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Introduction by Thomas Maddux
Reviewers: Max Paul Friedman, Greg Grandin, William M. LeoGrande, Alan McPherson, Richard Saull


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In *In from the Cold: Latin America’s New Encounter with the Cold War*, Gilbert Joseph and Daniela Spenser have collected a series of essays that exhibit the new directions in Cold War studies, particularly the emphasis on agency from the states drawn into the larger geopolitical and ideological confrontation among the superpowers and the importance of considering social and cultural forces along with the more familiar political and economic ones. Recent H-Diplo roundtables have featured several examples of this approach involving U.S. relations in Asia and Latin America. This is what Joseph and Spenser indicate in their response as a major objective, “to foment a more sustained engagement between foreign relations historians of the Cold War, who have been largely preoccupied with grand strategy and U.S. policy, based largely on U.S. archives, and those who approach the conflict from the standpoint of the periphery, often ‘from below,’ using tools and concepts from area studies, social and cultural history, and cultural studies.” (1)

As the reviewers note, the editors have advanced this perspective within several earlier volumes and the contributors to this collection have influenced the turn from a preoccupation with the U.S. role and its geopolitical and economic priorities in Latin America to studies on the agency of individual Latin American states and insurgent and counter-insurgent groups, and the ensuing interaction that takes place in all areas. Joseph’s introductory chapter, “New Approaches, Debates, and Sources” summarizes the status of the “new history,” and Daniela Spenser’s concluding chapter, “Standing Conventional Cold War History on Its Head” describes the new approach as one in which “we have placed national interests, state policy, and the international economy into the political-cultural realm, in which the state’s power is deployed or contested through representations, symbolic systems, and new technologies, recognizing that the exercise of power not only flows from the policies and interventions of states but also works through language and symbolic systems in everyday practices.” (381) Following the Cold War in Latin America, readers receive, among ten essays, a good summary from Piero Gleijeses on Cuba’s agency in African countries and an effective contrast by Ariel Armony on Argentina’s counterinsurgent agency in Central America before the U.S. took over. The collection than shifts to explore the Cold War’s reach into the domestic life of Latin Americans and their engagement with it such as Eric Zolov’s evaluation of the sacking of one of the United States Information Service’s seven bilingual centers in Morelia, Michoacan in response to the Bays of Pigs invasion and the political activities of former Mexican President Lazaro Cardenas; and Victoria Langland’s “Birth Control Pills and Molotov Cocktails: Reading Sex and...”

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Revolution in 1968 Brazil,” which offers a persuasive account of gendered conflicts between the regime and female insurgents influencing the Cold War political crisis that culminated in Brazil in 1968.

The reviewers are impressed with the study and the individual essays with a grass roots focus. They do raise some issues for further discussion and the authors discuss their concerns in their response:

1) As Richard Saull notes, In from the Cold, challenges traditional views on “what the Cold War was about, who it involved, and what were its consequences.” (2) On the nature of the Cold War in Latin America, Saull and Max Paul Friedman note the lack of extensive Soviet competition with the U.S., with the Cuban missile crisis as an exception, as a significant marker. “Maybe there was no Cold War in Latin America,” Friedman suggests, “in the conventional sense of explaining all important events through the prism of US-Soviet rivalry.” (2) Alan McPherson agrees that the real action is at the grass roots level explored by many of the essays. Greg Grandin and William LeoGrande, however, suggest more Cold War impact, as Grandin puts it, “in the intense internationalization and politicization of everyday life,” (3) and LeoGrande proposes that “local actors and decision-makers in Washington framed Latin America’s experience during the Cold War as an extension of the Cold War. But was it really? The local conflicts during the Cold War look a lot like the conflicts before and after it.” (4) In “The Caribbean Crisis: Catalyst for Soviet Projection in Latin America” and in “Standing Conventional Cold War History on Its Head,” the concluding essay, Daniela Spenser explores Moscow’s relationship with Cuba and its shifting stance on supporting Fidel Castro’s revolutionary policies in Latin America. Spenser also notes that research in Soviet and Eastern bloc archives has provided some evidence on their negotiations with and aid to Latin American communist parties, insurgent and labor movements, and Central American allies in the 1980s. (pp. 382-384, 392-394)

2) A related issue raised in this discussion is whether or not the Cold War in Latin America was unique with respect to the global Cold War or whether it should be singled out as a “singular epoch” in Latin American history. This leads to discussion about the beginning and end of the Cold War, if it ended at all. Grandin starts the conflict in 1947 “when a series of coups and conservative backlashes fueled by rising anticommunism ended a brief albeit consequential continent-wide postwar popular-front democratic spring.” (1) Grandin locates the end either in the U.S. 1989 invasion of Panama, an invasion without an anti-communist justification, or in the 1990 electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. LeoGrande, however, attributes more significance to the enduring resistance of Latin American elites to popular demands and Washington’s determination to advance its interests and keep Latin America in “its political and economic orbit.” (5) Joseph and Spenser raise the same question in the introduction and “Final Reflections” with respect to attitudes advanced by George W. Bush and his advisers, which included several veterans from the Central American wars of the 1980s, and Washington’s response to Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. (6) and (p. 394)
3) The reviewers welcome the authors’ emphasis on local agency and, as McPherson, states “into the grassroots where the real action was” such as Steven Bachelor and Stephen Pitti who integrate local labor struggles into the Cold War framework. Bachelor focuses on Mexican state security violence in 1969 against Mexican autoworkers at Chrysler's Toluca plant, and Pitti crosses the Rio Grande to follow Cesar Chavez and the United Farm Workers effort to keep the Cold War and anticommunism from undermining their focus on organizing farm workers. LeoGrande, however, questions how new the “New Encounter” approach is, noting a number of studies that “have not neglected the local dynamics of Latin America’s popular struggles.” (2-3) Friedman and Grandin also raise the challenge of how to integrate history from below and cultural approaches as presented in a number of the essays with narratives on state behavior. Recognizing the difficulties inherent in this task, Friedman suggests reading volumes such as this one that combines both subjects in different essays. (4-5) Saull suggests the “need to widen the theoretical lens as to what constituted Cold War struggle” as carried out in the essays and relate the local struggles to U.S. foreign policy concerns and domestic political conflict in the Latin American states. (4)

4) What issues are left out or downplayed according to the reviewers? They note that most of the insurgent and counter-insurgency campaigns in Latin America during the Cold War period have been omitted, although they recognize that this will be the focus of a forthcoming study by Joseph and Greg Grandin, A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence during Latin America’s Long Cold War. Saull would welcome more attention to questions of political economy as they affected the Cold War in Latin America such as the “introduction of neoliberalism in the wake of the debt crisis in the early 1980s.” (4) Friedman and LeoGrande suggest that the collection excessively downplays the role of the United States. In referring to the extensive military assistance of the U.S. to Latin American armed forces and training that focused on internal security, Friedman notes that the U.S. contributed “importantly to the growing focus on political activity as a subversive threat, with its sanguinary outcomes around the region.” (4) LeoGrande believes that the study gives insufficient attention to the United States, its decision-making, and the degree to which U.S. policy represented a continuation of its desire to maintain its hegemony in a traditional sphere of influence. “There is no doubt that both local actors and decision-makers in Washington framed Latin America’s experience during the Cold War as an extension of the Cold War,” LeoGrande notes, “but was it really?” LeoGrande’s answer is no, emphasizing the continuity of “Washington's hegemonic presumption in Latin American” beginning with the Monroe Doctrine. (4)

Participants:

Gilbert M. Joseph, a Yale Ph.D. (1978) is the Farnam Professor of History and International Studies, and the director of the Latin American and Iberian Studies at Yale University until 2005. He is the author of Revolution from Without: Yucatán, Mexico, and the United States,

Daniela Spenser is a senior researcher at the Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social in Mexico City. Her recent edited books include La Internacional Communista en Mexico: Los primeros tropiezos (2006), En busca de una nación soberana: Las relaciones internacionales de Mexico, siglos XIX y XX (2006); and Espejos de la Guerra Fría: Mexico, América Central y el Caribe (2004). Her current project is a book on the early years of the Mexican Communist Party.


Greg Grandin is Professor of History at New York University and received his doctorate in history from Yale University in 1999. He is the author of The Blood of Guatemala (Duke, 2000), which won the Latin American Studies Association's Bryce Wood Book Award for best book on Latin America; The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War (Chicago, 2004); Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism (Metropolitan, 2006). He is the co-editor (with Marilyn Young, Jeffrey Wasserstron, and Lynn Hunt) of Human Rights and Revolutions (2007); Truth Commissions: State Terror, History, Memory (special issue of Radical History Review, co-edited with Thomas Klubock, January 2007); and (with Gilbert Joseph) of A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence during Latin America’s Long Cold War (forthcoming from Duke University Press). His new book, Fordlandia: The Rise and Fall of Henry Ford’s
Forgotten Jungle City, will be published in May by Metropolitan/Henry Holt. He is currently working on a history of the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay in the early 1930s, tentatively titled “War and Peace: Conflict and Diplomacy in the Making of the Americas.”

William M. LeoGrande is Dean of the School of Public Affairs and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America. Professor LeoGrande received his A.B. (1971) and M.A. (1973) degrees in Psychology and Political Science from Syracuse University in Syracuse, New York. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science with Certificate in Latin American Studies from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University in 1976. Professor LeoGrande has written widely in the field of Latin American politics and United States foreign policy, with a particular emphasis on Central America and Cuba. He is the author of Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977-1992 (University of North Carolina, 1998) and Cuba’s Policy in Africa (University of California, 1980). He is co-author of Confronting Revolution: Security Through Diplomacy in Central America (Pantheon, 1986), and co-editor of The Cuba Reader: The Making of a Revolutionary Society (Grove, 1988); Political Parties and Democracy in Central America (Westview, 1992); and A Contemporary Cuba Reader: Reinventing the Revolution (Rowman Littlefield, 2007).

Alan McPherson is Associate Professor of International and Area Studies and CononoPhillips Petroleum Chair in Latin American Studies in the School of International and Area Studies at the University of Oklahoma. He is the author of Yankee No! Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations (Harvard Press, 2003) and Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles: The United States and Latin America since 1945 (Potomac Books, 2006). He received a Ph.D. in history at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill in 2001.

Richard Saull is Senior Lecturer in International Politics, Department of Politics, Queen Mary, University of London. His major publication include Rethinking Theory and History in the Cold War (London: Frank Cass, 2001); The Cold War and After (London: Pluto Press, 2007); Co-editor, The War on Terrorism and the American ‘Empire’ After the Cold War (London: Routledge, 2005). Saull is currently working on a book-length project on the historical sociology of far-right political movements in Western Europe tracing the international dimensions of their origin and evolution from the late nineteenth century to the contemporary era.
In a review essay on U.S.-Latin American relations I did a few years ago that Gil Joseph was kind enough to cite in his introductory essay to this volume, I opened with the old joke I first heard in Managua:

Q: Why are there no coups d’état in the United States?
A: Because there is no U.S. Embassy there. ¹

I then went on to mention that this way of thinking about the source of dramatic political change in Latin America used to be quite common among New Left historians: The United States was responsible, for good or ill, as the only important actor on an exotic tropical stage. It made sense to acknowledge the sheer power of the largest country in the hemisphere, but diplomatic historians often replicated the views of the U.S. officials they criticized by reading only U.S. sources, and describing only U.S. actions. It was foreign relations without the foreign, turning Latin Americans into bit players or scenery in their own past. The best work produced in the last decade or so differs, by bringing Latin America back in: Using Latin American sources, and focusing on Latin American agency, the relationship looks much richer. It operates at a number of different levels, explored through innovative methodologies.

Gil Joseph was one of the first North American scholars to not only appreciate this but to work energetically to nurture scholarship that brought Latin America back in. Now he and his co-editor Daniela Spenser continue in In from the Cold to push for a transnational approach to scholarship that is bottom-up as well as top-down, that understands that culture is political and politics is cultural, and that can incorporate new actors without failing to focus on the central role of the state. This volume does many things, and one of them is to emphasize how different the Cold War looks when seen from one of its peripheries -- and of course the major violence of the Cold War took place on the periphery. One way to think about this book is to reverse the subtitle: The Cold War’s New Encounter with Latin America. Conventional assumptions about the Cold War simply do not hold up when one begins to study Latin America carefully. For one thing we don’t know when it begins, or when -- or whether -- it ended. Diplomatic historians are used to locating the beginning in the hardening of lines between the United States and the Soviet Union around 1947, and ending it with some degree or another of triumphal self-congratulation around 1989 or 1991. But Marines were landing on Caribbean beaches to oppose nationalists for almost twenty years before the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. The continuing embargo on Cuba, the war of words with Hugo Chavez, and overwrought warnings about a “pink tide” show that the fears that preceded the Bolshevik Revolution have survived the disappearance of the Soviet Union.

So maybe the Latin American Cold War began in 1898 and hasn’t ended yet. Maybe it wasn’t an East-West conflict but a North-South conflict. To put it most provocatively, maybe there was no Cold War in Latin America, in the conventional sense of explaining all important events through the prism of U.S.-Soviet rivalry.

For another virtue of this book is its emphasis on Latin American agency, even if that does not mean complete freedom of action. To paraphrase Karl Marx, people make their own history, but not under conditions of their own choosing. So the question is how much did the Cold War determine local conditions? The book reveals familiar incidents from the Cold War, such as the Cuban missile crisis or the 1954 coup against Guatemala’s Jácomo Arbenz, to have been products not only of Cold War clashes but of Latin Americans in contest with one another. There have been calls for more pericentric histories of the Cold War, more attention to regional actors who pursue their own interests, and greater use of non-U.S. archives. This book shows the fruit of these approaches, and of the recovery and preservation of Latin American memories and archives—preserved through the heroic efforts of family members, grassroots organizations, and committed jurists—as well as the opening of some in the former Eastern Bloc.

The book destroys the notion of a bipolar conflict. It also tells us not to be too generous with phrases like “imperialism” or “U.S. hegemony.” Gil Joseph reminds us at the outset not to overlook “the level of support for anti-Communist authoritarianism in Latin America—among middle sectors, workers, campesinos, Christians, men and women.” (19) Fans of the joke I told at the outset could learn a great deal from reading Ariel Armony’s essay on how the ruling junta of Argentina engaged in its own independent anti-Communist crusade in Central America, complete with military aid, advisors, and covert operations, at a time before U.S. involvement in the contra war, when this diverged from Carter administration policies. Partisans of an opposite point of view who, like Ronald Reagan, blamed the Soviet Union for all unrest in Latin America, will benefit from reading Daniela Spenser’s careful accounting of just how limited Soviet support for armed rebellion in the Western Hemisphere was, and how much more Cubans drove the events of October 1962 than did their supposed masters in Moscow. Piero Gleijeses, in his superb book *Conflicting Missions* and in his essay in this volume, proves not only that Cuba acted independently of the Soviets in sending thousands of soldiers to fight in African liberation movements, but that these actions made Cuba the world’s leading remote interventionist after the United States, a small power with superpower reach, driven by a commitment to revolutionary ideology that bore little resemblance to Soviet doctrine. Sometimes, the tail does seem to wag the dog—because it is not a tail. Latin America emerges not as a backdrop for a U.S.-Soviet clash, but as the driving force behind its own history.

Writing that history is not only the product of discovering new archival sources, but of attention to the foreign-local encounter, of reading nontraditional sources in creative ways, from Seth Fein’s attempt to account for the impact of U.S.-subsidized newsreels in Mexico, to Victoria Langland’s analysis of the disconcerting overlap between the violence of sexuality in 1960s Brazilian magazine advertising and the sexuality of violence inflicted

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upon female political prisoners under the military regime. These are fine-grained studies based on analysis and immersion in local sources of the politicization of everyday life. They can produce surprising amendments to the familiar story about U.S. intervention and resistance to it. A classic “anti-American” event such as the burning of a U.S. cultural Center in Morelia, Mexico, in response to the Bay of Pigs invasion, becomes in the course of Eric Zolov’s investigation a richly textured local event that had as much to do with religious-secular conflict, traditions in higher education, and the delicate dance between the Mexican left and the ruling PRI’s effort to benefit from pro-Cuban rhetoric without antagonizing the United States. The whole picture of U.S.-Latin American relations becomes more complex as it is harder to think of the two sides to a straightforward equation. Steven Bachelor gives us useful insight into the debates over neoliberalism with an analysis of the earlier development of the Mexican maquiladora system with a twist: He studies auto workers at a Chrysler plant in Mexico who went on strike, not to protest the Americanization of their working conditions, but because they wanted more of what Americanization meant to them: democratic labor representation and middle-class living conditions, accompanied by what their sense of Mexicanism meant to them, which included the social justice and labor internationalist claims of Mexico’s 1910 revolution. Carlota McAllister’s study of indigenous women at rural markets in Guatemala shows the unintended consequences of the imposition of economic and political changes inspired by Walt Rostow’s modernization theory—an excellent example of the kind of history possible when one pays close attention to the agency of the apparently powerless, without ignoring the vast resources of the state. Stephen Pitti’s subjects cross or blend the line entirely, as Mexican-Americans nurturing a form of patriotism that would allow for the full citizenship rights of labor organizing and protest while also enabling a position of support or opposition to the Vietnam War. (In the transnational spirit of the volume, it would be interesting to see this study examine the cross-border organizing engaged in by the farmworkers.)

Taken together and read against one another, these essays contribute a great deal. They also raise a number of questions. The Soviet Union and pro-Moscow communist parties appear as relatively conservative forces, dragging their feet in supporting armed rebellion, calculating realists who tried to out-talk the Chinese and play catch-up with more radical, self-starting and idealistic Latin American revolutionaries. In the chapter by Glijeses, Cuba’s government, too, is cautious and seeks to avoid provoking the United States in the Western Hemisphere, but in Spenser’s account Castro recklessly risks war with the United States and provocatively supports rebels throughout the region. One reason for the dissonance may be that, while both authors carefully describe the constant conflicts between Moscow and Havana, Spenser winds up depicting a relatively homogeneous guerrilla struggle in which Cuba sent aid subsidized by the Soviets to an assortment of rebel groups in different countries. Thus the failure of Che Guevara to bring revolution to Bolivia is set alongside the outcome of the U.S. Marine intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 both as reversals for both Cuba and the Soviet Union. Even top U.S. officials quickly realized that there was no Soviet and little significant Cuban involvement in the Dominican uprising, launched by constitutionalists who wished to restore the legally elected president to power. Somewhat ironically, this detailed and archivally-based inventory of the limited amount of Soviet assistance to far left groups in Latin America could serve to confirm a dimension of the familiar Cold War model, which fuses assorted
leftist movements and their different national contexts into a single phenomenon. And so I second Daniela Spenser’s call for differentiated studies of Soviet bloc policy in the region.

This book is a corrective to the vast libraries of accounts that emphasize the U.S. role in Latin America as if only the United States could cause change there. And yet, as a corrective, it may lean enough on one side of the scale that conventional U.S. policy comes up short as a factor. To take but one example: By 1958, Eisenhower’s Military Assistance Program and Public Safety Program were pouring $100 million/year into Latin American armed forces and pushing them towards a focus on internal security. Every single Latin American military establishment in every country except Cuba received assistance from the United States, and the most repressive received the largest amounts. Training at the International Police Academy and later at the School of the Americas steeped Latin American officers in anti-Communist dogma and a doctrine of suppressing social movements that did not fill empty heads with dangerous ideas, but did contribute importantly to the growing focus on political activity as a subversive threat, with its sanguinary outcomes around the region.

That is not the whole story of why political repression of the moderate left rose exponentially in the region and targeted reformist as well as revolutionary projects. Authoritarianism has a long pedigree in Latin America. There was no Public Safety Program in 1932 when the Salvadoran military and hacienda guards massacred upwards of ten thousand peasants. Ariel Armony reminds us of the role of French doctrine in contributing to the formation of counterinsurgent states such as Argentina’s during the Dirty War, and he is quite right to say that the Cold War, that is, violence between right and left, “was not ‘imposed’ on these countries, essentially because they responded to local and regional socioeconomic and political dislocations” and acted independently of the superpowers. But he goes too far, I think, when he says the United States “cannot be considered as the leading external actor in regional conflicts.” (157) By any measure, U.S. security policy was a crucial part of the Cold War in Latin America, as was the concerted effort by successive U.S. administrations to use military, paramilitary and economic power against leftist governments in Guatemala, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Chile, and Nicaragua.

But we already know all that. There are hundreds, if not thousands of books available that tell that side of a sorry tale. And that is why I’m happiest with the book’s subtitle as it is: Latin America’s New Encounter with the Cold War. The old encounter we already know about.

So we have here a new contribution of great value. These authors join those who have demonstrated convincingly that the cultural is political and that the conventional wisdom always needs revision. A remaining challenge is how to integrate the new scholarship that emphasizes history from below and cultural approaches, with narratives that seek to explain state behavior. One notices this tension in reading through the chapters in this book. Spenser and Gleijeses and Armony enlighten us about the neglected role of Soviet, and Cuban, and Argentine officials, in government, military, and intelligence services. These excellent chapters differ from the intriguing ones that follow, which make only
occasional references to officials or geopolitical conflict, while seeking to understand the impact of visual culture, educational and nationalist traditions, and gendered identities upon political acts that take place in the public sphere. Stitching these together into a synthesis, or at least a comprehensive narrative of an extraordinarily complex relationship, may be for 21st century historians what Peter Novick’s “Noble Dream” of objectivity was for the 20th century: a goal towards which one can usefully strive even if it remains elusive.³ In the meantime, one of the best ways to resolve this dilemma is to read high quality scholarship of different kinds side-by-side. And that is exactly what one can do by picking up this volume.

In recent years, Latin American social historians have taken up the Cold War both as a meaningful historical period – corresponding to the nearly half century of postwar struggle between the U.S. and the USSR – and as an analytical category, considering the ways ideologies, politics and economics associated with the superpower conflict shaped local histories. Yet for the most part, Latin Americanists have largely detoured around debates associated with diplomatic history – questions related to geopolitics, the motivations of policy makers, and ‘first cause’ debates. Thus even as they embrace the Cold War as a useful construct they subvert it, diluting the conflict within a larger conceptual and temporal framework.

There is perhaps no other area outside the U.S. and Europe where the trajectory of post-WWII militancy maps so neatly onto to traditional periodizations of the Cold War than Latin America: The Latin American Cold War began in 1947 when a series of coups and conservative backlashes fueled by rising anticommunism ended a brief, albeit consequential, continent-wide postwar popular-front democratic spring; it ended either with the 1989 invasion of Panama (taking place a month after the fall of the Berlin Wall, this was the first U.S. Latin America intervention since the marine occupation of Nicaragua in the early 1930s not justified by anti-communism) or with the 1990 elections in Nicaragua that removed the Sandinistas from power. This timeframe is important not just for a “peripheral,” or marginal reading of the Cold War, for a number of the Cold War’s central events took place within it -- the 1954 CIA coup against Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz, the Cuban Revolution, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the election and overthrow of Salvador Allende and his Popular Unity coalition in Chile, the spread of death squads throughout the southern cone, and, of course, Central America and Iran-Contra.

But for this periodization to make any analytic sense it has to be fitted within a longer, arguably more consequential epoch: Latin America’s revolutionary twentieth century. Running from the Mexican Revolution of 1910 to the Central American insurgencies of the 1980s, this period was defined by sequential attempts to transcend what had become an unsustainable model of exclusionary nationalism, restricted political institutions, persisting rural clientalism, and dependent, export-based development. The experience of each country’s involvement in this nearly century-long cycle of insurgent politics was distinct, though many shared similar patterns of radicalization, followed by revolution, civil war, or state terror. Each successive bid to transform society generated experiences that shaped subsequent attempts. In 1910, Mexico’s revolution signaled the first sustained assault on nineteenth-century authoritarian liberalism, putting agrarian reform and social rights fully on the policy agenda. In the 1930s and 1940s, populism, in Brazil and Argentina for example, sought to extend rights, supersede caudillo patronage relations with national institutions, and articulate a more inclusive national-popular identity; in the 1940s, socialists, nationalists, and social liberals tried to make good on the promise of anti-fascist social democracy. In the 1950s, a sharper nationalism gained ground, with a defined program of import-substitution, particularly in Guatemala and Bolivia. By the late 1950s,
the frustrations and radicalization that produced the Cuban Revolution could have, in fact, come to fruition in a similar upheaval in any number of other countries, in Guatemala, Colombia, or, Peru. An over-determined event in the fullest sense of the term, the Cuban Revolution both crystallized decades of regional experience and linked that experience to a broader, global crisis of legitimacy that by 1968 had threatened to overwhelm both West and East alike. The revolution was consequential not just in that it was the first in Latin America to fully understand itself as “world historical” and thus try to “externalize” itself, fracturing Latin America’s already debilitated Old Left and spawning and supporting imitators throughout the Andes and Central America in the 1960s and the southern cone in the 1970s. It was also consequential because after the disaster of foco theory in Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, and Guatemala it quickly gave rise to movements that tried to transcend the theory’s limitations. Liberation theology; new social movements organized around nascent political identities that resisted vertical integration into reformist parties or bureaucratic corporatist states; Chile’s Popular Unity coalition which sought to achieve socialism without sacrificing political pluralism; and even new guerrilla organizations that hoped to avoid foquismo’s errors and build mass support through a New Left attention to consciousness raising – all were as much reactions to the Cuban Revolution as they were products of it. These elements came together in their fullest expression in Central America in the 1980s, a conflict coterminous with the Cold War’s end.

The challenge, then, that faces scholars of Latin America – including many of the contributors to In from the Cold: Latin America’s New Encounter with the Cold War, edited by Gilbert Joseph and Daniela Spenser -- is to identify what is specific about the postwar that justifies highlighting the Cold War as a singular epoch. One important distinction is the increasingly interventionist role the U.S. played in Latin American domestic politics. Well before even the Mexican Revolution, the progress of both Latin America’s attempt to transcend its “feudal” past and the United States’s ascension to first hemispheric and then global hegemon proceeded on parallel tracks, with each greatly informing the shape the other took. But after WWII, Washington’s containment policy became a more constant and common variable – albeit with differential effects -- shaping each nation’s history. The massive infusion of counterinsurgent aid in the decades after WWII quickly led to an erosion of the compromise-seeking center -- which in pre-Cold War Latin American politics was already narrowly circumscribed and only tenuously able to incorporate the strains of modern politics. The preponderance of influence exercised by the United States over the hemispheric system-- and the organization of the region’s nations as a caucus in the United Nations united behind Washington’s leadership -- ensured that the crisis politics of any given country didn’t spill over into external war (except in the case of the Argentine junta’s attempt to retake the Malvinas in 1982). Yet it did greatly accelerate the pace of domestic polarization. Politics and conflict didn’t end with the defeat of the Sandinistas or the invasion of Panama – much less did “history” -- but efforts to transcend the past no longer took the form of opposition to the U.S. but rather subordination to what was called the Washington Consensus, a broad policy framework designed to help Latin America move beyond what transitionologists described as the region’s Jacobin populist political culture, corporatist mentalité, and dirigist economics.
In *from the Cold* sets out an ambitious, double-pronged research agenda aimed at, as Daniela Spenser puts it in her conclusion, “standing the Cold War on its head” as well as synthesizing traditional, diplomatic studies of this “Latin Americanized” Cold War with explorations into the conflict’s social, cultural, and representational dimensions. Both editors are Mexicanists; Spencer is a diplomatic historian who has written on the foreign policies of Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean during the Cold War; Joseph is an historian of the Mexican Revolution and its legacy, part of a generational cohort of scholars who, drawing from a Gramscian attention to issues of power and culture, worked to “bring the state back in,” to borrow a phrase from Theda Skocpol, as a central variable in social history. This volume could be understood as an extension of that project, an effort to bring the “inter-state [system] back in.”

The progression of the anthology reflects the alliance between diplomatic and social history; after a pair of incisive introductory essays by Joseph and Thomas Blanton, the Director of the National Security Archive, the volume scales down from the heights of diplomatic history to the precincts of mass politics and popular culture. The first set of case studies surveys geopolitical events from a Latin American perspective – Daniela Spenser examines the Soviet’s post-Cuban Missile Crisis in the Caribbean, Piero Gleijeses summarizes Cuba’s African policy from 1959 to 1979, and Ariel Armony looks at Argentina’s role in “transnationalizing the Dirty War” in Central America. The second set of case studies are by scholars not, for the most part, associated with Cold War Studies as such and focus on specific local or national conflicts or ideologies informed and shaped by the international conflict.

What connects the two sections, and what should be a central element in any definition of the Cold War, is attention to the intense internationalization and politicization of everyday life. This transnationalization of experience and politics is clear in the first collection of case studies, which though operating within a customary international-relations framework nonetheless provides innovative perspectives on the dynamics of those relations, less focused on bilateral superpower conflict than on the interests and ideas of states operating on the margins. Gleijeses, for example, here summarizing his exhaustive work on Havana’s African diplomacy, demonstrates the ways in which Cuba drove Soviet policy in Africa and played an indispensable role in the democratization of Southern Africa. In the second set of case studies, essays by Seth Fein, Eric Zolov, Steven Bachelor, and Stephen Pitti highlight the way international politics penetrated daily life, ideas and conflicts on both sides of the US-Mexican border.

Taken as a set, these four articles – which look respectively at film propaganda, the transformation of the Mexican left in the wake of the Cuban Revolution and the Bay of Pigs invasion, union repression in the name of anti-communism at a Mexico City Chrysler plant (the year after the Tlatoloco Massacre), and Chicano United Farm Worker organizing in California – can be read as a book within a book, an attempt to sketch out a truly transnational history of the Mexican Cold War that triangulates between Mexico, Cuba and the United States and moves easily back and forth between cultural and social analysis. The two remaining essays – Victoria Langland’s study of sexual politics in 1968 urban Brazil and anthropologist Carlota McAllister’s essay on peasant mobilization in a rural
hamlet in highland Guatemala – would at first appear to have little in common. Yet the Cold War was a powerful integrator, and both cases remind readers that the conflict in Latin America had less to do with the Soviet Union than it did with the threat of democratization and social liberalization -- in Langland’s essay of gender roles, in McAllister’s of rural market, family and labor relations.

It’s fitting that the editors ended the anthology with McAllister’s incisive essay, which compellingly traces a line between Walt Whitman Rostow’s anticommunist developmentalism of the 1960s to the crisis politics of a marginal community in a remote province that provoked a genocidal response from the national military. In from the Cold won’t end the debate about how to define the Cold War in the Third World, but it does suggest that perhaps as good a definition of any can be found in Pope Paul VI’s 1967 encyclical, On the Development of Peoples. “Social conflicts," he wrote, “have taken on world dimensions.”
Review by William M. LeoGrande, American University

Just How New is the “New” Cold War History of Latin America?

The individual essays in this eclectic volume are of high quality and constitute a good representation of recent scholarship that focuses more on how the Cold War looked from the bottom-up rather than from the top-down -- that is, from the perspective of Latin Americans, especially in the popular classes, rather than from the perspective of Washington and Moscow. Essays by Piero Gleijesas and Ariel Armony chronicle how Cuba and Argentina took the initiative from their respective superpower allies in Africa and Central America, acting out their own national self-interest on the global stage. Half a dozen other chapters zoom in tight on specific episodes in which Cold War issues played themselves out in culturally particular ways from Brazil to California. There is no doubt that such carefully researched scholarship enriches our understanding of what the Cold War meant to Latin Americans and how its meaning was mediated through the conflicts and context of their everyday lives.

That said, the framing essays by editors Gilbert Joseph and Daniela Spenser claim too much for this “new” approach to Cold War history in Latin America, and hand down an indictment of previous scholarship that I find overdrawn. Joseph claims that the new approach represented in this volume may “alter the prevailing paradigms of interpretation” of the Cold War by enabling scholars to leave behind the “great diplomatic debates that have particularly stunted the region’s Cold War historiography,” and to “transcend frayed, dichotomizing paradigms of interpretation that themselves appear to be artifacts of the conflict.” (16-17). He then proceeds to critique “orthodox” and “new left” interpretations of the Cold War as equally inadequate.

According to the orthodox view, the conflict began with Soviet expansion and the United States merely reacted in defense of the values of liberty and democracy. Joseph rightly points out that this theory has difficulty accounting for U.S. actions in Latin America which were so often at odds with these values: overthrowing democratically elected governments and supporting military dictatorships that brutalized their own citizens. The orthodox interpretation is reduced to describing these anomalies as “mistakes” that inexplicably occur over and over.

In the “new left” interpretation, the Cold War began with U.S. efforts to expand the domain of liberal capitalism and exploit its post-World War II military advantage to secure economic domination. Joseph does not actually offer a critique of this view, but it has trouble accounting for the fact that the United States so often chose to intervene, overtly or covertly, in places where it had few tangible economic interests at stake relative to the costs of intervention. A less vulgar-Marxist version of this interpretation would argue that challenges to the capitalist status quo anywhere threatened the integrity of the whole international order and therefore had to be opposed. That’s a better post hoc explanation than saying, “mistakes were made,” but it fails to address a second weakness in the “new left” interpretation. As U.S. government diplomatic records have been declassified, there is
little evidence, especially after 1961, that U.S. officials thought about Cold War policy in terms of defending U.S. economic interests, either in particular or in general.

These are real weakness in the traditional approaches, to be sure, but the claim by Joseph and Spenser that the new scholarship is somehow superior falls flat. First, scholarship that focuses on how Latin America experienced the Cold War does not help resolve the anomalies in either of the traditional interpretations of U.S. policy. It just leaves them hanging by looking at other issues. This seems to be precisely what the editors find most appealing. Joseph approvingly quotes Greg Grandin's argument that scholars should be “less preoccupied with what motivated U.S. policymakers and more concerned with identifying what was being fought over in Latin America” (10).

Scholars certainly ought to study Latin America's social, economic, and political conflicts during the Cold War years, but whether Grandin’s argument is really good advice depends on what you are trying to explain. Focusing on how Latin America experienced the Cold War years will not get you very far if your aim is to explain U.S. policy. It seems unfair of Joseph and Spenser to criticize diplomatic historians for studying diplomacy instead of social history, just as it would be unfair to criticize social historians for ignoring diplomacy. Of course, one might argue that to have a full and deep understanding of these conflicts, social history cannot be ignored, but that critique works the other way, too.

Diplomatic historians study Washington for the same reason Willie Sutton robbed banks. As Sutton famously said, “That's where the money is.” Washington is where the policymakers are. You cannot understand Latin America's major local conflicts during the Cold War without understanding the role of the United States, and you cannot understand the role of the United States without studying U.S. decision-making. To recognize that decisions made in Washington had profound impact in Latin America is not to deny the agency of regional actors or, as Joseph claims, “marginalize human subjects” (17). It is simply to recognize that when it comes to wielding power, some subjects are more equal than others. During the Central American conflicts in the 1980s, both the Sandinistas and the Salvadoran guerrillas understood this perfectly well and sent very able diplomats to Washington to influence U.S. policy.

Spenser promises that the new approach represented by the essays in this volume will “stand conventional Cold War history on its head” by looking at grassroots social, political, and cultural conflicts in Latin America rather than at the dynamics between the two superpowers (382). In fact, scholars of Latin America have not neglected the local dynamics of Latin America's popular struggles, even in the high-profile cases most directly linked to the Cold War, let alone in cases where the Cold War was no more than a distant rumble. Before Grandin's excellent work on Guatemalan social movements, Piero Gleijeses recounted, a decade and a half ago, the history of the revolution and its overthrow in 1954 from “the Guatemalan side of the story,” (Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954). Subsequently, scholars have argued whether Arbenz's defeat turned on his failure to fully mobilize popular support because of the racial division between Ladinos and the Mayan majority, and the implications of that division for the growth of subsequent armed movements in the 1960s and 1970s (See, for example,

From the outset, almost all the scholarship on Fidel Castro’s insurrection against Fulgencio Batista’s dictatorship focused on the dynamics of Cuban society and polity, because the Soviet Union had no role at all until after the triumph. Even when studying the trajectory of the revolution in the early 1960s, scholars paid the most attention to class dynamics, especially why the Cuban middle and upper classes were so utterly unable to defend their interests as Castro steered the revolution toward socialism. (One excellent analysis, but by no means the only one, is in Jorge Domínguez’s *Cuba: Order and Revolution*, published in 1978.) Even on the Bay of Pigs, the scholarly consensus is that the fatal flaw in the CIA’s plan was Washington’s failure to appreciate the depth of popular support for the revolution.

As early as 1978, Arturo Valenzuela and Juan Linz offered a sophisticated account of the internal contradictions in Salvador Allende’s governing coalition that contributed to the Chilean military coup in 1973 (*The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile*). A lively scholarly debate has ensued over whether Allende would have been able to survive even absent U.S. efforts to make the economy scream.

When Central America erupted in armed conflict in the 1970s and 1980s, some of the very first scholarly treatments looked at the internal origins of the conflicts, not the role of the United States. Richard Millet, in *Guardians of the Dynasty* (1978), recounted the history of Nicaragua’s National Guard, and how the Somoza family installed and maintained its dynasty. Dennis Gilbert, in *Sandinistas* (1988), examined the origins of the party and its internal dynamics while in power. Enrique Baloyra’s *El Salvador in Transition* (1982) and Tommie Sue Montgomery’s *Revolution in El Salvador* (1982) traced the evolution of the country’s rightist and leftist political movements respectively.

Even my history of U.S. policy (*Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977-1992*), begins with an account of how structural social and economic change in the region gave birth to popular political movements, followed by elite repression and revolutionary mobilization. Moreover, throughout the study I argue that the dynamic driving U.S. policy was the tension between Washington’s attempts to assert control over developments in the region and the often successful resistance of local actors, on the right as well as the left.

Granted, most of the studies cited above were written by social scientists, not historians (Millet excepted). But perhaps the reason that Latin America has been peripheral to the field of Cold War studies is not the myopia of diplomatic historians but rather that Latin America was peripheral to the Cold War. The history of the Cold War in Latin America is not the same thing as the history of Latin America during the Cold War. The former, presumably, involves the ways in which the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union affected the region. The Soviet Union, sharing Washington’s Great Power presumptions, saw Latin America as the U.S. sphere of influence and involved itself there only rarely. Cuba was the principal venue, of course, and the revolutionary government
probably could not have survived the early years of U.S. pressure without Soviet largesse. Moscow also provided some assistance to Allende’s government in Chile and to the Sandinistas, but these investments were strictly limited because Moscow regarded the probabilities of success as slim. Cuba was more daring, of course, aiding revolutionaries all across the region, but with little success.

Was Cuba’s internationalism a manifestation of the Cold War? The Soviets largely opposed Cuba’s actions, assenting (as Spenser points out in her chapter on Cuba) only in deference to their bilateral relations with Havana. Castro was so angry at the Soviets’ unwillingness to bankroll the Sandinistas that he refused to attend the funeral of Soviet General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko in 1984. The Cubans regarded their support for revolutionaries abroad as both a defensive strategy (attacking the Latin American states that joined the U.S. diplomatic and economic embargo) and as support for national liberation. As Gleijesas’ chapter notes, the Cuban aim in Africa was to support progressive anti-colonial movements, not to export Marxism-Leninism or advance Soviet interests.

Beyond Cuba, the real connection between Latin America’s history in the second half of the 20th century and the Cold War pretty quickly becomes pretty thin. Yet talk about the Cold War (its symbolic representation, if you will) is pervasive both in the local conflicts between popular movements and conservative elites, and in U.S. policy. The Latin American right invariably denounced popular movements (even Christian Democrats) as communist agents of Moscow. Washington invariably defended its policies as necessary to preserve the Hemisphere from communist penetration. No one put it more succinctly than Ronald Reagan, when he said of Central America’s turmoil, “Let’s not delude ourselves. The Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on.”

So, there is no doubt that both local actors and decision-makers in Washington framed Latin America’s experience during the Cold War as an extension of the Cold War. But was it really? The local conflicts during the Cold War look a lot like the conflicts before and after it. Between local elites and popular movements, the issues were the recurring ones of control over economic resources, social status, and political power. U.S. policies during the second half of the century look a lot like U.S. policies in the first half. The driving force behind U.S. policy was not so much a Cold War imperative, whether understood narrowly as the contest with Soviet Union, or more broadly as the ideological struggle between capitalism and communism. Rather, the driving force behind U.S. policy was a Great Power imperative to preserve U.S. hegemony in its sphere of influence, hereby safeguarding all manner of interests. The Cold War offered an identifiable adversary and a convenient ideological rationale around which to rally both domestic support and regional allies. But Washington’s hegemonic presumption in Latin America preceded the Cold War by more than a century. Karl Marx was five years old when the Monroe Doctrine was promulgated, and the Roosevelt Corollary was articulated 13 years before the Bolshevik revolution. The United States was no more enamored of Juan Perón before the Cold War than it was of Fidel Castro during it, or Hugo Chávez after.

The end of the Cold War did not end Washington’s intolerance of challenges from the south, as demonstrated by conflicted relations with Venezuela under Chávez. Joseph and Spenser
both remark with apparent surprise that Washington’s Cold War policies seemed to continue in Latin America even after the fall of the Soviet Union. “Is the United States essentially waging a new version of the Cold War under another name?” Joseph asks. That misses the point. The United States has been waging the same struggle for a century and a half; the Cold War was just one incarnation of it.

In the concluding sentence of this collection Spenser writes, “Without the Cold War, Latin America would be a very different place.” I am not so sure. Had the Cold War never happened, would Latin American elites have resisted popular demands any less vehemently or violently? El Salvador’s Matanza of 1932 rivaled the 1980s civil conflict in its unmitigated brutality. Would Washington have been any less intent on preventing Latin American states from escaping its political and economic orbit? President George H. W. Bush was in the process of negotiating Soviet surrender in the Cold War when he invaded Panama to oust Manuel Noriega. The Cold War provided the language with which the Hemisphere’s actors described their struggles during the second half of the twentieth century, and perhaps even the language in which they themselves understood those struggles. But below the ideological veneer lay conflicts of a much older vintage.
A decade ago Gil Joseph with Catherine LeGrand and Ricardo Salvatore edited a magisterial volume for Duke University Press titled *Close Encounters of Empire*. It brought together top young scholars to explore the new cultural history’s potential for explaining U.S.-Latin American relations. They enlisted gender analysis, media studies, literary criticism, and cultural anthropology to help breathe new energy into a sub-field whose debates about political economy and geopolitics had, by the 1980s, stagnated along ideological Cold War lines. The authors of *Close Encounters*, in contrast, de-centered hemispheric relations, articulated the global in local spaces, and questioned epistemic constructions about Latin America.\(^1\) The volume, in short, represented the finest of its kind and its time.

Its only drawback was that it barely mentioned the Cold War. In the 1990s the obstacles to obtaining new evidence or even fresh perspectives on the Cold War understandably frustrated scholars. Archives in Latin America were still underfunded and disorganized. The hemisphere’s governments, many having just emerged from bruising left-right political battles, seemed reluctant to re-open old wounds by releasing documents.

Now that some wounds (though by no means all, the editors remind us) have healed, new archives have opened, and intrepid scholars venture beyond archives, Joseph has helped guide another signature collection in U.S.-Latin American historiography. *In from the Cold: Latin America’s New Encounter with the Cold War* gathers a remarkable cast of scholars to combine some of what we now know of the Cold War in Latin America with a continued search for alternative constructions of truth and cultural meaning.

Co-editor Daniela Spenser is more properly this volume’s instigator since she previously helmed *Espejos de la Guerra Fría* (Mirrors of the Cold War) in 2004 with a Mexican press.\(^2\) That volume did much of the heavy lifting of *In from the Cold* by publishing earlier versions of Joseph’s own introduction and of the *In from the Cold* chapters by Spenser, Ariel Armony, Piero Gleijeses, Eric Zolov, and Carlota McAllister.

In whatever language, the material sets a high standard for studying Latin America during the Cold War. *In from the Cold* is sure to become a model of the genre and an inspiration for further research the way *Close Encounters* was. Spenser and Joseph, armed with the conviction that the Cold War must be placed first and foremost in a Latin American context that emphasizes North-South issues, have gathered contributors whose sensitive insights, cutting edge methods, and tireless on-the-ground research have unearthed fascinating stories of transnational repression and grassroots resistance. From the spillover of Argentina’s “dirty war” into Central America to the impact of *Bonnie and Clyde* in Brazil, and from idealistic Cubans in Africa to brave Mayan women in Guatemala, Latin America

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suffered through the Cold War in its own unique ways.

To be sure, the chapters cannot cover all the themes of the Cold War, but they are remarkably diverse. They cover major countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Cuba. They look at “high” policy matters such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and more local issues such as what the 1961 riots in Morelia meant for Mexican politics. Methodologically, there is also admirably broad coverage: from the latest documentary releases from the NSA, to McAllister’s ethnographic study of market women, to Gleijeses’s multi-continental interviews with Cubans and Africans. Almost everyone has done interviews with actors in their dramatic episodes. Moreover, the organization of the book usefully highlights the transnational/local aspects of the Cold War, a choice that seems to fit perfectly into Duke’s “American Encounters/Global Interactions” series.

If we can speak of imbalances, Mexico perhaps takes an unusual amount of space since there were no major U.S. confrontations with that country during the Cold War. The authors who discuss Mexico, however, make the case that it was in an ambivalent relationship with geopolitics, stuck between Washington’s desires for stability and Latin America’s spurs of revolution and reform. There is also no chapter on important Cold War countries such as Panama, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Bolivia, and Chile, and, apart from Guatemala, not much discussion of Central America except for Armony’s chapter on Argentina’s network of repression there. The soon-to-follow companion volume by Joseph and Greg Grandin, *A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence during Latin America’s Long Cold War*, will correct some of these gaps with chapters on Chile, Peru, El Salvador, and Nicaragua.

I will here focus on only some of the material of *In from the Cold*, leaving out chapters, such as those by Gleijeses and Fein, the substance of which can be found in English elsewhere.³

Both introductory chapters make important comments on the profession. Joseph’s point is more historiographical. He makes the case convincingly that only a few books have begun recovering particularly Latin American memories of the Cold War. Those memories are not about the *origins* of the Cold War but they rather recall the hardships of living through the *currents* of the Cold War as it shaped—often stifled—grassroots struggles against poverty, dictatorship, and violence. The chapter by Thomas Blanton, Director of the National Security Archive, complements Joseph’s by surveying recent struggles to declassify documents or otherwise unearth—sometimes literally—the bones of Cold War repression. This is a remarkably well crafted chapter, reflecting both Blanton’s relentless pursuit of the facts and his playful tone.

The first few empirical chapters deal with a more traditional Cold War concern—state

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interactions in the U.S.-Soviet tug of war. Yet they bring fascinating new sources to the table. Newly released Soviet documents anchor Spenser’s take on the Cuban Missile Crisis, showing Moscow to be motivated by fear—of “losing” Cuba to the Chinese or to itself—and humiliation—at having to withdraw the missiles. Far from the cold, calculating monolith it appeared to be, this Communist empire, like the United States, was not free from careless improvisation and poor judgment, especially when dealing with an area of the world it knew little about. Armony’s contribution, “Transnationalizing the Dirty War,” is an admirably researched and comprehensive one-of-a-kind study of Argentine repressive efforts in Central America in the 1970s and 1980s. Readers will be surprised that right-wing Argentines, like their U.S. counterparts, were highly concerned with the growth of radical movements in Central America, and unlike their Congress-bound Washington counterparts, they were much freer to fund insurgencies and counterinsurgencies such as the original contras.

The rest of the book delivers what the editors promise: case studies of grassroots movements for freedom and rights inside an increasingly stifling political environment. Zolov’s chapter epitomizes all the strongpoints of this collection: on-the-ground research, sensitivity to local motivations, and fine writing, showing a Mexican state stuck in the political middle of the Cold War between pro-Cuban rioters and a powerful anti-Cuban neighbor.

Steven Bachelor and Stephen Pitti both successfully integrate local labor struggles into a larger Cold War pattern. Bachelor’s “Miracle on Ice” connects the struggles of local Mexican groups to the Cold War while it emphasizes the transnational nature of the ideas and resources of workers. Meanwhile, Pitti shows that César Chávez and his Mexican American farmworkers walked a thin line between fighting for their rights as workers while avoiding red-baiting employers. Chávez’s strategy was to maintain a strong anti-Communist rhetoric and to support U.S. wars in Korea and Vietnam. Wary also of the radicalism of urban youth, he waited until the summer of 1966 to criticize the war in Vietnam.

The last two chapters emphasize gender’s importance to the Cold War. Victoria Langland’s “Birth Control Pills and Molotov Cocktails,” about how Brazilians largely associated leftist violence with sexual deviance or danger in the late 1960s, is perhaps the boldest of the chapters yet among the most effective. The range of evidence is delightful and so are the visual aids. This is exactly the kind of entry that will surprise yet also educate readers. McAllister’s contribution is fully on par with the best in the collection. She has done remarkable grassroots research with indigenous Guatemalan victims of civil war repression, much as has Grandin.4 Her findings question the dominant political and economic spaces of the Cold War and argue for alternatives designed by rural Mayan women.

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In from the Cold should be required reading for scholars and graduate students interested in Latin America’s international relations, and for others searching for a model of Cold War history in the developing world. It is, simply put, the best collection of essays on Latin America in the Cold War so far. It firmly sets the scholarship on this crucial period in a bold new direction—into the grassroots where the real action was.
As Gil Joseph's excellent and finely balanced introduction – knotting together a discussion of theoretical, historiographical and empirical themes – stresses, Latin America has, to a considerable degree, been rather neglected in the discussion of the Cold War. Indeed, as Joseph highlights, the English language literature on the Cold War in Latin America is patchy at best. The primary aim of this edited volume, then, is to go some way in beginning to address this problem, hence the title of bringing Latin America 'In from the Cold'.

What accounts for the uniqueness of the Latin American experience of the Cold War? There are a number of issues to untangle here. First, with the important exception of the Cuban Missile Crisis the intensity of superpower geopolitical competition in the Western Hemisphere was of a significantly reduced tempo compared to other regional theatres of competition particularly with regard to north Asia, south-east Asia and the Middle East. Hence, the experience of the Cold War was different as, with the exception of 1962 – indeed, in large part because of the outcome of the Caribbean crisis and Soviet humiliation – unlike other regions the US had a much greater degree of external leverage than it had elsewhere. This distinct geopolitical context obviously explains much about why the region has been neglected by most ‘mainstream’ Cold War scholars.

The experience of Cold War was less about direct superpower competition on the ground involving US military interventions, but rather shifting degrees of antagonism, conflict and resistance involving social and political forces that drew inspiration from – to varying degrees – the societal model of each superpower (and which went beyond the ‘key moments’ of 1954, 1962 and 1973). Thus, local armed resistance to pro-US regimes in the region was mainly assisted by Cuba rather than the USSR but resistance struggles also included conflicts in the workplace – be it in the factory or on the farm – the university and the home. These struggles – at the local interface of how ordinary people lived their lives and how social orders were reproduced – were Cold War struggles because, as demonstrated in In From the Cold, they were subversive of the existing social and political order and drew inspiration from leftist revolutionary critiques of capitalist society and imperialism even if they were not officially sanctioned by Moscow (or even Havana). Whilst not reflective of a Soviet or necessarily communist political sensibility they were radical and revolutionary in intent and, furthermore, tended to trigger alarm bells in the beltway.

Secondly, there are other important characteristics of the political economy of Latin America that account for its unique place in the Cold War distinct from other regions. This was a region that had and has a pre-Soviet or pre-communist revolutionary tradition; a product of the struggles that brought the different countries of the region to independence in the nineteenth century against Iberian colonial power and, secondly, in quickly coming under a new form of imperial dominance with the rise of the United States. Thus, it was the experience of coming to terms with American imperialism and the dominance of American capital over the region that shaped the character of resistance struggles and revolutionary movements such that the US was ‘compelled’ to make a number of armed interventions to
prop up the rule of capital and ensure the continuance of political regimes friendly to Washington throughout the early decades of the twentieth century. A culture and popular mythology of resistance and revolution is ingrained in the fabric of Latin America perhaps more so than any other region of the world. It is no surprise then that flame of resistance – and the aspiration for radical political and economic transformation – continues to characterise much of the region's politics evidenced in the anti-neoliberal turn of recent years and in Hugo Chavez's Bolivarian Revolution.

Unlike the rest of the third world, then, Latin America was already post-colonial by the time that communism emerged as the favoured political-ideological vehicle of national and social revolution in the early decades of the twentieth century. Consequently, in spite of the spread of communist ideology and parties to the region after 1917 indigenous forms of resistance and revolution predominated. There were no communist revolutions akin to China, North Korea and Vietnam and elsewhere. Instead the two successful revolutions – in Cuba and Nicaragua – drew on very local political and ideological roots and developed into distinct post-revolutionary states. Whilst the Sandinistas co-existed with social and political opposition that would never have been tolerated by orthodox communist regimes (and a human rights record second to none in the region), the Sovietization of the Cuban revolution never managed to eclipse the legacy of Marti, Che and Fidel Castro's jealous guarding of Cuba's autonomy from Soviet direction and discipline.

The dynamic of revolutionary – Cold War – struggles, then, was driven by this historical cultural and ideological legacy in confrontation with local states supported by Washington rather than the expansion of superpower – pace Soviet geopolitical interest in the region. Indeed, as In From the Cold demonstrates, despite US suspicions the USSR was quite far removed – politically and ideologically – from many of these struggles.

Extending the analytical gaze of the Cold War's political geography, however, is not the only ambition of In from the Cold. Bringing in Latin America as a subject and object of the Cold War combines with an inter-disciplinary ambition in challenging a number of key assumptions about the study of the Cold War particularly the ontological straightjacket of the study of the determining relationship of superpower geopolitical struggle vindicated by the surveying of diplomatic archives. As Joseph and the contributions of other writers in the book demonstrate whilst the opening up of the archives of the former communist bloc has released bundles of new material that have triggered scholarly reassessments of the history of the Cold War, they have tended to re-affirm the scholarly pre-occupation with the bipolar relationship as defining of the Cold War and, in some cases, overlooked other sources of revelation and reassessment about the Cold War. The contributions in this volume bring a rich and illuminating methodological pluralism to the study of the Cold War (drawing on the testimony of truth commissions, oral history as well as the national/security archives of local states), and with this they also – most importantly – challenge the theoretical consensus on what the Cold War was about, who it involved and what were its consequences.

The upshot of this is that the Cold War is transformed from an international conflict anchored in the geopolitical manoeuverings of Washington and Moscow determining
developments in different theatres of competition, to a lived experience of ordinary people involving a range of social and political actors – not just states – including peasant movements, trade unions, students and feminists. And it was in some of these contributions – drawing on other national archives (and those of the United States too) – which I found most illuminating and revelatory about the Cold War.

Let me highlight some of key points raised by individual contributors before ending with some critical comments. The volume is organised into four sections: Gil Joseph’s excellent tour de horizon setting out the key themes and parameters of the book is followed by Thomas Blanton’s ‘forensic’ examination of the anti-communist terrorism prosecuted by state agencies across Latin America with the connivance of Washington. Much of this material is eerily reminiscent of more recent American diplomatic and political machinations associated with the justifications of the emergency politics that followed 9/11, particularly Blanton’s quoting of one of the main apologists for US policy, Elliot Abrams – then and now – in denying the torture and murder of suspected leftists by a number of Latin American regimes.

Part two consists of three contributions directly engaging with more conventional treatments of the Cold War situating Latin America as a unique zone of geopolitical rivalry and, most interestingly, the role of local actors in shaping the Cold War in the region and beyond. Daniela Spenser narrates the interplay between Moscow and Havana during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the impact of this on the relationship between the two revolutionary states over prospects for the export of revolutionary anti-imperialism to the rest of Latin America. As she demonstrates, in spite of its continuing geopolitical vulnerability and dependence on Moscow, Cuba remained committed to strategies sometimes at odds with Moscow, and managed to exert considerable influence on Soviet policy towards the wider Western Hemisphere in spite of this dependence.

The other two chapters – by Piero Gleijeses and Ariel Armony – are the most powerful vindication of Gil Joseph’s argument outlined in his introductory chapter. Gleijeses provides a synopsis – based on his magisterial work, *Conflicting Missions*, of Cuban involvement in revolutionary anti-colonial struggles in Africa centring on the intervention in Angola between 1975 and 1987, the greatest example of revolutionary internationalism in the twentieth century. The significance of this for our understanding of the Cold War is that it turns on its head the prevalent assumption about the dominance of the superpowers as ‘agents of Cold War conflict’. Further, it integrates the Cold War with Black liberation and the anti-colonial struggle in southern Africa through linking the particular place of race within the Cuban Revolution, founded upon addressing the historical legacy of slavery and racial oppression in colonial Cuba.

I found the chapter by Ariel Armony particular illuminating. In part this reflects my own guilt in not examining – enough – the local dynamic of the Cold War in Latin America in my own work. Thus, following the Cuban example, Soviet allies could operate with significant degrees of autonomy thus contributing an independent dynamic to the Cold War and so could American allies. His account provides evidence for the very paranoid, extreme and conspiratorial views of the Argentinean military *junta* on the ‘communist threat’ in Latin
America going well beyond that whipped up by the Reagan administration and its civil society allies – not least Hollywood – in the early 1980s. The irony here – noted by Armony and giving credence to the liberal characteristics of American imperial power – was that the Carter administration’s concerns with the human rights situation in parts of Latin America in the late 1970s provided a space for Argentina to develop its own anti-leftist apparatus of terror throughout the region giving counter-revolution a distinct flavour informed by the practices of the Dirty War against the left and civil society in Argentina in the mid-1970s.

The third part – the longest section – with six individual contributions concentrates on a range of issues marginal to the traditional historiographical discussion of the Cold War. Here, contributions discuss questions of representation and propaganda through newsreel and wider media involving civil society actors and private interests providing a lived experience of the Cold War on the ground in a range of Latin American locales – Mexico, Brazil and Guatemala – some distance from the international machinations of the superpowers. I don’t have the time to do justice to the richness of these discussions but they all manage to provide fresh light on the experience of the Cold War in Latin America by connecting struggles over cultural representations (of women, indigenes and workers) to conflicts over access to human rights, as well as the way in which ‘American’ ideas and goals associated with ‘market society’ and ‘liberal freedoms’ played out in a paradoxical fashion – where local, pro-US regimes acted to suppress the realization of such ideas and goals – in local power struggles in much of Latin America through the 1960s, 70s and 80s.

What these contributions demonstrate, above all else, is the need to widen the theoretical lens as to what constituted Cold War struggle. This is obviously a challenging issue to be definitive about; indeed, one or two of the contributions appeared to stretch the logic of a Cold War politics to a breaking point. Nonetheless these contributions, which include looking at the role of student rebellion in Mexico drawing on Mexico’s own revolutionary tradition in a context of Cold War and Mexico’s ambivalent relationship with Cuba, to the sexual representation of women in Brazil involved in radical protest, highlight not only the way in which local struggles had a Cold War dimension – at least for the foreign policy concerns of the United States – but that the wider context of the Cold War informed and was manipulated to serve domestic political ends playing an important role in the ‘resolution’ of domestic political conflicts in a number of Latin American states.

It seems a little unfair to end my review with some critical points, but these are relatively minor and I think the tone and substance of my review makes clear the very impressive and important contribution I think In From the Cold War makes to the study of the Cold War. I have two concerns. First, is that the volume does not sufficiently integrate questions of political economy into the discussion. This is a wider theme – and problem – in the study of the Cold War within diplomatic history and International Relations. With regard to the Latin American experience of the Cold War what role did struggles over ‘economic questions’ condition the Cold War on the ground particularly with regard to the introduction of neoliberalism in the wake of the debt crisis in the early 1980s? Secondly, whilst the volume did highlight some issues relating to the experience of the Cold War on the character of contemporary politics in Latin America, the discussion would have been
strengthened by a more extended discussion of the endings of Cold War in Latin America and how those endings are connected to contemporary developments, not least the recent ‘turn to the left’ that I mentioned earlier.
We are grateful to Tom Maddux and H-Diplo for the privilege of having our collection discussed in a venue dedicated to international and foreign relations historians, many of whom do not normally read our work in Latin American history and area studies. One of the abiding goals of *In from the Cold* (and our ongoing research initiative on the Latin American Cold War, of which this volume and its 2004 Spanish-language predecessor, *Espejos de la Guerra Fría: México, América Central y el Caribe*, represent only the first phase) is to foment a more sustained engagement between foreign relations historians of the Cold War, who have been largely preoccupied with grand strategy and U.S. policy, based largely on U.S. archives, and those who approach the conflict from the standpoint of the periphery, often “from below,” using tools and concepts from area studies, social and cultural history, and cultural studies. Sadly, although diplomatic historians and Latin Americanists should share fraternal relations, they have more often remained, in the words of Max Paul Friedman, one of the contributors to this forum, “Polyglot distant cousin[s].”¹ In *In from the Cold* (and our broader initiative), we have sought to identify contributors who have worked across the methodological, interpretive, and linguistic divides that too often separate our respective fields, in an effort to encourage a more vital crosstalk between them. In this respect, the H-DIPLO forum is a real boon, including as it does interlocutors from international relations and political science, Latin American history, and more mainstream foreign relations historians of the United States.

Like many projects that commence discussions across fields and disciplines, ours is intentionally exploratory and, in many senses, a work in progress—as several of the forum’s contributors note. In this first volume, we feature a strong emphasis on Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean; there is less coverage of South America, and certain high-profile arenas of Cold War conflict—the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Chile—do not receive explicit treatment. No single collection can adequately cover the gamut of multi-layered engagements that constituted the Latin American Cold War: we sought to feature instructive and absorbing cases representing mainland and circum-Caribbean areas; to include Brazil as well as Spanish America; and to inflect the transnational and cross-border dimensions of the struggle, not just for states but for everyday people. Of course, the volume’s overarching essays engage the region as a whole, and suggest arguments and methods that may have some relevance to areas and flash points that do not receive explicit attention. The heavy dose of Mexico, in addition to reflecting the editors’ primary specialization, is meant to address important gaps in the regional literature on the Cold War. The Mexican case (like those of Cuba and Argentina that are also highlighted in the collection) not only points out oft-ignored, highly ambivalent relationships between Cold War allies, but also showcases pivotal cultural and social issues, thereby moving the Cold War narrative away from its prevailing emphasis on diplomatic confrontation and military intervention. We found it near astonishing that Mexico’s experience has received

so little attention in Cold War studies—not only because Mexico (with Brazil) constitutes one of the region’s two “middle powers,” but also because it is the southern neighbor of the hemisphere’s Cold War hegemon. We suggest that Mexico’s Cold War experience severely complicates the notions of an exotic-but-familiar “amigo country” that the ruling PRI disseminated in its contemporary promotions. A companion volume, edited by Gilbert Joseph and forum contributor Greg Grandin, *A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence during Latin America’s Long Cold War*, which will also appear in the Duke University Press’ American Encounters/Global Interactions series, will extend coverage of the Latin American Cold War. Focusing extensively on the post-1945 period as part of a broader examination of the nexus of revolution and counterrevolution throughout the region’s twentieth century—a dialectical theme that Grandin (and Richard Saull) take up in their reviews here—*A Century of Revolution* includes chapters on Chile, Peru, Colombia, El Salvador and Nicaragua, countries not featured in *In from the Cold*. It also attends to important issues which, as Saull rightfully points out, receive less coverage in the present volume: namely the political and economic dynamics attending the transition to neoliberalism, and various forms of “blowback” from the Cold War that have figured into current leftist turns in Latin American politics—which are often inappropriately lumped together in the image of an onrushing “pink tide.”

Judging from William LeoGrande’s commentary here and a review by Stephen Rabe elsewhere, there may be the impression that *In from the Cold* seeks to dismiss the work of mainstream diplomatic historians of the Cold War—be they realists or revisionists or neither—for their tight focus on the state, policy formulation, the primacy of superpower conflict, and the like. To the extent that these colleagues read this message in *In from the Cold*, our invitation to further dialogue will suffer, and that would be extremely unfortunate. It may be that our collection’s call for a more decentered, multi-stranded, and more grassroots and subject-oriented understanding of the deployment and resistance to power in the Latin American Cold War is couched too much in the form of a clarion call. Such is often the case with exploratory projects such as this one. But we would reiterate that we are not claiming anything resembling a Kuhnian paradigm shift. We do not pretend to offer another “new history” of the Cold War; such claims have been made too often within the past decade. Rather, what the volume aspires to contribute is something more akin to a “rapprochement” with the Cold War in the region. This “reencounter,” if you will, rests upon new sources of documentation that shed new light (and perhaps recast prevailing interpretive notions) of international realpolitik, especially where the ideology of Cold War states, and the “Latin Americanization” and “transnationalization” of the conflict are concerned. It also harnesses the methods and sources of oral history, ethnography, and forensic history, as well as newer conceptual frameworks, to address more systematically the everyday contests over culture, representation, and meaning that brought Cold War states, elite establishments, and culture industries into play with local actors.

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As was the case in Joseph’s earlier project *Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations* (1998), many of the contributions to the present collection are informed by a postmodern sensibility to the formation of historical subjects, the ambiguities of power, and the multi-stranded character of historical processes; but the project does not abandon more traditional concerns with macro historical contexts, the state, and political relations. It is precisely in our attempt to bridge the gap between international relations and cultural/area studies that we regard this collection as less a paradigm shift than a dialogue between approaches. It should be clear that our understanding of how power played out within and across international, national, and local arenas owes much to the foundational works of political and economic analysis by foreign relations scholars such as Walter LaFeber, Bill LeoGrande, Stephen Rabe, Arne Westad, and David Painter, among others. We would also reiterate that, while the scholarship collected in *In from the Cold* constitutes a relatively new approach to the Cold War in Latin America (note that mainstream foreign relations scholars such as Rabe and Lars Schoultz have been moving in similar directions in their latest works), it builds on the exciting new cultural turn in foreign relations historiography *tout court* over the past decade or so. To be sure, in the framing essays of the book, we sought to accentuate the elements of this new encounter with the Latin American Cold War, one that might transcend venerable debates about who started (or ended) the global or Latin American variant of the Cold War, and might move the discussion beyond literary currents that still heavily privilege the machinations of the contending superpowers, the international determinants of their policies, and broad-brush treatments of the “collateral damage” these wrought upon Latin America roughly between 1947 and 1990. Still, our debts to these contending scholarly traditions—and to their post-structural critics—should be manifest.

It is quite heartening that all of our interlocutors recognize the collection’s contribution, as LeoGrande puts it, to “[enrich] our understanding of what the Cold War meant to Latin Americans and how meaning was mediated through the conflicts and context of their everyday lives.” But, given its integrative aspirations, our project aspires to do more than just shed light on the history of the Latin American Cold War “from below.” With the exception of LeoGrande, the forum’s other contributors validate our efforts at fomenting a synthesis that will leave Latin American social and political history by “bringing the interstate system back in” (Grandin) while also complicating grand strategy narratives by “transnationalizing” and “Latin Americanizing” them. These reviewers also recognize that, in the process, we hope to produce a history of the Latin American Cold War—rather than just a history of the Cold War *in* Latin America—by documenting in concrete terms and in multiple sites how an “international civil war,” which involved shifting geopolitical stakes and contending visions of how society and its benefits should be organized, intensely internationalized and politicized everyday life.3

This perspective obliges us to affirm certain claims that LeoGrande makes in his review and disagree with others. He is right to stress the long-term material and ideological stakes—

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3 The phrase “international civil war” is Arno Mayer’s, and was brought to our attention by Greg Grandin in *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 17.
the ‘hegemonic presumption’—of the United States, which both preceded and transcended the Cold War, and Joseph attempts to make just this point in his introductory essay to the volume. Without question we would contend, along with Grandin (and Saull), that the 1947-1990 conjuncture privileged in this volume was part of a “longer, arguably more consequential epoch: Latin America’s revolutionary twentieth century,” which “proceeded on parallel tracks” with the US’s rise to global preponderance, with “each greatly informing the shape the other took” (quotations from Grandin’s review). But another of LeoGrande’s assertions, namely that “Beyond Cuba, the real connection between Latin America’s history in the second half of the 20th century and the Cold War becomes pretty thin pretty quickly” (emphasis ours), or his skepticism regarding our contention that, “Without the Cold War, Latin America would be a very different place,” strike us as highly problematic. Indeed, they point up the kind of overweening grand strategy approach, centered on bilateral superpower relations, which this volume calls into question. The scholarship gathered in our volume and the work of several other contributors to this forum tells a different story.

With Grandin and Friedman we would argue that within the longue durée of US hemispheric hegemony and resistance to it, the Cold War represented a particularly consequential juncture. This is evident in terms of the massive infusion of counterinsurgent aid, the narrowing of political space and options, and the manner in which a deadly combination of rational, precise counterinsurgent tactics—typically imported from the United States, Argentina, Israel, South Africa, and France—and more atavistic local sentiments and tactics honed the new internal security state and the strategies of terror and “low intensity conflict” that undergirded it. At issue, then, is more than “ideological veneer and ” Cold War discourse, the “language,” as LeoGrande would have it, “with which the hemisphere’s actors described their struggles during the second half of the twentieth century, and perhaps even the language in which they themselves understood those struggles.” What we attempt to convey in this collection is a reality that goes much deeper than ideological veneer, a struggle in which forms of discourse and representation, often (but not always) generated outside the region, became imbricated in, and constitutive of, the lives people lived.

In this sense, as Grandin points out in his commentary (and larger body of work), “the Cold War was a powerful instigator,” and local and national political, social, and cultural fabrics often had less to do with the strategies, ideologies, and discourses of the superpowers, and more to do with the manner in which these mapped onto and were mediated by local values and aspirations—for or against democratization, a leveling of class or ethnic or racial distinctions, and a liberalization of gender relations. In this sense, Grandin is right to see Carlota McAllister’s contribution on peasant mobilization in a rural Guatemalan hamlet, which combines archival research and ethnographical techniques (the “methodological pluralism” to which Saull refers) as one of the signature pieces of In from the Cold and a fitting way to close the volume. McAllister relates how, in the highland community of Chupol, Maya campesinos/as sought to implement Walt Rostow’s contemporary developmental prescriptions according to their own lights, against a backdrop of generations of class and racial repression. Their efforts ushered in a species of market capitalism and empowerment which, in short order, provoked a genocidal response from the hyper-vigilant anti-communist military state. In reflecting on the essay, Grandin
invokes a phrase from Pope Paul VI’s 1967 encyclical that is fundamental to the multi-layered approach to Latin American Cold War history we seek to advance in this collection: “Social conflicts have taken on world dimensions.”

The outlook for scholarly work along these lines is quite promising. In his review, Alan McPherson echoes a point that Tom Blanton and other contributors made in our volume: namely, that as some wounds heal, and as a horizon of life replaces one of death in the region’s former killing fields and barrios, a greater variety of studies reconstructing the social histories and memories of the Latin American Cold War is possible. The Cold War is still palpable in Central America, the Southern Cone, the Andean nations, and even Mexico, as relatives of the victims of terror continue to protest past atrocities, exhume graves, and actively press legal claims against the perpetrators. But as these forensic and truth-telling processes play out, the climate for a new encounter with the Cold War, undergirded by a windfall of declassified documents and oral sources, warms. Spenser has just returned from an international conference in Chile that underscored the manner in which Latin America is being reintegrated into global Cold War studies and is no longer perceived as peripheral to it, apart from the high-profile struggles around Cuba. A series of future symposia are now on the drawing board and, like the recent Cold War conferences in Mexico and Chile, they auger the possibility of further dialogue between more traditional and newer approaches to the regional and broader conflict. With the historical record increasingly accessible at a variety of global locations, and with historical amnesia challenged at the international and national levels, as well as at the grassroots, Latin American and U.S. students are rediscovering new aspects of their nations’ political, social, cultural, and transnational histories during the second half of the 20th century. This development has enlivened our calling as teachers as well as scholars, both in the north and the south.

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