us today in both parties, among the Democrats as among the Republicans. One needs only look at the many publications of the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) of the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) to see a group of liberal intellectuals (including Anne-Marie Slaughter, Kenneth Pollack, Larry Diamond and a host of others) whose differences with the neoconservatives are relatively minor.

Where these ideas came from, how they came to be combined in what is called the Bush Doctrine, and what they meant—and still mean—for American foreign policy is the subject of my book.

Before moving to a consideration of the specific points made by each person good enough to submit a review, let me make a comment general to them all. Jeff Taliaferro wonders if I am not more distant from liberal internationalism now than I realize I am. Bruce Kuklick
and Doug Macdonald accuse me of what we might call a “flip flop,” after the way the term was applied to John Kerry. That is, I used to be a starry-eyed liberal but am now totally opposed to the doctrine, as if I were a lapsed communist contributing my thoughts to *The God That Failed*.

In fact, I was never naïve as to the shortcomings of liberal internationalism—my book *America’s Mission* is clear that Wilson made a mess of his interventions in the Caribbean and that Guatemala, Iran, and Vietnam were mistakes of the first order from the 1950s to the 1970s. And these days, I still support a progressive American foreign policy with support for human rights and democracy promotion where this country can be effective without being imperialistic.

What has changed, however, is not so much me as Wilsonianism itself. As I tried to lay out in detail in the book, an evolution set in after the collapse of Soviet communism whereby political theorists in a variety of fields—international relations theory, comparative political theory, and international jurisprudence—made claims for liberal internationalism of a sort never before entertained. The result was that superpower America now had a super-ideology to warrant its expansive ambitions. Perhaps the worm had always been in the fruit, but now the worm was destroying the fruit.

A final remark. Professors Kuklick and Macdonald appear to think that writing intellectual history of this sort is not so demanding as doing more complex historical investigations. They have kinder things to say, as a result, for *America’s Mission* than for the volume under review. In fact, writing *A Pact with the Devil* was a formidable challenge. It required seeing the Bush Doctrine for what it was—not boiler plate rhetoric but a considered, complex, and highly dangerous formulation of Washington’s intentions, something neither Kuklick nor Macdonald appears to understand as terribly important in and of itself. However, tracking the structure of this Doctrine required seeing the emergence of an ideological doctrine from disparate sources in a series of highly charged theoretical literatures that had been produced by neoliberal scholars many of whom I knew.

To put it mildly, most of these neolibs have not been happy with the book. Their strongest charge is that the composite portrait drawn of them is unfair; that the neoconservatives brought all of these ideas together in to a single ideology, but not them. My reply is that they were all part of a collective conscience, a “spirit of the times” or *zeitgeist*, that contributed to the decision to invade Iraq by providing critical building blocks to the Bush Doctrine. More, many of these liberal intellectuals were players in the PPI or the DLC. They cannot so easily wash their hands of their support for the Bush Doctrine for the only substantive difference this group had with official Washington was their opposition to American “unilateralism” and their preference that American imperialism have multilateral support. The Bush Doctrine is a Wilsonian document, no doubt about it, but of a cast of thought impossible to imagine before the 1990s.
Macdonald seems aware of this at some level and so deplores my “accusatory tone” and references to “pathology,” a feeling Kuklick echoes with his statement that “when events recede into the past, their valence changes” so that he is “suspicious of the moralistic rush to judgment” in this book. Jervis is quite right to say that the liberals analyzed in the book feel that their ideas have been “distorted and defamed,” as several have written me in intemperate messages. But just as the press, the military, the clergy, and the CIA (among others) have some explaining to do, so do the intellectuals however much they might like to deny their involvement in the makings of this calamity. To his credit, Taliaferro understands from the perspective of realist theory and analysis the tragedy of the human condition and the enormity of what the Bush Doctrine has brought into being. Jervis, too, alludes constantly to the “corrupting” influence of unaccountable power. The damage done has not only been to Iraq and our relations with the Muslim world. Domestically, with the rise of an imperial presidency, and internationally, as the repercussions of the America defeat play themselves out not only in the Middle East but also in South Asia (whither Pakistan?), East Asia (whither China?), Europe (whither Russia?), and with energy and the environment, momentous questions that are going unaddressed because of a focus on the debacle in Iraq are with us on every side. The future grows darker by the day.

In over thirty years of publishing books and articles, I have never had a review of my work as perceptive as that provided in Robert Jervis’s essay. Not that he is without criticisms. But he has the message of the book exactly right: under the impulse of what today is called liberal internationalism, or Wilsonianism, the mainstream American foreign policy political tradition evolved over time from a largely progressive formulation of what the U.S. position should be in world affairs to a doctrine of progressive imperialism ideologically expressed by some clever center-left political scientists whose arguments ultimately became basic to the intellectual appeal of the Bush Doctrine.

As a result of this development, in the annals of presidential doctrines the Bush Doctrine figures among “the greats,” if by that we mean a framework for action that has had enormous consequences for the conduct of our country on the world stage. The jury is still out, of course, but we can certainly rank it already above the Reagan, Eisenhower, Carter, Monroe, or Nixon Doctrines, and historians may well come to place it on a par with the Truman Doctrine in terms of its consequence. If we consider Washington’s Farewell Address or Wilson’s Fourteen Points or FDR’s Atlantic Charter and the Declaration on Liberated Europe, the Bush Doctrine still remains a candidate of distinction for its historical importance. It is a powerful expression of American nationalism converted into an international mission. Its complex yet coherent reading of the past, present and future, combined with its attention to military, political, moral, economic and social issues is unprecedented among presidential doctrines. Here for the first time, the United States is unquestionably possessed of an ideological statement of its place in world history, whatever definition you choose to give to the word “ideology.” As a Weltanschauung, the Bush Doctrine has no peers and is destined to remain a subject of interest for generations to come. Its influence looms over the 2008 presidential race as it is endorsed by most
Republicans (and especially John McCain) and also by Democrats (especially Hillary Clinton).

Still, Jervis is quite right that those approaching the understanding of world affairs from other frameworks may not find the study of ideas in and of themselves to be very persuasive in explaining the course of human events. Marxists would point to class interest; realists to the calculus of power; religions of every stripe to the role of hubris in human affairs. I wholeheartedly agree. Although my book had as its focus the way a set of ideas came to justify a bid for world supremacy, I see no incompatibility between my view and those of others.

Thus, the Bush Doctrine's emphasis on open, integrated, deregulated world markets (not to speak of control over critical energy resources) certainly plays to the Marxist view of its origins in corporate America. As left analysts have maintained correctly for some time now, Washington's concern for promoting "democracy" is in practice all too often a code word for supporting regimes that will cooperate with an American dominated world order. However, Marxists might recall Marx's own emphasis on the need for ideological justification of class interest in *The German Ideology* and the development of this argument about a century later by Antonio Gramsci.

So far as realist insights are concerned, I am clear in book that I do not take the liberal internationalist argument at face value but as a mask to justify the expansion of American power. To be sure, Wilsonians like Anne-Marie Slaughter or Larry Diamond or John Lewis Gaddis surely believe in good faith what they say. In this respect, they are more naïve than most neoconservatives, although at times I find myself persuaded reading Robert Kagan, say, that he too genuinely, indeed passionately, believes what he is arguing. Or one might consider, as Paul Berman does in *Power and the Idealists*, the many foreigners (he does not talk about Tony Blair, however) who unreservedly backed the American invasion of Iraq, including the current French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner. Or again, even Thomas L. Friedman, usually referred to as our country's most influential foreign policy correspondent, probably really subscribed to the nonsense he for years published on an almost weekly basis. Still, the realist point that when a state acts it usually does so based on power calculations is one I do not dispute. Surely Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld along with the President are evidence of that. Probably Condoleezza Rice as well. And most neoconservatives, as they will readily agree, subscribe to realist principles of statecraft, the iron fist in the velvet glove of the Bush Doctrine.

My own position is somewhat closer to that subscribed to by all of the world religions with which I am familiar: that pride comes before the fall. Bucked up by victory in the Cold War (and in the Gulf War), self-righteous to a degree on the blessings of open markets, human rights and democratic government for world freedom, justice, prosperity and peace, and eager for personal advancement, neoliberals could make common cause with neoconservatives (the romance was cemented for most by joint opposition to Milosevic in the mid 1990s) and in doing so join up with Christian Jacksonians well represented by then
Texas governor George W. Bush (Michael Lind’s *Made in Texas* is excellent on this last point).

In a word, as I have always supported meshing together as many insights as possible from different theoretical positions, I accept Jervis’s point that those from families outside liberalism or constructivism (to which one might add feminism, as the macho component of the Bush Doctrine is glaringly apparent) may feel the essential well-springs of American action have not been adequately identified by my book. So be it. I do not dispute their insights but would only ask that they consider the role of pride in world affairs (something that can be for the good, of course) and the teachings about hubris that are as old as human thought. William Pfaff and Chalmers Johnson, two men whom I consider to be outstanding writers on our current condition but whom I unfortunately neglected to cite in my book, can give abundant examples alongside my own of the full range of difficulties engendered by the Bush Doctrine—in domestic affairs as well as foreign policy, and in areas apparently far removed from Iraq or the Middle East as South Asia, China, Russia, and the environment where the catastrophe of the American intervention in Iraq will have important consequences.

Jervis’s particular strength is that he is both a realist and a student of human psychology. Thus, he has always known that “ideas matter,” but he has always seen that blending ideas to emotions and interests is the key to telling the story. *Misperception* has been a special concern of his so that he naturally has gravitated to an interest in the Bush Doctrine, which he finds “deviating from any reasonable conception of self-interest,” “hard to explain by standard rational theories.”

As a realist who is also a psychologist, the Bush Doctrine is obviously a laboratory for Jervis’s thinking. “Material forces are not unimportant; the transformation of liberalism...was made possible by the growth of American power,” he writes. “But the uses to which this power was put was strongly influenced by the liberal worldview.” Moving from this, Jervis looks at the levels and the timing of different perspectives American leaders had after 9/11. In doing so he accords real importance to my argument that the intoxicating ideas of liberal peace and transition theories contributed to the formulation of the Bush Doctrine, but he looks for other factors as well.

I think Jervis is quite right in making such a nuanced suggestion and giving examples of how different personalities at different moments conceived or reconceived world politics, all the while operating under “the corrupting nature of power.” But he might want to step back from 9/11 to 11/9, that is to November 9, 1989, the date the Germans have selected to celebrate the fall of the Berlin Wall. Here was the period of triumph if ever there was one, here the moment when pride could be unbounded, here the historical marker that engendered the change in thinking among American liberal intellectuals as they reformulated American nationalism into a mission to democratize (and capitalize) the world. The bookmarks, then, of emotion, interest, and ideology would seem to run from 11/9 to 9/11—from the rise to the fall of America as the world’s superpower.
Jervis closes his discussion of the psychology of power by referring to Lord Acton's famous phrase about the corrupting influence of absolute power. In doing so he joins with the major thesis of my book, to wit that arrogance was at the origin of our failure, a story as old as history. Some of that arrogance originated in Texas among the macho, bible-thumping, gun-toting people I grew up with along with George W. Bush. Some of it came from the neoconservative thinking that can be traced back to a first generation in the late 1930s through the 1940s before it evolved in to what we know it to be today. But the strongest contribution to this new mood of progressive imperialism came, I would maintain, from the bien-pensant liberal internationalists of the center-left, a group that may very well move in to power after the elections of 2008. Jervis is quite right to be concerned, as am I, that despite the wide recognition that Iraq has been a disaster, “crusading liberalism” may move in to an even more vicious form should another terrorist attack occur and/or war with Iran develop. In the minds of these Wilsonians, it was not the Bush Doctrine itself that should be criticized but its operationalization by the Pentagon. In more competent hands, those of the neolibs gathered around the Democratic Party, the dream lives on.

Bruce Kuklick has two major criticisms. First, he insists that the imperialist worm was in the Wilsonian fruit from the beginning; it did not get put there only after the fall of the Soviet Union. But I agree. It was always part and parcel of the dream that America could reform the world, that in fact this country would engage in imperialist manipulations that contradicted what might be seen as its assumptions that were hypocritical (as in the case of Guatemala or Iran, for example), or naïve (as in the case of the Dominican Republic, say). I never thought the effort to push democracy abroad “has been an unalloyed good,” as he puts it. America’s Mission is clear on this point. I do not understand why I am accused of something I have manifestly criticized myself.

Still, the Wilsonian effort was not always either hypocritical or naïve. Take, for example, the Marshall Plan and European Union. The American contribution to European sanity and union may yet come unraveled, but it was based on essentially Wilsonian ideas that were able to bear fruit. The expansion of NATO, interventions in the Balkans or East Timor, a sense of affinity with Israel, Taiwan, or South Korea once democratized seem to me to fall in to the same category.

What is so disturbing to me about the period after 1991, however, is that liberal internationalism evolved in to a much more idealistic, utopian, and ideological direction than it had ever before possessed. It is thus the Wilsonianism of the Cold War years that I would defend against that of its children who after 1991 became intoxicated by its promise thanks to developments such as democratic peace theory, which bid fair to making liberal internationalism a theory of world affairs as potent as Marxism-Leninism once had been. But Kuklick will have none of this. Apparently liberal internationalism is all bunk or all valid. Any effort to see it more complexly is “a superficial version of diplomatic history.” Yet while it is quite true that Guatemala, Iran, and Vietnam show the vacuity of American talk about freedom, peace, and democracy, U.S. policy toward Western Europe and Japan
were far more progressive and positive. If that is having it both ways, better this than what
seems to me an insistence that it was always good or always hypocritical. The “superficial
version of diplomatic history” seems to me rather to be Kuklick’s for whom liberal
internationalism is always nay, nay or yea, yea, a simplistic point of view that I am
surprised to hear him endorse.

Kuklick’s second point expresses much doubt that intellectuals’ ideas have much bearing
on foreign policy. He would have it that political elites remain immune from what I call the
“food chain” of ideas that lead from academic ivory towers and their publications to public
policy makers. Obviously Kuklick’s argument is right on its face; policy-makers are
responding to such a complicated set of pressures and emotions that to single out
intellectuals alone would be a grievous error. Still, ideas matter, and the ideas that
undergird the Bush Doctrine are as sophisticated a set—to my mind a more complex and
coherent set—than any that has ever been pronounced “doctrinally” in the history of US
foreign policy. Are we then to think that ideas simply don’t matter in the conduct of
American foreign policy, that instead we should discuss biography or chance history or
interest defined solely in terms of power? To do this would be to deny world religions or
their secular equivalents—Marxism-Leninism for example—the ability to link up with
nationalism and move history.

Where did the ideas that launched the invasion of Iraq come from? Not from the minds of
Bush and company, to be sure, but from gifted Wilsonian academics, most of them to the
left of the Republican Party, then recast by neoconservatives into a frankly imperialist
doctrine. Had these ideas not existed, would the Bush Doctrine have had the heft it did in
domestic opinion? I doubt it. Of course the lies and spins about weapons of mass
destruction and al-Qaeda’s links to Saddam were important. But for an elite, more was
required. To explain the character of these deadly ideas—their imperial hubris—was the
intention of the book.

Kuklick dismisses the intellectual history of the Bush Doctrine, in favor it would seem of an
elite personality style and the trauma of 9/11, but only at his peril. Apparently for him,
ideas don’t matter. Yet if ever in the history of U.S. foreign policy an ideological stance has
mattered, it was in the Bush Doctrine. How can we discuss the invasion of Iraq without
invoking ideas? Has Kuklick tried to see the logic of the vision that makes the Bush
Doctrine such a compelling position, however flawed in fact it is? The failure to take the
Bush Doctrine seriously as an ideological pronouncement is the failure of Kuklick’s
argument. It also guarantees his inability to understand the debates that are now breaking
out in the 2008 election cycle as we ask what went wrong and how we might do things
differently.

Doug Macdonald also sees me as having “changed sides” with respect to the promises of
liberal internationalism. However, I still believe that liberal internationalism has had its
triumphs consonant with Enlightenment hopes in the spread of reason and freedom. I
remain convinced that human rights matter morally and can have positive benefits for
America in world affairs. But once the 1990s arrived in earnest, and Wilsonian scholars began to polish their conceptual tools, a danger became more manifest that Wilsonianism could be an imperialist doctrine. During the Cold War, in the struggle with Marxism-Leninism, many American intellectuals had longed for themselves to have a doctrine so strong, so authoritative, and ultimately so redemptive as that of their opponents. Now their moment had arrived.

Where I once saw “America the Good,” he asserts, now I see “America the Demented.” But I never saw America as wholly good—my book America's Mission to which he refers makes it clear that I thought US interventions in Guatemala, Iran, and Vietnam were indefensible in any terms, and certainly not from a Wilsonian position. Nor did I fail to see that American policy toward the Dominican Republic, whether under Wilson or Johnson, was other than a failure. Macdonald has set up a straw horse, then set it afire.

More, it wasn't so much that I changed sides as that liberal internationalism did in the 1990s, when it became possessed of notions like “democratic peace theory” and so became more ideological and imperialist than ever before in its history. In a chapter devoted to the evolution of liberal theory wherein I give it five historical stages, I tried to make this clear. It is not I who am “singing a different song” but Wilsonian theory and practice as it evolved after the Cold War. A major point of the book, which Macdonald apparently missed, was the evolution of theory over time with special emphasis on the 1990s.

Macdonald appears to believe that being polemical is inappropriate for academic exchanges (unless, apparently, like him, one can be polemically anti-polemical). Surely he is correct when it comes to those who sling mud or fail to see nuance and detail. But in the case of contemporary liberal internationalism, we are confronted with an ideology that has been made flesh in the invasion of Iraq, with threats now against Iran. The Bush Doctrine, that is, is an ideological pronouncement without parallel in American history. Nuance is off the table; ideas have been forged in to an instrument of war. The result is that polemic against the ideas so assembled is appropriate, indeed necessary, in my opinion. That Macdonald would charge me with being “downright accusatory” when talking of the likes of Larry Diamond or Thomas Friedman might be seen as a compliment, not as a put down. He even cites opinion surveys to show how benighted the Muslims of the world remain with respect to 9/11, as if this were relevant to the case at hand. It only can be, as I see it, if Macdonald is still saluting American benevolence in trying to free them from what he calls their “appalling ignorance, aided and abetted...by their illiberal regimes.” Apparently Macdonald is still signing on to the goal of liberating the Muslims with armed force. He doesn't use the word “pathological” to describe the Muslim world, but there are certainly many who have who supported the invasion.

Take Macdonald’s criticism that while I oppose the attack on Saddam in the name of liberal internationalism, I support the attack on Milosevic on these very terms, or nearly. Yet surely motive and situation matter. It was one thing to attack Serbia, with the backing of NATO and the idea of bringing a modicum of human rights and democracy to the Balkans,
and to attack Saddam in a far more difficult circumstances and with the ultimate ambition of redeeming the “Broader Middle East” and perhaps Russia and China thereafter. The notion that one can be selective in supporting a liberal policy strikes me as commonsensical. Milosevic was not Saddam, hence policy could be liberal in the first but not in the second. This is an elementary distinction.

What Macdonald fails to see is the difference in liberal internationalism (including democracy promotion) as a set of values and the adoption of this position as an imperialist standard by the Bush Doctrine. So he finds democracy an appealing doctrine nearly everywhere but then seems bothered that someone criticizes its appropriation for a progressive war.

That democracy promotion has in most instances degenerated into an arm of American imperialism through the NED or AID seems to me to be evident. That it need not be so everywhere—as in some of the instances Macdonald cites—does not strike me as surprising. Like him, I endorse the help brought to Africa or East Timor by outsiders concerned that peoples there who suffer from oppression or anarchy find a better life. And I agree that democracy may have a universal appeal, as his references to Mandela, among others, indicates. Yet to think that all efforts to create such political regimes will be disinterested, or that such efforts may not be the sheep's clothing that covers the wolf's body, as Macdonald seems to think, strikes me as naive in the extreme. One might have said the same of Marxism—that it has universal values subscribed to by serious thinkers in very different circumstances, yet that in the wrong hands (that of Moscow prior to the 1980s, for example) it had “pathological” elements as well.

In other words, it is quite beside the point to argue, as Macdonald does, that liberalism has advocates everywhere. It has and it does, quite obviously. The question of my book is whether this creed can be formulated in to a doctrine of state power, then used imperialistically, as the Bush Doctrine most clearly illustrates it can. And when this happens, what then of its proponents? How many “good Marxists,” the equivalent of Macdonald’s good liberals, only came to see the error of their ways when they discovered what Soviet power was about? How many good liberals today are learning the hard way what their ideas can mean when wielded by Washington? How many of them still have this lesson to learn?

Macdonald makes this point himself citing Gandhi who when asked what he thought of Western civilization replied, “it would be a good idea.” It is ironic that Macdonald would use this citation as it would better serve to buttress my argument, not his. States possessed of universal ideologies—values of justice and freedom, progress and peace embodied in tried institutions—may be vehicles of human improvement. But given the complexities of history and human nature they may also be vehicles of oppressive imperialism. My argument is not with liberal democracy as a form of government with some universal appeal but rather with its appropriation by Washington as a mask to expand America’s power in world affairs. Gandhi had it right.
In his opening words citing Morgenthau and Kennan, Jeffrey Taliaferro would seem to agree with me that the values of liberal internationalism became an imperialist doctrine that was backed to our detriment with the attack on Iraq. Liberals who pretend that they can separate the message from the medium—that they can hold fast to liberalism while denouncing the invasion of Iraq—simply do not understand the full extent of the tragedy of American foreign policy in recent years. In the preceding section, Macdonald’s criticism of my use of the word “pathology” to describe what happened to liberal internationalism after the implosion of the Soviet Union is something that most realists would be more likely to agree is an appropriate term. The self-righteous belief that the United States had a blueprint for world order that would bring about freedom, prosperity and peace combined with a sense that history offered a window of opportunity through which we should charge. The United States did just as Morgenthau and Kennan (and other realists) warned us it might, with the disastrous consequences they so aptly foretold. It is worth adding that Taliaferro was one of those who early on saw the disaster looming.

Yet it seems that Taliaferro would have us dismiss liberalism entirely in favor of realism in the aftermath of this calamity. But this is to overlook the problems realism has with sensing that different regime-types may make for vastly different foreign policies. Democratic peace theory may have its problems, no doubt about it, as I tried to show in my analysis. But it has its insights as well. The strength and the promise of the European Union can be exaggerated, to be sure, but liberals everywhere salute the enormous strides the EU has made and hope to see it assert itself collectively in the future with progressive results regionally or even worldwide. U.S. relations with the EU likewise remain our most important tie, not for reasons of race and religion so much as for the community of values, interests, and institutions based on market democracy that holds us (together with Canada and soon perhaps Mexico) in a single community that we can with some justice still today call “the free world” even if the term may all too soon fade in to history.

Where Taliaferro gives short shrift to any of the liberal promise, I remain committed to the Enlightenment view that democratic peoples have shown themselves usually to be morally and practically superior to others, and that American foreign policy should recognize this reality in its dealings with foreign countries. I also believe that the strength and purpose that can come from multilateralism through international law and a sense of common democratic purpose need to be reinforced, not mocked. By virtue of their theory, realists must remain deeply skeptical of any such “moralism” as “idealism” and “utopianism” and hence potentially dangerous. While I can understand their concern with respect to the Bush Doctrine, in other instances—most notably Occupation policy after World War II—surely another judgment is called for.

Well in to the 1980s, realism was the dominant school of international relations theory in the United States. Then came the rise of liberalism. But as my book maintains, the liberalism of the 1990s was far more self-confident, self-righteous, and pugilistic than it was in earlier times. Its new emphasis on expanding “the pacific union” of democratic
peoples in a “zone of peace,” its confidence that “the democratic transition” could be mastered more easily than an earlier generation supposed, its insistence that genuine sovereignty should rest only on democratic covenants between a state and its people were certainly all exaggerated beliefs. From the megalomania of the Bush Doctrine there is much to be learned to quiet the liberal tendency to believe that we can emerge from Hobbes’s state of nature to Kant’s perpetual peace. Still, there is enough to recommend liberal democracy both domestically and internationally to make us continue to defend it whatever the bitter truths to be learned from the use and abuse of such concepts in the Iraq War.

But for Taliaferro the liberal interregnum—lasting roughly from 1987 to 2003—is to be replaced by a realist restoration. He finds reason for his optimism in my book, and I fear that he is correct. Liberal internationalist thinking contributed in important measure to the greatest mistaken expedition in the history of US foreign policy and there is a price to be paid as a result. That realism should undergo a rebirth of confidence in these trying circumstances is not only natural but to be welcomed.