
Roundtable Editor: Thomas Maddux
Reviewers: David G. Haglund, Wolfgang Krieger, Francine McKenzie, Andrew Preston

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Introduction by Thomas Maddux, California State University, Northridge

Since 2000 H-Diplo has presented 58 roundtables on an expanding range of books dealing with an increasing number of topics and periods from dominant areas such as the Cold War and Vietnam to newer cultural and international topics. Canada and other participants in international relations appear primarily as willing and unwilling participants in a number of the larger subjects covered. So it is most appropriate to feature a study that focuses on Canada’s international relations especially with Robert Bothwell as the author since the reviewers agree that, in the words of Andrew Preston, “Bothwell is the scholarly dean of both Canadian diplomatic history and Canadian-American relations.” An additional bonus is that Bothwell provides a masterful narrative that mixes clear description with insightful analysis and engaging assessments of Canadian leaders and diplomats as they interact with the major powers and related domestic issues.

As opposed to most of the H-Diplo roundtable authors who focus on a major power and its diplomacy or the interaction among the major powers in a crisis situation, Bothwell successfully faces the challenge of developing Canadian policies within an international context shaped by the major powers. Bothwell also has to give significant attention to the domestic political considerations shaping Canadian policy, such as the challenges raised by the issue of separatism in Quebec and federal/provincial relations such as with Alberta and oil and gas policy in the 1970s. Finally, Bothwell highlights the significant changes in Canada’s relationship with Great Britain and the United States and the adjustments made by Canadian leaders in response to the decline of Great Britain, and at the same time recognizing that Canada has expanding relationships with the rest of the world, most notably in the areas of economics, immigration, and peacekeeping in crisis situations such as Suez and Indochina in 1956.

The reviewers highlight a number of important dimensions in Bothwell’s analysis and are not uncritical of his selection of topics and coverage as indicated below:

1) Several of the reviewers, including Francine McKenzie, emphasize that Bothwell rejects the standard depiction of Canada’s role in foreign relations as “linchpin, helpful fixer, middle power, and literal internationalist” which McKenzie depicts as “powerful tropes and intellectual traps. They constitute a murky kool-aid from which many historians, as well as some diplomats have drunk fulsomely. Bob Bothwell, on the other hand, spat out the kool-aid.” (1) In his response to the reviews, Bothwell offers a related rejection of what he refers to as the so-called “golden age” around the 1950s and Louis St. Laurent, Minister of Justice and Prime Minister: “in those happy days Canada was respected, on the ‘A’ list of countries, consulted rather than cajoled, idolized rather than ignored…. The Golden Agers’ globe is a strange world. Invoking a mythical past, they create a magical future—after a dismal present.” (2-3)

2) The reviewers endorse Bothwell’s placement of Canadian policies within the larger context of major power interactions with the Cold War as the international setting. The historic North Atlantic triangle reaching back to A.L. Burt’s classic *The United States; Great*
Britain, and British North America from the Revolution to the Established of Peace after the War of 1812 (1940) is difficult to discard even with Canadian independence and the decline of Great Britain. As McKenzie notes, the North Atlantic triangle is a “mental map for Bothwell” with most subject matter “refracted” in the triangle. McKenzie “would have welcomed more discussion of relations with other countries because they also call attention to issues like culture, public diplomacy, and civil society, even if they were less important than relations with Britain and the U.S.” (2-3)

3) The reviewers give Bothwell high marks for his assessment of Charles de Gaulle's challenge on independence for Quebec and the response to de Gaulle by Canadian leaders and Washington. Wolfgang Krieger, for example, notes that Bothwell skilfully weaves together the internal development of cultural and political transformations in Quebec with the lurching intervention of de Gaulle and his boorish behaviour on his 1967 visit, and Washington’s successful support for the Ottawa government.

4) Bothwell is not uncritical of U.S. and Canadian leaders in their management of their direct relationship and he touches on the broader relationship from the expanding economic ties to the migration of Canadians south of the border and the movement of American cultural influences in the opposite direction. For example, Bothwell examines the relationship of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau with several U.S. presidents, and, reflecting his earlier study on Trudeau, Bothwell suggests that Trudeau had the least respect for Richard Nixon and found him helpful only in reigning in Secretary of the Treasury, John Connally, who mounted his Texas horse and went after the Auto Pact of 1965 with Canada that removed tariffs on automobiles and parts from Canada. By 1970 these exports represented 32 percent of Canadian exports to the U.S. When Canadian officials protested and Trudeau worked out a meeting with Nixon through Henry Kissinger, Nixon backed off and Connally got off his horse and left the White House.

5) The reviewers question a few omissions and the meaning of the title. Krieger, for example, emphasizes the transformation in immigration to Canada since 1965 with a surge in immigrants with a non-European background. Krieger would have appreciated more analysis on the consequences of this transformation in Canada. In his response Bothwell agrees with Krieger on the changes but suggests that immigration had little impact on Canada’s political and economic foreign policy before 1984. David Haglund questions the meaning of the book's title, “Alliance and Illusion,” which he considers “catchy enough” but “also cryptic, to the point of being misleading.” (2-3) What does “illusion” refer to -- NATO, Canada, or the idea that all alliances are constraining and somewhat disappointing? Bothwell pleads guilty to searching for the euphonious in his title and ending up with sonority, but he also suggests a larger challenge to the illusions of the “Golden Age” interpreters. He concludes on the hopeful note that a reprise on the book that takes the story past 1984 could be “Autonomy and Independence”: “Autonomy speaks to a traditional Canada, the Canada that went into the Second World War in 1939, Independence speaks to the Canada, and the Canadians, who emerged from the conflict.” We look forward to the next volume.
Participants:

Robert Bothwell is the Gluskin professor of Canadian history at the University of Toronto, director of the International Relations Program at that university, and a senior fellow of Trinity College. Educated in or at Ottawa public schools, the University of Toronto, and Harvard University, he has worked at the University of Toronto since 1970. He is the author, co-author, and editor of some twenty-odd books, including, most recently, The Penguin History of Canada (2006). He is co-editor of the 2008 version of Canada among Nations, due to appear in December 2008.

David G. Haglund is the Sir Edward Peacock Professor of Political Studies at Queen's University (Kingston, Ontario). After receiving his Ph.D. in International Relations in 1978 from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, in Washington, D.C., he assumed teaching and research positions at the University of British Columbia. In 1983 he came to Queen's. From 1985 to 1995, and again from 1996 to 2002, he served as Director of the Queen's Centre for International Relations. From 1992 to 1996 he also served as Head of Queen's Department of Political Studies. He has held visiting professorships in France and Germany, and was the Visiting Seagram Chair at the McGill Institute for the Study of Canada in the 2004-5 academic year. He co-edits the International Journal. His research focuses on transatlantic security, and on Canadian and American international security policy. Among his books are Latin America and the Transformation of U.S. Strategic Thought, 1936-1940 (1984); Alliance Within the Alliance? Franco-German Military Cooperation and the European Pillar of Defense (1991); Will NATO Go East? The Debate Over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance (1996); The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: Canadian Grand Strategy at Century's End (2000); and Over Here and Over There: Canada-US Defence Cooperation in an Era of Interoperability (2001).

Francine McKenzie studied at the University of Toronto (B.A. and M.A. in history) and at the University of Cambridge (Ph.D.). She is currently an associate professor in the department of history at the University of Western Ontario. Her research interests include the history of international relations, the British Commonwealth, especially from the perspective of the so-called peripheries, and international trade. She is the author of *Redefining the Bonds of Commonwealth 1939-1948: The Politics of Preference* (Palgrave 2002) and co-editor with Margaret MacMillan of *Parties Long Estranged: Canada and Australia in the Twentieth Century* (University of British Columbia Press, 2003). As her first glorious sabbatical nears an end, she is busy writing a history of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 1947-1994, making the case that the major faultlines of global geopolitics, including the Cold War and the North-South divide, turned the GATT into a contested political space and a microcosm of world international relations.

Andrew Preston is University Lecturer in History and a Fellow of Clare College at the University of Cambridge. He is also a Fellow at the Cold War Studies Centre at the London School of Economics and Features Editor at the Toronto-based *International Journal*. He is the author of *The War Council: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC, and Vietnam* (Harvard University Press, 2006) and co-editor, with Fredrik Logevall, of *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977* (Oxford University Press, 2008). He is currently writing a history, to be published by Knopf, of how religion has influenced American foreign relations from the seventeenth century to the present.
It is not an experience of unalloyed pleasure for political scientists to find themselves in close quarters with the University of Toronto’s Robert Bothwell, Canada’s ranking diplomatic historian. It is not that Professor Bothwell is uncongenial; quite the contrary, he is invariably good company. But one of his charms is that he has acquired a well-earned reputation for cantankerousness, no more so than when he finds himself having to put up with political scientists. These latter can seem to him, and no doubt to many other diplomatic historians, a singularly loveless bunch of jargon dispensers and concept mongerers – a bunch whose prose is usually impenetrable and who, for good measure, would not be able to recognize an archive even if they happened to tumble down a staircase into one.

I make no apologies for being a political scientist, but forewarned is forearmed: this review is going unavoidably to reflect a peculiar disciplinary deformation, and might seem esoteric, if not worse, from the point of view of diplomatic historians.

For starters, though, not even a baffle-gabbing social scientist could fail to appreciate the elegance, erudition, and wit displayed on every page of this book. Bothwell tells a story beautifully, and the story he tells is an important one in Canada’s diplomatic history, covering the four decades following the ending of the Second World War, up until the landslide election of the Progressive Conservative party led by Brian Mulroney in September 1984. It is the story of a country of middling size and great ambition, which although only formally “independent” for less than twenty years by the time the war drew to a close, had managed to carve out a role as an energetic and responsible international actor, largely on the back of important contributions to the anti-Axis struggle, but also because of a hard-working and highly talented cadre of diplomatists.

It was no more clear to those diplomatists than it was to any other country’s foreign policy elite, during that early postwar period, what the evolving international system would look like; but whatever shape it took, Canada expected to be part of it, alongside like-minded countries. Of these latter, the United States would emerge, over the course of the four decades under examination by Bothwell, as by far the most important partner for Canada, rapidly and indubitably supplanting Britain in that capacity. Not surprisingly, therefore, much of Bothwell’s book deals either exclusively with Canadian-U.S. relations or with those extra-continental international developments (e.g., Korea, Indochina, Suez, the defence of Europe) in which Washington was invariably a major player. A few chapters do depart from this rule, as they concern matters principally appertaining to Canadian involvement with the Commonwealth and la Francophonie, as well as with the sempiternal national unity question. Yet with respect to almost every file involving Canadian foreign policy, Washington figured prominently – at times, from Ottawa’s perspective, as an indispensable element of the solution to whatever problem needed resolution, but at other times as a large part of the problem itself.
Bothwell is at his best in dealing with the Canadian assessment of and response to American policies and interests, and nowhere more so than when he dissects the diplomatically inept government headed by Prime Minister John Diefenbaker between 1957 and 1963. On the matter of that government’s demise, there has long been a debate in Canada as to whether Diefenbaker fell on his own, or was pushed out by an increasingly irritated Kennedy administration. To this question, Bothwell’s answer is trenchant: “He fell. Diefenbaker had many enemies, laboriously if sometimes unconsciously cultivated. But he had little need of them. His own efforts were usually ... sufficient” (p. 175).

Bothwell’s breadth of knowledge and interest is unsurpassed, and though he might profess not to be as conversant with defence and military issues as he should be, the claim is false modesty: he knows his stuff, and provides a wealth of fascinating information that should make this book essential reading for anyone interested in Canadian foreign policy, as well as with America’s relations with allies (Canadians and others), and this irrespective of whether the areas of policy be economic, political, or military in nature.

In a book running close to 400 pages of text, I could detect only three factual errors. On p. 155 there is a footnote (11) that if one tracks down will reveal his misidentification of the acronym CoCom as standing for the Coordinating Committee for Mutual Export Control, rather than for what it actually stood for, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls. More significantly, on p. 18 Bothwell tells his readers that the League of Nations, derided by a long-serving Canadian prime minister (Mackenzie King) as the “League of Notions,” was crippled by the “absence of the United States and most of the Americas” from its membership. He is, of course, correct about the U.S., but he could not be more wrong about the rest of the Americas, for altogether some 20 Latin American republics – i.e., about a third of the entire League membership at its peak – belonged to the organization. The final error I detected can only matter to a baseball fan, which is what I happen to be: Bothwell claims (p. 260) that 1967, the year of the Montreal World’s Fair, Expo 67, also happened to be the year in which the city “inaugurated its big-league baseball team, the Expos” (now the Washington Nationals). In fact, the expansion franchise did not get awarded to Montreal until late May 1968, with its first season of big-league play being 1969.

But if the facts are mainly sound, can the same be said of the interpretation of the facts? Here some room for doubt exists, if only because at times Bothwell seems to want to go out of his way to avoid proposing interpretations – or at least the kind of generalizations doted upon by political scientists. The book’s title is a good place at which to pause to register this complaint, which admittedly may matter more to social scientists than to diplomatic historians. The title certainly is catchy enough. It is also cryptic, to the point of being misleading. In fairness to Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion might be invoked to suggest a number of hypotheses, any one of which could have been mustered into service to provide a bit of conceptual, and possibly theoretical, oomph to the book, and in so doing to make it resemble less a collection of trees and more a forest. But if the author had something like this in mind when he chose his title, I confess the message was lost on me. Did the “illusion” refer to the “alliance,” in the sense that in the book NATO was going to be revealed as something far, far less than the sum of its parts, really only a Potemkin village...
among collective-defence organizations? This is a charge that one often encounters, increasingly so over the past several years. But it is not a charge that animates the book, and rightly so; for Bothwell is writing about the Cold War NATO, and much of the “NATO-is-dead” talk has appeared subsequent to the ending of that great East-West contest, and precisely because that contest’s ending was thought by many to render the alliance purposeless.

Or does the illusion refer not to NATO but to Canada? Again, this is a claim with a familiar ring to it. In fact, it has a pair of such rings. If Canada’s membership in the alliance were somehow what the allusion to illusion was getting at, then one could argue either that a) Canada was never really a good ally, always more or less of a “free” (or “easy”) rider in the alliance, hence it was an ally in appearance only, thus an “illusionary” one; or b) its membership in such a constraining and costly defence pact effectively stripped Canada of its sovereignty, therefore what was illusionary was the claim that the country was an autonomous actor in world and even, to some critics, domestic affairs. Again, neither of these develops into a thesis that Bothwell chooses to advance, for eminently sound reasons, I hasten to add.

So the reader is left to conclude that if the title serves any pedagogical purpose, it is to establish what does not really need establishing: namely, that by their very nature alliances can be constraining, but that they can also be beneficial to their members. As with many other activities, alliance participation comes with a set of complicating factors. But this holds for all of members, the U.S. no less than Canada.
To many Europeans, Canada is what Switzerland has been to those who love German culture but, for various reasons, do not wish to deal with the real thing, that is the big and, historically, often ugly Germany. Canada is highly popular among Europeans who are drawn to the wide open spaces of the prairies, the rugged coasts, the spectacular Rockies, and above all to the cowboy and Indian atmosphere of the “wild” west. Canada has all of that, without the ugliness of U.S. imperialism, the N.R.A., racial hatred and high crime rates. But then, like Switzerland, Canada also lacks the cultural excitement of “America” and the raw power for surprise and for dramatic change.¹

For this simple reason a history of Canadian foreign policy cannot be as gripping as the drama played out during those same years in Washington between the good guys and the bad (and the very bad). Robert Bothwell begins by evoking the challenges of Canadian geography. The book’s title reminds Canadians that their country, after 1945, has lived under the shadow of its giant neighbour “south of the border”. Hence “alliance”. To believe anything else would be an “illusion”, so often nurtured by various branches of Canadian nationalism and leftism. And, I would add, by some of Canada’s admirers from abroad who think of Canada – not always without reason – as the better half of anglophone America.

Essentially, Bothwell’s book is about Canada’s search for an identity in foreign policy. As the British empire faded away, Canada had to fend for itself and, at the same time, came rapidly under the influence of the United States – above all in terms of trade and foreign investment but also in defense matters. The key question was and has been since: how to avoid becoming a mere dependency of Washington?

To begin with, Canada had important natural resources like fresh water, hydro-electric power, uranium and oil – all sorely needed “south of the border” and beyond. Then it created for itself a role in east-west as well as in north-south politics where the Ottawa government was clearly seen as a member of the west, but at the same time different from the omnipresent American “colossus” (Niall Ferguson) and the ex-colonial “Britannia overruled” (David Reynolds). The Suez crisis of 1956 and, two years earlier, the Geneva settlement of the Indochina war offered such opportunities which Canada used well. Its foreign minister Lester Pearson received the 1957 peace Nobel prize in recognition of that work. Canada’s commitment to the new diplomacy of peaceful settlement, largely but not exclusively based upon the United Nations, has become a trademark since those early days. International organizations such as the UN, NATO or the EEC (today the EC) typically became treasured tools for the small and medium powers who do not sufficiently “matter” in military or economic terms on a global scale. They use those bodies to tame, in some cases even to frustrate, the giants.

¹ By chance, Switzerland and Germany have about the same 1:10 population ratio as Canada and the United States.
Another way for Canada to find its distinctiveness in foreign policy has been to oppose the colossus and to build coalitions against him. As Bothwell makes abundantly clear, however, Canada never had the stomach – nor saw the need – to confront Washington in aggressive ways as did France under de Gaulle (and in 2003 under Chirac). Trade and financial relations were important reasons for not getting carried away by Canadian nationalism, even though these relations became fairly rough at times. In truth, Canada’s business community benefited from America’s fabulous wealth creation machine, as did Canada’s employees and consumers. The 1965 Auto Pact, which established a free trade zone for the automobile industry (and thus crowded out European exports), was too good to be sacrificed to Canada’s opposition to America’s policy in Vietnam, for example.

If Canada developed its own policies on China, India, nuclear weapons and international development (and on various other global issues), it played a minor role in European affairs. Unlike the US, it did not encourage European integration – except of course in NATO – and did not take a tough line in favour of German and European unification (again different from the US and France). “Europe” only began to matter in Ottawa when Britain joined in 1973, leaving Canada (and other white dominions) to hold the bag of “imperial preference”.

By far the most gripping subject of this book is Québec and its relations with France, the United States – and of course with the rest of Canada. Here the author shows his true mastery of bringing together issues of foreign and constitutional affairs with personalities (in politics and diplomacy), cultural politics (including the politics of memory) and much more. For de Gaulle, Québec may have been a left-over on the global agenda of decolonization. But for the Ottawa government it was a crucial issue of national concern which Pierre Trudeau eventually settled, incidentally with a little help from Washington which was encouraged to declare that it had no interest in Québec independence.

While France throws a big shadow on Canadian politics, Britain’s role is strangely remote – strange perhaps only to a non-anglophone reviewer who sees Big Ben replicas and pictures of the Queen in all Canadian souvenir shops. Only Britain’s EEC entry and her reluctant part in “bringing the constitution home” to Canada (in 1982) are described in any detail.

No review is complete without a dose of criticism. So let me mention Canada’s revolution in immigration policies as a major issue which is absent from this book. Beginning with the post-1945 surge in immigration and the 1967 Immigration Act, Canada now has more recent immigrants than the United States, and of these more from non-European backgrounds. This is surely a dramatic change in Canadian identity. From a nation whose living family ties were largely restricted to the British Isles and to (parts of) the U.S., Canada developed into a globally connected society with obvious consequences in terms of how it sees the world but, admittedly, less obvious ones in terms of traditional foreign policy.

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2 Maurice Vaisse, La grandeur (Fayard: Paris 1998) p. 670
3 Until 1982, the Canadian constitution took the form of the British North America Act of 1867 which could only be amended by the British parliament, not by the Canadians themselves.
That issue aside, Bothwell has provided a masterly overview and a wealth of subtle insights into Ottawa’s foreign affairs machinery. Some of that subtleness may well be too deeply buried in the narrative for non-Canadians to detect. Foreign readers will need a fat reference work to fill in those biographical and other facts which may be unfamiliar to them. But for sheer skill in tying together the diverse thematic threads and for soundness of judgement one could not be better served than by this thoroughly admirable work of diplomatic history.
All students of the history of Canada’s foreign relations soon learn that Canada has been a vital linchpin in relations between its key allies, a helpful fixer of dangerous conflicts that have threatened global peace, a middle power occasionally able to punch above its weight, to the benefit of the world, and a nation committed to liberal internationalism, a position that has offset the realist and self-interested approach that shaped the foreign policies of other, and more powerful, states. These roles – linchpin, helpful fixer, middle power, and liberal internationalist – have become powerful tropes and intellectual traps. They constitute a murky kool-aid from which many historians, as well as some diplomats, have drunk fulsomely. Bob Bothwell, on the other hand, spat out the kool-aid.

In *Alliance and Illusion*, readers will not find these familiar labels or ideas.¹ This book is a much needed alternative to a self-congratulatory approach to Canada’s role in world affairs since 1945. Bothwell does not explicitly debunk the standard, and comforting, narrative. Rather, he stands aloof from it. Bothwell’s book is also a corrective to a defensive strain in the literature on Canada’s international history, an insistence that Canada was present at and relevant to major developments in world international relations since the end of the Second World War, from the creation of the United Nations and NATO to the Suez Crisis, the war in Vietnam, and the Cold War. Instead of positioning Canada in the leading role, and the international incident or development – be it the Cuban Missile Crisis or apartheid in South Africa – as the backdrop, in *Alliance and Illusion* the grand narrative of global international history has the lead and Canada is a member of the cast. Some issues have had particular significance to Canada’s international history, such as President de Gaulle’s support for an independent Quebec. De Gaulle’s action and words (“Vive le Québec libre”) influenced Canadian foreign relations as well as the substance of Canadian foreign policy (increased aid for former French colonies, support for la Francophonie, and greater appreciation of the United States as a stalwart friend to federal Canada). But most of the time, Bothwell depicts a country reacting to global developments, from French withdrawal from Indochina, the skyrocketing price of oil, and the Sino-Soviet split.

Even if Canada was not always the star of the show, Bothwell assumes that participation in world affairs has been important for what it reveals about Canada’s history. He delves beyond the immediate response, policy, and prime minister to find explanations rooted in the domestic sphere. Immigration, the baby boom, the constitution, geography, natural resources, values, and generations all figure in his interpretation. Although prime ministers and ministers of external affairs are also prominent, Canada’s foreign policy has not been particularly partisan (even if John Diefenbaker, prime minister 1957-1963, cherished the tie to Britain and the Commonwealth as only a Conservative could), although it was sometimes very personal.

¹ He does occasionally mention Canada’s special relationship with the United States, but always in commas to convey his skepticism about the accuracy or helpfulness of a category that has been rendered meaningless through overuse.
Bothwell distinguishes between two manifestations of Canada as an international actor: political Canada and economic Canada. Diplomatic historians usually spend more time studying political Canada, because it is here that the impress of politicians, diplomats, and citizens was felt. Economic Canada was the product of natural bounty, geography, and individual initiative. It was largely beyond the government’s reach, despite determined efforts to control the price of oil, the direction of trade, and the inflow of foreign investment. Nonetheless, Bothwell argues that economic Canada was the stronger of the two, able to compel the American super power to grant Canada exceptional treatment and allow Canada’s admission to elite clubs like the G7. Although Bothwell considers both functions, he does not try to determine ‘whether economics or politics came first’ (p. 7) in the makeup of Canada’s overall foreign policy. Other diplomatic historians have tried to answer the question; the more important consideration, it seems to me, is the relationship between the two elements of external policy, a relationship that is hard to pin down but which says much about the processes and substance of a state’s international involvement. For instance, examining whether economic means were instruments or goals in their own right and how political aims or values might have been imbedded in economic policies complements the attention usually paid to elites and offers new ways of thinking about agency, causation, and objectives. Although Bothwell does not explicitly theorize about it, the interpretation in *Alliance and Illusion* suggests that the economic and political were often parallel and sometimes in conflict. The conflicts usually arose when governments tried to manipulate economic devices.

Although Bothwell ignores the tropes that prevail in the historical literature, he does not discard all old ideas. In 1945 J. B. Brebner laid out the idea of a North Atlantic triangle, with Britain, the United States and Canada as its three corners, as the context in which Canada’s interest and involvement in world affairs took shape. The North Atlantic triangle was a powerful mental map for generations of diplomats and politicians. Bothwell has strengthened the North Atlantic as an explanatory tool by showing how the British corner remained important to Canadian diplomacy well into the 1950s. According to Bothwell, Anglo-Canadian relations were never better than in the years 1945-55. This balances scholarly writings about Canada’s international history after 1945 which have been dominated by Canadian-American relations to the exclusion of almost everything else.

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3. The conflicts usually arose when governments tried to manipulate economic devices.


5. Phillip Buckner has recently edited several books that examine the Anglo-Canadian connection, covering many strands of connection including the military, the economy, populist and elite, the constitution,
The North Atlantic triangle is also a mental map for Bothwell, influencing the content and analysis of this book. Aside from France and its interventions in Canada’s fragile confederation, the subject matter is usually refracted in a North Atlantic triangle. While it would be misleading to treat Canada’s relations with China, India, Germany, Mexico, or Israel as being on a par with the United States or Britain, one can’t help but wonder why other parts of the world and their priorities (such as development) did not hold Ottawa’s attention. I would have welcomed more discussion of relations with other countries because they also call attention to issues like culture, public diplomacy, and civil society, even if they were less important than relations with Britain and the U.S.

These are minor quibbles about a sophisticated study and superb analysis that demonstrates the formidable intellectual reach of its author. Bothwell has much to say on subjects other than Canadian history. *Alliance and Illusion* is also a pleasure to read for its literate writing, tart judgments, and sharp insights. Bothwell’s former students (of which I am one) will want to check the footnotes closely: there are generous references to their work throughout. These references map out Bothwell’s teaching tree, which has grown over 35 years at the University of Toronto.

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and education. His works have restored interest in neglected and important subject. *See Canada and the End of Empire* (University of British Columbia Press, 2005).
Writing about the history of Canadian foreign relations requires a delicate balancing act—several, in fact. First, Canada is not, nor has it ever been, a major power on the world stage that others must consider when formulating their own foreign policies, and so the historian must explore Canadian policy while at the same time maintaining a focus on the real drivers of events. Second, because of its relative lack of power, the formulation of Canadian foreign policy is driven as much by domestic political considerations, especially on questions of national unity between the “two solitudes” of English and French Canada, as it is by world politics. A second balancing act, then, necessitates a nearly simultaneous focus on Canadian domestic politics and foreign policy. Finally, Canadian foreign policy, and Canadian national identity itself, formed and have evolved within the context of relations with the United States. Thus a third balancing act requires coverage of Canada’s relations with the United States without losing sight of the fact that the nation still had relations with the rest of the world.

Fortunately, Robert Bothwell is almost uniquely qualified to pull off all three balancing acts, sometimes all at once. Bothwell is the scholarly dean of both Canadian diplomatic history and Canadian-American relations. He has also written extensively on all aspects of Canada’s history, domestic and foreign, including, most recently, a magisterial survey of the whole sweep of Canadian history. He has, moreover, written several excellent biographies of Canadian political figures, and brings to *Alliance and Illusion* a biographer’s keen instinct for fascinating detail and interesting personalities. His portraits of Prime Ministers John Diefenbaker, Lester Pearson, and Pierre Trudeau are especially riveting. With his diverse skills as a historian, Bothwell is able to explore the history of Canadian foreign relations with an unrivalled depth and breadth of knowledge and perspective.

*Alliance and Illusion* is a large book, both conceptually and topically, but Bothwell holds it all together by pursuing several themes which shift back and forth between the three balancing acts. One grand theme, especially in the early chapters, is the waning of ties between Canada and Britain. Another is the emergence of Canadian diplomacy itself, rather than Canada’s foreign policy as a mere adjunct to Britain’s. In geopolitics, Canada came of age in World War II. True, the Great War had provided Canada’s troops with many glorious moments—most famously the raid on Vimy Ridge—and its politicians with an opportunity to assert independence from the mother country, Great Britain, but it was not until 1945 that Canada truly stood on its own in the family of nations. Still, it was a world dominated disproportionately by the great powers, especially the United States and the Soviet Union, and so while a “middle power” such as Canada had its own interests, it could not pursue them simply as it wished. The need to promote Canadian interests within such severe constraints would be the story of Canada’s Cold War—and it is, appropriately, the heart of the story of *Alliance and Illusion*. As Bothwell observes, the diplomatic and international economic crises facing Canada in the early Cold War “reminded Canadian officials and politicians that Canada was a small country facing a large world. The size of its population meant that Canada by itself could never make a decisive difference. It must act in combination or be resigned to ineffectiveness” (p. 52). Acting “in combination” meant
following the path of middle powers before and since: in unequal partnership with individual powerful allies, such as the United States, or with several other middle-power allies, such as in Western Europe.

The status of a “middle power,” which Canadian diplomats enshrined as a general principle of international relations during the Cold War, fed other guiding premises of Canadian diplomacy, such as the prudent tactic of “quiet diplomacy” and the self-ascribed role of the “helpful fixer.” A middle power would play to its strengths by bridging the gaps between the great powers or between the great powers and the rest of the world. As Bothwell points out, “quiet diplomacy,” in which Canadian politicians and diplomats avoided moralistic grandstanding in favor of behind-the-scenes problem-solving, is something of a tautology. Diplomacy is usually—indeed, almost by definition should be—quiet and behind-the-scenes. But in an increasingly globalized world in which colorful leaders could preach and preen before the world’s media, the more dour Canadian approach did actually offer something different. More important, quiet diplomacy was particularly useful in dealings with the almighty United States. Both countries shared a vast array of interests, but the imbalance in size and power between them meant that Canada was always in the more vulnerable position—not for nothing did Trudeau once memorably compare Canada’s relationship with the United States to that of a mouse with an elephant. Not coincidentally, it also meant that American policy was more scrutinized and criticized in Canadian popular opinion than was the case the other way around. Histrionics were therefore not in Ottawa’s best interests. The “helpful fixer” role, in which a disinterested Canada acted as an honest broker to help solve the world’s problems, between East and West and North and South, was the logical role for a “middle power” practicing “quiet diplomacy” to play on the world stage.

Yet the history of Canadian foreign relations has too often oscillated between the overly praiseworthy and the overly critical. Historians have been especially skeptical of the value of quiet diplomacy in the face of clear moral outrage. In the words of one specialist on Canada and the Vietnam War, quiet diplomacy was really tantamount to “quiet complicity.” But this only provides the setting for yet another of Bothwell’s deft balancing acts, for he sensibly runs a middle course between excessively hagiographic praise and unnecessarily harsh criticism. Canadian diplomacy was, he notes in succeeding chapters, sometimes successful, sometimes not. The middle power’s quiet diplomacy tactics and helpful fixer role scored notable victories in 1949, with the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and in 1956, with the settlement of the Suez crisis. Yet the same tactics and objectives were decidedly less successful during the Vietnam War. Overall, however, the successes and failures revealed less about Canadian capabilities and intentions than they did the changing nature of the international system and, most importantly for Bothwell’s study, the pressures this put on Canada’s role within it.

NATO, Bothwell notes, emerged partly out of Canadian ideas for collective security, specifically a series of trilateral meetings in Washington involving the Americans, British, and Canadians. Canadian diplomats facilitated cooperation, provided solutions, raised issues for discussion, and spearheaded the inclusion, against the Truman administration’s objections, of Article 2 regarding cultural cooperation and diplomacy—what we would
today call “soft power.” Would NATO have emerged without Canadian participation? Almost certainly. Would it have been all that different? In the end, probably not. But the way events actually unfold, and the judicious manner in which the Europeans and North Americans devised the most successful collective security organization in history, had much to do with the deft way in which Canada maximized its middle power role.

The Suez crisis provides an even better example of the helpful fixer in action. The Anglo-Franco-Israeli debacle in attempting to subdue a recalcitrant Egypt is well known in the annals of international history. Less well known to anyone other than a Canadian is how Canada’s Minister of External Affairs, Lester Pearson, helped diffuse the crisis and provided a mechanism for a peaceful settlement. Working behind the scenes, mostly at the United Nations, Pearson facilitated a ceasefire by brokering a withdrawal that would be maintained by UN peacekeeping forces. Pearson won the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts, and his fellow citizens began celebrating a national myth of Canada as the world’s naturally neutral peacekeeper. Indeed Suez, more than anything else, shaped postwar Canadian foreign policy by creating an ideal—never actually attained—of Canada as friend to all and beholden to none. Although the irritatingly smug slogan would not actually be coined until the 1990s, it was in 1956 when Canadians convinced themselves that “the world needs more Canada.” If only. But as Bothwell reminds us in his superb analysis of Suez, “Canada’s influence can nevertheless be exaggerated,” for the idea of the UN acting in an intermediary role came from the British, who were desperate for a face-saving solution, and the draft resolution Pearson put before the UN had actually been provided to him by the U.S. ambassador to the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge. “Pearson’s was the hand that put all the ingredients together,” Bothwell concludes, “but the influence and power that made them possible were not Canada’s” (p. 133). Such was Canada’s role.

Vietnam proves the point. True to its calling, Canada joined the tripartite International Control Commission (ICC) as the West’s representative; neutralist India and communist Poland served as the other two members. The ICC, established with the 1954 Geneva Accords on Indochina, was supposed to monitor the Vietnamese ceasefire and the temporary partition of the country at the seventeenth parallel; it would then help oversee the elections, to be held in 1956, that would finally, permanently reunify Vietnam. That the Canadians saw themselves as objective mediators while everyone else perceived them as representing the views of their NATO allies perfectly captures the tensions that often placed enormous strain on the middle power role. For a time, roughly between 1956 and 1962, Canada formed an effective partnership with India. But even when the ICC worked fairly smoothly, it could do precious little to deter the belligerents, let alone keep the peace. Canada, moreover, used its role on the ICC to act as either a messenger or a bridge-builder between Hanoi and Washington, most notably in the failed 1964-65 “Bacon” missions of J. Blair Seaborn. Thus up until the desultory “Smallbridge” peace missions of 1966, when the retired Canadian diplomat Chester Ronning twice traveled to Hanoi to see if Canada could nudge North Vietnam and the United States towards the conference table, even though neither belligerent welcomed the initiative, Ottawa employed the same tactics it had during the founding of NATO and the settlement of Suez. Even Lester Pearson, who had been so instrumental on both those occasions, returned in 1963, this time as prime minister. But what had worked in 1949 and 1956 failed in 1965—not even the glow from Pearson’s
Nobel Prize could deflect others from waging war. The key differences between the eras, what determined success or failure, lay not with the Canadians, but with the willingness of others to use the Canadians to facilitate or further their own aims. Canadian pretensions to being the world’s helpful fixer, then, were entirely dependent upon having the backing of its allies’ more traditional variants of hard power and the readiness of others, such as Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt or Pham Van Dong’s North Vietnam, momentarily to recognize value in Canada’s efforts. Canada could of course be a helpful fixer with a constructive role to play, but rarely in a manner of its own choosing.

Given the inherent limitations on Canada’s international influence—which have only become stronger since the drastic military cutbacks of the 1970s and 1990s—why should non-Canadians care about Canadian diplomatic history? The very question will affront sensibilities from Victoria to St. John’s, and especially in Ottawa and Toronto. But to put it differently, why would a Canadian bother reading a history of postwar Swedish diplomatic history? Or Brazilian? Australian? Does the history of a middle power deserve a readership beyond the nation in question? Does it have a wider relevance?

While not immediately apparent, the answer is a clear “yes.” As a middle power that was occasionally successful, occasionally not, Canada is an illustrative case study of how the international system functioned in the Cold War, when soft power questions of peacekeeping, political legitimacy, and universal human rights became central concerns even to the foreign policies of the great powers. Alliance politics and international society were also important components of the Cold War, and again Canada provides an ideal case study for their examination. If only for these reasons, Alliance and Illusion makes for compelling reading no matter what the reader’s nationality. But this is all in the past, of interest mainly to historians. The dynamics of Canada’s encounters with the wider world might just become vital to the future. In 1904, Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier rashly claimed that the twentieth century would belong to Canada; instead, the world lived through Henry Luce’s American Century. But perhaps Laurier was merely ahead of his time. By freeing up vast amounts of usable land and navigable water from the frozen tundra and ice floes, and by attracting an ever-increasing population in the process, climate change will enhance Canada’s power immeasurably. Thus in future decades, if not centuries, the world will have no choice but to pay attention to Canadian concerns, traditions, ideals, and objectives. For those interested in such concerns, Alliance and Illusion would be their best place to start.
Author’s Response by Robert Bothwell, University of Toronto

Alliance and Illusion: Comments on the comments

Writing a general book on foreign policy is an exercise in triage. There is so much, and one’s space, information and capacity so limited. In the end, many good topics end up on the cutting floor: but in cutting one must always bear in mind the old French saw, le mieux, c’est l’ennemi du bien. Perhaps I have defined le mieux out of existence, and I must hope that there is enough of le bien remaining. No matter how well-meaning the effort, the result always ends up being narrower and less comprehensive than the author would desire. But this inevitable sense of inadequacy is balanced by a certain curiosity, on this author’s part at least, as to how it will all turn out – which themes will prevail, what shape will emerge.

That is the question that the four reviewers have valiantly tackled, and in contemplating the result, I find, inevitably, some surprises. There are of course errors large and small. As David Haglund points out, I got the South American component of the League of Nations wrong, an elementary and important mistake; I had the date of the Montreal Expos’ first game off by a year; and I failed to explicate properly the mystery of the acronym CoCom. (It should be the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, which functioned as an inter-allied body supervising sensitive exports to the Communist bloc during the Cold War.)

Wolfgang Krieger notes the absence from the book of immigration policy, which was, as he argues, an important part of Canada’s relations with the outside world. As the younger historian Julie Gilmour has pointed out (in the 2008 edition of Canada Among Nations) the reform of Canada’s immigration laws derived from a sea change in Canadian attitudes toward the outside world, and others have made the same point in discussing the history of Canadian immigration. The renovation of Canadian racial attitudes and ethnic prejudices was obviously related to a change in Canada’s willingness to engage with the outside world, to move from quasi-colonial “autonomy” to independent, but multilateral, engagement.

While I can hardly justify leaving out immigration nearly completely – it appears seriously only in discussing the massive British immigration to Canada after 1945, and in analyzing the draft dodger phenomenon after 1965 – I suppose the omission derives from the fact that immigration had little effect on either Canada’s political or its economic foreign policy in the period under discussion. That would not be the case if the terminal date were moved along, through the Mulroney or Chrétien or Martin governments – not to mention Harper’s. It may also derive from the near-complete segregation of “social history” in Canada from “political history.” (I would like to add “economic history,” but apart from Francine McKenzie and a few other brave young scholars, it can hardly be said to exist.)

There is also the particular problem of writing the diplomatic history of Canada. Most of the diplomatic history accessible to Canadians in English deals with the two senior English-speaking nations, or with world diplomatic history broadly conceived. That can cause confusion, since some readers of foreign policy history expect that Canada will somehow win, show or place in a
kind of historical horserace – when the competing horses are the United States, Britain, France or some other great power.

Canadian diplomatic history not only must make sense against the backdrop of larger events, but also be relevant to, or derived from, the domestic Canadian historical narrative. Several of the reviewers (Preston and McKenzie especially) underline the problem of writing the diplomatic history of a smaller player – a supporting actor, perhaps a character actor, never destined to have the lead role. So I applied to *Alliance and Illusion* the same technique or formula I had used in earlier books on uranium, atomic energy and the Cold War, which involved explaining the larger context as well as the specifically Canadian part of it.

When we discuss context we inevitably come up against the term alliance, which forms part of the title. The problem I had there was not in defining an alliance, but in describing one. What was NATO, centrepiece of Canadian foreign policy for most of the period described in the book? There were books describing the origins of NATO to be sure, and books like John Milloy’s or Sean Maloney’s describing particular aspects of it, but there was very little that told you how the thing functioned, what happened when you warmed a seat at “the table,” what alliance spirit and alliance practice actually were. Historically speaking, NATO was something to be taken on faith. Writing the history of Canada in the alliance seemed like wrestling with smoke; and in the end, like other historians, I ended up writing the history “of” not “in”.

David Haglund addressed the problem of the title, and it is a real problem. Academic titles are usually the product of a conscious search for the euphonious, and when academics, tin-eared by nature, think they have found euphony, what they have usually committed is sonority. I must plead guilty as charged in the court of euphony, but behind the concepts of alliance and illusion there lurks a genuine question -- if not a satisfactory answer.

There is another dimension to *Alliance and Illusion*, and it involves a different kind of context. What I tried not to do in writing the book was pander to the notion that Canadian foreign policy had formerly enjoyed a “golden age.” I tried not even to mention the term, though in a very long book I may not have succeeded. Proponents of the idea – let’s call them “Golden Agers” – place the *Age d’or* forty to fifty years back, around Louis St. Laurent’s time. In those happy days Canada was respected, on the “A” list of countries, consulted rather than cajoled, idolized rather than ignored. Descriptions of the Golden Age are almost always political or military in nature, and have no large economic component. They seldom pause to contemplate budgets or other such mundane considerations; and they place Canada, not alone in the world, but alone in the exalted company of its senior ally or allies. This is “seat-at-the-table” history par excellence. But if it’s a dining table, it does not tell us what was served, and whether the guests left sated or hungry.

The Golden Agers’ globe is a strange world. Invoking a mythical past, they create a magical future – after a dismal present. They argue, in effect, that if you try hard enough, and really, really wish for something to come true, why, it will! Put into movie form, we could call it “Crouching Pearson, Hidden Nobel.” However you construe it, this semi-mythical version of Canada’s past belongs more in the realm of exhortation if not exaltation – a kind of “magic unrealism.” What pleased me most in the four perceptive reviews of *Alliance and Illusion* is that not one of them appears to
subscribe to the Mini-me version of the Canadian identity in which Canada is compared to the great powers and found wanting, guilty of not being large, or great.

What then underlies Canadian foreign policy? Is there some guiding spirit, some hidden doctrine? Or is it, in effect,” tell me what’s happened and I’ll tell you what our policy was”? Undeniably, Canadians take away very different lessons from studying their country’s external policy. Stephen Harper in a recent speech has argued that there is a conservative tradition in Canadian foreign policy, hidden behind or submerged under the dominant liberal narrative. If that is so, it is a tradition that was largely if not entirely absent from the period under discussion in my book.

Alliance and Illusion, then, describes a large part of the content of this book, yet I have an uneasy feeling that it does not go as far as it should. If there is a reprise of this volume, or it spawns a second covering Canada and the world since 1984, there is another phrase that may serve: “Autonomy and Independence.” There is a real difference here, as my friend Norman Hillmer recently reminded me. Canada for many years enjoyed “autonomy” in a larger world system, composed of empires, to which Canada either belonged or was closely allied. For their own reasons, and out of their own experience, the generation described in this book opted instead for “independence,” placing a greater distance between themselves, and their country, and the senior allies. Autonomy speaks to a traditional Canada, the Canada that went into the Second World War in 1939. Independence speaks to the Canada, and the Canadians, who emerged from the conflict.