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This collection results from an international conference organized in September of 2004 at Vanderbilt University by Matthias Schulz, now Professor of History of International Relations at the University of Geneva, and Thomas A. Schwartz, Professor of History at Vanderbilt. The book contains seventeen contributions to the history of transatlantic relations in the 1970s, divided into the discussion around West German Ostpolitik, the collapse of the transatlantic monetary order, the disagreements over Henry Kissinger’s Year of Europe and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the development of transatlantic relations in the era of Helmut Schmidt and Jimmy Carter.

The two reviewers who assess the volume as a whole come to different conclusions. While Melissa P. Yeager does greet “some jewels of original, archive-based research,” she also criticizes something of an imbalance between the contributions on German policy in the first half of the 1970s and the other contributions. Beyond that, she sees the book as suffering from a lack of precision in the definition of its subject and from numerous contradictions in the evaluation of the transatlantic relationship. These contradictions are not resolved by the editors in their epilogue; instead, the list of differing viewpoints is expanded by reference to the results of the editors’ own research. On the other hand, Kiran Klaus Patel characterizes the refusal to smooth out the differences as nothing less than “a great strength of the book.” He too is of the opinion that many aspects of transatlantic relations in that decade are not given adequate treatment, for example, the European dimension of CSCE negotiations or the influence of societal change on the shaping of relations. In his view, the volume nevertheless constitutes “a central point of reference” for further research—above all, because the editors situate the new contributions in the context of the existing literature and because they emphasize the permanence of the crisis character of the Western alliance along with its susceptibility to crisis.

The differing assessments bring to mind the glass of water that can be characterized as both half full and half empty. It is left to the reader to decide, for example, on the congruence or non-congruence between the goals of American and German détente policy — but the reader is indeed given sufficient material from which to draw conclusions. It is especially the case that the special character of the Atlantic alliance is made manifest: the third reviewer, Gerhard L. Weinberg, sees as noteworthy the extent “to which tensions and differences, even very acrimonious ones, came to be smoothed over.” Neither the interests nor the perceptions of the various alliance partners are identical—nor could they be. Intensive communication can, however, assist in uncovering partially shared interests, which then come to constitute the substance of the alliance. This applies not only to the 1970s of course. To that extent, the findings of this volume extend beyond the period examined.

It would be all the more important to go beyond the individual contributions and discuss the interpretational framework that Schultz and Schwartz offer in the conclusion of the volume. For them, three factors have served to hold the alliance together: “the continuing
relevance of the Cold War and the threat posed by the Soviet Union, the interdependence of
the American and European economies, and the institutional framework through which the
allies forced themselves to find agreement.” Two other factors have in their view worked
against the cohesion of the alliance: “first, the process of European integration, with its
creation of a separate, though relatively open, European market and a separate European
identity, and second, the global commitments and resulting responsibilities of the United
States, which frequently separated American policy from the Europeans.”

The distinction between the most important factors promoting integration and
disintegration is in my view not so evident. Along with economic interdependence, one
must also consider economic rivalry, not only between the U.S. and the European Market
but also between the U.S. and the individual European countries. The collapse of the
Bretton Woods System, discussed in Hubert Zimmermann’s contribution, offers striking
material illustrative of this. Institutional arrangements can in a certain sense facilitate the
search for compromises but are themselves often the cause of conflicts. The strategic
differences between the U.S. and its European partners were no longer so intensively
discussed in the 1970s as in the previous decade but did play an important subliminal role
in the discussions over European disarmament and Euro-strategic “re-fitting.” Lastly, an
autonomous European actor can be perceived as a disruptive factor as well as a
contribution to the stability of the international system. It seems that American views on
this oscillated in the 1970s as well, with Richard Nixon, for example, being influenced to a
greater extent by his European interlocutors than was Kissinger.

It thus does not seem appropriate to describe the relationship between European
integration and Atlantic community as a zero-sum game. The strengthening of the
European Community over the course of the 1970s did not result in a weakening of the
Atlantic alliance but rather in a transformation of its form, which was understandably
difficult for the American leadership to accept or even comprehend. More research is
clearly needed in order to gain a precise understanding of this.

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This book takes the necessary next step. After a long list of detailed works on transatlantic relations from the early postwar period to the Johnson years and beyond, we have to thank Matthias Schulz and Thomas A. Schwartz for bringing together such a rich collection of studies on the 1970s. Certainly, many of the contributors to "The Strained Alliance" have already published on similar issues elsewhere over the last few years. And for readers and authors alike, it is probably slightly frustrating that it took almost six years to publish a volume that goes back to a conference held at Vanderbilt University in 2004. Having said that, there is a clear added value of this book. This is mostly thanks to the convincing introduction and even more so the excellent conclusion, both written by the editors of this volume. Besides contextualizing the subject of this book and referring to the existing literature, they effectively enumerate factors that help explain development of the transatlantic relationship during this decade. By doing so, they offer a stimulating alternative to the two extremes one finds in the literature: the "decay" narrative, according to which the transatlantic relationship had its merry moment in the early postwar years and deteriorated ever since. Often, these studies feature words like "crisis" in their titles and find it difficult to explain why after a long sequence of developments from bad to worse, NATO still lives, the transatlantic partnership is still hailed as special, and that compared to other parts of the world, the United States and its West European allies do maintain a very good relationship. Books that fall into the other extreme emphasize America's ongoing empire, be it by invitation or of any other kind, and therefore find it hard to integrate ruptures and downturns.

Schulz and Schwarz, however, stress that there was never a time of complete harmony, that cooperation and conflict both stood at the cradle of transatlantic relations and from there on shaped its trajectory. They then sketch a succinct and convincing list of factors that both stabilized (the Cold War, economic interdependence, and the institutional frameworks of consensus seeking) and periled this relationship during the 1970s. Interestingly, they count European integration as one of the two factors of the latter group (the obvious other being: the global commitments and responsibilities of the United States) and emphasize that the 1970s were the first period of transatlantic interaction in which U.S. support for European unification was only sustained on a rhetorical level, whereas practically, silence ruled the day. Besides identifying these factors, this concluding chapter demonstrates their ambivalent and often dialectic potential; this text is a must for anyone interested in the issue.

The main body of the book brings together fifteen chapters by well-known specialists of the field from both sides of the Atlantic. A great strength of the book lies in the fact that the editors did not try to iron out some divergent opinions among its authors. Ostpolitik and in how far it challenged the West’s overall approach to the Eastern bloc is an obvious example, with Gottfried Niedhart, Bernd Schaefer, Werner D. Lippert as well as Ronald J. Granieri offering alternative views; reflecting their source-base as well as their convictions. It is also an asset to this volume that many of the contributions do not adopt a classical bilateral approach but highlight one or several of the numerous arenas of multilateral
negotiations in the transatlantic realm, such as NATO, the International Monetary Fund, or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Nonetheless, since this is still rather new research territory, certain weaknesses cannot be avoided. In her chapter on the CSCE, for instance, Sarah B. Snyder focuses primarily on the US-American view and thus misses one of the key dimensions for the West European side: during the CSCE negotiations, the European Community gained de facto recognition as a distinct entity from the Soviet bloc. Hence, despite all transatlantic squabbling over the right way to negotiate with the Soviet Union, one should not overlook the dynamics of intra-European integration that were triggered by these negotiations. There are also other imbalances when the chapters are taken together as a whole. Most of them focus merely on the first half of the decade – which also reflects the levels of access to archival sources at the time the book was planned. Moreover, roughly half of the chapters highlight the role of the Federal Republic of Germany for the European side of transatlantic relations. West Germany certainly needs special attention during this decade in which Ostpolitik and its new economic power became difficult to overlook and increasingly challenged the status quo in transatlantic matters. But still, this is more room than Germany deserves. Finally, most contributions focus on the top-level of negotiations and are based on a rather conventional diplomatic history. The only systematic remark reaching beyond this scope is the editors’ reflection in their epilogue about the different diplomatic cultures on both sides of the Atlantic: in the U.S., domestic politics had a larger impact on governments than in Europe where, by contrast, one finds a higher level of continuity of diplomatic personnel. This made European politics more predictable, stable, and more prone to be influenced by institutional settings than by the personality of top politicians. This interpretation is convincing but one wonders if one should not push the limits of historiography further. The rise of mass media and of new (transnational) social movements with their particular forms of political mobilization on both sides of the Atlantic is hardly felt in this book. Also, the extraordinary degree of transatlantic economic interdependence and the role of companies deserve more room (Raj Roy’s chapter on the Rolls-Royce Lockheed crisis would have been the obvious place to do so; instead, he concentrate on the usual state actors, too). It remains for future research to broaden the picture and to evaluate the impact of these other actors and arenas on high politics. But, obviously, any research of this kind will have to consult “The Strained Alliance” as a central point of reference.
This edited volume benefits from an unusually fine introduction that explains the issues to be covered, comments on the existing literature, and stresses the utilization by the participating authors of records on the period that have been declassified in the last few years. This last point will be of considerable assistance to those who work in the future on the period covered by the essays in this collection. The relevant Soviet records are largely still not accessible; one can only hope that at some point in time the tightening of access to the records of the Soviet period will be reversed, preferably before the chemical disintegration of the original paper closes them forever to everyone.

These comments will be limited to a small number of points that struck this reader. Although the four-power agreement on Berlin is briefly alluded to in several pieces, the major significance of that accomplishment does not in this reader’s opinion receive the emphasis it deserves. The same thing is even more certainly true of the peace settlement between Egypt and Israel in 1978; a peace that has held for over thirty years and appears likely to last. This is related to an aspect of the relationship between the United States and the countries of Western Europe that is almost completely ignored by those authors who touch on the Middle East at all. As was obvious at the time of the 1973 attack on Israel by Egypt and Syria, the Europeans generally sided with the Arabs at a time when the latter were aligned with the Soviet Union. Did it never occur to anyone in London, Paris, or Bonn that some concern might arise in Washington about NATO allies who could almost invariably be found on the Soviet side of a major issue? It is true that then as now all have been afraid that Arab countries might permanently stop selling their oil abroad and instead either drink it all or use it to irrigate their deserts, but the relationship of Middle East issues to the confrontation with the Soviet Union in most of the years under review in this collection should not have been screened out altogether.

One impression that is made by several of the pieces is the extent to which tensions and differences, even very acrimonious ones, came to be smoothed over. The Americans came to see the potential benefits of Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik – as did the CDU/CSU opposition – and the two-track decision came to be an enormous accomplishment in the face of massive domestic uproar in Western Europe (financed to a considerable extent from the East). The account of the road to the Helsinki accords in Chapter 12 shows how something truly important and substantial could be accomplished even while Henry Kissinger was not paying much attention. The different interests and perspectives of the United States and the European states, as well as occasional serious missteps on both sides of the Atlantic, surely caused plenty of friction; but in some ways it all looks rather like squabbles inside a rather large family.
Matthias Schulz and Thomas Schwartz’s edited collection, *The Strained Alliance U.S.-European relations from Nixon to Carter*, brings together an esoteric collection of essays from scholars working mostly in newly declassified archives, in multiple languages and with many different research questions of importance. While the volume contains some jewels of original, archive-based research, it lacks overall coherence: its conference origins are clear throughout. Although it is structurally divided into four sections, it reads as a book of two halves. It includes a cohesive if somewhat repetitive half on Germany between 1969 and 1975; and a much more disparate half on – everything else. The book suffers first from not defining its terms. Despite the “Alliance” of the title, most contributions are not about the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Only Fabian Hilfrich is explicit about defining the “Europeans” of the title (242): in contrast, Sarah Snyder’s chapter contains an odd confusion of terms that is more representative of the rest of the book: “NATO allies” and “Western Europeans” are used interchangeably without acknowledgement that some western participants at the Conference were members of the European Community (E.C.) but not NATO and vice versa. Snyder mentions Henry Kissinger mediating “between NATO and the Soviets”, a rather odd construction given that the U.S. was, of course, a member of NATO. Furthermore, no judgement is given regarding whether the “strains” felt by the Alliance were significant, and if so, in what way (267). The chapters reach contradictory conclusions on this question. Gottfried Niedhart highlights “uncertainty” and “dissonance” in the Alliance but no crisis, and comments that neither interdependence nor conflict were new phenomena in the 1960s (24 and 32); Werner Lippert flags a “rift” in the relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.) that lasted “through the Cold War and beyond” (81); Granieri asserts that Federal German Chancellor Willy Brandt was planning a “divorce” from the Alliance after 1973 (99); Snyder concludes that the events of 1973-1975 “strained the NATO alliance....tested the NATO alliance but did not fracture it” (274-275); Joe Renouard and D. Nathan Vigil report “significant discord” in trans-Atlantic relations (332). Were such difficulties as there were in NATO during the 1970s qualitatively different from those of the 1960s, when the French left the Integrated Military Command, or the 1980s, when superpower diplomacy again supplanted multilateral conversations? Several chapters mention the tired American threat of troop withdrawals, but none persuasively assesses the credibility of this threat (for example 251). The editors conclude that, by the early 1980s, Europeans were “no more satisfied with their part in transatlantic decision making than they had been a decade earlier” (373).

Second, the book is heavily weighted towards the Federal Republic of Germany (seven of fifteen chapters) - perhaps unsurprisingly in a book published by the German Historical Institute – and of the other E.C. member states, only Britain receives specific focus (the chapters by Raj Roy and Alastair Noble). France is a notable absentee, not only not receiving a chapter to itself, but not getting a mention in the index. Of course several contributors discuss French relations both within the E.C. and with the United States. Most, like William Gray’s chapter on the Deutsche Mark, stress French antagonism towards the
U.S. (154). Niedhart’s approach raises a more nuanced view of Franco-American relations improving as growing Federal German autonomy and activism in foreign policy worried both the Pompidou and the Nixon administrations (36). The other states of Europe receive bare mentions: certainly the consequences to transatlantic relations of the accession of a neutral state (the Republic of Ireland) into the E.C. are worthy of further comment, yet only Hilfrich mentions the topic (242).

A third broad comment on this volume is that, like the geographical one-sidedness, there is no chronological balance. The bulk of the volume covers the years in office of U.S. president Richard Nixon, with barely any attention to the administration of Gerald Ford and only small space allotted to that of Jimmy Carter. Eleven of the fifteen chapters deal with the period before 1975, leaving the four remaining chapters on the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (C.S.C.E.), Helmut Schmidt, Jimmy Carter and the NATO dual-track decision looking rather odd. This imbalance is perhaps explained by the fact that the original conference was held in 2004, when archival material was declassified for (most of) the Nixon era but not yet for Ford or Carter. Certainly the chapters by Renouard and Vigil (on Carter) and Scholtyseck (on the dual-track decision) rely more on secondary sources than is the norm in the rest of the book. As with the focus on Germany, however, this chronological skew is not explained in the introduction or conclusion. The selection of the “long 1970s” (1) from 1969-1983 as a coherent period is not explained.

For the most part, the chapters on Germany form a tight and persuasive if rather overlapping whole. Niedhart, Bernd Schaefer, Lippert and Ronald Granieri focus on Ostpolitik. Niedhart’s beautifully written chapter combines broad historical sweeps with detailed analysis to conclude that while Brandt’s eastern policy made the Nixon administration anxious, ultimately NATO remained the guarantee of German containment (39).1 Schaefer asserts that the F.R.G. deliberately tied the U.S. into the success of Ostpolitik but stresses continued American distrust of Brandt (55-56). Schaefer’s depiction of both Nixon and Kissinger’s “rants” against the German policy are both entertaining and revealing of the Republican administration’s desire to control Cold War relations, and his conclusion that, because of détente and Ostpolitik, “Europe was spared the proxy wars and superpower-backed coups that afflicted other regions of the world” is interesting (59 and 63). Lippert and Granieri highlight different aspects. Lippert argues that Ostpolitik and superpower détente were pursuing the same goals and that Brandt was “consciously disregarding American tutelage” (73). In contrast, Granieri asserts that the Nixon administration effectively used Brandt and federal minister Egon Bahr to advance its own détente agenda (96). This disparity may emerge from Lippert’s focus on Kissinger’s role in U.S. foreign policy, in contrast to Granieri’s attention to the State Department. The overlap in these chapters is best revealed by the repetition of certain quotations: Bahr’s promise not to ask the Americans every few months if they were still loved, and Kissinger’s “Thank God!” response, appears three times (41, 54, and 93).

1 For the most recent assessment of Brandt, see Andreas Wilkens (ed), Brandt und Europa, forthcoming.
The remaining three chapters on Germany, by Gray, Hilfrich and Schulz, examine the role of the Deutsche Mark in European and Atlantic relations, the FRG and the Year of Europe, and the Schmidt era of West German politics respectively. Gray suggests that Brandt prioritised European integration, and specifically, Franco-German relations over transatlantic relations, albeit not to the point of supporting an anti-American project in European monetary co-operation. He makes the strange assertion that, at the time of his inaugural speech as Chancellor, Brandt had “not developed any specific agenda” in European integration, a comment explicitly contradicted by Hilfrich, who underlines the fact that Brandt gave European integration the “highest priority” in his inaugural speech (150-151, 238). Like Gray, Hilfrich makes the point that, with the U.S. as the guarantor of their security, the West Germans were not willing to confront it head on over issues of a European identity or European foreign policy co-operation (252). Schulz echoes the dual dependence of the F.R.G. – economically on the E.C. and militarily on the U.S. and NATO (282). Both Hilfrich and Schultz note broad causal relationships between transatlantic relations and European integration. Hilfrich draws on Andrew Moravcsik in stressing the coincidence of European national interests in their collectively negative response to the Nixon administration’s “Year of Europe”, and the retreat to differing policies once the national interests were no longer aligned (see especially 255-256). Schulz suggests that integration in Europe takes place when transatlantic relations are more difficult or when American policy is perceived as threatening to European interests; he attributes a “hiatus” in European integration in the mid-1970s to an improvement in transatlantic relations (289-290). These analyses are a provocative addition to the growing historiographical reassessment of the 1970s.

The first three non-German chapters (together with Gray on the Deutsche Mark) raise the question, according to the editors, of a “widening Atlantic”. Claudia Hiepel’s chapter “The Hague Summit of the European Community, Britain’s Entry, and the New Atlantic Partnership” provides a compelling summary of the 1969 summit, reflecting her earlier work in this field. Hubert Zimmerman’s chapter investigates the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, subsequent American policy and its relationship to European policy, including attempts at building a European monetary system. Finally, Raj Roy’s fascinating case study of “The Politics of Planes and Engines” comes deeply embedded in a wider analysis of Anglo-American relations, especially in the long conclusion to the essay (184-192). The question mark in the section heading is well placed. These authors do not collectively suggest that the Atlantic was “widening”. The bulk of Hiepel’s essay focuses on intra-European relations rather than U.S.-European relations, but it raises some important questions about the trans-Atlantic dynamic, including the Nixon administration’s apparent


\[3\] For example, Jan van der Harst (ed), Beyond the Customs Union: the European Community’s quest for Completion, Deepening and Enlargement, 1969-1975 (Brussels: Bruylant, 2007).

belief that the U.S. had succeeded in shaping the details of “the structure of Europe” in the past (108-109). Given the Truman administration’s failure to shape the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation in its interests, or to persuade the British to join early efforts at integration, or the Eisenhower administration’s failure to persuade the French to ratify the European Defence Community Treaty, for example, it is difficult to pinpoint a moment when any U.S. administration did have influence over the details of European integration.5 Hiepel also raises the issue of Britain’s particular position within the E.C., arguing that due to its “political goals and its economic weakness”, it “could be neither a political nor an economic Trojan horse” for the U.S. in the Community (120). Zimmerman goes on to provide a fascinating exegesis of developments in the international monetary system from both American and European (mostly French and German) perspectives, and presents a clear picture of the resulting friction in trans-Atlantic relations and impetus to European monetary integration (127-144). However, it is not evident that there were lasting strains in the Atlantic Alliance, especially when the editors note in their conclusion that economic connections across the Atlantic remained strong (362). In contrast to these case studies of divergence in the Alliance, Roy’s intricate portrayal of the fate of Rolls Royce depicts the close co-operation between the American and British governments. He illustrates both the Nixon government’s willingness to exert extreme pressure on that of British prime minister Edward Heath, and Heath’s desire to maintain a close relationship with the United States, despite his reputation as a European first and foremost. Roy’s conclusion that “the unique relationship between Britain and the United States was likely to survive any challenges that lay ahead” certainly implies strains within the European side of U.S.-European relations, and offers a contrasting note to Hiepel’s rejection of the Trojan Horse characterisation of Britain (192).

The next section, on the Year of Europe, similarly raises compelling but contradictory points. Daniel Möckli’s chapter analyses Nixon’s “Year of Europe” as a catalyst for the emergence of European unity. While the chapter is somewhat disjointed due to a surfeit of sub-headings, it nonetheless provides a persuasive assessment of the reactions of European leaders to Nixon and especially Kissinger’s (lack of) diplomacy in 1973, reinforcing the essay by Hilfrich mentioned above: they came together “to join forces and defend their own interests” at least until the energy crisis and the Arab-Israel conflict created new divisions (203, 213-216).6 Coming immediately after Möckli’s chapter, Alastair Noble’s essay provides a striking echo. While Noble draws mostly on documents published in the series Documents on British Policy Overseas rather than archival sources, and includes a focus on the Arab-Israeli war rather than European integration, he nevertheless makes many of the same points as Möckli, to the point, noted elsewhere in the book, of


6 For a similar perspective, see Ine Megens, ’The December 1973 Declaration on European Identity as the Result of Team Spirit among European Diplomats’, in van der Harst (ed), Beyond the Customs Union, 317-338.
using many of the same quotations [for example, “Trafalgar Square” at 200 and 222; “messenger boy” at 205 and 227; “decayed Gaullism” at 209 and 232]. The last essay in this section, by Snyder, takes the book’s attention to the C.S.C.E. Snyder is largely focused on American policy and American perceptions of European policy, and highlights a prioritisation of superpower relations over multilateral negotiations. Kissinger’s dominance of American foreign policy in this period is underlined by president Ford’s minimal appearance in the chapter. The editors’ reference to a “strong improvement” in U.S.-European relations under Ford in the epilogue is therefore rather mystifying (365).

The final section stands out chronologically, as noted above. Renouard and Vigil present the volume’s first chapter concentrating on Carter. Parts of this chapter are under-referenced, with some direct quotations lacking clear citations (311) and some footnotes lacking source information (see fn 11, 77, 87): these are small points but they contrast with the weight of evidence in the rest of the volume. Renouard and Vigil focus on Carter’s efforts in NATO and defence, in economic policy and in response to the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, vis-à-vis his European counterparts. The vivid examples they present suggest that what friction there was in trans-Atlantic relations was driven more by events and less by clashing personalities than during the Nixon/Kissinger era, contrasting with Schulz’s depiction of Carter’s difficult relationship with Schmidt (295-296). The last substantive chapter, by Scholtyseck, is the only chapter to focus wholly on Alliance decision-making, in the dual-track decision to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe. The bulk of this chapter draws on secondary sources and memoirs, with some East German archival sources used in discussion of the European peace movements. Given that documents for this period were not yet available at the time of the 2004 conference, this selection is understandable: still, like Renouard and Vigil’s chapter, it fits oddly with the rest of the volume which claims to be based on “newly available archival material” (14). Again, it is the only chapter that reaches into the 1980s, which makes it a strange bedfellow for the others. Nonetheless, it presents a convincing, if provisional, assessment of American and European responses to the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe, and thus of the continued inter-dependence of western European and American security. It reinforces the previous chapter’s assessment of Carter’s “meandering” policy course and raises fascinating questions about the clash in western Europe between the need for security and the desire for disarmament (339).

Scholtyseck offers a tantalising look at the influence of the East German government on western European peace movements, beautifully mirroring earlier comments about western European influence on eastern European dissident movements after Helsinki (346-347, 275). As archives are opened, these reciprocal efforts to undermine the opposing bloc will surely be a productive area for future research on the Cold War of the 1980s.

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The “epilogue” by the editors introduces a chronological framework that first, would have been very helpful earlier, and second, is not wholly explored in the essays: the editors give a general overview of U.S. foreign policy that mentions those essays that are relevant. They introduce new material that is not covered in the essays and that in some cases, contradicts them. For example, they credit Ford with improving U.S.-European relations during the C.S.C.E., in contrast to Snyder’s portrayal of relations dominated by an antagonistic Kissinger during the Helsinki process (365, chapter 12). The central question of what this volume is about remains unanswered. The essays sometimes repeat and sometimes contradict one another: in any collection of scholarship differences of opinion are to be expected, but because the epilogue fails to resolve these disparities in any structural framework, the result is a lack of lucidity. The book is clearly not about NATO, and that is perhaps the root problem: the disparity between title and content. The question of the extent of the “strains” in the Alliance is not fully developed. Early in the volume, Niedhart concludes that with all the difficulties of Ostpolitik, “the overarching agreement on common Western interests was never called into question” (38). The same conclusion could apply to many of the essays and to the volume as a whole, and indeed the editors refer to “cycles of co-operation and conflict” (355) but fail to discuss whether the 1970s were special or unique in witnessing this pattern. The editors ask how “does the new research presented here affect our understanding of post-war American diplomacy and Western European responses to American predominance (and relative decline) within the Atlantic Alliance?” Unfortunately, the reader is left with an incomplete response to that question.
The book under review explores the “changing dynamics [and dilemmas] of transatlantic relations during the era of détente (1969-1980)” and their repercussions on Europe. The overarching argument developed from the articles assembled in The Strained Alliance is that during the 1970s transatlantic relations were more “strained” then in the decades before. A second major argument is that European integration no longer moved forward as a consequence of U.S. support, as it largely did in the 1950s, but rather as an unintended side-effect of U.S. leadership failures: Some of these were simply policy or (non-)communication failures, while others could be subsumed under the heading of U.S. nationalism or unilateralism which sometimes alienated the Europeans from the United States and triggered moves leading to further European integration. The third point the book helps to clarify is that divergent diplomatic cultures and Vietnam with its financial consequences were important factors explaining why the United States government frequently failed to respond constructively to what went on in the Community of Europe; while on the European side discontent with U.S. policies, economic and monetary rationales and the growing awareness of Western Europe’s political muteness were the main driving forces for initiatives to strengthen the voice and political leverage of Western Europe by means of the European Community and European Political Cooperation in foreign policy matters (EPC). Finally, the book underlines what kept the Alliance together despite the fact that conflicts of interest and of vision became clearly more frequent and acute than they were in the 1950s and for most of the 1960s.

I thank all the reviewers for their attentive reading of the book. Klaus Kiran Patel’s review puts the book into the wider context of historical scholarship on the transatlantic partnership, which so far has focused on the years from Truman to Johnson with very little on the years from Nixon onwards. He fully recognizes the implications which the interpretations put forward may have for the wider scholarly debate on the relative autonomy of European integration from U.S. leadership: The book reveals that the classical interpretation which portrays European integration largely as a consequence of constructive American influence,1 no longer holds for the 1970s. Therefore we are looking forward to the scholarly debate to come.

I shall respond to the weaknesses pointed out and criticism rather than comment on the favorable remarks. Patel’s criticism that transatlantic social ties and networks as well as business links should have received more attention in the book is certainly justified. In our defense, I may say that the editors originally encouraged proposals on transatlantic networks, and the drifting apart of social and political values. Yet the proposals received in this regard were, from our point of view too few and too marginal to make a substantive contribution, and either did not focus sufficiently on the transatlantic dimension, or did not

relate to the time period. We took this as an indication that it is too early to include scholarship in those emerging fields.

Gerhard L. Weinberg’s comments also fully vindicate our venture. His only substantive critique, like Patel’s, relates to issues not included in the book. However, his suggestion that we should have paid more attention to the Berlin agreement, the Arab countries, and the Camp David accords, strikes me as less convincing. While the Berlin accords are touched upon by Gottfried Niedhart, and the Camp David accords are mentioned in the book as the greatest success of the Carter presidency, neither of these treaties triggered a major conflict between the United States and its European allies. And this is what the book is essentially about. On the other hand, the transatlantic row over the Euro-Arab dialogue gets considerable attention in the contributions on the Year of Europe crisis. So the Middle Eastern dimension has been dealt with.

In the light of Weinberg’s very favorable mention of the editor’s introduction, I strongly disagree with some of Melissa P. Yeager’s comments. Many points claimed by Yeager to be missing or coming too late were in fact made in the book’s introduction. Her remarks also take little account of the scholarly context and the very purpose of the volume – which is to open up the field of transatlantic relations in the 1970s for scholarly debate among historians. While she recognizes the excellent quality of many of the contributions, she errs when reading the volume as a basic student textbook, wondering why the editors do not start by giving basic definitions and why the authors sometimes contradict each other or offer different perspectives on the same events. In my opinion, many of her comments are therefore simply misguided.

I am particularly struck by Yeager’s assertion that the book wants to be about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but does not fulfill that promise, or that it fails to define its object. The first part of the title to which she refers, The Strained Alliance, which gives only the theme of the book, must, of course, be seen in conjunction with the second part of the title, U.S.-European Relations from Nixon to Carter, which defines the book’s topic and puts the book’s Leitfaden in a much broader framework. Needless to say, the editors make the topic explicit in the promotional text (repeated preceding the book’s title page), in the preface (p. xiii), and in the introduction, where they state that the book analyzes the dynamics and difficulties of transatlantic relations both at bilateral and multiple institutional levels (and not only within NATO), not least because the military, political, economic and monetary levels of the Atlantic partnership were closely intertwined. How often did Nixon tell the Europeans that they could not have military protection without economic cooperation? Yeager’s main criticism strikes me therefore as wrong-headed. In fact, this point reminds me of a critically acclaimed New York Times bestseller entitled “The Burning Tigris”.2 Is this book about the river Tigris? And is the Tigris really burning? It is only in the second part of the title that the topic is really defined: “The Armenian Genocide and America’s Response”.

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There are, of course, many scholars before us – Geir Lundestad, Pascaline Winand, Frederic Bozo, Jeffrey Glen Giauque, for example – who have approached transatlantic relations in a similar, broader vein for the fifties and sixties. Ironically, the works that Yeager quotes in her references also deal with transatlantic relations in a broader context (i.e., Anne Deighton, Marc Trachtenberg).

The period covered by the book is also defined and justified in the introduction, where the changes in the U.S., French, and West German governments, the importance of Ostpolitik which ushered in a new period of East-West relations, the re-launching of “Europe” at the EC’s Hague Summit as well as the accelerating decline of the United States due to the Vietnam War are mentioned to justify the beginning in 1969. It ends with NATO’s dual track decision and its implementation, which signaled the crisis of détente and symbolized the attempt to find a new alliance consensus (pp. 1, 6, 8, 11, 14f., 16, 19).

The editors would have liked to have more on France, treated in detail only in the essays by Claudia Hiepel and Daniel Moeckli, in the volume. Our failure to attract French scholars tells a lot about the state of French-American relations around the time of the conference. But the book was not conceived with a view to having an equal number of contributions about the United States’ relations with France, Germany, and Britain, respectively. In fact, the book expressly eschews a perspective that reduces transatlantic relations to the sum of relations between nation-states. On the contrary, it was conceived to cover the main bones of contention which emerged between the United States and its European allies during this period within multiple institutional frameworks, including the European Community. Accordingly, the four chapters of the book reflect the themes the editors and authors identified as the most important ones: the transatlantic debate about Ostpolitik, the collapse of Bretton Woods, the Year of Europe crisis and its mid-term impact, and, both falling in the Carter Years (1977-1979), the second dollar crisis and the missile question. The implications of three of those issues for the European Community form a main portion of the book.

In the light of this thematic structure, Yeager’s artificial division of the book into articles about nation-states – about Germany and those about “everything else” is misplaced - it reveals her focus on the nation-state but does not reflect the organization of the book. If West Germany receives more attention than its European neighbors we have to bear in mind, first, that Ostpolitik was primarily a German-American exercise of cooperation in ‘dealing with the enemy’. This means that the first chapter necessarily deals heavily with West Germany, but it also does so from an American standpoint. The other chapters, on the contrary, are more balanced. Second, as the book makes clear, West Germany was at the peak of its relative power during the 1970s in economic, financial, military and political terms within the Western alliance – not least because of the extraordinary British weakness and France’s absence from NATO’s integrated command structure (both mentioned in the book). Third, West Germany was also at the center of discussions concerning the dollar crises and the resolution of the EC’s monetary problems, and, forth, also at the center of the missile question, since the deployment or not of Cruise Missiles and Pershings concerned not only, but chiefly West Germany. So whereas a book on
transatlantic strains in the 1960s would deal heavily with President de Gaulle, this book deals more heavily with West Germany. Still, the most important British figures in European and transatlantic affairs during these years, Prime Ministers Edward Heath, Harold Wilson, James Callaghan, and Roy Jenkins, President of the European Commission, receive due attention (see book’s index).

Although she overwhelmingly praises the contributions, Yeager’s criticism of individual authors is, in my opinion, too schematic and, for the most part, unjustified. When Sarah Snyder describes Henry Kissinger as mediating “between NATO and the Soviets” during the Helsinki talks, contrary to Yeager’s criticism, Snyder is perfectly right in describing the ambivalent American role. NATO’s position during the Helsinki talks was defined essentially by the governments of the EC members’ states. Although the U.S. was a member of NATO, Secretary of State Kissinger effectively mediated – thus sidelining the Europeans, but with a view to concluding the talks successfully. Yeager’s remark that Kissinger’s relations with the Europeans during the Helsinki talks were therefore "antagonistic", does not reflect Snyder’s findings, according to which Kissinger kept a distance, but remained cooperative. Similarly, Yeager’s assertion that the editors introduce in their conclusion findings which contradict the book when they credit Ford with having improved U.S.-European relations, is incorrect: Schulz’s article gives a detailed account of how under Ford, U.S.-European relations improved. Yeager’s statement that there is a contradiction between Hubert Zimmermann’s analysis of the unravelling of monetary ties with the editors’ conclusion that economic connections across the Atlantic remained strong, is also misleading, as monetary ties on the one hand, and trade, investment or industrial connections on the other hand, are not the same thing. Yeager’s assertion that the last part of the book, contradicting claims by the editors, is not based on archival materials is also incorrect. There have been fewer archival materials accessible for this period, as the introduction makes clear, but the Schmidt archives, the Carter Library’s archives and the GDR archives, have been exploited for the articles concerning the Carter years.

Finally, while Yeager notes that the "(Western) Europeans” are not defined in the book, in fact in the introduction the editors refer several times to the United States’ partners in the Atlantic alliance, most of which were also members of the European Community and began to act collectively as members of the EC on the world stage. Of course, different institutions with different members – the Helsinki conference, G-7 – make the world and transatlantic relations more complex, and not every reader may like this. But even though Ireland and Switzerland were not American military allies, and Switzerland and Norway, for example, were not members of the EC, I think all authors of the volume make a reasonable scholarly compromise between complexity and intelligibility when they call the American Allies of this period simply “Western Europeans”.

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Response by Thomas A. Schwartz, University of Vanderbilt

I want to thank the three reviewers for taking the time to provide Professor Schulz and me these critiques. It is very gratifying for an author, or in this case an editor, to respond to a serious reading and analysis of your work, especially since we live in an age of short and superficial sound bites which pass for meaningful debate. Let me first acknowledge that our volume does show the signs of emerging from a conference. As anyone who has ever tried to put together an academic conference knows, it makes the concept of “herding cats” seem like child’s play. The papers presented will overlap, disagree, and occasionally not even cover everything they promised they would. It is often difficult to cover every subject one might deem important, or to do so in the right proportion. But conferences are still one of few places where lively academic debate and interchange can take place, and where an edited volume can emerge.

Let me just say a word about the conference. It did take place in Nashville, Tennessee in September 2004, during the last phases of a very intense electoral campaign in the United States. Those of you with any memory know this was a difficult time for the Atlantic alliance, with most Europeans – and many Americans - alienated from American foreign policy and the war in Iraq. George Bush’s local campaign office was directly across the street from the hotel where we put our European participants, and I think a number of them wanted to protest the location! In effect, we did find ourselves talking about the strains in the Alliance during the 1970s at the same time we were living through a similar tension. That provided both a certain spark to our debate but also gave us some sense of historical perspective, and perhaps even a sense of “this too will pass.”

I mention this because of Professor Gerhard Weinberg’s remark that “in some ways it all looks rather like squabbles inside a rather large family.” As a middle child in a family of seven, I couldn’t agree more! Indeed, there are historians who have used the concept of a family as a way to approach NATO and the alliance.¹ My own preference is to think in terms of cycles of cooperation and conflict, with the long 1970s capturing one of these cycles. Professor Weinberg notes that the volume misses the significance of the Camp David Accords in helping to contain one area of US-European conflict. But other aspects of the Middle East certainly continued to bedevil the alliance, and I would hope our volume might encourage continuing research on this subject.

I also appreciate Professor Melissa Yearer-Pine’s discussion of this volume. Indeed, her descriptions, occasional praise, and sharp criticism of these articles make clear what we were debating at our conference. And while Professor Longwood finds it a weakness of our volume that we as editors have not ironed out all the differences in interpretation and emphasis from our heterogeneous group of European and American scholars, I would argue that this is a strength of the volume. It is a fashionable cliché, but history is an argument without end, and this volume hopes to keep that argument going.

¹ Frank Costigliola, "The Nuclear Family: Tropes of Gender and Pathology in the Western Alliance," Diplomatic History (Spring 1997), 163-83
I would also plead guilty to the criticism from Professors Kiran Patel and Yeager-Pine that the volume leans toward Germany in its treatment of Europe. This was not intentional, but I suppose with a team named Schwartz and Schulz, it may have been a little inevitable. Seriously, we certainly sought as multinational a participant list as we could, but the emphasis on Germany may well reflect Germany’s power during this era, as well as the greater availability of its archival sources than those from France. Let’s also face the fact that it is hard to treat every country in Europe in any scholarly collection that does not wish to be encyclopedic. Not all countries in Europe are equal in their diplomatic importance. Although Henry Kissinger did worry a lot about smaller European countries like Portugal and Spain, I doubt that neutral Ireland’s entry into the E.C. kept him up at night.

This does not mean I don’t recognize our shortcomings in this volume. Eurocommunism, of the sort that did keep Kissinger awake at night, does not receive the attention it should have in this volume. The second half of the decade is not as fully addressed as the earlier part of the period. I agree with Professor Weinberg that the volume needed much greater attention to the Camp David accords and to the role of the Middle East in US-European tensions in the second half of the decade. Professor Patel might be interested to know that in our original call for papers for the conference, we did seek to draw together historians doing more traditional topics of diplomatic history with newer areas of inquiry such as the rise of the mass media, transnational movements like the peace movement, and economic interdependence and globalism. We didn’t receive anywhere near the numbers or quality of papers on these subjects, which probably reflects the still nascent aspect of these fields but also that we may have advertised in the wrong venues. Patel is correct that we need to bring these different areas of study into conversation with each other. Perhaps our volume can help start that effort. We hoped to bring to a wider audience the results of a distinguished group of scholars on issues of significance to the Alliance in the 1970s. Implicit in our effort was the idea that US-European relations need to be understood in historical context, and that as new archival material became available, this should come into the debate. I think these commentaries do indicate that we succeeded in this effort.