

2011

H-Diplo

H-Diplo Roundtable Review

www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables

Volume XII, No. 1 (2011)

19 January 2011

Roundtable Editors: Thomas Maddux and Diane Labrosse

Roundtable Web/Production Editor: George Fujii

Leonard J. Sadosky, Peter Nicolaisen, Peter S. Onuf, and Andrew J. O’Shaughnessy, eds. *Old World, New World: America and Europe in the Age of Jefferson*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2010.

Stable URL: <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-XII-1.pdf>

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Introduction by Christopher Tudta, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State

Note: The views presented here are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of State or the United States Government.

The “Age of Jefferson” continues to be a source of endless – and appropriate – fascination for historians and other scholars, including diplomatic historians. *Old World, New World: America and Europe in the Age of Jefferson* is the latest example of scholarly attempts to understand the dynamic period between the late colonial period and the last years of Jefferson’s pre-presidential career, when the United States not only struggled to free itself from British rule, but then faced even more difficulties as a newly independent nation suddenly thrust into a world of balance of power politics. The new nation also had to determine its relationship with Europe. As a curious mix of old and new worlds, leaders of the young republic found themselves exhibiting what Peter Onuf in his introduction calls a “civilizational deficit” with Europe. (4) Americans became alternately fascinated with, and appalled by, European traditions and continually compared what they considered the virtuous “simplicity” of America with the decadent sophistication of Europe.

The contributors to this collection, as Andrew J. O’Shaughnessy notes in his preface, originally presented their findings at the Salzburg Seminar in Salzburg, Austria on October 12-16, 2005. The Salzburg Seminar, founded soon after the end of World War II, has become “a place of Atlantic exchange, with a particular mission to explain the United States to Europe.” (ix) This volume successfully fulfills that mission, and includes essays that will appeal to both the traditional diplomatic historian as well as diplomatic historians who look at culture and other new modes of analysis. For the former, the volume contains essays about how American diplomats, in particular Jefferson and his friend (and future rival) John Adams interacted with Europeans. The latter group will find essays that examine how cultural influences, fashion and dress, family, gift-giving and diplomatic protocol, and arguments over science reflected both the complex interplay between the new and old worlds and also the heterogeneous aspects of the world of the new republic that have often been excluded from traditional analyses of late eighteenth century America.

As Rachel Hope Cleves shows in her review, the recent shift in the historiography of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries toward an examination of the “Atlantic” view “hardly seems earth-shattering” to diplomatic historians. Nevertheless, this view, along with the trend of examining “non-traditional” influences on American identity and diplomacy, has helped reshape the profession’s approach to the early republic. *Old World, New World* epitomizes this shift, and Cleves points out that the essays, in particular the one contributed by Philip Ziesche, demonstrate the “patriotic ideal” of “revolutionary republicanism” that the new nation’s official and unofficial diplomats exhibited in their interactions with Europeans. Jefferson in particular, as several of the essays show, wanted to extend this very American republicanism to Europe even as he accepted the need to hew to the traditional and aristocratic diplomatic niceties and protocol of the European court system.

Max Edling notes that Jefferson epitomized American exceptionalism and optimism about the future, and yet the essays show just how essential America's ties to dreary old Europe were to creating and reinforcing this American identity. Essentially, the new republic needed to compare and contrast itself to the old monarchies in order to justify its new ideology of republicanism. At the same time, however, Jefferson followed a far more "realist" path in diplomacy during this time period and ironically seemed more like the John Adams of the late 1790s as he acknowledged the limits of American power in the early republic. Edling also delves into the essays that examine the late colonial period, and notes that these contributions show the rather mixed opinion many Americans had about their revolution. Although the traditional narrative holds that the vast majority of Americans had been alienated by imperial London's heavy-handed tactics in the 1770s, in actuality, as Julie Flavell and Sarah M.S. Pearsall document, wealthy merchants identified with the metropolis across the ocean, and those who remained loyal to the Crown valued loyalties to family and friends far more than American independence, and even their fealty to Britain paled in relation to their personal choices.

In his review, Matthew Rainbow Hale also shows that the essays illuminate just how deeply Americans cared about how Europeans viewed them. In spite of their vociferous proclamations of political independence, when it came to culture, style, dress, and personal relations, Americans not only awkwardly tried to shed their provincialism-- while at the same highlighting it--but they depended upon the comparison to Europe to validate their new republican path. In particular, Hale cites Lucia Stanton's essay on Jefferson's plow, which the future president considered not only a scientific innovation that could rival the more famous European inventions, but also one that demonstrated the virtues of simplicity that reflected American republicanism. Hale also shows that the essays in this collection demonstrate that the transatlantic interactions between the two worlds reinforced popular perceptions on both sides of the ocean.

As Cleves shows, however, the essays as a whole do not address the important question of Adams's political beliefs, in particular about the French, after he returned to the United States and became the first Vice President and the second President of the new nation. As she correctly notes, the essays show that the Adams of the 1780s was far more republican in his diplomacy, and Richard Ryerson's chapter does convincingly demonstrate how Adams's political views "darkened" during his time in Europe, in particular his growing concern about the creation of a new aristocracy in the U.S. However, given subsequent seminal events that occurred during his presidency such as the XYZ Affair and the Quasi-War, the omission of his shift about France is striking. As Cleves persuasively contends, the inclusion of an essay on this shift, including an examination of Adams's critique of the French Revolution and his son John Quincy's anti-French "Publicola" essays, would have strengthened the collection.

Participants:

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Leonard J. Sadosky is an independent scholar. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Virginia. A specialist in Colonial and Revolutionary American, he is author of *Revolutionary Negotiations: Indians, Empires, and Diplomats in the Founding of America* (2009), the subject of an H-Diplo roundtable at <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-XI-38.pdf>

Rachel Hope Cleves is Assistant Professor of History at the University of Victoria in British Columbia. She is author of *The Reign of Terror in America: Visions of Violence from Anti-Jacobinism to Antislavery* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), which won the 2010 Gilbert Chinard Prize from the Society for French Historical Studies and the Institut français de Washington. She has also published articles in the *William and Mary Quarterly*, *Early American Studies*, and the *Journal of the Early Republic*. Cleves received her Ph.D. from the University of California Berkeley in 2005. She is currently at work on a microhistory about two ordinary women who lived in an extraordinary same-sex marriage in early national Vermont.

Max M. Edling is an External Faculty Fellow at the Stanford Humanities Center and the author of *A Revolution in Favor of Government: Origins of the U.S. Constitution and the Making of the American State* (2003). He is currently writing a book on how the United States acquired and used the capacity to finance war and territorial expansion from the Revolution to the Civil War.

Matthew Rainbow Hale, Assistant Professor of History, Goucher College, is the author of "On Their Tiptoes: Political Time and Newspapers during the Advent of the Radicalized French Revolution, circa 1792-1793," *Journal of the Early Republic* 29 (Summer 2009) 191-218, which won the Society for Historians of the Early American Republic (SHEAR) Ralph D. Gray Prize for the best article in volume 29 (2009) of the *Journal of the Early Republic*. His study of the French Revolution's impact on American political culture is forthcoming from the University of Virginia Press.

Chris Tudda is a Historian in the Declassification and Publishing Division in the Office of the Historian, Department of State, where he declassifies manuscripts for the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series and co-produces the Office's internet-only publications. He earned a B.A. from the University of Vermont in 1987 and the Ph.D. from American University in 2002. He is the author of *The Truth is our Weapon: The Rhetorical Diplomacy of Dwight D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles* (2006). His most recent publication is "A Messiah that will Never Come: British Reconciliation Efforts, American Independence, and Revolutionary War Diplomacy," *Diplomatic History* 32 (November 2008). He is currently writing a history of Nixon's opening to China and a reassessment of American revolutionary diplomacy.

A great number of letters crossed the Atlantic between Europe and the United States during the 1780s. Betsey Galloway, in London, wrote to her mother Grace Galloway, in Philadelphia, about her desire to find friends in the English capital (69). John Adams, in The Hague, wrote to the president of Congress, Samuel Huntington, about his struggle to acquire diplomatic recognition and loans from the Dutch (108). Thomas Jefferson, in Paris, wrote to Archibald Cary, in Virginia, bemoaning the Comte de Buffon's ignorance about American elks' prodigious antlers (23). These three letters might seem to have little in common besides their decade and their shipping route, but each is cited in the new collection *Old World, New World: America and Europe in the Age of Jefferson*, as evidence of how American nation building took shape in the Atlantic world.

The attention garnered by the Atlantic turn in American history writing during the last decade has given diplomatic historians some genuine cause to grumble. Diplomatic historians have always been attuned to the ways that connections abroad shaped the nation. Atlantic historians' insistence on the ocean as a bridge rather than a barrier hardly seems earth-shattering. However, diplomatic historians have not always paid attention to the micro-dynamics of transnational exchange that play out, for example, in the spheres of family, science, and art. Atlantic history, which has taken up these topics, might not signify a complete paradigm shift to diplomatic historians, but the Atlantic history model has created an excellent incentive to bring together traditional questions about the high politics of foreign relations with new research on transnational friendship, family, and science, to discover how both participated in shaping American history.

Old World, New World includes eleven essays on the subject of the United States' connections with Europe from the late colonial era through 1815. Some treat familiar subjects of diplomatic history, others take a social history or cultural history approach. The topics range from a study of British career diplomat William Eden's attitudes toward American independence, by Leonard J. Sadosky, to a material analysis of the portraits commissioned by Thomas Jefferson during his embassy in France, by Gaye Wilson, to an engrossing account of how Elizabeth Patterson Bonaparte's sartorial choices challenged republican ideals in early nineteenth-century Baltimore, by Charlene Boyer Lewis. Across this diversity of themes, the essays share several concerns.

First, all of the authors are interested in teasing out the complicated relationship between the transnational and the national. None of the authors are satisfied with a binary model that positions cosmopolitanism and provincialism at opposites poles. Instead they see these categories as mutually constitutive. Peter Onuf observes in the book's introduction that "national identity was the threshold of a new cosmopolitanism," and "the new nation was inclusive and expansive, tending toward universalism" (7). This argument, that the transnational was a crucible of nationalism and vice-versa, is made most directly and eloquently within the collection by Philipp Ziesche. In an essay on Americans in Paris during the 1798 Quasi-War, Ziesche argues that his subjects personified the era's "cosmopolitan patriotism" (225). Ziesche's chapter treats both diplomats, like Consul

General Fulwar Skipwith, and private individuals, like the merchant Nathaniel Cutting, as equal participants in American nation building abroad. Although Cutting and his fellow merchants have previously been dismissed as a “gang of hustlers” (224), Ziesche argues that they were motivated by patriotic duty and preserved a vision of international cooperation even during this nadir of American-French relations.

The patriotic ideal that animated Ziesche’s American cosmopolitans is best described as revolutionary republicanism, which provides a second common theme to the essays. It is no accident that the subtitle of the collection refers to the “Age of Jefferson.” That revolutionary republican is very much the animating spirit for the book, which grew out of a conference sponsored by the Robert H. Smith International Center for Jefferson Studies and hosted by the Salzburg Seminar in Salzburg, Austria. Jefferson is the subject of five essays in the volume, and makes an appearance in two more. His struggle to craft an international position for the United States that would preserve and exemplify its republican values, while operating in the very aristocratic traditions of diplomatic relations, is taken up by several of the authors. Martha Elena Rojas explores how Jefferson sought to maintain republican asceticism while giving and receiving diplomatic presents. Lucia Stanton and Gordon Wood both examine Jefferson’s endeavor to craft a republican scientific voice within the elite circuits of European discourse. Gaye Wilson pays close attention to the semiotics of Jefferson’s physical self-presentation, arguing that he sought to republicanize traditional portraiture by combining elegant grooming and dress with symbols of American virtue.

While the individual essays on Jefferson are often fascinating, the collection’s origination in a Jefferson conference gives a certain slant to the broader depiction of transnational connections in the early American republic. Peter Onuf writes in the collection’s introduction that “the transatlantic spread of revolutionary republicanism epitomized the integrative processes” that linked Europe and America during the period. Such an assertion is well supported by the Jeffersonian example. However, if the transatlantic counterrevolutionaries of the age, such as William Cobbett (at least during his American sojourn), Gouverneur Morris, or John Quincy Adams had been given chapters, Onuf may have seen cause to modify his claim. It is probably more accurate to state that revolutionary republicanism and counterrevolutionary reaction epitomized the ideological integrative processes of the age. (This is leaving aside the most significant material process integrating old world and new world during the period: the transatlantic slave trade.)

John Adams, Jefferson’s habitual counterweight, receives more attention in this collection than he would have ten years ago. But the chapters on Adams catch him during his diplomatic service in the 1780s, when he was a beacon of American revolutionary republicanism in Europe’s decadent wilds, rather than during the 1790s and early 1800s, when he became a staunch opponent of transatlantic radicalism. Peter Nicolaisen’s essay analyzes Adams’s admiring yet supercilious response to the 1787 Dutch Patriot revolt. Supporting the collection’s core claim, Nicolaisen argues that Adams’s transnational observations confirmed his exceptionalist bias, and “pointed the way to an American self-conception that was to dominate American, and to a lesser extent, European views about the United States for years to come” (121). Richard Ryerson’s chapter about Adams’s

decade of diplomatic service describes Adams as an unwilling “provincial cosmopolitan” (132), who – to steal an old joke – traveled the world, met interesting people, and learned how to despise them. Ryerson argues that Adams’s experiences during his European decade darkened his political perspective (138). But the collection does not address in any serious way Adams’s political thought following his return to the United States. There is mention in Ziesche’s essay of Joel Barlow wanting Adams sent to the “Mad-house” for his “anti-French rants” (228). But there is no mention of the transatlantic discourse in which those anti-French rants participated.

Absent from *Old World, New World* is any sense of the rich exchange of anti-Jacobin thought that passed between Europe and the Americas in the 1790s and early 1800s. While the collection traces with loving detail the brief appearance in European imprints of Jefferson’s plans for a perfect republican plow, there is no account of the European editions of Adam’s critique of the French Revolution, *Discourses on Davila*, or of John Quincy Adams’s Francophobic “Publicola” essays. Nor is there any analysis of the fourteen-plus American editions of English author Anthony Aufrere’s anti-Jacobin masterpiece *The Cannibal’s Progress*. Inclusion of such evidence from the counterrevolutionary Atlantic would not just have added another chapter to an already rich collection. It would have presented a challenge to the volume’s optimistic assessment of the early republic’s “cosmopolitan patriotism.” The collection succeeds in revealing how early national patriotism could inspire generous and expansive political sentiments. However, to see counterrevolutionaries as cosmopolitan patriots in their own right suggests that transnationalism experiences did not, by definition, defang the nationalist beast. Cosmopolitan patriots could be naughty as well as nice.

This oversight in no way erases the real accomplishments of the collection. *Old World, New World* uses the Atlantic history model to broaden our understanding of transnational politics and national identity. It demonstrates why subjects ranging from friendship, to science, to art, to diplomacy all shed light on the subject of early republican nation building. It makes use of a praiseworthy variety of historical methodologies and sources, including material culture, personal letters, and formal diplomatic missives. The volume is exemplary at integrating the history of women into political history. And to boot, it is frequently a good read. *Old World, New World* shows Atlantic history to be more than old wine in new bottles. It is a young varietal with the potential to age well.

As the new United States Minister to France, Thomas Jefferson had hardly stepped off the boat before he sent an invitation to his friend and fellow Virginian James Monroe to visit Paris. The purpose of such a trip would not be to gape at the marvels of Europe, however, but to learn how wonderful it was to be born an American. A visit to the Old World, Jefferson wrote, “will make you adore your own country, it’s soil, it’s climate, it’s equality, liberty, laws, people and manners. My god! How little do my countrymen know what precious blessings they are in possession of, and which no other people on earth enjoy. I confess I had no idea of it myself. While we shall see multiplied instances of Europeans going to live in America, I will venture to say no man now living will ever see an instance of an American removing to Europe and continuing there.”¹

To Jefferson America was preferable to Europe in almost every respect. It was a view shared by many of his countrymen and the idea of America as a chosen nation remains central to American national identity to this day. Yet despite its many flaws, Europe was extremely important to the United States in Jefferson’s time. Europe’s great powers could challenge American political independence and prevent or hinder the United States from realizing its economic potential. And in the spheres of science, culture, and the arts, Europeans reigned supreme over Americans who lagged far behind in the development of their own nation.

Old World, New World: America and Europe in the Age of Jefferson sets out to analyze America’s ambivalent relationship to Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. With one exception this collection of eleven essays deals with American perceptions of Europe and America rather than with European views of America. It is a diverse set of essays presented chronologically rather than thematically. Rather than a new interpretation of the relationship between revolutionary America and Europe the collection is best seen as a kind of sample menu of what is on offer for diplomatic historians in the vibrant field of early republic scholarship. It is also an indication that the trend toward trans-national history that has long been evident in colonial history has now also reached scholarship on the post-independence period.

The essays span the decades from before independence to the early nineteenth century, but concentrate on the 1780s and 1790s. Together they cover a broad field. Jefferson and fellow diplomat John Adams figure prominently, but there are also essays on British diplomat William Eden and the Baltimore aristocrat Elizabeth Patterson Bonaparte. Although some essays present a more traditional type of diplomatic history the majority of the authors are cultural rather than political historians. Their contributions constitute a challenge to widen our conception of the diplomatic history of the American Revolution and early republic.

¹ *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, J. P. Boyd et al., eds. (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1950-) VIII, 233.

As Peter Onuf points out in his introduction, Jefferson's assessment of the relative merits of the New and the Old World was not that of a member of the European intelligentsia. As a rule Europeans knew little about America and those who did know something tended not to be impressed. They thought of America as a place where transplanted Europeans grew rich by dispossessing the native population and exploiting the labor of enslaved African-Americans. Jefferson may have seen America as the land of the future; European commentators saw a land where European settlers re-connected with their barbaric past (3). America was a primitive world sorely lacking in culture and refinement. In 1770, the French intellectual Guillaume-Thomas Raynal remarked that "America has not yet produced a good poet, a skilled mathematician, a genius in art or any science" (quoted on 18). Jefferson and many other Americans of his generations took such slights to heart and it prompted them to produce the type of "counter-narrative," in Onuf's phrase, of America and its destiny which is reflected in Jefferson's invitation to Monroe.

Not every American shared Jefferson's resentment against Europe's perception of America as underdeveloped and primitive, however. Charlene Boyer Lewis's fascinating portrait of Elizabeth Patterson Bonaparte shows a woman who made the European view of the New World her own. The daughter of a wealthy Baltimore merchant with Jeffersonian sympathies and the wife of Napoleon Bonaparte's younger brother Jerome, Patterson Bonaparte looked down on her native country as a land of "apples & nuts" where social life was characterized by "ennui and contentment" (263). It was her "misfortune to be unfitted for the mode of existence" in the United States. As soon as she could, Patterson Bonaparte fled to the high society of Paris from where she wrote her unhappy father that she could never "be contented in a country where there exists no nobility" (264). Returning to Baltimore many years later Patterson Bonaparte terminated all correspondence with her European friends because "there is nothing here worth attention or interest" (270).

Patterson Bonaparte's attempts to earn a title for herself or her son from Napoleon led Congress to adopt an amendment that would have deprived an American who accepted a title of nobility from "any emperor, king, prince or foreign power" of his citizenship. Such a reaction is no more than what one would expect from republican legislators. More interesting is the fact that "the Duchess of Baltimore" was embraced by fashionable society in America's seaboard cities. She became a social celebrity not despite, but because of, her aristocratic pretensions and her uninhibited flaunting of European fashion. Deep down under their Republican veneer, the social elite of Jeffersonian America found something appealing in Patterson Bonaparte's view of America and Europe.

Patterson Bonaparte's life-story forces us to reconsider the notion of America as a homogenous nation reacting in common to Europe. Julie Flavell's analysis of late colonial American travelers to London addresses this issue explicitly by calling for "a more sensitive model that allows for variations based on region, race, and social origin in reconstructing the responses of visiting colonists to the metropolis" (53). In the literature this response is commonly described in terms of alienation, which allegedly reflected a deeply held conviction among colonial Americans that the mother country was going off in a radically wrong direction. From this perspective there is no wonder that protests over imperial fiscal

and commercial policy so rapidly turned into a struggle for independence. The stage for separation between Britain and America had been set well in advance of the clash of arms at Lexington and Concord. As Flavell shows, however, this interpretation fits poorly with the empirical evidence. Wealthy merchants and planters from the South comprised the single largest group of American visitors to London in the pre-revolution decades.. Often accompanied by their families they found themselves perfectly at home in the metropolis. Indeed they were drawn to London because it was the center of *their* world and their prolonged sojourns in the capital signaled their identification with, not alienation from, the British Empire. There was in fact nothing in their response to London and Britain that heralded the revolution that broke out in earnest in 1775.

If Flavell's colonial travelers lived easily with their dual identity as Americans *and* Britons, Sarah M. S. Pearsall reminds us that there were those who cared little for either identity. Pearsall writes about young women who witnessed their families being torn apart by the Revolution because the *pater familias* either declared loyalty to the Crown or was branded a traitor to the cause. Betsey Galloway, whose father Joseph had his property confiscated by the Pennsylvania legislature before being forced into exile, accompanied her father to London. Like the Southern merchants and planters before her, she found it "the most agreeable place I can have an idea of" (quoted on 68). Yet Galloway was far from happy there. The reason was her separation from her mother Grace who had stayed behind in Pennsylvania to try to salvage the family's affairs. It mattered little to Galloway if she resided in the periphery or the center of the Empire if only her family could be reunited. Political allegiance, too, assumed second place to concerns for family and friends. Another young woman, whose fate was similar to Galloway's, wrote her mother that "even the once odious independency will cease to be disagreeable, if it will be a means of restoring you all in health and safety to our friends and us... [C]ould we be together, all country's [sic] would be alike to me" (quoted on 73). In Pearsall's analysis Galloway's response to American independence cannot be reduced to a choice between loyalism or patriotism. Her loyalties were to family and friends before either Britain or America. The political ideologies that have traditionally been used to make sense of people's reactions to the Revolution are therefore of little help in trying to understand Galloway and untold others caught up in these chaotic times. Their reaction to a changing world is much better understood through the prism of the culture of sensibility, which structured people's emotional life and intimate relations in the late eighteenth century.²

To the leaders of the revolution, however, America's status in the world was of great importance. Few men felt the need to defend all things American before the eyes of the European intelligentsia more keenly than Thomas Jefferson. No one did so with greater eloquence. In a wonderful tableau of European contempt for all things American and the New World's riposte, Gordon Wood tells how Jefferson took on the theories of European naturalists head on. According to Abbé Raynal, Comte de Buffon, and others, all living things degenerated in the unpropitious climate of America. Animals shrank in size and men

² This perspective is further developed in Sarah M. S. Pearsall, *Atlantic Families: Lives and Letters in the Later Eighteenth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

became feeble. This theory forms the intellectual context of Jefferson's *Notes on the State of Virginia*. As Wood points out, the painstakingly compiled and carefully laid out data on animals, plants, and Indians—which modern readers tend to skip over on route to the racist remarks in Query XIV—formed the core of Jefferson's project to expose the charlatanism of the best and brightest of Europe's scientific community and to prove that the New World was in every respect an improvement on the Old.

But Jefferson never turned his back on Europe. If the continent seemed to him the negation of his beloved America, he nonetheless craved the recognition of Europe's intellectuals. The *Notes on the State of Virginia*, after all, originated in a request from the French legation to the United States and the finished work was circulated by Jefferson among the Parisian literati. Lucia Stanton's story of Jefferson's mission to produce the perfect plow further testifies to this ongoing concern with European recognition of his own talents and, by extension, his country's prospects. Jefferson was spurred onto his feat of agricultural engineering on one of his European journeys when he came across some German farm hands trying to operate heavy and unwieldy plows. To Jefferson their labor was symptomatic of a general European underdevelopment brought about by a socio-economic system that reduced the common man to a life of ignorance, poverty, and hardship. As the herald of a brighter and better future, Jefferson applied Newtonian principles to perfect the most basic of farm implements. Interestingly, however, his primary concern was not to ease the life of Europe's laboring masses or even to increase the productivity of his neighbors' farms back in Albemarle County. Rather, Jefferson hoped to impress the scientific academies of London and Paris. In practice, Stanton suggests, Jefferson's perfect plow never delivered on its promise. But this did not stop him from taking immense pride in the gold medal he was awarded in 1805 by the *Société d'Agriculture du Département de la Seine* or from displaying it in the White House. The society's members happily accepted Jefferson's fashioning of himself as a great benefactor of humanity and of the United States as the great nation of futurity. It was impossible, they wrote, to witness "without interest the first Magistrate of such a great Republic linking his name and his glory to the improvement of an instrument of tillage. This is a characteristic remarkable in the history of our century and in that of the New World" (quoted on 207).

There is no question that Jefferson was hopeful about the long-term prospects of his nation, or that he was convinced that American independence was of universal concern to mankind. In the course of time, the republican political system of the United States and the American socio-economic order made up of property-owning freemen would doubtless be copied worldwide. Yet Jefferson's rosy vision of the future was tempered by a very realistic appraisal of American power and influence in the present and near future. His realism and that of his fellow diplomat John Adams can be seen in their lukewarm response to the Dutch reform movement of the 1780s. As Peter Nicolaisen shows, neither Jefferson nor Adams saw much chance of success for these Dutch republicans. In part it was because the radicals took unhealthy risks, but more important was the fact that the organization of their government was flawed and their nation therefore weak. Due to its geographic location, the Netherlands was destined to become a plaything of its powerful neighbors. As Nicolaisen notes, Jefferson's reaction to the French radical movement in 1789 was very different. France was major player in European power politics with the ability to transform

not only its own system of government but the international order of the Old World. To Jefferson the French revolution therefore represented the continuation of the American Revolution and heralded the dawn of the future. And he was as excited about it as he was unmoved by the struggle of the Dutch Patriots.

Compared to French diplomacy after the French Revolution, American diplomacy after the American Revolution was much less radical in style.³ We can see this in the manner in which Adams reigned in American freelance diplomats during the French crisis in the late 1790s, a group whose activities and rationales are analyzed by Philipp Ziesche.⁴ But long before this we can see it in the actions and behavior of Jefferson, who knew well that he could not play the revolutionary when dealing with Europe's monarchies. Slippers and homespun may have been proper attire in Jefferson's White House. It was not in Versailles. Gaye Wilson and Martha Elena Rojas provide detailed case studies of Jefferson's response to European diplomatic protocol and traditions. Wilson's analysis of Jefferson's dress and hairstyle during his Paris years is a welcome counterpoint to the image of the bespectacled Benjamin Franklin peeping out from under his fur cap, an image that has dominated popular ideas about United States diplomats during the revolution. In contrast to Franklin, Adams and Jefferson appeared at court with dress-sword, lace ruffles, and *chapeau bras*. When Jefferson sat for Mather Brown he posed as an urbane aristocrat in silk waistcoat and heavily powdered hair, not as a backwoods rustic. Yet as Wilson shows there is more to his image than first meets the eye. Although he looks most elegant to a twenty-first century observer, compared to European diplomats bedecked in ribbons, stars, and medals, Jefferson's dress carried a republican message. Jefferson may have worn a silk waistcoat but he also wore an English-style frock coat tailored in Paris. This garment represented republican equality and its adoption by French polite society reflected a radical political impulse. Jefferson's preference for the French rather than the English cut, in turn, signaled his attachment to France rather than Britain. Wilson even speculates that Jefferson may have appeared in such distinctly French dress at the Court of St James, thus giving a further reason why George III famously snubbed the principal draftsman of the Declaration of Independence. But if Jefferson really did this he must have been either uncharacteristically naïve or courageous.

On his return to the United States Jefferson again confronted the European diplomatic protocol. As Secretary of State he had to come to terms with the tradition of offering parting gifts to foreign diplomats when their term of service in the United States ended. As Rojas shows, this seemingly trivial custom offers interesting insights into Jefferson's ideas about the United States' place in the world. The origin of the gift-giving tradition lay in the habit of kings to bestow a token of their appreciation on loyal servants. The gift therefore represented a symbolic bond between the monarch and his or her servant and it often took

³ Linda Frey and Marsha Frey, "'The Reign of the Charlatans is Over': The French Revolutionary Attack on Diplomatic Practice," *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 65, no. 4 (Dec. 1993), 706-44.

⁴ For more on this group see Philipp Ziesche, *Cosmopolitan Patriots: Americans in Paris in the Age of Revolution* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2010).

the form of a miniature portrait of the prince. When Jefferson's tenure as Minister to France was up he received a miniature portrait of Louis XVI set in brilliants, a typical present for a departing diplomat. To the United States, which had neither crowned heads nor money for brilliants, this was hardly a suitable gift. Again, we find Jefferson following European precedents while adding a republican twist.

William Temple Franklin, Benjamin Franklin's grandson and the American legation's secretary in Paris, had suggested that the United States offer land or valuable furs as parting gifts to ambassadors. Jefferson rejected this idea. Instead he determined to copy the diplomatic medal that John Adams had received from the States General of the Netherlands. Consciously emulating the practice of another republic and engraving his medal with suitable republican imagery, Jefferson could both adhere to the European tradition of gift exchange and signal his nation's distancing from the monarchies of the Old World. As president Jefferson was much less innovative in his dealings with Native Americans. He simply replaced silver medals bearing the likeness of George III with identical medals wearing his own image. But when a Tunisian delegation visited Washington, D.C., Jefferson was at his most creative. Rather than strike another diplomatic medal, or offer the kind of tribute that European states habitually paid the Barbary Powers, the Tunisian ambassador was presented with a polygraph, a writing machine that copies handwriting. Like the perfect plow the polygraph was intended to showcase American ingenuity and engineering skills and thereby to send a message to the outside world that the United States embraced development and enlightenment.

From the outset of the revolution Jefferson had hoped that his America would be able to break the mother country's hold on its economy and culture. His persistent Anglophobia rested on the belief that Britain's maritime and commercial power had to be overcome for the United States to become truly independent. This never came to be in Jefferson's own lifetime, however. To the contrary, Britain strengthened its position as the nation's principal trading partner during Jefferson's presidency and neither Napoleon nor James Madison managed to bring the Royal Navy to its knees. But as Leonard Sadosky shows in his analysis of British diplomat William Eden, this was not simply the inevitable effect of American weakness. Britain was strengthened by the ordeals of the Age of Revolutions because its statesmen and diplomats managed to re-conceptualize and re-configure a British empire without the thirteen colonies. At least to some European statesmen the American Revolution was more than an irrelevant side-show to the real business that took place closer to home. American independence upset the balance of power in the Old World and forced European politicians to reconsider international relations.

It bears repeating that *Old World, New World* is a rich but also a diverse set of essays. A tighter focus, perhaps on responses to American independence in Europe and to the French Revolution in America or on Jefferson only, would have allowed the editors to reach more specific conclusions on the relationship between America and Europe in the Age of Jefferson. There is no disagreeing with Onuf's introductory claim that the volume demonstrates that the United States in the early days of its existence was conscious of its political weakness and "civilizational deficit" as well as eminently concerned with the outside world. Americans of the founding generation had neither the inclination nor the

option to turn inwards and ignore Europe. In addition to this, many of the essays invite us to question the extent to which the Jeffersonian view of Europe and America was really representative of the American people in general. Richard A. Ryerson's analysis of John Adams, for example, shows a man who was as unaffected by Europe as he was uninterested in contemporary Europeans. What mattered to Adams's intellectual development was his absence from America, not anything he found in Europe. Physically removed from his homeland, Adams "could clearly see aristocratic power at work in groups of wealthy men in America and especially in Congress" (141). Other essays lead to the conclusion that there was a considerable gap between Jefferson's radical rhetoric and his more realistic diplomatic behavior, although it would be a gross mistake to think that Jefferson passively gave in to the European diplomatic protocol.

Boyer Lewis, Flavell, and Pearsall challenge the conventional story of the Revolution as preordained, and caution against portraying the United States as a homogenous nation and making generalizations about what "Americans" in the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth centuries thought about Europe and America. They should also be applauded for bringing to our attention the voices and choices of people who have been largely ignored by historians. As he did in his recent book, which was the topic of a recent roundtable here on H-Diplo, Sadosky points to the need to approach the American Revolution as an international event.⁵ It was an international event not only in terms of its causes but also in terms of its ramifications, leading to a "reconceptualization of the boundaries and structures of the eighteenth-century transatlantic system of states" by *Europeans* and not only Americans (84). This seems to be both an important and a very fruitful avenue for further, perhaps collaborative, research. Finally, Wilson and Rojas introduce components to diplomatic history which broaden our concept of the cultural history of diplomacy. Again this seems a novel and most promising step.

⁵ Leonard J. Sadosky, *Revolutionary Negotiations: Indians, Empires, and Diplomats in the Founding of America* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009); H-Diplo, vol. XI, no. 38 (2010), 8 September 2010.

It is hard for twenty-first century Americans and Europeans accustomed to email correspondence, online banking, and six-hour New York-to-London flights to comprehend the degree to which their eighteenth-century forerunners interacted with and depended upon transatlantic connections. Granted, the maritime vessels that transmitted eighteenth-century people, goods, and ideas back and forth across the Atlantic Ocean operated at a glacial pace compared with the digital technology and passenger jets that facilitate modern transatlantic commerce, networking, and intellectual life. Yet in many ways, the ties between the Old and New Worlds were deeper in the 1700s than they are in the 2000s. Recognizing this truth, the editors of *Old World, New World: America and Europe in the Age of Jefferson* have compiled an illuminating collection of essays focused on various aspects of the Euro-American relationship. Culled from a series of papers delivered at a 2005 conference in Salzburg, Austria, the essays collectively highlight the benefits that can be derived when historians of early modern America and Europe make reference to social, cultural, and political developments on both continents.

Four essays in the volume shed light on Euro-American connections by focusing on Thomas Jefferson's attempts to prove the merits of the United States to Europeans. Gordon Wood stylishly explains how Jefferson countered the Comte de Buffon's claim that the North American environment stunted the growth of animals. Drawing heavily upon Antonello Gerbi's *The Dispute of the New World: The History of a Polemic*, Wood reveals how Jefferson expended considerable effort gathering and disseminating evidence that his homeland's climate and geography enabled animals to exceed in size and weight their European counterparts.¹ Gaye Wilson zeroes in on Jefferson's attempts to portray himself as a diplomat worthy of respect on the European stage. Buying new clothes, sitting for and commissioning portraits, and collecting the portraits of great enlightenment thinkers, Jefferson the foreign minister showed over and over again that he eagerly wanted to impress those with whom he came in contact. Martha Rojas likewise focuses on Jefferson the diplomat's desire to present the best face of the American nation. In particular, Rojas skillfully analyzes "three objects of Jefferson's design—the Diplomatic Medal of 1790, the Indian Peace Medal, and the silver polygraph commissioned for the bey of Tunis" (180)—and the way in which they revealed a struggle to reconcile "two impulses at odds with each other, one that would resist and remake courtly diplomatic norms and one that sought to accommodate and meet those expectations." (182) Finally, Lucia Stanton examines Jefferson's earnest attempts to devise a plow that would improve upon what he viewed as the crude and inefficient European version of the same. The result was not only a new design for a plow, but also an informal publicity campaign intended to persuade Europeans that American simplicity was a virtue not a vice.

¹ Antonello Gerbi, *The Dispute of the New World: The History of a Polemic, 1750-1900*, rev. ed., trans. Jeremy Moyle (Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1955 and 1973).

Taken together, these insightful essays underscore the anxiety coursing through late eighteenth-century Americans' notions of themselves and their new nation. For despite independence, Americans cared passionately about how Europeans viewed them. What is more, the only way the United States could earn the respect of the European world was if American citizens articulated their nation in terms understandable to and established by Europeans.

Americans who traveled to Europe had the chance to better understand how Europeans thought and acted, but in many instances, time abroad simply amplified preexisting tendencies or ideas. According to Richard Ryerson, John Adams's notion of a "republican monarchy . . . was probably not dependent upon his European experience, although his fear of American aristocracy, developed in Europe, made the need for executive power more apparent to him." (147) Likewise, Philipp Ziesche's essay on Americans in Paris during the 1790s shows that developments related to the XYZ Affair reinforced partisan divisions among Republicans and Federalists. In her intriguing and well-documented essay on Elizabeth Patterson Bonaparte, Charlene Boyer Lewis makes clear that her main subject's "anti-Americanism [and anti-democratic sentiments] intensified with every trip abroad." (263) And Peter Nicolaisen convincingly argues that the sense of American superiority that Thomas Jefferson and John Adams brought to Europe became stronger as they traveled to and worked in the Netherlands.

There was no iron law, therefore, dictating that travel abroad would necessarily overturn a person's fundamental worldview. On the contrary, the essays in this book make clear that encounters with foreign others frequently crystallized ideas that had already been well developed. Historians would accordingly do well to balance change and continuity. For in some cases, the type of change that occurred was an elaboration or extension of a previously existing trend.

That is not to say, of course, that thinking in transatlantic terms never altered the mindset of particular individuals. For example, as Julie Flavell notes, the mere presence of the "Decadents Abroad" (wealthy Southern planters and merchants living in London) prompted Britons to lump together virtually all colonial subjects, so much so that some American travelers noted that many English men and women believed that the majority of those who lived in the New World were of African descent. Leonard Sadosky's treatment of William Eden, meanwhile, illuminates the ways in which the emergence of the United States as a distinct nation pushed numerous British officials to reinterpret their empire. Sarah Pearsall focuses on the way in which the traumas of the revolutionary era—in particular, the dislocations associated with loyalist emigration—helped bring into being a new, tentative version of global citizenship oriented around familial sensibility rather than political imperatives.

As Flavell, Sadosky, and Pearsall's essays demonstrate, the Euro-American relationship depended on imaginative as well as physical spaces. For even as many individuals frequently held onto their most cherished beliefs when they traveled abroad, many others modified theirs simply by pondering various developments throughout the Atlantic world. That the Old World and New both resembled and differed from each other so profoundly

only exacerbated the process of mental journeying. For in their never-ceasing meditations on the meaning of America, Europe, and the relationship between the two, Americans and Europeans both misunderstood and understood each other.

The major achievement of *Old World, New World* is thus the manner in which it complicates and enriches our perception of what we talk about when we talk about transatlantic this or that. “New World and Old World were defined against each other,” (4) writes Peter S. Onuf in the introduction to the volume, and reading this collection of thought-provoking essays reveals the degree to which historians of early modern Europe and America have incorporated that insight into their studies. Students of diplomacy and the early modern Atlantic world would accordingly do well to attend to this carefully constructed and engaging volume of essays.

The editors of this volume are grateful for these three thoughtful and generous reviews. We plead guilty to a Jeffersonian bias: there would have been no conference or volume without the support of the Robert H. Smith International Center for Jefferson Studies at Monticello. The resulting “slant” to our collective “depiction of transnational connections in the early American republic,” to quote Rachel Cleves, slights equally transatlantic, counter-revolutionary tendencies manifest in Anti-Jacobinism. We certainly would have benefited from additional essays offering different “slants.” And we would not want to be read as overly “optimistic” in our assessment of “cosmopolitan patriotism,” for, as Cleves rightly suggests, revolutionary transnationalism did not “defang the nationalist beast” and lead to world peace and prosperity. She is absolutely right to assert that “counterrevolutionaries” were “cosmopolitan patriots in their own right,” a conclusion we endorse—and should have made more clearly.

It is always a challenge to editors to draw general conclusions from a wide range of essays exploring different themes and deploying different methodologies. Max Edling is quite right that “a tighter focus” on American independence and the French Revolution would have enabled us “to reach more specific conclusions on the relationship between America and Europe in the Age of Jefferson.” Our goal was to consider the binary opposition of Old World and New World that Jefferson cherished within the context of the complexities and ambiguities of transatlantic relations in various spheres. Jefferson himself epitomized the problem, as he followed European diplomatic protocols “while adding a republican twist.” After all, the new United States aspired to be incorporated *into* the civilized world and it was only “new,” relatively speaking, *in* a European context. As Edling indicates, our collection does not give rise to “a new interpretation,” but we are pleased that he sees it “as a kind of sample menu” of what international historians might learn from scholarship on the early American republic as “Atlantic history” moves forward in time. Cleves puts it nicely—and generously—in an appropriately transatlantic metaphor, concluding that the Atlantic history on offer here is “more than old wine in new bottles,” but rather “a young varietal with the potential to age well.”

Old World, New World does not generate paradigm-busting generalizations. But we do think that it offers fresh insights into the way Jefferson and his contemporaries sought to make sense of their rapidly and radically changing world. The paradox, Matthew Hale writes, is that “Old World and New” simultaneously “resembled and differed from each other so profoundly,” thus enabling and exacerbating “the process of mental journeying” between them. If there is a master theme in our collection, it is captured well by Hale: these essays “underscore the anxiety coursing through late eighteenth-century Americans’ notion of themselves and their new nation.”

We are delighted that H-Diplo is hosting this forum. Just as Old and New Worlds were, as we claim, mutually constituted, so too the best new history of the Age of the Democratic Revolution will draw liberally both from the “vibrant field of early republic scholarship”

(Edling) and from exciting recent work on geopolitics and the transformation of the European state system.

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