
Roundtable Editor: Thomas Maddux
Reviewers: Fred Anderson, Reed Browning, Todd Estes, Linda Frey, Marsha Frey, Leonard Sadosky


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Introduction by Thomas Maddux, California State University, Northridge

In most U.S. diplomatic history courses the Seven Years War, 1756-1763, probably receives little attention, although classic works such as Felix Gilbert’s To the Farwell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy (1961) and Richard W. Van Alstyne’s The Rising American Empire (1960) do refer to the conflict and its effects on American attitudes and ambitions. Specialists in early American history undoubtedly have more familiarity with the imperial wars of the 18th century and their significance, especially the American naming of the Seven Years War as the French Indian War, in shaping the circumstances and British-American colonial problems that precipitated the American Revolution. These specialists have relied on the studies of one of the roundtable reviewers, Fred Anderson.

What is missing the most, however, is an appreciation for the European context for the imperial wars, the international system that the Europeans were in the process of reshaping in the 18th century, and the extent to which the conflicts extended outward into a transatlantic interaction that fed back into and reshaped the European relationships by the last of the four imperial wars since 1689. Matt Schumann and Karl Schweizer’s study addresses this lack of perspective and understanding, at least on the side of American specialists. Their study extends the scope from the precipitation of the war in the woodlands of the contested Ohio Valley between the French in Canada, the English forces and their colonial allies, and the Indian allies and residents of the valley, to the shifting diplomatic alliances in Europe for round four of their conflicts. The authors follow each year of the conflict in its different theaters that extended as far as the British-French conflict in India, to British seizure of French slave-trading bases on the west African coast, to successful British attacks late in the war on French and Spanish outposts in the Caribbean and Manila in the Philippines.

As the reviewers point out, Schumann and Schweizer focus on war and diplomacy with a top-down approach that highlights the leaders of the major European participants as they dealt with the origins of the conflict, the main military campaigns in each year, and the struggle to finance the conflict with respect to their own forces as well as subsidies to allies. Britain and France incurred mounting expenses with their own forces and aid to their major allies, respectively, Frederick II, King of Prussia, Maria Theresa, Empress of Austria, and Czarina Elizabeth Petrovna of Russia, as well as a number of secondary allies in Central and Northern Europe. The extent to which subsidies were distributed to keep allies in the conflict and potential adversaries out probably exceeded the recent efforts of President George Bush to maintain a “coalition of the willing” in the Iraq war.

The reviewers very much welcome the authors’ reassessment of the Seven Years War and note significant contributions as indicated below even if they express a variety of reservations:

1.) There is some questioning of the authors’ stated objective that they “favoured narrative over argument, evidence over contention,” pleading neutrality on contested
issues such as the skills of English leader William Pitt the Elder and King Frederick II of Brandenburg-Prussia and whether or not Great Britain won North America in the German theater of the war or “whether people and events in North America exerted a decisive influence on the origins, conduct and outcome of the war in Europe.” (2) Todd Estes suggests that the authors “actually do both,” offering narrative and arguments, “despite saying that they will not.” For Estes the “real thesis of the book” is Schumann and Schweizer’s emphasis on “how the war-behind-the-war—matters of finance, supply and logistics, the realm of diplomacy, and the domestic considerations which helped to shape policy” had as much impact on the conflict and its results as the military campaigns. (3) Reed Browning also notes that arguments are made through narrative and that the authors are too partial towards British leaders, excusing their pursuit of British interests in the end at the expense of commitments to Prussia. (6)

2.) Several of the reviewers question whether Schumann and Schweizer provide too-British centric of a perspective on the conflict. Linda and Marsha Frey, for example, emphasize that the “reader learns a great deal about the cabinet discussions and infighting over strategy and tactics that took place in Britain but little about such debates elsewhere whether it be the Habsburg or Bourbon courts.” (2) Browning notes a similar orientation as well as an admitted partiality for the side of Britain and Prussia in the conflict. In Chapter IV on Domestic Politics, Britain does receive at least twice as much space as any of the other powers. The balance in others chapters such as the third on Finance and Logistics and the last two on diplomacy have more equality of coverage.

3.) Schumann and Schweizer do not cover all aspects of the operational military history and diplomatic efforts, but the Freys, Leonard Sadosky, and Estes note that the essential campaigns and negotiations receive good coverage. The authors provide background on the structure of diplomacy preceding the conflict, but Browning suggests they should have introduced the “military thinking and practices of the era” which shaped the “strategy, tactics, theories of offensive and defensive actions, and thinking about naval operations.” (5) Browning also challenges the authors’ attempt to note similarities between the land war in Germany and the conflict in North America, emphasizing the differences in demography and settlement patterns and the absence of similarity in the “norms of combat, or the means of financing warfare, or the character of the available auxiliaries, or the role of the navy, or the savagery that characterized some of the fighting, or the freedom of commanders in the two theaters....” (4) The absence of maps is noted by all of the reviewers, as the military campaigns take one to forts and outposts in North America and to strongpoints, villages, districts, regions, and much of Central and Northern Europe as Frederick leads his forces around the neighborhood to avoid the likelihood of immanent defeat versus French, Austrian, Russian forces and their allies.

4.) The reviewers unanimously applaud Chapter III on Finance and Logistics in which the authors explore the importance of financial and trade resources, and the advantages gained by Britain through its blockade of France and its support for privateers to seize French commercial shipping. As Sadosky emphasizes, this chapter delivers on the author’s effort to write a transatlantic history by developing the effects of the “little war” of limiting resources such as the British interdiction of French supply lines to General Montcalm’s
forces in Canada and the increasing reluctance of merchants to accept French bills of credit issued in Canada when France declined to redeem them at face value. As France increasingly could not back up bills with specie, merchants declined the risk and the impact spread to France’s major allies, Russia and Austria, which relied on French subsidies for their war efforts. With the decline in funding, France and her allies found it increasingly difficult to launch major military campaigns in 1760-1761. “It is their explanation of commerce, logistics, and finance that Schumann and Schweizer reveal how truly transatlantic the Seven Years War was,” concluded Sadosky. (2-3)

5.) The authors provide a persuasive analysis of the different alliances from their formation in the “Diplomatic Revolution” that led England to align itself with Prussia rather than Austria and Austria to shift to an alliance with France and Russia. The authors note the different considerations that shaped the alliances and on the British side, the degree to which London and Frederick pursued operational plans on their own but cooperated in their support for Hanover, George II’s German domain, and a substantial English subsidy to help keep Prussia from being defeated. Anderson does suggest Schumann and Schweizer would have strengthened their study by looking more thoroughly at Spain which stayed out of the conflict until an ill-advised decision to join France in 1762 when France was already negotiating with Britain. Anderson suggests a “what if” – arguing that if Spain had joined France at the start of the war this have brought several significant changes: (1) since Spain’s navy was of comparable size to France’s and would have eliminated Britain’s naval advantage, Britain “could never have conducted costal blockades and raised enemy commerce and mounted amphibious assaults at will against two enemies whose combined naval strength equaled its own, if only because it would have had to divert so many more vessels to the defense of the home isles and its far flung colonies; (2) Spain could have disrupted the Southern frontier in the British colonies by encouraging slave revolts and Indian raids; and (3) Spanish silver resources from Mexico and Peru would have helped to bolster French finances and subsides to its allies. (3)

Participants:

Matt Schumann (Ph.D., Exeter, 2005) is a lecturer at Eastern Michigan University, studying several aspects of the Seven Years War. His current research focuses on international relations, cultural diplomacy, and social commentary across the Atlantic world from 1748 to 1756.

Karl W. Schweizer earned his Ph.D from Cambridge University where he studied with the late Professor Sir Herbert Butterfield. He is currently a professor in the Federated Department of History at Rutgers University and the New Jersey Institute of Technology. In addition to many scholarly articles and book chapters, he has published other books: The International Thought of Herbert Butterfield (2007), Parliament and the Press, 1689-1939 (2006), Statesmen, Diplomats and the Press (2003), and War, Politics and Diplomacy (2001). He is a fellow of the Royal Historical Society and the Royal Society of Arts.

Fred Anderson received his B.A. from Colorado State University in 1971 and his Ph.D. from Harvard in 1981. He has taught at Harvard and at the University of Colorado, Boulder,

**Reed St. Clair Browning** received his Ph.D. from Yale University in 1965 and is Professor Emeritus, Kenyon College. His relevant publications include *The Duke of Newcastle* (London: Yale University Press, 1975); *Political and Constitutional Ideas of the Court Whigs* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982); *The War of the Austrian Succession* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994); and "New Views on the Silesian Wars," *Journal of Military History* 69 (April, 2005): 521-34.

**Todd Estes** is Associate Professor of History at Oakland University in Rochester, Michigan. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Kentucky. A specialist in early American political history, Estes has published, in addition to *The Jay Treaty Debate, Public Opinion, and the Evolution of Early American Political Culture*, a variety of articles in scholarly journals such as *Journal of the Early Republic, Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, The Historian, The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society*, and *The History Teacher*. He is currently at work on a book manuscript, tentatively titled *The Campaign for the Constitution: Political Culture and the Ratification Contest*, which explores the Federalist/Anti-Federalist newspaper debate over ratification in 1787-88 and is also working on several articles on various aspects of early U.S. political culture.

**Linda Frey** and **Marsha Frey** received their Ph.D.s in History from Ohio State University in 1971 and are respectively, Professors of history at the University of Montana and Kansas State University. They are co-authors of a number of books including *Daily Lives of Civilians in Wartime Europe, 1618-1900* (2007); *The French Revolution* (2007); *The History of Diplomatic Immunity* (1999); *The Treaties of the War of Spanish Succession* (1995); *Societies in Upheaval: Insurrections in France, Hungary, and Spain in the Early Eighteenth Century* (1987); and *Frederick I* (1984). They are senior editors of *Greenwood Guides to Historic Events, 1500-1900* (2002) with 20 volumes in print, and are writing a monograph on the culture of French revolutionary diplomacy.

**Leonard J. Sadosky** is Assistant Professor of History at Iowa State University. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Virginia. A specialist in Colonial and Revolutionary American, he has a forthcoming manuscript from the University of Virginia Press, *Revolutionary Negotiations: Indians, Empires, and Diplomats in the Founding of America* in Fall 2009 and is co-editor with Peter Nicolaisen, Peter S. Onuf, and Andrew J. O'Shaughness of *The Old World and the New World: America and Europe in the Age of Jefferson* forthcoming from University of Virginia Press; co-author with Peter S. Onuf of *Jeffersonian America* (2002); and "Reimagining the British Empire and America in an Age of Revolution: The Case of William Eden." in Leonard J. Sadosky, Peter Nicolaisen, Peter S.
Onuf, and Andrew J. O'Shaughnessy, eds., *The Old World and the New World: America and Europe in the Age of Jefferson* forthcoming from the University of Virginia Press.
This volume is the first attempt at a comprehensive overview of the Seven Years' War since Sir Julian Stafford Corbett's navalist account, *England in the Seven Years' War: A Study in Combined Strategy*.\(^1\) Corbett's two volumes were remarkable in their own day for scholarly quality and stylistic elegance; even today they repay close reading. His intention, however, was less to write a definitive narrative of the diplomatic and military dimensions of the conflict than to make a Clausewitzian analysis of how the British government under William Pitt successfully integrated policy and strategy—particularly naval strategy—to triumph in the greatest conflict of the eighteenth century. Matt Schumann and Karl Schweizer set themselves a more ambitious task than Corbett, for they wanted to produce an “overarching history” of the war, “synthesising the past century of scholarship . . . , while drawing upon an array of archival resources that have not been available to previous generations” (1)—and to do it in a single volume. To a remarkable degree they have succeeded in attaining their goal.

*The Seven Years War: A Transatlantic History*, firmly grounded in the relevant secondary sources and reflecting prodigious primary-source research in British, French, German, Austrian, American, and Canadian archives, deserves to be regarded as the standard concise account of the conflict in its military and diplomatic dimensions. I only wish that this unusually well-written volume, together with Jonathan R. Dull’s superb *French Navy and the Seven Years' War*\(^2\) and Franz A. J. Szabo’s new narrative of the war in Europe,\(^3\) had been available fifteen years ago when I was reading the secondary sources that framed *Crucible of War*.\(^4\) It would have been a better book by far if work of such exceptional scholarly depth had been at hand when I needed it most.

Schumann and Schweizer have organized the book in thematically coherent chapters that proceed chronologically through the war from its origins through its campaigns, its financial and logistical history, the internal politics of the belligerent powers, and its diplomatic course (two chapters). This scheme provides analytical depth and allows for enough forward movement, chapter by chapter, to give the book the quality of a narrative history—albeit a somewhat repetitive one. To take one example, the Battle of Kolín, a resounding defeat suffered by Frederick II in June 1757, is treated first in chapter 2 at the strategic and tactical level as a demonstration of the fallibility of Frederick’s judgment in battle and his incipient vulnerability; then in chapter 3 in terms of its expense and Prussia’s growing financial dependency on Britain; then in chapter 4 as it inflected British politics at the outset of the Pitt-Newcastle ministry and solidified the standing of Count Leopold von Daun as a military commander with the Empress-Queen Maria Theresa; and finally in chapter 5 as the battle that won the unreserved diplomatic support of Russia and France for the Austrian empire. Readers who already have some knowledge of the war will find

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1 (London: Longmans and Green, 1907).  
2 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005).  
that this approach creates a layered narrative of increasing richness and depth. Readers who lack prior familiarity with the period may find themselves frustrated as they flip back and forth between chapters, trying to put the pieces together in a way that restores some sense of the simultaneity, sequence, and contingency of events.5

This is predominantly a history of kings and ministers and commanders at war. It stresses the decisions, motives, and influence of those figures who organized and prosecuted campaigns far more than the experiences of those who served and suffered in the ranks or the civilian populations who groaned under the burdens of taxation and conscription. Given the authors’ intention to focus on military operations, politics, and diplomacy this is neither surprising nor particularly troubling. It does, however, limit the analytical scope of the book and narrow its interpretative focus in ways that make its conclusions look more conventional than in fact they are. When the authors explain the outcome of the war with heavy reference to the decisions and actions of Frederick II (whom they refrain from identifying as “the Great,” although they conclude that he deserved the title), or when they muse on whether Pitt in fact “conquer[ed] America through Germany” (as he said he intended to do in late 1757), they seem less to break fresh ground than to re-engage points passionately debated during the war itself. In fact their findings are more significant than that, but they advance them in ways so modest and understated that inattentive readers might actually overlook them.

In my view the greatest contributions of Schumann and Schweizer’s book reside in their careful explanations of the influence of fiscal factors, military supply organizations, and diplomacy (especially the significance of neutral powers) on the outcome of the war. Their third chapter, “Finance and logistics,” is particularly notable for its efforts to deal with these issues—indeed, for sheer synthetic usefulness, there is nothing quite like it (at least so far as I know) in the literature. The authors demonstrate that the war in Europe could continue only so long as Britain and France remained capable of subsidizing their allies. What mattered most was not the outcome of battles (which in the last analysis were merely the most spectacular and horrific means of consuming manpower and money) but the economic vitality of the principal combatants. That in turn depended upon overseas trade, which was to say the imperial command of colonies and resources. Britain held the best cards in this game, and—by the Royal Navy’s mastery of coastal blockades and control of shipping lanes, by the swarming privateer fleet that multiplied its capacity to destroy French commerce and capture French seamen, by its ability to make harassing descents on the French littoral, and above all by its seizure of immensely valuable colonial assets like Martinique and Gorée—Britain played them with ever-increasing skill. “In sum,” Schumann and Schweizer write,

British victories at sea and in America took their toll on France’s financial

5 Those readers—or perhaps all who do not have detailed political maps of eighteenth-century Europe, North America, and the Caribbean ready to hand—may also find themselves irritated by the absence of maps from the volume. While it is at least remotely possible that someone new to the war may be able to conjure the location of Kolín (approximately sixty kilometers east of Prague), comparatively few are likely to be able to place “the hilltop village of Křížkov,” even with a helpful comment that identifies it as situated “opposite what is now called Bedřichov hill.” (52)
regime, affecting not only the war in those theatres but in Europe as well. . . . Not only did the British have the motivation . . . to offer military and financial aid both to their own king’s German domains and the king of Prussia, but they also . . . had the wherewithal to prey on the weakest link in French schemes of public credit and debt finance, so that it was only a matter of time before victory in America helped to win the war in Germany. (128)

In light of that, it might seem churlish to suggest that the authors should have done more to follow out the logic of their insight, but it does seem to me that this fine book might have been strengthened if they had systematically considered a negative factor in their analysis: the role of Spain, which remained neutral from 1756 to 1762. At one level this boils down to a matter of ships and cannons. When war broke out Britain had the largest navy in Europe, with approximately 90 line-of-battle ships and 70 frigates. France, with about 45 ships of the line and 30 frigates, was at a striking overall disadvantage. That France could still achieve local superiority and win battles at sea was evident in the waters off Minorca on May 20, 1756, but it could not indefinitely sustain offensive operations against a navy with such numerical superiority as Britain’s. Yet Spain at the outset of the war had a navy of almost exactly comparable size to France’s, with about 45 ships of the line, a score of frigates, and perhaps 30 more ships of the line under construction. Had Spain seen it to be in its interest to join its Bourbon neighbor in an active alliance, Britain’s naval advantage would have been instantly eliminated. It could never have conducted coastal blockades and raided enemy commerce and mounted amphibious assaults at will against two enemies whose combined naval strength equaled its own, if only because it would have had to divert so many more vessels to the defense of the home isles and its far-flung colonies.

Spain, moreover, could easily have disrupted life in Britain’s southern American colonies by encouraging slave insurrections there, as it had done during the previous war, from Florida. It could also have encouraged Indian raids on the frontiers of Georgia and South Carolina. Had it done so, in 1756 Britain would have faced the same kinds of terror on the southern frontier as it did from Virginia to the north, and the early “years of defeat” in North America might well have been even more nightmarish than they were. Finally, as Schumann and Schweizer demonstrate, the possession of large stocks of specie was critical to military success, and Spain’s ability to produce silver from its Mexican and Peruvian mines was unmatched in the contemporary world. An early alliance with Spain would have given the French treasury access to a resource it sorely needed to subsidize its eastern European allies. When it finally came, the Spanish alliance brought France no relief, but instead allowed Britain to scoop up three million pounds’ worth of silver along with a dozen ships of the line in Havana harbor, which only enriched Britain and made the Spanish desperate to make peace.

In other words, Spain’s neutrality before 1762 may have been the single greatest factor that doomed France to defeat on the seas, and hence in the war as a whole. By the time Spain finally entered the war France’s naval power was nil and Britain—enjoying an even larger advantage (thanks not only to a vigorous shipbuilding program but to the capture of a number of superb French men of war), the cordial support of its North American colonists, and the control of virtually the entire French overseas empire—was in a position to seize
Havana, threaten Spain directly via Portugal, and make short work of France’s last desperate hope for a favorable peace.

Why did Spain wait so long? Schumann and Schweizer’s uncharacteristically cursory treatment of the Spanish question (180-81) gives greatest weight to the Anglophilia of Ferdinand VI’s foreign minister, Don Ricardo Wall. That was surely a factor, but they base their arguments entirely on British diplomatic correspondence, which may not be a completely reliable guide to the internal reasoning of the Spanish foreign ministry. Certainly the surprise that British diplomats expressed in late 1761 when Wall “suddenly assumed a tone of haughty defiance” (206) would suggest that his Anglophilia did not run so deep as to overrule his ability to weigh other considerations in the balance of policy.

What happened? Given the almost superhuman research in European archives reflected in their footnotes, I have no intention to find fault with Schumann and Schweizer for not having burrowed equally deeply into Spanish diplomatic correspondence and minutes. It seems clear, however, that the riddle of Spain’s neutrality, and hence the extent to which the decisive outcome of the Seven Years’ War depended on Spain’s unwillingness to make early common cause with France, can only be solved in the Spanish archives. Until it is, we will not quite have the full picture of the Seven Years’ War as a Transatlantic event in view. But for the time being, we have the best account of it yet written in Schumann and Schweizer’s excellent book. It is a splendid achievement. And there’s always the option of a second edition.
Matt Schumann (Eastern Michigan) and Karl Schweitzer (Rutgers) are co-authors of this new history of the larger of the two great European wars of the middle of the eighteenth century. Unlike the war over the Austrian succession that immediately preceded it, this second conflict had world-historical consequences, creating a British dominance – with all its subsequent Anglophonic and constitutional implications – in North America, while establishing a new power center in the Teutonic world around which, as decades rolled by, other German states would gradually accrete. In explicitly seeking comparison with Sir Julian Corbett’s *England in the Seven Years War*¹ and advancing the hope that their work proves “a worthy successor” to that magisterial treatment, the authors suggest that they see their book as a contribution to historical understanding that might well command the attention of scholars for several generations to come (3). The comparison provides, however, a disquieting beginning, for Corbett’s book is, as the title suggests, a history merely of Britain in the war, and it is moreover a history of naval activities alone. The two works are thus quite unlike. A more appropriate point of comparison (in English) might well have been Walter Dorn’s shorter but wide-ranging examination of the conflict in his *Competition for Empire, 1740-1763.*²

In broad terms, the authors’ picture of the Seven Years War is a familiar one. The conflict arose from the intractability of certain territorial claims, both in America (between Britain and France, over lands in the Ohio valley) and in Germany (between Austria and Prussia, over Silesia). The American confrontation began in 1753, when, after several years of mutually hostile probes by restless, autonomous, and ambitious colonial officials on both sides, the British government raised the stakes by authorizing the use of force against the French in the Ohio country. This action seized the attention of various European powers, and, worried lest a nascent belligerence in America should leave them without a reliable ally if a Franco-British war came to Europe, they began a series of ingenious diplomatic maneuvers. Shaped by excessive cleverness on Britain’s part, lethargy on France’s, and a relentless perseverance from Austria’s Count Kaunitz,³ these negotiations eventuated in the so-called Diplomatic Revolution of 1756 that converted Vienna and Versailles into allies. Thereupon, fearing that Austria would be sufficiently emboldened by its new alliance to launch an attack on Silesia, Prussia preemptively struck in Saxony, and the German war was under way. In accordance with the rearranged international framework, Britain and Prussia found themselves allied against a coalition of Austria, France, and Russia.


³ Kaunitz had been prospecting for a change of allies ever since the end of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48), in which Britain had disappointed Austria as an ally against France and Prussia. Britain’s activities in America merely intensified Kaunitz’s hope to swap London for Versailles.
Although the narrower Franco-British aspect of the conflict involved clashes in India and Africa, the two great theaters of the broader war were the Atlantic/American stage and Germany. In America, London and Versailles engaged each other without (until the very end) European allies. The outcome there depended finally on which metropole could be more successful at getting supplies to its settlers across the ocean. In Europe, however, the full memberships of the two coalitions faced off against each other. Britain and Prussia fought their side of the war with the understanding that each ally could exercise “operational autonomy” in its own special theater (168); northwestern Germany constituted their only common geographical interest, with the defense of the Hanoverian homeland of the British monarch against French attack serving the ends of both London and Berlin. Meanwhile, the three members of the “new grand alliance” sought to defeat Prussia with a swift and decisive campaign that would be based (they hoped) upon close diplomatic and military cooperation (169).

From a military point of view the war had two decisive moments: Prussia’s extraordinary success at Leuthen in 1757 (“perhaps Frederick’s greatest victory”) and Britain’s devastating victory at Québec in 1759 (60). But across the longer trajectory of the war, the fighting in the two theaters followed dissimilar courses. In America, once having gained their footing, the British moved from triumph to triumph, routing the French almost everywhere. In Germany by contrast, the beleaguered Prussians barely hung on against the vaster military potential of their foes. In the end, it was Britain’s unrivaled capacity to harness financial resources and in the process to grind all its enemies toward bankruptcy that carried the day.

The twin peaces of 1763 – Paris and Hubertusburg – defined the character of the British-Prussian victory: a triumphant Britain had its pick of American real estate (it chose Canada), and a stubborn Prussia retained Silesia. Although Britain had been the most formidable national combatant, it was Frederick the Great, the indomitable roi-connétable of Prussian troops, who emerged as the “iconic figure” of the war (228). And while the Diplomatic Revolution had not led to the recovery of Silesia that Kaunitz had hoped for, it provided the matrix, especially after the clarification effected by the death of the Czarina in 1762, for a new order in European politics that endured until the French Revolution.

The book is organized topically. The first chapter explores the origins of the Seven Years War, the second provides the narrative backbone of the book by moving the reader chronologically through each year of military and naval campaigning, the third analyzes the financial and logistical sinews of the war, the fourth looks at the domestic politics of the various combatant states during wartime, the fifth and sixth tell the tale of the diplomatic activities that sought to bring the war to an end, and the brief seventh offers the authors’ final thoughts about the conflict they have discussed.

This volume has important strengths. It rests on extensive international research. Its treatments of the origins of the war and its negotiated conclusions are full. Its emphasis on the differences in the assumptions of operational coordination distinguishing the two alliances helps account for the outcome of the conflict. Its attention to the centrality of
finance and logistics demonstrates that the grand alliance’s failure to knock out Prussia quickly (hence the importance of Leuthen) left its members without the resources adequate to fighting a longer war to a successful conclusion. It stresses the importance of the technique of “little war” — that is, the “war behind the war” that involved the application of smaller forces, whether on land or sea, to harass enemies, disrupt their activities, and force them to divert resources to peripheral locations (102). It examines the difficult character of wartime diplomacy with neutral states. Finally, it makes a useful comparison among the regimes of the various combatant states, arguing that the character of a state’s governance was not unrelated to its ability to engage successfully in war.5

But the book is also beset with some serious weaknesses. Take, for example, the fuzziness about the presentational polarities the authors seem to see themselves operating within. They begin their work by declaring that they favor “narrative over argument, evidence over contention” (2). But that is a puzzling assertion, since it seems to overlook the possibility of making arguments via narrative and suggests that a fair presentation of facts precludes the need for any disagreement about their meaning.

There is also fuzziness in the treatment of the war aims of the British-Prussian alliance. At the opening of the chapter on campaigning the authors offer this introductory summary of the activities of the alliance: it “salvag(ed) operational flexibility from strategic weakness, never pursued any particular aim but evolved according to circumstances and exploited opportunities as they arose” (46). I suppose this might be a convoluted way of saying that Prussia fought in Germany while Britain fought largely at sea and in America, or that the conduct of the war changed as the situation changed, or maybe simply that the opposing coalition set goals (in Germany at least) that were remarkably single-minded. But it still largely misses the point, since the term “strategic weakness” would seem to be applicable only to beleaguered Prussia. After all, Britain knew its métier well, and quickly set about reasserting its “accustomed supremacy at sea” with the goal of “bringing France to the negotiating table on disadvantageous terms” (47). Moreover, the American side of the war had begun as a struggle for territory, and Britain steadily pursued that end — so successfully in fact that by 1760 “debates began to emerge on Canada versus Guadeloupe” (89). It is true that as British fortunes prospered, Prussia found itself struggling to defend its territory; and with the aid of British troops in the west and massive infusions of British money it was seeking to exploit opportunities as they arose. But to suggest that Frederick had no particular aim would be silly — he was defending his kingdom against invading enemies. And in any case, in the authors’ own words, this strategy of “holding territory in Germany while achieving victory overseas” gave greater “coherence” to the allies’ campaigning than the coalition that was arrayed against them was able to muster in its campaigning (172). Perhaps fragments of the introductory remark remain intact after an examination of the narrative that follows it, but in general the foreword must be adjudged misleading.

4 This term may be more familiar in its German guise: der kleine Krieg.

5 Oddly, the authors assert that France had a “parliamentary system” (132).
Then there is the implausibility, except at higher levels of abstraction, of the authors’ efforts to see operational similarities between the large land war in Germany and the small, maritime-supported war in America. After all, the armies in Europe were far larger – by a factor of five or more – than those in America. The opposition that Prussia faced in Germany was far more disorganized than the opposition Britain faced in America. The two theaters had startlingly different demographic and settlement densities. And as for the norms of combat, or the means of financing warfare, or the character of the available auxiliaries, or the role of the navy, or the savagery that characterized some of the fighting, or the freedom of commanders in the two theaters, the chief impression that emerges from the book is the essential incommensurability of the belligerences in the two continents. The closest America came to providing an engagement in the European mode was at the taking of Québec – “the first and only European-style battle in the American theatre” – and even in this battle the victorious army was only about a fourth or a fifth the size of the victorious armies at Leuthen or Kunersdorf (111).

The authors’ decision to avoid taking sides on two major interpretational disputes concerning the war in the belief that “the evidence speaks for itself” is simply perplexing (2). If the issues are important – and they are – then who else should readers turn to for guidance on matters of historical understanding than historians who write a major treatment of the war? It is perhaps true that on the issue of whether William Pitt’s role in superintending Britain’s victory has been exaggerated they may need to say little by way of summary: their steady denigration of the Great Commoner’s work leaves little doubt that they side with the revisionists. But on the complicated issue of whether (from the Prusso-British point of view) America was won in Germany or Germany in America, their judgments would be helpful. For as the text stands, they seek to have it both ways – or perhaps even to leave the issue unresolved.

And then there are organizational problems. In principle, there is much to be said for a topical structure that allows the authors to focus coherent analytical attention on such separate subjects as military activities, financial management, diplomatic parrying, and domestic politics. But the great danger of such an organization is that, unless care is taken, the narrative of the war will suffer from some serious explanatory gaps. Unfortunately, such gaps emerge. Take for example the centrally important British-Prussian subsidy treaty of April 1758. It finally solidified the alliance and afforded Frederick the Great the

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6 Cf. the various comparisons ventured on pages 77, 109, 112-13, and 228.

7 Sometimes their approach to Pitt seems simply unfair. They call his leadership from late 1756 to early 1757 “peculiarly ineffective” even though the ministry he presided over had the disadvantage of being a minority government and even though his brief tenure witnessed, in the authors’ own words, “some successes” (142). Under these circumstances “peculiarly” seems a bit harsh.

8 See pages 2, 56-57, 60, 82, 123, 128, 130. Moreover, if America was in fact won in Germany, as Pitt argued and the authors sometimes affirm, they will not give him any credit for his insight, declaring that the Great Commoner “may not have understood” the reasons for its being true (123).
assurance that he could count in the future on large, annual payments from London. Presumably, therefore, it affected his thinking about campaigning in 1758 and beyond. But in the narrative section, the treaty receives only passing mention, and the reader must wait 100 pages to learn of its significance for Prussian freedom of action (63, 162-63). Or take the third Treaty of Versailles. By the authors’ own account it “almost by itself ... explains” Maria Theresa’s orders to Daun in 1759 and 1760, and yet it is unmentioned in the section that tells of the military initiatives of the Austrians that transpired as a result of those orders (171).

Moreover, having chosen a topical structure for their book, the authors then omit some topics that readers will expect to see treated: wartime intelligence, for example, or the role of propaganda, or the situation of civilians, or the culture of war in the eighteenth century. The oddest gap is the inattention to the military thinking and practices of the era. After all, eighteenth-century commanders, like commanders in all ages, planned and operated within a structure of assumptions and rules about how military and naval assets should be deployed. To understand the decisions of Frederick and Daun and Hawke – the options they saw before them and the constraints they had to deal with – the reader needs some grasp of this structure. But such central matters as strategy, tactics, theories of offensive and defensive actions, and thinking about naval operations receive almost no treatment at all. Nor do the authors explore the reasons for the startling deterioration in the performance of France’s army since the successful days of 1744-48. The authors thus miss some opportunities to flesh out the structural dimension of the military side of the war.

There is one important exception to the point I’ve just made – the valuable examination of “little war” I alluded to above. But because there is no obvious chapter to locate this treatment in, it finds its home, somewhat awkwardly, in the chapter on logistics and finance. (Even odder is the decision to locate the discussion of the rigidity of Austria’s money-raising system not in the chapter on finance but in the chapter on domestic politics.)

If the authors pay too little attention to theories about the use of military force, they pay too much to political machinations – and especially to British political machinations. I need to be clear about the nature of my objection here, for I think the authors deserve credit for

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9 The authors write that they will treat some of these subjects in a forthcoming volume (2).

10 This omission is surprising because another combatant’s change in proficiency – namely, the considerable improvement in Austria’s forces since the preceding war – is well accounted for.

11 The authors justify this location by describing little war as an activity that straddles “the middle ground” between finance/logistics and the “more exciting clashes of arms” (101). This conceptualization may make sense with respect to Britain’s trade-disrupting naval raids that the authors give full attention to. But it seems misused when applied to activities on land, whether by British Rangers or Russian Cossacks or Prussian jäger, that are essentially folded into the military strategy of the nation that employs them. As the authors themselves say, “the little war began – and arguably ended – with British attacks on the French at sea” (102). And on page 113 little war seems further diminished, coming to mean scarcely more than securing small states as military allies.
demonstrating that war in the eighteenth century had effects on the course of politics and, more to the point, that politics had effects on the conduct of war. My point is that they have lost their sense of proportion. When more space is given to the turmoil in British domestic politics extending from the death of Henry Pelham to the creation of the Pitt-Newcastle administration than is given to the turning-point battles of Leuthen and Québec together, it may fairly be suggested that the authors have their priorities awry. Besides, extended as the treatment is, the authors have little to say about such important structural elements as the role of Parliament, the significance of Hanover, or the character of the reversionary interest. Another opportunity lost.

The foregoing remark points to a related difficulty – the authors’ partiality for Britain. That London was the most important participant in the conflict cannot be denied, and one of the values of this book – which is after all a “transatlantic history” – is that it demonstrates the centrality and interrelatedness of British actions on both sides of the Atlantic. But what is one to make of the claim then that Bute’s unilateral re-casting of the subsidy arrangement with Prussia was “honourable and necessary” (208)? Or of the judgment that he pursued his political strategy with “honourable single-mindedness” (203)? Or of the readiness of the authors to associate themselves with the statement that historians tend to regard the Treaty of Paris as “honourable and immensely beneficial” (225)? To my mind these opinions reflect not so much a respect for Bute’s ability to deal with a daunting task as a somewhat blinkered desire to see the war through pro-British eyes. As a consequence, Bute’s two-facedness about Prussia (204), his dodging of commitments to Denmark (215), and his final suspension of the Prussian grant (215) all pass without reproach because Britain’s interest required such actions. In sum, with the authors using a rather one-sided moral alembic to distil their assessments, the reader won’t detect much sign of perfidious Albion here.13

And because of another consideration, this point needs to be pressed. The authors recognize that they are partial to Britain, acknowledging early on that “the weight of our evidence and bias [my emphasis] falls preponderantly on the side of Great Britain and Prussia” (2). They attribute this partiality to three factors: 1) the “adage that history is written by the victors,” 2) the “tenor of previous historiography on both sides of the war,” and 3) the fact that Britain and Prussia “frequently did seize the initiative” in the conflict (3). The third consideration might have some merit, but the first two are simply expressions of the kind of partisan short-sightedness in historiographical labors that historians generally try to free themselves from. Thus the authors’ explanation sounds awkwardly like an affirmation not of the inevitability of bias but of the acceptance of inappropriate bias.

12 By contrast, France’s foreign minister Choiseul was lacking in personal integrity and displayed “an amplitude of opportunism and guile.” Moreover, “his only concern was France’s national interest; the means were irrelevant” (202). The implication that Bute prioritized these considerations differently is not sustained by a full examination of the narrative.

13 I must note that on page 210 the authors call Bute’s procedure “cavalier.”
The text of the book would have benefited from closer editorial scrutiny. Consider the “for as much as” on page 50 that imposes a causal link between two considerations that are not causally connected. Or the concluding paragraph in the treatment of the campaign of 1757, where the authors use “varied” when they probably mean “shifting” and “should” when they seem to mean “might” (60). Or the sentence on page 122 where “maintaining” should replace “subsisting?” Or the sentence on page 127, where something like “secured agreement to the canceling of” should replace “waived.” Or page 129 where something like “gnawing” should replace “ebbing.” (I realize that I run the risk of sounding like a picker of nits here, but I know of no way of documenting infelicities and errors aside from citing them – and there are many other sentences that I might have mentioned. And while it is often possible to squeeze or infer meaning out of the flawed sentences, readers should not be expected to re-read and parse sentences in order to pull sense out of them.)

An odd aspect of the work is the authors’ readiness to see remarkable military victories as “miracles.” As a trope, the term might effectively be employed – once or twice – to underscore the authors’ belief that a particular victory was secured against apparently great odds or that an important outcome was thoroughly unexpected. There is, for example, wide historical precedent for their allusion to the Czarina’s death in early 1762 as “the miracle of the House of Brandenburg” (211). But “miracle” (or its variant forms “miraculous” and “miraculously”) threatens to substitute for analysis when it is employed in association with an array of events – e.g., Prussia’s victories in 1759, Prussia’s survival at the end of the campaign of 1759, the entire 1759 campaign season, Laudon’s odd decision to cross the Oder River in an eastward direction, Prussia’s success at Liegnitz, Frederick’s escape at Torgau, Prussia’s and Hanover’s survival in 1760, and Frederick’s general capacity for survival (69, 72 [2], 71, 83, 84, 87). Not even the fact that contemporaries made recourse to the term, as Frederick did for the battle Liegnitz, or that generations of scholars have used annus mirabilis14 to foreground the character of the British successes of 1759, exempts twenty-first-century historians from trying to explain terrestrial events in terrestrial terms. What makes the usage still more exasperating is that in another part of the book – the chapter on finance and logistics – the authors do provide what readily constitutes at least part of an analytical explanation for many of the events that are styled miraculous in the military chapter.

I’ll close with some remarks about how the user-friendliness of this book might have been improved. Since readers are unlikely to have the geographical contours of Germany and North America inscribed on their minds, the book needs maps. And the convenience of the book would have been enhanced had the lengthy section of endnotes been marked with headers that guided the reader to pages (or at least to chapters) in the text, and had the index been less erratic (there are, for example, sixteen references for “Leuthen” and none for “Québec.”)

In sum, I found this a disappointing book. A good idea has been undermined by faulty craftsmanship. The authors have not dealt adequately with the potential for narrative incompleteness inherent in their decision to organize their material topically, they have

14 Which the authors semi-translate as “Annus miraculous” (69).
evinced a peculiar partiality to some subjects while choosing to omit others, they have been careless in exposition and writing, and they have not made the book as serviceable to scholars as they might have done. I wish I had more positive things to say; perhaps my fellow reviewers will show that I have misjudged the volume.
This volume succeeds admirably at providing what its authors say they intend: to provide “a concise synthesis” (1) of the Seven Years War. Additionally, it delivers even more than the authors modestly claim—but more about that later. In six tightly organized thematic chapters and a conclusion encompassing 229 pages of economical prose plus detailed notes and bibliography, Matt Schumann and Karl Schweizer have produced a succinct narrative of a truly transatlantic war that was an even more sprawling conflict than I realized before reading the book.

After a scene-setting chapter on the origins of the war that makes clear the very wide nature of the conflict, Schumann and Schweizer plunge into the campaigns of the war. They note that while some nations sought quick victory, the British and Prussians prepared for the long haul and never expected complete victory. “[O]ne could speak of two separate wars being fought at once: one of Frederick struggling desperately for survival by fighting on interior lines, and another of British forces gradually and methodically...destroying French forces around the globe” (45-46). The war, in short, matched two competing strategic systems. The lengthy campaign of 1757 was the war’s most dynamic. France seemed on the verge of great victories only to find itself in retreat everywhere by year’s end. And while the British had looked to Frederick for aid and inspiration, from 1758 onward they were the ones in control of the war while Frederick was fighting less for victory than for survival. Soon, by the end of the 1759 campaign, the entire structure of the war had changed and “Britain stood unchallenged as master of North America and the seas, while the king of Prussia still clung to life amid increasingly dire odds” (70). The campaigns of 1759 and 1760 left little chance for total victory or total defeat but presented the opportunity for a negotiated settlement. The British “reigned supreme at sea and in the colonial theatres, but neither they nor the French could achieve victory in Hanover” (87), nor could either nation successfully invade the other across the channel. War weariness took hold and the peace settlements increasingly reflected a diminished war-making capacity on all sides and a lack of desire for cooperation.

While the campaign summaries are solid, the real contribution of the book comes in its discussion of the war away from the battlefields. Schumann and Schweizer make it clear that the most important wars were conducted behind the scenes in such areas as supplying the armies, logistics and finance, and diplomacy. This war-behind-the-war had huge consequences for the outcome. The British triumphs on the seas and in North America proved devastating ultimately for the French, harming their ability to prosecute the war in Europe as well as America. The seemingly banal activities of supply and finance were anything but and were decisive elements in determining the war’s winners and losers. What the authors call “the little war—the battlefield away from the battlefield” (129) that was marked not by large battles but by small-scale actions that halted or interrupted supplies and commerce and disrupted troop movements played a role as well. No less than the military side of the war, then, the other aspects of the conflict also proved determinative—a realization grasped instinctively by William Pitt and the British that greatly aided their victory. “The various theatres of the Seven Years War more nearly
touched one another in the realms of logistics and finance than in any other,” the authors conclude. “The true tests of military prowess and alliance cohesion lay not only on the battlefield but off it” (130).

Similarly, another behind-the-scenes factor that was not particularly visible but very important was domestic politics on the homefronts of the belligerent powers. A war fought on many fronts, in many realms, and in multiple theatres required centralization and bureaucratization, and some nations (like Britain) handled this better than others. Likewise, stability and continuity of political leaders and philosophies was crucial to sustaining success in such a long war, and so, too, was the degree to which governments prosecuted the war efficiently and received public support for their conduct of the war they enjoyed. Schumann and Schweizer argue that “The Seven Years War was decided...as much on the back stairs as on the battlefield. Like the failure of financial or logistical support, a change of leadership or failure to appease local sentiments,” they observe, “could alter the progress of the war as much as a major battle” (155). Finally, the war’s outcome was also shaped by diplomacy. It seems the authors would agree with the old adage that “diplomacy is the continuation of war by other means,” for the diplomatic overtures and policies pursued (or not) contributed to the success of some nations and the failure of others. The diplomatic challenges of a multi-front war were as complex as the military challenges and the authors note that diplomacy consequently “played as great a role as military strategy in the Seven Years War, particularly in informing its aftermath” (185).

Schumann and Schweizer conclude that the war “subsumed many others, both domestic and foreign, both personal and international” (227). Victory as well as survival “depended as much on clarity of perception and the ability to navigate the vicissitudes of war as upon the forces that one could bring to bear” (227). While the book highlights the great successes of the British nation in managing those sets of challenges, it also focuses personally on Frederick the Great of Prussia who managed multiple roles simultaneously and thus “stands as an iconic figure” (228) of the war. More than any other individual, Frederick proved himself capable of conducting a truly transatlantic conflict in many different realms.

This book has many strengths. It is well-organized and clearly written and is based on an impressive array of primary source research in multiple languages. It also achieves its goal of concision despite the vast breadth of its topic. The volume provides brief but sharp overviews of the military campaigns. But just as important (if not more so) to the outcome of the war was the significance of the non-military aspects which the book nicely emphasizes. Specialists in U.S. history who teach this war with a decided (or even sole) emphasis on the North American theatre will receive a useful corrective about the true transatlantic nature of the conflict—a valuable point to keep in mind when assessing the British and French in North America.

Despite these achievements, some will find faults as well. Specialists may be disappointed by the authors’ decision not to engage more in the historiographical issues raised. The book’s structure is useful for organizational purposes but perhaps a bit rigid and formulaic. And while the book, as noted above, provides a valuable corrective to the North American-
centric conception of the war, it may actually downplay the North American theatre of operations and the significant results there in evaluating the long-term consequences of the war (and the peace that followed). But the biggest criticism I have of the book is its stance on interpretive analysis of the conflict. The authors seem to abjure analysis right up front when they write, “we have favoured narrative over argument, evidence over contention...we hope to plead neutrality, and to allow readers to come to their own conclusions” (2). Fair enough, but isn’t this a false choice? Can’t narrative and argument be combined? Can’t a book provide both a narrative and offer evidence while simultaneously making arguments and contentions about the material? In fact, I would argue that the authors actually do both despite saying that they will not. The real thesis of the book, it seems to me, is the point Schumann and Schweizer make consistently about how the war-behind-the-war—matters of finance, supply and logistics, the realm of diplomacy, and the domestic considerations which helped to shape policy—was as important as the military campaigns themselves. This is a major interpretive claim which the book substantiates. I think the authors should be bolder and less reluctant to argue that thesis. It doesn’t subtract from the narrative at all; rather, it gives readers a way to think about and organize the narrative and the evidence offered in a helpful way.
The Seven Years War, which proves the truth of the dictum that war gives rise to treaties and treaties give rise to wars, has generated a great deal of scholarly interest of late as has the field of transatlantic history. The Schumann and Schweizer book is the second work to appear this year on this second conflict generated by the “Rape of Silesia.” Franz Szabo’s *The Seven Years War in Europe, 1756-1763* (New York: Pearson Longman, 2008) was considerably less ambitious in scope. Schumann and Schweizer’s goal is to provide an “elusive overarching history” (xi) of a war that spanned five theatres and took on an Atlantic dimension. This book provides a useful overview of the war and skillfully integrates the various areas of the conflict. Its strengths lie in its clear operational military history and its strong delineation of the diplomatic efforts, chiefly from the British side, to end it.

Although this is essentially a narrative history, this work is not for the neophyte. The authors implicitly assume that this war was the “first global conflict in history” (p.1.) but they do not make a persuasive case. What about the War of the Spanish Succession or the War of the Austrian Succession? They see this war as a “major turning point in European and Atlantic history” (1) but again we are not told why. In the introduction the authors do not discuss Frederick II’s desire to annex Saxony or later the extent of Frederick’s ruthless exploitation of and reliance on Saxony. Nor do the authors adequately explain the Secret du Roi nor the execution of Admiral John Byng. Princess Gouvernante is mentioned (179) but we are not told who she was or why she was important. Although the Newfoundland fishery question is discussed, no background to this vital question is provided. The Barrier Treaties are mentioned, but not explained. Although the involvement of most European powers is discussed, the role and involvement of Sweden is unclear. Nor do the authors analyze in depth the terrifying collapse of French finance and the devastating effect of the disaster at Rossbach. The index is fairly inclusive, but does not include such key battles as that over Prague, which Maria Theresa had determined to hold no matter the cost. The authors are quite insightful about the strengths and weaknesses of British players but we learn little about that of others such as the basically mean spirited and callous Frederick who often shunted the blame off on others. In addition, phrases such as the Canadian “inability to support a French style levée en masse” (111) cannot but confuse the reader who would normally associate the levée en masse with the revolutionary era. To describe the French parlements as “quasi representative bodies” is incorrect. Furthermore, there were not 15 but 13 parlements in France before the Revolution. Based on an impressive array of archival sources in Britain, France, Austria, Russia, Germany, Stockholm, Canada, and the United States, the bibliography includes a scant two pages of secondary sources and does not include classics such as Geikie and Montgomery on the Barrier, a problem to which they frequently allude. Of the select secondary sources cited, only eight are not in English and do not include standards such as Curt Jany’s *Geschichte der Königlich Preussischen Armee*, Reinhold Koser’s *Geschichte Friedrichs des Grossen*, Theodor Schieder’s *Friedrich der Grosse*, or D.F. Masslowski’s *Der siebenjährige Krieg nach russischer Darstellung*. 
Nonetheless, they are to be commended for undertaking a challenging task. The authors correctly stress the pivotal role of Silesia in the eighteenth century as well as the “intensely personal nature of eighteenth-century diplomacy.” (4) The conflation of the European and the colonial conflicts and how they led to a reversal of European alliances is clearly explained as is the nature of diplomacy in the Early Modern period, especially the extensive nature of kinship networks. The unexpected aftermath of the victory at Fort William Henry and its adverse effects as well as the significance of key battles, such as Kunersdorf, Leuthen, and Kolin, are underscored. The ravages of disease, especially typhus and scurvy, the crucial role of logistics, the impact of piracy and letters of marque on the various financial systems, and the often unexpected consequences of alliances with Native American tribes are detailed. This history is, nonetheless, a basically Anglo-centric view of the conflict. The reader learns a great deal about the cabinet discussions and infighting over strategy and tactics that took place in Britain but little about such debates elsewhere, whether it be the Habsburg or Bourbon courts. This perspective is hardly surprising given Prof. Schweizer’s previous work, England, Prussia and the Seven Years War (1991) and William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, 1708-1778, a Bibliography (1993). Many of the insights of the former inform this one. The work might be more accurately titled, The Seven Years War, a Transatlantic History, a British Perspective.
From its title alone, Matt Schumann and Karl Schweizer’s *The Seven Years War: A Transatlantic History* promises much. The subject of an increasing number of studies in recent years by both American and European historians, the Seven Years War is a topic upon which a synthesis of recent research, even if only in preliminary form, is certainly welcome. Additionally, Schumann and Schweizer’s invocation of “transatlantic” in their title acknowledges a category of historical analysis that has, in the last two decades, become a standard among historians of the early modern period. Historians have readily acknowledged the reality and complexity of the interconnections between the histories of the Americas and the histories of Europe and Africa. As most studies of the Seven Years War tend, even against their best intentions, to focus on either the American or European (or Asian and Pacific) theaters of the Seven Years War, a study that is truly transatlantic in scope would be a welcome addition to the literature. Schumann and Schweizer’s work is, with a few important caveats, a success. The authors have produced a concise volume that summarizes the events, outcomes, and effects of the Seven Years War in all its theaters. The book provides a valuable service to professional historians in that it incorporates much of the current literature on the war (although this is done mostly via the endnotes) while also pointing historians to the archival resources where future research can be conducted with profit. It is, however, a book aimed a professional readership, rather than a general one.

Schumann and Schweizer have organized their book into six major chapters, in addition to a very brief introduction and conclusion. The first two chapters concern themselves with the War’s origins and its progress on the battlefield. The middle chapters describe the financial and logistical efforts that supported the war effort and the effects of the war on domestic politics within the belligerent powers. The final two chapters outline the intricacies of diplomacy between the participants, culminating in the separate 1763 treaties of Paris and Hubertusburg.

Chapter One deals with the war’s origins, both in the contest between France and Britain for control of the Ohio Valley in North America as well as the “Diplomatic Revolution” that witnessed the major powers of the War of Austrian Succession switching sides, with Austria and France on the one hand and Prussia and Britain concluding new alliances by 1756. Chapter Two deals with the various campaigns of the War, from its official declaration in 1756 through the winding down of major hostilities in 1761-1762. The Seven Years War pitted two sets of belligerents against one another. Britain and Prussia were joined in their alliance by the smaller German states of Hanover (of which the British king, George II, was a native and also the sovereign), Hesse-Cassel, and Brunswick. France and Austria were also joined by Russia, and the smaller powers of Sweden, Saxony, and Würzburg. Although they rarely collaborated strategically, Prussia and Britain’s actions reinforced each other. Britain sought to destroy French colonial and maritime power while also protecting George II’s interests in Hanover, while Frederick II’s Prussia contended with successive Austrian, Russian, and French campaigns to destroy his army and the capacity of the Prussian state to make war. The policy of the Franco-Austrian-Russian
alliance was largely the work of Count Wenzel Anton Kaunitz-Rietberg, chancellor and minister of foreign affairs for Maria Theresa’s Austria. Kaunitz’s plan was to combine allied forces and destroy Frederick’s armies in a single campaign. Despite many Prussian defeats, including a devastating loss at Kunersdorf (1759), Frederick was always able to keep an army in the field, foiling the allies’ strategy. The year 1759 marked a turning point in the war, as, in addition to Frederick’s survival in the eastern German theater, a combined Prussian-Hanoverian-British army defeated the French attempt to invade Hanover at Minden, and the British forces under James Wolfe captured Quebec in Canada. Schumann and Schweizer chart the ebb and flow of each side’s battlefield fortunes in detail. It is here that the book’s lack of maps or illustrations of any kind becomes its biggest detriment, as keeping track of the comings and goings of various armies in multiple theaters tests the attention of even the most enthusiastic reader.

It is in Chapter Three, on “Finance and Logistics,” that Schumann and Schweizer provide some of the book’s most astute analysis and deliver on the promise of writing a truly “transatlantic” history. The importance of finance and logistics to the story of the Seven Years War is not a surprise to historians of eighteenth-century Britain and British America, as John Brewer revealed in his 1988 study The Sinews of Power the important role the emergent British “fiscal-military state” played in Britain’s success in the Seven Years War.1 What Schumann and Schweizer reveal is the importance the emerging financial sector played in driving the war efforts of both sets of allies and the key role the ebb and flow of Atlantic commerce had in this story. The authors first focus on the role of the “little war,” or the interdiction of enemy commerce by formal naval forces and by privateers, in shaping the outcome of the War. British strategy relied heavily on interdicting French commerce and, after the promulgation of the “Rule of 1756” in August 1758, neutral commerce with belligerents that had not been open in peacetime. Hundreds of British letter of marque and reprisal followed the May 1756 declaration of war, and during the course of the War, the British Admiralty granted “2205 letters of marque for 1679 privateers.” (p. 103) The scope of the operations by which the British sought to limit French commerce was thus massive.

The effects of the “little war” were felt in both Europe and America by 1759. The most obvious effect was the limiting of supplies available to General Montcalm’s forces, which set the stage for British victories at Louisbourg, Quebec, and Montreal. But French supply lines were stretched not only by physical destruction, but also by a refusal of merchants to accept French bills of exchange issued in Canada. The French government had long stopped redeeming Canadian bills of credit at face value, and French losses in 1758 made merchants even more skittish in accepting French paper. Merchants did not want to put their ships and cargoes at risk only to be paid in worthless bills of credit. Issuing bills they could not back with specie not only in Canada, but in the entire Marine Department, the “French government through 1759 staged a colossal exercise in self-deception” to fund both its war effort and the efforts of its allies. (p. 127) As both Russia and Austria depended on French credit to subsidize their war efforts, French failure on the Atlantic and

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in North America reverberated across Europe. With diminishing funding, major operations became more difficult for the allies to mount in 1760 and were almost impossible in 1761. Indeed, it is remarkable that nearly every power in the War, save Britain, was virtually at its logistical and financial limits by the beginning of 1761. It is their explanation of commerce, logistics, and finance that Schumann and Schweizer reveal how truly transatlantic the Seven Years War was.

The book’s final chapters are more conventional. Chapter Four, “Domestic Politics” treats the politics of the various courts and legislatures of the major belligerents. This is helpful explication, especially in the case of Britain, where the changes in ministerial appointments between the 1754 death of Henry Pelham and the ascension of George III in 1760 is positively head-spinning. Readers looking for a discussion of popular politics will however be disappointed, as the focus is on policy-makers and policy. Chapter Five and Chapter Six, detailing diplomatic initiatives, are similarly focused on the actions of heads and state and their diplomats. The diplomatic chapters make the case that the key turning points in the Seven Years War were not events on the battlefield, but the death of monarchs, in particular George II’s passing in 1760 and the ascension of George III and, in Russia, the passing of Czarina Elizabeth and the rise of Czar Peter III. George III’s rise marked the beginning of a change in British policy, as he appointed Lord Bute to the cabinet, ultimately driving out William Pitt and changing the direction of British policy away from an extended, open-ended commitment to a continental war effort. In Russia, Peter moved to affect a rapprochement between Russia and Prussia, an opening that Frederick embraced. With an increasing number of belligerents less and less interested in prosecuting the war, and nearly every power’s financial and logistical system pushed to the limit by late 1761, peace discussions were the only logical step.

It must be acknowledged that as valuable Schumann and Schweizer’s work is for scholars, this is not a book for general readers or undergraduates. Because of the lack of maps, illustrations, or any attempt to engage the non-specialist in their prose, one would be wise to direct a general reader away from this book and towards a more friendly work, such as Fred Anderson’s *The War the Made America.* But that limitation acknowledged, with *The Seven Years War: A Transatlantic History,* Matt Schumann and Karl Schweizer have provided scholars with a valuable resource. They have written an excellent synthesis of the War’s origins, its battlefield progress, and the domestic court politics and diplomacy that shaped its outcome. Furthermore, in explicating the role of logistics and finance in shaping the War’s outcome, the authors have a compelling case why the War can only be understood in a transatlantic context. Scholars embarking on a research program in this area of study will find the authors’ bibliography and catalog of the major American and European archives with materials relating to the war of great assistance. In short, this is a book that serious students of the Seven Years War will find helpful to consult for years to come.

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Response by Karl W. Schweizer, New Jersey Institute of Technology

First, I wish to join my co-author in thanking Dr. Maddux for organizing this roundtable—an excellent way of highlighting the current resurgence of Seven Years War research—and the eminent contributors for their thoughtful, stimulating and fair-minded reviews. Collectively, their shared reactions—as well as differences in opinion—have given us much food for thought and hopefully will provide guidelines, creative points of departure for future scholarly narratives on this topic.

Dr. Schumann has effectively addressed reviewers’ comments on the book’s central thesis—the impact of finance and logistics on the war in its full Euro/Atlantic context—leaving me at liberty to engage (perhaps somewhat idiosyncratically) other issues, variously touched upon in the Roundtable critiques. On a technical note, there is the matter of seemingly neglected secondary sources—making it, at times, appear that we are “reinventing the wheel.” Here the explanation is simple: when a publisher insists, at the last moment, that authors expunge 15,000 words of an already slenderized text, what has to suffer if the integrity of the main narrative is to be preserved? Alas, the bibliography (hence our qualifier “selected” in the “Secondary Sources” section) plus, in our case, numerous footnote references—necessary so the required word cut could be accommodated (had we been granted 500+ pages, as Longman allowed F. Szabo, for instance) the above problem would not have arisen. Regarding the lack of maps, rightly considered essential by the reviewers for a work exploring military operations in multiple theatres, we had at least five—one Routledge simply failed to include; the others entailed problems of copyright, still unresolved by the time of publication. Hopefully this can be redressed in the paperback edition due to appear later this year.

Unlike most histories of wars, our volume is organized topically rather than being strictly chronological. As a result readers may have to jump back and forth a bit; a slight inconvenience: granted, but not, in my view, a taxonomy detrimental to scholarly depth, conceptual clarity or thematic (as averred by Anderson and Browning). Indeed, precisely because of the war’s complexity—its myriad dimensions together with the unprecedented array of archival sources deployed, our organizational format seemed best suited to chronicle/highlight the interconnectedness of events and historical reality per se; the Seven Years War, the first global conflict, was to quote directly “not merely an exercise in combat and campaigns but a struggle for survival and hegemony that strained the resources of the greatest European powers in every corner of the globe.” (pp. 1-2).

Also, it should be stressed that the book, congruent with the Series of which it is a part, is aimed more at specialists than general readers (a point seemingly overlooked by the

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1 i.e. “It is in their explanation of commerce, logistics and finance that Schumann and Schweizer reveal how truly transatlantic the Seven Years War was.” (L. Sadosky).
2 Franz A. Szabo, The Seven Years War in Europe, 1756-1763 (New York, 2008).
3 Thus Dr. Estes’ observation: “It (the book) achieves its goal of concision despite the vast breadth of its topic.”
4 War, History and Politics Series, Editor: Prof. Jeremy Black.
reviewers). Professionals will not be deterred by our chapter structure while novices in the field may appreciate that the work is “unusually well-written,” (Dr. Anderson); an exercise in “economical prose,” (Dr. Estes).

In one sense, our volume represents an attempted corrective to writings on the Seven Years War which in recent years have suffered parochial over concentration on its North American aspects and the tendency to rely excessively on English language sources, mostly printed: what John Shy calls “the metro liner outlook.”\(^5\) Given that *The Seven Years War: A Transatlantic History* culminates a 35 year research odyssey making it the first work in English (if not any other language) to synthesize archival material from Leningrad (correction, once again, St. Petersburg) to Paris, with many points in between, it is perhaps understandable that we gave precedence to the detailed collection of original sources over interpretational disputes or historiographical issues. The sheer massiveness of our evidence combined with publisher generated restraints concerning length militated against a more catholic approach. Still, conflations of narrative and interpretative analysis are interspersed throughout the book (as noted by Dr. Estes); though admittedly not as uniformly or structured as one might wish—possibly another task awaiting a future edition.

That our general perspective appears “Anglo-centric” (concluded by the Drs. Frey) should not evoke surprise. Great Britain, after all, was the “key player” in the most determinative theatres of operation, not to mention being the ultimate victor internationally:\(^6\) attaining world power, status, with command of the sea, control over trade and hence the capacity to shape global affairs. Along the same line, our discussion of domestic/court politics determining military decisions has been viewed as unbalanced (*pace* Prof. Frey)—alleged disproportionate attention being devoted to London at the expense of St. Petersburg, Vienna, Paris, and even Berlin. This has been attributed, at least partly, to the lingering influence of my previous works on the war;\(^7\) whereas actually it reflects the differing nature of contemporary governments throughout Europe (i.e. constitutional vs. absolute monarchy): their divergent philosophies, infrastructures, operative assumptions and policymaking agencies. These in turn are responsible for much of the surviving documentation that illustrates their guiding principles and so assists in unlocking the mindset of the age. An understanding of this requires extensive source-based scholarship, deep and prolonged immersion in the relevant archives which for Britain, since it had a constitutional government are invariably more revealing regarding official policy formulation than those of autocratic courts, whether Russia, Prussia, Austria or France, all of whose depositories were mined as the notes indicate. For Britain also, I had the


opportunity to consult a wealth of private archival materials\(^8\) which when joined with the official documents, inevitably allows deeper insights into the dynamics of and personalities behind decision making within the British cabinet.

I question Dr. Anderson’s assertion that Spain was ever a threat to Britain’s naval advantage either after 1761 when she finally joined the war on France’s side or even before. On paper—yes, France and Spain united would have numerically equaled if not surpassed Britain’s fleet strength. However, as every naval/military historian knows, numbers alone are **not** the decisive criterion: administrative efficiency, financial resilience, resource concentration, strategy and tactics, ability within battle fleet command are all critical to success and are all areas in which Britain arguably enjoyed decided superiority from the outset. Even diplomatically, lacking military credibility, Spain carried little weight—certainly not in the crucial Anglo French peace deliberations (1761, 1762-3) which explains why Z. Rashed in her work on *The Peace of Paris*, though purportedly aiming “to throw new light” on the role played by Spain in the negotiations,\(^9\) utilized only one document from Simancas. So negligible was Spain’s role (actual or potential) that the French sources proved sufficient. Still, from a research angle I appreciate Dr. Anderson’s admonition. Spanish archival sources ought to be explored, if only as a crowning touch and the off chance, however tenuous, that some pivotal gem, having radical historiographical implications, has been missed.

Finally there is the critical issue of Anglo Prussian relations during the war. Dr. Browning takes us to task for not elaborating on the subsidy treaty of 1758 (“an explanatory gap”) and being “fuzzy” about relations between the two wartime allies as a whole. Since, avowedly, we were not writing for newcomers to the topic, it ought to be recognized/assumed that scholars would know about the extensive secondary literature on these (and related topics)—much of it, ironically, produced by myself.\(^10\) As for such issues as “wartime intelligence”, the “role of propaganda” or the “culture of war” in the 18th century—inattention to which is (again) deplored by Dr. Browning, I can only say: we were fully aware of their importance—so important in fact that each topic could easily command 300 pages plus, for proper coverage. Since we are not in the “miracle business” we are at a loss to see how these could have been adequately incorporated in an already truncated text. Advice on this would be greatly appreciated.

In sum, we hope that despite its defects our survey of an important topic will adequately fill a niche which until now has been neglected.

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\(^10\) See *supra*, notes 7 and 8.
Let me first express my thanks to H-Diplo and to all of the reviewers for their encouragement, criticism and insightful comments. As several of the reviewers note, the Seven Years War is an exciting field of study enjoying a small renaissance of scholarly attention. It is also a broad and complex area of inquiry, a fact perhaps best illustrated by three recent histories in English: Franz Szabo’s on the conflict in Europe (2008); Jonathan Dull’s on the French Navy (2004); and Fred Anderson’s incomparable Crucible of War (2000). To combine the scope of all three of these works is an ambitious intellectual goal, and I am grateful for the reviewers’ consensus regarding its difficulty. To condense that scope into just 300 pages, however, leaves a work that is necessarily concise, and perhaps as necessarily unbalanced in its presentation. The introduction therefore notes the relatively humble pretensions of this book: to “suggest the promise held by a larger, more comprehensive work (1),” “to point the interested reader in the direction of more detailed sources (2),” and to “point a way forward, through its deficiencies as well as its strengths (3).”

The promise of a larger work comes out in the book’s two main arguments: that Prussia’s King Frederick II retains some claim to greatness, and that the Seven Years War was truly an Atlantic conflict if not in fact a global one (2). As the Drs. Frey note, recent historiography has taken the luster away from Frederick’s achievements, and has instead tended to highlight flaws in the king’s character, as well as in his political and military conduct. Growing institutional divisions between American and European history, meanwhile, have tended to separate the war’s major theatres—so much so that Longman’s two-part series is divided geographically¹—and left behind the works of Richard Waddington and Julian Corbett, in particular, which took a more comprehensive and interconnected view.²

One may continue to argue Frederick’s greatness as a matter of semantics, which I will do later, but the main thesis that I hoped to contribute to the work was the interconnectedness of the war’s main theatres: Europe, North America and the high seas. This was the primary argument in my doctoral thesis, “British Grand Strategy and the Euro-Colonial International System, 1754-1761” (Exeter, 2005), though I appreciate the reviewers’ sentiment, best stated in Dr. Estes’ comments, that we might have given it more prominence in the book. Still, all five reviewers seem to have caught the central theme from their readings of Chapter 3 on finance and logistics, and Dr. Anderson captures it best with his quote from p.128. I am also grateful to the reviewers for remarking the points at which issues of supply and economics impacted diplomacy among both sets of allies and among neutral states in Chapter 5. In my estimation, it is really these confluences between finance, logistics and diplomacy that both defined the war’s trans-Atlantic character and shaped most (though not all) of its course.

Critical to this formulation are the British leaders whose ministry is often credited with winning the war: Thomas Pelham-Holles, First Duke of Newcastle and William Pitt the Elder. Several reviewers, especially Dr. Browning, note our ambivalence toward the Great Commoner, though for those more well-read in the historiography, I hope our opinions will appear more in line with the moderation of Richard Middleton and Jeremy Black than with the revisionism of Marie Peters.\(^3\) In general, we tend to see Pitt as the creative engine behind much of British policy at the height of the war (particularly the West Africa expeditions of 1758, on pp.68-69), while his colleagues scrambled to provide the means—a point best illustrated on pp.144-45. Foremost among these colleagues was Newcastle, who not only managed government finances but also maintained London’s largest patronage network. His concern for patronage more than for public opinion harmed his reputation among both contemporary pamphleteers and later historians, though recent scholarship has tended toward a more sympathetic treatment. In that vein, I hope we may infer from the silence of the Duke’s principal biographer\(^4\) on this point that he generally approves our continued revision of the historiography in Newcastle’s favor.

Further explication of British ministerial relations awaits another volume—perhaps a sequel to J.C.D. Clark’s magisterial work\(^5\)—but particularly in light of remarks by the Drs. Frey and Szabo’s pro-Austrian narrative,\(^6\) it is worth recounting here again our assessment of Frederick’s claims to “greatness”. As Dr. Anderson notes, we left the question open until the concluding chapter, and we hope our narrative conveys a sense of agreement with the king’s critics on at least one point: that the Frederick of history was not the enlightened philosopher-king that he hoped would be remembered. We concur that his means and methods left much to be desired (e.g. pp.116-17, 133-37), yet we did find some items on the positive side of the ledger: his means may have been inhumane and unconventional, but Frederick did keep his ship of state afloat both politically and financially; he kept an army in the field out of all proportion to his kingdom’s population and held off attacks in at least three directions for six campaigns in succession; he often maintained both strategic and operational initiative in spite of the numbers against him, and he was the only monarch of the era who conducted diplomacy and managed affairs of state while leading troops in battle and on the march. In short, he made out about as well as one could have expected from an eighteenth-century monarch in his unenviable situation, despite often-poor relations with both peers and subordinates; despite stress, sickness, his noteworthy temper and the occasional flight of utter fantasy—such as the illusory Ottoman alliance (e.g. pp.182-83). Had we wished to separate the king’s achievements from his personality, we might have called him “Frederick-who-did-great-things-and-overcame-great-odds,” but in lieu of such an awkward title and still bearing the above caveats in mind, I concur with Dr. Estes’ assessment that it still seems fair to call him “the Great”.

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On the book’s two major arguments, I am pleased to see the variety of agreement and criticism. Authors and reviewers appear largely of one mind on the war’s trans-Atlantic nature, though I concur with Drs. Estes and Anderson that we might have given the argument more punch. All parties also seem to concur that the chapter on finance and logistics represents a good start in this direction, though I accept the suggestions of Drs. Sadosky, Browning and Anderson that it would be useful for the future to move farther from the halls of power. For Frederick, I concede that it is difficult to maintain a coherent ledger-sheet while tracking so many developments elsewhere. However, I think our narrative well captures the spectrum of opinion between Dr. Estes’ general approval and the caution from the Drs. Frey: Frederick certainly committed errors and atrocities, but the genius that underlay those errors and atrocities also preserved his kingdom against overwhelming odds. Again, the reviewers may have a point in asking for more clarity, and in prodding us to engage the historiography more deeply.

Here, then, we enter into the book’s second objective: to point the interested reader toward more detailed sources. In this, I think Dr. Sadosky’s critique is the most telling. While we hoped for a narrative that would appeal to general readers, in fact we produced a text for experts, and one that through its copious footnotes might well make an expert of someone who follows up enough of their references. Dr. Anderson’s comment on the breadth of archival research is well-taken, and it was for this reason alongside our trans-Atlantic perspective on the war that Dr. Schweizer and I agreed to collaborate. Whatever wealth of research and insight that our combined efforts represent, however, Dr. Browning and the Drs. Frey justly remark that we couldn’t fit everything that one could have wished between our two covers, and the reviewers rightly note some of the problems in our bibliography.

This brings me to the third objective of the work, pointing ways forward through weaknesses as well as strengths. As we suggest in our introduction about our arguments in the book, I hope I may let the reviews speak for themselves on our strengths. It is ultimately in the hands of readers and reviewers to judge where we have succeeded, and I see no real point in continuing to argue the book’s merits. On its shortcomings, however, I believe there remains room for discussion, and here, I believe, is where we might find the seed for a better future work.

So far as I can tell, the shortcomings of the book fall in two main areas: authorial and editorial. Drs. Anderson, Browning and Estes all note that the argument might have been strengthened in different ways, and I think Dr. Sadosky is fair in judging that the pitch of the work may be a bit high for the interested undergraduate. Alongside Drs. Anderson and Browning, I am also grateful to the Drs. Frey for noting some of the historiographical debates that we might have engaged further. On the authorial side, these are critiques enough, but I also have some technical points to address, regarding the index, bibliography, grammatical errors, and lack of maps.

For us as authors, I think the largest single problem may have been our intent to let the evidence speak for itself to a reader of sufficient knowledge. It would undoubtedly have been better to insert just a few phrases in the text to highlight our two main arguments—about the Atlantic nature of the conflict and about Frederick’s greatness—and to use bolder
language to this effect in the introduction. Important and legitimate as the criticisms may be on this particular point, I believe that the needed revisions would be relatively slight.

More fundamental is the book’s organization. Rarely are histories of war organized topically as ours is, and our departure from the chronological norm, as Drs. Anderson and Browning remark, can make for some difficult reading. Chapter 2 may suffice for a fair chronology of campaigns and battles, but taken on its own it lacks the context to give them real meaning—including one of Dr. Browning’s favorites: Leuthen. Well might Frederick be immortalized for his Parchwitz speech and his handling of battlefield logistics with his march around the Austrian left, but there, for all effective purposes, ends the discussion of the battle itself. Perhaps we could say more, as Dennis Showalter did, about the role of individual regiments, but how and where are we to comment on the pressure felt both in and from Vienna for Prince Charles and Marshal Daun to bring a quick end to the war? Where are we to discuss the Empresses’ sense of their financial dependence on France? And when will the reader learn about Austrian problems with supplies coming north and east from Bohemia, the thousands of sick returning along the same routes, and the utter collapse of Austrian logistics and morale after the battle, despite holding the key fortress of Schweidnitz? And how and where would we add our thoughts on the connections between Leuthen and the British side of the war—in Hanover, the Atlantic and around the world? It is these kinds of questions that led us to believe that a topical organization might be more useful.

Dr. Anderson and the Drs. Frey mention some important segments of the historiography that we might also have engaged, on Spain and the German theatre(s), respectively. Ideally, I think all of us would agree among ourselves and with Corbett and Waddington that a thorough history of the war requires several volumes. In the absence of that kind of space, I understand the reviewers’ concern that we retain a balanced perspective, but I also submit to them the histories by Dull and Szabo—focused on France and Austria, respectively—which still often concede that initiative rested with Britain and Prussia. If even these historians can see Frederick and Pitt influencing the flow of events more than Choiseul and Maria Theresa, we see fair reason to retain that emphasis in our work. Why initiative often rested with Britain and Prussia, however, requires a deeper analysis, and I agree with the reviewers’ collective instinct that the answers are to be found in a more nuanced look backwards to Europe’s previous systemic wars of 1689-97, 1702-14 and 1740-48; in more detailed expositions on the Austro-French side of the ledger, along with their allies; and in expanding the geographical scope of Seven Years War research to embrace neutrals and potential belligerents such as Spain (perhaps foremost, as Dr. Anderson suggests), Denmark, the Ottoman Empire and Sardinia. Although we made some starts in these directions in the present book, I concur with the reviewers that much remains to be done.

At this point, it becomes imperative to mention the editorial side, or rather the constraints

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7 Dennis Showalter, *Wars of Frederick the Great* (London, 1994).
8 One might also add the Dutch Republic to this list, but, this country, alone among the prominent neutrals in the Seven Years War, actually has received very good academic treatment. See Alice Clare Carter, *The Dutch Republic in Europe in the Seven Years War* (London, 1971).
of publishing. I join our harshest critics in lamenting the shortened bibliography, the book’s lack of maps and even some errors of prose and spelling. Unfortunately, decisions made out of view of the reader (and in some cases, even of the authors) had a profound influence on this book’s final form. The original manuscript had more copious notes and a complete bibliography with dozens of foreign-language sources, it contained at least five detailed maps and cover art which might have acted as a sixth, and it included a table of currency exchanges that would have been useful for chapter 3. All of these things were either truncated or omitted completely, and problems with the index reflect pressure from the publisher to save both time and costs. Finally, I was myself surprised to find mistakes in the final product that I had corrected in the proofs! In all of the above, I do not mean to push blame onto our publishers, but to suggest that there was more of which we as authors perhaps ought to have been aware, and more that we might have done to anticipate these difficulties. While we join other authors in lamenting unfortunate shortcomings of this sort, I think we can also point to them as a warning for the future, to be as mindful as one can of the publishers’ bottom line!

In conclusion, I think the reviewers rightly commented on several of the book’s strengths, and some of them as noted above merit even greater emphasis. Meanwhile, though Dr. Browning seems to believe that the book’s shortcomings are quite numerous, I do not see them as being by any means insurmountable. Rather, I am grateful for his critique and see both his criticisms and those of the other reviewers as pointing towards lessons learned—mistakes that I, Dr. Schweizer and others might avoid in the future, as Seven Years War historiography continues to grow and mature. Finally, while I stand by my work on this book in its current form, I also concur entirely with Dr. Anderson that the best remedy for such shortcomings as reviewers may see may well be a second edition. I for one look forward to working on it.