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Catch-phrase descriptions have adhered to many decades—the twenties roared, the thirties were depressed, the forties revolved around war and its aftermath, the fifties promised spreading affluence, the sixties rebelled. These slogan-style characterizations do not stand up as “history,” of course, but they can provide starting places, even if only for revisionist accounts of the past.

But the seventies? Even before this era ended, many historians had dismissed it as a time hardly worth labeling. Recently, however, many U.S. history texts have seen the seventies primarily as a crucible for the growing power of the New Right. The “Shock of the Global,” by contrast, centers the decade on the processes that came to be called “globalization.”

In a brief opening essay, Niall Ferguson dismisses the rise of the New Right frame as too limiting and suggests that the seventies be viewed as a period that set the stage for momentous changes arising from globalization and backlashes against it. He highlights transformations associated with the liberalization of international capital markets, even as monetary policy continued to be controlled on the national level; the Soviet collapse; the Chinese reorientation toward markets; and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. The seventies, Ferguson writes, seem to have been characterized by a “widespread perception of crisis,” but he also insists that the decade itself was hardly crisis ridden. Rather, the seeds of future crises were sown at that time (14, 18). The decade ushered in the “shock of the global,” but its specific disruptions did not become manifest until later.

The epilogue by Thomas Borstelmann also foregrounds globalization but suggests a slightly different focus than Ferguson. Borstelmann sees the clash of two global currents: first, the decline of old hierarchies of race and sex, which were associated with rights movements in the United States and decolonization abroad; second, “the turn toward the market,” which re-sorted “people into what were seen as their natural socioeconomic levels.” (353) The softening of the discourses of racial and gender hierarchy together with the solidification of divisions by class and wealth produced disorientations of many kinds. Like Ferguson’s essay, Borstelmann’s can be read as positioning the seventies as a crucible for shocks to come.

As these two book-end contributions suggest, the value of this collection lies less in its authors’ agreement on any single definition of what might be meant by the “shock of the global” than in how its broad and suggestive essays collectively raise questions about

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historical themes and framing. As the period often called the “long seventies” slips from the realm of commentary to that of “history,” this book can help shape a conversation about whether it should be conceived as pivotal and, if so, in what sense.

Collections of essays nearly always run the danger of flying apart, and several reviewers in this roundtable highlight the centrifugal forces inherent in this book. For one thing, there are 21 essays, most very short. Any attempt to herd that many well-regarded contributors along one clearly focused path would be impossible—and probably misguided. In addition, the editors themselves have failed to articulate a clear central thesis. Despite the title of the book, which implies that the 1970s might be viewed as a coherent unit characterized by “shock,” Ferguson’s lead essay takes issue with such a frame. In his typically contrarian way Ferguson thus begins the book by being its own first revisionist: Decades are too narrow in scope, he rightly argues, and this one was less shock-prone than the ones that came before and after. Adding to the cacophony of the message, the editors are clearly most interested in political economy but have included essays on assorted other topics without theorizing the fit among them. The essays on political economy, which lead off, do speak to each other in various ways. The following essays on culture, religion, environment, gender, human rights, disease, and other topics come later, and often primarily address specific historiographies outside of the book rather than commonalities or concerns internal to it.

The reviewers in this roundtable all mention this sprawling character as they assess whether the collection makes a case for a broad-based structural upheaval associated with the shock of globalization during the 1970s. As befits a roundtable, they present different takes on this issue.

William I. Hitchcock’s review places a positive spin on the project by seeing it as “far more than a ‘decade’ book.” In his view, “it serves as a state-of-the-field commentary on the craft of international history.” Praising the “impressive team of scholars” and the wide range of essays covering “economics, international politics and institutions, human rights, and transnational socio-cultural developments,” he sees the value of the collection “in the intellectual framework it lays out.” By demonstrating the breadth of topics within the purview of international history, Hitchcock implies, this book helps map a broad terrain for the field.

Neither he nor the editors of the book, however, address this “state of the field” contribution in greater depth. In fact, even Hitchcock points out that, of the 21 essays, only one each deals with Latin America, China, and the Islamic world. And other reviewers also directly challenge the “international history” dimension of the project. William Glen Gray notes its scanty attention to Western Europe, Japan, and Israel. Gray joins Hitchcock in singling out the substantial number of essays on U.S. foreign policy (Nguyen, Suri, Gavin, Lawrence) as being the least integrated into the overall themes of the volume. Is this a book centering on “U.S. and the world” or is it “international history”?

Gray’s, Hitchcock’s, and David Painter’s reviews balance comments on the volume as a whole with close observations on some of the individual essays. Gray views the book as failing “to congeal into a compelling interpretation” and asks whether the world of the
seventies may have been too “fractured” to accommodate any over-arching narrative. He then adroitly summarizes the contributions of certain essays. He takes to task Alan Taylor’s methodology and conclusions, but he gives most of the other essays very high marks and concludes that the volume will well serve as a “supplement” to other studies of the decade. Hitchcock characterizes the social/cultural essays as a “Whitman’s sampler” but acknowledges that the “oppositional voices” covered in these essays were important in creating networks that enlarged the global public sphere and challenged state power. Hitchcock follows with a lengthy and valuable discussion of five specific areas in which he finds limitations in the book’s core concept. David Painter agrees that the project “lacks coherence” and presents detailed commentary on each of the essays dealing with political economy. He makes the important point that although issues related to oil dramatically affected the international history of the era, there is no specific attention to or interpretation of the role of oil in that decade.

The final reviewer, Natasha Zaretsky, advances a more synthetic, and more positive, view of the book. She compliments it for centering the decade on “globalization” and for presenting essays on its social and cultural as well as economic and political accompaniments. Although she agrees with other reviewers that the volume falls short in making connections among its essays, she emphasizes how it has presented excellent raw material for a more synthetic understanding. Zaretsky, whose own book connects political economy with culture in this decade, adapts the general outlines of Thomas Borstlemann’s short concluding essay to suggest how one might have drawn the kinds of intersections that other reviewers found lacking in the book. The coherence is there, she suggests; it just has not been overtly teased out.

Collectively, these reviews suggest that this book will likely become an important text for global and U.S. history of the seventies. The drawbacks that result from so many brief essays are counterbalanced by their breadth and high quality. The overall gauzy focus can be more positively cast as suggestive and provocative. Some essays, as noted above, see the seventies mostly as a staging decade for shocks-to-come. Other essays on many specific themes argue for the seventies itself as a decade of singular importance: in the integration of financial markets, with associated economic challenges in both capitalist and communist regimes (Maier, Sargent, Westad, Kotkin, Taylor, Adelman), in the rise of securitization and debates over multinationals (Hyman, Oliveiro), in development of “modern environmentalism” (McNeill), in the place accorded international institutions and human rights (Sluga, Morgan); in changing understandings of the cultural contexts of global feminisms (Olcott), in the emergence of global regimes for disease control (Manela), in the global politics of rock music (Sheehan), in visions of the future both secular (Connelly) and religious (Preston and Jalal). Individual essays may be enormously helpful to a wide variety of specialists, while synthesizers may appreciate the scope of topics. If this volume inevitably leaves much of the world and a great many issues unexamined, it also presents a very wide range of perspectives that can open up, rather than settle, scholarly conversations about the transformations of the late twentieth century. The following reviews themselves project important components of those conversations.
Participants:


Erez Manela is the Dunwalke Associate Professor of American history at Harvard University. He received his Ph.D. in 2003 from Yale University, winning the John Addison Porter Prize and the Mary & Arthur Wright Prize for his dissertation. He has published a number of articles and essays in the *American Historical Review*, *International Journal, Diplomacy & Statecraft*, and *Middle Eastern Studies*, and in a number of edited volumes. Manela is currently working on a history of the global campaign to eradicate smallpox in the twentieth century.

Daniel J. Sargent is Assistant Professor of History at the University of California, Berkeley. He graduated with a PhD in International History from Harvard University in 2008. He is a co-editor of *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective* (Harvard, 2010) and is currently working on a history of American responses to globalization in the 1970s, provisionally titled *A Superpower Transformed: Globalization and the Crisis of American Foreign Policy in the 1970s* (Oxford University Press, Forthcoming).

William I. Hitchcock is Professor of History at the University of Virginia. He received his Ph.D. from Yale in 1994, and has taught at Wellesley College and Temple University, where he was Chair of the Department of History. He is the author of a number of books including *The Struggle for Europe: The Turbulent History of a Divided Continent, 1945-present* (Doubleday, 2004), and most recently, *The Bitter Road to Freedom: A New History of the Liberation of Europe, 1944-45* (Free Press, 2008), which won the George Louis Beer Prize from the American Historical Association and was a Finalist for the Mark Lynton Prize and the Pulitzer Prize.

David S. Painter teaches international history at Georgetown University. His publications include *Oil and the American Century, The Cold War, and Origins of the Cold War* (co-editor), and articles on US policy toward the Third World, US oil policies, and the Cold War. He is currently working on a study of oil and world power in the 20th century. He is a past Director of Graduate Studies in the History Department, and was the founding Director of the Master of Arts in Global, Comparative, and International History program. He was educated at King College, the University of Oxford, where he was a Rhodes Scholar, and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where he received a Ph.D. in History.

Emily S. Rosenberg is professor of history at the University of California, Irvine. She is author of *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945; Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930; A Date Which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory*; and coauthor of *Liberty, Equality, Power: A History of the American People* (6th ed., 2011). She has served as president of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR); an editor of the *Oxford Companion to United States History*; a Board member of the Organization of American Historians; and co-edits the “American Encounters, Global Interactions” book series for Duke University Press. Her current research deals with mass consumerism in global perspective.

Natasha Zaretsky is an Associate Professor of History at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. She is the author of *No Direction Home: The American Family and the Fear of National Decline*, which was published by the University of North Carolina Press in 2007.
Review by William Glenn Gray, Purdue University


Considered as an assortment of brief sketches, collected volumes are often a treat. From that perspective, scholars have every reason to welcome The Shock of the Global, which functions as a kind of compendium of Harvard international historians and others who happened to be in Cambridge some time around 2008. The individual articles are, with few exceptions, worthwhile in their own right. If the volume fails to congeal into a compelling interpretation of the 1970s, that is surely a reflection of the inherent difficulty of trying to render a "global" picture of a not-so-globalized world.

Niall Ferguson’s opening essay – “Crisis, What Crisis?” – exemplifies the problem. Writing in the best contrarian fashion, Ferguson skewers the notion that the 1970s were somehow a period of unique malaise. The 1980s were worse, he insists; in 48 out of 105 countries where data is available, inflation was higher in the 1980s than the decade before (6). Recessions were more painful, and wars more violent, in the 1980s. Going further out on a limb, Ferguson suggests that “Anglophone academics” are to blame for the gloomy reputation of the 1970s; they suffered from poor returns on stocks and bonds, and their prestige in the classroom was plummeting (9-13).

It is unlikely that Ferguson means this seriously, but his statistical observations make clear the problem of using aggregate data to present a picture of international life in the 1970s. Alan Taylor provides a further example when attempting to tease out the relationship between the severity of the Great Depression in given countries and the subsequent openness of those nations to trade in the 1970s. He finds that countries that suffered the most in the 1930s were the most resistant to liberalizing their trade four decades later; but he achieves this result by excluding the Western industrial countries – the EEC, OECD, and even “early liberalizers” such as South Korea (109). Taylor’s regression analysis thus produces a meaningless correlation, one that ignores the prevalence of the opposite effect in the capitalist West. To Helmut Schmidt, Gerald Ford, and (less consistently) Harold Wilson and James Callaghan, the mistakes of the 1930s provided a compelling reason for overcoming protectionism and removing controls on capital. In ignoring the subjective views of contemporaries, Taylor’s “new comparative economic history” falls flat, and has little to tell us about the 1970s.

Happily, the other contributors with an economic focus have actually consulted the documentary record. This allows them to dispense with facile talk of waning sovereignty and the inexorable pressures of globalization. To Jeremy Adelman, nation-states still held the reins: “Whatever might be said of the origins of the crisis, it was a set of interlocking public decisions that reconstituted the rules of the global financial system in the early 1970s: it was this change that was shocking.” (116) Although his essay focuses on the specific problems of Latin America – foreign debt and capital flight – Adelman’s essay is a model for writing in clear and concise terms about the international financial system. Another very fine essay, if narrower in scope, is Louis Hyman’s story of how mortgage-
backed securities attracted global investors in the 1970s, drawing much-needed foreign capital into the American property market.

One of the central tensions in this volume concerns the place of the United States. Co-editor Daniel Sargent presents the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations as warily peeking out at an alarmingly interdependent world. To Sargent, the United States was “an object as much as an agent of globalization” (64) – a fair point, but one which still places Washington at the center of the narrative. More satisfying is Vernie Oliveiro’s approach, in which American actors appear as participants in larger conversations about the global economy. Complaints about multinational enterprises (MNEs) led the G-77, the most prominent grouping of the global South, to demand a “code of conduct” for capitalist enterprises. American policy makers responded proactively by seizing control of the conversation, sponsoring a “Declaration on International Investment” within the OECD and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) within the U.S. Congress.

At times, the volume tips over into a “United-States-and-the-World” perspective, with several authors writing on American foreign policy toward developing countries (Mark Lawrence), arms control (Frank Gavin), Vietnam (Lien-Hang Nguyen), or the multipolar world more generally (Jeremi Suri). Here the Harvard editors have been “scooped” by Nixon and the World, an earlier, more tightly focused collection edited by Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston, which features longer pieces by each of these accomplished historians. The function of such essays in The Shock of the Global is less obvious, raising the more general issue of territory. The book’s subtitle, The 1970s in Perspective, is intriguingly open-ended. Whose “1970s” is under consideration here? The conference behind this volume bore the title “The Global 1970s,” and excellent pieces on Soviet bloc debt (Stephen Kotkin), China’s turn toward a market economy (Odd Arne Westad), and Muslims in Central and South Asia (Ayesha Jalal) suggest an interest in exploring the specific experiences of non-U.S. regions. Strangely absent is any sustained attention to the West writ large – Western Europe, Japan, Israel. Granted, selective coverage is inevitable in any collection of 21 essays, but the implication here is apparently that the United States can simply stand in for the entire industrialized West. Only Charles Maier truly pulls this off, probing the West’s central economic challenges in his essay on “malaise”: the breakdown of the Keynesian consensus, the rise of monetarism, the crisis of Fordist production.

The book’s most insistently global chapters are spearheaded by co-editor Erez Manela, who wants to highlight the centrality of international organizations and non-state actors. Even so, Manela’s own chapter on smallpox eradication offers a mixed lesson when it comes to transcending the nation-state. The project was imbued with the space-race spirit of the 1960s, taking its impetus from a 1965 challenge by Lyndon Johnson to achieve the worldwide elimination of smallpox. Clearly the goal would not have been met by 1979 without international coordination through the WHO. But could global society have achieved this result in the absence of U.S.-Soviet détente? Was there a causal relationship between the damping down of the Cold War and the emergence of a certain kind of global consciousness? J. R. McNeill first acknowledges that détente provided “some help” when it came to organizing international conferences on the environment (276). But his conclusion takes matters a step further, suggesting that détente really was a prerequisite for
environmental activism: “When security seems assured and the economic pie is growing, environmentalism flourishes in the resulting anxiety vacuum.” (278) After a brief bubble in the early 1970s, economic anxieties rushed back in and détente tottered, swiftly displacing the ascendance of environmental concerns.

McNeill’s essay is satisfying for its clear directionality – the ebbing and flowing of tides of sentiment. Ayesha Jalal does something similar in her chapter, reflecting on the rise and fall of “secular-socialist alternatives” in the Muslim world and the long-term impact of “Islam’s second globalization” fueled by Saudi petrodollars. It may have been an “uncertain trajectory,” as Jalal indicates, but the story has contours. As Matt Connelly reminds us, the 1970s was a decade of peak demand for futurologists, who offered their readers chilling extrapolations on the basis of unidirectional trends. Several authors in this volume take pains to do just the opposite. Writing on changes within the United Nations system, Glenda Sluga cuts a wide swath, pointing to a push and pull between globalist optimism and the alarming proliferation of violent ethnic conflicts. She ends by remarking on “the uneven and often contradictory developments of the global 1970s.” (236) In a similar vein, Jocelyn Olcott offers a perceptive analysis of the dynamics at play at the International Women’s Year conference in Mexico City in 1975. A showdown between American feminists and Marxist delegates from the Third World was widely anticipated; but Olcott goes beyond this story to expose sharp clashes among the various Latin American delegations. Whereas other writers have criticized Betty Friedan’s arrogant efforts to speak on behalf of the various NGOs on hand in Mexico City, Olcott makes a more fundamental point: “the [NGO] tribune could not be represented.” (292) The cacophony of views was too overwhelming.

Still, there is something frustrating about “uneven,” directionless history. If it is not possible to offer a clear perspective on the shape of the entire globe in the 1970s, then surely it makes sense to choose a smaller unit of study. Implicitly, that is just what Michael Morgan does in his piece on the “rebirth of human rights.” At a time when the United Nations was dominated by dictators, the human rights agenda was hardly reflective of majority sentiment (except for the campaign against apartheid, cynically abused as it was). And yet the 1970s was indeed an important decade for human rights: outrage over the Nigerian civil war gave rise to Doctors Without Borders; American activists took aim at the Soviet bloc. Morgan’s subjects constitute a kind of international civil society that was not global in a literal, all-inclusive sense, but that arguably mattered more than many institutions that did claim universality.

Perhaps, then, one should simply concede that the world was too fractured in the 1970s to accommodate over-arching narratives. Working within more defined communities might allow greater scope for pursuing classic topics from the period – the Arab oil boycott, international terrorism, the founding of the G-7 – which appear only obliquely in these pages. Here we find Yahya Khan, but not Sheikh Yamani; China’s Red Guards, but not the Red Army Faction or the Brigate Rosse. The editors have done an excellent job of “shocking” us with new and unfamiliar perspectives on the 1970s. The result is a volume that can supplement, but not supplant, more traditional accounts of international life during this perplexing decade.
This collection of essays about the 1970s is far more than a “decade” book. It serves as a state-of-the-field commentary on the craft of international history. The editors of the volume deserve praise for gathering an impressive team of scholars and pushing the range of the contributions as far and wide as possible: essays cover economics, international politics and institutions, human rights, and transnational socio-cultural developments. Though the essays are rich in content about the international politics of the 1970s, the value of the collection really lies in the intellectual framework it lays out and the claims the authors make about the significance of the 1970s in the narrative of twentieth century global history. The book is dedicated to the late Professor Ernest R. May, one of the finest scholars of international history in the last half-century, and does credit to his memory.

The central concern of the book, as laid out in Niall Ferguson’s introduction, is the way in which major states, mostly Western and, truth be told, mainly the United States, grappled with a series of new geopolitical, economic and cultural transformations whose dimensions were seen by contemporaries to be genuinely global in scale. Actors on the world stage, whether national leaders, bankers or activists, saw themselves as operating in a new system that was visibly more interdependent and therefore more complex than anything they had known. The book sets out to chart the response of global players to these “shocks,” and to examine the consequences of policy choices made in this decade that would do a great deal to shape the 1980s and beyond. The general drift here is that the 1970s ought not to be written off simply as a decade of drift and decline. There was much more going on than we’ve typically assumed. The pace of global economic and political change was increasing, and policy-makers tried to adapt to these new circumstances in innovative ways. To be sure, Ferguson openly admits that the 1970s cannot stand alone as a decade of decision in which a series of great crises erupted and were seen to have changed the world order, such as in the ‘40s or ‘60s or even the 1980s. Rather, this decade is treated as a prelude to the intense era of global economic growth and regime change of the 1980s. “The essays gathered here,” Ferguson observes, “therefore tend to recast the 1970s more as the seedbed of future crises than as the crisis conjuncture itself (20).” He admits: “the real crisis was yet to come (21).”

The variety of topics touched on in the book is impressive. Essays examine not only foreign ministers and presidents but also non-state actors whose presence, and impact, can be registered across the globe. These include human rights, women’s rights and environmentalism; the United Nations and the many affiliated world organizations that worked under its wide umbrella; politico-religious organizations that began to engage in direct political activism; and even rock bands such as Led Zeppelin and the Rolling Stones, cultural icons that globalized western sexual mores while creating a universally recognized commercial brand. The book is not perhaps as “global” as one might wish: of the twenty-one essays, one deals with Latin America, one deals with China, and one takes on the Islamic world. The editors clearly did not aim to offer comprehensive global coverage, however: what interests them are points of particular crisis and policy response, and this
explains why so much of the book is devoted to the changes in the global economy. Indeed, despite the inclusion of a jumble of essays on aspects of culture and society, the real story the editors wanted to tell is one of global economic transformation. The advent of globalization was the signature "shock" of the decade.

Charles Maier’s essay strikes the keynote theme: “the turmoil of the 1970s provoked fundamental rethinking of the economic and political axioms that had been taken for granted since the Second World War. It closed the 'postwar' era and its policy premises (26).” The trente glorieuses, as the French termed the unprecedented postwar boom years, stalled, and the West got stagflation: simultaneous inflation and unemployment. The postwar social compact became too costly, as a wage-price spiral gripped developed economies; the oil embargo quadrupled energy costs, pushing inflation higher; and heavy industries in steel, coal, and durable manufactures slowed as the economy shifted to service industries. To many contemporaries the age of affluence appeared to be coming to an end. But what makes the period so significant for Maier, and for Daniel Sargent, whose essay on the advent of globalization complements Maier’s, is the policy response to these problems. Capitalism did not die; it reinvented itself in “a surprisingly successful turn to market solutions (Maier, 36).” Trade barriers were reduced; convertibility of currencies was embraced; capital controls were abandoned; all in an effort to stimulate international economic growth as a response to a slowing domestic economy. Trade liberalization, Alan Taylor claims, picked up steam, setting the stage for rapid advances of world trade and opening the era of globalization. This progress in freeing up global trade, Taylor argues, makes the 1970s “one of the most important turning points of the modern era (97).” Daniel Sargent and Vernie Oliveiro both agree that in the 1970s, American leaders became conscious of the nation’s interdependence with the global economy, and began to frame policy choices that responded to this new climate. Oliveiro, for example, shows how eager U.S. leaders were to pave the way for the growth of multinational corporations, because they believed that America’s future could be best assured through “the vigorous promotion of a liberal, market-driven global economy(145).” The U.S. was embracing the global to save the national: the era of interdependence had fully arrived.

It may be that the 1970s was perceived to be an era of economic crisis in the West. But it is instructive to recall just how much worse the picture was in the Communist bloc, and how attractive even the struggling capitalist model appeared from the outside. Odd Arne Westad reminds us that Deng Xiaoping’s 1979 visit to the United States “bowled him over; he was so taken by the technology and the productivity levels he saw in the United States that he ... could not sleep for several days.” What America had “was what he wanted for China in the future (77).” The same held true in Eastern Europe, as Stephen Kotkin shows, where Poland and East Germany began in the 1970s to borrow heavily from capitalist lenders in order to appease demands for consumer goods from restless and disgruntled populations that were perfectly aware of how much better things were on the other side of the Iron Curtain. The plan ended in disaster, as Eastern bloc states faced mounting debt and stagnant productivity. By the end of the decade Poland and the GDR were unable to pay even the interest on their loans. It would not be long before the ideological imperatives that held the Eastern bloc together were called into question.
The first half of the book features eight essays on the advent of a global interdependent economic order in the 1970s. They are fresh and ambitious. Unfortunately, the four essays devoted to “International Relations in an Age of Upheaval” do not seem to be in direct conversation with those on economic transformation; thus, economics and diplomacy remain compartmentalized. Jeremi Suri’s essay on Henry Kissinger is an intellectual tour d’horizon of the great man who, according to Suri, was “the only figure who appeared to make sense of a rapidly changing world.” Kissinger, “more than any other figure in the 1960s and 1970s, thought systematically about future challenges and opportunities (175, 173).” The essay, like Kissinger, is somewhat old school. According to Suri, Kissinger wanted to reassert state power at a time when that power seemed to be eroding rapidly, and he wanted to do it by reviving the model of the nineteenth century Concert of Europe in which great powers agreed to secure global stability while keeping dissent at bay and stomping on local trouble-makers. Kissinger did not believe the cold war order was stable, nor did he find bipolarity comforting. He wanted to devise a multipolar framework that was more flexible and better balanced, and this led him to play the China card. What strikes the reader about Suri’s emphasis on individual leadership – a view that implies that Kissinger alone could guide the global system toward radical realignment simply by the power of his ideas – is how sharply it contrasts with the essays on globalization, in which the globe is depicted as a highly complex, interdependent system that is no longer subject to the control of national policy. Mark Lawrence’s accompanying essay makes a similar assumption: leaders in Washington still call the shots for the rest of the world. Lawrence, though sharply critical of U.S. leaders in the 1970s, including Kissinger, for failing to devise a workable strategy toward the developing world that could stanch the erosion of U.S. power in the face of peripheral challenges in South America and South Asia, nonetheless believes that decisions made in Washington could – if they were the right decisions – guide the world to a new era of harmony and stability. We have on display two methodologies of how to cast the international history of the 1970s: one that emphasizes interconnection and erosion of sovereignty in an economically integrated world; another that remains focused on the way that key U.S. leaders tried to reassert state power on behalf of specific foreign policy objectives.

The essays grouped together in the last third of the book comprise a kind of Whitman’s Sampler of new trends in international history. Nine essays treat developments in international society: the United Nations, the rise of human rights, policies toward global health and the environment, women’s rights, popular culture, and religion. Michael Morgan’s essay provides sound evidence that the 1970s was the pivotal decade for human rights: it was then that various trends, from decolonization to the rise of NGOs, underground dissident movements and new technologies of communication, joined into a powerful challenge to the great powers to take human rights seriously. Erez Manela urges us to integrate international efforts to eradicate smallpox into the global history of the era. Jocelyn Olcott places the 1975 International Women’s Year at the center of an essay on increasing global connections between women’s rights advocates. Andrew Preston’s impressive chapter shows the way the religious Right in the United States was spurred on to political activism precisely by the sense that power once reserved to the nation was increasingly being leached away by multinational corporations, NGOs and international agencies. These are richly researched, thoughtful essays that indicate exciting new avenues
for scholarship. Taken together, they seem to imply not so much that state power no longer mattered, but that many more participants were crowding into the global public sphere. NGOs, the UN agencies, environmental activists, religious zealots—all could tap into new technologies to connect, to agitate, and to make their voices heard. These voices rose up not from a gaggle of hippies who wanted to tune in and drop out: one of the main shocks of the global 1970s, it seems, was how effective these oppositional voices were in creating “durable networks” (Maier, 38) that would, in the subsequent decades, seriously challenge state power.

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For all the quality of the individual essays here, the volume as a whole left me wishing for more coherence, more clarity about its objectives, and more historiographical bite. It also left me wondering if the concept of the book – a preoccupation with “shocks” or crises – did not tend to distort the decade somewhat, hyping discontinuity and underplaying longer-term continuities. Let me elaborate on five areas in which the volume was for me less than satisfactory.

1. The cold war. Scholars of the cold war may wonder, upon putting down this volume, where the cold war has gone. Of course, the cold war is mentioned throughout the essays, but only a few authors here seem all that concerned with it. It is background music, a faint theme one hears that triggers nostalgic memories of an earlier time, little more. Only four of the twenty-one essays explicitly address international relations, and these seem a bit forlorn, bracketed between much more robust sections on global economic change and new trends in international society, organization and culture. Readers who want to push international history beyond the cold war may welcome this approach, but the result is an absence of coherence and structure. Issues we might typically expect in a survey of the global ’70s – Ostpolitik, détente, the Paris peace talks on Vietnam, the 1973 October War in the Middle East, the Helsinki Accords, the proxy wars in Africa, the Euromissiles debate, the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan – all of these staple topics of cold war history are pushed to the background in this collection. The editors, one concludes, question the centrality of such topics in the history of the 1970s.

Without a cold war story to anchor the decade, the editors instead privilege the liberalization of trade and finance as well as the growth of international society as the hallmarks of the age. “In no field was the shock of the global more palpable than in the economic realm,” (16) Niall Ferguson writes in his introduction, implying that the economic transformations of the world in the ’70s are essentially unrelated to geopolitics. Does this choice reflect a new consensus that, as a subject of historical analysis, the cold war is passé, not an especially useful framework for understanding global developments in the 1970s—and beyond? Matthew Connelly quite casually affirms this view, saying that “historians have come to understand that a preoccupation with the US-Soviet confrontation distorted our understanding of the rest of the world” (337). The cold war has failed us, it seems, and perhaps some international historians will not be sorry to see it go.

But readers will scratch their heads occasionally at the editorial choices that have been made here. Neither Willy Brandt nor Ostpolitik is mentioned in this book, though the
normalization of relations between the two Germanies is surely one of the more “shocking” developments of the decade. There is an entire essay on the advent of mortgage-backed securities, but the Iran hostage crisis, another “shocker,” appears only once, in passing. Leonid Brezhnev, who presided over the Soviet Union from 1964 to 1982 and launched the ill-fated invasion of Afghanistan, receives roughly as much attention as Cynthia Plaster Caster, whose claim to fame was that she made casts of the erect penises of her favorite rock and roll stars. The pop futurologist Alvin Toffler gets detailed consideration in Matthew Connelly’s clever essay, but Menachem Begin, Anwar al-Sadat, and Yasser Arafat are never mentioned in the book. Jerry Falwell is here; Andrei Gromyko is not. Tom Wolfe yes; Daniel Ortega no, etc. etc. Many of the regions covered in Odd Arne Westad’s massive book *The Global Cold War* – from Cuba to Southern Africa to Ethiopia and Iran – are shunted off to the side. My own impression is that the insistence on searching out avatars of change, crisis or innovation has led the editors to downgrade and sideline the longer-term geopolitical contest between the Soviet Union and the United States and their various proxies—even though it was this contest and its sudden end that would certainly define the 1980s. By leaving so much of the cold war on the margins, the editors have failed to connect developments of the 1970s clearly to the geopolitical transformations that would come a decade later.

2. People vs. Structures. If you wrote a “decade” book about the global 1960s, it would be driven by strong personalities and the agency of individuals who made war, triggered revolutions, protested in the streets, launched civil rights movements, and so on. If you wrote a book on the global 1980s, there too you would deploy strong personalities, some engaged in saber-rattling (Reagan), others launching new monetary orthodoxies (Thatcher), some forming illegal trade unions (Walesa), others breaking ideological taboos (Gorbachev and Deng). In these essays on the 1970s, by contrast, there are few people (other than Henry Kissinger, who lurks throughout the essays). There are structures, forces, trends, institutions, banks, states, and visions, but rather few human beings who actually do things.

What is the significance of this depopulated scholarly style? I think it reveals a strong bias among most of these authors that in the era of globalization, autonomy – whether of individual leaders, ordinary people or states – was, in Daniel Sargent’s words, “circumscribed by global integration” (53). That is, the choices of individuals just didn’t matter much anymore. This may be a tempting conclusion when contemplating a complex process like globalization, but I think it points to a risk inherent in writing “global” history. Since globalization can appear to us as a process with a mind of its own, a runaway train beyond human comprehension or control, we are prone to write about it as if human

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agency has no role in shaping, guiding or directing it. Such a stance toward the past, I fear, abdicates the role of the historian in exploring how human beings shape the world.

A few examples of this sort of thing: Niall Ferguson provides a list of ’70s-era technological breakthroughs in his introduction, without any suggestion that people in specific social contexts created these technologies. “Microsoft was founded in 1975, followed a year later by Apple (21).” Isn’t there more to be said about the founders of these companies and the West Coast techno-geek culture that Bill Gates and Steve Jobs exemplified? (And it is worth noting that Microsoft is only mentioned once in the book, pointing to a broad failure to integrate technological innovation into the collection). In Charles Maier’s essay on “Malaise,” liberalism, interdependence, globalization, and capitalism are not simply subjects of analysis, they are the actors themselves, largely replacing human agency. Alan Taylor’s discussion of how free trade policies became so strongly favored by the world’s large economies is wholly devoid of individual persons confronting problems and doing the work of making policy. The problem extends beyond the essays on economics. Take J.R. McNeill’s essay on the rise of environmentalism. His explanation for the rise of a new awareness of the ecological health of the planet centers on “interactions among technology, culture, economics and ecological change” (264). But, as is too often the case in environmental history, people are not part of the story. Jeremy Adelman’s excellent essay on the origins of the Latin American debt crisis is an important exception: he highlights the role of Latin American policymakers in choosing free-market policies and he has done enough digging into the biographies of key finance ministers and economic advisers to show that the liberal economic policy choices of the 1970s were not imposed by unseen forces of globalization but were chosen by specific people with specific ideological preferences.

Is this the future for international history – scholarship that examines structures rather than people? This book leans strongly in that direction, but I do not think this is the only possible approach. I would prefer to see scholars historicize globalization, as Adelman has done here, not by zooming out but by zooming in and restoring the actions and ideological premises of people – whether political leaders or human rights activists or shop-floor workers or inventors or consumers – to the historical narrative.

3. Oil and the Middle East. The oil embargo and energy crisis were defining features of the 1970s. One recalls gas lines, sudden economizing efforts, the advent of fuel-efficient cars, a worried president asking us to wear sweaters and turn the heat down, and so on. Indeed, the Middle East and South Asia – Zbigniew Brzezinski’s “arc of crisis” – occupied a central place in the decade: the 1973 October War, the embargo, the Camp David peace process, the Iranian Revolution, the invasion of Afghanistan and the rise of militant Islam—all of these issues stand out as among the most “shocking” of the decade. Niall Ferguson, in his introduction, seems to agree: “perhaps the biggest of all shocks in the period was the oil export embargo” imposed by OPEC, he writes (17). Daniel Sargent also casts the oil embargo as “one of the seventies’ seismic events” (49). And yet, there is no single essay on the subject in the volume. The oil crisis is an assumed part of the backdrop, to be sure. The inflation that followed the embargo, and its impact on the debt-laden countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe is touched on. But it seems to me that the subject deserves an
essay of its own: by focusing only on the embargo’s economic impact, the book deracinetes the oil crisis from its origins in the politics of the Middle East. As a result, the editors missed an opportunity to tie the 1970s oil shock to a major theme of post-1970s world: the nexus of oil, war, and Islamic radicalism that has been such a significant part of global politics ever since.

The one essay on the Islamic world here, by Ayesha Jalal, is called on to do the impossible—to cover “Islam’s Contemporary Globalization” in a few pages. The author principally deals with Pakistan, beginning with the narration of the bloody 1971 birth of Bangladesh, which featured a humiliating defeat of Pakistan by its archrival India. She then shows how Pakistan, humbled militarily and hurting economically, enhanced ties to oil-producing – and increasingly wealthy – Muslim states such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. American policy in the region, she shows, only made matters worse, green-lighting a military coup in Bangladesh in 1975 and the ouster of Pakistan’s Zulfikar Ali Bhutto by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977. Although Zia advanced Pakistan’s nuclear program and intensified the Islamicization of the country, he also shored up ties to the United States by acting as the main conduit of weapons and money to the Afghan mujahideen who were fighting the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. The rise of the Taliban and al-Qaeda would follow close behind. Phew! All this in seventeen pages. It is a noble effort, but what is the rush? If one of the goals of the book is to show leading western states grappling with “shocks of the global,” then a detailed examination of western policy toward Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan would seem to be called for. The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War and subsequent oil embargo also need sustained attention if we are to understand the scale and complexity of Western policy-making toward the Middle East and South Asia in this decade. Again, what we have is an editorial choice: the book contains eight substantial essays on the global economy but only one on the Islamic world. Given the significance of the “arc of crisis” not just in the 1970s but in the rest of the twentieth century, it is difficult to justify this imbalance.

4. The Rest of the West. In 1973, David Rockefeller founded the Trilateral Commission in an effort to create a network of “wise men” from the United States, Europe and Japan that could develop coherent, international solutions to a wide range of problems that were besetting the developed world. It made perfect sense for elites from these three regions to act in concert: for the whole decade of the 1970s, the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Britain and Italy made up the six largest economies in the world. Yet in this collection of essays, there is no sustained discussion of any major European nation or the regional developments that were bringing European states ever closer toward monetary union. Japan does not receive much attention; nor, for that matter, do the “tigers” of Southeast Asia, whose startling economic development was gaining momentum in this period. This seems somewhat surprising in a book that places such strong emphasis on the 70’s-era transformations in the world’s economic arrangements, in which the G-7 states were closely involved. Again, it is not that these nations go unmentioned, but that they are considered irrelevant to the story-line of global transformation. For this reason, China receives more attention than Europe or Japan. Looking at the course of the whole post-1945 period up to the present, this has a certain logic to it. But within the framework of the 1970s, it is useful to recall that China was still a rather small blip on the global economic
radar screen. China’s GDP at the close of the 1970s was about the size of Spain’s, half the size of Italy’s and a small fraction of Japan’s. The astonishing rise of China began in later years. Because the editors want to impose a story of “shock” onto the 1970s, they have perhaps overlooked the reality that the global economy was still dominated by the old, developed economies, and their predominance was unchallenged throughout the decade.

That Europe has gone AWOL here is perhaps not too surprising: the seventies were hardly Europe’s finest hour. Yet a chapter on developments in the old continent might have helped sustain the larger purpose of the volume: to show policy-makers adapting to the challenges of globalization. It was in this period, post-de Gaulle, that the project of European integration picked up steam again after a decade of slumber; at the end of the decade, Europe launched the European Monetary System which aimed to stabilize European currencies and promote intra-European trade. In this decade, Spain and Portugal made stunningly swift transitions to democracy after more than four decades of dictatorial rule; this Southern renaissance offers powerful evidence of the ways that global economic and social trends were wearing down the walls of closed single-party systems. And the decade featured persistent attacks by terrorist organizations, whether Red Brigades or Red Army Faction, trying to keep alive a dream of radical social change that was becoming increasingly irrelevant in a richer, less ideological and ever more porous Europe. It seems odd to leave these elements out of the story of the 1970s.

5. The Meaning of the Seventies. Finally, I think the book is weakened by its inability to settle on an overriding argument about what makes the 1970s important. Charles Maier comes closest to setting out a dominant position: he sees the central feature of the 1970s as a “crisis of industrial society (45),” an era when the economic model in place from the 1930s to the 1960s finally collapsed and had to be replaced with a new economic and social order based upon the free market and greater inequality. Yet Maier goes on to question the utility of the concept of “crisis,” instead suggesting that perhaps the transition to the postindustrial order is still going on, and that what historians see as crises are “better construed as the normal conditions of complex societies (47).” Crisis or no crisis? The question remains open. Likewise, Niall Ferguson seems unsure which themes to stress as the defining pivot points of the age: “nothing changed more radically in Western societies in the 1970s than the role of women (12),” he says, before positing that it was the economic realm in which the shock of the global was greatest (16). No, “the biggest of all global shocks was the oil export embargo (17).” But wait: “the single most portentous event of the 1970s was in fact Deng’s visit in 1979 to the United States (20).” Then Ferguson discards these “shocks” to claim that the ‘seventies were not really more crisis-ridden than previous decades; they were just perceived to be so by contemporaries, especially Anglophone academics (A.J.P. Taylor’s diary is deployed as evidence) whose pay had been frozen in an era of high inflation (10). The reader is whip-sawed from one argument to another for the distinctiveness of the decade only to find that the “shock of the global” may simply have been imagined by a few impecunious British dons. One is left yearning for a few sign-posts.

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I asserted at the outset of this review that these essays, though focused on the 1970s, also constitute a report on the latest trends in international history. I think they amply illustrate the exciting work going on in the field, the new questions that are being asked, and the
fresh talent that has emerged to answer them. I also think the essays reveal some of the ambiguities and troubles that international historians of the postwar world are struggling with right now: what to do with the cold war; how much leaders still matter in an era of eroding state sovereignty; how the vibrant free-market world order that has emerged in the last 30 years has impacted geopolitics; and above all, how historians should write about these global problems while remaining grounded in the tools of narrative, evidence and argument that we have always relied upon. Whatever the shortcomings of this volume, these essays show that the state of the field is robust and that we have entered an exciting era of innovative historical writing about the contemporary world.
Although the Cold War dominated international relations for forty-five years following World War II, many scholars have long recognized that it was not the only, and possibly not the most important process shaping world history. Moreover, as Matthew Connelly notes, “preoccupation with the Soviet-American confrontation distorted... understanding of the rest of the world” (337). This volume seeks to redress this imbalance by examining the 1970s with a focus on globalization.

Although many contemporaries and scholars perceived the 1970s as a time of global crisis, the 1970s may have been, at least in terms of political violence and economic instability, “an unexceptional decade” (20). Statistics presented by Niall Ferguson in the introduction reveal that there were more deaths in interstate, colonial, and civil wars, more coups, more deaths due to terrorism, and slower economic growth in the 1980s than in the 1970s. These statistics lead Ferguson to suggest that “the period’s dire reputation may owe more to the bad experiences of Anglo-American academics, caught between inflation and student radicalism, than to any measurable increases in global disorder” (20), a notion questioned by one reviewer. Ferguson is on firmer ground when he argues that the essays in this volume reveal the 1970s “more as the seedbed of future crises than as the crisis conjuncture itself—the decade when autarky yielded to interdependence, but before the full implications of interdependence became clear” (20).

Charles S. Maier emphasizes the economic difficulties suffered by the leading capitalist economies during the decade, including economic stagnation, inflation, and increased unemployment. Maier situates the 1970s as one of three systemic crises that shaped the twentieth century. In the first crisis, international rivalries and “a widespread crisis of political representation” reshaped world politics between 1905 and the end of World War I (44). The second crisis grew out of the collapse of employment and national incomes during the 1930s and led not only to World War II and a new international system but also to shift in the balance of social forces within Western societies, with a larger role for labor and social spending. According to Maier, the crisis of the 1970s affected both “postwar Fordist capitalism and Fordist state socialism,” leading to the decline of the postwar Keynesian settlement in the West and the collapse of state socialism in the East (45-46).

Some of the most important developments of the decade revolved around oil. Daniel J. Sargent describes the 1973-74 oil crisis as a “seismic” event that altered the balance of power in the world economy if not the overall global balance of power (49). During the 1970s, U.S. domestic oil production began to decline, forcing the United States to import increasing amounts of oil to meet its energy needs. At the same time, war and revolution in the Middle East and the changing dynamics of the Cold War raised questions about the ability of the United States to maintain access to the oil of the Persian Gulf, which had become the center of world oil production by the 1970s. In addition, oil prices quadrupled during 1973, resulting in a massive transfer of wealth from oil consumers to oil producers.

Prices doubled again during the market turmoil resulting from the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79.

Higher oil prices intensified the economic problems faced by the United States and the other Western industrial countries in the 1970s. The cost of importing larger amounts of more expensive oil also had a significant impact on the balance of payments of the United States and other importing countries. Non-oil-producing developing countries were especially hit hard as they had to pay higher prices for products from the developed countries as well as for oil at the same time as demand for their exports dropped due to the impact of high oil prices on the economies of their key customers. Many countries borrowed large sums from Western banks to cover their costs. Sargent points out that the U.S. Treasury successfully demanded that petrodollar recycling be left to the private sector—mainly the banks of Wall Street and the City of London—rather than handled by the International Monetary Fund. Flush with petrodollars from the oil exporting countries, the banks were eager to lend and offered low interest rates. Many countries borrowed more than they could afford, a move that contributed to the Third World debt crisis of the 1980s when the United States sharply raised interest rates in late 1979.

By providing the producing countries with extra revenues and the confidence to assert their prerogatives, the oil crises led to a massive buy-out of the major producing firms and the establishment of national oil companies in the producing countries. In 1970, national oil companies owned less than 10% of their oil industries; by the end of the decade (1979), the figure was almost 70% (68.7%). Ownership of all aspects of their oil industries gave producing countries greater control over such factors as the pace of development of their reserves, the rate of production, and the destination of their exports.

Although most authors mention the 1973-74 oil crisis, and some also mention the second oil shock of 1978-79, there is no analysis of the origins of the crises and their course, and discussion of their consequences is scattered throughout the volume. Given the significance of the topic, the editors should have included a chapter on the changing dynamics of international oil and energy markets in the 1970s.

The sharp increases in the price of oil in the 1970s played an important role in the restructuring of the global economy. According to Alan Taylor, the 1970s saw “a widening embrace of trade liberalization,” that, in turn, laid the ground work for the ending of postwar restrictions on international capital flows (112). Most of his chapter, however, focuses on the question of how countries’ different experiences in the 1930s affected the pace of liberalization in the 1970s. This is an important question, but given the importance of trade and financial, liberalization for “reglobalization,” one would have expected a chapter dedicated to analyzing these developments.


Louis Hyman examines the creation of mortgage-backed securities, an innovation that facilitated the flow of investment capital around the world. Hyman’s examination of how “American policymakers fashioned the mortgage-backed security in an attempt to harness the powers of global capital markets to restore stability in the American city” resonates with Jeremy Adelman’s argument that policy preferences and political choices, in addition to structural changes in the world economy, shaped Latin America’s response to the financial and economic challenges of the 1970s.

International finance and oil prices also had a profound impact on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Stephen Kotkin traces the origins of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe to a failed development strategy. East European regimes sought to expand industry and raise living standards by borrowing money from the West to purchase needed technology. They hoped that industrial exports to the West would pay back the loans and that the increased employment and prosperity resulting from development would bolster Communist rule. The strategy failed due to low productivity, rising oil prices, and competition from the newly industrializing countries of East Asia. Low productivity stemmed from the rigid planning system with its “mania” for heavy industry, the misuse of human capital, the neglect of agriculture, and the suppression of the service sector. Although higher oil prices increased Soviet export earnings in the 1970s, higher prices raised costs for East European industries, despite some Soviet efforts to cushion the impact. Economic development was a substitute for conceding the communist establishment’s monopoly on power, and when borrowing from the West resulted in massive debts rather than economic growth, the region’s regimes lost any justification for their continued existence.

Kotkin’s recognition of the impact on Eastern Europe of the emergence of the East Asian “tigers” highlights another key omission in the collection—the absence of any analysis of the sources, dynamics, and consequences of this important development. Indeed, there is no discussion of the changes in the international division of labor during the decade, in particular the shift of manufacturing to the semi-periphery and periphery. Finally, any history of the global economy in the 1970s should examine the impact of changes in world agriculture in this period.4

Multinational enterprises (MNEs) became an important international political issue in the 1970s. The decade saw a sharp increase in the expropriation of foreign investments. Of the 575 such cases recorded between 1960 and 1992, 336, almost 60 percent, occurred between 1970 and 1975 (144). Vernie Oliveiro examines the response of the U.S. government and U.S. business to this development and argues that “the positions and policies they adopted in response to attacks on MNEs committed them to reorienting states toward serving the security and, therefore, the freedom of investment capital” (145).

4 See, for example, the classic study, Robert G. Williams, Export Agriculture and the Crisis in Central America (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1986).
Although Oliveiro does not make the connection, most students of U.S. foreign policy would recognize the continuity with the Open Door policy. Oliveiro claims that “the success of export-oriented newly industrialized countries in East Asia showed that multinational enterprises and poorer countries could work to their mutual profitability,” (155), a statement that conflates the experience of Singapore, where multinationals played a large role with that of the rest of the region, where multinationals played a much smaller role.5

Although many contemporary observers saw the 1970s as marking the end of the American Century, the United States was able to reconstitute its hegemony and eventually outlast its main rival in the Cold War. Some scholars have claimed that the United States manipulated globalization to achieve this outcome. Sargent argues “globalization was largely “the consequence of exogenous structural changes” rather than the “achievement of specific policy choices” (53), and that it was “anything but an imperial project imposed on weak nations by the United States” (64). Sargent admits that “the U.S. government, in key respects, promoted the infrastructure of globalization after 1945, “ but he argues “it did so because of Cold War security imperatives” (60), a statement that ignores the economic component of U.S. Cold War policies. In contrast, Jeremi Suri claims that Henry Kissinger “practiced a sophisticated foreign policy of globalization that rested on the reassertion of state power” that “sought to turn globalization to the advantage of the American state” (175).

Suri’s spirited defense of Kissinger’s “geopolitics of globalization” does not ignore his subject’s flaws. In addition to praising Kissinger for understanding the challenges globalization presented, Suri also notes that his policies were marred by ethnocentrism, elitism, cynicism, indifference toward human rights, ignorance about Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, and indifference toward these regions except as they related to Cold War concerns. He could easily have been more critical. In contrast to Salim Yaqub’s devastating critique of Kissinger’s policies in the Middle East, Suri sees Kissinger’s Middle East policies as successful, and he does not mention Nixon and Kissinger’s deeply flawed response to the breakup of Pakistan in 1971 and the resulting conflict between India and Pakistan.6

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China played a key role in the “great transformation” of the 1970s. During the decade, the Chinese Communist Party reoriented its domestic politics, began the transformation of the Chinese economy, and entered into a “de facto alliance with the United States” (65). According to Odd Arne Westad, “China’s siding with the United States and with the market system was a key element, possibly the key element, in bringing the Cold War to an end” (66). Drawing on recent Chinese scholarship, Westad argues that China’s transformation into a market economy had its origins in the Cultural Revolution, which discredited the planning system the Chinese had built up in the 1950s. According to Westad, the momentous shift in China’s foreign policy in the 1970s “originated in one of the great geopolitical misunderstandings of the twentieth century” (76). Rather than the strategic geniuses that Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger believed them to be, Chinese leaders had a poor grasp of the world outside China and erroneously believed that the Soviet Union was about to overtake the United States and dominate world politics. To protect China from Soviet attack, Mao Zedong and other leaders advocated a diplomatic opening to the United States. This shift in foreign policy allowed reformers like Deng Xiaoping to use China’s opening to the United States to bolster their domestic efforts.

At the time, the U.S. defeat in Vietnam seemed to herald the end of U.S. dominance and the emergence of Third World revolutionary regimes as a major factor in world politics. In addition to these impacts, Lien-Hang Nguyen points out that the climax of the Vietnam War also coincided with and contributed to the breakdown of unity in Communist international society. The United States reconstituted its hegemony, in part because the Sino-Soviet split persisted, worsened, and played a key role in the demise of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the communist victory in Vietnam marked the zenith rather than the dawn of Third World power on the world stage. The Vietnamese example inspired many revolutionaries, but with the exception of Iran, the revolutionary gains of the 1970s were in areas of marginal strategic and economic importance, and during the 1980s, the United States renewed its counterrevolutionary offensive in the Third World.

Mark Atwood Lawrence examines U.S. policy toward the developing world in the 1970s as it moved from the liberal developmentalism of the 1960s through the “cynical Realpolitik” of Nixon and Kissinger and the “idiosyncratic idealism” of the Carter administration to the “utopian hawkishness” of the Reagan years (207). Nixon and Kissinger believed that the Third World mattered only insofar as developments there affected the pursuit of their geopolitical agenda. To promote stability in the Third World they sought to contain “not just communism but also global currents eroding U.S. power” by providing U.S. military, economic, and diplomatic support to pro-U.S., often-repressive, right wing regimes under the aegis of the Nixon Doctrine (210). Although the Nixon –Kissinger policy may have avoided dramatic setbacks to U.S. interests in the short term, Lawrence concludes, “when viewed against the longer flow of history,” it “must be rated a momentous failure” (211).

Though inconsistent in application, the Carter administration, at least initially, sought to change U.S. policies toward developing countries by emphasizing the protection and promotion of human rights. Carter believed that supporting human rights and reform was not only the right thing to do but also that it would ultimately promote stability more effectively than the Nixon-Kissinger approach. As Cold War concerns reemerged at the end of the decade and the influence of his anti-Soviet national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski grew, U.S. policy returned to viewing Third World developments through Cold War lens. Ronald Reagan retained the moralism implicit in Carter’s policies and used human rights “primarily as a cudgel to beat up repressive Communist regimes rather than repressive Third World allies of the United States” (217). Lawrence believes that Reagan’s policies were ultimately unsuccessful and harmed U.S. interests in the long run.

One of the most significant developments in the 1970s was the decline of secular-socialist regimes in the Muslim world and the increasing influence of radical Islamic movements. Although radical Islamists took power only in Iran, regimes throughout the Muslim world had to deal with the impact of these movements. Ayesha Jalal argues that this process was driven by the impact of the oil shock of 1973-74, the repressive character of the state socialism advocated by secular regimes, and continuing Cold War rivalries that deeply affected the periphery. According to Jalal, this process “had little to do with religion as faith, but rather flowed from contestations over religion as a demarcator of identity” (334). Jalal notes that what scholars like Samuel Huntington misdiagnosed as a clash of civilizations was “in reality a set of conflicts triggered by unfulfilled expectations, growing disparities, and humiliating indignities” (335). A specialist on South Asia, Jalal is able to illuminate the local and regional roots of many issues that had global impact due to Cold War concerns.

Francis J. Gavin provides a useful, though somewhat incomplete, overview of differing U.S. views on nuclear weapons in the 1970s. Gavin provides a fairly full discussion and critique of the mutual vulnerability school of thought, though he might have engaged critiques that argued that Western ideas of deterrence were inherently flawed.7 He is surprisingly uncritical of the nuclear vulnerability school. He notes that the “nuclear superiority arguments were driven, one suspects, more by political than technical arguments,” but he fails to point out that almost all of the school’s claims about the nuclear balance in the

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7 For example, Michael C. MccGwire, “Deterrence—the Problem, Not the Solution,” *International Affairs* 62 (Winter 1985-86): 55-70
1970s have been shown to be false. In addition, Gavin’s discussion of nuclear proliferation neglects Israel and South Africa. As my Georgetown colleague J. R. McNeill notes, “among the unforeseen developments of the 1970s was the rise of modern environmentalism around the world and the emergence of global-scale environmental anxieties and awareness” (263). Technological change, especially in the chemical industry, combined with cheap oil, helped create new and threatening environmental problems. Technological change also allowed scientists to detect these and other threats more effectively and, in some cases, provided solutions. Moreover, communications technology helped spread environmental awareness around the world, “generating popular movements with political consequences on local, national, and international scales” (263).

Due to the large number of chapters (21 chapters, plus an Introduction and an Epilogue), my own limitations, and concerns over length, I will only mention the remaining chapters in passing. Glenda Sluga, Jocelyn Olcott, and Rebecca J. Sheehan creatively interweave issues of culture and gender with the currents of change during the decade. Andrew Preston looks at the ways American Christians responded to the upheavals of the 1970s, while Matthew Connelly looks briefly at the increasing interest in futurology and forecasting in the United States. Although Michael Cotey Morgan provides an interesting overview of the emergence of human rights as an important international issue, he neglects the impact of the brutal 1973 coup in Chile on U.S. attitudes. Erez Manela summarizes part of his forthcoming work on international efforts to eradicate smallpox, and Thomas Borstelmann provides a very brief look at his forthcoming study on how key developments in the 1970s—“greater egalitarianism and inclusion, and deregulation and free market economics”—resulted in “a world simultaneously more equal and less equal” (354).

Despite many fine individual chapters, the collection lacks coherence as a scholarly project and is less illuminating that it might have been. One problem is that the authors were apparently given fairly strict word limits. As a result, many of the chapters are more suggestive than convincing. The main problem is the uneven attention to the key developments of the decade. As already noted, the oil crises of the 1970s receive inadequate coverage as do key developments in international trade and finance. There is nothing on the changing international division of labor, in particular the rise of the East Asian newly industrializing countries, or on changes in world agriculture. It is not clear why these issues were not covered. Other than noting that the book grew out of a

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conference on the “Global 1970s” hosted by the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, the editors do not explain what they were seeking to accomplish, how the contributors and topics were selected, and how much direction individual contributors received. While most readers will find *Shock of the Global* a useful addition to the history of the 1970s, most will also find it incomplete.
Forty years after the formal start of the decade, scholarship on the 1970s is finally beginning to come into its own. For many years, the 1970s were seen as a kind of historical dead zone, as a dreary period marked by recession, crisis, and declining expectations as Americans and Western Europeans collectively retreated from the social, cultural, and political upheavals of the 1960s. In the last ten years, this characterization has undergone revision as scholars have focused more and more on the 1970s as a crucial period for understanding the consolidation of recent conservatism, particularly in the United States. Looking at the rise of conservative think tanks, political action committees, direct mail campaigns, and grassroots Christian mobilization, scholars of contemporary U.S. history have shown that while it may have “seemed like nothing” was happening in the 1970s (to borrow from the title of Peter Carroll’s influential 1982 survey of the decade),

a diverse array of grassroots activists were redrawing the political map and methodically transforming the stinging 1964 political defeat of Barry Goldwater into Ronald Reagan’s stunning 1980 victory.\footnote{See for example Bruce J. Schulman and Julian Zelizer (eds.), \textit{Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the 1970s}. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008).} These recent studies deepen our understanding of the period. But they also run the risk of teleology while recapitulating the failure to assess the 1970s on its own terms (instead of only in relation to the decades that preceded and followed it).

This excellent essay collection breaks with these tendencies and marks a major leap forward in our historical understanding of the 1970s. The strength of the volume lies in its insight that the 1970s were marked not by the buzzwords often associated with the decade—“crisis,” “decline,” and “malaise”—but instead by what the editors term “the shock of the global.” The essays gathered here make a strong case that the 1970s witnessed the birth pangs of what we today call “globalization.” Although the term itself was not be incorporated into the common parlance until the 1990s, the volume shows that the intersecting political, economic, and cultural transformations that we associate with the process were well underway during these years. Part of what makes this insight about globalization so crucial is that it moves scholars away from the nationalist presumptions that are often embedded in terms like “crisis” or “decline.” In the midst of global economic turmoil, President Richard Nixon analogized the United States to once-great empires that eventually fell: “I think of what happened to Greece and Rome, what is left—only the pillars” (56). Nixon’s filtering of economic upheaval through the lens of national and imperial decline is a move that should be interrogated rather than duplicated by historians, and this volume provides them with several valuable tools for doing just that.

\footnote{Peter Carroll, \textit{It Seemed Like Nothing Happened: America in the 1970s} (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990).}
The collection explores globalization in the 1970s along a number of different axes, but here I will focus on three. First, the volume explores the transition to what Daniel Bell in 1976 called “a post-industrial society” within advanced capitalist states. Throughout the United States and Western Europe, this transition entailed the decline of heavy industries like iron, steel, coal, and automobiles, and the rise of information, leisure, and service-based economies. This shift also had global implications: factories relocated to the global South in search of cheaper labor, companies that remained nominally American and European increasingly outsourced production to other parts of the globe, and a new entity—“the multinational corporation”—emerged as a powerful global economic player. Deindustrialization in the global north went hand-in-hand with the relocation of factories to the global south. And within advanced capitalist countries like the United States, the transition to a service-driven economy went hand-in-hand with the wide-scale entrance of women and racial minorities into the workforce.

The second transition had to do with the liberalization of trade and financial markets. Scholars often emphasize inflation and “stagflation” in their accounts of the economic turmoil of the 1970s, an emphasis that takes the nation-state for granted as its frame of reference. But several contributors make a compelling case that what was truly remarkable during this period was not inflation, but rather the liberalization of both trade and finance. World trade expanded, restrictions on trade that had been in place since World War II were lifted, and policymakers within advanced capitalist states became more organized in their efforts to coordinate trade policies that would prove mutually beneficial to national economies. Within the domain of finance, capital began moving with greater ease across national borders, money became more fungible, international banking expanded, Eurodollars began moving overseas, and banks emerged as major controllers of world liquidity. The cumulative result was the rise of a world economy that was simultaneously more interdependent, less bounded by territorial boundaries like the Westphalian nation-state, and also more crisis-prone. In the words of Charles Maier, “Political economy fled toward the global” (44).

The third transition had to do with the emergence of an international civil society populated by non-state actors. New social movements emerged that were transnational in both their reach and their political vision; non-governmental organizations (NGOs) proliferated. Human rights activists, environmentalists, and global feminists forged alliances across national borders and articulated their struggles in global terms. Meanwhile, the defeat of U.S. forces in Vietnam generated transnational linkages between revolutionary movements in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Abetting the rise of an international civil society was the advent of new technologies that simultaneously promoted a planetary consciousness and helped sustain movements. The environmental movement, for example, was catalyzed by satellite images of the earth from space—a vision of “spaceship earth” that powerfully conveyed a sense of interdependence. Satellite technology meant that images of the desertification of the Aral Sea or human rights atrocities could circulate quickly around the globe and mobilize a diverse array of citizens. At the same time, certain threats—like global pandemics—required coordinated responses across states, compelled superpowers like the United States and the Soviet Union to set
aside Cold War grievances, and enhanced the role of international organizations. Like the political economy, civil society fled toward the global in the 1970s.

By looking at these dynamics, the collection sheds light on the history of globalization in the 1970s in three significant ways. First, the volume debunks a misconception that sometimes circulates in historical accounts of globalization: namely that the process was been characterized by the disappearance of the state. Several contributors illustrate instead that the transition generated novel roles for policymakers who were compelled to create what Jeremy Adelman calls new “ecologies” for law and policy-making (118). The rise of global finance and trade placed on policymakers unique burdens that were no longer resolvable at the state level, and they responded by devising rules for international investment that would foster stability. Jeremi Suri uses the example of Henry Kissinger to illustrate the ways that globalization generated new modes of policymaking, showing how Kissinger sought to reconceptualize American power in light of an emerging global order. In an increasingly interdependent world, Kissinger argued, the United States could best meet its own aims by eschewing overt domination and serving instead as a kind of “global manager.” In Suri’s words, “globalization transforms state power but does not necessarily degrade the power of strong government actors” (174). Suri’s insight helps to explain how the United States was able to restore its post-Vietnam hegemony by successfully adapting to the demands of globalization.

Second, the volume shows how globalization gave rise to discourses that can contain both universalizing and nationalistic dimensions. Perhaps the most illustrative example is human rights. The revival of human rights rhetoric in the 1970s was linked to several intersecting historical transformations: European decolonization, the U.S. civil rights movement, the emergence of a holocaust consciousness, the proliferation of NGOs, and the rise of television and satellite technologies that sped up communication. At the most obvious level, the grammar of “human rights”—as opposed to the rights of citizens of individual states—challenged notions of national sovereignty and was universal in its implications. But as Andrew Preston shows, the grammar could also serve nationalistic aims. In the United States, conservative Christians seized on human rights as a vehicle for what Preston calls “a universal nationalism that placed the United States at the head of the family of nations and envisioned it as the arbiter of the world” (353). Both Preston and Michael Cotey Morgan show that the rhetoric of human rights became a weapon in the hands of policymakers like Henry Jackson, who mobilized the rhetoric to stir up anti-Soviet antagonisms and derail détente. The example of human rights illustrates the malleability of the grammars of globalization, which can undermine nationalism in some contexts and advance it in others.

The final insight concerns the history of the Cold War in the 1970s. Scholars have tended to focus on the rise and fall of détente during this period, tracing the ways that Cold War tensions thawed in the mid-1970s but were revived by the end of the decade. By foregrounding the history of globalization, this volume does not debunk this Cold War narrative, but it does de-center it in a number of creative and suggestive ways. Several contributors look at new lines of political conflict that transcended the Cold War context. Individual case studies, like Odd Arne Westad’s examination of China during the long
1970s, also suggest that the end of the Cold War had its origins in this period. The reaching of nuclear parity between the two superpowers challenged traditional conceptions of military power and contributed to the rise of what scholars call “soft power”—global markets, the proliferation of popular culture and Hollywood film, and the creation of consumer markets. At the same time, Ayesha Jalal makes the case that the Cold War was not as recessive in the mid-1970s as some accounts of détente imply, reminding readers of the many U.S. Cold War interventions throughout the Muslim world during these years. The volume contains no consensus about the history of the Cold War in the 1970s, but this is precisely what is so exciting about it. Taken together, the essays make a powerful case that the histories of the Cold War and globalization are deeply entwined and need to be analyzed together.

My main criticism of the volume is that it fails to fully thematize the relationship between political economy, social movements, and cultural change. In the book’s epilogue, Thomas Borstelman points to two global currents in the 1970s: first, the crumbling of old hierarchies of race and sex, both in the United States where previously disenfranchised groups won formal equality, and across the globe as decolonization and anti-imperialism continued to gain momentum. The second major current was the turn toward the market. Borstelman points out that the old hierarchies were replaced by a new one: “the sorting out of people into what were seen as their natural socioeconomic levels by the operation of the free market” (353). The crucial question for historians is to figure out the relationship between these two currents. Did the breakdown of the old hierarchies facilitate the expansion of the free market, and if so, how? In regard to these questions, the volume comes up short. It is hard to figure out what the connections are between the volume’s strong essays on social and cultural upheaval (such as global feminism and the rise of Christian evangelicalism) and the equally strong essays on political economy and foreign policy. While the essays do a wonderful job of challenging the nation-statist framework that too many historians still take for granted, they hew too closely to their respective subfields. As a result, important questions about the intersections between political economy, foreign policy, and culture are elided.

This is unfortunate, because some of the most exciting scholarship on the 1970s is engaging with precisely these questions. Scholars of feminism, for example, are increasingly recognizing the extent to which feminism emerged out of the transition to a post-industrial economy. As the family wage economy disappeared and more women went to work for wage labor, they encountered a contradiction between their growing participation in the workforce and the persistence of sexism, and it was this contradiction, among others, that spurred feminist organizing. Arguably, the valorization of the free market at the end of the twentieth century has been underwritten by the very breakdown of the old hierarchies described by Borstelman.3 Bethany Moreton’s recent history of Walmart (which focuses at length on the 1970s) provides a rich example.4 Moreton shows how the company’s

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emergence as the post-industrial-corporation-par-excellence was fueled in part by its recognition of a changing gender order as well as the rise of evangelical Christianity. Walmart rose to success by tapping into a reserve army of rural women (and especially mothers) who sought part-time employment in the service industry as farm-based economies went into decline. Simultaneously, evangelical Christianity’s emphasis on submission helped the men who worked at Walmart make the transition to the historically feminized world of service work. Making historical sense of the 1970s requires trans-disciplinary work like Moreton’s that locates culture, gender, and religion at the center of the history of post-industrialism, and it is frustrating to see so little of this in the volume. Nevertheless, by foregrounding the “shock of the global” and moving away from the nation-statist presumptions that have informed earlier scholarship on the 1970s, the contributors have given us an immeasurable gift.
It may be useful to begin, as one of the reviewers suggests, with some backstory. The *Shock of the Global* emerged out of a conference that we hosted in Cambridge in October 2008. That event proceeded not from an interpretative framework but a set of questions. To the guests who became the volume’s authors, we described our purpose thus:

“We want to ask if the framework of Cold War détente, which tends to dominate historical scholarship, is the most useful way to view the decade [of the 1970s]. We seek to understand how the Seventies relates to other narratives in international history, including the rise of non-state actors, the emergence of transnational issues like human rights and environmental protection, and the intensification of economic globalization.”

Recognizing that the 1970s has become a frontier of sorts for archive-based historical work, our purpose was to open a conversation about the decade’s shape, to ask whether it constitutes a distinct period, and, if so, to inquire as to its distinctive characteristics. We are glad to welcome the four reviewers to the conversation, and we thank them for the careful readings that they have offered. In the spirit of the dialogue that we have sought to foster, we will not engage criticisms of individual essays but will instead address the more challenging questions that the reviewers raise about the volume as a whole and its relationship to the larger historiographical landscape.

Hypothesis is too strong a word to describe what was at the outset a loose contention on our part that globalization -- the spread and acceleration of cross-border interactions and the associated rise of interdependencies among nations -- could be a useful lens through to view the international history of the 1970s. Yet in seeking new perspectives on the Seventies, we felt that we were responding to a clear sense among contemporary observers that new and striking patterns were afoot in the international arena. It was from the late 1960s that social scientists, including a group at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs (which sponsored our conference some forty years later), began to question the applicability of both Cold War policy assumptions and Westphalian models of the international system. For analysts of “transnational relations,” interdependence, non-state actors, and cross-border flows were all on the rise, defining new international realities and, in some respects, curtailing the autonomy of nation-states. After all, it was during the 1970s that leaders of the large industrial countries began to hold annual summits to coordinate their macroeconomic policies in a response to rising levels of cross-border exchange. Proceeding from contemporary intimations that something new was shaking, we asked out whether globalization -- “the shock of the global” as we came to call it -- might offer a paradigm in which the international history of the 1970s could be understood afresh.

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We did not anticipate unanimity among our contributors. In fact, we were surprised by the degree of concurrence among them that the 1970s had witnessed a global shock. That is not to say that there were not disagreements, nor that we accepted the “shock of the global” as a master key to the international history of the 1970s. The framework of “global shock,” we will readily concede, betrayed a Western bias: it was in the so-called “trilateral” arena of North America, Europe, and Japan that new patterns of interdependence were most felt and remarked upon in the 1970s. Yet, as many of our contributors demonstrate, the shock of the global was never just a Western phenomenon. Before the decade was out, as Arne Westad explains, Chinese entrepreneurs and factory managers were coming to participate in a transnational capitalist economy; their incremental reorientation towards the global antedated Deng’s famous trip to the United States. The shock of the global made itself felt in myriad ways. That its impact was not felt simultaneously across the nations and regions of the world does not diminish its utility as an interpretive framework; after all, the Cold War, which still dominates the landscape of postwar international history, was always more intense in some places than it was in others. While acknowledging the ambiguities and the exceptions, we sought to reinterpret the 1970s as a decade that introduced the world to the phenomenon of globalization in its contemporary form, marking a disjuncture in the postwar order and the advent of new integrative patterns, the consequences of which are still with us today. This framework our four reviewers found to be more and less persuasive.

We would like to address some of the specific points that the reviewers raise. These we would see as falling into three main areas of concern: (i) coverage, (ii) focus and (iii) coherence. In many cases, the reviewers identify concerns with which we ourselves concur. In others, we feel that an explanation of the volume’s purpose and intent may allay the reviewers’ misgivings.

First, the issue of coverage. The reviewers point out that our selection of essays was not as balanced as it could have been. This point can be approached in two ways. First, we could ask whether the volume gives proportional representation to the regions and countries of the world? This is a fair question, but we would answer it by reiterating that our purpose was not to write a history of the world as a whole but, rather, to examine the shock of the global across a diverse set of contexts. It is more reasonable, we would suggest, to ask whether an alternate selection of cases would have better served our interpretive purpose? Here, the reviewers make some useful points. William Hitchcock and William Gray suggest that we might have paid more sustained attention to Western Europe and to what Gray calls “the West writ large.” We agree that we could have done so. Both Hitchcock and David Painter note that the issue of oil and the Middle East region appear only episodically. This is a quite legitimate concern. Painter argues that the oil crisis merited its own chapter. With hindsight, we agree.

Next, the question of focus, about which the reviewers raise several concerns. One has to do with the looming presence of the United States. Another, which Hitchcock raises, introduces the hoary question of agency versus structure and suggests that we privilege the latter at the expense of the former. We will answer this point after discussing the question about geographical balance. It is true that the United States occupies a prominent
place in many of the essays that comprise *The Shock of the Global*. At our count, seven or eight of the twenty-one essays focus on the American state; others incorporate North American historical actors. Does this amount to geographical bias? That may depend on how we define balance. In our defense, we could simply highlight the outsized influence of the United States on world affairs in the 1970s and defend our selection accordingly. But a more satisfying response, we believe, would be to relate our focus to the questions that we sought to answer. We have already stated that the shock of the global did not unfold evenly across space. It was in the United States (and the West more broadly) that its impact in the 1970s was most clearly felt.

Another response to accusations of America-centrism would be to invoke the historiographical context. Insofar as traditional, Cold War narratives of postwar international history have often focused on the United States, we felt that our effort to complicate those narratives should emphasize the ways in which the United States experienced the shock of the global. So, for example, we present Henry Kissinger not as the architect of détente but as a policymaker who struggled to shape and accommodate new patterns of global integration. To perceive the new, it can help to view it from familiar vantage points. There may, on reflection, be a distinction to be drawn between “international history” and the history of the “United States and the World”, a distinction our book blurred. Would it have been better if we had defined our project as international history with a cosmopolitan intent, detached from any North American moorings? Maybe. But practitioners of international history, we would suggest, should be wary of de-centering their narratives altogether. It may be a better strategy to let the historical problems define our geographical selection.

Next, the concern that Hitchcock raises about our focus on “structures rather than people”. We might defend this bias as a corrective tactic. After all, traditional diplomatic history has often focused on individuals -- the infamous talking clerks -- at the expense of structural questions. Asking how international society has evolved as great powers have risen and fallen, as new actors have jostled for attention, and as transnational relations have bred new interdependencies can help to make better sense of the thoughts and actions of individual. We agree that international historians should favor interpretative optics with variable focal lengths: to relate the experiences of individuals and entities (even nation-states) to larger patterns of change is a crucial challenge for us all. For our part, we believe that *Shock of the Global* introduces a diverse cast of characters and that it acknowledges the agency of flesh-and-blood human beings. Mortgage securitization, as Louis Hyman explains it, is an *ad hoc* solution that harried policymakers devise in the face of exigent circumstances; it is not the achievement of inexorable financial flows and forces. We could cite other examples.

Finally, the question of coherence. Several reviewers, especially William Gray and David Painter, argue that the volume does not, ultimately, provide a persuasive framework for interpreting the international history of 1970s. Painter writes that “the collection lacks coherence as a scholarly project.” Gray suggests that “one should simply concede that the world was too fractured in the 1970s to accommodate overarching narratives.” This we are loath to do. We believe that there is utility in overarching narratives, including the one that
we offer in *Shock of the Global*. At the same time, we do not want to argue that our overarching narrative -- that of the “global shock” -- is all-encompassing, nor that it supplants alternative perspectives, including the Cold War. As Natasha Zaretsky writes in her insightful response, “the histories of the Cold War and globalization are deeply entwined and need to be analyzed together.” To argue whether the traditional paradigm of Cold War détente or “the shock of the global” offers the more compelling historical framework is to miss the point.

Our perspective on the decade began with the voices of contemporaries. The world in the 1970s was changing in tangible ways: “Global reality”, wrote Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1970, “increasingly absorbs the individual, involves him, and even occasionally overwhelms him.” We believe that the historical evidence bears out his point. We can gauge the shock of the global, as some of our contributors do, by measuring the integration of markets or by charting the manifestation of global issues such as environmental degradation and human rights. The Seventies, we contend, represents a phase when changes that we have since subsumed under the heading of “globalization” became self-evident and unavoidable. That is not to say that the volume offers a coherent theory of world history in the 1970s; all that it seeks is to provide an interpretative paradigm that proceeds from the observations of historical actors and relates some of the decade’s most striking phenomena to larger patterns of historical change.

Overarching narratives are what most historians try to create; without them, we are left only with the thicket of events. In the 1970s and 1980s, post-structuralists revolted against what seemed to be the tyranny of hegemonic and Eurocentric narrative projects. Their revolt transformed historiography, but it went too far. Unless we prefer our history in minuscule, pointilist pieces, we shall continue to depend on narratives to integrate fragments of experience into frameworks of meaning. Yet international historians have with important exceptions been too often uncritical when it comes to narrative perspective -- too willing to take the Cold War as the master narrative of the postwar world. Our intent was never to replace the Cold War with a new hegemonic framework, but to articulate an alternative narrative as counterpoint. International history, we suggest, will be richer and more satisfying if it can encompass multiple perspectives on long-term and large-scale historical change. Like American foreign policy, the historical enterprise suffers if it insists on filtering complex reality through polarizing lenses. As an alternative to monolithic narrative frameworks, we would prefer to envisage multiple histories: overlapping, entwined, and interrelated but analytically distinct -- a history in strands, perhaps, but not in fragments. That is the spirit in which we offer *The Shock of the Global*. We appreciate this opportunity to clarify our purpose, and we thank the four reviewers for giving us the opportunity to engage with their thoughtful and provocative readings of the text.

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2 Bzezinski, *Between Two Ages*, p. 274