
Roundtable Editor: Thomas Maddux
Reviewers: Patricio Abinales, Kenton Clymer, Anne Foster, Emily S. Rosenberg


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The War of 1898 represented the first transnational conflict for the U.S. extending from the Caribbean islands of Puerto Rico and Cuba to the Philippines in the Pacific. The early historians of this conflict such as Samuel F. Bemis and Julius W. Pratt did not anticipate that this was just the beginnings of the transformation of the United States to global hegemon with troops, bases, and interests encircling the globe. Bemis’ classic dismissal of the conflict as “the great aberration” suggested that the war was less of a culmination of the arrival of the United States as a major power and more of a major mistake in which weak leaders such as President William McKinley succumbed to public pressure generated by yellow journalism over the Cuban struggle for independence from Spain and to the pressure of imperialists like Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt who desperately wanted to go to war.¹

As George Herring and other authors have noted, U.S. historians have significantly broadened their perspectives and inclusion of shaping forces for the culmination of the U.S. arrival as a major power in an international system defined by clashing imperial powers scrambling to establish colonies around the globe with China as the last major prize up for grabs. Ernest R. May and David Healy have emphasized the impact of this imperial scramble on why and how Americans joined the “great game”.² William A. Williams and the Wisconsin school led by Walter LaFeber and Thomas McCormick added the important impact of the economic transformation of the U.S., the emerging search for overseas markets, and the “Open Door” policy as guiding force for overseas expansion.³ More recently, a new generation of scholars has brought the cultural turn to U.S. diplomacy, and broadened the focus from considerations of security, economic expansion, and politics to the impact of gender and race on America’s turn to overseas imperialism. Kristin L. Hoganson’s studies have explored both the broader impact of middle and upper class women and their engagement with the international environment through patterns of consumption, a parallel study with LaFeber’s The New Empire, and a more specific focus on

¹ For a recent overview, see George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776 (2008), Chapter 8 “The War of 1898, the New Empire, and the Dawn of the American Century, 1877-1901,” 299-336, and contrast Herring’s assessment with Thomas Bailey’s in A Diplomatic History of the American People, 10th Edition (1980), Chapters 31-32, 451-478 which puts more emphasis on McKinley’s short-run political maneuvering and the public pressure generated by the yellow journalism of William Randolph Hearst. Bailey also quotes McKinley’s own recollection that he didn’t know what to do about the Philippines and ended up turning to prayer and received some sort of vision at night that the U.S. had to keep the Philippines and ‘civilize’ the Filipinos. Bailey refers to the source, the Christian Advocate, as “a dubious witness.” See also Julius W. Pratt’s classic Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands (1936).


the 1890s that shifted Richard Hofstadter’s essay, “The Psychic Crisis of the 1890s”, from a focus on the impact of political, economic, and environmental transformations to a gender crisis in the 1890s among male policy-makers who could not act out manly virtues and turned to war and empire to fulfill their ambitions and restore a manly nation.4

Paul Kramer makes a very significant contribution to the study of American imperialism by providing a transnational evaluation of race and empire with the Philippines. By relying on race as a central category of analysis, Kramer joins other scholars such as Louis Perez on Cuba and Mary Renda on Haiti who explore race in other new American imperial outposts. The reviewers raise some questions concerning Kramer’s award-winning study:

1.) Emily Rosenberg and Kenton Clymer point out the many significant contributions that Kramer’s study makes to imperial studies, U.S. diplomacy, and Philippine-American relations. Rosenberg, for example, notes how Kramer bolsters the emphasis of imperial studies on how an imperial system operates in every part of the empire, the imperial center in the U.S. and the Philippine colony: “Colonials and outsiders interacted in imperial space; words changed meanings; goals set in one context spilled their effects into others. And, in this encounter, the colonizers, no less than the colonized changed their ideas about the world and about themselves.” Rosenberg also points out the intersection in Kramer’s study between domestic progressive reform and international studies by developing how the “emphasis on science and expertise, together with a faith in social improvement ... connects the domestic and international histories of the era.” (1) In highlighting the lack of scholarly attention to the Philippine-American relationship involving governance of the Philippines, Clymer emphasizes that Kramer has made a significant contribution to this topic on both the U.S. and Philippine sides. As Rosenberg and Anne Foster suggest, Kramer lays the foundation for comparative studies of other American acquisitions and the social and cultural dynamics in their relationships.

2.) The reviewers agree that Kramer has appropriately applied the historical category of race to his study of both the war in the Philippines and the ensuing colonial relationship. As Rosenberg emphasizes, Kramer presents a dynamic interaction of racial views and imperialism in operation in the Philippines in which concepts evolved and interacted on both sides through the war and afterwards into the 1930s. Neither side had a static, monolithic perspective. Patricio Abinales and Clymer reinforce this assessment, although they do have some reservations. Clymer, for example, recognizes Kramer’s emphasis on how the racial attitudes of American soldiers were changed by the conflict. From an initially cooperative relationship between Filipino forces under Emilio Aguinaldo and the U.S. Army troops that arrived by July 1898 (97-111), Kramer emphasizes how the conflict prompted American troops to racialize the enemy and justify the war as one of racial extermination. Clymer, however, would give more weight to preexisting American racial attitudes as “sufficient in themselves to account for their racist remarks about Filipinos

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and to justify the atrocious actions that some of them took” relying on old racial formations from the Indian wars. (5-6)

3.) Abinales questions whether Kramer’s thesis on the “contingent, contested, and transnational” nature of race adequately explains the shifts that took place with both Filipinos and Americans as they moved from the “exclusionary and brutal racism of the U.S. Army to a more accommodating inclusionary racial formation.” (2) First, Abinales suggests that the change may be linked to the replacement of Army leaders by civilian imperial managers, but notes that Army officials remained “active in promoting public education, one of the pillars of inclusionary racial formation. Was this a case of 'conversion' from vicious racism, or were the cases of soldiers-turned-Thomasities merely outcomes of contestations between different racisms?” (2) Second, Abinales contrasts the effort of U.S. colonial officials to include and accommodate Filipino leaders—at least those of Christian background versus non-Christian—and their political aspirations at the same time that Progressive America intensified racial discrimination against African Americans with Jim Crow segregation and discriminated against and excluded Chinese and Japanese immigrants. “At the moment when American officials had considerably expanded Filipino participation in colonial governance through the introduction of male suffrage and the establishment of a national assembly,” notes Abinales, “American domestic politics had taken a turn for the worse.” (3) Third, Abinales suggests that not only different racial conceptions shaped the debate “between military and civilians over who and how best to govern the Philippines” but also the influence of different models of governance with the Army and its rule in the non-Christian areas as representing the new national state model versus civilians representing traditional local institutions. (3-4)

4.) Chapter 4 “Tensions of Exposition” on St. Louis World’s Fair captures very well Kramer’s model of the interaction of racial attitudes between Filipinos and Americans flowing back and forth across the Pacific. American officials in the Philippines hoped that by promoting a major Filipino exhibit at the fair they would confirm that the Philippine “insurrection” was finally over after having been declared as over several times and that Filipinos under American tutelage were on parallel paths to acquiring “American ways, customs, and loyalties.” After much debate and careful preparation, American officials sent four companies of Filipino Scouts representing different groups—Macabebe, Ilocano, Visayhan, and Tagalog—1,369 Filipinos led by 59 American officers; a delegation of Filipino elite members who collaborated with the American officials; and a group of non-Christians from the Igorots, Tingians, Moros, Negritos and other groups who had been kept under U.S. Army rule in two segregated provinces on Luzon and elsewhere. The Filipino exhibition attracted substantial American attendance but also stimulated conflict. Filipino students at the fair criticized the Igoroto exhibit as reinforcing the image of uncivilized Filipino life especially since American visitors gave the most attention to this exhibit, and Americans, led by Marines, objected to the socializing between Filipino Scouts and white women and attacked the Scout camp. As Kramer concludes, the fair confounded the assumptions and objectives on all sides and reinforced or shifted racial perspectives among Filipino and American participants.
5.) Kramer suggests that the U.S. pursued a policy of “calibrated colonialism and inclusionary racial formation” in the Philippines. Calibrated colonialism, according to Kramer, “involved the setting of criteria by which Filipinos would be recognized as having the capacity to responsibly exercise power in the colonial state and establishing credible, if illusory, markers in time that would signal devolutionary progress in the regime under construction. It could succeed only as long as freedom could be both reliably promised and endlessly deferred.” (191) Clymer questions this thesis, with respect to Woodrow Wilson’s support for eventual Filipino independence, the Jones Act of 1916 which referred to independence as the U.S. goal, and the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 that set a date certain for independence. Clymer compares Wilson with Republican imperialists who tried and failed to stop any change in the status of the Philippines and Wilson’s appointment of Francis Burton Harrison as governor general who maneuvered Filipinos into control of most of the government. The Tydings-McDuffie Act, Clymer notes, was passed also over imperialist objections and an earlier veto of a similar bill by Herbert Hoover. (7-8)

6.) How then does Kramer’s thesis on racial attitudes as a shaping force intersect with more traditional studies on U.S. diplomacy and the Philippines. Kramer, for example, does not suggest that racial attitudes shaped Washington’s decisions to attack Spain in the Philippines or McKinley’s decision to demand control of the islands from Spain in the peace negotiations. Instead, Kramer defers to the “standard” assessments on wartime strategy to immobilize the Spanish fleet in Manila so that it wouldn’t attempt a journey to Cuban waters and to obtain at least a coaling-station to facilitate access to the China market. (91-96) The tensions that culminated in the outbreak of war against the insurgent forces outside of Manila undoubtedly reflected some racial tensions as well as an enthusiastic desire for martial glory in combat, although Kramer notes a degree of both conflict and mutual interest and interaction among American forces and Filipinos. (102-111) The outbreak of violence and the U.S. Army’s move to defeat the insurgents unleashed full-blown racial hostility that shaped the conflict and influenced U.S. officials on how to manage the Philippines during the prolonged conquest as well as attitudes toward the non-Christians and the Filipino elite. Kramer, however, does return to economic and strategic considerations, including the expansion of trade and American economic and imperial interest groups in the Philippines, and the relationship of the Philippines to the Japanese-U.S. relationship, most notably the realization that the Philippines was a hostage to maintaining relations with Japan. (348-349) Kramer does bring racial attitudes into what he describes as the pillars of U.S. Pacific policy by 1914: “informal commercial and naval empire and the ‘Open Door’ in China; formal colonialism in the Philippines, Hawaii, Guam, and Samoa; and racial exclusion from the United States of Chinese and Japanese migrants....” (349) Kramer also skillfully integrates economic and racial considerations into why Congress finally approved the Tydings-McDuffie act, with attention to the opposition of U.S. sugar producers and others to increased competition from Filipino imports and domestic opposition to the Filipino immigrants who migrated to Hawaii and California especially after the exclusion of the Japanese and were admitted as U.S. nationals under the U.S. colonial state in the Philippines.5 Independence would facilitate new tariffs

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5 Kramer’s inclusion of the 1928 world map of exclusionary zones within U.S. immigration law illustrates this with clarity.
on Filipino imports and expose Filipinio immigrants to exclusionary immigration restrictions. (392-402) In short, Kramer does not excessively push racial considerations into every dimension of U.S. policy on the Philippines.

Participants:


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Emily S. Rosenberg is professor of history at the University of California, Irvine. Two of her books, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945 and Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930, deal with the intersections of culture and economics in U.S. international relations. Her most recent book, A Date Which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory (also translated into Japanese), examines the issue of collective historical memory in a media age. She is a coauthor of Liberty, Equality, Power: A History of the American People (5th ed., 2007). She has served as president of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR); an editor of the Oxford Companion to United States History; a Board member of the Organization of American Historians; and co-edits the “American Encounters, Global Interactions” book series for Duke University Press.
Paul Kramer’s massive tome seeks to shift our attention away from the popular – but empirically wobbly – arguments that economic interests and a desire to strengthen projections of power in Asia were the main impetus for the American colonization of the Philippines. He proposes race as an alternative framework of understanding this bloody adventure and complex social re-engineering of a nascent imagined community. But he deploys race with a certain sensitivity to its variable meanings based on how it is articulated in specific historical settings. Where some scholars treat imperial racism as merely a reflection of domestic “racial formations” (p. 19) or, in the case of Filipino and Filipino-American nationalist historians, as simply “the outcropping of generic, archetypal racial formations found elsewhere in the colonial world” (p. 21), Kramer sees dynamic, shifting and “multilevel” (p. 23) racisms that were “contingent, contested, and transnational in scope” (p. 4). He proceeds to prove his point through a rich empirical overview of the 40 years of American rule, interspersed with a panoply of new concepts to back up his basic argument.

Kramer re-examines the brutal Philippine-American war and refers to it as “a race war” reinforced by a “policy of outsourcing savagery” (p. 149). He then proceeds to the era of colonial state building in which “inclusionary racial formation” (pp. 5, 161) displaced the militant racism of the war years; this era was underpinned by a “discourse of capacity” (p. 312) wherein America played the role of “a watchful elder brother or father overseeing an increasingly potent, but potentially troublesome, [Filipino] male adolescent” (p. 312). Racism at this point also developed several variations which ranged from technocratic approaches to the machine-like approaches to governance at the top level. There were even regressions back to the savage racism of the war years.

As Americans and Filipinos confronted each other, the “old” American notions of race were constantly redefined and compelled their own colonial policy of “inclusionary racial formation” to aim to legitimize Filipino elite participation in colonial governance. This “novel racial formation” (p. 5) opened the Americans to challenges by Filipino elites as the latter expanded their influence and fought for more power inside the colonial state. It also became the subject of intense domestic criticism in the mainland when colonial officials attempted to showcase the policy’s “successes” to a domestic audience that was – deep down – still racist.

There are an incredible number of side-stories in the book, including racialized discussions of health care and the Filipino body, infrastructure and education as evidence of inclusionary racism, colonial architecture (from office buildings to public schools) as symbolic representations of American power, and arguments between Americans and Filipinos over the meaning and practice of nation-building and claims over who could

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1 Such explanations are popular among nationalist historians in the Philippines. See, for example, Renato Constantino, The Philippines: A Past Revisited (Quezon City: Renato Constantino, 1975), 287-291, 306-313. Kramer mentions some of the older generation of American leftwing historians, like William Appleman Williams and Walter LaFeber, who highlight the economic or strategic argument.
speak for the colony’s heroes. All these are intertwined in the narrative and serve well to provide the empirical heft that makes Kramer’s work extremely rich and dense. Yet, it may also be the “contingent, contested, and transnational” nature of race that opens the argument to critical interrogation. The book talks about the different racisms to which Americans subjected Filipinos – Christian and non-Christian -, but does not fully account for the shift from the exclusionary and brutal racism of the U.S. Army to a more accommodating inclusionary racial formation. Was it simply because the civilian politicos and technocrats had taken over and sent the army back home? This dichotomy may be problematic: according to Kramer, once the major battles were over, the army was still active in promoting public education, one of the pillars of inclusionary racial formation. Was this a case of “conversion” from vicious racism, or were soldiers-turned-Thomasites merely the outcome of contestations between different racisms? One is not sure.

More importantly, it is not really clear in the book how these different and discordant racisms came about in the process of colonial state-building. What were their origins? The obvious answer is, of course, mainland America, and the book’s discussion of the American public’s reactions to the presence of Filipinos in the St. Louis’ World Fair gives us a glimpse of these. Kramer, however, stops at the descriptions, hesitating to delve deeper into the origins of these sentiments and their possible links with the racisms in the colony. This may be a self-imposed limitation given an already lengthy manuscript, but it is – to my mind – an opportunity that should not have been missed as there are a couple of interesting puzzles worth exploring.

Consider this contradiction: at a time when colonial officials had opted for an “inclusionary racial formation” that accommodated and incorporated Filipino political aspirations, the reverse was happening in the mainland –despite the reformist surge identified with the Progressive Movement which, among other things, fought for “ultimate democratic control of government and values of honesty, community service, and virtuous self-realization.”

A racist counter-response to the nineteenth century populist movement sought to reverse the victories African-American men attained through the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Writes Ellen L. McDonagh:

> By 1908 every southern state had passed legislation establishing voting requirements such as poll taxes and literacy and registration standards that made it impossible, or virtually impossible, for African American men and, in some cases, poor whites, to qualify to vote...[And] though the federal government was fully aware of how state-level de facto disenfranchising laws successfully eliminated the formal participation of most African American men...no efforts were made in the Progressive Era by the national congress, the president, or the courts to correct the South’s success in subverting the Fifteenth Amendment.\(^3\)

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Despite attempts by certain factions of the Progressive Movement to institutionalize the political participation of African Americans and to confront Jim Crow policies, the Progressive Era was “a time of racial segregation.”¹⁴ This racist backlash extended to Chinese and Japanese immigrants who were refused citizenship and barred from owning property, as well as Native Americans whose tribal autonomy was “all but obliterated” by Congress and the Supreme Court.⁵ Thus at the moment when American officials had considerably expanded Filipino participation in colonial governance through the introduction of male suffrage and the establishment of a national assembly, American domestic politics had taken a turn to the worse. What are we to make of these divergent directions in the context of Kramer’s argument of a constant back-and-forth flow of ideas, biases, and policies between colony and metropole? Rogers M. Smith provides a possible answer to this connection between empire and re-segregation:

Perhaps the most far-reaching consequence of the government’s embrace of racial rationales for imperial rule and immigration and naturalization restrictions was the manner in which they strengthened political coalitions and ideological defenses supporting segregation. With this backing, once Jim Crow survived judicial scrutiny in Plessy, all Southern and some border and western states and towns legally codified many other forms of segregation in factories, hospitals, asylums, prisons, parks, circuses, movie houses, theaters, sports arenas, and other locales during the Progressive Era. Many of these institutions had long been segregated in practice, and many Jim Crow practices were never legally enshrined; but the extensive new codes often warmly anointed by federal judges, conferred by the dignifying ‘majesty of law’ on all segregation. The fact that most Northern states did not pass Jim Crow laws did not make them just a regional phenomenon. Throughout these years the states which passed [Jim Crow laws] included about one-third of the U.S. population and the vast majority of blacks; the laws had to be obeyed by all U.S. citizens whenever they passed through these states; and the U.S. government declared these laws valid and itself mandated extensive segregation in the nation’s capital.⁶

The attacks on Filipinos at the St. Louis World Fair were part of this larger movement toward racial segregation. The irony was quite stark: the attempt by American colonial officials to show that inclusionary racial formation worked – by displaying Filipinos as they moved from barbarism to civilization – would never be positively received by the people of a western state where racism had returned. Colonial success did not become the symbol of American civilization but yet another excuse to reinforce domestic bigotry.

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¹⁴ Arthur Link and Richard L. McCormick, Progressivism (Arlington Heights, Ill.: Harland Davidson, 1983), 36, as quoted by McDonagh, “Race, Class, and Gender in the Progressive Era,” 157.
⁵ McDonagh, “Race, Class, and Gender in the Progressive Era,” 158.
Additionally, the contradiction between military and civilians over who and how best to govern the Philippines, for example, may illustrate the contingency and contestation of race, but they also signified the friction between differing models of governance arising in turn from contending political currents. The occupation of the Philippines came at a time when American domestic politics was experiencing a profound shift in the manner of governing in which forces allied to reform and a stronger federal state were engaged in political and institutional combat against “localist” forces embedded in Congress and the party machines. Scholars of American elections initially treated these battles as evidence of yet another “critical alignment” in American politics, but colleagues who specialize in “American political development” see in them the profound transformation of political parties and major administrative institutions during the Gilded Age.7 Stephen Skowronek even makes the provocative proposition that in the 1890s, a “new national state” evolved with the strengthening of national institutions like the army and the presidency.8

In short, it would be equally meaningful to view the prevalence of multiple racisms in the Philippines in the above institutional terms so that Army rule in the non-Christian territories also represented those forces which favored this “new [and empowered] national state,” while the civilians responsible for inclusionary racial formation stood for their localist rivals.9 It was not only varying notions of race that informed colonial state-building, but also ideas of what a state should look like and what it should engage in that underpinned such efforts. Moreover, the persistence of contentious racisms in the Philippines had to do with the fluidity of American domestic institutions as political forces fought for control over resources, but more importantly, over what their power and purpose would be. Like all other conjunctures and transitions, early twentieth century American politics was exposed to an impressive display of various political and ideological currents that affected the political and administrative capacities of federal and local state


agencies as well as the personnel that manned them. The American bureaucrats being sent to the Philippines during this period – both military and civilian -- were inevitably affected by these instabilities, and the state-building they were engaged in mirrored the political flux and the vigor of their respective racial positions.

One could certainly counter that behind these administrative transformations (hence the Jim Crow laws) and the Progressive support for empire were “prevailing Darwinian doctrines [that claimed] it was all right for a republic to rule others, so long as the others were thought to be biologically incapable of ruling themselves.” But we cannot discount the signs of the times, especially the resurgence of competing ideologies that fought for “egalitarian liberal and republican themes” (e.g., the writings of W.E.B. DuBois). Certainly there were colonial bureaucrats who saw themselves as purveyors of these ideas. And as Kramer and other scholars have shown, liberalism’s and republicanism’s profound influence on the formation and spread of Filipino nationalism was not completely obliterated by colonial racial formation.

After he was caught, Apolinario Mabini, the Philippine revolutionary government’s foremost ideologue, was brought by his captors to meet William Howard Taft who then headed the second Philippine Commission sent by Washington to determine how best to govern the Philippines. He recalled that in the meeting Taft explained to him that the U.S. was imposing “a sovereignty [that was] in consonance with the spirit of the Constitution of the United States.” Mabini responded by reminding Taft “that the American Government, in not remaining contented with limiting the sovereignty of the Filipino people, but annulling it completely” was committing “an injustice which, sooner or later, will demand retribution.” This was an argument to which Taft could only give the lame but brutally blunt excuse that he and the Commission “were not authorized to discuss abstract questions, for they had orders to impose their opinions even through the use of force, after hearing the opinions of the Filipinos.” Mabini saw this as a signal that “the conference [was] terminated as I considered it idle to discuss with force and to express my opinions to one who refuses to listen to the voice of reason.” These republican stirrings in challenging racial colonialism persisted even after Mabini’s exile to Guam and eventual death, as evidenced by the relentless attempts by collaborating Filipino politicians to expand their power, as well as the persistence of radical nationalist and socialist associations among the urban and rural poor.

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13 On the steady erosion of American power by Filipino political leaders see Frank H. Golay, *Face of Empire: United States-Philippine Relations, 1898-1946* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University, 1998).
hastened the abandonment of the militant racism of the army in favor of the more inclusive racial formation of civilian rule. And as the latter became more embedded as policy, all the more did the colonial state reveal an inherent flaw to Filipinos: that once a racist policy allowed hitherto excluded “natives” a taste of political power, it could not reverse a trend towards further “liberalization.” In the end, even American officialdom – in spite of its racist sentiments – had to make good its republican promise and grant the Filipinos first autonomy, then independence.

Paul Kramer has written a book that will define and influence the way the next generation of scholars will look at the American empire in the Philippines and Asia. It deserves Amy Kaplan’s description of it as a “groundbreaking study.” The next step, I think, is to extend his analyses back into the realm of American domestic politics at one end, while delving deeper into the Philippine political landscape at the other.
Full disclosure: I had the privilege of reviewing The Blood of Government in the *American Historical Review* and was at first reluctant to take part in this roundtable on a book that I had already reviewed. I ultimately decided to contribute, however, in the belief that I could expand my comments on this important book beyond those that a short review permitted.

In 1972 Peter W. Stanley wrote “The Forgotten Philippines,” an essay in Ernest R. May and James C. Thomson, Jr., eds., *American-East Asian Relations: A Survey*. Given the nature of the book, Stanley asserted that the Philippines had been neglected when it came to writing about East Asian history. But the title applied equally well to the historiography of Philippine-American relations, which were surely very much “forgotten” at that time and might, indeed, have remained so were it not for the tragic war in Vietnam. About the only positive result of the war was a burgeoning historiography of American relations with Southeast Asia, including the Philippines. Prior to the 1960s, for example, there had been only one semi-scholarly account of the Philippine-American War (then called the Philippine Insurrection) by an American historian, although there had been some significant treatments by Filipino scholars. Now there are fifteen or twenty scholarly accounts of the war, and almost certainly the war in Vietnam was responsible for this new scholarly interest because it focused attention on America’s first war in Southeast Asia, with which it was sometimes compared.

Similarly, although the decision to acquire the islands as a result of the Spanish-American War had received considerable scholarly attention from many well known American diplomatic historians, there were very few accounts by such scholars about the subsequent governance of the islands. The acquisition of the islands was deemed important, but the subsequent governance of the colonies was apparently not. Perhaps it wasn’t considered “foreign” enough to interest historians of American foreign relations. The exception was Julius W. Pratt who, after his enormously influential Expansionists of 1898 (published in 1936), went on to write *America’s Colonial Experiment: How the United States Gained, Governed, and in Part Gave Away a Colonial Empire*, which was published in 1950. Thus Stanley was entirely correct to characterize the Philippines as a “forgotten” subject as far as American historiography as of 1972 was concerned.

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Since that time there have been important studies, not only about the Philippine American War, but also of American governance of the islands, and Paul Kramer’s book, The Blood of Government, demonstrates unquestionably that Philippine-American historiography has now come of age. This ambitious and significant work will be required reading for anyone interested in America’s colonial empire.

The book begins with a lengthy introductory chapter that addresses theoretical concerns and outlines Kramer’s major themes. Among other things he notes the centrality of the Philippine American War (1899-1902) which he properly describes as an event “of profound historical importance” which, he asserts, stands in stark contrast with “its oblivion in U. S. historical memory.”4 One might quibble with the latter point, since the war has received considerably more attention in the past several decades and now finds its way even into basic textbooks on American history. But of its profoundness there can be little doubt.

Kramer next devotes a lengthy and very interesting chapter to “Spanish colonialism and the Invention of the Filipino.” Although the Filipinos and the Spanish were supposed equals (based on a blood compact that went back to the earliest contacts), in fact racism in Spain was widespread and even institutionalized. Thus in legal cases, for example, it took the testimony of six Indios (Filipinos) to balance the testimony of a single Spaniard.5 Still, even in the nineteenth century Filipino “ilustrados” (intellectuals) sought assimilation with Spain and even defined civilization as Hispanic and Catholic. This meant, therefore, that in their view Muslims and non-Christian mountain people (the Igorots) were not a part of their civilization. Thus the Hispanicized ilustrados created an “internal empire” of their own.6 Still, Filipinos (including the ilustrados) came to understand Spanish racism, and in the late nineteenth century efforts at reform shaded into revolution against Spain.

I found Kramer’s discussion of the Spanish background to be enlightening and important, especially the analysis of the “internal empire” and the racial attitudes of the Spaniards. It is important to begin a discussion of the relations between the United States and the Philippines with the Spanish period, though Kramer’s attention to the Spanish period is not new; Peter W. Stanley devoted two lengthy chapters to the same topic in his pathbreaking account (the first really serious account by an American scholar) of the early American encounter with the Philippines, A Nation in the Making.7

The next four chapters (all of them long) discuss the period from the American acquisition of the islands to the end of the William Howard Taft administration in 1913. These chapters represent the heart of Kramer’s analysis. The first of these chapters is devoted exclusively to the Philippine American War, which he characterizes as a “race war.” Race is the central organizing feature of the book, and I’ll discuss this below. The chapter includes

5 Ibid., 40.
6 Ibid., 75.
numerous insights. One that I found particularly important was that Aguinaldo’s delay in switching to guerrilla tactics (something he did not do until late in 1899) was due in part to a sense among the Filipinos that guerrilla warfare was not civilized warfare. And in fact that was precisely how the Americans characterized it. They were fighting savages, they said.

Kramer’s analysis in the next chapter of the early colonial state is not entirely dissimilar from the findings of earlier scholars, including Stanley’s emphasis on the Republicans’ unwillingness to define the Philippine future and their tactics of indefinite “tutelary retention.” Similarly, his discussion of the Americans working with the local elites and the limited impact of American education is reminiscent of Glenn A. May’s analysis in his important book, Social Engineering in the Philippines; Kramer’s analysis of the cultural resistance to American governance and the uses of the census of 1903 are reminiscent of Vincente Rafael’s work in White Love and Other Events in Filipino History, while his discussion of the Americans’ walling off of Mountain Province largely because it was a place they could control reminds one of Rodney Sullivan’s study of Dean Worcester, Exemplar of Americanism.

More original is the next chapter on the St. Louis World’s Fair, a chapter that begins appropriately with the almost forgotten Buffalo Pan-American Exposition of 1901 (best recalled as the place where President William McKinley was assassinated), where William Howard Taft hoped to have an exhibit that would focus on the potential of the new Philippine colony as a place for trade and investment. Numerous obstacles developed, but in the end there was a “Colonial Exhibit” which, although it lacked live “natives,” did supposedly illustrate “every phase of native live.” More significant was the St. Louis World’s Fair. Although that fair has been the subject of some scholarly attention, Kramer does an excellent job of not only discussing the well known Igorot exhibit (and all this revealed about American racial and sexual perceptions and attitudes) but also the non-Igorot participants, including the Philippine Scouts and the pensionados. The latter -- bright Filipino students sent to the United States for higher education -- very much disliked the Igorot exhibit since it gave the impression that “primitive” Igorots were representative of typical Philippine life. The exhibit also had the unintended consequence of providing the pensionados a quick education about American racial attitudes. This was further enhanced by a melee between American Marines and Philippine Scouts (a military force), the result of Marine anger at socializing between the Scouts and white women. In an insightful observation, Kramer suggests that this meant that in some ways the Philippine-American War was not yet over: “white men at St. Louis had fought to guarantee that the United States would not be invaded by Filipinos.” Americans continued to feel that all Filipinos

8 Ibid., 127.
10 Vincente Rafael, White Love and Other Events in Filipino History (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000)
12 Kramer, Blood of Government, 236.
were savages, or at least near-savages. The Fair only confirmed that. Exhibiting the Scouts was supposed to demonstrate racial inclusion and advancing civilization. It didn’t work that way with the average fair goer and the Marines. “Beneath the new uniform of every marching Scout was a tamed savage,” Kramer writes.13 This chapter contains considerable new subject matter and outstanding analysis.

The next chapter, “Representative Men: The Politics of Nation-Building,” analyses the different American and Filipino conceptions of the Philippine nation. The chapter contains new insights on a number of issues, including such matters as the use of prison labor. Kramer’s analyses of racial perceptions, Governor General Luke Wright’s insensitivity to Filipinos, the meaning of the establishment of the elected Philippine Assembly, the focus on education of Filipinos to produce productive workers, and the “flag incident” are not entirely new (though he adds interesting and important detail, such as the banning of the film of the famous boxing match where the “black menace” Jack Johnson defeated Jim Jeffries in 1910),14 and it is cogently related.

The final chapter covers much ground, from the Woodrow Wilson administration to World War II. I found this chapter a bit disappointing. The first thirteen years of American rule in the islands are discussed in four long chapters, while the remaining thirty years receive only one chapter. I was hoping, for example, that the 1920s -- a badly underresearched area -- would receive some in depth attention, but it does not. The discussion of the debate over whether to grant the Philippines independence does not go much beyond Theodore Friend’s Bancroft Prize-winning book, Between Two Empires.15 On the other hand, Kramer’s assessment of the impact of Filipino migration to the United States is impressive. Filipinos encountered bitter racism and anger over interracial dating and marriage. One such incident led to a “race war” in Watsonville, California, which Kramer analyses with sensitivity and skill. “The Watsonville race war was,” he nicely concludes, “biology’s spasmodic rebellion against empire.”16 Also new and significant is Kramer’s discussion of the Welch bill that aimed to exclude Filipino immigrants. Colonial officials objected, arguing that its passage would cause disorder in the Philippines. Ultimately the Welch bill failed, but the debate it inspired only accentuated the degree that race played in the debate over Philippine independence.

Having tried to provide an overview of the book=s structure and to comment on some of the author’s points, I would now like to turn to the central thesis of the book, which is that not only was race an important factor in understanding the American approach to the Philippines, the way the Americans fought the Filipino resistance, and the way they governed -- all points that have long established pedigrees, going all the way back to some of the earliest memoir accounts B but that race was “a dynamic, contextual, contested, and contingent field of power.” Earlier accounts are inadequate, Kramer argues, because they

13 Ibid., 279, 284.
16 Kramer, Blood of Government, 413.
treated race as a static category. Thus this is a “transnational history of race in the Philippine-American colonial encounter.”

Kramer drives this point home most fully in his extensive discussion of the Philippine American war. Other histories of the war have of course taken race into account (and perhaps Kramer’s claim of novelty in this regard is a bit overdone). But Kramer’s main point is that the dynamics of the war itself helped create the racial ideologies, that it was not just a matter of racial concepts that the soldiers brought with them to the Philippines. Their ideas changed over time as the dynamics of the war progressed. Racist concepts, even racist words, acquired new meanings. It was, in Kramer’s words, “the contingency and indeterminancy of the process by which the United States’ racial-imperial ideologies took shape.” Thus American soldiers racialized the conflict “with striking speed and intensity. What had been diffuse and fragmented prewar animosities congealed into novel racial formations at the very center of U. S. Soldier’s popular culture, capable of defining a wartime enemy and organizing and motivating violence against it.” The hatred that developed was not a “projection or an export, but a new racial formation developing on the ground.” The newly formed racial attitudes in turn justified a war of “racial exterminism” [sic].

It is probably true that contextual events do interact with preexisting attitudes to produce some changes. It is not unreasonable to state that the racial attitudes that American soldiers brought to the Philippines were modified as a result of their experiences. Yet I come away from Kramer’s stimulating argument not being entirely convinced. It has been amply demonstrated in study after study that the late nineteenth century was a time of considerable fascination with race, and that scientific racism had “demonstrated” that there was a hierarchy of races, with white Anglo-Saxons being at the pinnacle. Non-white races were not just “inferior” but members of these races were discriminated against, often persecuted, sometimes killed. The tragic experience of the American Indians is replete with violent racism. In California they were hunted down like wild animals and virtually exterminated. The United States acquired the Philippines at precisely the nadir of American race relations, with segregation of African Americans legalized, with disfranchisement fully established in the South, and with lynching commonplace. The white soldiers (there were also black regiments) who went to the Philippines (most of them in any case) undoubtedly shared these widely-held attitudes, and it seems to me that these attitudes alone were sufficient in themselves to account for their racist remarks about Filipinos and to justify the atrocious actions that some of them took. As some have argued, they saw themselves fighting Indians in the Philippines. Treating Filipinos in atrocious ways did not necessarily require new racial formations. The old ones would

17 Ibid., 2.
18 Ibid., 89.
19 Ibid., 124.
20 Ibid., 127.
21 Ibid., 139.
suffice, particularly when inflamed by passions of war, just as they were when fighting Indians (or later Germans or Japanese or Vietnamese).\textsuperscript{22}

Another point -- though perhaps not central to Kramer’s thesis -- that might be contested is his implication that the reason that the United States prevailed in the Philippines was that it used harsh tactics, allegedly fighting a war of extermination. But others have answered the question of why the Americans won quite differently. Glenn May, for example, argues persuasively (in my view) that Emilio Aguinaldo (the leader of the Philippine resistance) genuinely wanted independence but an independence that had little positive to offer to the masses of ordinary Philippine farmers. Aguinaldo wanted the elite to retain political and economic control. Thus support for the resistance was lukewarm at best, making it difficult for Aguinaldo to prevail in a guerrilla war, which requires strong support from the populace.\textsuperscript{23} Kramer does not engage such arguments, however.

Another major theme that can be challenged is Kramer’s insistence that every move that the United States made that appeared on the surface to be movement toward independence for the Philippines was in fact the opposite. Woodrow Wilson, long honored by the Filipinos as a champion of their freedom, in fact played an important role in blocking independence. The Jones Act of 1916 which, in its preamble for the time made independence the goal of American policy, actually prolonged colonialism. It “established new ground for calibrated colonialism” and “sacrificed Philippine political independence to U.S. moral independence.”\textsuperscript{24} The Filipinization of the government in the Wilson years, together with the Jones Act, were “highly effective hegemonic strategies for preserving the tense compromises between ongoing colonialism and deferred independence.”\textsuperscript{25} Finally the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 that provided a date certain for independence after a ten year transition period was “yet another moment in the unfolding of calibrated colonialism.”\textsuperscript{26}

Such judgments are contrary to the accepted wisdom, and while a case can be made that these acts were not all they seemed to be, that they had limitations and flaws, were compromises, and that none of them provided for immediate independence, I think Kramer goes much too far in dismissing them as hegemonic acts that were essentially meaningless. Let me examine each in turn.

Woodrow Wilson was not among the more advanced antiimperialists, and his racial attitudes presumably militated against seeing the Filipinos as equals. Nevertheless, his election brought great fear to the Republican imperialists who had deliberately avoided

\textsuperscript{22} It is worth viewing the documentary, \textit{First in the Philippines: A Film History of the Second Oregon Volunteer Regiment}, produced by Robert Koglin. (Portland, OR: Salmon Studios/Film & Video, 1984), which is replete with soldiers using racist language.


\textsuperscript{24} Kramer, \textit{Blood of Government}, 362-63.

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Ibid.}, 389.

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Ibid.}, 424.
defining the future relationship between the Philippines and the United States. Their idea of indefinite tutelary retention was indeed designed to maintain American ownership of the islands for generations. Thus when Wilson was elected they went to great lengths to stop any change in the Philippines, but they failed. Wilson may not have been an advanced antiimperialist himself, but he appointed a genuine antiimperialist, Francis Burton Harrison, as governor general. And Harrison, in the rarest of administrative actions, used his power to limit his own power and turn it over to the Filipinos. By the end of his term, Filipinos were effectively in control of most of the government. This was not a minor accomplishment, and the imperialists bitterly resented it. The same was true with their reaction to the Jones Bill. The author, William A. Jones, was a committed antiimperialist, and the imperialists fought bitterly against his bill. In the end the bill did not provide a specific date for independence. This was partly due to Manuel Quezon, the Filipino leader who was privately ambivalent about immediate independence, despite brave public words to the contrary. But even then, the preamble made it clear that ultimate independence was now American policy. This was the first time that a colonial power had made such a declaration. And if the Democrats had retained power in the elections of 1920, the Philippines might have obtained its independence quite soon, since before he left office Wilson certified that the islands had met the requirements of the Jones Act and should be freed. Despite the limitations of the Jones Act, it was not insignificant, and it was not (as I see it) an effort to extent American hegemony in the islands.

As for the Tydings-McDuffie Act, it did not provide for immediate independence either. But it did provide for a specific transition period at the end of which independence was assured. Furthermore, as Kramer, Friend and others have pointed out, the motives in passing the legislation were mixed. They include idealistic antiimperialists, racist xenophobes, and self interested business interests. Still, the bill was passed over the objections of the old fashioned imperialists and even those with more reasonable voices like Herbert Hoover who had vetoed an earlier version of the bill (only to see his veto overridden). This was the first time a colonial power had set a date for independence for its colonial possession (something Americans trumpeted ad nauseam in future years), and Filipinos welcomed the legislation. Despite its many limitations, it was a considerable advance and was not as meaningless as Kramer seems to suggest.

In sum, then, this is a very important book. It does not supplant earlier accounts by Peter W. Stanley, Glenn May, Bonifacio Salamanca, Teodoro Agoncillo, Theodore Friend, and others. I don't agree with all of its interpretations. But it is a very serious work that approaches the topic in sometimes novel and thoughtful ways and is provocative in a good sense.
There is much to applaud in Paul Kramer’s *Blood of Government*. In many ways, his study exemplifies the type of work which scholars of US foreign relations have been urging themselves to do for decades. He grounds his study in multi-lingual, multi-archival research. He explores a critically important episode in US history (rule in the Philippines) through a lens (race) not completely familiar. He takes seriously the history of the “other” side of the equation, contributing to Philippine historiography as well as US historiography. He draws attention to continuities in the exercise of US power from the late 19th through the mid 20th centuries. And he makes a seamless web of the histories of US actions “at home” and “overseas.” All these achievements prompt a few thoughts and questions about the state of the field, which I will take up at the end of my comments.

The chapters move deftly among topics. The first chapter explores how Filipinos developed ideas about their identity during the late Spanish colonial era, not only creating a fledgling idea about Philippine nationalism, but also coming to see a racialist component to that national identity. It was a confused one, both drawing on and rejecting Spanish identities. Scholars of the Philippines have paid increasing attention in recent years to the early, and sometimes odd, development of anti-Spanish activism and the ways that activism shaped nationalism in the Philippines, a bit differently than in other colonized areas of Southeast Asia. Kramer does not aim to overturn the existing scholarship so much as help Americanists to know it, and to demonstrate ways in which ideas formed in the 1870s and 1880s informed choices made by Filipinos in the 1890s and beyond.

Kramer turns next to an examination of the American war in the Philippines, demonstrating the ways in which the initial positive, hopeful waging of war with Filipino allies, at least potentially and the later war against Filipinos which turned so brutal, both had racialist components. Here again, Kramer is especially effective in exploring the mutual images, Filipinos of Americans as well as Americans of Filipinos, and demonstrating the misunderstandings between and within groups which contributed to the violent nature of the war at its end. A key theme of his book emerges fully here, as well. He explores how and why some Filipinos collaborated with Americans, as well as the story of those who chose to resist. The nuanced treatment is welcome, and as it builds up over chapters, helps remind us why the United States and Philippines have the complicated relationship which exists until the present. It also helps us understand better the course of internal politics in the Philippines.

Chapter three makes this theme of choices about collaboration explicit. The state the United States wanted to build in the Philippines had some complicated objectives and perspectives. Filipinos were not an undifferentiated mass for involved Americans, but rather two undifferentiated masses, a Christian, Hispanicized one which Americans assumed would work with the US colonial state, and a non-Christian, non-Hispanicized one
which Americans assumed would continue to rebel against civilizing influences.\(^1\) A “politics of recognition” (Kramer’s phrase, used throughout the book) reassured both Americans and collaborating Filipinos of their mutual understanding and interests. These distinctions and assumptions were full of problems, which almost immediately began to hinder achievement of goals. Another key objective for Americans was what Kramer calls the insulation of America from its colony. The Philippines might be ruled by the United States, but in many ways, US policy and law worked to minimize the effects of that rule on the United States itself. As the very struggles to define the legal and political status of the Philippines and Filipinos demonstrate, the United States was changed by having become an imperial power.

The next chapter returns to the United States, and explores what happens when the empire comes “home.” Specifically, chapter four takes up an episode by now familiar to all US historians, the 1904 St. Louis World’s Fair. Kramer’s detailed exploration of the planning, the acquisition of artifacts, the decisions about where to build the exhibit, and the reactions to the full exhibit are fascinating. Even scholars who have examined this episode previously were, like World’s Fair visitors, more interested in the exotic Igorots rather than the churches and schools of the civilized Visayan exhibits. The politics of the exhibit itself, as well as the racial tensions caused by the fact that Filipino people (men) who participated moved out into society, meeting young women, reveal the ways in which Americans were learning about how to be imperialists. Kramer here again is especially effective in conveying the complexities of race, moving away from simple binaries of us and them, and of black and white.

The story then returns to the Philippines. Chapter five explores the first fifteen years of US rule in the Philippines, examining the choices in governance, by both Filipinos and Americans. The politics of recognition comes into its own here, as Filipinos began to realize that no matter how well they performed the activities of self-government within the limits allowed by the United States, their ability to achieve fully was limited by the system itself. There seemed no route to independence, even though they moved ever closer. Race naturally played an enormous part in this ever-evolving, never-completed process of movement toward self-rule. Equally important, however, is that Christian Filipinos created a situation of internal imperialism, behaving toward non-Christian citizens of the Philippines much as Americans behaved towards them. During these years, too, US colonial officials came to believe that only by fully taking over the Philippines, and developing a modern state structure there, could the United States fulfill its developmental promise to Filipinos. The irony: anti-colonial sentiment led to intrusive imperial governance.

\(^1\)There is a curious lack of attention to the ethnic Chinese in the Philippines by Kramer. Quite likely the reason is that US colonial officials largely hoped to exclude the ethnic Chinese from the Philippines, and therefore reported little on their perceptions of them in the context of state-building. But the ethnic Chinese “problem” was another example of the ways in which conceptions of race shaped US rule and Filipino perceptions of it.
A further irony shapes the final full chapter. Serious movement toward independence came not from the fulfillment of the politics of inclusion and recognition, but rather as a result of the politics of exclusion. During the 1910s and 1920s, Filipino laborers came in increasing numbers to work in Hawaii and California, primarily, but in other places throughout the West and United States. Immigration politics were heated enough in these years, but Filipinos immigrants raised even greater problems for many white Americans. Filipinos often had been educated in English, in American style schools, and had absorbed a reflected, or refracted, version of American culture. They may have expected the streets of gold other migrants did, but even more they expected to feel at home in America, with some claim to the status of being an American. White Americans found the combination of this expectation and Filipino brown skin too threatening, and jobs, public places, and even whole towns posted “no Filipinos allowed” signs. This story has been told before, and Kramer reminds us that it fits in a broader tale of the shifting sentiment on Philippine independence. US officials began to perceive the costs of imperialism, from the need to defend these islands against an increasingly restive Japan to the need to figure out how to allow Filipinos to participate in US military efforts in World War I to the conflicts between the economic interests between US and Philippine raw material producers. It began to look simpler to exclude things and people from the Philippines. This politics of exclusion helped shape a growing emphasis on the capacity of Christian Filipinos to rule over, even civilize, their non-Christian compatriots.

Kramer concludes with a short discussion of the difference empire made, arguing primarily that ideas about race for both Filipinos and Americans were formed in their relationship with each other. He notes the ways in which white Americans saw and treated Filipinos differently than they did Japanese, Chinese, Native Americans, and African Americans. This nuance and, as he calls it, plasticity, should be better reflected in the scholarship on race in America. He calls attention as well to the ways in which US rule shaped the workings of race and ethnicity in the Philippines, reinforcing trends started already under the Spanish, but then elaborating them in particularly American ways, of dividing the people of the Philippines along ethnic, religious, and geographical lines in ways which complicated national identity and relations among the various peoples of the Philippines.

The strengths of this book lie in its insistence on, and then demonstration of, the intertwined nature of US and Philippine history. Kramer focuses primarily on race and racial formation, but along the way we get hints about other types of mutual influence, from the ways in which colonial armies and police grew out of and influenced similar institutions in the United States to economic, immigration, and education policies. The construction of the narrative, with Filipino and American voices interwoven rather than politely taking turns, reinforces this radical notion that the United States was profoundly changed by the experience of becoming a colonial power. Its length (slightly more than 440 pages of text) means it will probably be assigned to few undergraduates, which is too bad, because the writing is engaging and the stories often fascinating.

The book raised a few questions for me, however. Mostly these are commentaries on the field of US history generally, and of the history of US imperialism and US foreign relations more specifically, rather than criticisms of Kramer’s work. The first is an observation that
although reviews of this work often note that it covers the years of the 1880s through the
1940s, coverage essentially ends in 1916, with episodic attention to some issues in the
1920s and 1930s in order to demonstrate the immediate context of the Tydings-McDuffie
Act. Scholarship by Americans on US rule in the Philippines often covers some portion
of the time period 1898-1916, rarely exploring the period after World War I through World
War II in any depth. The Spanish-American War naturally attracts a lot of attention, as
does the period of state-building which Kramer has so helpfully reinterpreted, and then
there is a small flurry again for the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth. These
episodes are all notably about acquiring, establishing, or ending imperial rule. Imperial
rule itself does not seem to interest scholars very much.

This relative lack of interest in imperial rule seems prompted in part by the amnesia of
Americans, including scholars, about US empire. With the new adventures in Iraq and
Afghanistan, commentators tout the rising US empire, whether to praise or to condemn.
But the United States has been an imperial power, in the formal, European-style, at least
since 1898. To be sure, the Philippines received independence in 1946, but the United
States still holds other possessions from the Spanish-American War era, as well as later
acquisitions. Kramer’s work demonstrates thoroughly the mutual effects on the
Philippines and United States of this period of imperial rule, even when he also notes that
US officials worked to insulate the United States from its colonial possession. More
systematic exploration of how the American state, and American culture, have been shaped
by the experience of being an empire, as well as the reasons for the amnesia about those
effects, is imperative for understanding the history of the United States. Kramer’s work
situates itself within the broader context of US empire to some degree, demonstrating
familiarity with many of the most important works on the United States and Puerto Rico.

What this effort reveals most starkly, however, is the lack of a community of scholars who
work on the US empire.² Situating the study of US relations with each of its colonies
primarily within the area studies of each colony’s geographical location (i.e., Philippines
within Southeast Asian Studies, Puerto Rico within Caribbean Studies) rather than, at least
in part, as part of the broader study of US empire may give voice to indigenous perspectives
but at the expense of serious attention to the fact of US empire. The costs, scholarly and
political, of this choice are substantial.

One cost is the continued insularity of scholarship on US imperialism. Rarely, and Paul
Kramer is among few to have made the attempt, is US imperialism compared to other
imperial regimes, whether European or other (Japan is a prime possible comparison.).³
European scholars, more accustomed to comparison than US scholars, also rarely attempt

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² One hopeful sign that such a community is developing is the conference, in which Paul Kramer and I, as
well as Patricio Abinales, participated, convened by Alfred McCoy and Francisco Scarano, at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison in November 2006, titled “Transitions and Transformations in the U.S. Imperial State:
The Search for a New Synthesis.” A volume from the conference is forthcoming from University of Wisconsin

³ See Paul Kramer, “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and
United States Empires, 1880-1910,” in The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives edited
the comparison. There are many reasons, but at the least, the lack of comparison, and hostility by some to the few attempts, suggest that Americans succeeded, rhetorically and ideologically, in their attempts to insulate the United States from its empire. For all the efforts, in many ways successful, to internationalize the study of US history, there is more than a little irony that a last bastion of insularity is the study of the projection of US power overseas through the device of formal colonial rule.
The historical field of imperial studies has seen considerable transformation in recent years. Scholars employing postcolonial theory and analysis have challenged the conventional categories generated during imperial rule and have changed the ways in which both imperial structure and agency are conceptualized and historicized. The idea that the impact of imperial policies primarily affected the lives of colonial subjects, for example, has come under challenge by those who emphasize that an imperial system operates in every part of the empire, including what used to be regarded as “domestic” space within the home country. New configurations of power and interactions have emerged as the scope of imperial history has widened.

Moreover, the concerns and methodologies of social and cultural history have edged into the once heavily political/diplomatic domain of imperial studies. Ann Stoler, Antoinette Burton, and Catherine Hall, among many others, have emphasized the intimacies involved in empire by scrutinizing the grammars of race, class, gender, citizenship, and expertise that shaped imperial hierarchies. Imperial relationships involve not just administrative contact zones but what Tony Ballantyne and Burton have called “bodies in contact.” Empires are all about setting and challenging the rules of engagement that structure the lives of individuals and groups.

Professor Paul Kramer’s *The Blood of Government* joins other recent work that brings the concerns of this new imperial history into the study of United States empire. Kramer advances a sophisticated framework about imperial interactions. Imperialism was not simply a set of impositions on passive people but a framework within which broad networks of knowledge developed and circulated. Colonials and outsiders interacted in imperial space; words changed meanings; goals set in one context spilled their effects into others. And, in this encounter, the colonizers, no less than the colonized, changed their ideas about the world and about themselves. Avoiding the metaphor of cultural “export” from the metropole, Kramer emphasizes how changes in the metropole and colony emerge interactively within shared imperial social formations.

Kramer’s book, with its detailed archival research nested within a broad context of secondary literatures, also makes a substantial contribution to turn-of-the-century transnational history. Kramer points out that the conventional narratives of “Philippine history” and the history of “American empire” need to be connected outward into the transnational realm. Focusing specifically on the U.S. colony of the Philippines, for example, his study is nonetheless cast within a broad set of questions about what constitutes “reform” during the age of high imperialism. U.S. histories of the turn of the century have been afflicted by a gulf between domestic studies, which emphasize progressive reforms, and international histories, which emphasize imperialism and interventionism. In his work, the politics of progressive reform and various imperial projects intersect. Kramer shows how the emphasis on science and expertise, together with a faith in social improvement that developed within a collaborative transnational context, connects the domestic and international histories of the era.
As the title indicates, one of the striking contributions of *Blood of Government* relates to racial formations. Specifically, Kramer examines how racial discourses intersected with the growth of a modern administrative state and how race and empire were interwoven and mutually constitutive. A dynamic interplay developed between the U.S. military effort, which labeled guerilla activities as “uncivilized,” and those Filipinos who sought to assert their status as “civilized” and thus receive the national recognition for which they had fought against Spain during the late 19th century. Carrying out these themes in well-researched and clearly written chapters, he charts a long history of changing racial politics in the colonial relationship. Kramer explains how racial categories initially took shape within the context of the brutal guerilla war that developed after Spain’s defeat in 1898. His disturbing chapter on this Philippine-American War, in the context of race, recalls some elements of John Dower’s classic *War Without Mercy*, in that it emphasizes the nurturing interaction between racial fears and warfare. He then shows, however, that racial ideas and the colonial state changed during the postwar enterprise that some Americans called “regeneration.” Without a powerful colonial office, American administrators depended on local power structures and dense patronage networks – that is, upon the collaboration with “civilized” groups that could be candidates for assimilation. The theme of the complicated interaction regarding ideas of race and governance (among diverse groups in both the United States and the Philippines) is well illustrated in a wonderful chapter on the St. Louis World Fair and is then pulled into a detailed examination of the politics of nation-building – cultural as well as political. Importantly, Kramer extends his study past the early years of the imperial relationship to also take up issues of immigration and national sovereignty. In his final chapters, he argues that it was less America’s benevolent ambivalence about colonialism that led to political independence for the Philippines and more the domestic forces of racist nativism, economic protectionism, and power politics in the Pacific.

It is no criticism of this book to suggest that its rich analysis of politics and culture, of war and racial formation, opens as many questions as it answers. The Philippines may have been the United States’s largest, most complex, and most rebellious colony, but it was only one of many acquisitions. How might the social and cultural elements of the imperial dynamic, which are well analyzed by Kramer, have differed in Hawaii, in Puerto Rico, in Cuba, in Panama (after 1903)? How might warfare and its social stratifications have played out similarly or differently during the military occupations of the Dominican Republic and Haiti less than two decades later? There is an emerging scholarship, especially in works such as those by Louis Perez, Mary Renda, Eileen Findlay, Julie Greene, and others, that is, brick by brick, building a better sense of the social and cultural dynamics of early twentieth century U. S. empire. But one of Kramer’s most important contributions, along with those other works, may be to highlight how much is yet to be done within a comparative dimension, especially if the United States’s far-flung territories are further set within a transnational context alongside those of other imperial systems.

All in all, this is an impressive book that is both highly specific and broadly suggestive. It presents a thorough and thoughtful study of the imperial relationship between the United States and the Philippines. In addition, it speaks to the concerns of scholars who are interested in imperial history and postcolonial theory more generally. Kramer’s book is a
solid contribution toward building a new historiography of U.S. empire that helps build a dialog with comparative imperial studies.