

Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction by Paul A. Gilje</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review by Kathleen DuVal</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review by Eliga H. Gould</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review by Matthew Rainbow Hale</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review by Eric Hinderaker</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author’s Response by Leonard J. Sadosky</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Very once in awhile along comes a young historian who writes a book that approaches a well-worn subject with a fresh perspective. Leonard Sadosky fits this description. *Revolutionary Negotiations* combines the history of Native Americans with American diplomatic history from the late colonial period to the Jacksonian era. The result is a work which is unique and provocative, compelling the reader to rethink the course of American relations with other countries and with Native Americans. Each of the commentators in this round table recognize this contribution.

Kathleen DuVal, whose own work is on the intersection of empires and Native Americans in the Mississippi Valley, believes that Sadosky combines narratives that we already know separately and helps us to see that a multicultural history is also a transnational history. DuVal’s major criticism is that Sadosky writes more from the European-American perspective and has not provided Native Americans with enough of a voice of their own. In a largely laudatory review, perhaps DuVal could have taken a little more time to develop this criticism. She is correct that Sadosky is writing from the perspective of the European Americans who created the United States. I would like to have known what she thinks would be gained by adding Indian voices more forcefully. Since Sadosky centers his story on changing conceptions in the European-American world toward Native Americans, arguing that there was a shift from looking at Native Americans as separate nations who had to be dealt with diplomatically in a fashion similar to European nations, to a world where they were considered dependent nations who could be dictated to, what would be gained by adding more Indian voices in reaction to this process? Is DuVal simply being politically correct by calling for more Native American agency, or is there something of greater substance to be gained from this approach? Since her own work argues that Native Americans often dictated the terms of interaction in the colonial period, I suspect the latter. But it would have been nice if DuVal had been more explicit in showing us how Sadosky could have pursued this course.

Eric Hinderaker is another historian whose work concentrates on the interior of the continent, Native Americans, and the borders of empire. While DuVal writes about the Mississippi, Hinderaker studies the Ohio River Valley. Hinderaker’s review points out that Sadosky has written a series of “linked thematic essays” rather than a straight narrative, but like DuVal and the other reviewers, he recognizes that Sadosky has shed “new light” on the subject by placing “Indian relations” next to “traditional European-centered diplomacy.” Calling Sadosky’s argument familiar in detail, he sees it as cumulatively “novel.” The book is thus “illuminating” with “striking insights.” These are high words of praise and Hinderaker spends much of his review summarizing several of Sadosky’s key points and compliments especially Sadosky’s discussion of the relationship between the Monroe Doctrine and the Jackson Doctrine (Sadosky’s term) concerning the removal of Indians to the West. Hinderaker does criticize the selective nature of the stories Sadosky has chosen to tell, suggesting that he gives short shrift to the Seven Years War and should have spent more time on the military campaigns during the Revolutionary War. Perhaps Hinderaker should have pushed this line of criticism further. Ultimately Hinderaker is right. Sadosky is
selective in his stories. Such a selectivity is fine, but Sadosky could have been clearer as to the rationale behind how he chose the stories. The book jumps over huge sections of both Native American and diplomatic history in the period. No doubt Sadosky needed to do so to keep the book moving along and prevent it from ballooning into some behemoth 600 page tome. But at times, and I say this as a huge admirer of the book, I was not sure if Sadosky excluded material for any rational reason, or if he was just running out of time and space as he was writing the book.

Both DuVal and Hinderaker are scholars whose work speaks to the Native American content of Sadosky's book. The next two reviewers are more historians of the Atlantic world and therefore more concerned with European-American diplomacy. Mathew Hale studies the diplomacy of the early American republic. He summarizes much of Sadosky’s book, finding it praiseworthy and provocative. His biggest criticism is that he wishes that Sadosky had addressed a number of historiographical issues more directly. In particular Hale notes three areas where he thinks Sadosky could have been more up front with his historiographical positioning: issues concerning the origins of the Constitution, questions about the role of race in Indian policy, and the relationship between sovereignty and states rights (Hale calls it “persistent federalism”). In the first instance, Sadosky does a good job of outlining his position at several points in the book without picking a fight with those who might disagree with his emphasis on the weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation. In the second instance, Sadosky's argument – explained best in a footnote cited by Hale – does not exclude race and merely reflects Sadosky's interests: diplomacy and politics as opposed to race (plenty of other books cover race). Finally, Sadosky ends his book just as sectional issues of states rights became increasingly important. Moreover, that story is not directly relevant to the transition Sadosky traces in the diplomatic position of Native peoples.

Eliga Gould is one of the leaders in a new Atlantic history of the American revolutionary era, having written a book on British perspectives on empire before and during the American Revolution. Gould therefore welcomes Sadosky’s effort to write an “international history” of the founding era. He believes that the book is “original” and an “important contribution” that connects the Atlantic world and the continental history of the native peoples of North America to the American Revolution. Gould sees the book as moving Native American history beyond ethnography and offering a model for the study of subsystems of diplomacy elsewhere which are similar to the diplomacy of the Native Americans, citing Saint Domingue (Haiti) as an example of an area which could benefit from Sadosky’s methodology. Gould finds little to criticize in the book. Although I agree with every positive word in his review, I wonder if Gould could have shifted his focus a little and ask if Sadosky has really contributed as much as he could have to the Atlantic world of the British Empire and the more traditional diplomatic history of the early republic. In many ways, although Sadosky does write an “international history,” ultimately his aim is to explain changes in the policy of the United States toward Indians, and not so much changes and patterns of foreign policy within the British empire and the early republic.

Take these four reviews together and you get a real sense of Sadosky’s achievement. Whatever their criticisms, and in all instances the reviewers found little to criticize, there is no question that Sadosky has combined Native American and diplomatic history in an
original and compelling formulation. Although ultimately the book helps us to understand Native American history more than diplomatic history, Sadosky will change the way we think and the way we teach the period.

Participants:

Leonard J. Sadosky is an independent scholar. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Virginia. A specialist in Colonial and Revolutionary American, he is co-editor with Peter Nicolaisen, Peter S. Onuf, and Andrew J. O’Shaughnessy of The Old World and the New World: America and Europe in the Age of Jefferson (2010), the subject of a forthcoming roundtable; co-author with Peter S. Onuf of Jeffersonian America (2002); and "Reimagining the British Empire and America in an Age of Revolution: The Case of William Eden." in The Old World and the New World: America and Europe in the Age of Jefferson (2010).

Kathleen DuVal is associate professor of history at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill and the author of The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent (2006) and Interpreting a Continent: Voices from Colonial America, co-authored with her father, the literary translator John DuVal. She is currently writing a history of the American Revolution on the Gulf Coast.


Eliga H. Gould is an associate professor of history at the University of New Hampshire. He is the author of The Persistence of Empire: British political Culture in the Age of the American Revolution (2000) and is finishing a book on the American Revolution and the legal transformation of the European Atlantic.


Eric Hinderaker is professor of history at the University of Utah. His most recent book, The Two Hendricks: Unraveling a Mohawk Mystery (Harvard University Press, 2010), includes a sustained consideration of Anglo-Iroquois diplomacy. He is also the author of “Diplomacy between Britons and Native Americans in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” in Huw Bowen, Elizabeth Mancke, and John Reid, eds., Britain’s Oceanic Empire: Projecting Imperium in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean Worlds, ca. 1550-1800 (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
In the early 1750s, Archibald Kennedy, New York’s Collector of Customs, imagined a union strong enough to withstand the inevitable next war against France. In Kennedy’s vision, Britain’s disparate colonies and allied Indian nations would form a mutually beneficial military and commercial union while maintaining their separate governance and separate relations with London. Kennedy’s plan got no further than the Albany Congress of 1754, but his prescriptions highlight the main point of Leonard J. Sadosky’s *Revolutionary Negotiations*, that these were interrelated concerns: imperial-colonial relations, diplomacy between Indians and colonists, and questions of how much sovereignty individual colonies held.

In this well-written and fast-paced account, Sadosky puts the American Revolution and early republic back in their international context, and he defines *international* as broadly as late eighteenth-century British colonists and early Americans would have. The United States was a weak newcomer in relation not only to European and North African powers but also to American Indian nations, who had shaped how diplomacy was conducted in North America before and since the arrival of Europeans. Simultaneously, the competing sovereignty of the thirteen (and growing) states inserted itself into these other diplomatic realms, adding another dimension to foreign policy. It is in combining these players that *Revolutionary Negotiations* makes its most significant contribution.

These are stories we already know separately. In undergraduate courses and textbooks, the standard narrative of the American Revolution travels, like *Revolutionary Negotiations*, through imperial financial crisis and Pontiac’s War in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War, through the increasing and ultimately successful drive toward independence and the new nation’s shaky start amid Barbary Pirates, British continuing occupation of western forts, and Ohio Valley Indians again defending their border. After the Constitution, the nation gradually gains its diplomatic legs through the early 1800s, including the ironies of Jefferson’s centralization of power during his presidency. This is a well-worn path, and David Nichols’s recent *Red Gentlemen and White Savages: Indians, Federalists, and the Search for Order on the American Frontier* (Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2008) is more original in its inclusion of Indian perspectives on the diplomacy of the early republic. Sadosky’s version presents this era from the perspective of colonists and then American citizens.

Still, Sadosky’s book is both enjoyable and important. He tells the stories beautifully, with fascinating yet never overwhelming detail. He draws together scholarship on American diplomatic history, the history of U.S.-Indian relations, and questions of federalism and states’ rights and weaves them into a story more representative of diplomacy at the time. Writing diplomatic history that treats Indians and Europeans as presenting somewhat similar problems and opportunities for the United States is tremendously important and effective. By beginning in the mid-eighteenth century, Sadosky puts the early republic in a long chronologic context, showing how the concerns of the past continued. These choices
restore the era’s contingency, despite the predicable end of rising U.S. power and the (eventual) decline of everyone else.

Sadosky makes good use of proposals that, like Archibald Kennedy’s, went nowhere and of conflicting assumptions about relative power and how that power would shape the future. Sadosky shows both how things might have gone differently and how rival agendas assumed vastly different relationships among the sovereign and semi-sovereign powers in question. American diplomats successful in their wartime diplomacy with France imagined that their new nation was a much bigger player than it really was, even as European and Indian diplomats believed the United States would have little influence and probably would not last long anyway. Briton William Eden in 1777 and 1778 argued for a federated system of self-governing American states within the British empire. The state of Georgia brought state militia troops to the 1796 Treaty of Colerain with the Creek Indians, surprising federal commissioners, who “found themselves, for all intents and purposes, engaged in negotiation with the state of Georgia before they could even think about beginning their planned negotiation with the Creek Indians” (169). Federal commissioners in turn feared that Creeks would not trust or even attend the negotiations if the Georgia militia seemed to be in charge. Those Creeks who did come simply laughed when the Georgia commissioners presented them with a bill for $110,000 in lost property. The undermined federal commissioners, more aware of Creek power than the Georgians, could only write a report detailing the Georgians’ “high self-created pretensions” (174).

Federal and Creek diplomats share bemused astonishment at Georgians’ presumption. George Washington in 1789 sits at a desk covered in memos detailing how Europeans and Indians have slighted U.S. sovereignty. Out of scenes like these, Sadosky constructs a much-needed model for a new early American diplomatic history. Rather than leaving Indian relations to the field of American Indian history, this kind of diplomatic history treats Indians, Europeans, and Americans on the same plane. It recognizes commonalities between, say, European diplomatic protocols and Indian ceremonies of negotiation. Revolutionary Negotiations will help historians find a scope and vocabulary that place these concerns as close in our histories as they were in reality. Sadosky moves us toward a narrative of American history that not only is more multicultural and more transnational but that shows us those were sometimes the same thing.
On July 4, 1776, Congress adopted its famous declaration signaling the intention of thirteen of Britain’s North American colonies to become independent states. As everyone knows — and as Congress said in the opening sentence of the Declaration — doing so required Americans “to dissolve the political bands” that had connected them to the British crown and people. But for the new American states, independence also entailed joining the other sovereign “Powers of the earth,” meaning, in practice, the sovereign powers of Europe.\(^1\) As Americans at the time realized, their bid for sovereign statehood was both an act of secession from Britain and an act for inclusion in Europe.

Leonard J. Sadosky’s *Revolutionary Negotiations* is a welcome and timely intervention in what he calls the “international history” of the American founding. “The American Revolution,” Sadosky reminds us, “was an event in international history, and thus an event with an international history” (p. 2). For citizens of the new United States, this fact raised two fundamental questions: how would the new states interact with the sovereign states of Europe, and how would they interact with each other? Because of the United States’ relative weakness vis-à-vis Europe’s maritime powers, Americans lacked the capacity to answer the question about transatlantic relations unilaterally, and it took them two attempts — the Articles of Confederation (1776) and the Constitution (1787) — to come up with a satisfactory answer to the question about the states’ relations with each other. But the revolution raised a set of equally difficult questions about how Americans would interact with nations that lacked sovereign status (as the concept was understood by Europeans). In particular, the revolution forced both Anglo-Americans and Native Americans to consider what the new states’ relationship would be with the people whom the Declaration of Independence misleadingly, but also revealingly, called “merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and condition.”\(^2\) Sadosky’s answer will surprise no one (and is not meant to): “the achievement of full American sovereignty [during the second quarter of the nineteenth century] came at the expense of [the sovereignty] of other nations,” especially the Indians (p. 9). In explaining how Americans and Indians arrived at this point, however, Sadosky makes a number of salient and important points.

Sadosky situates his analysis of the American Revolution’s international history in three distinct but connected settings. The first is the “Westphalian system” that guided relations among the European powers between the end of the Thirty Years’ War in 1648 and the wars of the French Revolution. This system, which takes its name from the Peace of


\(^2\) Greene, ed., *Colonies to Nation*, 300.
Westphalia (1648), depended on a set of shared norms that gave European rulers absolute sovereignty over their own internal affairs, that treated their territory as inviolable, and that required them to interact with each other as equals. As Sadosky shows, these principles, which also functioned as imperatives, eventually created a powerful incentive for the thirteen North American states that declared independence from Britain to form a “more prefect union” (meaning a more centralized union with a stronger federal government) in the Constitution of 1787. For most of the colonial era, however, the European powers lacked the resources necessary to impose the absolutist structures of post-Westphalia Europe on their subjects in the Americas, whether the subjects were indigenous peoples or their own colonists. As a result, relations between Europeans, European colonists, and Indians evolved into a New World variant of the Westphalian system that Sadosky calls a “borderland diplomatic regime.” Although neither European colonies nor Indian nations were sovereign polities as jurists in Europe understood the term, both functioned as quasi-sovereign actors in the diplomatic subsystem that emerged in the borderlands — and, we might add, waters — of the Western Atlantic. In the resulting “middle ground,” Indians and Europeans interacted on terms of rough equality, à la diplomatic relations in Europe. But because this equality required Europeans to accept, at least provisionally, the legitimacy of non-European customs and practices, their interactions occurred beyond the pale of Europe’s own diplomatic republic.

The third system in Sadosky’s analysis is the union that the new American states created for themselves, first in the Articles of Confederation that Congress drafted in 1776, followed by the Constitution that the delegates to the Philadelphia convention submitted for ratification in 1787. Although the goal of both unions was to enable the United States to participate as equal(s) in the Westphalian system in Europe, Sadosky notes that both Congress and the states continued to interact with Indians as sovereigns. For this reason, Indian diplomacy carried far-reaching implications for the structure and disposition of power within the new state and federal governments. Significantly, the first treaty — and therefore the first precedent-setting treaty — that the Washington administration negotiated under the new Constitution was the Treaty of New York (1790) with the Creek Nation. Yet because the Constitution established the undisputed sovereignty of the United States government, the consolidation of the post-1787 union ultimately heralded the end of the Indians’ autonomy. Although other factors, notably the racism and insatiable land-hunger of white settlers, played a role as well, Americans came to view the state and Indian sovereignty upon which the borderland diplomatic regime had depended as incompatible with what Sadosky, borrowing from the political scientist Daniel Deudney, calls the

---

3 The term “middle ground” is a reference to Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (Cambridge and New York, 1991). Although White approached the subject of European-Indian relations from the standpoint of cultural anthropology, it is worth noting that the relations that he discussed were, in fact, diplomatic relations.
“Philadelphian system” (p. 121).\(^4\) By the second decade of the nineteenth century, Indians were no longer a sovereign people (or peoples), but members of “domestic dependent nations,” as Chief Justice John Marshall wrote in *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia* (1831).

The result is an original and important contribution to early American history, broadly conceived. Sadosky writes lucidly and well, and he demonstrates, as few other historians have managed to do, that the Atlantic and continental/Indian Country dimensions of the American Revolution were not distinct spheres, but linked. Building on the so-called “new Indian history,” especially the work of Eric Hinderaker, he shows that Native Americans were formidable diplomatic actors in their own right — in Europe, if not of it.\(^5\) Sadosky also makes a convincing case for the role that the Indians’ diplomatic capacity played in determining the shape and scope of both of the American federal unions. In addition, Sadosky’s use of diplomatic history to elucidate developments in Indian Country serves as a useful reminder of the benefits of moving beyond the ethnography that is still the preferred approach among practitioners of Indian history. These are all significant achievements, and they should guarantee *Revolutionary Negotiations* a wide and appreciative readership.

Most important of all, though, Sadosky’s book raises questions that other historians could profitably investigate. Foremost among these is the question of how the history of the borderland diplomatic regime in North America relates to the history of diplomatic subsystems elsewhere in the extra-European Atlantic. For reasons that are not entirely clear, Indian history tends to be studied in isolation from the history of other non-European peoples, including, notably, Africans. Insofar as American and Atlantic historians have approached the history of either group from the standpoint of “connected” or entangled history, they have generally done so by investigating connections between each group and metropolitan Europe. Yet the history of blacks and Indians was also entangled with each other in ways that played a crucial role in shaping the history of each. In the French Caribbean, the slave insurrections on Guadeloupe and St. Domingue raised many of the same questions as the struggle over sovereignty in Indian Country. Significantly, in their dealings with Toussaint Louverture, St. Domingue’s *de facto* leader during the late 1790s, the United States and Britain used the same legal and diplomatic devices as they did when dealing with the Indian nations of North America. Emancipated slaves on St. Domingue seem to have been aware of these connections as well, taking Haiti, which was what the Taino Indians originally called the island of Hispaniola, as the name of the independent nation that they proclaimed in 1804.\(^6\) Nor did such linkages run in only one

---


\(^5\) Eric Hinderaker, *The Two Hendricks: Unraveling a Mohawk Mystery* (Cambridge, Mass.).

\(^6\) Laurent Dubois, *Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 2004), 299. This was not the only such example. In 1802, the St. Domingue leader Jean-Jacques Dessalines adopted the name “army of the Incas” for his soldiers; also, in the Haitian Declaration of Independence, the
direction. Because of the Floridas’ proximity to the Caribbean, the Haitian Revolution was a recurring presence in the Creek and Seminole wars of the early nineteenth century, serving as a model for William Augustus Bowles’s short-lived State of Muskogee (1799-1803), helping to inspire the Negro Fort that the United States navy destroyed in 1816, and giving American settlers and officials an excuse to invade and, eventually seize Florida from Spain. Although reduction to the status of dependent nationhood placed unusually harsh burdens on Native Americans, they were by no means the only people to suffer such a fate.

Because they lie beyond the scope of Sadosky’s book, he does not deal with these questions, and it would be unfair to expect him to do have done so. Taken on its own terms, *Revolutionary Negotiations* is an impressive book. By helping to bridge one gap in the scholarship — that between the Atlantic and continental dimensions of the American Revolution — Sadosky lays down markers that will be of use to historians who are interested in bridging other, equally entrenched divides. That, ultimately, is one of the most important things that a good book does. Leonard Sadosky is to be congratulated for having produced such a work.

---

In *Revolutionary Negotiations: Indians, Empires, and Diplomats in the Founding of America*, Leonard J. Sadosky illuminates the linkages between efforts to construct a strong American union and attempts to establish useful ties with various Indian and European nations. According to the author, these seemingly disparate developments “are rendered more explicable, and their interconnections illuminated, through an appreciation and examination of the international context of the American Founding.” (2) In particular, Sadosky focuses attention on the Euro-centric “states system,” which he defines “as a network of interacting polities, tied together via real and observable relationships of negotiation and exchange—relationships with the potential for mutual cooperation, or conflict and subsequent resolution.” (6) The “Westphalian system,” which “was rooted in the principles of the inviolability of state sovereignty, territoriality, and state equality,” proved especially durable, for even though this Old World mode of conducting international affairs emerged “in the wake of the Thirty Years' War (at the eponymous 1648 Peace of Westphalia),” it nonetheless powerfully shaped the actions of eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Indian leaders and Euro-American diplomats. (6) The founding and early maturation of the United States was, in that sense, less a clear break from the European states system than an unexpected offshoot of the preexisting regime.

In chapter one, Sadosky develops this argument by focusing on some colonists’ and British officials’ attempts to restructure the Empire. In particular, he asserts that individuals like Edmond Atkin, Archibald Kennedy, and Charles Wyndham, Earl of Egremont promoted greater integration of the colonies and various Indian tribes into the imperial network because they feared both a Franco-Spanish-Indian alliance and the colonies’ self-serving, narrow perspectives on inter-colonial and Euro-Indian affairs. In chapter two, Sadosky turns his attention to the year and a half period leading to the Declaration of Independence, during which representatives in the Second Continental Congress accumulated various pillars of sovereignty. According to the author, the irony in this drift toward separation from Britain was not only that American leaders approached questions of sovereignty with great reluctance, but also that they did so by drawing upon preexisting concepts of the interconnectedness of Euro-American relations, Indian-American affairs, and the ties between colonies. As Sadosky writes, “one of the foremost” reasons for declaring American independence “was the perceived necessity of rationalizing, regularizing, and legalizing the Thirteen Colonies' relationships with the other sovereign powers of the European-centered world.” (72)

Chapter three addresses American revolutionaries’ attempts to build upon the Declaration of Independence by securing formal recognition, as well as material assistance, from France. Success in those attempts did not translate into smooth international relations for the United States, however. Rather, the heated controversy surrounding Britain’s Carlisle Commission of 1778, as well as the rocky negotiations leading to the Peace of Paris (1783), demonstrated that integration into the European-centered states system posed almost as many problems as it resolved. In chapter four, Sadosky argues that Congressional difficulties dealing with European and Indian nations in the 1780s combined to engender a
“diplomatic imperative for reforming the Articles of Confederation and ratifying the resulting federal Constitution of 1787.” (10) After a discussion of John Adams’s unproductive attempts to address Anglo-American commercial issues, the author insightfully characterizes the 1784 Fort Stanwix Treaty negotiations as an instance of how “disorder on the frontier between the United States and the Indian country was a reality that rendered a stronger Confederation” a necessity. (138)

The clash between Federalist and Democratic-Republican notions of diplomacy and federal authority occupies the center of chapter five. Although Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton, and Washington initially agreed on an array of issues, including broad executive power in the realm of foreign relations, Federalist attempts to exert a strong hand during the crises of the 1790s pushed Democratic-Republicans to reemphasize the sovereignty of the states. The sixth and last chapter documents the Indian and European diplomacy of the Jefferson and Madison administrations, which resulted in the War of 1812 and the outbreak of military hostilities with southern Creeks and northwestern Shawnees. Despite these diplomatic failures, the United States successfully maneuvered in the 1810s to preserve (or obtain) access to European markets and to bludgeon defiant Indians into submission.

The way in which Native peoples suffered in the War of 1812 era is not simply a sidelight for Sadosky. Instead, one of the book’s major themes is the degree to which the establishment of the American states system within the larger, albeit rapidly changing, European states system effectively marginalized previously influential Indians. Whereas groups like the Iroquois in the early and middle decades of the eighteenth century took advantage of relatively weak colonial governments, inter-colonial frictions, and imperial competition to secure for themselves a prominent role in the pre-revolutionary Westphalian system, by the 1810s British proposals for an Indian buffer state were confidently rebuffed by American diplomats at the Treaty of Ghent. Along the same lines, the “[Andrew] Jackson Doctrine of 1814,” which “sought to undermine the sovereignty of the Indian nations and render them dependent,” helped the United States “deny” to Indians “everything” Americans “had sought for themselves in the first War of Independence—recognition and sustained dialogue with the European powers in order to facilitate commerce.” (200) Native peoples were thus increasingly marginalized within the Euro-centric states system, so much so that from the 1820s forward, Indians encountered the international states system primarily through insidious federal subsidies and the martial aggressiveness of the United States government.

The overarching story of budding American power and diminishing Indian sovereignty is brought to life with style and vivid detail in the prologue and epilogue. The former surveys the South Carolinian and English peregrinations of a minor Scots aristocrat named Alexander Cuming as a way of portraying the haphazard and rather formless nature of Indian, colonial, and imperial diplomacy in the second decade of the eighteenth century. The latter highlights former attorney general William Wirt’s unsuccessful legal efforts on behalf of Cherokee sovereignty in 1830-31 in order to dramatize the “eclipse” of Native power in the eastern half of North America. (213) Sadosky makes clear, therefore, that there were winners and losers in the century-long struggle over diplomacy and sovereignty. Indeed, while striking continuities undergirded the transition from the
Westphalian system of the Old Regime to the federal framework of the American union, equally striking discontinuities marked the Indian-American relationship from 1730 to 1830. Taken as a whole, then, Sadosky's book is a well-researched, penetrating analysis of the way in which diplomatic initiatives tied together Euro-American, Indian-American, intercolonial, and interstate relations in the British colonial and early national eras. The great strength of this work, in that sense, is the bird’s eye view the author provides of a transatlantic states system in motion. Indeed, the “key structural changes” he documents speak to a momentous shift from the law of nations to modern international law. (5) At the same time, Sadosky develops his argument in such a way as to make little known stories of the American borderland matter—and matter not just for their own sake, but for the way in which they revealed and shaped the diplomatic interweaving of local, regional, national, and international forces. Although some Americanists may find Sadosky’s references to the Westphalian states system jarring, it is precisely because of his keen understanding of the Old World mode of conducting international affairs that the colonial, revolutionary, and early republican eras appear in a new light. In sum, Sadosky has written a model study of what he calls the “the political culture of diplomacy.” (5)

Of course, like all good works of scholarship, Revolutionary Negotiations provokes almost as many questions as it answers, and I accordingly put forth a series of questions revolving around various historiographical issues. None of these questions is meant to suggest that Sadosky should have written a different book; he had enough on his plate with the “Indians, Empires, and Diplomats” mentioned in the subtitle. Yet there are elements of the argument that invite not only a rethinking of old assumptions, but also an elaboration of emergent paradigms. How revolutionary, to put it bluntly, is Revolutionary Negotiations? And how exactly would Sadosky “negotiate” his way around or into or through current historiographical thickets?

The first set of questions has to do with the Constitution. Ever since the publication of The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 in 1969, Gordon Wood’s argument about federalists seeking to constrain the democratic excesses of the states has served as the standard explanation of the coming of the Constitution.1 In the last decade, a number of scholars have challenged Wood’s thesis by reviving the nineteenth-century idea that a perception of the Confederation’s weaknesses both propelled the movement leading to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and decisively shaped the document that was produced


13 | P a g e
in that Convention. Sadosky’s book clearly buttresses the scholarship of those who take issue with The Creation of the American Republic. But what, then, should we do with Wood’s influential argument? Should it be drastically revised? Should it be discarded? One (somewhat easy) answer to these questions would be to say that the two theses are not mutually exclusive. Perhaps. But even if that response is the best answer, we still would be left with the problem of determining how exactly these rather divergent constitutional imperatives related to one another. Did someone like Madison worry more about democratic excesses than he did about the Confederation’s weaknesses? Did the diplomatic imperative inform its democratic-excesses counterpart and vice versa? Did one of these two forces undergirding the Constitution predominate at a particular point in time or in a particular setting? Is there a way to satisfactorily answer such questions? If so, how?

The second set of historiographical questions deals with race and its relationship to Indian-American affairs. In a footnote, Sadosky challenges those scholars who “argue that racial animosity made” the dispossession of Native peoples “inevitable.” “While not dismissing the importance of emergent notions of racial difference in shaping the attitudes and actions of contemporaries,” he explains, “my argument sees political and diplomatic power as definitive, and thus allows for a strong measure of contingency in the interactions between Anglo-Americans and Americans through the end of the War of 1812.” (221) In light of many early Americanists’ emphasis on racial matters, this is a fascinating, bold assertion, and my first query on this topic is why Sadosky chose to put it in a footnote rather than in the introduction itself. Equally important, I wonder how exactly Sadosky determined that “political and diplomatic power” was “definitive,” especially since he does not dismiss (or address at length) the concept of racial difference as a major force “in shaping the attitudes and actions of contemporaries.” All historians make subjective judgments about relative weight, about the degree to which this factor rather than factor determined the outcome of events. But given Sadosky’s desire to forge a new diplomatic history, a “political culture of diplomacy,” is it even possible to separate out racial attitudes from formal expressions of political and diplomatic power? And considering Sadosky’s trenchant analysis of the interconnections between (historiographical and historical) realms previously considered disparate, why not analyze the degree to which racial (or ethnic or religious) perceptions influenced various states-systems imperatives and vice versa?

---

The third and final set of questions arises from Sadosky’s treatment of the relationship between emergent American sovereignty and persistent federalism. The author forcefully argues that the “full achievement of American sovereignty came at the expense of” Indian sovereignty. (9) This makes sense when it comes to the relationship between the federal government and various tribes like the Cherokees. Yet as Sadosky repeatedly points out, such power relationships should never be viewed in isolation, and numerous historians—especially those interested in sectional tensions leading to the Civil War—would surely take issue with the idea that the early nineteenth century witnessed the “full achievement of American sovereignty.” More to the point, recent scholarship on the early national borderlands shows that diplomatic fluidity and irregularity did not disappear simply because the United States had established hegemony over the Indians, nor even because British imperial power in North America diminished. How would Sadosky deal with, therefore, Peter Kastor’s work on Madisonian diplomacy in the southeastern borderlands, which convincingly shows that the federal government could not enforce its will in many areas? To what degree, in addition, were the filibusters and diplomatic entrepreneurs of the nineteenth century (including Andrew Jackson, who intermittently defied the central government in Washington) simply post-revolutionary versions of unofficial colonial adventurers like Alexander Cuming? Finally, what does Sadosky make of John Murrin’s statement that “Jeffersonians’ main weapon in this quest [for continental expansion]” was demography itself, the “ordinary citizens of the Republic” rather than a strong central state, federal sovereignty, or even a standing army?

No matter how Sadosky answers these questions, his book merits praise and a wide readership. Indeed, the mere fact that Revolutionay Negotiations provokes a rethinking of various historiographical assumptions is testimony to its coherence and cogency. Sadosky’s monograph brings into relief the connections between groups of people not always viewed as part of a single transatlantic system. It documents and explains fundamental changes in the nature of Indian-American relations. And perhaps most importantly, it shows how integral Euro-centric states-systems imperatives were to the founding and development of the American union.

3 Peter J. Kastor, “‘Motives of Peculiar Urgency’: Local Diplomacy in Louisiana, 1803-1821,” William and Mary Quarterly 58 (October 2001) 819-848.


Review by Eric Hinderaker, University of Utah

Less a monograph than a series of linked thematic essays, Leonard J. Sadosky’s *Revolutionary Negotiations* seeks to draw together disparate threads in the historiography of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to cast the origins and early development of the United States in a new light. Its essential contribution is to consider American Indian nations, Britain’s North American colonies, and European states on the same analytical plane, and to ask how various actors sought to extend Europe’s Westphalian state system to the complicated political landscape of North America. This was already a question of some urgency to imperial reformers in the mid-eighteenth century, and it became still more pressing as thirteen of Britain’s mainland colonies went to war, declared independence, and sought to establish themselves as a sovereign power within that system. Sadosky traces the evolution of diplomatic thought through the tumultuous years of the American Revolution—a period to which he devotes three of his six chapters—and into the era of the early republic. In every chapter, he places Indian relations alongside his treatment of traditional, European-centered diplomacy. The result is consistently illuminating: *Revolutionary Negotiations* produces a series of striking insights into the evolution of American political and diplomatic ideas and actions.

Sadosky begins by considering the efforts of a generation of British imperial reformers to arrive at a workable conception of Britain’s extended sphere of imperial dominion. Archibald Kennedy, Benjamin Franklin, Cadwallader Colden, William Johnson, and Edmond Atkin were all either born in the colonies or had extensive experience there. All sought imperial reforms that would centralize authority and more clearly define the status of Indian nations in relation to Britain’s North American colonies. They believed that the British colonies possessed immense advantages in their contest with France to control eastern North America, but that British interests were hamstrung by a lack of cooperation and coordination among the colonies and neglect of Indian alliances. The treaty grounds of colonial America gestured toward a world of negotiation among equals, where colonies and Indian nations both acknowledged the superintending authority of the British Empire and accepted an orderly system of diplomatic engagement and conciliation. But that world remained largely illusory, as both imperial warfare and endemic local conflict between colonists and Indians made it impossible to arrive at a sustained and rationalized diplomatic system that could adjudicate backcountry conflict.

After 1775, the thirteen colonies that found themselves in revolt against the British crown once again faced the question of how to unite in common cause, this time in opposition to British authority. The decision to declare independence was a tortuous one, not least because “American independence depended on rationalizing and fortifying the Thirteen Colonies’ connections with the world of sovereign states beyond the British Empire” (p. 71). At the same time that the Continental Congress established a Committee of Secret Correspondence to reach out to prospective European allies, it also appointed commissioners to manage relations with neighboring Indians. Even as Congress undertook these efforts, however, its own powers, and the relationship among the incipient states whose delegates comprised it, remained unclear. One principal reason why it took
Congress so long to declare its independence, Sadosky reminds us, is that such a
declaration could only move forward in conjunction with a diplomatic initiative and the
creation of a permanent confederation. The three efforts were “so interconnected, that a
misstep on the first measure [the Declaration of Independence] would doom the future of
the other two” (p. 82).

War’s end did not bring the generous peace that American leaders hoped for. The
Revolutionary War years demonstrated to both allies and enemies that the newly
independent United States were neither united nor especially independent. In its relations
with both Europe and neighboring Indians, Congress employed a series of more or less
desperate, and ultimately unsuccessful, diplomatic gambits. Its delegates failed to negotiate
a favorable post-war commercial treaty with Great Britain, in large part because the British
recognized how powerless Congress would be to enforce it. In a similar way, the attempt to
impose an effective peace on the Iroquois Confederacy at Fort Stanwix was impeded when
New York sent its own commissioners to conclude a separate agreement. In both cases, the
weakness of the confederation vis-à-vis its constituent states crippled Congress’s
diplomatic efforts. This diplomatic inefficacy was one critical impetus for a new federal
constitution in 1787.

One way of understanding the Constitution is to say that it replaced a treaty among
sovereign states—the Articles of Confederation—with a fully federalized system of
government. Yet, as Sadosky rightly notes, the new union was itself vaguely defined, and
the precise structure and balance of its diplomatic authority would emerge only through
trial and error. Though Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans argued about the extent to
which the executive should control the government’s diplomatic powers, the Constitution
laid the foundation for what Sadosky, following political scientist Daniel Deudney, calls the
“Philadelphian system” (p. 7). The Philadelphian system was intended to allow the United
States to take its place among European nations as a fully sovereign power, and at the same
time to subordinate American Indian polities to an inferior and dependent status. The
urgency of both these purposes was driven home in the first two decades of the nineteenth
century, when Britain and France contested American neutrality on the high seas, Britain
invaded the United States and captured its capital, and Indian revolts in the Great Lakes
and Creek country imperiled western settlements and challenged United States control of
the affected territories.

By the 1820s, Sadosky contends that American policy toward outside powers was
governed by two complementary principles: the Monroe Doctrine, which insisted upon
European noninterference in the Western Hemisphere, and the “Jackson Doctrine,” which
sought to isolate “American Indian polities ... from the commercial and political networks
of the wider European-Atlantic world” (p. 200). These two principles developed alongside
each other in a complementary symbiosis, and each came to be regarded as a critical
bulwark of the fragile sovereignty and independence of the United States. By 1830, “the
shape of polity relations in North America was utterly different from what it had been a
century before. Where there had been access, negotiation, and dialogue for American
Indian nations dealing with settler polities, now there was little but subordination,
subjection, and the unfettered sovereignty of the United States of America” (p. 12).
This a sweeping argument, and though many of its elements are familiar, the cumulative effect is novel. Readers will recognize the ideas of many other scholars in these pages, including Jack P. Greene, Timothy Shannon, David C. Hendrickson, David Armitage, Bernard Sheehan, and Drew R. McCoy. Yet important aspects of Sadosky’s argument are original, and the idea of a “Jackson Doctrine” to complement the Monroe Doctrine is especially ingenious and compelling. More generally, it is consistently useful to bring Indian relations into dialogue with more traditional, European-centered diplomatic history. Clearly they are variant threads of a larger common subject, and Sadosky effectively demonstrates the extent to which events in the two spheres both ran in parallel and influenced each other.

The individual chapters in *Revolutionary Negotiations* are presented less as fully-fledged arguments than as braided stories, and they often rely as much on suggested affinities between parallel topics as they do on demonstrated connections and chains of causation. Sadosky is selective in his choice of stories, and some of his omissions are striking. It is especially jarring to see the Seven Years’ War go by in the space of a few pages that address the conflict between South Carolina and the Cherokees but do little to assess the war’s impact in a more comprehensive way. Even in his account of the American Revolution, Sadosky offers no sustained consideration of the way that the ebb and flow of military events impacted the diplomatic fortunes of the United States. If, to paraphrase Clausewitz, war is the continuation of politics by other means, it seems odd to pass over military events with so little attention to their political and diplomatic effects.

Sadosky may also overestimate, or overstate, the extent to which “access, negotiation, and dialogue” defined Indian relations in the mid-eighteenth century. Historians have engaged in a lively debate over the past fifteen years about whether the British Empire was in any sense more impartial or responsive or humane in its Indian relations than the United States was. Some (myself included) have contended that the empire might have moved in this direction, had it not been overwhelmed by events in the years following the Seven Years’ War. Others, most notably Gregory Dowd, argue that postwar British administrators and

---

military officers were especially disdainful and hostile toward American Indian polities, and were therefore unlikely to implement policies that would have given Indians an equal footing with Anglo-American colonists. Dowd contends instead that the doctrine articulated by the Marshall Court in the Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831)—the idea that Indians were “domestic, dependent nations” within the bounds of the United States, and therefore not entitled to independent standing—expressed the principle that had, in fact, governed Indian relations in British North America since the post-Seven Years’ War era.² If Dowd is correct, then the Jackson Doctrine might be understood less as a reversal of British policy toward Native American polities than as its culmination.

None of this should diminish the magnitude of Sadosky’s achievement. In little more than 200 pages of graceful, vigorous prose, he succeeds in bridging two deep historiographical divides: one that separates Indian relations from the history of foreign relations as it has traditionally been conceived; the other separating the history of British North America from that of the early republic. The result is a book that should command a wide audience among students and scholars of both diplomacy and ethnohistory, and also among those interested more generally in the complex process of state formation in the early modern era.

Author’s Response by Leonard J. Sadosky, Independent Scholar, New York City, NY

I am very grateful for Thomas Maddux’s invitation to organize a roundtable about *Revolutionary Negotiations*. It is a privilege to have my book be a part of the extended conversation about diplomatic history that has been going on now at H-Diplo for over a decade and a half. I am also thankful to Paul Gilje for his introduction and to Kathleen DuVal, Eliga H. Gould, Matthew Hale, and Eric Hinderaker for their thorough and thoughtful reviews of my book. I am humbled that the reviewers’ overall reception of my book is a positive one. I therefore want to devote my remarks here to exploring some of the areas for further study, which my reviewers noted that I touched on in *Revolutionary Negotiations*, but, for various reasons, did not explore in as much detail as they or I would have liked.

I opened *Revolutionary Negotiations* by saying that it “was a book about how the United States of America came to be.” Obviously, it was not meant to be a book about every aspect of the origins of the United States, but rather one about a vitally important element of the American Revolution and the Founding Era, namely that of the new American nation’s international history.

That the American Revolution and Founding have an international dimension is not a new idea. The belief that the American Revolution was an event not simply in the history of America, but that it could have an impact on the rest of the world was an idea embraced not only by its American participants such as John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, but also by those in other nations, such as the Marquis de Condorcet and Richard Price. The notion of transatlantic revolutionary movement was articulated to modern historical readers most famously by Robert R. Palmer in his 2-volume work, *The Age of Democratic Revolution*, and since then it has become a major part of much of the scholarship on the early modern Atlantic world produced in recent decades.¹

In *Revolutionary Negotiations*, I was, of course, operating within the now-established framework of Atlantic history. But I was making a slightly different point about the nature of the American Revolution and the American Founding than those, like Palmer, who wanted to talk about these events as part of a transatlantic revolutionary political movement, or those who see them as the origin point of a new and exceptional solution to the age-old question of the proper way to govern humans. I was concerned primarily with the Revolution and Founding as acts of state formation, and in particular the construction of the instrumentalities of state needed to deal polities beyond its borders. To tell the story and to do it justice required dealing with a set of political actors beyond the sovereigns of Europe – I had to redefine what early American historians meant when they used the term international. American Indian nations had to be brought into the picture. In considering

the evolving relationship between the American states, Indian nations, and European sovereigns together, I had hoped that a new and informative story of the Revolution and Founding would be revealed, that a new avenue for integrating American Indian history into the general history of the United States could be provided, and that other scholars and myself could ask new and different questions of this era, its peoples, events, and ideas than we had thought to ask before. And my reviewers are correct that in many places there is still more story to tell.

Matthew Hale’s question about what my approach means for the study of the Constitution and its origins is a compelling one, for which I only have a limited answer at this point. Hale takes *The Creation of the American Republic* off the shelf, and essentially asks me, what would Gordon Wood think of my argument? My explanation of the origins of the Constitution sees it as a solution to a set of diplomatic problems (within which are subsumed the problem of access to foreign markets and the ability to acquire Indian lands), whereas Wood, *pace* James Madison, saw the Constitution as the solution to the state-level problem of an “excess of democracy.” Perhaps a way to split the difference is to acknowledge, as recent (and interpretively diverse) work by scholars such as Terry Bouton, Max Edling, and Woody Holton has, that the democratic excesses at the state level, and the centralizing impulse of those whom E. James Ferguson labeled as nationalists, were driven by fundamental arguments over fiscal policy, monetary policy, and public debt. Strengthening the United States diplomatically offered the potential to open the trans-Appalachian west to settlement and speculation (via Indian diplomacy), open up the Mississippi River as a commercial corridor (via diplomacy with Spain), and open foreign ports to American produce (via diplomacy with all the European powers). Connecting American producers, merchants, and carriers into the Atlantic (and global) marketplace via commercial treaties was the unrealized goal of Revolutionary and Confederation diplomacy. To be sure, Edling’s proponents of an American fiscal-military state and Bouton’s and Holton’s “unruly Americans” remained suspicious of one another, but the notion that the expansion of commerce and opportunity (via strong diplomacy) could increase the fortunes of (almost) all white men in the new Republic surely was a salve to many who felt their side had lost in the ratification debates and votes of 1787-1788.² I would, again, point to Jack Rakove’s finding that there was little debate over the treaty-making clause at Philadelphia and add my discussion of the near-unanimity in carving out

---

strong executive powers for diplomacy in the 1789 Foreign Affairs Act to buttress the notion that the “diplomatic imperative” for a strong union was felt by almost all.3 (151-55) Americans engaged in the ratification debate could differ over the extent that state “excesses” needed to be reigned in, and still acknowledge that the United States collectively needed a strong hand to advance their interests in the wider world. That said, I know that I focused primarily on Anglo-American elite statesmen in Revolutionary Negotiations, and it may well be that discussions over diplomatic powers were more contentious and heterogeneous at the local level, especially in the interior areas that were less commercially inclined and that tended to vote anti-federalist. This is an area where future study could be undertaken with profit.

If the prospect of treaty-making to acquire Indian lands for either settlement or speculation could unite white federalists and anti-federalists together, then this seems to be a good place to address one of Hale’s other set of questions, that about my treatment – or lack thereof – of the issue of race, racism, and racial thinking in Revolutionary Negotiations. Hale may be right that (to use a journalistic phrase) I buried the lede by placing my contentions with other historians of early American Indian peoples in my footnotes. As I say in my notes, the debate here is largely one about timing – when exactly did the political, intellectual, ideological, and cultural forces that made the dispossession of the Native peoples of eastern North America a fait accompli come to be dominant and irreversible? Gregory Dowd and Jane Merritt and, to an extent, Daniel Richter, have seen 1763, and the Treaty of Paris, as the major turning point. Enough Britons and British Americans saw American Indians as racially distinct others who simply could not be incorporated into an extended British political nation. As I wrote in my notes, other scholars such as Gregory Knouff and Robert Parkinson see the American Revolutionary War as the turning point in hardening racial lines and thinking, while Richard White, Eric Hinderaker, and Patrick

Griffith see racial boundaries as much more inchoate and emergent during this period.4 This last position is the one that I was agreeing with, but perhaps not as explicitly and forthrightly as I could have. My goal in introducing race in the introduction, but keeping it off to the side during the body of the book, was to make it clear that I was writing about the conceptualization, construction, and deployment of state power and not the emergence, growth, and transformation of Enlightenment-era racialism. Obviously, Matthew Hale is right; state power and racial thinking are intimately linked throughout American history, from the seventeenth century through the twenty-first. Indeed, we begin to see these connections reveal themselves explicitly at the end of my book, with the words of John Quincy Adams at Ghent ironically echoing those of Andrew Jackson on the Alabama borderlands. Both Adams and Jackson used racist thinking to justify their diplomatic course of action and the consolidation of the power of the American federal state. (196-205) I plead guilty to the fact that race is, for the most part, explicitly present only at the beginning and end of my story. In focusing primarily on the construction and consolidation of state power in the diplomatic realm, I hoped to highlight the extent to which discussions among Anglo-American diplomatists about American Indian nations were discussions about sovereign power and status as much as they were about nation and race. My hope is that future work can take my discussion about state power and structure and connect it to scholarship on race, culture, and ideology. I meant to add to the larger story of the rise of the United States as a world power and the dispossession of Native Americans, not take away from it or diminish it.

In addition to attempting to connect American Indian history to the mainline of American political and diplomatic history, I also hoped to reinvigorate exploration of early American diplomatic history. For early American historians studying political thought and political culture there is a body of rich source materials that only a relative few recent scholars have sought to tap into and explore. I hope that will change. But for diplomatic historians and international relations scholars, a consideration of the international history of the American Revolution and Founding should bring other, more important lessons. I began my book by invoking the image of the United States of America at the cusp of the twenty-first century as a “hyperpower.” The Revolutionary-era United States was, of course, anything but. The United States was a weak, peripheral power as it sought entry into the community of nations. Obviously, with time, that position changed, in part because of the decisions and events I describe in my book. But studying the early United States’s diplomatic history reminds us that American hyperpower was not always so. Such an acknowledgement – that preponderant power in the international realm is a contingent, and not essential, characteristic of a nation – can be a healthy reminder to scholars and commentators on international relations as they contemplate America’s changing place and role amidst the current age of uncertainty and anxiety.

Copyright © 2010 H-Net: Humanities and Social Sciences Online. H-Net permits the redistribution and reprinting of this work for nonprofit, educational purposes, with full and accurate attribution to the author, web location, date of publication, H-Diplo, and H-Net: Humanities & Social Sciences Online. For any other proposed use, contact the H-Diplo Editors at h-diplo@h-net.msu.edu.