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**“As Historians, We Have Responsibilities: Final Comments on Discrepancies between Qing Simei’s Citations and Sources”** by Chen Jian, Cornell University

**Re:** Response by Simei Qing, James Madison College, Michigan State University. URL: <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/RT-XI-44-Qing-furtherfurther-response.pdf>

**Re:** “Serious Concerns: Discrepancies between Qing’s Citations and Her Sources,” by Chen Jian, Cornell University. URL: <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/RT-XI-44-ChenJian-SeriousConcerns.pdf>

**Re:** H-Diplo Roundtable Review of Simei Qing, *From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity, and U.S.-China Diplomacy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007. Published on 13 October 2010. URL: <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-XI-44.pdf>

**See Also:** Reviews by Shen Zhihua, <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/RT-XI-44-ShenZhihua.pdf>, and by Yafeng Xia, <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/RT-XI-44-YafengXia.pdf>

**The roundtable:** <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-XI-44.pdf>

Stable URL: <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/RT-XI-44-ChenJian-FinalResponse.pdf>

### Final Comments by Chen Jian, Cornell University

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I present in this essay my final comments on the discrepancies between Professor Qing Simei’s citations and her sources. I feel obliged to do so because this is a matter concerning the essence of historical study. I am very grateful for the comments by

Professors Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng,<sup>1</sup> which not only clarified the basic facts that Qing's response had obscured but also confirmed my contention that Qing's way of citing sources is seriously flawed. On the basis of the reviews by Shen and Xia, I address in this essay the problems in Qing's citations that are in need of further clarification. Most important of all, I would like to emphasize that as historians, it is our responsibility to cite sources accurately, which is one of the central components of the norms and codes of our profession.

### **More on Qing's Mishandling of Quotations**

The highlight of Qing's response is that she posted a photocopy of the Chinese text from pages 7-8 of *Mao Zedong yu Kangmei yuanchao* (*Mao and Resisting American and Assisting Korea*) by Pang Xianzhi and Li Jie, together with a "word-by-word" English translation.<sup>2</sup> She did this to rebut, literally and visually, my contention that her quote failed to match her source. The way she presented the case created an impression that I could not or did not read the Chinese text and, thus, totally misconstrued the case. However, as Xia pointed out, the reality is that Qing handled this case (especially in citing Mao saying that the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel "was the 'bottom line' in our final decision to enter the Korean War" ) by confusing the quotation marks Pang and Li used to highlight their own points with the quotation marks they used to quote Mao. Here, I would like to call the reader's attention to the fact that in Qing's response, although she offered the Chinese text and a "word-by-word" translation of it, she omitted her own quotation that should match the Chinese text. Consequently, her rebuttal drew upon the "word-by-word" translation of the Chinese text, rather than her actual citation of it, as the focus of her comparison. If readers do not cross-check her quotation and compare it with the Chinese text (and the translation), therefore, they could be confused and misled. Thus, a direct comparison of Qing's quote and the text that it is alleged to match is necessary.

In the following two columns, the left contains the "quote" that Qing offers on page 161 of her book *From Allies to Enemies*;<sup>3</sup> the right column is the "word-by-word" translation, also provided by Qing herself, of the Chinese text upon which the quote on the left should be based:

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<sup>1</sup> Review of "Qing Simei/Chen Jian Recent Exchanges in H-Diplo" by Shen Zhihua, <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/RT-XI-44-ShenZhihua.pdf>; and Review of "Qing Simei/Chen Jian Recent Exchanges in H-Diplo" by Xia Yafeng, <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/RT-XI-44-YafengXia.pdf>.

<sup>2</sup> Response by Qing Simei to "Serious Concerns: Discrepancies between Qing's Citations and Her Sources," by Chen Jian, <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/RT-XI-44-Qing-furtherfurther-response.pdf>, pp. 3-4.

<sup>3</sup> Qing Simei, *From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity, and U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1945-1960* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).

And as Mao told a Soviet Central Committee delegation in September 1956, "Our 'bottom line' in the Korean War was whether US troops would cross the 38th parallel. If the Americans intervened, but decided not to cross the 38th parallel, we would not join the Korean War. However, should US troops cross the 38th parallel, we would send our troops cross the Yalu. That was the 'bottom line' in our final decision to enter the Korean War."<sup>59</sup>

59. Mao Zedong's conversation with the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Delegation, September 23, 1956, in Pang and Li, *Mao Zedong yu Kangmei yuanchao* (Mao Zedong and the Korean War), pp. 7-8.

However, whether China would send its troops, Mao Zedong had a "bottom line," this "bottom line" was whether American troops would cross the 38th parallel. "Should American imperialists intervene, and would not cross the 38th parallel, we would not intervene, should they cross the 38th parallel, we would certainly send troops to Korea." (1)

(1) Mao Zedong's conversation with the delegation of the Soviet Communist Party, September 23, 1956.

Comparing the above, it becomes crystal clear that Qing's "quotation" of Mao actually is composed of three parts: Pang and Li's words, Mao's words, and Qing's own words. In the Pang-Li book it is the two authors who argue that "However, whether China would send its troops, Mao Zedong had a 'bottom line,' this 'bottom line' was whether American troops would cross the 38th parallel." In fact, this is a point contentious among historians.<sup>4</sup> Pang and Li quote the excerpt from Mao's conversation with the Soviet delegation in 1956 to support their own argument.

In Qing's block quotation, however, she changed the two authors' argument into Mao's own words, and added a sentence of her own, "That was the 'bottom line' in our final decision to enter the Korean War." The sentence does not exist in the text of the Pang-Li book.

The mishandling of the source in this case is not an isolated accident. As Xia noticed, in Qing's response to my essay, she failed to answer my question about how, in quoting Mao's statement at a Politburo meeting on August 4, 1950, a sentence that does not exist in the original text ("should MacArthur's troops cross the 38th parallel") appeared in her "quote."<sup>5</sup> In fact, there are other similar examples. On page 167 of Qing's *From Allies to Enemies*, in quoting Mao's discussion about what the Americans might do in a counteroffensive in Korea, she added to the quote the sentence: "and then to cross the 38th parallel." Again, this line does not exist in the original text.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, Michael M. Sheng, "Mao and the Korean War: A Personality Account," *The New England Journal of History*, Spring 2004, pp. 212-226; "The Psychology of the Korean War: The Role of Ideology and Perception in China's Entry Into the War," *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, Spring 2002, pp. 56-72; "Beijing's Decision to Enter the Korean War: A Reappraisal and New Documentation," *Korean and World Affairs*, vol. 19, 1995, pp. 294-313.

<sup>5</sup> Review by Xia, p. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Qing quotes on the page that Mao "warned the North Korean comrades of the grave danger that MacArthur's troops could land on Inchon from the sea, to cut off the advancing North Korean army's retreat route, and then to cross the Yalu." The last part of the quote, "and then to cross the Yalu," is added by Qing.

Qing's work attaches exclusive importance to the role that the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel played in Beijing's decision to enter the Korean War. By altering the sources in her citations, however, she undermines, rather than strengthens, the validity of her argument.

The examples discussed above epitomize a number of similar problems in Qing's writings. Let me discuss here just one more of them, in which Qing quotes from the English edition of *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (Mao Zedong). The example provides an opportunity for non-Chinese readers to examine and compare her citation with the original text.

On pages 117-118 of Qing's *From Allies to Enemies*, she quotes Mao as follows (I use here a photocopy of the text):

"In name," Mao claimed, the new government was called the "people's democratic dictatorship"; yet "in nature, it is a coalition government." According to Mao, the new political system was based on the theory of New Democracy, or a coalition between the working class, the poor peasants, the intellectuals, and the private entrepreneurs or "national industrialists," led by the CCP. It was not "an old democratic political system" like that of the West, Mao said. He quoted Sun Yat-sen's critiques of Western democracy as largely "a system for the rich, not a system for the poor," to make his point. On the other hand, Mao also stressed that this "new democratic polity" in China was not a one-party communist government like that in the Soviet Union: "Russian history has shaped the Soviet system. . . . In the same way, Chinese history will shape the Chinese system. The system of New Democracy . . . will be entirely appropriate to the Chinese situation, and will be very different from the system of the Soviet Union."<sup>15</sup>

15. Mao Zedong, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. 4 (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1961), pp. 411-424.

I attach to this essay, as Appendix I, the text of Mao's "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship" from Qing's source, the English edition of *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*. Nowhere in it can one find the phrase: "In name, Mao claimed, the new government was called the 'people's democratic dictatorship'; yet 'in nature, it is a coalition government.'" Nowhere in it is the block quotation: "Russian history has shaped the Soviet system.... In the same way, Chinese history will shape the Chinese system. The system of New Democracy... will be entirely appropriate to the Chinese situation, and will be very different from the system of the Soviet Union."

Regardless how Qing has come up with these quotes, they are completely incompatible with what Mao actually stated in the text. This, I must emphasize, is in fact Mao's "lean-to-one-side" statement—one of the most important Mao texts—in which Mao defines such fundamental issues as the essence and identity of the "New China," and articulates China's path toward modernity in both his own and the CCP's terms.

In my earlier H-Diplo essay (p. 4), I pointed out that Qing's citation of what Zhou Enlai said during a meeting with Roshchin on November 15, 1949 does not exist in her source. In Qing's response, instead of answering my question, she defended herself by quoting a series of Zhou's other statements. Professor Shen's comment that "Professor Qing should not 'quote' something that does not exist in the original document"<sup>7</sup> has made the problem of this case very clear.

Considering that most of H-Diplo's readers may not have ready access to the Russian original of the transcript, or its Chinese translation, I have made the relevant part of the document available as Appendix II to this essay. Two Cornell University Ph.D. students, Christopher Tang and Zhou Taomo, translated the document into English. As readers can see, nowhere in the transcript does Zhou make any statement, as Qing quotes, to the effect that "if China had to be involved in a war, it would be a 'fatal blow' to the Chinese economic recovery." As for what comprises the "key points" of the transcript, readers may arrive at their own judgments by studying the document and comparing it with Qing's "summary" of its contents.

### **Mao's and the CCP leadership's decision-making in early October 1950**

In Qing's response, she emphasizes that she holds different interpretations from me concerning Beijing's decision-making in early October 1950, which I presented in *China's Road to the Korean War*.<sup>8</sup> The book was published almost two decades ago; that it is still remembered is a form of flattery. I truly welcome Qing's challenge, but I regret that she has misread my work in addition to mishandling the sources.

Qing states that "Professor Chen said that the CCP leadership made the **final decision** to enter the war immediately at the meeting in the afternoon of October 2" (emphasis is Qing's).<sup>9</sup> This is a complete misrepresentation. In *China's Road to the Korean War*, I point out that "the decision to send troops to Korea was certainly the most difficult one that Mao and his fellow CCP leaders had to make in the early years of the PRC."<sup>10</sup> In describing Beijing's decision-making process in October 1950, I use "the first decision," "the second decision," and "the final decision" to highlight how difficult, complicated, and tortuous it all had been. On page 207 of my book, one finds the section title, "The Final Decision: October 18"—that is, one day before Chinese troops crossed the Yalu.

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<sup>7</sup> Review by Shen, p. 2.

<sup>8</sup> Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Chinese-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

<sup>9</sup> Qing, response, p. 18.

<sup>10</sup> Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War*, p. 217.

I wrote *China's Road to the Korean War* in the early 1990s with the support of the sources available at the time—that is, before the declassification of Korean War-related Russian documents, which occurred in 1994 as a truly exciting moment for all of us working in the field. Upon learning that there existed a sharp discrepancy between the Chinese and Russian versions of Mao's October 2, 1950 message to Stalin, I was the very first to investigate the reasons why this had been so. Reflecting the results of this investigation, my "Preface to the Paperback Edition" of *China's Road to the Korean War* (1996) discussed the discrepancy between the two versions of Mao's message to Stalin. It further articulated the implications for the scholarship of the origins of the Korean War in general, and my own study of China's road to the Korean War in particular.<sup>11</sup> In light of new Russian sources, I revisited the Chinese sources I had used, and have since revised some of my concrete accounts of the details of China's path toward the war, including what happened in Beijing on October 1-2, 1950.<sup>12</sup> At the same time, I also found that "the main conclusions drawn here (in *China's Road to the Korean War*) are consistent with new documentation."<sup>13</sup>

Even with the support of the new Russian documentation, however, it remains a daunting challenge for historians to reconstruct the exact "sequence of events" in Beijing on October 2, 1950, as key Chinese documents are still missing. Although Qing claims that she "presented declassified Russian and Chinese documents" to support her construction, her writings clearly indicate that she relied completely on the Russian version of Mao's message to Stalin to support her contention. Neither in Qing's H-Diplo roundtable essay nor in her response essay does she quote any Chinese source to support her description of the CCP leadership's activities on October 2. Tracing this back to her book, she cites one Chinese source (Marshall Nie Rongzhen's memoirs) to support her description of the CCP leadership's meeting on the afternoon of October 2.<sup>14</sup> This source was published in 1984, however, and in it Marshal Nie offers only a very general account about how difficult it had been for the CCP leadership to make the decision to enter the war in October 1950. He provides no specific time reference, let alone any mention of the CCP leadership's meeting on October 2.<sup>15</sup> With the support of this source, it is impossible for Qing to either establish the "sequence of events" on October 2, or to ascertain the "nature of the discussions that occurred at the meeting" that afternoon.

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<sup>11</sup> Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War* (1996 paperback edition), pp. x-xii.

<sup>12</sup> Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), Chapters 3 and 4; Chen Jian, "In the Name of Revolution: China's Road to the Korean War Revisited," in William Stueck ed., *The Korean War in World History* (Lexington, KY: The University of Kentucky Press, 2004), pp. 93-125; and Chen Jian, "Reorienting the Cold War: The Implications of China's Early Cold War Experience, Taking Korea as a Central Case," in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ed., *The Cold War in East Asia, 1945-1991* (Washington D.C and Stanford, CA: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 2011), pp. 81-97.,

<sup>13</sup> Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War*, p. ix.

<sup>14</sup> Qing, *From Allies to Enemies*, p. 155.

<sup>15</sup> Nie Rongzhen, *Nie Rongzhen huiyilu* (Nie Rongzhen's Memoirs) (Beijing: Jiefangjun, 1984), pp. 735-736.

## Significance of the Case

The exchanges between Professor Qing and myself have occurred within the context of a particular moment in the study of international history – namely, the age of multi-archival, multi-source and multilingual research. This unique environment has provided scholars of international history with both unprecedented opportunities and new challenges. In the pursuit of nuanced narratives and fresh, meaningful interpretations, historians have benefited enormously from source materials previously unavailable or inaccessible. At the same time, the works produced from these sources have oftentimes presented insurmountable difficulties for observing scholars and readers to check or trace the sources cited. It is thus, now more than ever, necessary for historians working with foreign-language materials to cite these sources accurately, and to clearly define the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate citations. Just as the scientist has a responsibility to accurately portray his/her test data, so too the historian must accurately marshal his/her source material. This is the essence of historical research and writing, and this is the principal reason why I have stood up to express my serious concerns regarding the discrepancies between Qing's citations and her sources. To be sure, this is a very saddening case. And it is alarming that a book containing such basic flaws passed the review process of one of the world's most prestigious university presses. But it has happened, and as historians we must draw lessons from it. As I pointed out in my earlier essay, "At stake here is a larger matter—one that all of us face—concerning the norms, standards, and codes of behavior in an age of multi-archival, multi-source, and multilingual research."

## Appendix I [begins on the next page]

### **Photo copy of Mao Zedong, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship"**

Source: *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1961), vol. 4, pp. 411-424.

# SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG

## Volume IV

FOREIGN LANGUAGES PRESS  
PEKING 1961

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MAO TSE-TUNG

truth because it does not want to be overthrown. To be overthrown is painful and is unbearable to contemplate for those overthrown, for example, for the Kuomintang reactionaries whom we are now overthrowing and for Japanese imperialism which we together with other peoples overthrew some time ago. But for the working class, the labouring people and the Communist Party the question is not one of being overthrown, but of working hard to create the conditions in which classes, state power and political parties will die out very naturally and mankind will enter the realm of Great Harmony.<sup>1</sup> We have mentioned in passing the long-range perspective of human progress in order to explain clearly the problems we are about to discuss.

As everyone knows, our Party passed through these twenty-eight years not in peace but amid hardships, for we had to fight enemies, both foreign and domestic, both inside and outside the Party. We thank Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin for giving us a weapon. This weapon is not a machine-gun, but Marxism-Leninism.

In his book *"Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder* written in 1920, Lenin described the quest of the Russians for revolutionary theory.<sup>2</sup> Only after several decades of hardship and suffering did the Russians find Marxism. Many things in China were the same as, or similar to, those in Russia before the October Revolution. There was the same feudal oppression. There was similar economic and cultural backwardness. Both countries were backward, China even more so. In both countries alike, for the sake of national regeneration progressives braved hard and bitter struggles in their quest for revolutionary truth.

From the time of China's defeat in the Opium War of 1840,<sup>3</sup> Chinese progressives went through untold hardships in their quest for truth from the Western countries. Hung Hsiu-chuan,<sup>4</sup> Kang Yu-wei,<sup>5</sup> Yen Fu<sup>6</sup> and Sun Yat-sen were representative of those who had looked to the West for truth before the Communist Party of China was born. Chinese who then sought progress would read any book containing the new knowledge from the West. The number of students sent to Japan, Britain, the United States, France and Germany was amazing. At home, the imperial examinations<sup>7</sup> were abolished and modern schools sprang up like bamboo shoots after a spring rain; every effort was made to learn from the West. In my youth, I too engaged in such studies. They represented the culture of Western bourgeois democracy, including the social theories and natural sciences of that period, and they were called "the new learning" in contrast to

## ON THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP

In Commemoration of the Twenty-eighth Anniversary  
of the Communist Party of China

June 30, 1949

The first of July 1949 marks the fact that the Communist Party of China has already lived through twenty-eight years. Like a man, a political party has its childhood, youth, manhood and old age. The Communist Party of China is no longer a child or a lad in his teens but has become an adult. When a man reaches old age, he will die; the same is true of a party. When classes disappear, all instruments of class struggle – parties and the state machinery – will lose their function, cease to be necessary, therefore gradually wither away and end their historical mission; and human society will move to a higher stage. We are the opposite of the political parties of the bourgeoisie. They are afraid to speak of the extinction of classes, state power and parties. We, on the contrary, declare openly that we are striving hard to create the very conditions which will bring about their extinction. The leadership of the Communist Party and the state power of the people's dictatorship are such conditions. Anyone who does not recognize this truth is no communist. Young comrades who have not studied Marxism-Leninism and have only recently joined the Party may not yet understand this truth. They must understand it – only then can they have a correct world outlook. They must understand that the road to the abolition of classes, to the abolition of state power and to the abolition of parties is the road all mankind must take; it is only a question of time and conditions. Communists the world over are wiser than the bourgeoisie, they understand the laws governing the existence and development of things, they understand dialectics and they can see farther. The bourgeoisie does not welcome this

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Chinese feudal culture, which was called "the old learning". For quite a long time, those who had acquired the new learning felt confident that it would save China, and very few of them had any doubts on this score, as the adherents of the old learning had. Only modernization could save China, only learning from foreign countries could modernize China. Among the foreign countries, only the Western capitalist countries were then progressive, as they had successfully built modern bourgeois states. The Japanese had been successful in learning from the West, and the Chinese also wished to learn from the Japanese. The Chinese in those days regarded Russia as backward, and few wanted to learn from her. That was how the Chinese tried to learn from foreign countries in the period from the 1840s to the beginning of the 20th century.

Imperialist aggression shattered the fond dreams of the Chinese about learning from the West. It was very odd – why were the teachers always committing aggression against their pupil? The Chinese learned a good deal from the West, but they could not make it work and were never able to realize their ideals. Their repeated struggles, including such a country-wide movement as the Revolution of 1911,<sup>8</sup> all ended in failure. Day by day, conditions in the country got worse, and life was made impossible. Doubts arose, increased and deepened. World War I shook the whole globe. The Russians made the October Revolution and created the world's first socialist state. Under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin, the revolutionary energy of the great proletariat and labouring people of Russia, hitherto latent and unseen by foreigners, suddenly erupted like a volcano, and the Chinese and all mankind began to see the Russians in a new light. Then, and only then, did the Chinese enter an entirely new era in their thinking and their life. They found Marxism-Leninism, the universally applicable truth, and the face of China began to change.

It was through the Russians that the Chinese found Marxism. Before the October Revolution, the Chinese were not only ignorant of Lenin and Stalin, they did not even know of Marx and Engels. The salvos of the October Revolution brought us Marxism-Leninism. The October Revolution helped progressives in China, as throughout the world, to adopt the proletarian world outlook as the instrument for studying a nation's destiny and considering anew their own problems. Follow the path of the Russians – that was their conclusion. In 1919, the May 4th Movement took place in China. In 1921, the Communist Party of China was founded. Sun Yat-sen, in the depths of despair,



came across the October Revolution and the Communist Party of China. He welcomed the October Revolution, welcomed Russian help to the Chinese and welcomed co-operation with the Communist Party of China. Then Sun Yat-sen died and Chiang Kai-shek rose to power. Over a long period of twenty-two years, Chiang Kai-shek dragged China into ever more hopeless straits. In this period, during the anti-fascist Second World War in which the Soviet Union was the main force, three big imperialist powers were knocked out, while two others were weakened. In the whole world only one big imperialist power, the United States of America, remained uninjured. But the United States faced a grave domestic crisis. It wanted to enslave the whole world; it supplied arms to help Chiang Kai-shek slaughter several million Chinese. Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese people, after driving out Japanese imperialism, waged the People's War of Liberation for three years and have basically won victory.

Thus Western bourgeois civilization, bourgeois democracy and the plan for a bourgeois republic have all gone bankrupt in the eyes of the Chinese people. Bourgeois democracy has given way to people's democracy under the leadership of the working class and the bourgeois republic to the people's republic. This has made it possible to achieve socialism and communism through the people's republic, to abolish classes and enter a world of Great Harmony. Kang Yu-wei wrote *Ta Tung Shu*, or the *Book of Great Harmony*, but he did not and could not find the way to achieve Great Harmony. There are bourgeois republics in foreign lands, but China cannot have a bourgeois republic because she is a country suffering under imperialist oppression. The only way is through a people's republic led by the working class.

All other ways have been tried and failed. Of the people who hankered after those ways, some have fallen, some have awakened and some are changing their ideas. Events are developing so swiftly that many feel the abruptness of the change and the need to learn anew. This state of mind is understandable and we welcome this worthy desire to learn anew.

The vanguard of the Chinese proletariat learned Marxism-Leninism after the October Revolution and founded the Communist Party of China. It entered at once into political struggles and only now, after a tortuous course of twenty-eight years, has it won basic victory. From our twenty-eight years' experience we have drawn a conclusion similar to the one Sun Yat-sen drew in his testament from his "experience of forty years"; that is, we are deeply convinced that to win victory, "we

reactionaries. Only if we draw a clear line between reactionaries and revolutionaries, expose the intrigues and plots of the reactionaries, arouse the vigilance and attention of the revolutionary ranks, heighten our will to fight and crush the enemy's arrogance can we isolate the reactionaries, vanquish them or supersede them. We must not show the slightest timidity before a wild beast. We must learn from Wu Sung<sup>9</sup> on the Chingyang Ridge. As Wu Sung saw it, the tiger on Chingyang Ridge was a man-eater, whether irritated or not. Either kill the tiger or be eaten by him — one or the other.

"We want to do business." Quite right, business will be done. We are against no one except the domestic and foreign reactionaries who hinder us from doing business. Everybody should know that it is none other than the imperialists and their running dogs, the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries, who hinder us from doing business and also from establishing diplomatic relations with foreign countries. When we have beaten the internal and external reactionaries by uniting all domestic and international forces, we shall be able to do business and establish diplomatic relations with all foreign countries on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty.

"Victory is possible even without international help." This is a mistaken idea. In the epoch in which imperialism exists, it is impossible for a genuine people's revolution to win victory in any country without various forms of help from the international revolutionary forces, and even if victory were won, it could not be consolidated. This was the case with the victory and consolidation of the great October Revolution, as Lenin and Stalin told us long ago. This was also the case with the overthrow of the three imperialist powers in World War II and the establishment of the People's Democracies. And this is also the case with the present and the future of People's China. Just imagine! If the Soviet Union had not existed, if there had been no victory in the anti-fascist Second World War, if Japanese imperialism had not been defeated, if the People's Democracies had not come into being, if the oppressed nations of the East were not rising in struggle and if there were no struggle of the masses of the people against their reactionary rulers in the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and other capitalist countries — if not for all these in combination, the international reactionary forces bearing down upon us would certainly be many times greater than now. In such circumstances, could we have won victory? Obviously not.

must arouse the masses of the people and unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us as equals". Sun Yat-sen had a world outlook different from ours and started from a different class standpoint in studying and tackling problems; yet, in the 1920s he reached a conclusion basically the same as ours on the question of how to struggle against imperialism.

Twenty-four years have passed since Sun Yat-sen's death, and the Chinese revolution, led by the Communist Party of China, has made tremendous advances both in theory and practice and has radically changed the face of China. Up to now the principal and fundamental experience the Chinese people have gained is twofold:

(1) Internally, arouse the masses of the people. That is, unite the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, form a domestic united front under the leadership of the working class, and advance from this to the establishment of a state which is a people's democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants.

(2) Externally, unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us as equals and unite with the peoples of all countries. That is, ally ourselves with the Soviet Union, with the People's Democracies and with the proletariat and the broad masses of the people in all other countries, and form an international united front.

"You are leaning to one side." Exactly. The forty years' experience of Sun Yat-sen and the twenty-eight years' experience of the Communist Party have taught us to lean to one side, and we are firmly convinced that in order to win victory and consolidate it we must lean to one side. In the light of the experiences accumulated in these forty years and these twenty-eight years, all Chinese without exception must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road. We oppose the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries who lean to the side of imperialism, and we also oppose the illusions about a third road.

"You are too irritating." We are talking about how to deal with domestic and foreign reactionaries, the imperialists and their running dogs, not about how to deal with anyone else. With regard to such reactionaries, the question of irritating them or not does not arise. Irritated or not irritated, they will remain the same because they are

And even with victory, there could be no consolidation. The Chinese people have had more than enough experience of this kind. This experience was reflected long ago in Sun Yat-sen's death-bed statement on the necessity of uniting with the international revolutionary forces.

"We need help from the British and U.S. governments." This, too, is a naive idea in these times. Would the present rulers of Britain and the United States, who are imperialists, help a people's state? Why do these countries do business with us and, supposing they might be willing to lend us money on terms of mutual benefit in the future, why would they do so? Because their capitalists want to make money and their bankers want to earn interest to extricate themselves from their own crisis — it is not a matter of helping the Chinese people. The Communist Parties and progressive groups in these countries are urging their governments to establish trade and even diplomatic relations with us. This is goodwill, this is help, this cannot be mentioned in the same breath with the conduct of the bourgeoisie in the same countries. Throughout his life, Sun Yat-sen appealed countless times to the capitalist countries for help and got nothing but heartless rebuffs. Only once in his whole life did Sun Yat-sen receive foreign help, and that was Soviet help. Let readers refer to Dr. Sun Yat-sen's testament; his earnest advice was not to look for help from the imperialist countries but to "unite with those nations of the world which treat us as equals". Dr. Sun had experience; he had suffered, he had been deceived. We should remember his words and not allow ourselves to be deceived again. Internationally, we belong to the side of the anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet Union, and so we can turn only to this side for genuine and friendly help, not to the side of the imperialist front.

"You are dictatorial." My dear sirs, you are right, that is just what we are. All the experience the Chinese people have accumulated through several decades teaches us to enforce the people's democratic dictatorship, that is, to deprive the reactionaries of the right to speak and let the people alone have that right.

Who are the people? At the present stage in China, they are the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. These classes, led by the working class and the Communist Party, unite to form their own state and elect their own government; they enforce their dictatorship over the running dogs of imperialism — the landlord class and bureaucrat-bourgeoisie, as well as

the representatives of those classes, the Kuomintang reactionaries and their accomplices – suppress them, allow them only to behave themselves and not to be unruly in word or deed. If they speak or act in an unruly way, they will be promptly stopped and punished. Democracy is practised within the ranks of the people, who enjoy the rights of freedom of speech, assembly, association and so on. The right to vote belongs only to the people, not to the reactionaries. The combination of these two aspects, democracy for the people and dictatorship over the reactionaries, is the people's democratic dictatorship.

Why must things be done this way? The reason is quite clear to everybody. If things were not done this way, the revolution would fail, the people would suffer, the country would be conquered.

"Don't you want to abolish state power?" Yes, we do, but not right now; we cannot do it yet. Why? Because imperialism still exists, because domestic reaction still exists, because classes still exist in our country. Our present task is to strengthen the people's state apparatus – mainly the people's army, the people's police and the people's courts – in order to consolidate national defence and protect the people's interests. Given this condition, China can develop steadily, under the leadership of the working class and the Communist Party, from an agricultural into an industrial country and from a new-democratic into a socialist and communist society, can abolish classes and realize the Great Harmony. The state apparatus, including the army, the police and the courts, is the instrument by which one class oppresses another. It is an instrument for the oppression of antagonistic classes; it is violence and not "benevolence". "You are not benevolent!" Quite so. We definitely do not apply a policy of benevolence to the reactionaries and towards the reactionary activities of the reactionary classes. Our policy of benevolence is applied only within the ranks of the people, not beyond them to the reactionaries or to the reactionary activities of reactionary classes.

The people's state protects the people. Only when the people have such a state can they educate and remould themselves on a country-wide scale by democratic methods and, with everyone taking part, shake off the influence of domestic and foreign reactionaries (which is still very strong, will survive for a long time and cannot be quickly destroyed), rid themselves of the bad habits and ideas acquired in the old society, not allow themselves to be led astray by the reactionaries, and continue to advance – to advance towards a socialist and communist society.

In 1924 a famous manifesto was adopted at the Kuomintang's First National Congress, which Sun Yat-sen himself led and in which Communists participated. The manifesto stated:

The so-called democratic system in modern states is usually monopolized by the bourgeoisie and has become simply an instrument for oppressing the common people. On the other hand, the Kuomintang's Principle of Democracy means a democratic system shared by all the common people and not privately owned by the few.

Apart from the question of who leads whom, the Principle of Democracy stated above corresponds as a general political programme to what we call People's Democracy or New Democracy. A state system which is shared only by the common people and which the bourgeoisie is not allowed to own privately – add to this the leadership of the working class, and we have the state system of the people's democratic dictatorship.

Chiang Kai-shek betrayed Sun Yat-sen and used the dictatorship of the bureaucrat-bourgeoisie and the landlord class as an instrument for oppressing the common people of China. This counter-revolutionary dictatorship was enforced for twenty-two years and has only now been overthrown by the common people of China under our leadership.

The foreign reactionaries who accuse us of practising "dictatorship" or "totalitarianism" are the very persons who practise it. They practise the dictatorship or totalitarianism of one class, the bourgeoisie, over the proletariat and the rest of the people. They are the very persons Sun Yat-sen spoke of as the bourgeoisie of modern states who oppress the common people. And it is from these reactionary scoundrels that Chiang Kai-shek learned his counter-revolutionary dictatorship.

Chu Hsi, a philosopher of the Sung Dynasty, wrote many books and made many remarks which are now forgotten, but one remark is still remembered, "Deal with a man as he deals with you."<sup>11</sup> This is just what we do; we deal with the imperialists and their running dogs, the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries, as they deal with us. That is all there is to it!

Revolutionary dictatorship and counter-revolutionary dictatorship are by nature opposites, but the former was learned from the latter. Such learning is very important. If the revolutionary people do not master this method of ruling over the counter-revolutionary classes,

Here, the method we employ is democratic, the method of persuasion, not of compulsion. When anyone among the people breaks the law, he too should be punished, imprisoned or even sentenced to death; but this is a matter of a few individual cases, and it differs in principle from the dictatorship exercised over the reactionaries as a class.

As for the members of the reactionary classes and individual reactionaries, so long as they do not rebel, sabotage or create trouble after their political power has been overthrown, land and work will be given to them as well in order to allow them to live and remould themselves through labour into new people. If they are not willing to work, the people's state will compel them to work. Propaganda and educational work will be done among them too and will be done, moreover, with as much care and thoroughness as among the captured army officers in the past. This, too, may be called a "policy of benevolence" if you like, but it is imposed by us on the members of the enemy classes and cannot be mentioned in the same breath with the work of self-education which we carry on within the ranks of the revolutionary people.

Such remoulding of members of the reactionary classes can be accomplished only by a state of the people's democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the Communist Party. When it is well done, China's major exploiting classes, the landlord class and the bureaucrat-bourgeoisie (the monopoly capitalist class), will be eliminated for good. There remain the national bourgeoisie; at the present stage, we can already do a good deal of suitable educational work with many of them. When the time comes to realize socialism, that is, to nationalize private enterprise, we shall carry the work of educating and remoulding them a step further. The people have a powerful state apparatus in their hands – there is no need to fear rebellion by the national bourgeoisie.

The serious problem is the education of the peasantry. The peasant economy is scattered, and the socialization of agriculture, judging by the Soviet Union's experience, will require a long time and painstaking work. Without socialization of agriculture, there can be no complete, consolidated socialism. The steps to socialize agriculture must be co-ordinated with the development of a powerful industry having state enterprise as its backbone.<sup>12</sup> The state of the people's democratic dictatorship must systematically solve the problems of industrialization. Since it is not proposed to discuss economic problems in detail in this article, I shall not go into them further.

they will not be able to maintain their state power, domestic and foreign reaction will overthrow that power and restore its own rule over China, and disaster will befall the revolutionary people.

The people's democratic dictatorship is based on the alliance of the working class, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie, and mainly on the alliance of the workers and the peasants, because these two classes comprise 80 to 90 per cent of China's population. These two classes are the main force in overthrowing imperialism and the Kuomintang reactionaries. The transition from New Democracy to socialism also depends mainly upon their alliance.

The people's democratic dictatorship needs the leadership of the working class. For it is only the working class that is most far-sighted, most selfless and most thoroughly revolutionary. The entire history of revolution proves that without the leadership of the working class revolution fails and that with the leadership of the working class revolution triumphs. In the epoch of imperialism, in no country can any other class lead any genuine revolution to victory. This is clearly proved by the fact that the many revolutions led by China's petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie all failed.

The national bourgeoisie at the present stage is of great importance. Imperialism, a most ferocious enemy, is still standing alongside us. China's modern industry still forms a very small proportion of the national economy. No reliable statistics are available, but it is estimated, on the basis of certain data, that before the War of Resistance Against Japan the value of output of modern industry constituted only about 10 per cent of the total value of output of the national economy. To counter imperialist oppression and to raise her backward economy to a higher level, China must utilize all the factors of urban and rural capitalism that are beneficial and not harmful to the national economy and the people's livelihood; and we must unite with the national bourgeoisie in common struggle. Our present policy is to regulate capitalism, not to destroy it. But the national bourgeoisie cannot be the leader of the revolution, nor should it have the chief role in state power. The reason it cannot be the leader of the revolution and should not have the chief role in state power is that the social and economic position of the national bourgeoisie determines its weakness; it lacks foresight and sufficient courage and many of its members are afraid of the masses.

Sun Yat-sen advocated "arousing the masses of the people" or "giving assistance to the peasants and workers". But who is to

"arouse" them or "give assistance" to them? Sun Yat-sen had the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie in mind. As a matter of fact, they cannot do so. Why did forty years of revolution under Sun Yat-sen end in failure? Because in the epoch of imperialism the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie cannot lead any genuine revolution to victory.

Our twenty-eight years have been quite different. We have had much valuable experience. A well-disciplined Party armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism, using the method of self-criticism and linked with the masses of the people; an army under the leadership of such a Party; a united front of all revolutionary classes and all revolutionary groups under the leadership of such a Party – these are the three main weapons with which we have defeated the enemy. They distinguish us from our predecessors. Relying on them, we have won basic victory. We have travelled a tortuous road. We have struggled against opportunist deviations in our Party, both Right and "Left". Whenever we made serious mistakes on these three matters, the revolution suffered setbacks. Taught by mistakes and setbacks, we have become wiser and handle our affairs better. It is hard for any political party or person to avoid mistakes, but we should make as few as possible. Once a mistake is made, we should correct it, and the more quickly and thoroughly the better.

To sum up our experience and concentrate it into one point, it is: the people's democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the working class (through the Communist Party) and based upon the alliance of workers and peasants. This dictatorship must unite as one with the international revolutionary forces. This is our formula, our principal experience, our main programme.

Twenty-eight years of our Party are a long period, in which we have accomplished only one thing – we have won basic victory in the revolutionary war. This calls for celebration, because it is the people's victory, because it is a victory in a country as large as China. But we still have much work to do; to use the analogy of a journey, our past work is only the first step in a long march of ten thousand li. Remnants of the enemy have yet to be wiped out. The serious task of economic construction lies before us. We shall soon put aside some of the things we know well and be compelled to do things we don't know well. This means difficulties. The imperialists reckon that we will not be able to manage our economy; they are standing by and looking on, awaiting our failure.

<sup>2</sup> Kang Yu-wei (1818-1927), of Nanhai County, Kwangtung Province. In 1891, after China had been defeated by Japanese imperialism in the previous year, he led thirteen hundred candidates for the third grade in the imperial examinations at Peking in submitting a "ten thousand word memorial" to Emperor Kuang Hsu, asking for "constitutional reform and modernization" and asking that the autocratic monarchy be changed into a constitutional monarchy. In 1898, in an attempt to introduce reforms, the emperor promoted Kang Yu-wei together with Tan Sze-tung, Liang Chi-chao and others to key posts in the government. Later, the Empress Dowager Tsa Hsi, representing the die-hards, again took power and the reform movement failed. Kang Yu-wei and Liang Chi-chao fled abroad and formed the Protect-the-Emperor Party, which became a reactionary political faction in opposition to the bourgeois and petty bourgeois revolutionaries represented by Sun Yat-sen. Among Kang's works were *Forgeries in the Classics of the Confucian Canon*, *Confucius as a Reformer*, and *Ta Tung Shu* or the *Book of Great Harmony*.

<sup>3</sup> Yen Fu (1853-1921), of Foochow, Fukien Province, studied at a naval academy in Britain. After the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, he advocated constitutional monarchy and reforms to modernize China. His translations of T. H. Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics*, Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*, J. S. Mill's *System of Logic*, Montesquieu's *L'Esprit des Lois*, and other works were vehicles for the spread of European bourgeois thought in China.

<sup>4</sup> A system of examinations adopted by China's autocratic dynasties. It was a method used by the feudal ruling class for selecting personnel to govern the people and also for enticing the intellectuals. The system, dating from the 7th century, persisted into the early 20th century.

<sup>5</sup> The Revolution of 1911 overthrew the autocratic regime of the Ching Dynasty. On October 10 of that year, a section of the New Army, at the urging of the revolutionary societies of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, staged an uprising in Wuchang. This was followed by uprisings in other provinces, and very soon the rule of the Ching Dynasty crumbled. On January 1, 1912, the Provisional Government of the Republic of China was set up in Nanking, and Sun Yat-sen was elected Provisional President. The revolution achieved victory through the alliance of the bourgeoisie, peasants, workers and urban petty bourgeoisie. But because the group which led the revolution was compromising in nature, failed to bring real benefits to the peasants and yielded to the pressure of imperialism and the feudal forces, state power fell into the hands of the Northern warlord Yuan Shih-kai, and the revolution failed.

<sup>6</sup> A hero in the novel, *Shui Hu Chuan* (*Heroes of the Marshes*), who killed a tiger with his bare hands on the Chingyang Ridge. This is one of the most popular episodes in that famous novel.

<sup>7</sup> For the relation between the socialization of agriculture and the industrialization of the country, see *On the Question of Agricultural Co-operation* (Sections 7 and 8), a report made by Comrade Mao Tse-tung on July 31, 1951 at the Conference of the Secretaries of the Provincial, Municipal and Autonomous Region Committees of the Chinese Communist Party. In this report Comrade Mao Tse-tung, on the basis of Soviet experience and our own country's practice, greatly developed the thesis that socialization of agriculture should proceed in step with socialist industrialization.

<sup>8</sup> The quotation is from Chu Hsi's commentary on the *Confucian Doctrine of the Mean*, Chapter 13.

We must overcome difficulties, we must learn what we do not know. We must learn to do economic work from all who know how, no matter who they are. We must esteem them as teachers, learning from them respectfully and conscientiously. We must not pretend to know when we do not know. We must not put on bureaucratic airs. If we dig into a subject for several months, for a year or two, for three or five years, we shall eventually master it. At first some of the Soviet Communists also were not very good at handling economic matters and the imperialists awaited their failure too. But the Communist Party of the Soviet Union emerged victorious and, under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin, it learned not only how to make the revolution but also how to carry on construction. It has built a great and splendid socialist state. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is our best teacher and we must learn from it. The situation both at home and abroad is in our favour, we can rely fully on the weapon of the people's democratic dictatorship, unite the people throughout the country, the reactionaries excepted, and advance steadily to our goal.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Also known as the world of Great Harmony. It refers to a society based on public ownership, free from class exploitation and oppression – a lofty ideal long cherished by the Chinese people. Here the realm of Great Harmony means communist society.

<sup>2</sup> See V. I. Lenin, "Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder, Chapter 2. Lenin said: "For nearly half a century – approximately from the 'forties to the 'nineties – advanced thinkers in Russia, under the oppression of an unparalleled, savage and reactionary tsardom, eagerly sought for the correct revolutionary theory and followed each and every 'last word' in Europe and America in this sphere with astonishing diligence and thoroughness. Russia achieved Marxism, the only correct revolutionary theory, veritably through suffering, by half a century of unprecedented torment and sacrifice, of unprecedented revolutionary heroism, incredible energy, devoted searching, study, testing in practice, disappointment, verification and comparison with European experience."

<sup>3</sup> Faced with the opposition of the Chinese people to her traffic in opium, Britain sent forces in 1840-42 to invade Kwangtung and other coastal regions of China under the pretext of protecting trade. The troops in Kwangtung, led by Lin Tse-hsu, fought a war of resistance.

<sup>4</sup> Hung Hsiu-chuan (1814-64), who was born in Kwangtung, was the leader of a peasant revolutionary war in the middle of the 19th century. In 1851 he led a mass uprising in Kwangsi and proclaimed the establishment of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, which held many provinces and fought the Ching Dynasty for fourteen years. In 1864 this revolutionary war failed and Hung Hsiu-chuan committed suicide by poison.

CAST AWAY ILLUSIONS,  
PREPARE FOR STRUGGLE\*

August 14, 1949

It is no accident that the U.S. State Department's White Paper on China-U.S. Relations and Secretary of State Acheson's Letter of Transmittal to President Truman<sup>1</sup> have been released at this time. The publication of these documents reflects the victory of the Chinese people and the defeat of imperialism, it reflects the decline of the entire world system of imperialism. The imperialist system is riddled with insuperable internal contradictions, and therefore the imperialists are plunged into deep gloom.

Imperialism has prepared the conditions for its own doom. These conditions are the awakening of the great masses of the people in the colonies and semi-colonies and in the imperialist countries themselves. Imperialism has pushed the great masses of the people throughout the world into the historical epoch of the great struggle to abolish imperialism.

Imperialism has prepared the material as well as the moral conditions for the struggle of the great masses of the people.

The material conditions are factories, railways, firearms, artillery, and the like. Most of the powerful equipment of the Chinese People's Liberation Army comes from U.S. imperialism, some comes from Japanese imperialism and some is of our own manufacture.

The British aggression against China in 1840<sup>2</sup> was followed by the wars of aggression against China by the Anglo-French allied forces,<sup>3</sup> by France,<sup>4</sup> by Japan,<sup>5</sup> and by the allied forces of the eight powers (Britain, France, Japan, tsarist Russia, Germany, the United States, Italy and Austria);<sup>6</sup> by the war between Japan and tsarist Russia on Chinese territory;<sup>7</sup> by Japan's war of aggression against China in China's Northeast, which began in 1931; by Japan's war of aggression against all China, which began in 1937 and lasted eight long years; and,

## **Appendix II**

### **Memoranda of Conversation between Roshchin and Zhou Enlai (November 15, 1949)**

According to Roshchin's Diary

On November 15 of this year at 5:00 in the afternoon, Soviet Ambassador Roshchin paid a formal visit to Chinese Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhou Enlai, where he conveyed Moscow's attitude toward a series of issues of concern to the Chinese government (all of the relevant information has already been forwarded by telegram to the Soviet Foreign Ministry). After discussing these issues, upon the Ambassador's request, Zhou Enlai offered a briefing regarding China's domestic circumstances and war situation. Zhou Enlai said:

1. The financial and economic difficulties China is currently experiencing, including the early November spike in the price of all essential living products, were absolutely not unforeseeable, and are absolutely not irresolvable. The direct causes for the early November spike in commodity prices (approximately 5-6 times) are as follows:

(1) The circulation of large quantities of paper currency into the market. This is the result of an unsatisfactory consideration of potential consequences on the part of the Ministry of Finance. Even though the total amount of circulated paper currency is not excessive, the government henceforth still needs to print and distribute paper currency; however, if the paper currency were to be gradually circulated into the market, commodity prices would not spike like this; but now the government, in one fell swoop, is circulating a half-year's worth of reserve paper currency into the market. This was the government's third mass currency circulation in accordance with its 1949 plan. The People's Bank's first supplementary circulation of paper currency was in April, the second in late July / early August, and the third and largest in early November. It was precisely this last circulation that triggered the disastrous spike in commodity prices. To prevent commodity prices from sharply spiking like this, our comrades in the Ministry of Finance should have gradually, month-by-month, circulated the currency into the market. But the Ministry of Finance, in its defense, says they believe that in order to prevent commodity prices from further increases, it is appropriate to temporarily control the further distribution of currency during the period of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Perhaps this is correct. Admittedly, it is necessary to initiate this kind of mass distribution of currency, for the purpose of ensuring the purchase of grains and other agricultural products (cotton, tea, silkworms, etc.) from the peasantry; as well as for ensuring the peasantry financial support to purchase enlarged plots of farming land; and for ensuring financial support for the newly established air force and navy.

(2) The circulation of large amounts of currency has clearly shaken the people's confidence, and has damaged the currency's purchasing power. After the peasants sell their own agricultural products, they immediately want to dispose of the new currency, so they can quickly purchase cloth, salt, farming tools, etc. Because of increasing demand, the price of these goods rises rapidly. Those who first suffer from this rapid rise in price are workers, the army, and office employees, since the increase in their salaries cannot keep pace with the rise in commodity prices. For the purpose of safeguarding the lives of these people, the state is compelled to provide them with grains, coal, and cloth in accordance with fixed quantity supply.

(3) The spread of Bubonic Plague in Chahar Province, and the subsequent quarantine of all roads leading from Inner Mongolia to northern China, also induced a rise in prices since expected grain

sales from Suiyuan Province, Chahar Province, and Rehe Province to Beijing and Tianjin, which usually happened each autumn, were all completely stopped.

The price of grains has now somewhat receded, owing to the government taking action against the emergence of profiteering merchants, as well as its mass distribution of grains onto the market for the purpose of stabilizing commodity prices. However, the government has predicted: in 1950, the price of grains will still, at the very least, double.

Currently, relying on state provisions are 4.5 million people in the People's Liberation Army, and close to 1.5 million workers and office employees in state enterprises and government agencies. By the end of 1950, as the entire country will be liberated, provincial and local warlord armed forces will be subsumed under the PLA, and with the continuing enlargement of state agencies and enterprises, the number of people relying on the state for living provisions will reach 8 million; undoubtedly, this is a considerable burden for the country.

Our state agencies and every departmental agency are vastly larger than their counterparts were under the Guomindang regime. For example, under Guomindang rule, the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications had 50,000 employees, whereas in our long-liberated areas alone we have 40,000 postal workers. Since our regime pursues the interests of the people, we are planning to extend postal service not only in the cities, but also in the countryside. In this way, the number of employees in the state Ministry of Post and Telecommunications will continuously rise; currently, we have 80,000 post and telecommunications employees. On average, one-third of our political administration and economic management agency staff is composed of employees transferred from the army.

Even though we are currently experiencing financial and economic difficulties, they are difficulties emerging in the process of marching forward, and they are inherently different from those faced by the Guomindang – even the difficulties they encountered during their most stable period of rule in 1935-1936.

During these years, the total amount of paper currency distributed by the Guomindang was 1.5 billion silver dollars, and 500 million silver dollars issued in state treasury bonds. Thus, the currency in circulation totaled 2 billion silver dollars. Currently, the total amount of currency circulated by the Central People's Bank is equal to 2 billion silver dollars. However, the territory and population under our control is much greater than that of the Guomindang regime in 1935-1936. We believe the distribution of currency is far from exhausting our total resources; for the period 1951-1952, we are preparing to increase the distribution of paper currency to be equivalent to 4-5 billion silver dollars.

To ensure the strength of our currency, we will issue domestic treasury bonds and expand taxation, so as to gradually withdraw a portion of currency from circulation. We plan, within these two years (1951 and 1952), to properly adjust our financial and economic situation. In the north and northeast regions, land reform is currently being carried out; there are 130 million peasants in these regions. Within two years, we will also carry out land reform in the central and southern regions; this would affect 200 million peasants. In 1952, we will carry out land reform in the southwest region, where the population is 145 million. Carrying out land reform will increase the supply of agricultural products, thereby stabilizing commodity prices. The peasants' faith in the government and the distributed currency means a portion of the currency in circulation will become deposits in the national bank. Within two years, we plan to reopen the factories and

enterprises shut down by the Guomindang regime; all of these measures will help to stabilize the economy.

Among the government's entire tax revenue, 60% comes from the peasantry, and 40% comes from the cities. In areas in which land reform has been carried out, peasants give 20% of their harvest to the state. The peasants willingly pay this tax because prior to land reform they had to give 50% of their harvest to landlords. According to this kind of circumstance, in southern China we will collect 40-50% of the income extracted by landlords from the land, through the form of taxation.

We believe, in two years time, we will have completely resolved our financial and economic difficulties.

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(Translated by Christopher Tang and Taomo Zhou, from the Chinese translation of the document's Russian original by Professor Shen Zhihua)

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