



Simon Kitson, *Vichy et la chasse aux espions nazis, 1940-1942: complexités de la politique de collaboration*. Éditions Autrement, Collection Mémoires no. 110, 2005. 268 pp., index, bibliography, ISSN: 1157-4488; ISBN 2-7467- 0588-5.

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Roundtable Participants: Peter Jackson, University of Wales, Aberystwyth; Sean Kennedy, University of New Brunswick; Kim Munholland, University of Minnesota; Douglas Porch, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School

Reply of Simon Kitson,
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I should like to begin by thanking Diane N. Mason Labrosse for organising this session and Martin Thomas for chairing it. In his introduction Martin has stated the reasons why the other members of the panel should be there but with characteristic modesty he has not underlined his own expertise in the areas of Vichy, of the Secret Services and of the Empire which make him the ideal chair of such a session. I'd like also to thank all the participants in this round-table who have shown quite clearly that they have read the book thoroughly and engaged with it intelligently. Their reviews are full of perceptive and helpful comments. I am greatly touched by their generous praise. I am glad to see that they have understood that although this book does relate to the Secret Services it actually covers a much wider range of issues than just that.

Both Martin Thomas and Peter Jackson raise the question of how the book has been received in France. It strikes me that what will be interesting in this forum is to reply not only to the reactions of Peter Jackson, Sean Kennedy, Kim Munholland, Douglas Porch and Martin Thomas but also to address the wider issue of reactions to this book and some of the points I might have made slightly differently given the two years that have passed since the book was finished and the comments of reviewers and readers. Because of heavy commitments elsewhere I am not intending to work on this topic again and should therefore like to use this opportunity to clarify one or two points raised here or in other forums, which might also be questions that readers of this round-table ask themselves about the book.

I am very flattered by the reviews the book has received in France. It seems to have been well received by publications of the left (*Marianne*, *Le Nouvel Observateur*) and of the right (*Le Figaro*). To my knowledge there has only been one negative comment in all the reviews to date: *Le Patriote Résistant* concluded its otherwise positive review with the following remarks: « un seul reproche: pourquoi avoir choisi pour première de couverture une fort belle affiche qui est sans rapport avec le sujet traité? Et en passant sous silence le nom de l'artiste? » In answer to this question the cover photograph is a genuine anti-German counter-espionage poster from 1940. It probably dates from the first half of 1940 but many 'pre-war' posters of this kind continued to be in circulation after Vichy came to power. The words « L'ennemi guette vos confidences » which

appear at the bottom of the original have been removed here because although we were keen to show a scene related to the general topic we wanted to 'neutralise' it so as not to imply that Vichy actually published anti-German posters itself. As I'm sure anyone who has worked on related topics knows it is actually a nightmare to find interesting visual material related to the subject. The name of the artist was not made available to us by the Keystone agency from which we bought the rights.

A more negative appreciation of the book has come from the Secret Services themselves. Since the book came out I have been contacted by a veteran of the secret services as well as from relatives of another who felt that I'd presented the wartime Secret Services in a negative light. This was never my intention. I was trying to be balanced and I will try to maintain this even-handedness in this discussion. Although my book is actually centred on Vichy much of what follows will be focused on the Secret Services. This is because they are, judging by the comments of my correspondents, the area of the book which has aroused the most controversy and in one or two cases some misconceptions. For those unfamiliar with the workings of the Secret Services I should clarify, before proceeding, that the Deuxième Bureau is the name given to the sedentary branch of the Secret Services, responsible for producing analytical reports drawn from intelligence activity, and the Cinquième Bureau is the more active military counter-espionage branches (broken down into the semi-clandestine Bureaux des Menées Anti-Nationales and the totally clandestine Travaux Ruraux). The Surveillance du Territoire is the counter-espionage branch within the police which was responsible for almost all the arrests of German spies, often making these arrests on information provided by the military Secret Services (see chapter 4 of my book for further explanation).

Peter Jackson in his review makes references to the difficulties of the occupation period. The first thing I would say is that my biggest regret is that I did not write more on the dangers that Secret Service personnel were running in operating these counter-espionage missions. If ever there is a second edition of this book that is certainly something I would wish to address. Some French agents were arrested in the occupied zone as early as 1940 and others were taken once the southern zone was occupied in late 1942. Many members of the Secret Services died as a result of working against the Germans during the dark years. According to the head of the Cinquième Bureau General Rivet the counter-espionage services paid a heavy price for their activity with 78 deaths in the military branches alone[1].

Something I should have stressed in the book is that even in the unoccupied zone of France Secret Service personnel lived under threat. There was always the fear that this zone would be invaded and the Secret Service personnel targeted. This possibility was felt particularly keenly after Laval's first government came to an end in December 1940. The sacking of Laval resulted in massive diplomatic tension between France and Germany, opening the possibility that Germany would invade the unoccupied zone. The diary of Jacques Britsch of the Deuxième Bureau is explicit about this sense of danger. On 15 January 1941 he notes sarcastically in his diary about the instructions they have received in case of a German occupation: « les officiers doivent tous venir au bureau en cas d'irruption allemande! Autrement dit en tenue d'oflag et servis 'sur un plateau' ». Ten days later he notes that his superiors have procured a false passport for him but had informed him that the risk of invasion seemed temporarily to have disappeared. But Britsch remained weary and on 1 February withdrew all of his savings from the Société

Générale bank -- just in case. On 7 February his pessimism resurfaced in the question « va-t-on vers l'occupation totale ? » to which he gave the gloomy response: « J'estime que, si je ne suis pas dans un Oflag à la fin du mois, j'aurai de la veine ». The diplomatic tension passed and the threat disappeared from explicit mention in Britsch's diary [2].

But this was only a stay of execution and on 11 November 1942 German troops poured across the demarcation line. Four days later Commissaire Jean Léonard of the Marseille branch of the Surveillance du Territoire (ST) sent a desperate letter to his superiors in Vichy underlining the threat that hung over the Inspecteurs and Commissaires of his service. The members of this branch, he underlined, were open to a very specific danger owing to their professional responsibility, firstly in pre-war counter-espionage but also in such activities since the armistice. Léonard singled out the position of four of his subordinates who had been in Nice before the war and had been particularly zealous in their anti-Italian activity. Léonard's own position was far from reassuring. Native of the Lorraine, he had joined the police as an Inspecteur in 1920 and been detached to the French army on the Rhine until his transfer to a police post in Strasbourg in 1929. In these capacities he had been heavily engaged in counter-espionage activity causing him to become the object of a violent German press campaign. But Léonard also drew attention to the fact that since January 1941 the Surveillance du Territoire in Marseille had carried out the arrest of over 170 German agents. Amongst these were a number of German nationals, 12 of whom had thereafter been condemned to death by military tribunal but subsequently released by Vichy only to complain of the brutalities they had suffered at the hands of the ST [3]. That the ST should find itself in a delicate position in the event of a German invasion had been foreseen and precautions had been taken. With the likelihood of invasion growing members of the brigade were issued with special false identity cards six months before the invasion of the zone by the senior local police chief, the Intendant Rodellec du Porzic, and were given special ration tickets in November 1942[4]. Ironically, Léonard, who spent the rest of the occupation hidden, was not viewed favourably at the Liberation. Besides his strongly anti-German stance he had also worked against the Allies and the Resistance[5]. A resumé of his April 1945 purge procedure states « ce fonctionnaire, foncièrement anti-allemand, a cependant obéi aux ordres de Vichy et donnait des directives pour des arrestations à la S.T. à Marseille ». The purge committee concluded by recommending to the Minister of the Interior « la réintégration de l'intéressé mais demande qu'un retard de 3 ans à son avancement lui soit infligé »[6].

Even if there were ambiguities of attitude and behaviour within the Secret Services it should be recognized that their task was often a dangerous one. Sean Kennedy has stated in his review that I refute “suggestions made in post-war memoirs that the regime's intelligence officials pursued a pro-Resistance agenda independently of the central government”. Well, yes and no. Just to clarify, I do not actually say that there was no Resistance within the Secret Services. In one paragraph in my conclusion I state that the arrest of German spies should not in itself be seen as an act of Resistance. Recent definitions of Resistance by scholars such as Pierre Laborie, Jacques Semelin or François Bédarida have insisted that for an act to be considered as an act of Resistance it must be carried out consciously in that spirit. In other words Resistance status cannot be attributed to acts carried out unthinkingly by an individual simply acting on orders from a superior. There must be a conscious, voluntary decision to act. Many functionaries of the Surveillance du Territoire were simply obeying the orders of their superiors in conducting the

arrests of German agents. So whilst it is true that the arrest of German spies might not systematically have been an act of Resistance this does not mean that some individuals within the Secret Services did not carry out acts of Resistance in other areas.

Where I think there was a degree of Resistance was in the passing on of warnings of German activity to members of the 'Combat' network or in some help offered to Resisters to escape from prison. It is these actions, and not the arrest of German spies, which were carried out in opposition to instructions received from the Vichy government. I take a slightly more lenient view on this than the former Resister Henri Noguères who stated that you cannot even begin to talk of Resistance with regard to the Secret Services [7]. It is my belief that what Resistance there was, and before November 1942 it was limited, was highly ambiguous. Paillole, head of the Travaux Ruraux network, typified this. In all the contemporary documents I have seen he speaks highly of the Americans and urges his subordinates to ignore their activity because they were only working against the Germans. In training sessions for these subordinates he described the Germans as enemy number one but added that the English were enemy number two. This Anglophobia was reiterated in other documents from his network. In these same training sessions he makes explicit reference to help he offered some Resisters (Colonel Heurteaux) and we know from the memoirs of Henri Frenay and Maurice Chevance-Bertin that he offered them assistance. True, as Noguères notes, the Secret Services were effectively just offering help to those Resisters, generally former military colleagues, known to them personally. But this was partly because of a belief that these Resisters presented the lowest security risk. Being former military men must, the belief went, have given a seriousness to their activities which was not present amongst other Resisters. Paillole and his colleagues seemed to believe that the Gaullists and often the British were so amateurish that they would be infiltrated by the Germans and that contact with them would therefore present dangers for the Secret Services. There are also some examples, quoted by Philippe Bernert and Henri Noguères, of Paillole providing information to the Surveillance du Territoire about Resisters such as Jean Moulin or behaving in an unsupportive way during the interrogations of one Resister, Roger Wybot [8]. What is certain is that even if, like me, you accept a limited level of Resistance on the part of the Secret Services it never escaped ambiguity. Perhaps this is because even those members of the Secret Services inclined towards Resistance were caught in a dilemma: whatever their personal feelings, their professional duties revolved around preserving French sovereignty. This meant arresting all comers. To resist fully and unambiguously implied ignoring those duties. It was something the Secret Services clearly found difficult.

The relationship between Vichy's Secret Services and those operating for the Gaullists remained extremely tense, even after the bulk of the former defected to the Allies in November 1942. In fact, tensions remained in the relationship of the individuals on either side of this divide well after the war. A highly significant (and often amusing) document highlighting these continued difficulties is a pamphlet written in 1950 by General Rivet, former head of Vichy's Cinquième Bureau[9]. The pamphlet was a reply to a book written by Jacques Soustelle of the Gaullist Secret Services. At times the level of the criticisms in this document (and one supposes in Soustelle's book) reaches very personal and somewhat puerile levels. Rivet: « Vous me décrivez 'petit, le crâne bossué d'une grosse loupe'. Or je mesure 1m 71 sous la toise, et mes familiers ont du mal à distinguer la 'grosse' loupe qui, selon vous, rompt la régularité de mon crâne rachycéphale. Imaginez un instant que ma plume, devenue frivole, vous qualifie de 'poussah' ».

That they are reduced to insulting each other's physical appearance does not suggest a high level of personal respect or admiration.

But Rivet's pamphlet also highlights a number of more serious differences which underline some of the points Douglas Porch was making in his comments. The Vichy Secret Services liked to pretend that they were apolitical whilst those operating for the Gaullists were highly politicized. Rivet even suggests that the Gaullist Secret Services were being used for the purposes of a political dictatorship : « Soyons net: si votre rancune 'nous' poursuit, c'est que nous avons refusé de courir avec vous, votre aventure, lorsque délégué d'un parti prédestiné, vous arrivez en 1943 à Alger avec des projets politiques. (...) La preuve n'était elle pas déjà faite que la mission d'un Service de Renseignements national est inconciliable avec la politique du parti? (...) Aux heures de grands malheurs nationaux, quand le pays paralysé ne peut plus choisir ses chefs, l'investiture est acquise à ceux d'entre eux qui se battent, hors de tout souci, de toute ambition d'ordre politique. Ceux là sont responsables du destin et des actes du SR, appareil de défense contre l'ennemi extérieur, et non instrument de domination intérieure reflétant les tendances et les besoins d'un Etat totalitaire ».

Rivet dismissed the Gaullist Secret Services as amateurs whose effectiveness was very limited : « Vous opposez le rendement de vos 'réseaux' à celui du S.R.. Vous êtes trop ambitieux. Nous les connaissons bien, ces réseaux. Vous avez, c'est certain, disposé de quelques bons éléments aptes à la recherche du renseignement. Qu'ils soient loués pour le travail qu'ils ont accompli en France. Sommairement formés, généralement improvisés, ils ont assumé des risques, couru des périls que nos agents chevronnés n'affrontaient pas à la légère. Mais vos 'réseaux' n'étaient pas purs. J'entends par là (...) que leurs missions étaient diverses, et qu'ils s'occupaient de trop de choses qui n'étaient pas seulement la force, les projets et le comportement de l'ennemi. (...) Vous ne pouviez évidemment prétendre que quelques courageux Français jetés sans préparation dans la bagarre France, étaient capables de fouiller la structure totale de l'armée allemande disséminée sur le continent, d'atteindre ses sources d'impulsion, ses Etats-Majors. C'est là un métier qui s'apprend, et qui demande une organisation dans le temps ». Rivet believed that where the Gaullists had managed to recruit quality individuals these individuals could have been employed better by his own Secret Services who would have given them more focused missions: « la place de tels hommes n'était pas dans un organisme hétéroclite qui les employait à tort et à travers. Et ici reparait le vice fondamental de cette étrange création (votre S.R.) où les besoins d'une politique (...) faisaient confier à un même organe de renseignement, et souvent à un même homme, la mission de surveiller les opinions du préfet de Quimper-Corentin ou les vellétés du garde-champêtre de la Ferté Sous-Jouarre, et de donner, de surcroît, le dessin du dispositif allemand en France, la contexture de l'Abwehr ou celle de la Gestapo. En matière de S.R., il n'est de pire hérésie ni de plus grande faute ».

The relationship between Vichy's Secret Services and the Allies/Gaullist Resistance was an ambiguous one.

The third point I'd wish to clarify is that I did not actually accuse the Secret Services themselves of collaboration with Germany. It is only really in respect of the Desloges Affair, when a mission of German agents were given official police protection to cross into the Southern zone to detect allied radio transmitters between September and November 1942, that there is any proven direct

cooperation between the Secret Services and the Germans. This operation was carried out uniquely by the Surveillance du Territoire, not the military Secret Services. The ST showed their hostility to this operation by trying to undermine it, whilst the military Secret Services during meetings with senior Vichy personnel objected openly to the operation. Collaboration came from Vichy not the Secret Services and the latter were generally hostile to Vichy's pro-German foreign policy, despite their own ambiguities towards the British and the Gaullists. Vichy may have used the arrest of German spies to reinforce its negotiating position with and independence from the Germans but this does not make the agencies who arrested those spies responsible for its policy of collaboration.

On the other hand what my book does question is the degree of independence of these Secret Services from Vichy. Reading the Secret Service memoirs one has the impression that somehow they were going against the wishes of the government in arresting Axis agents. I do not believe such an argument can be sustained. It is true that in the period immediately after the armistice Vichy was reticent at the idea of reactivating anti-Axis counter-espionage. However it is equally clear from the documentation that by the autumn of 1940 this need was much more recognised in the corridors of power. Governmental correspondence makes it clear not only that Vichy was fully aware that its Secret Services were operating against the Germans but that many ministers actually approved of this state of affairs. Senior dignitaries such as Pétain, Darlan and Laval were all involved in negotiations about the execution of German spies. Vichy courts continued to try German agents up until December 1943, long after Paillolle and his cronies had left for North Africa. What Vichy protested about was the methods and indiscretions of the Secret Services, rather than the actual arrest of German agents. The central argument of my book, as Peter Jackson makes clear, is that the arrest of German spies was used by Vichy as a means of preserving its sovereignty, in all its different manifestations. This was to allow the government to centralise collaboration and to negotiate with the Germans from a position of strength.

The Secret Services operated for the Vichy government. On a daily basis they may have had a technical autonomy but this did not preclude institutional contacts with Vichy. This point is amply demonstrated by some documentation concerning negotiations about the exchange of Italian prisoners. At the end of 1941, Vice-Président du Conseil Admiral Darlan decided that an exchange should be negotiated with the Italians offering one of their agents against a French agent previously arrested by the Italians. It is commandant Paillolle, head of the clandestine Travaux Ruraux network, who is assigned to conduct the negotiations in person. The report about these negotiations makes it utterly explicit that he is acting as a representative of the Vichy government during these discussions[10]. The institutional links between Vichy and the Secret Services are also highlighted by the presence of representatives of the Bureaux des Menées Antinationales at an inter-ministerial meeting to discuss the fate of arrested German agents (page 162). Part of the funding for the Secret Services came from Vichy coffers and decrees concerning the reorganisation of the structures were signed by Pétain, Darlan and Laval. Moreover, the exact location of the Travaux Ruraux network headquarters in Marseille was made explicitly clear to the local pro-Vichy Intendant de Police in November 1940[11].

The relationship between the Secret Services and Vichy was always complicated. The Secret Services were uncomfortable with the main thrust of Vichy's foreign policy. It is clear that the Secret Services did not escape all ambiguity in their attitude towards the Allies but it is also true

that generally their attitude was resolutely anti-German. When the chips were down they usually sided with the anti-German camp. For its part Vichy may have been officially neutral and some of its members, such as General Weygand, strongly anti-German but the government's overall position clearly favoured the Germans rather than the Allies. Laval was consistent in this. It seems that Darlan, on the other hand, ever the opportunist, started to be less intolerant if not of the British then at least of the Americans after his replacement by Pierre Laval as Vice-Président du Conseil in April 1942. Up to that point Darlan had clearly been, as Paxton makes clear, a firm proponent of collaboration. The diary of Laval's defence minister General Bridoux portrays Darlan as adopting a pro-allied position after the spring of 1942. Paul Paillole recounted in 1948 to the Comité d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale that he had had a farewell meeting with Admiral Darlan in early November 1942, the day before the Admiral's departure for North Africa [12]. Darlan, Paillole asserted, claimed to have turned a blind eye to the information passed onto the Allies by the Secret Services. Obviously the point merits further consideration because, if true, it might imply that Darlan, who was in receipt of Secret Service reports suggesting an imminent Allied invasion of North Africa, made up his mind to join the Allies before and not after his arrival in Algeria. Despite this it seems that on those occasions where the Secret Services gave information to the Allies they did so on their own initiative. Indeed, an instruction from Darlan a year before Paillole's farewell meeting with him shows him trying to insist that contacts of the Secret Service with the Allies and the Gaullists should be limited to those necessary for combating them and should only be pursued with the consent of the government[13]. This implies that up till that point they had not been.

One of the things I highlight in the book, which has not gone down well with the Secret Service community, is the suggestion that they may have had a degree of affinity for Vichy's internal programme. My interpretation on this appears to concur with that of the members of this panel- many of whom have worked directly on these questions. Although the Secret Services clearly never had any liking for civilian politicians of the ilk of Pierre Laval, it is my conviction that the coming to power of a traditionalist, military dominated regime would have been viewed favourably by this ultra-conservative community. Weygand seems to have been very much their man. He has assumed almost demi-God status in the pages of the Secret Service veteran's association's bulletin in the post war period. As we well know Weygand was one of the most fervent supporters of the National Revolution. Even when the Secret Services did break off institutionally from Vichy after November 1942 they opted to side with General Giraud and only slowly accepted the authority of General de Gaulle. Andrew Shennan is just one of many historians to underline that Giraud's "politics were barely distinguishable from those of Vichy"[14]. With regard to the attitude of the Secret Services towards Vichy's internal policies I do also quote some more concrete examples of pro- Vichy declarations on the part of members of these services. I give a number of quotes from the diary of a member of the Deuxième Bureau underlying his joy at the end of democracy and the institution of an authoritarian state (page 102). On page 89, I quote the reaction of an agent of the Travaux Ruraux (TR) network after the Mers El-Kebir incident when the British sunk part of the French fleet. This agent noted in his diary: « Allons avoir de grosses difficultés, l'Angleterre va nous susciter mille 'ennuis'- elle va animer communistes, socialistes et Juifs »- an assertion which does not exactly seem hostile to the philosophy of Vichy. As I underline on page 88 Capitaine Bernard, also of the TR network, stated quite clearly that one of the objections of the military class to the Gaullists was that they

devote so much space to criticising Vichy's internal program. Robert Terres, also of the TR, presented his superiors as « des milieux ultra-vichystes » (page 85).

Paillole is actually less explicit than his colleagues in his support for Vichy's internal program. For example, only once in all the documentation that I consulted does he make explicit reference to the Jews. This is in his book *Les Services Spéciaux* where he describes how it was only when a German Jew whom he was interrogating spat in his face that he realised the full humiliation of the defeat. But this is not presented in an anti-Semitic fashion. Where I do believe Paillole is making more explicit a support for Pétain's regime is in the quote I give on page 100. In an administrative report written in July 1941 for the Deuxième Bureau he states: « Le pays abattu, ruiné, divisé, est chaque jour davantage exposé aux coups furieux de ses nombreux ennemis. Il appartient à TR, spécialement en Zone Occupée, d'aider en toute objectivité et sans passion partisane, ceux qui ont la lourde charge de le relever »[15]. One of the things which I should have shown more clearly in the book is why I think this is a pro-Vichy statement. It is my belief, and this of course is a personal interpretation, that this statement is a reference to a speech by Marshal Philippe Pétain made on Wednesday 23 July 1941 to a military audience in Aix-en-Provence. It is likely that senior members of the Travaux Ruraux based in Marseille attended this meeting. Even if they did not attend in person the speech was broadcast by the radio. In this speech Pétain outlined the difficulties the government faced in rebuilding the country: « Nous sommes tombés si bas, l'an dernier, qu'il ne faut pas penser à autre chose qu'à nous relever, à remonter la pente ». He described this as « cette tâche très lourde ». He drew attention to the particular difficulties the government faced in administering the occupied zone (hence perhaps the reference in Paillole's report). He called on the military to work for the government « Celui-ci a besoin que vous suiviez sa trace, que vous marchiez selon ses vues ».

The TR report from July which I have just quoted ends on the following conclusion: « Sans routine, ni particularisme, TR luttera loyalement, de toutes ses forces, avec ceux qui comme lui, concourent à l'assainissement et à la Libération de la Patrie ». Historians have clearly established that Pétain was not playing a double game but many at the time believed that he was. On occasion Pétain did play on this belief by making ambiguous statements. Thus in a radio speech of 19 March 1941, he said that the National Revolution was preparing the country « pour le jour où la France redeviendra libre » (without however specifying how this freedom would come about). In the July speech to the army in Aix-en-Provence, he again made an ambiguous statement: « Il ne faut pas abandonner notre préparation militaire. Il faut même être prêt à toute éventualité ». The vagueness of the statement clearly left open the interpretation that Pétain was working towards French revenge against Germany[16].

We know that Pétain had an immense personal following in the first couple of years after the armistice. Robert Belot, in his biography of Henri Frenay, underlines how this support for Marshal Pétain was particularly prevalent in military circles where many continued to believe in a Pétainist double-game: « Lorsque Frenay rencontre en août 1940 le futur général Chevance-Bertin (...) il lui explique que 'ce que Pétain ne peut pas faire lui-même, nous allons le faire officieusement' » [17]. Frenay and Paillole may well have been under the same illusion on this as Belot implies, but both Belot and indeed Paillole make clear the two men chose very different political paths[18]. Frenay decided it was impossible to work within a Vichy framework because it would inevitably lead to compromises. Paillole, on the other hand, clearly believed that the

ambiguities involved in working for Vichy did not outweigh the benefits. Both men reached these decisions based on their own patriotic reasons. Indeed it is interesting to note that in the documentation I have consulted nobody, not even his rivals or opponents, challenges Paillolle's sense of patriotism. Martin Thomas is right to underline that they may have been fervently anti-communist and sometimes reactionary but the intelligence officers at the heart of this book were first and foremost patriots.

I hope that all reviewers and readers of the book will take into account just how difficult this book was to write. There is nothing thornier to work on than areas of extreme ambiguity. And ambiguities and complexities do not come in more extreme forms than those at the very heart of the subject matter of this book. This is not a subject that I am currently intending to work on again and I am only too happy to pass the baton to the group of historians who have started work in this field. I am particularly pleased to see that French scholars have begun to take Secret Service history seriously. Excellent work has already been published by Sébastien Laurent and Olivier Forcade. A thesis is also underway about the *Surveillance du Territoire* (ST) during the war. Under the expert guidance of Jean-Marc Berlière, this thesis is being researched by Gaby Castaing. From my discussions with her I am confident that she will produce quality research and expect excellent things from her.

Although my text is based on extensive archival research from a wide range of sources, like *all* historical studies the book represents an *interpretation* of past events. It is not the definitive history and as I say in my introduction other historians are free to challenge my conclusions. I saw a huge number of archives but one person could not possibly see all the documents available on this subject. Other historians might be able to add to my findings or alternatively contradict them on various points. In particular, as the reviewers in this panel rightly underline, there is a history of the Secret Services beyond the two years I cover here. Some of this has already been the subject of excellent work, including by some of those on this panel, but there are still areas of Secret Service history which merit much greater attention. I shall watch this debate unfolding...from a distance.

Notes:

[1] AN (Archives Nationales) 72AJ 82, Unpublished memoirs of Louis Rivet, p 7.

[2] J.Britsch, *Nous n'accepterons pas la défaite*, (*Journal 1940-45*), Neuilly-sur-Seine, undated.

[3] Roland Nosek of the Sicherheitsdienst said that the German Services blamed Commissaires Léonard and more particularly Blémant for the violence inflicted upon their agents in interrogations: SHAT (Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre) 1K 545 5, Interrogatoire du SS Hauptsturmführer NOSEK, Roland, undated but probably 1945.

[4] AN 3W 91, le Commissaire Principal de la Surveillance du Territoire, Marseille à M Le directeur de la Police de Sûreté, Vichy, n° 4488, 15 November 1942.

[5] An outline of some of his activity against the Allies can be found in AN 72 AJ 1912, Témoignage de M Stanislas Mangin, recueilli par Melle Goineau, 16 and 26 October and 6, 13 et

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20 November 1951. See also: Henri Noguères, *La vie quotidienne des résistants de l'armistice à la libération*, Paris, Hachette, 1981, p 103.

[6]AN F1A 3341, P.V. Sous-Commission d'épuration, 7 Avril 1945.

[7] Henri Noguères, *La vie quotidienne des résistants de l'armistice à la libération*, Paris, Hachette, 1981, p 102. See also Daniel Cordier, *Jean Moulin, l'inconnu du Panthéon*, Vol 3, Paris, 1993, p 695.

[8] Henri Noguères, *La vie quotidienne des résistants de l'armistice à la libération*, Paris, Hachette, 1981, p 103 ; Philippe Bernert, *Roger Wybot et la bataille pour la DST*, Paris, Presses de la Cite, 1975, pp 37-38.

[9]AN 72AJ 82, Général Louis Rivet, "Défense du SR français: réplique à un chapitre du volume 'D'Alger à Paris', de Monsieur Jacques Soutelle", Pamphlet written in Paris in December 1951.

[10] SHAT IK 545 carton 15.

[11] SHAT 'Fonds de Moscou' 1095/1415, Compte-rendu de mission du lieutenant- colonel d'Alès à Marseille, Montpellier et Toulouse, 8 novembre 1940.

[12]AN 72AJ82, Comité d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale entretiens avec Paul Paillole, April and May 1948.

[13] AN 72AJ 82, L'Amiral de la Flotte, Ministre, Vice-Président du Conseil (signé F Darlan) à M le Général d'Armée, Ministre, Secrétaire d'Etat à la Guerre, N° 17/SGA, Vichy, 6 October 1941. The text was as follows : « Divers incidents ont montré qu'une équivoque pouvait subsister sur l'attitude à adopter à l'égard des Service de Renseignements étrangers. J'ai l'honneur de vous prier d'inviter vos Services de Renseignements, quels qu'ils soient, à s'abstenir de toute relation avec les Services de Renseignements anglais et anglo-gaulliste. Les circonstances qui paraîtraient nécessiter l'établissement de contacts indirects, par exemple dans le but de combattre l'activité de ces SR seront soumises à l'appréciation du Vice-Président du Conseil (Centre d'Information Gouvernementale) ».

[14] Andrew Shennan, *Rethinking France, Plans for Renewal, 1940-1946*, Oxford, OUP, 1989, p 36.

[15] SHAT 'Fonds Paillole' 1K 545 9, 'TR a un an d'existence', Rapport de TR, juillet 1941.

[16] Exerts from Pétain speeches taken from Jean-Claude Barbas (ed), *Philippe Pétain : discours aux Français*, Paris, Albin Michel, 1989, pp 117-118 & 161- 163.

[17] Robert Belot, *Henri Frenay, de la résistance à l'Europe*, Paris, Seuil, p 119.

[18] Paul Paillole, *_Services Spéciaux_*, Paris, Plon, 1975, p 276. Robert Belot, *Henri Frenay, de la résistance à l'Europe*, Paris, Seuil, p 129.

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