

For many observers, both Canadian and international, Canada’s hardnosed and self-interested stance at last December’s climate change conference in Copenhagen came as an unpleasant surprise. On the margins of the international gathering, outraged environmentalists presented the country with seven “fossil awards” for obstructing progress towards an agreement on global warming, more than any other country. “Until now I believed that the nation that has done the most to sabotage a new climate change agreement was the United States,” wrote the British environmental journalist, George Monbiot. “I was wrong. The real villain is Canada.”

For Canada-watchers, generally a soft-hearted and admiring group, this was a tough and unfamiliar charge. It certainly seemed a long way from the heady days of yesteryear when foreign policy pundits, if they bothered to think of Canada at all, recalled the New York Times headline -- described as its most boring ever -- announcing “Another worthy Canadian initiative.” Surely, Canada was one of the good guys. It had, since the end of the Second World War, joined the right clubs (UN, NATO, & the Commonwealth), fought the right wars (Korea & the Gulf, not Vietnam & Iraq), and maintained the peace (everywhere). Canada was a strong and vocal advocate for foreign aid, liberal trade, and a robust multilateral international order. An idealistic commitment to a better world rather than realist notions of power and self-interest characterized Canadian diplomacy.

And for a long time, that’s just how most Canadians understood Canada’s foreign policy after 1945. It was a view that was profoundly influenced by the efforts of the practionners themselves, who often retired to cozy university perches to craft literate and document-based studies of the very foreign policies they once managed. Not surprisingly, looking back at the eventful decades of the 1940s, the 1950s, and even the 1960s, these scholar-diplomats uncovered a “golden age” of Canadian diplomacy, when national self-interest was leavened with healthy dollops of selfless idealism to produce a generous and far-sighted diplomacy. For John Holmes, a former senior diplomat who eventually taught generations of graduate students at the University of Toronto between 1967 and his death in 1988, postwar Canada was “the young Lochinvar who came out of the North...to put the world right.”

Over the past decade or so, however, a younger group of Canadian historians have begun to challenge this smug and self-satisfied view of postwar Canadian diplomacy. They have slowly expanded their geographic range beyond Europe and the North Atlantic, where Holmes’s generation felt most at home, and engaged their sources in more critical ways.

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The two works reviewed here, Kevin Spooner’s *Canada, the Congo Crisis and United Nations Peacekeeping, 1960-64* and David Webster’s *Fire and the Full Moon: Canada and Indonesia in a Decolonizing World*, are carefully argued and richly documented studies that target Canada’s “golden age” certainties and reveal the complex motivations that underpinned its approach to the postwar world.

In responding to these two works, our reviewers are largely unstinting in their praise. All agree that both books are well-written and clearly argued, and that they marshall research from an impressive variety of archives, presenting competing perspectives from the many different actors involved. Webster’s work is sophisticated in approach and wide-ranging in scope. *Fire and the Full Moon* experiments with “mental maps” to explore the spatial limitations of Canadian policy-makers, and it is especially innovative in examining the role of non-governmental organizations and civil society in shaping both Canadian foreign policy and Canada-Indonesia relations. Spooner’s study is obviously narrower in focus, and employs a more traditional narrative structure that bears heavily on officials and politicians.

This enthusiastic response is hardly offset by the few small problems that the reviewers encounter. One finds Webster’s chapter on the decolonization of East Timor a bit rushed, while another complains that Spooner’s account of actual peacekeeping operations, though firmly within the traditions of military history, is too detailed. These are minor quibbles. Historian Francine McKenzie describes the two monographs as “exemplary works of international history,” a judgement that fairly reflects the views of her three colleagues.

The reviewers too are excited by the new historiographical boundaries that Webster and Spooner have established. Conceptually, they welcome the explicit arrival of decolonization as an important lens through which we can analyze postwar Canadian foreign policy, both on the ground in Africa and Asia, and at the UN and NATO. Indeed, Webster and Spooner are justly credited with being among the first historians to address race as a formative influence on Canadian diplomacy. They are also among the first scholars to push the historical study of Canada’s foreign policy beyond the safe confines of the North Atlantic triangle or the Commonwealth, a development loudly applauded by the three Canadian reviewers, who are delighted to escape these narrow geographical limits. Their American colleague, Daniel Byrne, offers a different perspective, and rightly emphasizes the continued importance of the intersection of Canadian policy in the Congo and Indonesia with U.S. and NATO plans and priorities. And for this reason, these books will interest a broad readership outside of Canadian circles.

More important, as all four reviewers acknowledge, these two studies disagree intensely, but very politely, over Canada’s approach to the world, past and present. As we might expect, both authors probe deeply and critically into the motivations behind Canadian foreign policy in the postwar era. Webster is the tougher critic and cuts compromising policy-makers no slack. Canadian policy, he argues, was defined by its network of cold war alliances and its own narrow economic, political, and ideological interests. Spooner is more judicious. Though he rejects the idea that Canada acted in the Congo as a detached “moral superpower,” he shows how the Canadian national interest, despite many shortcomings
and failures along the way, led Ottawa and its diplomats to embrace roles as an authentic peacemaker and mediator.

This is clearly a debate that animates our reviewers, who have all chosen sides: Byrne and Robin Gendron back Webster’s view on the vital importance of the national interest, while McKenzie and John Meehan embrace Spooner and his more uplifting perspective. Indeed, Meehan wonders if the mythology surrounding the “golden age” does not create its own aspirational identities that shape policy, rendering the boundary between idealism and realism a good deal more porous than either Spooner or Webster admit. Whatever the outcome of this debate, though it may be old and stale for our European and American colleagues, it is undoubtedly refreshing to see Canadian diplomacy considered so critically and in such different terms.

Participants:

**Kevin Spooner** is Associate Professor and Program Coordinator in the North American Studies Program at Wilfrid Laurier University. He holds a PhD in Canadian History from Carleton University. He is author of *Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64* (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, 2009) and “Just West of Neutral: Canadian ‘Objectivity’ and Peacekeeping during the Congo Crisis, 1960-61,” *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 43.2 (2009): 303-336, and co-edited *Documents on Canadian External Relations, 1959*, vol. 26 (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing, 2006). His current research examines Canadian policy towards Africa in the period of decolonization.

**David Webster** has a PhD in History from the University of British Columbia. He held post-doctoral fellowships at the University of Western Ontario, the University of Toronto and the University of San Francisco. Besides *Fire and the Full Moon* (UBC Press, 2009) he was collection editor of *East Timor Testimony* (Between the Lines, 2004). He has published on the foreign policy of the Kennedy administration in *Diplomatic History*, on Southeast Asian history in *Pacific Affairs* and other journals, and on Canadian foreign relations on *activehistory.ca* and elsewhere. He is currently assistant professor of International Studies at the University of Regina where he is working on a study of Canadian postwar development advisors to be titled *Modern Missionaries*.

**Daniel Byrne** is an assistant professor of history at the University of Evansville where he teaches courses on the history of the United States, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. He earned his PhD from Georgetown University and focused his research on the American response to the decolonization of French North Africa centered on the Algerian War of Independence. He is currently working on expanding the scope of his research to include the decolonization of French and British West Africa.

**Greg Donaghy** is Head of the Historical Section, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. He is the General Editor of its series, *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, and author of *Tolerant Allies: Canada and the United States, 1963-1968*. Most recently, he edited (with Kim Richard Nossal), *Architects and Innovators: Building Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1909-2009* (Kingston &
Montreal: McGill-Queen’s UP, 2009). The views expressed here are his alone and do not reflect the views of his Department or the Government of Canada.

Robin Gendron received his PhD in 2001 from the University of Calgary. He is an Assistant Professor in the Department of History at Nipissing University in Ontario and his research focuses on Canada’s relations with developing countries in Africa and Asia, Canada’s relations with French-speaking countries, and the international history of Canadian mining companies. He is the author of Towards a Francophone Community: Canada’s relations with France and French Africa, 1945-1968 (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006) as well as articles in The Journal of the Canadian Historical Association, the International Journal, Historical Studies, and Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains. He is currently working on a study of the International Nickel Company of Canada and its operations in Guatemala, Indonesia, and New Caledonia as a manifestation of Canadian interests in the developing world from the 1960s to the 1980s as well as a co-edited collection of articles on the aluminium/bauxite industry entitled Bauxite, State, and Society in the 20th Century

Francine McKenzie is an associate professor in the department of history at the University of Western Ontario. She received her PhD in Commonwealth history from Cambridge. She is the author of Redefining the Bonds of Commonwealth 1939-1948: The Politics of Preference (Palgrave 2002) and co-editor with Margaret MacMillan of Parties Long Estranged: Canada and Australia in the Twentieth Century (University of British Columbia Press, 2003). She is currently writing a history of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 1947-1994. Her approach is twofold. First, she is examining how the major faultlines of global geopolitics, including the Cold War and the North-South divide, affected the GATT’s institutional development. Second, she is studying the economic expression of global geopolitics through such issues as trade in agriculture and protectionist sentiment and policies. The result is a portrayal of GATT as a contested political space and a microcosm of global geopolitics.

John Meehan is a Visiting Fellow at Regis College, University of Toronto, and currently is on sabbatical at the Vatican Archives, Rome. His doctoral thesis was published as The Dominion of Canada and the Rising Sun: Canada Encounters Japan 1929-1941 (2004). Currently he is finishing a study of Sino-Canadian relations and engaged in a project on Vatican relations with China.
Students of United States foreign policy rarely consider the foreign policy of Canada and its impact on areas outside of NATO or bilateral relations. This is especially true in the consideration of developments in Africa and Asia. Two young Canadian scholars of Canadian foreign policy point out the folly of this oversight. Their engaging narratives highlight points of intersection and divergence in the two allies’ policies while telling the distinctly Canadian story of Canada’s role in Indonesia and Congo. Both scholars explain the importance of both Commonwealth and alliance politics to Canadian policymakers, but show that Canada consistently attempted to maintain an independent policy shaped by Canada’s own national interests and the Canadian conception of its own distinct role in the decolonizing world. Canada’s unique history also shaped Canadian support for evolutionary decolonization and the use of federations as a vehicle for delivering orderly transitions to independence.

As a North American nation without imperial or superpower status, Canada found itself positioned to win the support of Africans and Asians, which opened opportunities for Canada to play a role in the shaping of decolonization and its aftermath. Additionally, Canada had other attributes such as a history of bilingualism and outstanding educational institutions combined with the ability to offer limited amounts of economic aid and military force that allowed it to directly influence developments in Congo and Indonesia. Despite these distinct attributes, Canadians also shared negative racial attitudes towards Africans and Asians that often shaped the mindsets of their NATO allies in Europe and the United States. These attitudes combined with deep concerns about maintaining Commonwealth or NATO unity to shape the Canadian vision of its own interests in Congo and Indonesia. By engaging all of these questions as well as an impressive array of multi-national archives, Kevin Spooner and David Webster present two uniquely Canadian narratives that are quite understandable to American scholars and will require those scholars to begin incorporating the Canadian influence on international history into their own scholarly work.

In his focused study of Canada’s participation in the international peacekeeping effort during the Congo Crisis, Kevin Spooner provides both a highly detailed history of the Canadian peacekeepers and a more general analysis of Canadian foreign policy during the Diefenbaker government. Spooner places the mission within the broader history of Canadian participation in United Nations peacekeeping efforts and the specific challenges of supporting the United Nations mission during a crisis that engaged African and Asian nationalism, NATO allies, and Cold War rivalries. Despite the difficulties of navigating these intersecting interests, Spooner argues that “Canada’s Congo policy differed little from foreign policy generally: it was motivated by self-interest.” (Spooner, 8) As his narrative develops, he consistently highlights the ways that Canada maintained its independent course and interests while attempting to support the overarching mission. For Canadians, the importance of supporting the United Nations and its peacekeeping missions stemmed
from a strong desire for an arena where middle powers like Canada could influence developments and, perhaps, keep the Cold War at bay.

While Kevin Spooner takes on a very specific moment of international crisis, David Webster pursues a broader review of Canada’s relations with Indonesia, which incorporates the entire postwar period. This allows Webster to address several decolonization questions surrounding Indonesia: Indonesia’s independence struggle against the Dutch (1945-1949); the West New Guinea dispute (1957-1963); the crisis over north Borneo (1963-1966); and the long simmering battle over East Timor (1975-1999). Webster traces Canadian policies across the various periods and notes the varied approaches to decolonization taken by the Canadian governments. Like Spooner, Webster notes that “policy toward Indonesia was always a function of overall Canadian foreign policy and so was mediated through the prism of alliance politics.” (Webster, 192) As a result, Webster argues that “beneath the rhetoric of ‘partnership’ with developing countries and ‘bridges’ to Asia and Africa, there was not much substance to Canadian relations with the global South.” (Webster, 192)

Although a great distance apart in scope and geographic location, Spooner and Webster tackle a number of similar questions, which provide historians of international relations and foreign policy excellent opportunities to compare and contrast the Canadian approaches to decolonization. Both books seek to alter, or perhaps even debunk, a myth of an altruistic activist Canada using the United Nations and peacekeeping for the sake of peace alone. Spooner and Webster show that any altruistic motives were subsumed by alliance politics and Canadian national interests.

One of the many unifying themes in both books centers on Canadian support for an evolutionary approach to decolonization. David Webster argues early that “orderly evolution toward independence remained the dominant Canadian thinking about decolonization.” (Webster, 21) Referencing Canada’s own evolution to independence over an extended period of time, Canadians hoped that Indonesians and Congolese would be equally patient. While Spooner concurs that the Diefenbaker government inherited such ideas about orderly transition, he believes that Canadian policymakers remained divided about the role of the United Nations and whether to fix dates for these orderly decolonization processes. Most Canadians accepted racialized views that Congolese and Indonesians might not be ready for self-government and feared potential political crisis as a result. (Spooner, 18-19) Canadians shared these views with their American and European counterparts and the stated concerns about whether Indonesians or Congolese had “sufficiently developed a responsible political consciousness” became self-fulfilling prophecies. (Spooner, 18-19) In both cases, these consistent evolutionary desires emerged to cast doubt on the revolutionary nature of leaders such as Sukarno and Patrice Lumumba and their susceptibility to communism.

As a result of this commitment to a slow process of decolonization, Canadian policymakers generally favored the United Nations as a vehicle. Early Canadian support for the trusteeship system stemmed from the hope that the orderly process could be achieved with minimal disruption of relations between the imperial powers and the United States, which
was perceived as more anti-colonial in its attitudes. According to Webster, “the primary Canadian interest in decolonization was to prevent American-British conflicts.” (Webster, 14) Thus, Canada often found itself positioned between the United States and its European allies. In the case of Indonesia, Webster points out that the U.S. sought to position itself “somewhere between the Netherlands and Indonesian nationalists; [while] Ottawa...settled on a “middle course” between the Dutch and American positions.” (Webster, 34) Over ten years later, Spooner finds Canadians once again trying to navigate the use of the United Nations to foster an orderly and peaceful transition of power. In his narrative, the middle course changes twice as the Canadians try to navigate between Belgium and a UN supported by the United States and, after the coup against Lumumba, between the UN and the United States who had thrown its lot in with Colonel Joseph Mobutu. As Charles Ritchie, permanent Canadian representative to the United Nations, stated in December 1960, it would be very difficult to follow “the straight NATO line.” (Spooner, 120) Efforts to mitigate European and American demands with those of nationalist leaders often left Canadian governments in a precarious situation, but allowed them to suggest to the Afro-Asians that they had been impartial. Between 1957 and 1963, Canadians found themselves equally confused during the struggle over West New Guinea. David Webster argues that John Diefenbaker sought the middle course between both the Dutch and the Indonesians as well as between the United States and the Dutch. During debates over the self-determination for the Papuans, Canadians hoped for a period of UN tutelage and to avoid the “negative example of the Congo.” (Webster, 120) Ultimately, the Canadians settled for an aborted decolonization process that calmed tensions between the various nations, but left “the Papuans, [to] simply exchanged one form of outside rule for another.” (Webster, 128) In both cases, the Canadians hoped to use the UN as a vehicle for minimal disruption, but found themselves caught in tumultuous debates which often left both allies and nationalists suspicious and aggrieved.

In addition to seeing the UN as an avenue fostering evolutionary decolonization, Canada hoped that the organization would provide a means of keeping the Cold War out of the decolonization question. While not always successful, the Canadians believed that the UN could provide a neutral venue for solving these crises and turned to the United Nations to deal with almost all of the issues considered by Spooner and Webster. In the case of Indonesian decolonization, Canada used its position on the United Nations Security Council in 1949 to organize and pass a resolution that salvaged the negotiations between the Dutch and Sukarno and strengthened the UN as an organization. This resolution also allowed Canada to prevent the derailing of the North Atlantic treaty talks and helped to foster a federalist approach to the creation of the United States of Indonesia. As a result, “the Canadian government saw itself as the midwife of Indonesian independence.” (Webster, 42) Canadians took on a “myth” about their participation, which “invented a role as conciliators and self-professed friends to decolonizing states. They had sought the middle path between allies, but imagined themselves seeking the middle path between parties to a dispute, a path that fed Canadian self-perceptions of a role as “bridge” to Asia.” (Webster, 43) These themes would continually emerge in later efforts to deal with Indonesia and Congo.
Indeed, Kevin Spooner argues that Canada’s willingness to participate in the Operations des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) stemmed from a fear that “failure in the Congo might mean the final failure of the United Nations.” (Spooner, 60) As Cold War tensions elevated, Congolese leaders fell upon one another in quick succession and left the UNOC faced with rival parties throughout Congo. Rajeshwar Dayal, head of ONUC, quickly responded and refused “to let the UN act as midwife at the birth of a military dictatorship.” (Spooner, 95) Spooner asserts that Dayal’s decisions to support the elected government of Kasavubu and to protect Lumumba from arrest countered U.S. efforts to support a Mobutu regime and led to a divergence in opinions between U.S. and UN officials which Diefenbaker’s government would have to navigate. Almost immediately, Spooner notes that Diefenbaker outlined a policy of support for Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold and ONUC, but sought to limit public statements and to focus instead on quiet diplomacy. However, Spooner believes that “these instructions demonstrate an inconsistency or contradiction in the Canadian position. On the one hand, Canada was clearly a member of NATO and a developed nation; yet the government perceived a role for Canada as a bridge between East and West, North and South. Through quiet diplomacy, it seems, Canada hoped to rise above its geopolitical position to facilitate communication between blocs of nations.” (Spooner, 99) Clearly, Spooner has elucidated a conundrum that many historians of American foreign policy have noted in United States efforts in the immediate postwar decolonization process. Inconsistencies in United States policies led to an astonishing array of responses to decolonization in Asia and Africa. It is therefore not surprising that Diefenbaker and his advisers also had a difficult time both walking the middle of the road and creating the bridges across the many chasms created by the decolonization process in Congo.

Within this broader Canadian effort to support the United Nations as a vehicle for evolutionary decolonization, Canadian policymakers looked to their own history as a federation. Canada sought to avoid any movements towards separatism or dissolution of federations. Leaders such as John Diefenbaker remained committed to a “one Canada” ideal which was threatened by the possible failures of federations in Asia and Africa and the support of European nations of separatism. (Spooner, 39) During his 1956 visit to Canada, Canadian officials attempted to convince Sukarno of the “merits of federalism.” (Webster, 61) Strikingly, after returning from Canada and the United States, Webster argues that Sukarno’s visit “did nothing to convince him of the merits of parliamentary democracy, still less federalism.” (Webster, 65) This result disillusioned Canadian policymakers and led them slowly to withdraw their support for the Sukarno government. Although unsuccessful in convincing Sukarno of the need to support federalism, Canadians refused to surrender their advocacy of it.

During the Congo Crisis, Kevin Spooner clearly shows that this concept and the deep-seeded fears of separatism played a central role in Canada’s response to developments. From the outset, Canada rejected the right of Katanga to separate from Congo and sought to preserve the unity of Congo. Debates emerged of how to effectively advocate this position and whether to accept the use of force to achieve this goal. As noted earlier, Canadian officials struggled to navigate among its allies’ positions, but also wanted to insure the success of the UN mission. After the assassination of Lumumba in January 1961, Canadian officials feared that “ONUC is adrift.” (Spooner, 135) As a result, Diefenbaker’s government
began to seek to strengthen the UN position and supported the passage of UNSC Resolution 161 (1961). This authorized the use of forces to prevent civil war as a last resort. Canadian officials argued “if the United Nations presence in Katanga can be reinforced and if the external props removed, his [Tshombe’s] position will be less tenable and he will be better disposed to reach accommodation with the other political leaders in the Congo.” (Spooner, 139) Although this resolution upset European allies like the UK, Belgium, and France, Canada continued to support ONUC and UN efforts to eliminate the separatist threat. Although seeking a peaceful solution, “Canadian authorities were not critical of the UN in its first round of hostilities with Katanga (in August and September 1961), but they were certainly uncomfortable with the direction of events.” (Spooner, 167) Despite this comfort, Canada continued to support U Thant’s plans for national reconciliation for Congo and willingly challenged its European allies. (Spooner, 191) By December 1962, Canadian officials had come to the belief that “the point had nearly arrived when the UN would have no alternative but to end Katangan secession by force.” (Spooner, 196)

Support for federalism again emerges as an important theme in Canada’s response to the North Borneo question with Indonesia. When Sukarno began to challenge the legitimacy of the Malaysian federation, it “evoked considerable sympathy in Canadian policymaking circles.” (Webster, 131) As the federation emerged in 1963 and linked newly independent states in territory Sukarno felt should be part of Indonesia, Sukarno began to foster dissent in the region and issued direct challenges to the federation and the Commonwealth nations that supported it. Webster notes that the British pursued a much stronger pro-Malaysian position which challenged US efforts to mollify Indonesia. The British feared that Malaysia would be “Rhodesia all over again.” (Webster, 136) Canadians eventually fell in line with this argument and stopped aid shipments to Indonesia while increasing aid to Malaysia. The Malaysian federation and Canada shared similar evolutions to independence and Canadian officials even likened Indonesians encroachment to “nineteenth-century Fenian Raids by Irish Americans on British North America.” (Webster, 142) Equally, Sukarno’s decision to withdraw from the UN in January 1965 greatly disturbed the Canadians. By “assailing an institution that was central to Canadian foreign policy,” Sukarno weakened any Canadian support for his position. (Webster, 146) “Only with the removal of Sukarno from power [in late 1965] would the Government of Canada smile on Indonesia.” (Webster, 155)

In addition to the ways in which Canada viewed federations, the role of the United Nations, and the process of evolutionary decolonization, both Spooner and Webster examine the limited, but important role played in providing peacekeepers, economic and military aid, technical assistance, and education to Congo and Indonesia, both bilaterally and through the United Nations. Spooner describes the vital importance that the Canadian 57th Signal Squadron played in providing the communications systems for ONUC. It is clear that without the key communications equipment and technical support provided by the Canadians, the UN mission would have faced even greater difficulties from the outset. David Webster notes the importance of Canadian peacekeepers in UNTEA to the final resolution of the West New Guinea question because they were acceptable to both the Dutch and the Indonesians. (Webster, 127) Canada also supplied 600 peacekeepers for UNTAET which oversaw “the completion of a self-determination process.” (Webster, 183)
In addition to direct intervention of Canadian troops, Canada supplied modest amount of aid to Congo for the relief of famine. Canadian aid to Indonesia was more sustained and significant beginning with Indonesia participation in the Colombo plan through the turbulent Sukarno years and long rule of Suharto. On matters of technical assistance, Canada focused its aid to Congo through the UN and actively sought to avoid bilateral agreements requiring commitment of Canadian personnel. With Indonesia, Canadian civilians played a small, but significant role in the first decade of Indonesian independence by assisting with modernization efforts. More significant was the impact felt in the educational opportunities granted to several dozen Indonesian students for study at McGill University in both the economics department and the Institute for Islamic Studies. These students returned to Indonesia in the late fifties and participated in economic planning and the moderating of Islamic political parties under the Suharto government. This “McGill mafia” rekindled their relationship with Canada and McGill in the 1970s helping to underpin “the New Order” of Suharto. (Webster, 160)

In addition to many other lines of connection in their fine monographs, both Spooner and Webster note an inherent racism that existed among Canadians towards Asians and Africans, which subtly, and not so subtly, shaped Canadian responses to various crises. This racism also involved itself with the shaping of public opinion which both authors believe played a continual role in foreign policy. Ideas about evolutionary decolonization filtered their way into public discourse about Canada’s various missions and policies. Public support for the Congo mission emerged despite concerns by some Canadian officials that “savagery is still very near the surface in most of the natives.” (Spooner, 20) Canadians saw the need to engage in uplift while remaining skeptical of the ability to reform native behaviors. When the question of independence for West New Guinea emerged, Canadian Ambassador J.P. Sigvaldson wrote “if the Dutch are tired of trying to tempt the Papuans down from the tree-tops, I do not see that it matters too greatly, even to the Papuans, whether the job is assumed by the United Nations or by Indonesia.” (Webster, 119) These expressions of racialized doubt help to underline some of the reasons for vacillation in Canadian policy and public opinion. While Spooner argues that public opinion played less of a role in policy towards decolonization of Congo, Webster shows that its role in Canada’s Indonesia policy only truly manifested itself in the human rights movements and protest over East Timorese persecution in the most recent decades. What both scholars do point out, however, is that, regardless of the direct impact of Canadian public opinion on actual policy, participation in United Nations missions and engaging the third world perpetuated “an invented tradition” or myth of Canadian altruism. Both Spooner and Webster successfully complicate this myth or tradition and show that despite this image of Canadian altruism, which has been accepted by the Canadian public, the realities of policy developed from national interests and alliance politics.

For historians of American foreign policy, these two studies will seem quite familiar even if they are unfamiliar with the history of Canada. Like their neighbor to the North, the United States faced similar vacillations in its decolonization policies and in its specific policies toward Congo and Indonesia. These works advise historians of American foreign policy of the need to consider a host of national histories, bilateral relations, and interconnected diplomacy when tackling questions of decolonization or international history more
generally. Both narratives should be engaged by historians for their individual strengths as well as for their contributions to the broader history of decolonization in the postwar era. Spooner and Webster force historians of the end of empire to note the role of non-imperial “middle powers” and their influence on relations between nationalists and metropoles, NATO allies, the non-aligned movement, and Cold War rivals.
What are Canadian interests in the structures of global governance and what is the nature of Canada’s relations with the emerging and developing states that are assuming such a prominent place in the leadership of the international community? These are important questions for Canada, faced as it is with the need to find its way in a world in which the United States and, to a lesser extent Western countries in general wield relatively less influence over global affairs. Though they reach different conclusions, Kevin Spooner and David Webster offer valuable insights into these subjects in the pivotal first decades after the Second World War. Their books are part of a growing body of literature on Canadian interests in and relations with newly independent countries in Africa and Asia from the 1940s to the 1960s, focusing on the way that the Canadian government responded to decolonisation and the challenges it posed to the relatively stable, and familiar, global order established in the immediate postwar years.

Webster’s book on Canada’s relations with Indonesia is the more wide-ranging of the two, examining its subject from 1945 to the late 1990s, though the bulk of the book is concerned with the period from Indonesia’s independence to the establishment of the Suharto government in the late 1960s. Canada and Indonesia did not enjoy either intimate or particularly good relations in these earlier years. This is not surprising considering that Canada had few direct interests in Indonesia at the time, despite the latter’s size, regional importance, and potential wealth. Yet according to Webster, the root of the problem went deeper than that, to the difficulties that Canadians and the Canadian government had in identifying, and identifying with, Indonesian interests formed during the violent campaign for independence from Dutch rule and the subsequent struggle to preserve that independence and consolidate central authority over all Indonesian territory. Simply put, Indonesia did not figure prominently on Canadians’s mental map, a map heavily oriented towards Canada’s traditional interests in the strength of its relations with the United States as well as Britain and the Commonwealth, and towards the preservation of Western interests as the Cold War expanded to Asia in the 1950s and 1960s.

To the Canadian government, Indonesia’s best course would have been to follow Canada’s own example and achieve its independence through a peaceful evolutionary process while maintaining close ties to the Netherlands and to the West as a whole. Moreover, Canada’s example also showed that rapid economic development and a high standard of living could be achieved with the help of foreign investment, technology, and technical assistance and by adopting, essentially, Western-capitalist models of economic development at the expense of traditional models. What influence Canada wielded was thus used to promote compromise political solutions between the Dutch government and Indonesian nationalists during the conflicts of the late 1940s, to ensure that issues like the West New Guinea dispute did not irredeemably divide the Netherlands and the United States and impair NATO unity, and to promote Indonesia’s integration into a Western-oriented political and economic sphere. These Canadians interests, however, frequently clashed with the experience and expectations of most even moderate Indonesian nationalists, for whom national independence had to be won through the fires of revolution, who wanted to
insulate Indonesia from neo-colonial influences, and who believed that Indonesia’s economic development needed to be integrated into and reflective of its traditional societies. As a result, the Canadian and Indonesian governments generally looked past each other, with Canada in particular displaying more sympathy and support for Indonesia’s neighbour and rival Malaysia, a country that had more closely followed the Canadian ideal of decolonisation and development within the Commonwealth context. Canadian-Indonesian relations only began to improve when the Suharto government seized power in the late 1960s and re-oriented Indonesia towards the West both internationally and domestically.

Kevin Spooner’s book is much more focused, examining Canada’s involvement in the United Nations peacekeeping operation in the Congo from 1960 to 1964. Here too, however, the Canadian government confronted the problem of how to respond to a situation caused by decolonisation in the context of the Cold War and Canada’s interests in supranational organisations like the United Nations and NATO. For Spooner, though, the Canadian government approached these issues in a nuanced and balanced way, striving to preserve the authority of the United Nations as well as the integrity of NATO and Western interests while demonstrating respect for the Afro-Asian countries and their anti-colonial attitudes and surprising tolerance for the establishment of a non-Western oriented government in the Congo. He depicts the Canadian government as wholly supportive of the United Nations – its initial reluctance to contribute to the peacekeeping force explained by the confusion over whether Dag Hammarskjold wanted Canadian combat forces or, as it turned out, communications and support personnel – and willing at key junctures such as the crisis over Katanga’s secession to oppose the policies of Canada’s NATO allies including Belgium and even the United States. Though deeply committed to the Western cause and deeply suspicious of the Soviet Union and the expansion of its interests in Africa during this period of the Cold War, the Canadian government nonetheless did not let Cold War hostilities blind it to the weaknesses of Belgian or British neo-colonial ambitions nor to the possibility of working with an individual like Patrice Lumumba, whose political leanings were decidedly anti-Western. All told, Canadian policy towards the peacekeeping operation in Congo in the early 1960s demonstrated a high degree of pragmatism and objectivity, the pursuit of Canadian interests even in the face of competing pressures from within NATO, and most importantly overarching support for the United Nations as the key pillar of Canada’s multilateralist foreign policy.

These books are well written, extensively researched, and convincingly argued. There is much to admire in them both, from the way that Webster integrates non-governmental organisations into his examination of Canadian-Indonesian relations to the sensitivity that Spooner displays when considering the nature of Canadian public opinion and the effect it had on the Canadian government’s contribution to peacekeeping in the Congo. At the same time, one wonders whether Webster would have been wiser to leave out the last chapter surveying over 30 years of Canadian relations with Indonesia and policy towards East Timor after 1967, especially since he did not include in it much discussion of Canadian mining interests in the country even though, as he admits, Inco and Freeport almost formed states within the Indonesian state. This last chapter deserved a full study of its own. Spooner, for his part, neglected to consider whether concerns about protecting the
territorial integrity of a federal state significantly affected the Canadian government’s policy towards Katanga’s secession, in the way that it would later affect Canadian policy towards Biafra and Nigeria under Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. The separatist movement had not yet gained its full voice in Quebec in the early 1960s but even then Canadian officials were nervous about supporting the right of a province to secede from a federal state. This dynamic alone may help explain Canadian reticence to encourage Belgian and American ambitions in Katanga. Nonetheless, whatever small limitations these books contain in content or approach, they are greatly outweighed by the merits of the books.

And yet they present their readers and scholars of Canadian foreign relations with a bit of a problem. Together, they offer competing, even conflicting images of Canada and its foreign relations, its response to decolonisation, and its relations with developing countries in Africa and Asia in the postwar era. Kevin Spooner clearly rejects the idea of Canada as a ‘moral superpower’ yet in his analysis Canadian foreign policy is still conditioned primarily by support for the United Nations and the institution of peacekeeping; Canada is unquestionably a member of NATO and the Western bloc of nations but that does not prevent its government from pursuing an objective foreign policy or from criticising, even opposing its allies; and Canada is more tolerant than the United States, for example, of governments of different ideological stripes than its own and is perhaps the best friend that newly independent African and Asian countries have in the West. This Canada, the multilateralist peacekeeper and bridge builder, bears a striking resemblance to the image of the country that dominates Canadian public opinion, or did at least until fairly recently. This is not a criticism, and Spooner certainly makes a persuasive argument based on a sound assessment of the evidence of Canada’s involvement in peacekeeping in the Congo.

David Webster’s analysis of Canadian foreign policy, however, offers a striking contrast. In it, the Canadian government is sympathetic to the aspirations of anti-colonial and newly independent states in Africa and Asia after the Second World War but is fundamentally incapable of appreciating those aspirations unless they corresponded to Canadian and Western ideals. The determinants of Canadian foreign relations lay in Canada’s relationships with the United States, Britain, and the Commonwealth, and NATO as well as the political, economic, ideological, and other dimensions of the Cold War struggle with the Communist East, while countries like Indonesia are barely located on Canadians’ ‘mental map.’ If Canada is a peacekeeper or a bridge builder, it is mostly within the context of preserving relations between its allies or advancing their interests.

So which Canada is the ‘real’ one? While these books demonstrate that there are elements of both in effect throughout the history of Canada’s postwar foreign relations, on balance one has to conclude that as much as the Canadian government proclaimed itself an ardent supporter of the United Nations or an objective friend to the developing world, the occasions when these concepts actually influenced Canadian foreign relations were relatively few and far between. More typically, the Canadian government pursued policies tied concretely to its interests vested in its place among the developed Western nations, the strength of its relations with its closest partners and allies, and its own ideological convictions. As Spooner indicates, there are some exceptions including as well the
Diefenbaker government’s opposition to apartheid in South Africa or Canada’s continued relations with Cuba after 1959. Yet the motivation behind the Canadian response to the Suez Crisis is more typical. That response – which has since become iconic of the country’s commitment to peacekeeping, opposition to colonialism, and friendship for the developing world – owed more to Canada’s interest in extricating its allies Britain and France from a quagmire of their own making and preserving their relations with the United States, and thus harmony within NATO, than it did to the concept of collective security through the UN or the desire to protect Egypt’s sovereignty or the amity of the Afro-Asian countries.

On balance, the Canadian government did not respond particularly objectively to decolonisation and the emergence of new powers in Asia and Africa in the decades after the Second World War. These developments posed too many challenges to the global order and the West’s place in it for Canada’s comfort.
G
goography has long made Canadian-American relations a subject of historical
fascination and importance, although more so to Canadian than American historians.
Some of the terrain of Canadian-American relations has been well trodden, for
instance the Canadian preoccupation with sovereignty and the implications for identity.
There is also a polemical strand in the historiography in which the relationship is lamented
or celebrated, denounced or accepted. The subject has been usefully examined through a
number of lenses including the economy, environment, culture, society, politics, natural
resources, and diplomacy. But, preoccupied by the U.S., Canada’s international historians
have often neglected the rest of the world. Not only has there been little scholarly interest
in places other than the United States or issues that do not have an American dimension,
but even when attention has turned to China, Britain, or the Soviet Union, for example, the
historical analysis of Canadian policy has generally been situated in a Canadian-American
context. Even when the United States was not the subject under study, it is typically still
front and centre.

More recently, historians of Canadian foreign relations have begun to study relations with
the ‘margins’: this is the case with the two works under review here. David Webster
openly acknowledges that Indonesia was ‘an afterthought in postwar Canadian foreign
policy’ (4) and Kevin Spooner shows that not only was the Congo not a priority, neither was
Africa as a whole: on the eve of the Congo crisis of 1960, Canada’s Department of External
Affairs had assigned three desk officers to the entire continent. Webster and Spooner agree
that Canada was a largely unknown entity in Indonesia and the Congo. These are,
therefore, studies of relations between mutually-marginal nations. One could be cynical
and question the value of such case studies. There is, however, nothing marginal about
these impressive studies and they will not be relegated to the periphery of Canada’s
international history.

The parallels between the two works are striking. Their studies are situated at the nexus of
the Cold War and decolonization and in both analyses Cold War concerns are present,
particularly in the case of Indonesia, but they do not dominate the thinking of the makers of
Canadian foreign policy. Instead, the authors have more to say about Canadian attitudes
towards and involvement in decolonization and development. Both put alliance
considerations at the heart of their explanations. Webster identifies three main alliances
through which Canada’s approach to the independence of Indonesia, as well as its
subsequent development as a state, took shape: the United Nations (UN), NATO, and the
Commonwealth. Spooner attaches more importance to the UN – indeed, one of his central
arguments is that it was out of its regard for the UN that Canada decided to participate in
ONUC (Opération des Nations Unies au Congo) – but he also considers the impact of NATO
and the Commonwealth on Canada’s involvement in the Congo crisis.

Despite the emphasis on alliances and allies, the United States is not at the centre of either
study. Webster and Spooner explain American involvement where relevant to the
respective historical narratives and they understand the impact of American policies, but
both position the United States in the background. Instead they concentrate on Canada’s relations with the Netherlands, Australia, Belgium, Sweden and Ireland, states that were directly involved in, and in some cases obstructed, decolonization and nation-building in the Congo and Indonesia. Spooner and Webster also write from multiple perspectives: the views from Jakarta, Leopoldville, and Washington are given as much room as the perspective from Ottawa. These are exemplary works of international history. They also reach similar conclusions about the way that pragmatism and national interest, rather than idealism, defined Canadian attitudes, policies and engagement, in so doing challenging the view that Canadian involvement in world affairs has been guided by moralism and impartiality. The dichotomy between idealism and interest is not new: Spooner and Webster are adding their considered opinions to an on-going debate.

Despite similar methodological approaches, shared conceptions of global geo-politics, and common insights, they disagree on some fundamental points. Webster offers a quietly scathing critique of the general characterization of Canada as a world actor: helpful fixer, bridge builder, honest broker, humanitarian aid donor, mediator and peacemaker. He argues that these are largely feel-good myths that mask the primacy of alliance considerations and self-interest that shaped policy towards Indonesia. He is deeply critical of the failure of the Canadian governments to address issues such as human rights on their own terms, instead making policy a hostage to alliance welfare, all the while taking credit for significant developments in Indonesia. Spooner’s conclusions also emphasize the importance of alliances and self-interest but he is positive where Webster is critical. Nor does Spooner repudiate the conventional roles. Instead, he reconciles them with a policy grounded in self-interest and being played out in a complex and volatile crisis. His analysis makes clear that being a mediator, peacemaker, and loyal ally was not easily achieved or maintained, especially when the UN asked Canadian peacekeepers to spy, Canada’s allies importuned it to leak confidential information, and Congolese soldiers brutally assaulted Canadian peacekeepers. Nor was it a role that the government of John Diefenbaker (which was in power for most of the crisis) rushed to fill. He paints a picture of Canada as a wary peacekeeper, aware of the many pitfalls and dangers that went along with participation in ONUC. I agree with Webster that the sterling self-image of Canada in world affairs does not explain government policy towards Indonesian independence, or any other issue, but the divide between idealism and pragmatism that he depicts is too stark: Canadian motivations, like those of governments elsewhere, were multilayered and overlapping. But while some motivations and goals might be hard to reconcile, indeed contradictory, the portrayal of a complex, even messy, foreign policy – which Spooner reveals vis-à-vis the Congo – is more compelling than Webster’s dismissal of foreign policy as hypocritical.

But if the judgments that Spooner makes are more convincing, Webster’s book is more theoretically sophisticated and ambitious in its reach. He uses the idea of mental maps to explain how policymakers made sense of the world beyond their borders. If the mental map circa 1950 had actually been drawn, the North Atlantic region would occupy much space and include fine-grain details whereas Asia would be eerily distant and unknown. Dichotomies of unease and familiarity, fear and comfort characterize the mental maps of Canada’s policymakers and explain some of their views of Indonesia, its people, culture and government. But mental maps were not monolithic or static. When Pierre Trudeau
became prime minister in the late 1960s, his mental map 'had more room for Asia', although this did not significantly change the substance of Canadian policy towards Indonesia. (157) Webster also looks at the important role that non-state actors - such as the McGill Institute for Islamic Studies - played in developing connections with people who would eventually constitute an Indonesian elite. Webster’s conception of Canadian-Indonesian relations is inclusive and multidimensional, in particular emphasizing the importance of cultural connections between the two countries.

Spooner’s work is more traditional in conception – it is a chronological narrative that focuses on Canadian bureaucrats, diplomats, and politicians and the decisions that they made. His book is nonetheless a riveting account of the twists and turns of ONUC and the precarious position of Canadian peacekeepers in the Congo. Unlike Webster who addresses major themes in global international history, Spooner engages in specifically Canadian debates. For example, he addresses the enduring view of Prime Minister John Diefenbaker as a bumbler in foreign affairs. His study treats Diefenbaker in an even-handed way and his analysis, alongside the work of Basil Robinson in Diefenbaker’s World, seeks to explain rather than lampoon him. Spooner shows him to be cautious but decisive, thoughtful and acting largely independent of public opinion. Nonetheless, it is not evident that the credit Diefenbaker deserves for Canadian policy in the Congo crisis can be generalized, in particular to his handling of Canadian-American relations which were overly personalized and marked by knee-jerk nationalism. Spooner’s study is more pioneering in the way it begins to open up race as a factor in Canada’s international history; this is a factor that has largely gone unnoticed. Officials in the Department of National Defence were uneasy about quartering Canadian peacekeepers with “coloured soldiers”. (73) The Canadian public used racist and pejorative language and images when referring to the Congolese. He also explains that Canadian diplomats understood the realities of racial politics at the United Nations and adapted their diplomatic style accordingly. Their success was evident in numerous praiseful descriptions of Canada that stressed that it was not a colonial power. Webster’s account suggests that race politics were not always as skilfully played and racist beliefs not as effectively masked. Sukarno apparently included Canada on a list of ‘imperialists with white-skins’. (150) The presence of race as one element informing Canada’s official position introduces a new dimension to Canadian foreign relations which should be applied across the spectrum.

So what is the value of studying relations with countries that were never priorities for the Canadian government? Spooner and Webster have certainly filled two gaps. But the value of their work does not stop there. Their studies of Canadian involvement in the Congo crisis and Indonesian decolonization and state-building allow new questions to be asked, new ideas to be explored, and well-established issues to be cast in a new light. This is particularly important with respect to the issue of independence. Historians have examined the advancement and setbacks affecting Canada’s sovereignty and independence of action from the First World War on. Set in the context of decolonization, Webster and Spooner depict Canadian views towards the independence of other states. At times Canada’s own decolonizing experience clearly injected valuable perspective and understanding, whereas at other times it was a secondary consideration. Juxtaposing Canadian concerns for their own sovereignty with their regard for the independence of
others might show that there was another kind of mental map in which Canada was located at the centre.
Canada, the Developing World and the Golden Age

Often overlooked as a sideshow to North Atlantic affairs, the developing world has received little attention from historians of Canadian diplomacy. Surveys in the field have tended to give only cursory treatment to Canada’s involvement in this regard through the Commonwealth, the Francophonie, and other multilateral bodies. Here as elsewhere, a mythic “golden age” of Canadian diplomacy has shaped assessments of such relations, presenting Canada as a benevolent middle power, whose lack of colonial baggage ostensibly made it an impartial mediator. By challenging such notions, David Webster’s *Fire and the Full Moon: Canada and Indonesia in a Decolonizing World* and Kevin Spooner’s *Canada, the Congo Crisis and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64* provide a welcome corrective.

Both Webster and Spooner widen the scope of Canadian diplomatic history but do so in different ways. In *Fire and the Full Moon*, Webster provides a comprehensive, perceptive, and well-written analysis of Canada’s relations with Indonesia since 1945. His account is structured around key moments such as Indonesia’s struggle for independence, its subsequent consolidation and tensions with neighbours, and debates over trade and human rights during its rule in East Timor (1975-1999). For his part, Spooner offers an in-depth narrative of Canada’s role in the *Operation des Nations Unies au Congo* (ONUC), which sought to foster peace in the troubled African nation during its first four years of independence (1960-1964). While his focus is narrower than Webster’s, Spooner uses the episode as a case study to test the enduring perception of Canada as a helpful fixer and natural peacekeeper.

Webster’s study is a major addition to a small but growing literature on the history of Canada’s Pacific involvement. By 1945, Indonesia had gained the attention of Canadian diplomats and businesses as Southeast Asia’s first independent state as well as its most populous and one of its most richly endowed nations. Yet its diplomatic self-perception was markedly different from Canada’s. To use a poignant image from Sukarno, its first president, it had been forged in the “the fire’s heart of revolution” and thus saw itself as morally superior to nations that had gained their autonomy over time “under the rays of the full moon” (10). Epitomizing the latter, Canada advocated a more gradualist approach to nation-building than did Indonesia’s mercurial founder. Inspired by different myths, Canadian and Indonesian policies diverged for much of the period until Sukarno’s demise in 1966. For Canada, development enhanced its self-image as an honest broker that was sensitive to Third World concerns. Hoping to bridge Dutch and U.S. views with a UN resolution in 1949, for instance, Ottawa saw itself as “the midwife of Indonesian independence”, though few Indonesians shared this view or even knew of the measure (42). Canada was not involved in the anti-Sukarno revolt of 1957, unlike the U.S. and other allies, and it declined Indonesian requests for mediation during the West New Guinea dispute (1957-1963). Yet Sukarno’s opposition to Malaysia’s creation in 1963 led the staunchly pro-Commonwealth Diefenbaker government to side with the latter, providing military aid to the region for the first time. A middle course became impossible by 1965,
when Indonesia’s withdrawal from the UN made it a “rogue state” in the eyes of Canada and other Western nations (149).

The final chapter of Webster’s book examines relations since 1968, a period more familiar to most readers. Under Suharto, Indonesia embarked upon a New Order that embraced capitalist economic development, its pro-Western and pro-investment stance more favourable to Canadian political and business interests. Webster sets the stage for this change by highlighting Canada’s role in forming key non-state actors, notably economic planners who became Indonesia’s new technocratic elite as well as progressive Islamic experts who constituted a “McGill mafia” within its government. By this point, as Webster aptly observes, “The fire was cooler, the full moon a bit brighter.” (11) The usefulness of his international history approach is apparent in his analysis of the controversy over Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 1975. By placing bilateral relations within a global context, he shows how human rights concerns, as advocated by non-state actors, increasingly affected Ottawa’s position on the question so that, by the 1990s, it could no longer maintain its earlier acquiescence. Particularly insightful in this regard is his use of “mental maps”, ways of picturing a global order that took into account Canada’s commitment to multilateralism, through NATO, the Commonwealth and the UN, but also its new-found incorporation of human rights into the making of foreign policy. While he perhaps could have provided more context on the rise of regional bodies such as ASEAN and APEC, Webster’s book constitutes a seminal work on Canada’s role in postwar development and decolonization.

In his thorough study of ONUC, Spooner also eschews an idealist view of a golden age to highlight realism and alliance politics. The Congo operation, though not Canada’s first peacekeeping mission, became the cold war’s largest with over 1,800 UN troops serving between 1960 and 1964 (211-12). Throughout the conflict, Spooner finds a basic contradiction at the heart of Canada’s involvement: although clearly part of the Western alliance, it also saw itself as a conciliatory “bridge” between colonizer and colonized (99). As in the Indonesian case, impartiality was most apparent to the beholder. Wary of alienating European allies as well as non-aligned states, Ottawa refrained from commenting publicly on Congo’s domestic affairs, particularly regarding the breakaway region of Katanga. In October 1960, after his visit to North America, Congolese prime minister Patrice Lumumba declared he had sought bilateral aid from Canada believing it was “a truly democratic land” but was disappointed to learn that “although honest Canada was just another imperialist country” (59). To the Belgians, Ottawa’s quiet diplomacy amounted to little more than an ambivalent ally’s “lukewarm support” (122).

While Spooner’s account might be too detailed for some readers, it offers rich insights into Canada’s role in ONUC and peacekeeping more generally. He sees Diefenbaker’s apparent reversal on sending troops as due less to public opinion, as some historians have claimed, than to his awareness of the UN’s desire for only non-combat forces from Canada (41). The contingent’s bilingual character, moreover, seemed more relevant to UN and Congolese officials than to the staunch defender of “One Canada”. Soon ensnared in the conflict, some of Canada’s soldiers, apparently mistaken for Belgians, were beaten by Congolese troops while its diplomats, like UN secretary general Dag Hammarskjold, aroused the ire of Soviet
officials who saw the operation as a form of Western imperialism. As in Indonesia, Canada struggled to find middle ground as events outpaced diplomacy: its allies diverged in response to the U.S.-backed coup by Joseph Mobutu in 1960, the deaths of Lumumbu and Hammarskjold the following year, and a more offensive ONUC role against rebels in Katanga (176-77). By the end of the mission, Cyrille Adoula’s unity government hoped Canada as a “non-colonial” state would join with other ONUC members to train the Congolese army (204). Like its peacekeeping partners, however, Ottawa decided not to do so, thus leaving a fragile regime that was overturned less than two years later by Mobutu in a second coup.

In their excellent case studies, Webster and Spooner provide a critical analysis of Canada’s legendary role in development and peacekeeping, two foreign policy areas especially prone to myth-making. Their accounts portray a diplomacy motivated less by altruism than by concrete self-interest based on alliance politics, trade and other pragmatic concerns. Significantly, they include image and identity among such factors, particularly as Canada positioned itself in the postwar order as a proponent of multilateralism, internationalism and gradualist nation-building. Over time, development and peacekeeping became political tenets in their own right, which leaders and policy-makers recognized as core values in Canada’s global persona. By projecting this identity to fellow citizens and the world, as the Indonesian and Congolese cases indicated, they moved foreign policy into a sphere where the boundary between idealism and realism became porous indeed.
Please allow me to thank the four reviewers who have graciously given of their time to read and assess my book; thanks also to Greg Donaghy, for so succinctly integrating and interpreting the responses of Daniel Byrne, Robin Gendron, Francine McKenzie, and John Meehan. The reviewers’ enthusiastic reaction to the work is of course very gratifying, but it was equally important for me to see was how carefully and critically the reviewers had considered the evidence and arguments I presented. Surely, there is no better reward than to have your peers distill your ideas so precisely and accurately, to know that the essential elements of narrative and interpretation intended to be conveyed were, indeed, heard.

Even though the subject matter of the two books reviewed here may be geographically distinct, what struck me as I read the reviews was how fitting it was to examine the books together. David Webster’s *Fire and the Full Moon* contributes to the same historiographical agenda I perceive in my own writing: to widen the gaze of the history of Canadian foreign policy. Canada’s relations with the United States and Britain have dominated scholarship in this field. While hardly surprising, given the clear significance of these bilateral relations, there is a real need to see beyond North America and Europe to develop a more complete understanding of Canada’s role in the world. Such avenues not only hold out hope for better comprehending the Canadian presence in Asia, Africa, Latin and South America, but also promise in varying ways to reshape, revise and also confirm our thinking about the bilateral European and American relations deemed so fundamental.

Just as American and British bilateral relations have dominated the history of Canadian foreign policy, the post World War II period has been dominated by writing on Canada and the Cold War. Again, I believe both books are self-consciously situated, in the words of Francine Mackenzie, “at the nexus of the Cold War and decolonization.” It is certainly not my intent to suggest the Cold War was not a significant consideration for Canadian policy during the Congo crisis; it most certainly was. That said, decolonization was also fundamentally important, even though its role has been very much overshadowed by the emphasis placed on the Cold War. The reviewers seem to concur in the judgment that it’s time to consider how a more complete appreciation of the politics of decolonization shaped both Canadian approaches to new nations and existing relations with important NATO allies. In particular, much can be gleaned about Canadian official and elite views of the international order as it existed in the post war period by exploring the similarities and differences between and amongst the western nations, as they confronted the realities of a rapidly transforming world. Here, Daniel Byrne’s observation, that historians of American foreign policy could also benefit from reading such analyses of middle power attempts to navigate relations with new nations, is quite relevant and interesting.

This also leads directly to the issue of ‘race’. Donaghy, McKenzie and Byrne suggest these two books represent an attempt to introduce and to explore race as a consideration and perhaps consequence of policy formulation and implementation. As I was researching and writing, I recognized obvious signs in both official and public views that race was clearly a
lens through which Canada’s response to the Congo crisis could be viewed. I am hesitant, though, to claim to have done much more than to have raised this as an issue that deserves further investigation. This field of inquiry will prove rich for more detailed and narrow analysis of particular events comparable to the Congo crisis; indeed, I readily acknowledge that my own work, meant to be the first full account of Canadian peacekeeping in the Congo, still leaves room for more in-depth examination of the impact of race and racial conceptions on Canadian foreign policy during the crisis. I can, for example, easily conceive of the need to thoroughly canvass and interpret how race was constructed in Canadian media coverage of the Congo’s political tribulations and of the experiences of Canadians who served there.

All the reviewers have commented on the significance of public opinion. I am particularly grateful to Robin Gendron’s observation that I have displayed sensitivity in my assessment of both the nature of Canadian public opinion and its effect on Canadian policy. I confess that this was one of the most difficult elements of the book. Previous brief accounts of the Canadian government’s decision to participate in the Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) had placed so much emphasis on public opinion that it was impossible not to address this. At the same time, I feared the same methodological conundrums that were apparent in these earlier accounts: (1) how does one define public opinion in a historical context, and (2) how does one demonstrate a causal relationship between opinion and government policy. I am quite certain that I have not resolved either of these conundrums. Instead, I attempted to give voice to the various views that were clearly in evidence in public discourse and private correspondence to government officials, and usually did so without assessing the relative weight and influence of such views. In my view, it was necessary, however, to correct the long-standing assertion that John Diefenbaker’s decisions on Canadian participation in ONUC were fundamentally influenced by public opinion. This was at least one instance when Diefenbaker and his government were consistent, decisive, and thoughtful in formulating foreign policy. As Francine Mackenzie cautions, though, it would be unwise to generalize from this episode. If anything, the government’s approach to the Congo crisis could prove even more damning to Diefenbaker’s already tarnished reputation by demonstrating that, at times, the Prime Minister was indeed capable, a finding that may add weight to the idea that his subsequent foreign and defence policy failures were the consequence of capriciousness and personality.

Robin Gendron raises one other important issue that deserves further discussion: federalism and separatism. I agree with his assertion that I might have more fully explored and explained potential connections between Canadian government concerns for separatism in Québec and the government’s reaction to the secession of Katanga. While this was not made explicit in the book to the degree it might have been, I would argue that the Diefenbaker government, including officials in the Department of External Affairs, were very dismissive of the Katangan attempt to secede. Nowhere did I find evidence of politicians or officials making comparisons between Quebec and Katanga. This is not to suggest that there weren’t such views; it may very well be the case that many found the parallels obvious without a need to expose them. Still, I believe the most important consideration in the government’s response to the secession was the desire to support the
United Nations. At the UN, Katanga’s secession was quite correctly perceived as threatening the viability of the Congo and the organization’s efforts to assist in the restoration of peace and order. Canada supported UN efforts to secure the territorial integrity of the Congo because it recognized this would be equated with the overall success of ONUC and UN peacekeeping. This was the preeminent consideration, though it is impossible to discount completely domestic, political motivations vis-à-vis Québec.

I am grateful to John Meehan for the image of a porous boundary between idealism and realism. In his review, he has quite succinctly described a theme I tried to convey throughout the book. In a similar vein, Byrne has suggested the two books reviewed here seek to “debunk” the “myth of an altruistic activist Canada using the United Nations and peacekeeping for the sake of peace alone”. I could not agree more. It is important to recognize that peacekeeping contributions to the United Nations are not inherently altruistic, though in Canada that is certainly the commonly held, public view. My point is that peacekeeping can be seen to serve overlapping interests that may be simultaneously altruistic and self-interested. Even interests that seem on the surface to be altruistic, a desire to pursue multilateral diplomacy in an institution like the UN, for instance, may in fact buttress concrete, hard foreign policy considerations. Francine Mackenzie sums this up by acknowledging the messiness and complexity of foreign policy motivations; I, too, share the view that messiness does not always equate with hypocrisy.

Finally, it is worth commenting on the differences the reviewers have perceived between these two books. David Webster has been identified as the “tougher critic” who has emphasized hard interests in shaping foreign policy in Canada’s relations with newly independent nations in the post-war period. My own work is characterized as the “more uplifting perspective” that demonstrates national interests could still lead to an “authentic” role as “peacemaker and mediator”. I do wonder if the differences are not subtler and if they can, in fact, partly be attributed to the dissimilar subject matter (in terms of specificity of nation and/or region), timelines, and methodologies. As Greg Donaghy has suggested, maybe the boundary between idealism and realism is “a good deal more porous” than either Webster or I have admitted – a suggestion that implies to me that these two books could, in fact, have been less divergent than they appear to be.

My thanks to Thomas Maddux for commissioning this H-Diplo roundtable and to David Webster for agreeing to have our books reviewed together.
Thanks, first of all, to all the reviewers for their close reading and comments, and to H-Diplo for offering to run a roundtable. Canada is not the world’s most important diplomatic actor, but comparative studies may cast further light on actions of the “big beasts,” a point Daniel Byrne makes in his review. In that connection, I hope to have added to the literature on relations with Indonesia written from the perspective of Washington, Canberra, and other capitals.

Kevin Spooner and I have written different types of book, but they are tied together, as the reviewers note, by the theme of Canada’s approach to decolonization. Canadian foreign relations history concentrates on the “North Atlantic triangle” into which Canada was born, between the United States and Great Britain. Francine McKenzie thus notes that those of us writing the less-told histories of Canadian relations with other parts of the world are writing “from the ‘margins’ ... studies of relations between mutually-marginal nations.” Studying Canadian approaches to more peripheral areas can highlight themes in Canadian international history that are not, perhaps, as easily visible in the denser relations between Ottawa and Washington, London, or Paris. John Meehan, Patricia Roy, and Greg Donaghy among others are adding a Pacific dimension to the study of Canada’s global interactions centered on Japan and China. Innovative perspectives are on offer from those suggesting, with Henry Yu, that “Pacific Canada” offers a new “perspective on our past, a way to refract our history not solely through the prism of trans-Atlantic migration and settlement.”

I hope that Fire and the Full Moon adds to this body of work, and helps underline the fact that Canada did not in fact start to notice Asia only when Pierre Trudeau traveled to Japan in the 1970s and declared the continent Canada’s “New West.”

One of these themes is the question of whether Canada really enjoyed a postwar “golden age” when Canadian diplomats acted as wise and selfless peacemakers, a diplomatic self-image that takes external affairs minister Lester Pearson’s 1957 Nobel Peace Prize as its emblematic trophy. Popularizing journalists have mourned the alleged decline from this period when Canadian “wise men” are said to have tread the earth like altruistic mediating giants.


conclusion, but it still seems necessary to argue against the peacemaker myth. When the
documents are front and centre, alliances are very visible in Canadian policymaking, and
the rest is revealed as illusion (to borrow from the title of Robert Bothwell’s recent volume
on Canadian foreign relations). Roundtable editor Greg Donaghy recently debunked the
myths convincingly at the last of a series of seminars on the 100th anniversary of Canada’s
Department of External Affairs. A renewed stress on Canada following its own perceived
national interests seems to be emerging as the scholarly consensus – if we’re in an age of
northern revisionism, it’s none too soon.

I'm not sure that Spooner and I disagree as intensely (if politely – another piece of Canada’s
image) as some of the reviewers suggest. Byrne, the one non-Canadian reviewer, suggests
instead that: “Spooner and Webster show that any altruistic motives were subsumed by
alliance politics and Canadian national interests.” Perhaps I am less judicious than Dr.
Spoon, but the difference may come down to methodology – my time period is longer and
I use a broader brush to explore issues in Canadian foreign relations. I do believe the
Canadian diplomatic self-image as peacemaker and mediator is an invented tradition, and
there’s little truth to the smug “Canadian exceptionalism” that is evident in the way many
Canadians see our country’s role in the world. (It’s a view drawn in sharp contrast to
American beastliness, and indeed dependent on ideas of American sin.) The invented
tradition, however, need not always be a flaw. It can also be deployed aspirationally,
establishing moral benchmarks that Canadians (usually outside government) aim to meet.
“Long live invented traditions,” as my graduate school historiography professor used to say
– as long as we’re aware that they are invented. If I’m “quietly scathing” of Canadian
government actions (in McKenzie’s words) it’s not just an attempt to debunk. Policymakers
knew very well (and in some cases wrote) that they were acting from self-interest where
necessary, if not necessarily self-interest. The 1956 Suez crisis, where Lester Pearson and
others saw themselves acting to help save Britain and France from the consequences of
their own folly rather than solely from motives of pure idealism, is the classic example,
discussed in the recent H-Diplo roundtable on Mike Carroll's book. Though it was less
central to core concerns, I argue that Canadian responses to the 1945-49 Indonesian
revolution also aimed to save the Dutch government from its own errors and avoid splits in
the North Atlantic alliance then being formed. That doesn’t mean that policymakers were
hypocrites – they themselves said they were acting to preserve Canada’s key alliance from
U.S.-Dutch disputes. The myth that Canada acted as disinterested peacemaker in Indonesia
was a tradition invented later, not by the diplomats who made policy decisions.

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4 Robert Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007); Greg Donaghy, “Coming Off the
Gold Standard: Reassessing the 'Golden Age' of Canadian Diplomacy,” paper presented at symposium on “A
Very Modern Ministry: Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada,” University of Saskatchewan, Sept. 28,
It’s pleasant to see some theoretical points noted by the reviewers. “Mental maps” (the North Atlantic triangle being one of the most prominent) are to me a useful way of examining background influences in the mind of the policymaker. It’s a shame that Alan Henrikson’s work on mental maps in U.S. diplomatic history vanished from the second edition of *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, which introduced so many valuable new approaches. As I’ve argued elsewhere, I think the mental maps approach still has legs, especially when perceptions of “race” are tied in to spatial mappings of stages and places of development.\(^5\) Ideas, for instance, of Canada as a “linchpin” between Britain and the United States likely made it easier for Canadians to think of themselves as linchpins between the West and the developing world, a notion seldom backed up by an abundance of evidence.

“For Canada,” John Meehan writes in his review, “development enhanced its self-image as an honest broker that was sensitive to Third World concerns.” I hope that a study of the marginal Canada-Indonesia relationship points to the need to integrate development aid with diplomatic history, as migration and missionaries among other areas are being brought in as part of a “transnational turn” in the writing of international history. Gendron and McKenzie have noted my effort to include non-governmental organizations alongside state-level interactions in studying Canadian foreign relations. When relations with the “developing world” are put at the center, this aspect probably becomes more visible. Brad Simpson has made a similar point in his wonderful examination of U.S.-Indonesia relations in the 1960s (cited earlier).

“Juxtaposing Canadian concerns for their own sovereignty with their regard for the independence of others might show that there was another kind of mental map in which Canada was located at the centre,” McKenzie writes. I agree. To come at it from a different angle, I’d argue that there was a tentatively-offered “Canadian model” for development and decolonization, offered to the global South as a gentler version of the American model. It was expressed most directly through individual Canadian development advisors, the topic of my current project.

I also appreciate the points raised by McKenzie about race perceptions in Canadian foreign policymaking. As Byrne points out, this is not new in U.S. diplomatic history. Space did not permit much attention to race, but it is likely a major and much-overlooked factor in Canadian foreign policymaking. Only a minority of those teaching Canadian foreign policy start with the numbered Indian treaties. Existing studies of Canada’s role in the break-up of the Japan-Britain alliance fail to draw sufficient links to debates over Asian migration exclusion. Perhaps Canada seized quickly upon the vision of a “multi-racial

Commonwealth” as part of its own debates over deracializing immigration policy. Eagerness to embrace postwar European loans and reluctance to play a leading role in aid to Asia probably drew on race. And so on.

Both Spooner and I are attempting to a degree to decentral the Cold War and make more room for that other great theme of the second half of the 20th century, decolonization. We’re following a direction indicated by at least two of the reviewers here. I believe this will be a main direction in other studies to come in this country. The decolonization frame is also the reason I included a final, post-1968 chapter, that Gendron felt would have better been a study of its own. Perhaps so, but my final chapter is about the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, which provides a stark illustration of the disconnect between high-minded rhetoric and the reality of Canadian complicity in near-genocide. It also brings to a close the story of Canadian attitudes towards decolonization in maritime Southeast Asia. Ultimately, what I tried to write is less a diplomatic history centered on Ottawa and Jakarta, than a tale of Canada facing decolonization in one region – of the Dutch East Indies becoming Indonesia, the “good” (because orderly, evolutionary, and anti-communist) decolonization of Malaya as a more positive example, and then the decolonizations of Papua, British North Borneo, and finally East Timor – a story only completed this century, with East Timor’s independence in 2002. There are multiple issues to be explored if decolonization, not just the Cold War, is at the centre of the questions being asked by historians of Canada’s international relations.

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