
Roundtable Editor: Thomas Maddux
Reviewers: Robert Art, Michael Cox, Henry R. Nau, William O. Walker III


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Introduction by Thomas Maddux, California State University, Northridge

To *Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine* emerged out of a two-day workshop in June 2007 sponsored by the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia. The editors, Professors Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro, asked the ten contributors to the volume to move beyond a critique of the national security strategy statements of George W. Bush and to advance their own strategy statement for the next administration with a list of eleven tasks their statement should address. (p. 4)

Leffler and Legro provide an excellent concluding chapter, “Dilemmas of Strategy,” that identifies the authors’ areas of agreement and disagreement. They identify a significant consensus on issues such as leadership, preponderance, freedom, economic openness, and collaboration. The contributors “dispute what kind of leader the country should be and what particular tasks are required in such as role,” Leffler and Legro note, “yet not a single one of the experts is calling for disengagement from the international arena.” (p. 251) The authors disagree somewhat on the use of military force, but they want Washington to retain its military preponderance “to deal with major conflicts should they arise, deter the use of force by others, and buttress U.S. influence in the international system.” (p. 252) The authors endorse U.S. support for democracies and the spread of freedom, although they also note the difficulties involved with spreading democracy and the necessity of working with authoritarian regimes. Although devoting relatively less attention to economic policy, the authors favor an expanding capitalist economic order despite some of the less-than-desirable results of globalization. Finally, the authors reject the unilateralism of the Bush doctrine and endorse more multilateral institutionalized cooperation to deal with a wide range of problems from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to global warming and the challenge of dealing with problems emerging from what Francis Fukuyama refers to as the “band of instability that runs from North Africa through the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia.” (p. 206)

Within this consensus, Leffler and Legro point to areas of significant disagreement among the authors on the “landscape of international affairs; they assess threats differently; and they argue over the importance of ‘legitimacy,’ the utility of coercive power, the right approach to democratization, and the value and configuration of international institutions.” (p. 259) The authors also have to grapple with what Henry Nau, in his review, identifies as the problem that academics, “like weather forecasters, are just not smart enough to think ‘creatively’ about the future—except in terms of the past. And there’s the rub. No academic or pundit predicted the end of the cold war, the terrorist attacks on 9/11, or the current global financial meltdown because these events were not predictable from the past.” (1) The reviewers note some of the unanticipated challenges in their favorable evaluations:

1) Henry Nau divides the views of the commentators into perspectives that “differ principally in terms of the relative emphasis they place on the role of power, international institutions and the spread of democracy.” (1) Realists focus on threats and balance of power approaches to address these threats through a league
of democracies [Robert Kagan (p. 50)] or a “Concert of Great Powers” [Stephen Van Evera (pp. 16-17) Liberal internationalists, according to Nau, “focus more on social and institutional relationships than on power configurations or preoccupation with democracy promotion.” (2) They emphasize not only power considerations but also a range of collective actions to address social, economic, and environmental concerns. Nau points out the absence of two viewpoints: full-scale supporters of “democratic enlargement‘ or a foreign policy based on the spread of freedom,” and conservative nationalists who “seek minimalist aims abroad, chiefly defensive, and would not accept the premises of American leadership, preponderance and so forth” in world affairs. (3-4) What Nau views as the central issue that merits more direct discussion is the challenge of legitimating the use of force considering the challenges of working through the United Nations as well as winning and maintaining bipartisan political and public support.

2) Robert Art admires the continuity expressed by the authors. On the one hand, they are highly critical of the Bush administration with respect to its grand strategy, its mismanagement of the Iraq war and concurrent failure to focus on Afghanistan and the challenge of al Qaeda in Pakistan, and its disdain for NATO allies, the UN, and other multilateral bodies and agreements. Art is impressed with the fact that the authors nonetheless remain committed to a significant role for the United States in dealing with the full range of international challenges and that this “speaks to the continuity of problems that the United States and the world face and the need for heavy American involvement to help solve them.” (3) Art has significant problems with the arguments of the five authors that he focuses on with respect to the feasibility of their strategies to deal with many problems. These include the importance of keeping WMD weapons away from terrorists through the cooperation of the major powers or through the creation of strong states, democratic or authoritarian; John Ikenberry’s call for a rebuilding of a new international order with many daunting tasks and enhanced difficulties in an emerging multipolar environment; and Kagan’s emphasis on great power rivalries in which the U.S. should back political liberalism versus autocracy. Art poses a number of questions that are related to his concerns: “Are Russia and China autocracies or fated to become such again? Is the struggle between modernization and traditionalism that unimportant? Do not regional great powers striving for regional hegemony mark the early stage of the emergency of a multipolar world?”

3) Michael Cox endorses the reviewers’ consensus to “jettison the Bush doctrine” and notes the different recommendations to restore the U.S. as a great power and to rebuild a liberal international order. Cox, however, questions “how far the United States can abandon everything that has been done in its name over the past eight years?” (1) The problem of terrorism remains even if the authors disagree with Bush’s “war on terror”, and it will be challenging for Barack Obama to reverse longstanding U.S. policies of support for Israel and acceptance of Israeli policies towards the Palestinians from expanding settlements in the West Bank to economic coercion and the use of force against the Hamas and Palestinians in Gaza. Cox also notes that the Bush administration “actually managed to get some things right” with respect to
policy in Asia and China and eventually in “mending bridges with its main European allies.” (2) Cox would have preferred a greater variety in the choice of authors, the inclusion of more dissenting perspectives, and especially some foreign perspectives on future U.S. strategy.

4) William Walker agrees with the almost unanimous criticism by the authors of Bush’s strategy and notes their emphasis on the importance of the U.S. regaining world leadership. Walker, however, questions both the feasibility of this happening and the potential drawbacks: “Americans have long clung to the belief that their country can reinvent itself and that, with its sense of mission, it possesses ‘immunity from history,’” a condition that concerns Walker. (2) In contrast with many of the authors who support rebuilding U.S. predominance as a dominant power or hegemon, Walker recommends a different approach that would look back to the Founding Fathers, an approach of encouraging a better world order by example and by regaining core American principles that have been submerged in the global Cold War and Bush’s domestic surveillance and legislation restraining and restricting civil liberties in the “war on terror”. “If the literal cost of hegemony is enormous in light of the country’s debt-ridden GDP, if there are not sufficient troops to sustain hegemony, if the public is unsure of the worth of a global mission, and if there is no guarantee that a leader with the appeal of Barack Obama can restore American credibility to former heights even should he serve two terms,” Walker concludes, “then it may be times to ask whether the United States would not be better off leading by example.” (4)

5) Henry Nau’s ‘weather forecaster’ limitation is certainly evident on the issue of grand strategy and economic relations. All of the reviewers mention the current global economic decline with the U.S. leading the downward spiral with the collapse of its inflated housing market, the undermining of its major banks, expanding unemployment, a stock market in retreat past 1997 values, and declines in production of almost everything except political rhetoric. Few of the authors anticipated the impact of the economic decline not only on the U.S. but also on global economic relationships and their grand strategies. Charles S. Maier did warn that “a global economic crises would mean that all bets are off,” (p. 79) and Barry Eichengreen and Douglas A. Irwin in their essay, “A Shackled Hegemon,” focus on international economic policy. After a review of Bush’s policies in this area, the authors emphasize that the constraints from “existing interests and inherited structures” would work against any significant change in U.S. policies. Thus, a new administration in Washington would be dealing with familiar problems with the World Trade Organization, domestic farm legislation, protectionist pressures, and an effort to regain trade promotion authority, and the “large current account deficit and ongoing dependence on foreign central banks for financing will continue to be a source of vulnerability going forward.” (pp. 195-197) What Michael Cox refers to as the “meltdown in the world economic system” has brought immediate changes in U.S. economic policies on the domestic scene and will most likely have significant repercussions in global economic relationships, internal stability in many states, and international relations. As Cox concludes, “the disaster that is upon us was made in
America and in the process had done a lot to destroy faith in the American way of doing things. Certainly, if America is to ‘lead’ then it has quite a lot of explaining to do in the meantime to the millions of people around the world who have followed its economic advice over the past twenty five years—and are now paying a very heavy price.” (3)

Participants:

Jeffrey W. Legro is Compton Professor of World Politics, Chair of the Politics Department, and faculty associate of the Miller Center at the University of Virginia. He is the author of Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order (2005) and Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II (1995).


Robert J. Art is Christian A. Herter Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University, where he teaches international relations and specializes in national security affairs and American foreign policy. He is also a senior advisor at the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and director of MIT’s Seminar XXI Program. Professor Art received his his Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1968. He has written the following books: The TFX Decision: McNamara and the Military (1968); A Grand Strategy for America (2003) – a finalist for the Arthur B. Ross Award of the Council on Foreign Relations; and America's Grand Strategy and World Politics (2009). He has coedited (and contributed to) the following books: with Samuel P. Huntington and Vincent Davis, Reorganizing America’s Defense (1985); with Seyom Brown, U.S. Foreign Policy: the Search for a New Role (1993); with Patrick Cronin, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy (2003); and with Louise Richardson, Democracy and Counterterrorism (2007). He has also coedited two readers: with Robert Jervis, International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Problems, now in the 9th edition; and with Kenneth Waltz, The Use of Force, now in the 7th edition. He is currently working on a book on international relations.

Michael Cox holds a Chair in International Relations at the London School of Economics where he is also Co-Director of IDEAS, a Centre for Diplomacy and Strategy. The author, editor and co-editor of over twenty books including Superpowers at the Crossroads (1990); US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Superpower without a Mission (1995); Rethinking the Soviet Collapse (1998); and The Eighty Years Crisis: international relations, 1919-1999
Professor Cox has also published a volume on E.H. Carr, *E.H.Carr: A Critical Appraisal* and in 2001 brought out a new edition Carr’s classic *The Twenty Years’ Crisis*. In 2009 he will publish two volumes of his own writings: *The Rise and Fall of the American Empire* and *The United States and World Order: From the Cold War to the War on Terror*. In 2010 he will also bring out two four volume editions of key writings on the Cold War and U.S. Foreign Policy.


This is a smart book. Melvyn Leffler and Jeffrey Legro have put together an all-star cast to talk about America’s foreign policy and grand strategy after the Bush administration. The cast includes Barry Eichengreen and Douglas Irwin, Niall Ferguson, Francis Fukuyama, G. John Ikenberry, Robert Kagan, David Kennedy, James Kurth, Charles Maier, Samantha Power, and Stephen Van Evera.

All the authors, even Ferguson, agree that the Bush administration has been a disaster for America’s foreign policy and its position in the world. None, however, argue that the United States should retreat into an isolationist or offshore balancing strategy. All consider the problems facing the world and the United States to be too pressing, and America’s power and position too central, for the country to adopt such a posture. Each, while arguing for more prudence, wisdom, and care in designing America’s future foreign policy, calls for the United States to persevere with an activist and internationalist stance. Where they differ is over the problems they see as central and the policy prescriptions they consequently outline.

I cannot do justice to all ten chapters in this short review; therefore, I shall concentrate on the five that in my view make a strong argument for a distinctive line of action that the current administration must take. This review thus will touch only briefly upon the other five, each of which gives more of a menu of things that need to be done, although they are not any less valuable for that.

Stephen Van Evera declares that the geopolitical era in world politics is over. Great power wars are a thing of the past. The most pressing threat and greatest danger to the United States today is a terrorist attack with weapons of mass destruction on the American homeland. To combat this threat Van Evera calls for a concert of the great powers to produce the cooperation among them necessary to keep Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) weapons out of terrorist hands. The prescription makes sense; the question is whether the great powers share the terrorist WMD threat equally and therefore have sufficient shared interest to cooperate to the necessary degree. Although there appears to be much cooperation among the great powers, especially between the United States and Russia regarding the spread of WMD, it is by no means perfect. Thus, the questions as to how much great power cooperation we can expect, and whether it will be sufficient, do not have clear-cut answers. Nonetheless, Van Evera argues, rightly, that the United States, for its own interest, has no choice but to undertake the task to “forge and sustain” great power cooperation.

James Kurth likewise sees the terrorist use of WMD to be the greatest threat to the United States. Therefore, the United States must at once make national security the principal objective of U.S. foreign policy, putting that above the laudable goals of democracy promotion, free markets, and open societies around the world. While he shares Van Evera’s priorities, Kurth’s solution to the terrorist WMD threat differs: the United States needs strong states to be restrained by the rule of law. A strong state is not necessarily a
democratic one in his view, but such a state is crucial because it can be held responsible “for the actions of people and groups, particularly Islamist terrorists, who are operating on its territory.” How to create strong states (are we talking about state-building?), and how much departure from its democratic values the United States should tolerate in helping to create them, are two thorny problems to which clear-cut solutions are not self-evident.

John Ikenberry argues that the United States must once again rededicate itself to rebuilding a liberal international order, something it did quite successfully after World War II. The need for such an order is as great as it was in the earlier era, not only because that liberal order has frayed during the Bush administration, but also because of the changed nature of the threats the United States now faces. These new threats are more “decentralized, complex, deeply rooted, diffuse, shifting, and uncertain” than previous ones and consequently call for a global architecture of institutions that, by institutionalizing cooperation among states, will be flexible enough to deal with all the uncertainties that will come America’s way. The specific tasks Ikenberry mandates for the United States are daunting: among others, creating new international institutions and reforming old ones, making room for rising powers, and reestablishing the primacy of America’s alliances and its “hegemonic legitimacy.” If, as many argue, the world is becoming more multipolar, then these goals will be much more difficult politically to attain than they were during the bipolar era.

Robert Kagan makes a powerful case that history has returned—that is, that great power politics is back, if, indeed, it ever went away. States remain powerful actors, national ambitions remain strong, and great power competition has returned. So, too, has ideological competition—the titanic, two-centuries old struggle between “political liberalism” and autocracy. In his view, however, the world still remains unipolar, not multipolar, with the United States the dominant power, but now faced by great powers—China and Russia, for starters—that have regional hegemonic ambitions. None can challenge the United States for global predominance, but all can—and will—make America’s task more difficult. The future will be dominated by the struggle between autocracy and political liberalism, not by radical Islam and not by the competition between modernization and traditionalism. The task for the United States is to throw its weight behind political liberalism in this struggle. This is a clear position. Is it correct? Are Russia and China autocracies or fated to become such again? Is the struggle between modernization and traditionalism that unimportant? Do not regional great powers striving for regional hegemony mark the early stage of the emergence of a multipolar world? If Kagan is correct about the nature of international politics today, then it will be hard to realize Van Evera’s concert of the great powers and Ikenberry’s new liberal international order, but perhaps not Kurth’s strong state vision.

Finally, Francis Fukuyama presents a balanced and nuanced view of America’s current interests and what it must do to protect them. He entitles his essay “Soft Talk, Big Stick.” The United States needs to listen more to others, take their interests into account, and be more humble and restrained. This is the soft talk. But it also needs to carry the big stick because “there are a number of global public goods that will be significantly undersupplied if the United States does not remain heavily engaged in world politics, from maintenance of
an open international trading order to sea lane security to environmental protection and disease control to humanitarian assistance....” (p. 204). The tasks are large. East Asia and the greater Middle East remain the two theaters of prime strategic significance. Hard power has to be used against America’s hard core enemies, but soft power needs to be used to promote development and better governance in the turbulent areas of the world. Fukuyama may call for a more “humble” posture on the part of the United States, but the role he prescribes is anything but humble. It sounds as if the United States remains “the indispensable nation,” to quote a former secretary of state.

The other authors make sensible points. Samantha Power argues for more legitimacy and competence in America’s foreign policy. David Kennedy calls for the United States to be true to its democratic heritage. Barry Eichengreen and Douglas Irwin emphasize the economic constraints the United States will continue to operate under, and their essay looks positively prescient given today’s economic troubles. Niall Ferguson similarly stresses the dangers that a collapse of the global trading system could bring. Finally, Charles Maier provides a broad historical perspective on the challenges the United States faces today. The book ends with a good synthetic essay by Leffler and Legro.

It is interesting that a book that lambasts the havoc wrought by George W. Bush ends up calling, not for a radical departure from extensive American involvement with the world, but rather a change in the tone, shape, and implementation of that involvement. This speaks to the continuity of the problems that the United States and the world face and the need for heavy American involvement to help solve them. This book is a good read and well worth the time spent on it.
TO LEAD THE WORLD? NOT ANY LONGER

It has become one of the standard truths of the last few years that the Bush years have done enormous damage to U.S. standing in the world. What follows from this, quite logically, is that whoever won the White House in November 2008 would either have to modify the doctrine associated with Bush’s name or, more radically, abandon it altogether. How many conferences has one attended, and how many books and articles has one read of late, that speculated at length about the direction US foreign might take once Bush had returned home to Texas? In my case at least, far too many.

It was with some trepidation therefore that I picked up this particular book. I need not have worried. Indeed, the Mel Leffler and Jeff Legro volume—published a little while before the near-landslide of Barack Obama last November—makes a very good stab at thinking through some of the big issues likely to face the U.S. after Bush. The various authors—all American with the one exception of Harvard exile Niall Ferguson—all do a perfectly fine job. From this point of view there is a great deal to recommend in the book. One minor caveat I suppose: because the various contributors and their views are all so well known, there are few surprises contained here. Thus while Steven van Evera informs his readers that the era of great power geopolitical rivalry is over, Bob Kagan (wouldn’t you know) says that it ain’t. Meanwhile, while my good friend John Ikenberry provides the new policy team with some very sound advice on how to build, or more precisely rebuild, the liberal world order so insouciantly weakened by Bush—a position that Ikenberry has advanced with very great verve before—Ferguson (who like Francis Fukuyama now appears to have washed his hands of the whole Bush episode) informs anybody who cares to listen why America has to completely jettison the Bush doctrine and its three essential truths: pre-emption, unilateralism and democratic promotion. To which we can only respond, amen. But we’ve heard all this before.

Still, the key question remains—and it is one with which the editors grapple bravely in their two chapters—as to how far the United States can abandon everything that has been done in its name over the past eight years. Here it may be much easier to talk change than practice it. Take the ‘war on terror’. Bush may have fought it in an especially counterproductive way. But that hardly means the problem of terrorism will go away now that he has left the White House. Indeed, it is worth noting that even though Barack Obama has promised to close down Guantanamo and to stop torture he has not—thus far—gotten rid of extraordinary rendition. Nor has he said a great deal—thus far—about one of the issues that so angers Moslems around the world: Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians. On the contrary, everything up until now points to business as usual. Even in the midst of the near total destruction of Gaza, Obama remained ominously silent. Obama may have proclaimed the need for a new way forward, but whether or not he can translate these fine words into real policies remains to be seen. Indeed, it was Bob Kagan no less who in a recent debate at the LSE warned us “Obama lovers” in Europe not to expect too much from the new boys and girls in Washington. This is not what we wanted to hear of course. But it
does point to something we would all be silly to ignore: that Barack Obama may turn out to be something of a disappointment to those of us over here (and over there) who have invested so much in him.

A number of Bush critics and Obama fans (amongst which I would decidedly include myself) may also not want to hear what long ago became obvious to all but the most rabid Bush haters: that in certain areas his administration actually managed to get some things right. This is most obviously the case in terms of U.S. policy towards Asia in general and China in particular. In the case of China this was no mean feat given that Bush came into office carrying a copy of that Foreign Affairs article authored by Condoleezza Rice advising the United States to abandon the Clinton strategy of engagement with Beijing and adopt her then-preferred policy of containment. Thank goodness he saw the light (though it took 9/11 for him to smell the coffee). Nor was Bush quite so bad when it came to Europe—in the end. Admittedly, his team continued to get Russia wrong by pushing too hard for full NATO membership of Georgia and Ukraine (a policy we are told that Barack Obama will abandon). He and the Republicans were also far too indulgent towards Georgia (with disastrous consequences for that poor country). Still, having looked over the proverbial abyss in 2003, his foreign policy team did begin mending bridges with its main European allies. This did not make Bush himself especially popular on the continent. Nor did his discovery of Europe do much to weaken anti-Americanism. But at the highest level at least it did begin to calm things down a bit, even if normal service was not resumed.

If most of the excellent essays gathered here contain few surprises and even fewer rash predictions, one thing at least did strike me as being distinctly odd: the book’s title. Whether or not the decision to call it ‘To Lead the World’ was taken by the publishers or the editors I know not. But it might have been wise to have added a question-mark! After all, the one thing the U.S. has not been doing very well over the past few years has been to lead. From global warming to international law, from the Doha round to the UN, the United States has quite simply lost the plot over the past decade. This is not to suggest that the U.S. has been on a Kennedy-like descent. Nor is it impossible for the United States to regain the moral high ground and start being ‘smart’ once again. Still, it is a real issue; one that might have been better reflected in a slightly more tentative title.

Secondly, though Leffler and Legro do a great job in bringing together some really top authors, the volume overall has too much of an insider American ring about it for my liking. To be blunt, there are far too many of the usual suspects in the same room and not enough dissenting—or indeed foreign—voices. This is not to imply that all the authors sing from the same ideological or theoretical hymn-sheet. It is to imply however that the inclusion of one or two ‘dissenters’ and perhaps the odd non-American (I don’t include Ferguson in that category) might have made for a livelier, more angular, read.

Finally, in spite of its many qualities, the volume has in many ways been overtaken by events—not so much by the Obama election but rather by the meltdown in the world economic system that is now taking place before our very eyes. The implications of this, as we are fast learning, are enormous: first for international relations; second for the domestic stability of a host of states around the world; and finally for the United States...
itself. The crisis may well leave the still enormously powerful USA in its current number one position. But as analysts as far apart as the Chinese Prime Minister and Vladimir Putin pointed out at the recent Davos get together in Switzerland (where official USA was notable by its absence), the disaster that is upon us was made in America and in the process has done a lot to destroy faith in the American way of doing things. Certainly, if America is to ‘lead’ then it has quite a lot of explaining to do in the meantime to the millions of people around the world who have followed its economic advice over the past twenty five years—and are now paying a very heavy price.
This volume collects an all-star cast of academics and political commentators to “stimulate creative thought” (2) about America’s national security strategy after the Bush administration. It doesn’t quite succeed but due to no fault of its own. The volume acknowledges that President George W. Bush’s strategy of preemption was creative—“a radical departure from the policies that had defined America’s approach to world affairs throughout the cold war and beyond.” (2) Yet, with the exception of one contributor (Robert Kagan), the volume roundly rejects this “creative” alternative and, for the most part, focuses on relatively familiar “anything but Bush” (ABB) alternatives which some of the contributors have detailed in other places.¹

The problem is not willful partisanship or a lack of intellectual firepower. Even amidst the chorus of anti-Bush views, the disagreements in this book are enlightening. The problem is that academics, like weather forecasters, are just not smart enough to think “creatively” about the future—except in terms of the past. And there’s the rub. No academic or pundit predicted the end of the cold war, the terrorist attacks on 9/11, or the current global financial meltdown because these events were not predictable from the past. As Alan Greenspan reminded us in testimony to Congress in October 2008, everyone works from a mental model, an “ideology” that provides “a conceptual framework with the way people deal with reality.” People apply this framework to the past. That’s all they can do. And the future turns out not to be like the past or, in the case of surprises, even close to it. As Greenspan lamented, “I was shocked, because I had been going for 40 years or more with very considerable evidence that it [his conceptual framework] was working exceptionally well.” (http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/july-dec08/crisishearing_10-23.html)

Commentators, including academics, would do well to take a page from Alan Greenspan. The conceptual frameworks in this volume differ but even then they do not include all relevant ones. As a result, they predict different and incomplete futures. Readers won’t find any easy answers, except maybe the ones which resonate with their conceptual framework. But that’s small comfort, as Greenspan learned.

The conceptual frameworks in this volume differ principally in terms of the relative emphasis they place on the role of power, international institutions, and the spread of democracy in the formulation and implementation of American grand strategy. Realist contributors such as Robert Kagan, Stephen Van Evera, James Kurth, and Niall Ferguson start from the nature of material threats and envision the future chiefly in terms of balance of power arrangements to manage threats. They don’t ignore international institutions and

democracy. Van Evera, for example, calls for a global institution, “a Concert of Great
Powers,” to manage the balance of power; and Kagan believes that a world order under U.S.
preeminence will be “benign” because American democracy “does not stand in the way of
progress toward a better world . . . [but rather] . . . stands in the way of regression toward a
more dangerous world.” (41) Institutions and values play a role. But they serve the
balance of power; they don’t replace it.

Differences among the realists arise primarily from the different levels of analysis they
address. Van Evera goes farthest toward a systemic structural solution to the balance of
power. Somewhat ironically for a realist, he argues that “the main threat to the United
States is no longer conquest but war itself”—in short, a threat to the system rather than to
specific countries. (24) Kagan takes a more traditional systemic process approach to the
balance of power. He expects counterbalancing by rising powers such as China but also a
continuing American preeminence and because of American values a “relatively benign
configuration of power.” (41) Kurth emphasizes the domestic level of analysis, worrying
that weak states undermine the traditional balance of power. He advocates less emphasis
on democracy promotion (more explicitly downplaying the role of values than Kagan) and
more emphasis on strengthening states whether they are liberal or not. Ferguson, who
earlier advocated an American empire to manage future order; now despairs that the
American polity is suited for any type of leadership other than retaliation after attack. He
recommends that the new president “abandon all three of the key pillars of Bush’s national
security strategy: preemption, unilateralism, and cryptoimperialism [by which he means
‘extending the benefits of freedom across the globe’].” (242) Ferguson identifies the
fundamental flaw in basing policy on a future that cannot be known from the past. The
problem of conjecture, or the “black swan” phenomenon, refers to the inability of any
leader, particularly a democratic one, to preempt an event no one can foresee. If such a
leader is right, no one will ever know it. And right or wrong the leader will be pilloried
because he is betting everything on something that no one expects to happen. Witness
Bush’s gamble to avoid another 9/11 and the widespread sense now that the threat was
greatly exaggerated (or did Bush preempt it?).

Liberal internationalist contributors to the volume (also called liberal institutionalists)—
Barry Eichengreen, Francis Fukuyama, G. John Ikenberry, Douglas A Irwin, David Kennedy,
and Charles Maier—focus more on social and institutional relationships than on power
configurations or preoccupation with democracy promotion. Their conceptual framework
points to general (collective) not specific threats that affect the “milieu” of international
relationships but not the “position” (e.g., power) or ideology of specific countries. Again,
power and ideology, namely terrorism and radical Islam, are not ignored but interpreted
differently, namely from the collective interests of all countries rather than the national
interests of specific ones. Thus, according to Ikenberry and Fukuyama, solutions involve
not power balancing but building up the “social capital” of international institutions to
permit what Ikenberry calls “multitasking” and Fukuyama elsewhere calls “multi-
multilateralism.” 3 Such multi-faceted collective action addresses across-the-board

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3 Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroad*. 
education, health, housing, and other social infrastructure requirements associated with nation-building. Eichengreen and Irwin warn that global economic constraints may limit such efforts. Protectionism and now credit shortages (which to their credit they anticipate in general terms) are probably here to stay. And Kennedy and Maier go a step farther and argue that equity concerns, and in Maier’s case religious zealotry, unless addressed more explicitly, undermine globalization and thwart Woodrow Wilson’s legacy of consensual (self-determination) and citizen (participatory, including conscripted militaries) democracy.

Again, like realists, liberal institutionalists differ among themselves primarily in terms of the levels of analysis they address. Ikenberry and Fukuyama address the systemic structural level, how to fashion an international order out of complex interdependence (following the work of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye who wrote 40 years ago about the increasing multi-issue and multi-functional character of the international system).4 Eichengreen and Irwin focus on the systemic process level and the negotiations that constrain both economic (trade and financial) and political (prospects for consensus) outcomes. And Kennedy and Maier emphasize the domestic level of analysis where, as they see it, threats to sovereignty, consent and capitalism portend the end of the Westphalian state.

None of the contributors in the volume advocate “democratic enlargement” or a foreign policy based on the spread of freedom rather than international institution building or the balance of power. In the aftermath of George W. Bush, democracy promotion is not a popular idea. But Samantha Power and the two editors, Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro, come closest. For Power, the overriding problem the next American president faces is legitimacy. While she acknowledges that there is no single understanding of legitimacy, her standard is clearly American virtues and values at home. In good Jeffersonian fashion, she believes the United States should lead by example not by empire or rhetoric. According to her, “a vibrant, self critical, self-correcting democracy at home will do more to increase the success of U.S. diplomacy abroad than any rhetorical democracy-promotion strategy overseas.” (138) Her priority level of analysis is domestic. But what if Americans can’t reach a stable domestic foreign policy consensus?

The editors, Leffler and Legro, take up this question. They offer a superb comparison of the differing views in their concluding chapter, arguing that there is more consensus among the contributors than meets the eye—“along crucial dimensions—perhaps distinctly American dimensions . . . of leadership, preponderance, freedom, economic openness and collaboration.” (250) The disturbing thing, they note, is that this consensus may not be shared by the American public, which prefers that other countries pay their own way (Dutch treat) if America takes the lead. And the consensus breaks down very quickly when one asks “for what specifically and how” American leadership, preponderance, freedom and so forth should be used? Different conceptual frameworks and levels of analysis lead even the best academic and political commentators down different paths to different

conclusions because international reality is endlessly complex and impervious to prediction.

Because the world is so complex, perhaps the worst outcome we could wish for would be a foreign policy consensus that then caught us completely by surprise when some “black swan” showed up. The academy itself is, sadly, not diverse enough to safeguard against such false consensus. Conservative views other than realists are not included in this volume. Conservative nationalists, who are more popular among the masses than academic elites, seek minimalist aims abroad, chiefly defensive, and would not accept the premises of American leadership, preponderance, and so on in world affairs. And conservative internationalists, who accept the premise of spreading freedom, are not convinced that it is best done by relying on international institutions to legitimate the use of force, especially when international institutions contain so many non-democratic countries.

This issue of who or what legitimates the use of force in international affairs, in fact, is the “big elephant in the room” of this volume as well as the contemporary American foreign policy debate. Do all governments in the world, through the United Nations (UN), have to agree to use force before it is legitimate because excluding other peoples whatever their type of government is anti-democratic? Interestingly in this volume, no one, including the editors, objects to continuing American preponderance. Yet, by some standards, American preponderance which defies appropriate checks and balances (and these can not just be voluntary or self-imposed) is fundamentally anti-democratic. On the other hand, if all governments have to be included on a more or less equal basis, how then do democratic governments who are elected and accountable to their people defend themselves if non-democratic governments object? The western countries faced this dilemma when Russia and China objected to UN action in both Bosnia and Kosovo. Non-democratic countries face no constraints on the use of force domestically. So the only constraint they face is international. Yet if they can evade this constraint simply by vetoing actions in international bodies, then only non-democratic governments would be free of constraints to use force in international affairs.

Do democratic governments then hold the real legitimacy to use force in the international system? If so, do they have to act unanimously, as NATO did in the case of Bosnia and Kosovo? Or is the requirement to act unanimously unreasonable since no democracy requires unanimity at home to decide the legitimate use of force? Does then a simple majority of democratic governments suffice, as was the case in NATO and the wider community of strong democracies at the time of the Iraq invasion in 2003? The reality is that it is tough to get democracies to use force at any time. The United States entered World War I, World War II, the Cold War, and the Korean War very late and may have

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5 A superb presentation of this point of view by a rare academic of this persuasion can be found in Eric A. Nordlinger, *Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

never done so if the United States had not been attacked first (the case of World Wars I, II and the Korean War) or feared attack in western Europe so soon after having liberated the continent from fascism (the case of the Cold War when Soviet forces blockaded Berlin in 1948, and no western troops stood between Berlin and the North Sea to stop the Soviets had they decided to march). This volume suggests that the American people are increasingly less willing to assume world leadership unless other countries contribute their fair share (Dutch treat), presumably including, most of all, putting their sons and daughters in the line of fire. Maybe, as Niall Ferguson concludes, the United States will have to wait until it is attacked again before it can undertake another Afghanistan-type intervention. But even a retaliatory intervention such as Afghanistan generates only lukewarm support in Europe and could easily lose support in the United States if casualties go up.

The complications compound and cry out for more, not less, argument and tough debate. This volume contributes to this goal. Let’s hope that the U.S. public does not get what it supposedly wants, a single approach that the overwhelming majority of the American people support. Partisanship has a bad name today, but the United States will need more not less of it in the future. Continuous debate is the only way, if there is one, to anticipate the “black swan.”
To *Lead the World* is a thoughtful collection of essays about what U.S. national security policy and grand strategy should become in the wake of the Bush doctrine. The editors and contributors are well-known historians, political scientists, economists, and public intellectuals. What they urge in common is that the United States must quickly transcend the bars to successful global leadership put in place by the Bush administration during its eight years in power. With few exceptions, the contributors believe such a mission is not only possible but is the *sine qua non* of world order in the near future.

One way to review a volume like this one is to group the essays thematically and then contrast the various policy recommendations. Yet, given the relative similarity of prescriptions offered by most contributors, differences about the nature of grand strategy do not vary greatly. The editors, Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro, conveniently provide something of an overview in a useful final chapter, so readers might want to start there.

What I propose to do is examine a number of the themes and implications that permeate the book, push a few issues raised in particularly freighted arguments beyond where individual contributors take them, and raise an important question about grand strategy—which *To Lead the World* largely ignores or addresses only implicitly. In the interest of full disclosure, especially on this latter point, I must mention that my book *National Security and Core Values in American History* will appear in mid-2009.1

Almost unanimously, the contributors find the Bush doctrine of preemption and the promotion of democracy a badly flawed strategy for providing lasting security for Americans and an impediment to furthering legitimacy abroad and, as David M. Kennedy contends, at home. What seems most objectionable about George W. Bush’s strategy is not perhaps the willingness to use force, although some contributors differ over whether conventional forces or counterinsurgency tactics best meet the threats that America faces, but rather its unilateral nature. A unilateral defense policy is not at all novel, as Robert Kagan notes; what made it problematic was the overly negative reception to unilateralism in the wake of Bush’s Iraq war. This seems to me a highly situational argument rather than one inherently opposed to unilateralism by a hegemonic power like the United States. Nevertheless, the contributors generally agree that a form of multilateralism would be far more conducive to a successful grand strategy in the future.

That multilateralism, whose purpose would be to ward off perceived threats to vital interests, is commonly rendered herein as a concert strategy. Stephen Van Evera, for instance, anticipates an end to geopolitics as traditionally understood. The same can be generally said for G. John Ikenberry, James Kurth, and Samantha Power. For his part Kagan

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celebrates the return of the “normal” world of geopolitics. To explain away the non-state threat that is radical Islam, Kagan terms it “a kind of religious nationalism” (43). However true, such a characterization is not useful analytically because it posits a centrality to radical Islam that is hard to discern. Its utility, of course, is that it tends to dehumanize Muslims who have historically legitimate grievances against the arbiters of a Western-dominated international system.

The idea of a concert strategy ranges from proposals for something of a formal concert akin to NATO to calls for more salutary American participation within existing global institutions like the United Nations and International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. Whether given a military hue or a political or economic emphasis, the concert idea furthers the contention that the United States must pursue cooperative diplomacy if it is going to lead the world in any effective way. The assumption behind such proposals is that the United States during the Bush presidency often acted as a rogue state, eschewing the rule of law at home and disdaining respect for sovereignty abroad when such actions suited its unilateral purposes. Most contributors therefore point to a concert strategy as their preferred antidote to the Bush doctrine with security from primarily non-state-based threats, the spread of democracy, and the growth of trade as the products of strategic change.

A return to leadership may not come as readily as many contributors desire. While applauding American willingness to shoulder international leadership in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, Charles S. Maier worries about what will happen after Bush leaves the White House and warns: “A global economic crisis would mean that all bets are off” (79). Americans have long clung to the belief that their country can reinvent itself and that, with its sense of mission, it possesses “immunity from history” (62). Both of these are fraught assumptions. Efforts to evade history do persist as the ugly underside of American exceptionalism. Restoring the nation’s political will to lead might actually worsen that situation—a conclusion largely at odds with the aspirations of the contributors to this volume.

Before considering that unhappy conundrum, it is important to ask what Maier’s warning, now a reality, means for the revitalization of American leadership. The United States spends about 4 percent of its Gross Domestic Product on defense; that percentage is unlikely to decrease significantly. Kurth, Kennedy, Van Evera, and Power argue that, sustainable (as Kagan would have it) or not, spending of that magnitude will impede the reordering of foreign policy priorities. Francis Fukuyama forcefully contends that “the Bush doctrine is not affordable over the medium term” (234). In their chapter, Barry Eichengreen and Douglas Irwin do not explicitly address the issue of military spending, though their analysis about systemic weaknesses in the American and global economies lends credence to Fukuyama’s conclusion.

If, as Eichengreen and Irwin believe, these dire conditions will “prevent the next administration from undertaking radical changes to U.S. foreign economic policy” (182), is it fanciful to argue that American legitimacy can be restored? Since a restructuring of America’s relationship with international financial institutions does not seem to be at hand,
the answer partly depends on what leadership entails. Among the various ideas about leadership in *To Lead the World*, David Kennedy's historically based reflections are surely the most important. He asserts that American foreign policy since the Second World War has been designed "to fulfill the Founders' promise of a new world order" (165). What Kennedy suggests, if I read him correctly, is that even the Founders believed the United States must be deeply engaged in world affairs in order to bring a new order to life. John Lewis Gaddis (a favorite in the Bush White House), whose views on the Bush doctrine are largely absent from this volume, would not disagree with Kennedy. In fact, an impulse for what might broadly be seen as regime change (a key aspect of reordering) has permeated American history—in wars with Native Americans and via intervention abroad since the 1890s.

Is such a reflexive resort to state-violence likely to change despite the manifest shortcomings of the Bush doctrine? Probably not, unless we consider the goals of the Founders in a different light. They feared inextricable engagement in world affairs; for them, the United States would best foster a new world order through the strength of its example. Should that endeavor fail, America [had to] rely on its own resources to make its way in the world. The foremost task of the government, therefore, was to protect the American people and the nation's core values as expressed in the Constitution and Bill of Rights. The relative ease of continental expansion and the advent around 1890 of what I call in my book the "security ethos," which officials from the time of William McKinley drew on to involve the country more deeply in world affairs, has not produced, I believe, greater security for the American people. Even Franklin D. Roosevelt's effort to fashion a kind of globalism with a human face, if you will, soon morphed into the grand strategy of global containment. The consequences for America's exceptional historical experience are on display in the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and the FISA courts, as well as in the more recent PATRIOT Act and Military Commissions Act, all of which pose great danger to the nation’s values.

The Truman and successive administrations laid the groundwork for the Bush doctrine by waging a cold war that can be characterized as preemptive. In constructing what they judged to be security through strength, they made Bush-Cheney foreign policy possible, if not inevitable. I reach this conclusion based upon my reading of the recent scholarship on Soviet foreign policy of Geoffrey Roberts and Vladislav Zubok, among others, whose work is not engaged by the contributors in *To Lead the World*.

What is to be done? Is there a grand strategy for the United States that will allow it to lead the world without unalterably damaging its core principles? In their conclusion, Leffler and Legro acknowledge "the need for the United States to show fidelity to its values" (263). It is unfortunate that two of the agencies most involved in the history of grand strategy since 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency which have illegally spied on American citizens, have no place in a book about the contours of grand strategy after 20 January 2009. Nevertheless, two contributors, Francis Fukuyama and Niall Ferguson, consider what it would mean to go against the grain of established strategic thinking. Heretically, Fukuyama asks whether the United States has strategic interests that are actually international in scope. The promotion of democracy, which he supports, tends
to fail in those places where it is needed most if a revamped global grand strategy is to succeed. Why? “[I]t is precisely the modernization process that produces terrorism . . . at least in the short run” (211). In the best tradition of Theodore Roosevelt, Fukuyama retreats from the radical implication of his analysis and calls for a grand strategy that combines “soft talk” with a “big stick” in order to revitalize America’s hegemonic status.

Niall Ferguson, who once called for the United States and its citizens to shoulder the responsibilities of modern empire, comes across as an apostate in To Lead the World. He argues that America’s financial crisis, the lack of manpower, and the absence of the public’s will to lead, in conjunction with the crisis of legitimacy under Bush make the restoration of hegemony problematic. Ferguson contends that “the Bush doctrine was in some ways less radical than its critics claimed” (228). He urges, however, that it be jettisoned in favor of a concert strategy that harks back to Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt. This determination ignores the weight of his own evidence that “the deficits of American power are structural” (237). Again, what is to be done?

If the literal cost of hegemony is enormous in light of the country’s debt-ridden GDP, if there are not sufficient troops to sustain hegemony, if the public is unsure of the worth of a global mission, and if there is no guarantee that a leader with the appeal of Barack Obama can restore American credibility to former heights even should he serve two terms, then it may be time to ask whether the United States would not be better off leading by example. Would the country be less secure if it engaged the world selectively, rejecting the false promise of finding security through a global military presence? Also, economic hegemony may be vanishing as the current crisis seems to indicate. Further, the United States for some time has not met its financial obligations to the United Nations or Bretton Woods institutions and has insisted on exceptions to WTO provisions. Isn’t it time to admit the reality of selective engagement and accordingly devise a grand strategy that reflects these manifest limits to power?

To continue implementing a grand strategy that erodes the nation’s basic values, whether under the guise of global containment, selective globalism, the Bush doctrine, or some novel concert strategy, seems misguided. Acting in this manner would possibly run the risk of destroying the cherished qualities of exceptionalism in a vain, if disarmingly familiar effort to make America secure. I am not advocating a reversion to isolationism. I am instead proposing that the conduct of diplomacy, the occasions on which the United States employs its military power, and how it responds to the demands of globalization be considered from a perspective that puts America first—its ideals, institutions, and people. Therein lies hope for the future health of the republic and perhaps a more productive way of leading the world.
Response by Melvyn P. Leffler, University of Virginia, and Jeffrey W. Legro, University of Virginia

We want to thank the commentators for their thoughtful and constructive remarks on our book. We think they highlight some of the key attributes of the volume and raise key issues for further reflection.

In order for readers of H-Diplo to understand the comments, we want to reiterate here what we stated in the introduction to the book. We tried to bring together some of the nation’s most renowned scholars and public intellectuals from all sides of the political spectrum to focus on what should be done after the Bush administration left office. Although many of the contributors shared a view that recent foreign policy had been either disappointing or a disaster, their task was not to dwell on the past, but to focus on the future. We asked each of them to author a basic national security paper in which they identified key threats, defined overriding goals, assigned priorities to objectives, examined the tradeoffs between “interests” and values, and addressed the challenges of mobilizing domestic support for preferred policies, designing effective tactics, and re-configuring multinational institutions.

Although Mick Cox mentions that the volume has too much of an “insider” ring to it, we wonder whether Samantha Power, Charlie Maier, Jim Kurth, or David Kennedy would consider themselves Washington “insiders,” although some of their views might have more resonance now that Barack Obama is in the White House (and indeed Samantha Power had been an adviser to him for a period of time). Be that as it may, our point here is that we self-consciously chose contributors who we thought would offer divergent answers to the challenging set of questions we posed. We hoped that their views in dialogue with one another would illuminate key challenges for U.S. strategy. They did not disappoint.

As we edited the book, one matter really surprised us. Although some commentators might rightly question whether the United States could lead, an interesting, indeed compelling, conclusion was that the United States should lead. Whether authors’ political sensibilities were on the right or the left, they almost uniformly believed that the United States had to exert some form of leadership role; hence the title of the book. Moreover, and equally surprising given all the criticism of the United States in recent years, we found that there is both domestic and international support for U.S. leadership. In many respects the demand for U.S. leadership has only increased with the onset of the current economic crisis. Mick Cox is right about the damage inflicted on the world by U.S. mismanagement and insouciance over the last few years, and the adverse consequences such actions have had on the attractiveness of the U.S. model, yet nonetheless, money and investment, in relative terms, have headed to the United States.

The agreement on leadership, however, did not mean there was consensus on many critical matters. The contributors disputed the goals and strategies of leadership, and we agree with Henry Nau that such debate is critical to thoughtful assessment and sound decisions. In our conclusion, we highlight the areas of disagreement as well as agreement. And the
discord over threat perception, priorities, capabilities, and institutions illuminates why the actual tasks of policymaking are so daunting. When some of the smartest and most knowledgeable observers disagree on so many fundamental matters and when they lay out their ideas with so much lucidity, one can readily understand why there is confusion and sometimes paralysis in decision-making circles. If anything, we hope readers will take away from the volume a renewed appreciation of the dilemmas faced by officials and a greater tolerance and openness for views other than their own.

It is fair to inquire, as Bill Walker thoughtfully does, whether the United States should lead, and can lead. Indeed, given the formidable constraints and its eroding capabilities, perhaps the United States should lead only selectively (assuming we can agree on what ‘selective’ entails). But if the United States does not lead, who will, and toward what ends? And what will be the consequences of a possible absence of leadership? As one reflects on such matters in the midst of the present financial meltdown, we cannot help but recall the widespread consensus that one of the overriding problems of the years between World War I and World War II was the absence of a benevolent hegemon. Charles Kindleberger pointed this out long ago, and the absence of leadership in those years had profound economic as well as geopolitical repercussions.

Yes, let’s think more deeply about whether the world needs a hegemon, about what constitutes “benevolence,” and how “preponderance” should be exercised. We think the essays in our volume can lead to a healthy debate about these matters and many more such issues, matters that have become more, rather than less, pressing in the months since the book was published.

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