

H-Diplo

H-Diplo Roundtable Review

www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables

Volume XI, No. 44 (2010)

26 July 2010 (original roundtable)

23 March 2011 (this response)

Roundtable Editors: Thomas Maddux and Diane Labrosse

Roundtable Web/Production Editors: John Vurpillat;

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[**Updates of 15 August and 30 September, as well as 27 March 2012, published on the H-Diplo web site**]

Author's response to Douglas Macdonald's further comments on H-Diplo Roundtable Review of Simei Qing, *From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity, and U.S.-China Diplomacy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007. Published on 13 October 2010. Roundtable URL: <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-XI-44.pdf>

Stable URL: <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-XI-44-Qing-further-response.pdf>

Response by Simei Qing, James Madison College, Michigan State University

I. Regarding Contemporary Cultural Analysis and How to Evaluate China's Foreign Policy Intentions.

In his February 9 2011 response to my comments on the H-Diplo roundtable on my book, Professor Douglas Macdonald asked me to explain the differences between Mao Zedong, Chiang Kai-shek, and Hu Shi within the framework of contemporary cultural analysis.¹ In his view, their differences can best be explained in his "ideology and power paradigm." The following is my interpretation within the framework of "informal ideology" and power or contemporary cultural analysis. The profound difference in paradigms or conceptual frameworks is, in effect, intimately tied to the broader methodological issue regarding how to better evaluate China's domestic conditions and foreign policy intentions.

As is discussed in chapter one of my book, the moral/cultural parameter in China's quest for modernity and new identity remained the common good or China's national equal rights in the post-Opium War age. While modern Chinese reformers all championed of China's national independence, they had very different blueprints for how to achieve that goal.

For Hong Xiuquan and the Taiping peasant rebels of the 1850s, the common good meant

¹ <http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=H-Diplo&month=1102&week=b&msg=tauAVin%2bFMk%2bRq87a9tMvg&user=&pw=> (accessed on 22 March 2011).

above all protection of the poor peasants devastated by the drowning out of Chinese silver, both in the British opium trade and the Manchu government's reparations after the Opium War. The Taiping rebels' 'official religion' was an imported religion -- Christianity. In their minds, God was to help them to drive out all foreign invaders as well as the Manchu dynasty, to bring about a land redistribution and to build a paradise on earth for the poorest and the most underprivileged in China. On the other hand, for Zeng Guofan and the urban reformers in the self-strengthening movement of the 1860s, the common good meant above all the suppression of all poor peasant rebels to consolidate the state-building.

In a sense, Sun Yat-sen and the Nationalist Party (KMT) he had founded attempted to combine both the populist and the elitist movements in modern China, to establish a coalition between the urban elite and the poor peasantry for China's national liberation and modernization.

After the passing of Sun Yat-sen (1925), and the collapse of the first CCP-KMT 'united front' (1927), for Mao Zedong and many CCP members, the priority in China's struggle for national liberation was to safeguard the basic rights of the poor peasants and the urban poor. In their view, China's national liberation would depend upon a thorough social revolution, particularly land revolution. On the other hand, for Chiang Kai-shek and many KMT members, as for Zeng Guofan and the elite reformers in 1860s and 1870s, the common good meant above all that the CCP rebels in rural China must first give up their weapons and respect the state's laws unconditionally. It is not surprising that Mao Zedong often proclaimed that the CCP's land revolution was a continuation of the great Taiping rebellion, while Chiang Kai-shek repeatedly confessed that his hero was Zeng Guofan who had succeeded in suppressing the Taiping peasant rebellion of the late Manchu dynasty.

In this regard, Hu Shi's discourse on China's modernity provides a very interesting case. Philosophically, his major concern is not about the common good, but the intrusions of the public realm into the individual. He argues that the public realm usually "favors dictatorship or absolute conformity, often uses arbitrary power to ruin individualism, and suppresses an individual's free spirit."² In this regard, Hu Shi is basically different from Liang Qichao, one of the founders of the Chinese Constitutional Movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, who believed that the common good and individual freedom could be reconstructed in a relationship of mutual benefits and mutual complementarity.

Hu Shi argues that individual freedom is the antithesis of group rights. As such, whenever there is a conflict between an individual's interest and the group's interests, the individual's rights should be first protected. However, his arguments did not express an explicit support for the supremacy of individual liberty. Like other modern Chinese reformers, he also defined society as 'Big Me' and individuals as 'Small Me.' As he wrote: "The Small Me has a great responsibility for the immortal Big Me's timeless past and

² Hu Shi: "Ibsen zhuyi" (On Ibsenism), in *Xinqingnian (New Youth)*, vol. 4, no. 6, 1918; p. 14.

timeless future.”³ After all, he said, the moral reasoning behind his advocacy of individualism is the interests of the society or the common good.⁴ In other words, Hu Shi implied that individual freedom is not an end in itself. In this sense, he vaguely agreed with, or rather ambiguously conformed to, the mainstream moral/cultural parameter wherein the public debates took place in China.

Meanwhile, politically, whenever Hu Shi talked about the ‘common good,’ his ideas were surprisingly similar to those of Zeng Guofan and Chiang Kai-shek. He asserted that Sun Yat-sen’s policy of building a united front with the CCP was a “huge mistake.” He was convinced that the CCP’s policy of land revolution and armed struggle in rural China after the breakup of the first united front in 1927 was no better than bandits’ behavior. While Hu Shi’s life-long belief was against violence, he publicly supported Chiang Kai-shek government’s military campaigns to eliminate the CCP force during 1927-1937. He wrote that the Chiang Kai-shek government needed to “unify the nation,” thus “we should not be unconditionally against all kinds of civil wars,” and “we should not be against the central government’s strenuous efforts to get rid of those bandits and rebels.”⁵

After Japan occupied Manchuria in the early 1930s, Hu Shi pushed aside the CCP’s call for a “united front” and continued endorsing Chiang Kai-shek’s military campaigns to eliminate the CCP. He agreed that “to resist foreign invasions, one must first quell the internal disturbances and unify the nation.” He suggested to Chiang Kai-shek that “we should wait for fifty years to solve the Manchuria question,” so that “we can try out best to solve the problem of armed law-breakers and to unify the nation.”⁶

The complexity of Hu Shi’s ideas can explain why his warning of the possible encroachment of societal pressures onto individuals’ rights has continued to enjoy a powerful appeal in the discourse of the Chinese community. Yet on the other hand, whenever there is serious national and social crisis in China, or whenever the national survival or group rights are under dire threats, Hu Shi’s ideas rapidly lose their appeal for this same mainstream Chinese community of discourse, such as in the War of Resistance.

Clearly, Mao’s interpretations of socialism and communism, Chiang’s understanding of capitalism and republicanism, and Hu Shi’s articulation of Anglo-Saxon liberalism, cannot be truly understood within the paradigm of power and a narrowly defined concept of ideology Chinese historical evolution, cultural heritage, and different interests of different social classes, as well as China’s place in the world economic system at the time, provided

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ji Xianlin ed., *Complete Works of Hu Shi, Vol. 22* (Anhui renmin chubanshe, 2007); pp. 504-507.

⁶ *Complete Works of Hu Shi, Vol.21*, p. 605; also *Vol 24*, pp. 301, 325.

the vital contexts wherein an ideology, particularly an imported Western ideology, was reinterpreted in China's quest for modernity and new identity.

More importantly, the above discussion is directly related to the critical question of how to evaluate more accurately Chinese domestic conditions and foreign policy intention.

For instance, prior to the U.S.-China indirect confrontation in the Vietnam War, the dominant view in Washington with regard to China's intentions in Southeast Asia was that the Chinese people were going to "rise up" to overthrow the "repressive Chinese communist regime," and that Beijing was poised to conquer Southeast Asia with military power because of Beijing's expansionist communist ideology, its population pressures and the need for food and mineral resources. As Secretary of State John Foster Dulles claimed when installing a new strategy of "peripheral military containment" against China in 1956, the People's Republic was the new Nazi Germany and South Vietnam was now its Munich. To prevent a new world war, the United States must draw a line in South Vietnam.⁷

America's strategic planning and the escalation in the Vietnam War, as Hans Morgenthau argued persistently in 1965-1968, had been built upon a fundamental misjudgment of China's intentions; namely, that China was bent on a military conquest of Southeast Asia because of its communist ideology. As he points out, "We have made a great deal of what we call Chinese imperialism, and we have been wont to quote extreme statements of Chinese statesmen about their world-wide aims....They have become the verbal champions of what they call wars of national liberation. They believe in, they declare at least to believe in, the inevitability of world revolution which will destroy capitalism. In other words, they have adopted a simplified version of Marxism-Leninism as an ideology."⁸ However, Morgenthau argues that if one is familiar with Chinese diplomatic history in Southeast Asia and the foreign policies the Beijing government actually pursued after 1949, one would realize that Chinese foreign policy has been and is more driven by Chinese history, culture and "the permanent aspiration of China," rather than by the communist ideology.⁹ As he emphasizes:

"It is of great relevance for our policies in Southeast Asia that for a thousand years China has not tried to expand her influence and power west and southwestwards by military conquest and annexation. It has, rather, relied upon the natural attraction of Chinese civilization. It has relied, and history has shown it could rely, upon the enormous

⁷ Simei Qing: *From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity, and US-China Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), Chapter 7: "Inducement versus Containment: U.S. China Policy under Eisenhower," pp. 169-204.

⁸ Hans J. Morgenthau: "Ideology and the National Interest," in Kenneth W. Thompson, Hans J. Morgenthau, and Jerald C. Brauer: *U.S. Policy in the Far East: Ideology, Religion, and Superstition*, (New York: Council on Religion and International Affairs, 1968); pp. 29-30.

⁹ Morgenthau, p. 31.

attractiveness which its powerful civilization has had upon the border states to the west and the southwest.....

We have here a traditional relationship between China and its neighbors to the west and the southwest which is infinitely more subtle, more complex than the traditional relationships between a powerful nation and weak neighbors with which we are accustomed from the history of the West. So the idea that, for instance, China is poised to conquer Southeast Asia by physical force certainly has neither support in Chinese history nor has it support in the actions which the Chinese government has put into effect since it came into power in 1949.”¹⁰

In this regard, he particularly warns:

“We have looked at China very much as we failed to look at Hitler Germany – that is to say, as a power bent upon world conquest – and the spokesmen for successive administrations have time and again pointed to the similarity between Mao Tse-tung and Hitler, Munich and Vietnam, and so forth. In truth, this analogy is utterly mistaken.”¹¹

And he further warns that should America not “radically change” its China policy, this strategy of “peripheral military containment” would bring about a direct military confrontation between the US and China in the mainland of Asia, which would be disastrous to America, as the testimony of Generals MacArthur, Eisenhower and Ridgeway has shown. He emphasizes that “if my assumption is correct that China does not seek the physical conquest of additional territories at least to the west or southwest....then the peripheral military containment of China is not only going to be ineffective but it is also going to be provocative.”

“For a strong China is not going to countenance a ring of American military bases from Taiwan to Thailand regardless of its intrinsic intentions with regard to the rest of Asia.

In other words, our present policy leads directly to a military confrontation with China, and that this confrontation has not yet occurred is not due to the goodness of the Chinese, but to their weakness. History has allowed us a temporary breathing space during which we can, if we have a mind to , radically change our policy with regard to China and in general.”¹²

¹⁰ Morgenthau, p. 32.

¹¹ Morgenthau, p. 33.

¹² Morgenthau , pp. 34-35.

Fortunately, in the 1970s the Vietnam War ended, the U.S.-China relationship normalized, and a direct U.S.-China military confrontation did not become a tragic reality. However, unfortunately, the Vietnam War had already brought about enormous suffering for the Vietnamese people and American soldiers in the war. It also ruined President Johnson's cherished blueprint of the "Great Society" and inflicted permanent damage on the American economy. To a great extent, the escalation of the Vietnam War (1965-1969) had a direct impact on the American financial conditions in the early 1970s, when the U.S. ran a balance of payments deficit and a trade deficit, the first in the 20th century. In 1971, President Nixon had to end convertibility between US dollars and gold, or the Gold Standard system, which signaled the collapse of the Bretton Woods system established in 1944.¹³

In retrospect, Robert S. McNamara, secretary of defense under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, points out that "We misjudged then – as we have since – the geopolitical intentions of our adversaries (in this case, North Vietnam and the Vietcong, supported by China and the Soviet Union)...."¹⁴ He particularly emphasizes that

"Worse, our government lacked experts for us to consult to compensate for our ignorance.... The irony of this gap was that it existed largely because the top East Asian and China experts in the State Department – John Paten Davies, John Steward Service, and John Carter Vincent – had been purged during the McCarthy hysteria of the 1950s. Without men like these to provide sophisticated, nuanced insights, we – certainly I – badly misread China's objectives and mistook its bellicose rhetoric to imply a drive for regional hegemony. We also totally underestimated the nationalist aspect of Ho Chi Minh's movement. We saw him first as a Communist and only second as a Vietnamese nationalist....

Such ill-founded judgments were accepted without debate by the Kennedy administration, as they had been by its Democratic and Republican predecessors. We failed to analyze our assumptions critically, then and later. The foundations of our decision making were gravely flawed."¹⁵

With hindsight, a rigid paradigm of power and narrowly defined ideology¹⁶ did ease the path to an indirect U.S.-China confrontation in the Vietnam War and contributed to

¹³ David Frum: *How We Got Here: The '70s*, (New York: Basic Books, 2000), pp. 296-298; and Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw: *The Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy* (New York: Free Press, 2002), pp. 60-64.

¹⁴ Robert S. McNamara: *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam* (New York: Vintage Books, 1996); p. 319.

¹⁵ Robert S. McNamara: *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam* (New York: Vintage Books, 1996); pp. 205-6.

¹⁶ It is significant to note that there are fundamental differences between the concept of "narrowly defined ideology" and the concept of "informal ideology" as first proposed and defined by Michael H. Hunt and Steven I. Levine. See: Michael H. Hunt: *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press,

repeated misjudgments of Chinese foreign policy intentions in the Cold War, as I argued in the book.

II. Regarding “Asymmetrical Warfare” in the Chinese Civil War and the Truman Administration’s China Policy

Professor Macdonald emphasizes that “The initial large scale Soviet military aid to the CCP, as best we can tell, was in 1945, specifically, from August to November. In this period the USSR facilitated the movement of CCP troops to Manchuria, and turned over large amounts of captured Japanese military stores to the CCP.”¹⁷ And he further emphasizes that “this Soviet aid was crucial to the early military success of the CCP in late 1945 and early 1946, and their move into Manchuria and ‘radically affected the outcome of the Civil War.’”¹⁸

With respect to the USSR’s military aid to the CCP in Manchuria, a significant question, in my view, is whether it surpassed that of the Truman administration to Chiang Kai-shek’s government there. Or whether the CCP’s victory in the civil war can be attributed mainly to the Soviet military aid to the CCP in Manchuria. This question is directly related to a larger and more important question of how to draw historical lessons from U.S.-China diplomacy in the Chinese civil war.

It is important to note that the huge U.S. military aid to the Chiang Kai-shek government in Manchuria and China proper was not intended to help it start a Chinese civil war. According to the Yalta agreement, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s view of U.S. policy toward Nationalist China in the postwar era was to help the KMT government, with extensive military and economic aid, unify China proper and Manchuria. To achieve that goal, he turned down the proposal of American diplomats in China in spring 1945 that the U.S. military aid be given to both the KMT and the CCP in the final stages of WWII. And he urged the Chiang Kai-shek government to sign a friendship treaty with Moscow; and in return, the USSR recognized the Chiang government as the only legitimate government in China. After FDR’s passing, in November 1945, under the Truman administration, the State Department had a major review of America’s China policy. Secretary of State James F.

1987); and Steven Levine: “Perception and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy,” in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh ed., *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 34.

The concept of “informal ideology” is, to a great extent, similar to the concept of contemporary cultural analysis. Namely, the understanding and interpretation of an “official ideology” is deeply rooted in one’s social, cultural and political and economic environments. The concept of “narrowly defined ideology,” in contrast, is to use one’s own interpretations of an ideology, such as socialism and communism, to explain the behaviors and intentions of another nation and people with different history, culture, and different positions in the world economy, assuming that both sides share similar definitions and understandings of this ideology. In doing so, the concept of time and space is lost in such uniform interpretations. See the “introduction” chapter of my book, pp. 4-5.

¹⁷ Doug Macdonald’s second commentary, p. 3.

¹⁸ Macdonald, p. 3.

Byrnes advocated the continuation of FDR's China policy. That is, "Neither 'to support the National Government directly against the Communists' nor to abandon 'a policy we have long supported which contemplated unifying China and Manchuria under Chinese National Forces.'"¹⁹ In the view of General Albert C. Wedemeyer, the commander of U.S. forces in China since 1944, "If China were to become a puppet of the Soviets [Union? Soviets? Please check this quotation], which is exactly what a Chinese Communist victory would mean, then Soviet Russia would practically control the continents of Europe and Asia. ..." But he warned that "opposition to Russian aspirations in China carried grave risks, including war with the Soviet Union."²⁰ Accordingly, the State Department's China policy review concluded that "the wisest course of action was to press for an accord between the Nationalists and the Communists, partly by using military aid as a lever to gain Chiang's cooperation."²¹

It was within this context that the Truman administration provided massive military assistance to the Chiang Kai-shek government in Manchuria and China proper, both as a continuation of America's traditional China policy and as leverage to force the KMT government to accommodate with the CCP in the post-WWII years. From August to October 1945, America's military lend-lease amounted to \$430 million, which was "more than half the value of wartime arms aid,"²² all of which went to the Chiang Kai-shek government. This aid, along with troop support and transportation assistance, "enabled Nationalist forces to establish their authority in the major cities" in both Central and North China, including Manchuria.²³ During the first five months of 1946, the Truman administration further helped to transport 225,597 KMT soldiers into Manchuria; and "Wedemeyer outfitted these troops and supplied their operational needs."²⁴

Thus, with approximately \$700 million in lend-lease aid in the year after the Japanese surrender, the 3-million-men Nationalist army was surely superior to the Communists in manpower, equipment and training all over China, including Manchuria. In fact, Chiang Kai-shek himself was so confident of the KMT's military superiority in China proper and Manchuria at the time that he decided to launch a nation-wide offensive campaign to eliminate the CCP force once for all and to unify the nation under his government. As he announced at a KMT headquarters' meeting on June 10, 1946,

¹⁹ Eisenhower to Wedemeyer, 11/19/1945; *FRUS*: 1945: 7: pp. 644-45; also see Chester, J. Pach, Jr., *Arming the Free World* (Chapel Hill and London: the University of North Carolina Press, 1991), p. 76.

²⁰ Chester, J. Pach, Jr., p. 77.

²¹ Pach, pp. 78-9.

²² Pach, p. 72.

²³ Pach, p. 72.

²⁴ Pach, p. 84.

“During the Northern Expedition, I had decided to solve the unity question in three years; it turned out that in less than three years, the unity was achieved. Now may comrades trust my words again: I decided to achieve military victory within one year, and restore the economy within two years.”

Two weeks later, the Chiang Kai-shek government’s nationwide offensive campaign began.

The key issue here is: why the leverage of America’s military aid failed to work? Or why did America’s China policy generate such undesired policy results in China?

Prof. Macdonald writes that “My critical point was that Professor Qing's book seemed to argue that the Americans more or less ignored the agrarian question because of cultural blinders as to its importance to the Chinese. But they did not ignore it; it was a major aspect of their overall solution to the problem.”²⁵ He further argues that the apparent dilemma was “As far as the inability of the KMT to carry out land reforms, the US was well aware of this. There were constant internal debates over whether Chiang could not or would not reform. The decision was made that the KMT certainly would not even try to reform itself with some of its leading members opposed to agrarian reform, and here the Chen brothers (Chiang's “nephews”) were seen as the main reformist target. Before there could be effective distributionist reforms, the thinking went, there had to be elite reforms at the top. Otherwise, the U.S. would have to get involved more directly at the lower levels of Chinese society, something that Marshall and virtually everyone else on the American side agreed was impossible.”²⁶

Here I would like to state again that the Truman administration did demonstrate interest in land reform in Nationalist China. And I also agree entirely with Professor Macdonald that it was surely impossible for Americans to be “involved more directly at the lower levels of Chinese society”²⁷ to implement land reform in China.

However, my argument is that in the post-WWII years, the Truman administration, except for the Far Eastern Bureau at the State Department, did not see the intimate connection between the CCP’s rural organizations and the implementations of land reform. A major weakness of the Nationalist Government under Chiang Kai-shek was that after the passing of Sun Yat-sen (1925) and the breakup of the CCP-KMT coalition (1927), it neglected land reform in rural China between 1927-1945. Thus, in the postwar years, the Chiang Kai-shek government did not have any institutional mechanism to implement any land reform programs, even if it intended to do so, as shown by Chiang Kai-shek’s executive orders in the height of the civil war.

²⁵ Macdonald: p. 4.

²⁶ Macdonald, p. 3.

²⁷ Macdonald, p. 3.

Accordingly, the leverage of U.S. military aid over the Chiang Kai-shek government, particularly its land reform policy, was severely compromised or undermined by President Truman's policy 'bottom line' with regard to the Marshall mediation in China. That is, even if the Chiang Kai-shek government refused to give reasonable ground to the CCP, the Marshall mission should continue to support the Chiang government and to transport its troops into North China and Manchuria. As I write in the book:

"Marshall tried to clarify and confirm this point in his memo to Truman before he left for China:

"I stated that my understanding of one phrase of my directive was not in writing but I thought I had a clear understanding of the President's desires in the matter, which was that in the event that I was unable to secure the necessary action by the Generalissimo, which I thought reasonable and desirable, it would still be necessary for the U.S. Government, through me, to continue to back the National Government of the Republic of China...

The President stated that the foregoing was a correct summation of his direction regarding that possible development of the situation."²⁸

As a result, by acquiescing in excluding the CCP from the coalition government, the Truman administration in effect permitted the Chiang Kai-shek government to lose its **only** institutional mechanism to implement land reform policy. Without the CCP's organizational power in rural China, the Chiang government could not even implement the policy of rural tax reduction, not to mention the land reform itself, as I discussed in the book and in my previous response to the roundtable discussion.

This proved fatal to the KMT government's fortunes in the civil war. After all, in "asymmetrical warfare" or guerrilla warfare, the decisive factor in winning is, in my view, certainly not about guerilla fighters going wherever the government is not, or "All [the communists] have to do is be where the government is not,"²⁹ but about people's support at grassroots levels, as well as correct military strategies. In this regard, the CCP's land reform policy in rural China and "united front" policy with the Third Party in urban China, or the establishment of the coalition between villages and colleges, which was precisely what Sun Yat-sen had called for in his effort to reform the KMT in the early 1920s, played a crucially important role in the outcome of the Chinese civil war.³⁰

²⁸ "George Marshall's notes on Meeting with the President and Under Secretary of State," Dec. 14, 1945. Office of Chinese Affairs (CA), box 12, NA. For a more detailed discussion about this "bottom line," see Qing: *From Allies to Enemies*, pp. 58-62.

²⁹ Macdonald, p. 3.

³⁰ For a more detailed discussion on this question, see Qing, chapter 3: "Disillusionment and Polarization: The Failure of the Marshall Mission and Deepening Divisions in Nationalist China," pp. 37-94.

More important, it is significant to note that President Truman's China policy 'bottom line' was basically consistent with FDR's policy toward Nationalist China. Why did two great progressive presidents hold similar perceptions of the CCP? Why did both of them try to solve the CCP issue through Moscow? Could one really believe that the policymakers' perceptions or misperceptions of the Chinese "reality" had little to do with the mainstream American moral/cultural parameters or moral/cultural norms and deviance at the time?

That is why I emphasize in the introduction chapter of my book that

"The purpose of this study is not, therefore, just to ask why a specific policy was made, but to go further: to ask how it could become so counterproductive as to generate exactly the opposite of its desired and expected outcome. The answer to the question of why a specific policy was made usually involves issues of power, ideology, domestic politics, or policymakers' personalities. But to explore how a policy could be counterproductive, one needs to delve more deeply, revealing those rarely examined assumptions that might be so ingrained in mainstream policy debates that the general public, and even most policymakers, are not conscious of them. In the broadest sense, this is a study of the critical role of deeply anchored visions in the origins of human military conflicts."³¹

III. Regarding the *I-Ching* and Defining the "Core Values" of Non-Western Civilizations

During my research for the book, I was increasingly convinced that many human military conflicts, including the U.S.-China confrontations, could be partially attributed to perceived, rather than actual, conflicts of national interests and moral principles. As a result, I was increasingly interested in the call of contemporary cultural analysis for the study of deeply ingrained, subconscious as well as conscious, mainstream assumptions, formulated in the nation's history, culture, and their position in the world economy. I was aware that it would be a tough call to explore "the critical role of deeply anchored visions in the origins of human military conflicts."³² The intellectual challenge was obviously twofold: On the one hand, it was hard to pin down the concrete connections between "deeply anchored visions" in specific policy decisions in archival research, as I explained in the introduction of my book. On the other hand, the sharply differing views in Western literature regarding the characteristics of non-Western civilizations, hugely complicate these difficulties.

Samuel Huntington's influential thesis of a "clash of civilizations" has made it even more important to define the "core values" of non-Western civilizations in the post-Cold War world. In his view, with the collapse of the USSR, to understand current and future conflict,

³¹ Qing: *From Allies to Enemies*, p. 2.

³² Qing, p. 2.

the rifts between civilization must be understood, and civilization -- rather than the State -- must be accepted as the locus of war. "The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future," he asserts.³³

What are the implications for U.S. foreign policy of the assumed "clash of civilizations" between the West and the rest? His prescription is that

"In this emerging era of cultural conflict the United States must forge alliances with similar cultures and spread its values wherever possible. With alien civilizations the West must be accommodating if possible, but confrontational if necessary. In the final analysis, however, all civilizations will have to learn to tolerate each other."³⁴

Obviously, there is a major self-contradiction in Huntington's thesis. He calls for learning to "tolerate" different civilizations down the road. However, the way he ambiguously defines "alien" civilizations indicates an assumed intrinsic antithesis between the West and the rest in terms of core values.

In this regard, I truly appreciate Professor Macdonald's interest in the *I-Ching*, or the *Book of Change*. Here I would like to discuss very briefly the critical importance of the *I-Ching* in the formation of the "core values" of the Chinese civilization. This is an important question, because it is closely related to the more general question concerning how to define non-Western civilizations and how to project China's developmental model in its quest for modernity and new identity in the following decades.

According to Fritjof Capra -- a prominent Indian theoretical physicist and philosopher --, the foundation of the Chinese civilization is the *I-Ching*, or the *Book of Change*. In his pioneering study *The Tao of Physics: An Exploration of the Parallels between Modern Physics and Eastern Mysticism*, he emphasizes that

"The *Book of Change* is the first among the six Confucian Classics and must be considered as a work which lies at the very heart of Chinese thought and culture. The authority and esteem is comparable only to those of sacred scriptures, like the Vedas (of India) or the Bible, in other cultures."³⁵

He emphasizes that the basic moral principle of the *I-Ching* is that

³³ Samuel Huntington: "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs*, summer 1993; see also, Huntington: "If Not Civilizations, What?" *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 1993; p. 192.

³⁴ Huntington, "The Summary" of "The Clash of Civilizations?"

³⁵ Fritjof Capra: *The Tao of Physics: An Exploration of the Parallels between Modern Physics and Eastern Mysticism* (Boston, MA: Shambhala, 4th edition, 2000), p. 108.

“The interplay of *yin* and *yang*, the primordial pair of opposites appears as the principle that guides all the movements of the Tao, but the Chinese did not stop there. They went on to study various combinations of *yin* and *yang* which they developed into a system of cosmic archetypes. This system is elaborated in the *I-Ching*, or *Book of Changes*.”³⁶

And he further emphasizes that the *I-Ching* has guided the leading minds of China throughout the ages, among them Lao Tzu,” the founder of Taoism, and Confucius. As for Taoism, he pinpoints the intimate connection of its core values with the *I-Ching*:

“The Taoist saw all changes in nature as manifestations of the dynamic interplay between the polar opposites *yin* and *yang*, and thus they came to believe that any pair of opposites constitutes a polar relationship where each of the two poles is dynamically linked to the other....In the East, it has always been considered as essential for attaining enlightenment to go ‘beyond earthly opposites’, and in China the polar relationship of all opposites lies at the very basis of Taoist thought. Thus Chang Tzu says,

The ‘this’ is also ‘that’. The ‘that is also ‘this’...That the ‘that’ and the ‘this’ cease to be opposites is the very essence of *Tao*....”³⁷

Right here Capra draws a parallel between the primary principle of the *I-Ching* and philosophical implications of Einstein’s *Theory of Relativity*, namely, “harmony between the opposites,” and Quantum Theory, namely, “interconnections and complementarity.”³⁸

As for Confucian philosophy, in the view of Barrington Moore, Jr., a leading American political sociologist, it lacks the concepts of “moral purity” and “moral pollution” as defined in the Western philosophy:

“Missing or very weakly developed in China are the two basic themes in the Western theory and practice of moral purity. First is the otherworldly sanction for our moral purity, be it God, revolutionary faith, or the mythic Aryan race. The ‘will of heaven’ lacks the power to bring about the fundamental changes in human affairs so widely attributed to Western notions. Second is a strongly developed notion of pollution (in the West) that makes the impure and unbelievers into a mysterious dehumanized threat that must, if at all possible, be rooted out for the sake of preserving ‘our’ moral purity in our society, imperfect though that may be.”³⁹

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Capra, p. 114.

³⁸ Capra, pp. 160, 172-3.

³⁹ Barrington Moore, Jr., *Moral Purity and Persecution in History* (Princeton, NJ): Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 127-8.

This lack of concepts of “moral purity” and “moral pollution” in Confucian philosophy is, one may further argue, intimately connected with the *I-Ching*'s construction of the relationship between *yin* and *yang*. That is, apparently opposing forces can be reunified in terms of mutual benefits, mutual dependence, mutual penetration and mutual complementarity.

Contrary to the conventional wisdom that identifies Confucianism with authoritarianism, Wm. Theodore de Bary -- a leading American scholar on Asian civilizations -- emphasizes that the Confucian philosophy consists of the concepts of “nobility” and “civility” as a counter force to political power. The Confucian concept of “nobility” is a “Noble Person” who speaks truth to power, similar to today’s idea of “public intellectual,” in de Bary’s view. And the Confucian concept of “civility” is a distinctive “civil space” wherein both the gentry-scholars and the ordinary people are mobilized to participate in political discourse on governance.⁴⁰

“What is striking in the Chinese case is....something like a civil society expressed in the Confucian (and more particularly Mencian) conception of the Noble Person as the loyal minister whose prime virtue consists in his honest, forthright correction of the ruler.....Particularly striking is the inclusion of artisans, blind musicians, merchants, and commoners in this picture of a participatory process that does not restrict the counseling function only to the elite.”⁴¹

Obviously, with the above interpretations of an “alien” or non-Western civilization, it is hard to assume there is a deep-seated antithesis between the West and the rest in terms of core values or civilizations.

More important, the above very brief discussion with respect to the core values of classic Chinese philosophy also indicates that China’s developmental model or continued quest for modernity and a new identity in the twenty-first century cannot be predefined, prescribed or predetermined exclusively within the Western ideological boundaries and historical experiences.

In commenting on China’s quest for modernity and a new identity, great English philosopher Bertrand Russell pointed out,

“I believe that, if the Chinese are left free to assimilate what they want of our civilization, and to reject what strikes them as bad, they will be able to achieve an organic growth from their own tradition, and to produce a very splendid result, combining our merits and theirs.”⁴²

⁴⁰ Wm. Theodore de Bary: *Nobility and Civility* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. ix-x,

⁴¹ de Bary, p. 8.

⁴² Bertrand Russell: *The Problem of China* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1922), p. 13.

He further emphasized that in doing so, China would be able to forge a more constructive, more peaceful and mutually beneficial relationship with the West. And he particularly warned that the attempt to Americanize or Westernize China, just as Chinese cultural fundamentalism or “an anti-foreign conservatism,” would produce disasters not just for China, but also for America and the West, and for mankind.⁴³

In conclusion, I would like to express again my deep gratitude for H-Diplo Roundtable editors Professor Tom Maddax and Diane Labrosse. Without their wise guidance and persistent efforts, this roundtable discussion could have never taken place. I also would like to express my gratitude for Professor Macdonald’s continued interest in engaging in scholarly exchanges and for offering his honest critiques of my work. I will take seriously his recommendation that the causal impact of the deeply-ingrained visions upon policymaking should be more vigorously illustrated. As for our major differences with regard to methodological approach and historical narratives, I whole-heartedly concur with his suggestion that we should “agree to disagree.” I hope that this spirited discussion and debate may help to deepen and broaden general discussions related to the study of U.S.-China relations and the evolution of U.S. foreign policy toward the developing world.

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⁴³ Russell, pp. 13-14, and chapter XV: “The Outlook for China.”