Tsuyoshi Hasegawa’s new book *Racing the Enemy* is subtitled “Stalin, Truman and the Surrender of Japan,” and the author clearly believes a central contribution to be the emphasis he gives to the concept of a “race” between Truman and Stalin as World War II in the Pacific drew to a close. Hasegawa does offer important new insights in connection with this issue, much of which will be of particular interest to specialists (especially information drawn from Soviet materials). However, by far the most important contribution of the book has to do with our understanding of a related but different matter—namely, how, precisely, Japan came to surrender, and what the critical factors were which led to the final decision.

Non-specialists are not always aware of the difficulties which have faced historians concerned with this question. For almost half a century after World War II American scholars have been seriously handicapped by their lack of Japanese language skills and by the paucity of Japanese documents. Robert Butow’s 1954 book *Japan’s Decision to Surrender* was the primary and often only source of basic information on Japanese decision-making. In recent years this has begun to change. Herbert Bix, a researcher with language sophistication and knowledge of modern Japanese scholarship, offered his analysis in his 2000 Pulitzer Prize-winning *Hirohito*. An inherent limitation of this work, however, was that its biographical focus left little room for a full analysis of American decision-making. Richard Frank’s 1999 *Downfall* attempted to dissect decision-making on both sides of the Pacific, but among other things Frank was forced to rely in part on a Japanese language interpreter. Hasegawa is the first modern American scholar with command of the language to focus detailed attention on all aspects of the problem and to draw fully upon the Japanese scholarly and primary sources now available.

*Racing the Enemy* provides an in-depth, day by day—often hour by hour—account not only of how key Japanese actors at the top of the decision-making pyramid maneuvered in the final days of the war, but of how subordinate players strategized behind the scenes to help orchestrate the final decision. Hasegawa also clarifies important distinctions concerning the concept of kokutai which are often confused in non-expert accounts—especially the degree to which at different points in time different factions and Hirohito himself upheld (or would settle for) a mystical version of the Emperor’s role, a political version of his authority, or of a limited, figurehead form of Constitutional monarchy.
Hasegawa’s conclusions are straightforward: First, contrary to conventional American belief, he argues that the atomic bomb did not provide the knock-out punch which caused Japan to surrender: the traditional “myth cannot be supported by historical facts;” Second, he holds that by far the most important factor forcing the decision was the August 8th Soviet declaration of war.

Although these judgments run contrary to conventional American understanding, they are in line with a wide range of other Japanese studies. Many—if not most-Japanese historians who have assessed the causes of Japanese surrender have accorded the Russian declaration of war either a central or equal role in bringing about surrender.[1] Hasegawa challenges the interpretation of an important recent exception, Sadao Asada. He also challenges key points of fact and interpretation in connection with this and other matters in related work by American writer Richard Frank.

_Racing the Enemy_ is distinguished by the subtlety and depth of Hasegawa’s scholarship, and by his comprehensive grasp of the underlying sources. He offers a nuanced account of how well known changes occurred—including: how the peace faction maneuvered to gain support for a mission to seek Soviet help in ending the war; how the Emperor came to support such an approach; how in July he came to propose that a Personal Envoy be sent to Moscow; how he thereafter made his desires known—and, finally, how Japan’s military leaders (particularly the Army) were ultimately brought to accept surrender.

In all of this the central question, of course, was what it would take to bring the Army around. Hasegawa’s emphasizes that the Army’s contention that the war could be continued depended critically on the idea that Soviet neutrality could be maintained. The Army leadership’s credibility with the Emperor, he suggests, also significantly hinged on this hope and expectation. So long as it was possible to believe the Red Army might not join the fighting, it was possible to sustain belief that there might be a way to achieve a mediated end to the war. Hasegawa notes that when the Potsdam Proclamation demanding surrender was issued without Stalin’s signature from the site of (and in the midst of) the Big Three meeting the underlying theory was given important, although very brief, support. It prompted Japanese leaders “to continue their efforts to terminate the war through Soviet mediation rather than immediately accepting the conditions stipulated by the Potsdam Proclamation.”

The entire house of cards (Hasegawa calls it a “pipedream”) collapsed when the Red Army attacked on August 9th. He argues that the decision to move forcefully for surrender was powerfully impacted by Stalin’s decision to enter the war (and by the fact that the Red Army advanced so rapidly through the once vaunted but now depleted Japanese forces in Manchuria). He also holds that the Army’s military strategy of “Ketsu-go”—one major battle to force American concessions—was dependent upon keeping Moscow neutral; hence also lost credibility when the Russians entered the war. The military leaders yielded to the inevitable—even “allowed themselves to be tricked” by the peace advocates, he suggests—in large part because their own argument for continuation of the war now “lacked conviction.”

Other important points Hasegawa offers in support of his central argument include: (1) “There is no convincing evidence to show that the Hiroshima bomb had a direct and immediate impact on
Japan’s decision to surrender;” (2) The day after the first bomb was dropped “neither the cabinet nor any member of the peace party believed that any change of policy was needed;” (3) The Nagasaki bombing was reported after the key decision-makers had assembled, and had little if anything to do with top level decisions; (4) Although in a public rescript announcing the war’s end the Emperor alluded to “a new and most cruel bomb,” in his rescript addressed to the military he emphasized the Russian attack and made no mention at all of the atomic bomb; (5) The argument that the atomic bomb was central to the Emperor’s personal decision is based in significant part on unreliable “hearsay” evidence; (6) Finally, the overall record makes it very difficult to believe that the decision to surrender would not have occurred shortly in any event (with or without the atomic bomb) as the Red Army continued to move in the direction of an assault on Hokkaido.

Ernest R. May concluded that the Emperor’s decision probably resulted from the Russian attack fifty years ago—and also that “it could not in any event been long in coming.” Herbert Bix offers a similar judgment in a recent article.[2] Analysts with Japanese source expertise who disagree will, of course, inevitably suggest contending interpretations of underlying documents and of the subtle maneuvering which brought about surrender.[3] What makes Hasegawa’s overall account of particular significance is that it ties in with the evidence we now have suggesting that by the time of Potsdam (and indeed well before that time) top American and British policy makers believed that a declaration of war by the Soviet Union combined with assurances for the Emperor would likely end the war before an invasion. As early as April 29 the Joint Intelligence Committee advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that given the ongoing strategic bombing, air-sea blockade, and collapse of Germany, the entry of the Soviet Union into the war would “convince most Japanese at once of the inevitability of complete defeat”—and further, that if they were persuaded that unconditional surrender “did not imply annihilation, surrender might follow fairly quickly.” On June 7 General Marshall approved a memorandum prepared by the Strategy and Policy Group of the War Department’s Operation Division advising that a Russian declaration of war, either alone or in combination with a landing “or imminent threat of landing,” might be enough to convince the Japanese of the hopelessness of their condition. Meeting with Truman on June 18, Marshall specifically added what he termed an “important point” to a discussion of intelligence findings: “[T]he impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation at that time or shortly thereafter if we land in Japan.” [4] Three weeks later the U.S.-U.K. Combined Intelligence Committee completed a pre-Potsdam Conference “Estimate of the Enemy Situation” which judged that an “entry of the Soviet Union into the war would finally convince the Japanese of the inevitability of complete defeat.” The Estimate was discussed by the Combined U.S.-U.K. Chiefs of Staff, and a summary which British military leaders presented to Churchill was blunt: “[I]f and when Russia came into the war against Japan, the Japanese would probably wish to get out on almost any terms short of the dethronement of the Emperor.”

For such reasons before the atomic test a major U.S. objective was to get the Russians into the war sooner rather than later; the fear was Stalin might wait until the U.S. had done all the dirty work and then join in for the spoils. Truman was pleased after his first Potsdam meeting with Stalin to note: “He’ll be in the Jap War on August 15th. Fini Japs when that comes about.” In a letter to his wife the next day he wrote: “I’ve gotten what I came for-Stalin goes to war on
August 15 with no strings on it....” “I’ll say that we’ll end the war a year sooner now, and think of the kids who won’t be killed!”

The precise meaning of Truman’s diary on this point has been a matter of dispute among historians. Some hold that he meant only that a Russian attack plus the atomic bomb would end the war before an invasion. In his memoirs Truman writes that he sought Russian participation because if the test were to have failed then it would have been “even more important to us to bring about a surrender before we had to make a physical conquest of Japan.”

Hasegawa is not primarily interested in this issue, however. Instead he argues that on the basis of the Magic intercepts before and after the Potsdam Proclamation (and leaving aside the likely impact of a Russian declaration of war) American leaders “must have known ... that the emperor’s involvement in the peace process marked a new departure in Japan’s policy, and, further, that the major stumbling block in persuading Japan to capitulate would be the demand for unconditional surrender.” Nor does he leave any room for doubt as to his position: “An alternative was available but they [American leaders] chose not to take it.” “[T]here were alternatives to the use of the bomb, alternatives that the Truman Administration for reasons of its own declined to pursue.” That by late July and early August Truman must have been aware the bomb was not the only way to end the war without an invasion which could not begin for another three months is also strongly suggested by an often overlooked entry in the diary of Byrnes’ assistant Walter Brown. This records the following August 3 discussion on the way back from Potsdam:

Aboard Augusta/ President, Leahy, JFB agreed [sic] Japas [sic] looking for peace. (Leahy had another report from Pacific) President afraid they will sue for peace through Russia instead of some country like Sweden.

Hasegawa concludes that without the atomic bombs the war would likely have ended shortly after Soviet entry in any event—and, again, clearly well before the planned November 1 landing. What he focuses most attention on is not the Soviet option, however, but the fact that once the bomb had been successfully tested American leaders were moving very fast and not at all interested in exploring other ways to end the war. Especially not the Soviet option: A central emphasis of the book is that once word of the successful test reached Potsdam Truman and Byrnes desperately wanted to end the war before the Russians got in. “Truman was in a hurry. He was aware that the race was on between the atomic bomb and Soviet entry into the war.” “Contrary to historians’ claim that Truman had no intention to use the atomic bomb as a diplomatic weapon against the Soviet Union, it is hard to ignore the fact that the Soviets figured in Truman’s calculations...”

Hasegawa’s main contention is that the bomb gave Truman a solution to three problems: It was a way to end the war and save lives, to maintain a tough domestic position on unconditional surrender, and (possibly) to avoid Soviet entry into the war. In different parts of the book, however, he offers more than one explanation for Truman’s decision—or, more precisely, he emphasizes different sources of his views. At one point he argues that as early as June 6 for Truman to not have used the atomic bomb would have required “overwhelming justification and incredible courage.” At other points he stresses revenge: “Punishing the Japanese, soldiers and
citizens alike, with atomic devastation represented in Truman’s mind a just retribution against
the ‘savage and cruel people’ who had dared to make a sneak attack on Pearl Harbor and mistreat
American POWs.” In fact, Hasegawa uses the terms “revenge” or “vengeance” or “thirst for
revenge” repeatedly throughout the book as he tries to explain Truman’s underlying attitude.
(Although he acknowledges the importance of recent work demonstrating a build up of Japanese
forces on Kyushu, Hasegawa stresses that there is no evidence this information reached the
President or that it had anything to do with Truman’s decision).

A critical issue is why the famous paragraph twelve offering assurances for the Emperor was
eliminated from the Potsdam Proclamation. US and British military leaders urged that some
form of assurances be clearly stated. Without this a surrender would be impossible, and without
this many more American and British lives would be lost. At Potsdam U.S. military leaders felt
so strongly about the matter they asked British military leaders to convince Churchill to ask
Truman to offer such assurances! (Moreover, Churchill did just that.)

Why, Hasegawa asks, did Truman and Byrnes actively choose to remove assurances from the
Proclamation? One possible answer is American politics. Hasegawa allows that this may have
been one motive, but he finds it difficult to believe it was of overriding importance. For one
thing, he makes it clear that Byrnes was by no means a “hard liner” on the matter. Moreover, as
he observes, numerous columnists and editorial writers (including, for instance, the editors of
The Washington Post) had long been calling for a change in the unconditional surrender formula,
as had many Members of Congress. He mentions Senator Wallace H. White, but neglects to note
that as the Republican Minority Leader of the Senate White was far from unimportant. In
political terms, this was not a situation where changing the surrender terms would involve
opening Truman to attack by the opposition party. Quite the contrary, not only was the Senate
Republican leadership actively calling for a change, but other leading Republicans had long
urged a revision of the surrender formula—including, most obviously, former President Herbert
Hoover (who had met with Truman in the late spring to urge change) and Henry L. Stimson,
Truman’s Secretary of War, an eminent Republican figure in his own right.

“It was not public opinion that dictated their course of action;” Hasegawa concludes, “rather they
selectively chose public opinion to justify their decision.” But, he asks, if the traditional answer
that politics required it cannot explain why Truman and Byrnes eliminated paragraph twelve
from the Proclamation, were there any other reasons? Clearly troubled by the question,
Hasegawa comes to rest on a two part answer which many will find the most controversial aspect
of this work. First, as noted, were a mix of reasons which involved the Soviet Union, on the one
hand, and vengeance, on the other. (But, note carefully, not saving lives—since eliminating the
assurances clearly made it harder, not easier, for Japan to end the fighting).

Second, he argues that Truman and Byrnes eliminated paragraph twelve because they knew this
would make the surrender demand unacceptable to Japan—and that making it unacceptable was in
fact what they sought to accomplish. Hasegawa’s argument is much more explicit and goes
much further than that offered by most critics of the Hiroshima decision: American leaders
wanted to have Japan reject the Potsdam Proclamation in order to justify using the atomic bomb.
“In order to drop the bomb, the United States had to issue the ultimatum to Japan, warning that
the rejection of the terms specified in the proclamation would result in ‘prompt and utter

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destruction.’ And this proclamation had to be rejected by the Japanese in order to justify the use of the atomic bomb. The best way to accomplish all this was to insist upon unconditional surrender.”

We may also note, contrary to Hasegawa, that the idea that Truman was personally profoundly committed to the unconditional surrender formula (or overwhelmingly thirsty for revenge) is challenged by many documents. Among other things, in May he told Acting Secretary of State Grew that “his own thoughts had been following the same line” in response to Grew’s proposal for a statement modifying the surrender formula. In June he told Assistant Secretary of War McCloy “that’s just what I’ve been thinking about.” In July at Potsdam Churchill reported after talking with Truman his impression that “there is no question of a rigid insistence upon the phrase ‘unconditional surrender’...” At this time, too, Truman told Stimson that “he had that in mind, and that he would take care of it” if the Japanese were “hanging fire” on the issue. (Stimson noted that he was hardly “obdurate” about the matter.) Moreover, after Potsdam Truman was more than willing to accept Japan’s proposal not only that the Emperor be maintained, but that his prerogatives not be limited. (The President had to be carefully and explicitly reminded of the “unconditional” language which he himself had endorsed less than two weeks earlier at Potsdam-hardly a sign of his over-riding concern with the formula). There is also the well documented fact that all along key decision makers knew that in the end the only way to obtain the surrender of Japanese soldiers in the field was for the Emperor to order it. Perhaps the most obvious point is the simplest: political objections notwithstanding, in the end Truman did allow Japan to keep its Emperor; a descendant of Hirohito still sits on the Imperial throne.

Leaving aside whether or not one accepts Hasegawa’s explanation for why paragraph twelve was removed, he has clearly put his finger on one of the most troubling of all the many questions involved in the Hiroshima decision. Why-especially in view of the of very strong military arguments to the contrary-did American leaders make it harder for Japan to surrender?

The truly puzzling question, furthermore, is that obviously if “racing” to end the war before the Soviet Union could get involved (or, minimally, before the Red Army got very far into Manchuria) was a primary objective-and clearly in the minds of Byrnes and Truman it was an important goal-then why, specifically, act in a way which was almost certain to prolong the fighting? Making the terms harder makes little sense-especially in the face of U.S. and U.K. military objections.

Scholars who accept the argument that domestic political concerns were central, of course, have no problem answering this question. But if, like Hasegawa, one discounts political concerns, then one is forced to probe for other possible reasons why American leaders issued the Potsdam Proclamation in a manner that both made use of the atomic bomb inevitable and also—by making it more difficult for Japan to surrender-increased the likelihood that the Red Army would move ever deeper into Manchuria and North China.

The question is whether there were other reasons why U.S. leaders may have wished to use the atomic bomb.
There are, of course, many suggestions in the documents of other possible explanations. Atomic scientist Leo Szilard reported that as early as May 1945 “Byrnes did not argue that it was necessary to use the bomb against the cities of Japan in order to win the war. .. At that time Mr. Byrnes was much concerned about the spreading of Russian influence in Europe; ... [his view was] that our possessing and demonstrating the bomb would make Russian more manageable in Europe.”

May also found Stimson advising that we should ...”let our actions speak for words. The Russians will understand them better than anything else. It is a case where we have got to regain the lead and perhaps do it in a pretty rough and realistic way....They can’t get along without our help and industries and we have coming into action a weapon which will be unique. Now the thing is not to get into unnecessary quarrels...; let our actions speak for themselves.”

And, of course, Truman postponed discussion of the entire complex of European and Asian issues so that he would know if the atomic bomb actually worked before sitting down to negotiate with Stalin. Once the full report of the successful test came in Truman “stood up to the Russians in a most emphatic and decisive manner... He told the Russians just where they got on and off and generally bossed the whole meeting...” (This is Churchill’s report of a meeting at which Eastern European matters were discussed. Sir Alan Brooke, chief of the Imperial General Staff, reports that Churchill had also “paint a wonderful picture of himself as the sole possessor of these bombs and capable of dumping them where he wished, thus all-powerful and capable of dictating to Stalin...”)

The general attitude which Byrnes expressed to Szilard was also evident in numerous specific reports. After a discussion with Byrnes at Potsdam, for instance, Ambassador Joseph Davies noted that the bomb was directly involved in Byrnes’ calculations regarding reparations negotiations: “The details as to the success of the Atomic Bomb, which he had just received, gave him confidence that the Soviets would agree...” (Davies also noted: “I told him the threat wouldn’t work, and might do irreparable harm.”) In September McCloy met with Byrnes before he left to negotiate Eastern European issues and noted: “‘He was on the point of departing for the foreign ministers’ meeting and wished to have the implied threat of the bomb in his pocket during the conference...” At this time, too, Stimson found Byrnes wanted to have “the presence of the bomb in his pocket, so to speak, as a great weapon...”

In addition to what we know about the apparent consistency of Byrne’s views before, during, and after the Potsdam Conference, there are also many indications that Truman’s chief adviser was fully capable of extremely complex, subtle and devious maneuvers. He was “a very Machiavellian character”-as Truman’s appointments secretary Mathew Connelly put it. To Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. he was “an operator;” Forest Pogue understood how it was that “he was called a fixer.” Byrnes was also Averell Harriman’s candidate for “worst Secretary of State during an important period of the life of our Republic...” Truman himself described Byrnes as his “conniving Secretary of State.”

Even to raise the possibility that diplomatic considerations connected with the Soviet Union not only in Asia but in Europe may have played a major role in the decision to use the atomic bomb has occasioned extreme anger over the years. Hasegawa, by suggesting that issues in the Far
East connected with Russia were important, touches on the hot button issue. He also notes that at Potsdam Stalin appears to have sensed that there was an intimate relationship between American diplomacy related to Europe and the atomic bomb. Hasegawa, however, has very little to say directly about European matters-or any of the other major issues in dispute at the long Potsdam Conference. In this respect his book reflects one of two continuing limitations of a number of studies concerned with the use of the atomic bomb: Few historians whose primary expertise has centered on the war in the Pacific or the Hiroshima decision have themselves actually done much detailed research on the relationship between the bomb and the emerging European confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Few know much about the details of the Polish issue which was hotly debated throughout the spring and summer. Few have explored the intensity and importance of the German reparations negotiations in dispute from the time of Yalta on. Most know little about Byrnes’ concerns over conditions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary—or the importance of the fact that he personally had been the chief spokesman for (and was personally politically identified with) Roosevelt’s Yalta agreement on these matters. Some have accepted without themselves having spent any serious time with the documentary sources the judgment of other historians that the impact of the atomic bomb on these matters was a mere “bonus.” [5]

If lack of real knowledge of the European issues at the center of American-Soviet struggles throughout 1945 is one limitation, a second is that many scholars working in this area appear to have had a very difficult time accepting just how devious some of the key players were. One reason undoubtedly is that it is simply not easy to come to terms with the idea that some of the most important American leaders were men whose behavior was (to say the least) less than straightforward. Another reason may be that few scholars have much direct experience with the often distasteful realities of hand-to-hand combat at high levels of political decision-making.

We are slowly beginning to lose our innocence about such matters. Even a cursory review of the Oval Office tapes from both the Johnson and Nixon Administrations reminds us of just how complex (and, yes, devious) the conventional world of real world political feints, maneuvering, and posturing often is. We have also been forced to greater clarity by what we have learned about the manner in which the United States was maneuvered into war by the Johnson Administration on the basis of mis-information at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution-and, increasingly, of what we are learning about the ways in which the current Bush Administration led the nation to war in Iraq on the basis of faulty information (and strident rhetoric stressing the imminent danger of a “mushroom cloud.”) Jimmy Byrnes no longer seems so unusual a figure, or his standard operating procedure so hard to confront.

My own view continues to be that although there are very strong suggestions in the available documents both of the deviousness of Byrnes and of the importance of both European and Asian issues related to the Soviet Union in the decision to use the atomic bomb, the truth is we still do not have sufficient information to definitively answer some of the most important questions concerning why the bomb was used.

This, however, leads to two final observations. Some writing in this field not only seems innocent of real world political experience (and not well informed about broader issues of Cold War maneuvering in Europe). In some cases the tone of pronouncements is certain and assertive;
sometimes even Olympian and magisterial—allowing, as it were, no possibility of error. Such a posture reaches well beyond what can be documented with certainty. Hence, the final issue we need to confront is the inadequacy of the record.

Non-specialists may not fully understand that most discussions concerning the decision to use the atomic bomb at the very highest level were simply not recorded. Not only were such matters handled in an extremely secretive manner at the time, they were largely handled outside the normal chain of command. There is also evidence of the manipulation of some documents, or simply of missing documents in certain cases—and in some cases, explicit evidence that specific documents were destroyed.

Most important is that although we know that Byrnes was Truman’s closest adviser, we have almost no information on critical discussions related to the key issues between the two men. The point needs to be stressed. Byrnes and Truman were old friends; their relationship dated to the days when the Byrnes mentored Truman when he first came to the Senate. They often ended the day with a “libation” (often Byrnes’ bourbon)—and what they called a “bullbat session.” It is also clear that Byrnes dominated the relationship in the early days of Truman Presidency—especially with regard to atomic bomb issues (he was Truman’s representative on the Interim Committee) and on foreign policy (both before and after he was formally sworn in as Secretary of State.)

Byrnes briefed Truman on the Yalta understandings at the very outset of his Presidency, and the two men met privately to discuss the key issues on many, many occasions throughout the spring and summer of 1945. They were at sea together for eight days on the way to Potsdam, meeting at least once a day to plan for the Conference and for the use of the bomb. (Truman’s “conniving” characterization of Byrnes was made in connection with one such discussion.) They also shared a villa at Babelsberg near Potsdam. (And commonly drove back and forth together, in all probability discussing the day’s events.) Virtually none of the discussions between the two men most responsible for the critical decisions related to the atomic bomb at Potsdam were recorded in any direct way. [6]

Perhaps one day we will know more and will be able to define with greater certainty the way decisions were really made. We are unlikely, I think, to discover new official sources. However, a new generation of scholars may well be able to ferret out diaries, letters, or additional personal papers in the attics or basements of descendants of some of the men involved. An even more interesting possibility is that the President’s daughter Margaret will one day donate additional papers to the Truman Library. (In her own writing Margaret reports details from the Potsdam Conference which seem clearly to be based on documentary sources. However, she has so far refused to respond to inquiries from historians asking for access to these.) A third possibility is that if the Soviets did, in fact, bug the Truman villa near Potsdam (or the villas of other American or British officials), there may be tapes or transcriptions of some key conversations in NKVD or other files in the Russian archives. [7]

Notes:

[3] Papers taking up some of the issues by Frank, Asada and other writers will be published this coming year in a collection to be edited by Hasegawa.

[4] Some historians think the words “at that time” can be read to mean at the time of a possible invasion rather than at the time of Russian entry, which seems the more obvious meaning and grammar of the additional point Marshall is here adding to the intelligence discussion.

[5] The “bonus” theory is that of Barton Bernstein—a historian with whom I disagree on this matter, but, who, unlike many, has personally undertaken the research required to make a serious judgment of the issue.

[6] A list prepared by David J. Williams of numerous known meetings at which Byrnes was present in the spring and summer of 1945 (as well as additional evidence of his return from South Carolina and presence in Washington) is published as an Appendix to my *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb*, Knopf (1995).

[7] Documentary evidence cited in this essay is well known in the literature; references to most of the sources may also be readily found via the index to my *The Decision To Use The Atomic Bomb*, Knopf (1995).