

**Contents**

- Introduction by Thomas Maddux, California State University, Northridge.............................. 2
- Review by John O. Iatrides, Southern Connecticut State University........................................ 6
- Review by Barın Kayaoğlu, The University of Virginia .......................................................... 14
- Review by Konstantina Maragkou, Yale University ................................................................. 21
- Review by Thanos Veremis, University of Athens and ELIAMEP ............................................ 24
- Response by James Edward Miller, Georgetown University .................................................. 26
Since the end of the Cold War an increasing number of studies have taken advantage of newly available primary sources to explore the relationships between the leading Cold War powers, especially the United States and the Soviet Union, and their allies, clients and dependents. After a revival of interest in evaluating the U.S. as an empire with the initial American success in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, historians have returned to more focused studies that emphasize the limits to what the Soviet Union and the U.S. were able to accomplish with their hard power and the difficulties faced in changing the political culture of even dependent states. The ultimate failure of the Soviet Union to integrate its empire into a viable nation state and the difficulties encountered by the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan where the U.S. intervention has now lasted longer than the failed Soviet effort in the 1980s may have contributed to this new focus on the limits of what even a superpower can accomplish and the desirability of calibrating ends with available means and restraint.  

In The United States & the Making of Modern Greece. History & Power, 1940-1974, James Miller explores a contentious relationship between the U.S. as Cold War hegemon and an important NATO ally with historic claims, ambitions, and contemporary weaknesses and political rivalries which challenge Washington’s management of the relationship and undermine Greece’s ability to maintain a representative government during the period under study. The reviewers agree that Miller has had more access than any other scholar to U.S. documents through his service as editor of several volumes of the Foreign Relations of the United States that focus on Greece, Turkey and Cyprus during the period of his book as well as access to other governmental documents including Central Intelligence Agency files and relevant presidential archives. Although Greek government archives remain closed, Miller did consult British, French and some private Greek archives. Konstantina Maragkou, John Iatrides and Thanos Veremis suggest that Miller neglects some of the Greek historians writing on this period, a younger generation of historians that Veremis identifies, and historians who in their analysis of Greek domestic developments “offer more comprehensive and more nuanced analyses than one finds in Miller’s narrative,” according to Iatrides. (2) 

Despite Miller’s willingness to criticize Greek and American leaders as well as British, Turkish and Cypriot officials, the reviewers agree that his critical assessments are well-founded and without bias. Barin Kayaoglu emphasizes that Miller “demonstrates the value of objective scholarship in the face of self-serving narratives,” on the different sides of the

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relationship. (6) “There are no heroes in Miller’s evaluation,” comments Veremis, who indicates that Greeks would welcome Miller’s criticism of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, although Veremis suggests that Miller needs some “refinement” of his analysis of the Greek junta that seized power in 1967. (2) “Miller’s often critical comments are judicious, evenhanded, and based squarely on the evidence at hand,” concludes Iatrides. Maragkou suggests that Miller debunks “in an unbiased manner the popular distortions regarding America’s handling of the complex political, diplomatic, military, and economic issues that underpinned its relations with Greece.” (1)

Although Miller presents an overall continuity in U.S. policy towards Greece being shaped by Cold War considerations, most notably containing any Soviet breakthroughs into the eastern Mediterranean and keeping Greece and Turkey in the NATO alliance, he does note the different priorities and preoccupations of U.S. presidents and their representatives and their overall reluctance to take on too much responsibility and involvement in Greek’s political turmoil, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. Maragkou, however, would have appreciated “more emphasis” on the “military and strategic parameters, including the American bases and nuclear weapons, which often undergirded American policy.” (3) Iatrides and Kayaoğlu point out how Miller demonstrates Washington’s desire to pull back its level of intervention in the political system despite extensive U.S. military and economic assistance to the Greek government in the civil war. Dwight Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles moved to reduce U.S. economic and military aid but not entirely given the strategic considerations of the Cold War. Miller identifies the central challenge for the U.S. with Greece: Washington wanted to reduce its aid based on a “rational criterion of strategic importance” but at the same time U.S. officials “wanted to retain the level of influence its earlier investments had purchased” but began to lose “its leverage over Greece’s political leaders.” This led to what Miller defines as the “Greek tar baby”: “The Greek political class became a tar baby from which the United States could not disengage successfully, except on terms it was unwilling to accept.” Washington wanted political reform and responsible, representative political leaders—Iraqi leaders and President Hamid Karzai and Afghan leaders please pay attention—but Greek leaders expected a “patron-client relationship as practiced in Mediterranean society” in which U.S. economic aid was long term and Greece was “at the center of world geopolitics.” When the U.S. intervened in Greece to reduce its involvement this “struck Greeks as absurd, and when the U.S. intervened the Greek targets “took advantage of the opportunity provided to play the role of aggrieved defenders of national autonomy against the Americans.” (pp. 28-29)

As the reviewers note, Washington retained its Cold War presence in Greece with ambassadors who engaged with the King and Greek leaders, Central Intelligence Agency agents, military officials and an important Naval base, and economic advisers. Under Eisenhower and Dulles, Washington, however, displayed disinterest in the Cyprus issue when it heated up in the 1950s before the 1959 London-Zurick pact which affirmed the independence of Cyprus based on two ethnic communities as opposed to partition or enosis unification with Greece. Dulles and John F. Kennedy rejected repeated requests for increased aid from Greek leaders backed by the U.S. embassy in Athens. The embassy did support a major covert-funding operation in the 1958 elections. (pp. 73-74) When Greece’s political stability deteriorated in the 1960s over strife among the political elite and the
Cyprus issue with Archibishop Markarios receiving Miller’s nomination as the chief instigator of turmoil leading to partition, Miller views the U.S. as pursuing an inconsistent policy from Eisenhower’s indifference to Richard Nixon’s embrace of Markarios. (p. 85) Washington through the U.S. ambassador gradually moved to a mediation role but pressure mounted for a more direct intervention and the CIA proposed, again with embassy support, another covert political operation. With Washington preoccupied with Vietnam by the spring of 1967, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and other advisers rejected the plan.

The reviewers agree with Miller’s criticism of the U.S. response to the April 21st coup by Greek army colonels and the engagement of the Nixon administration with the military junta. As iatrides and Kayaoğlu note, Miller places most of the responsibility for the coup on Greek leaders although he does criticize Washington officials for failing “to make their opposition to a coup firm enough to discourage the Palace and the military” with the American embassy carrying much of the responsibility as the White House focused on Vietnam and the State Department devoted more attention to Arab-Israeli issues. (p. 134-135) Washington did impose a partial arms embargo, but Miller suggests that a public break with the junta “would have served U.S. interests much better over both the long and short term.” (149) Miller is critical of Nixon’s removal of the limited arms embargo, but he does reject the accusation that the U.S. backed the junta’s move to overthrow Makarios on Cyprus in the summer of 1974. Miller provides a detailed assessment of the shifting views of Greek leaders on the status of Cyprus and the steady movement of Makarios to favor independence for Cyprus under his leadership rather than enosis with Greece with the dissolving junta backing unification. The reviewers support Miller’s critical assessment of Kissinger’s response to the coup on Cyprus as reflecting incompetence and excessive preoccupation with the short term and tactical advantages vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. (pp. 193-200)

Veremis suggests that most Greeks will welcome Miller’s emphasis on the “arrogance, complacency and ultimate failure of Henry Kissinger,” but Miller overall identifies few successful Greek or American leaders as they maneuvered to advance their interests in the post-1950 relationship. Not until the epilogue on the post-1974 period does Miller note a backing off by the U.S. from a partitioned Cyprus and extensive political involvement in Greece with a recovery of relations with Greece and Turkey. (p. 204) For iatrides the “lesson to be learned from the American experience in postwar Greece ... is that, at least in the land that gave birth to the ideals of democracy, attempts at modernization, political reform and state-building are best left to the locals.” (8) Maragkou also suggests that Miller underplays the repercussions of U.S. policy on relations with Greece, most notably in the “strong tides of Anti-Americanism, which swept Greece in recent decades.” (3)

Participants

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Konstantina Maragkou holds a Ph.D. from the University of Cambridge and teaches Modern Greek and European history at Yale University. She was previously a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the Hellenic Observatory at the London School of Economics and Political Science. She had also held visiting fellowships at the European Institute of the LSE, the Remarque Institute of New York University and the Hellenic Foundation for Foreign and European Policy (ELIAMEP). Her research interests revolve around Modern Greek History with special emphasis on Greece’s foreign relations in the post-WWII era. Her current project involves the forthcoming publication of her revised and extended doctoral dissertation on Britain and the Greek Colonels, 1967-1974. On various aspects of this era, she has given a number of presentations at conferences and published articles and chapters in edited volumes.

“Good knowledge of history,” Winston Churchill once remarked, “is a quiver full of arrows in debate.” Recently, the debate on America’s postwar involvement in Greece has gained new life thanks to the publication of James E. Miller’s *The United States & the Making of Modern Greece*. Commentators in the Athenian press have charged that the author disparages the Greeks’ national character, their political culture and their conduct of foreign policy, especially the handling of the Cyprus issue. They argue that Miller downplays and rationalizes American intervention in Greek domestic affairs and absolves Washington officials of responsibility for the colonels’ coup of 21 April 1967 and for the dictatorship that ensued. One writer expressed outrage over Miller’s claim that the dictator, George Papadopoulos, rather than the leftist Andreas Papandreou was the first Greek leader who consistently refused to bow to American power.

Regarding the issue of the author’s alleged bias, it should be stressed at the outset that Miller’s often critical comments are judicious, evenhanded, and based squarely on the evidence at hand. Although the Greek side receives the lion’s share of the blame for friction in US-Greek relations, he is also critical of the Americans, the Turks and the British. In fact, he reserves his most blistering comments for the “two Henrys”: Secretary of State Kissinger and the U.S. ambassador to Greece, Tasca. It is also worth recalling that from the beginning of the cold war, the so-called patron-client relationship between Washington and Athens lent itself to frustration and irritation on both sides and at the highest levels. Thus, in July 1947, President Harry Truman scribbled on the margin of a memo he had just read: “Greeks and Jews suffer from an inferiority complex as well as a persecution complex. I’ve tried to help both and so far they’ve only given me a pain in the neck.”

A complaint more legitimate than anti-Greek bias concerns the secondary sources on which the book is based. Although Miller has made effective use of books and personal archives of leading Greek political figures, he largely ignores the work of a growing number of Greek historians who have written important books on U.S.-Greek relations during the cold war. Particularly in their treatment of Greek domestic issues and developments in the period under review, these scholars offer more comprehensive and more nuanced analyses than one finds in Miller’s narrative. In the end, of course, every author must decide how much of the available literature needs to be utilized and how much attention should be devoted to each topic discussed. It should also be pointed out that Greek government archives for the period covered in Miller’s book remain closed and that Greek historians of the cold war base their research primarily on American archives.

An experienced diplomatic historian and author of important studies, Miller is uniquely well qualified to write this particular book. While serving in the Office of the Historian of

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1 An earlier version of this review appeared in *The Athens Review of Books* (No 1, November 2009).

the State Department, he edited several volumes of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* which cover Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. In the course of that monumental undertaking, which gave him top security clearance, he examined countless documents of the State and Defense departments, the National Security Council, presidential libraries and the Central Intelligence Agency. After selecting the documents he regarded as historically important, he argued successfully for the release of certain items regarded as too sensitive by the CIA, and supervised the publication of the relevant *FRUS* volumes. In short, Miller’s knowledge of American government documents concerning Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, some of which remain classified, far exceeds anything other researchers can hope to achieve.

The purpose of *The United States & the Making of Modern Greece* is to provide an authoritative and carefully documented account of US-Greek relations, from the end of the Greek civil war in 1950 to the collapse of the military dictatorship in 1974, and to assess the long-term impact of the relationship upon political, economic and social developments in Greece. The period of the late 1940s, when the American involvement in Greece was at its deepest and most pervasive phase, is outside Miller’s main focus. On the other hand, in two introductory sections he offers a highly selective survey of the Greek national experience, including the periods of Byzantium and Ottoman rule, attempting to show how they may have molded today’s state institutions, political culture, and national character. Although there is brief mention of a collective inclination to engage in conspiracy theories, and of a trait labeled “underdogism,” the author’s discussion of the Greeks as a nation is neither particularly original nor disparaging.

Regarding the other side of the relationship, Miller touches on America’s nineteenth century expansionist nationalism (“manifest destiny”) and on a high-minded if self-serving “special mission” (p. 2) to spread democracy and promote free enterprise abroad while in the process expanding the country’s own wealth and power. After the Second World War, in the context of a strategy to contain Soviet expansionism, the United States sought to use its enormous power in Greece to defeat the local communist insurrection, bring stability, prosperity and modernization to a weak and undeveloped country, and secure it within the Atlantic alliance. Sweeping political reforms, initially considered crucial for the success of Washington’s objectives in Greece, had to be deferred until the end of the civil war and were in the end essentially abandoned after the conservatives’ electoral victory in 1953. Pointing out that Greek elites welcomed American intervention in their country’s internal affairs, Miller sets out to examine how the American and Greek governments cooperated and struggled over charting the future of Greece as a stable and independent state.

A thread that runs through the entire study concerns the motives and consequences of Washington’s interference in Greek internal affairs. Thus, in the late 1940s U.S. Ambassador Henry Grady intervened to prevent a “Papagos solution” (a Right-wing government under Marshall Alexandros Papagos) which the palace, the military and certain American officials, including the chief of the US military mission, Gen. James Van Fleet, were advocating. According to Miller, Ambassador John Peurifoy’s often-cited public intervention in favor of a majority system for the November 1952 elections was not prompted by arrogance and the flexing of diplomatic muscles but by his lack of experience
in Greek politics: Peurifoy had hastily adopted a plan suggested to him by King Paul and designed to sidetrack the monarchy’s nemesis, Nikolaos Plastiras, and ensure the victory of Papagos, presumed to be loyal to the palace.

American officials welcomed Papagos’s electoral victory and his Right-wing government because they represented domestic stability and strong attachment to NATO. This despite the fact that the new prime minister was a difficult client and anything but subservient to the United States. Taking advantage of the crisis brought about by the outbreak of the Korean war, Papagos offered to send troops to that far-away conflict and accept American bases in Greece in exchange for more generous military assistance. He authorized the establishment of the Greek Central Intelligence Agency (KYP) without consulting the American embassy. But his most dramatic act of defiance was his decision to bring the issue of Cyprus to the United Nations, which Miller attributes not only to British provocation (Anthony Eden’s peremptory refusal to discuss the matter) but mostly to growing public pressure which Papagos felt he could not ignore.

After 1954, the festering controversy over Cyprus, which Miller discusses at length, would define relations between Athens and Washington. The Eisenhower and Johnson administrations are shown to have been in principle receptive to Greek aspirations regarding Cyprus but wished to have the issue resolved within NATO, with Britain taking the lead, and without alienating Turkey. Above all, they had no wish to become directly involved in the controversy. Washington officials did not appreciate the traumatic impact in Athens of the September 1955 anti-Greek riots in Istanbul, aggravated by Secretary John F. Dulles’ “even-handed” (p. 59) notes to the two governments. The London-Zurich agreements of February 1959, which established the Republic of Cyprus, were welcomed by Washington officials at least in part because they appeared to lift a heavy burden off the shoulders of the conservative Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis, whom they regarded as a friend and loyal ally of the United States.

For American diplomats, the decade 1953-1963 was the golden age in U.S.-Greek relations. Miller provides a perceptive assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of Karamanlis who, on balance, scored well in Washington. On the other hand, the Eisenhower administration ignored his pleas for further assistance and diplomatic support and remained passive as his power crumbled, attacked by the palace, the Center Union, and the emerging pro-communist Greek Democratic Left (EDA). Alarmed by EDA’s surprisingly strong showing in the May 1958 elections, the CIA’s clandestine funding of electoral campaigns became a high priority, benefiting both Right and Center. In 1963 the embassy made known its opposition to a rumored coup to topple Karamanlis. Although Washington regretted his fall when it finally came in June 1963, he was no longer regarded as indispensable for American interests in Greece. Following closely the embassy’s frequent (and CIA’s occasional) political reporting, Miller describes in disparaging language the self-absorption and bad judgment of the royal couple, especially of Queen Frederika, which, he believes, undermined not merely Karamanlis but the country’s political system. As American officials had feared, with Karamanlis out of the picture, and while the Center Union leader George Papandreou and the palace feuded over control of the military and security forces, the Cyprus issue returned once again to the fore.
Dissecting the many facets of the negotiations over Cyprus in the 1960s, Miller finds that Washington’s diplomacy was inconsistent and ineffective but rejects conspiracy theories regarding supposedly sinister American motives and objectives. He asserts that while in principle a negotiated enosis (union) with Greece was acceptable, partition was never the goal of American officials. When in the summer of 1964 the Johnson administration felt compelled to mediate (after sharply warning Ankara not to invade Cyprus) and put forward concrete proposals for a settlement, it found Papandreou’s demands highly unrealistic and his confidence bordering on the “delusional.” (p. 101) Although the Turkish Cypriots were responsible for the collapse of the Cypriot constitution, in the Washington and Zurich talks the Americans found the Turkish side to be more “accommodating.” In the end, with Cyprus President Makarios remaining the dark figure behind the Greek delegation, the talks disintegrated into a “dialogue of the deaf.”

While finding themselves enmeshed in the Cyprus controversy, American policy makers were determined to stay out of Greek domestic politics. They had a rather low opinion of the Center Union leadership (they especially disliked Sophocles Venizelos) but foresaw no difficulties in dealing with George Papandreou. They initially considered his American-educated son, Andreas, an ally. But the Papandreous’ clash with the palace, the military, the opposition, and even members of their own party raised concerns in the embassy. Andreas’ efforts to build up his popularity and deflect attacks against him by publicly criticizing the United States and NATO added to the embassy’s worries and its reports became increasingly alarmist about the prime minister’s tactics and his son’s neo-Marxist and neutralist rhetoric. The embassy knew about the impending defection of key Center Union deputies, which crippled Papandreou’s ability to govern, but was not involved in the affair. Instead, the embassy urged Papandreou to avoid a break with King Constantine, advice which the prime minister chose to ignore.

As the domestic crisis in Athens intensified during the mid-1960s, Miller traces through the documents a gradual shift in American policy away from a hands-off stand toward discreet support of efforts to create a coalition of Karamanlis’ conservative Radical Union (ERE) and prominent deputies who had defected from the Center Union. In anticipation of a showdown through national elections, the embassy recommended covert CIA funding to strengthen the anti-Papandreou forces but the plan was categorically rejected in Washington. Fearing the consequences of a Papandreou electoral victory, the embassy continued its efforts to serve as intermediary between the prime minister and the young king. But the Americans’ influence over the two antagonists appeared to be minimal at best. The head of the king’s political office floated the idea of a possible royal coup as a way to prevent elections and a Papandreou victory. The response he received, from the CIA station chief, was that the reaction of the United States to such a move would be “extremely unfavorable.” (p. 129) Yet in his persistent efforts to block the Papandreous’ return to power the king continued to solicit the embassy’s advice and support. Other political personalities also urged the American ambassador to intervene so that a way out of the impasse could be found. In February 1967, Ambassador Phillips Talbot recommended to Washington a CIA operation to help reduce the size of the Papandreou victory in the anticipated elections—a plan that Miller characterizes as overly ambitious and unrealistic.
This time the proposal was discussed at the highest levels and, once again, it was rejected. Among the reasons given for that decision was the assertion that the embassy exaggerated the threat that Andreas Papandreou posed to American interests in Greece.

During the early months of 1967 Talbot’s reports to Washington continued to stress King Constantine’s search for a way to forestall elections and avert the formation of a new Papandreou government. On several occasions the palace left no doubt that the king was anxious to have Washington’s approval of the extra-constitutional measures he was contemplating. In turn, requesting new instructions the ambassador expressed the hope the Department would abandon its long-standing opposition to undemocratic solutions to Greece’s political problems.

As Miller’s account shows, the Department remained unmoved. Talbot was instructed to impress upon the king “…the inability of [the] USG[overnment] to give assurances of support to [the king] and noted our traditional opposition to dictatorial solutions.” (132-330) Curiously, Miller makes no mention of a qualifying sentence which was inserted in the Department’s telegram of 3 April 1967, just before it was sent to Athens. It indicated that, in the event the king resorted to unconstitutional measures, the United States reaction “cannot be determined in advance but would depend on circumstances at time.” 3 In retrospect, such an assertion might well have been interpreted by the king (and Talbot) as a sign that, its traditional policy notwithstanding, Washington was not in fact unalterably opposed to a royal coup.

Talbot’s fears that Greece faced a choice between a royal dictatorship and Andreas Papandreou’s attacks on the monarchy and the West prompted him to request authorization to attempt to prevent a dictatorship through the application of American pressure on the palace, the leadership of the armed forces and on rightist politicians. The ambassador clearly understood that, whatever the threat posed by Andreas, the blow to the democratic process would come from those who could enforce their will by force. The Papandreous were not among them. But Talbot had failed to persuade his superiors, whose understanding of the situation in Athens was hopelessly outdated. In its cable to Athens of 20 April, the Department rejected Talbot’s request and instructed him instead to pressure Papandreou to reach an accommodation with the king by promising that, if he won the elections (scheduled for 28 May), he would appoint ministers of defense and foreign affairs acceptable to the palace and would not purge the leadership of the armed forces. By the time the cable had been deciphered by the embassy, a conspiracy of army officers under Col.George Papadopoulos had staged a coup and Athens was under military rule.

In apportioning blame for the dictatorship Miller recognizes that the United States had played a part, if only inadvertently, in precipitating the crisis that gave the colonels the opportunity to strike. The Americans’ assumption that they could persuade the king and politicians of the Right and Center to put aside their differences and uphold the democratic process was naïve and misguided. The CIA’s failure to monitor closely conspiracies within

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the army highlights the agency’s lack of success in carrying out one of its most important functions in Greece. The Department’s Greek Desk had allowed Andreas’ vitriolic anti-American language to distract it and warp its understanding of the young Papandreou’s relative importance in the political crisis. On the other hand, in Miller’s judgment, “placing the Americans at the head of the list of culprits for the collective suicide of the Greek political establishment is to reverse the order of responsibility. The Colonels, the generals, a young and inexperienced king, his advisers, ambitious politicians led by the aging George Papandreou and the insecure Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, and, above all, Andreas Papandreou vie for the distinction of most culpable.” (134)

However offensive to some readers, Miller’s meticulous presentation of the American documentary evidence fully supports his judgment on this sensitive issue. Aware that documents do not tell the whole story, he seeks to augment his narrative through a dissection of what Andreas Papandreou and his supporters have published on the role of Andreas, and of the United States, in the events leading up to the dictatorship.

On the “Andreas factor” Miller is understandably swayed by embassy reports and official communications to and from the State Department. As already mentioned, higher level officials in Washington were not convinced that the young Papandreou represented a genuine threat to American interests in Greece and that, once in power, he would change drastically Greece’s foreign policy orientation. They were therefore taken by surprise when a military coup, not the one the King had contemplated and Talbot had expected, placed Greece under a brutal dictatorship. The view that, despite his combativeness and extremist rhetoric, Andreas was not as dangerous as Talbot and his top advisers (and some in the Department) believed, receives endorsement from Ambassador Robert Keeley, whose book on his tour as junior political analyst in Athens during 1966-1969 will soon be published by Penn State Press under the title “American Diplomacy and the Breakdown of Democracy in Cold War Greece, 1966-1969: An Insider’s View.” (A Greek translation is also in preparation)

Keeley, who arrived in Athens with a good knowledge of Greek, followed the local press closely and developed good contacts with many outside the Greek establishment. His understanding of the country’s mood, politics and public opinion was more nuanced and sophisticated than that of his superiors in the embassy whose knowledge of Greece was limited. He saw Andreas as a clever politician whose fiery rhetoric played on the disappointments and frustrations of many Greeks and was intended to distance him from his American past and establish his credentials as a new kind of national leader, different from the old politicians who had dominated the scene for decades. To Keeley, Andreas’ anti-American and anti-NATO diatribes were mostly populist sloganeering, risky but effective. Despite his public image and neo-Marxist jargon, the young Papandreou was not a communist and was attracting to his following many who otherwise would have flocked to the communist-dominated EDA. However, Keeley’s superiors did not share his views on Andreas and his reports were not forwarded to the Department.

In dealing with the aftermath of the 21 April coup, Miller’s narrative becomes noticeably more critical of those involved in the making and execution of American policy in Greece.
He describes Washington officials as divided and indecisive regarding the new situation in Athens. They were aware that Greeks opposed to the junta counted on the United States to pressure the colonels to restore power to civilian rule. On the other hand, how this could be achieved without damaging American interests in that country and elsewhere did not appear obvious. When the Congress-imposed arms embargo proved ineffective, Talbot recommended bowing to the new realities and normalizing relations with the government of junta chief Papadopoulos. As Miller puts it, the United States “begun its slide down a slippery slope into the embrace of the junta.”

The Nixon administration was favorably disposed toward the junta, which Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once called “men of vision.” Ignoring congressional objections, American policy stressed the strategic value of Greece in the East-West conflict and Kissinger ordered the new ambassador in Athens and Nixon favorite, Henry Tasca, to refrain from exerting pressure to have democracy restored in that country. In 1972, arrangements for home-porting facilities for the US 6th Fleet appeared to enlarge the American presence in the country, although the Papadopoulos government proved prickly and unyielding on issues of national pride and sovereignty. As Miller shows, rather than being Washington’s pliant client, the junta repeatedly stood up to American wishes. A rare exception was American intervention in February 1972 to block the junta’s plans to overthrow Cyprus President Makarios, whom Nixon and Kissinger had briefly come to regard as the principal guarantor of regional stability. In his discussion of the 1974 crisis which precipitated Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus and the collapse of the Greek junta, Miller directs his harshest criticism at the new junta boss, Col. Dimitrios Ioannides, President Makarios, and the two Henrys: Kissinger and Tasca. In his view, Kissinger accepted Turkey’s resort to force as the least damaging outcome of the crisis which he did not anticipate and was incapable of averting. Miller attributes Kissinger’s failure not to sinister motives but to the distractions of the Watergate crisis, as well as to arrogance, ignorance, and incompetence.

Following the bloody student uprising at the Polytechnic Institute of Athens in November 1973, and Papadopoulos’ ouster by Ioannides, Ambassador Tasca, who had been in contact with the junta’s opponents, had recommended that Washington publicly denounce the new regime. However, while Nixon was crippled by the Watergate scandal, Kissinger instructed Tasca to stay out of Greek domestic affairs. In what is certain to remain as one of the most outrageously false claims in American diplomacy during the cold war, Kissinger declared: “We don’t muck around with other countries.” In the junta’s final days, Tasca’s refusal to deliver personally Kissinger’s message to a raging Ioannides, and Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco’s frantic mission to Ankara and Athens (armed, as he put it, “with an empty brief case, a shoe-shine and a smile”)4 dramatize the depths to which the influence of the superpower had fallen in its relations with two of its minor allies.

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In the final sections of his book Miller gives full credit to Karamanlis for guiding the country out of the ruins left behind by the junta’s collapse, toward the restoration of a stable democracy and the peaceful abolition of the monarchy. In the process, he confined the military back to the barracks, brought Greece into the burgeoning European community, and reduced its dependence on the United States. Miller concludes with a brief survey of Andreas Papandreou’s record of achievements as head of government during 1981-89. While he regards Papandreou as a terrible manager of the national economy, he acknowledges the importance of his reforms affecting labor unions, women, the Church, and the security agencies, and his fostering of a climate of reconciliation between the Left and its opponents in the civil war. In an attempt at reconciliation of another kind, Papandreou visited the White House in 1994 and was treated as a friend and ally. After Papandreou’s death, President Clinton visited Athens and came as close as he could to expressing his personal regret over Washington’s support of the junta and the legacy of America’s interventionist practices in Greece during the cold war.

The record of US-Greek relations in the period Miller examines in this important book is long, complicated, multi-faceted, and therefore difficult to explore fully, particularly in view of the paucity of Greek primary sources. The many questions and controversies that surround those relations will not be settled in one book and arguments about them are certain to continue. Miller’s contribution to the on-going debate is an authoritative, detailed and carefully argued chronicle representing largely but not entirely the American side. One need not agree with all his arguments and conclusions to appreciate the value of his work.

In retrospect, despite the book’s grandiose title, after the early 1950s the United States was neither willing nor capable of shaping political developments in Greece. American officials continued to wield power and influence but their impact was increasingly narrow and marginal. If there is a lesson to be learned from the American experience in postwar Greece it is that, at least in the land that gave birth to the ideals of democracy, attempts at modernization, political reform and state-building are best left to the locals. As for the Greek side, the old adage still holds true: in diplomacy you get not what you believe you deserve but what you can successfully negotiate.
In April 1964, discussing the possibility of a Turkish military intervention in Cyprus and his government’s response, Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou said the following: “A clash between Greece and Turkey would be madness, but if Turkey decides to enter the insane asylum, we shall not hesitate to follow her.”¹ That summer, as the situation worsened, former U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson mediated talks in Geneva between representatives of the Greek and Turkish governments on behalf of the Johnson administration. On 22 August, after several unsuccessful attempts, Acheson asked Washington to “liquidate Geneva” and let him return home. The legendary American diplomat, who had brought Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952, could not get the two nations to resolve their differences twelve years later. Exasperated with both sides, Acheson reportedly said “we spent two months in the worst rat race I have ever been in – trying to deny Greeks and Turks their historic recreation of killing one another.”² Unfortunately, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus did enter the metaphorical insane asylum in 1974 after the Turkish military intervention, and, despite recent attempts to normalize their relations, have failed to check out.

In *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece*, James Edward Miller has two objectives: To explain the dynamics of U.S. relations with Greece during the Cold War, and, in line with that aim, to deconstruct the “Andreas version” of Greece’s recent history as rendered by former Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou (George’s son) and his allies. Miller succeeds on both counts. And readers also get a good sense of the making of the trilateral “insane asylum” in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The book’s main theme revolves around Greece's failure to create a stable democracy in the 1950-1974 era. “This failure,” says Miller, “was largely the work of Greece’s politicians, military, and monarchy, but the United States cannot escape some burden of responsibility for what went wrong,” especially with its initial acceptance of, and eventual support for, the Colonels’ coup in April 1967 (x).

The book first discusses how the United States and Greece shared similar models of expansionist nationalism in the nineteenth century. According to Miller, both countries possessed “supercharged ideologies that fueled and justified this expansion” (1). The nineteenth-century belief in America’s “Manifest Destiny” to take control of the North American continent reached its logical conclusion when, at the end of World War I, President Woodrow Wilson assumed a “special mission” to spread democracy and free enterprise to a world that lacked both (2).

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Also an exceptionalist creed, the *Megali Idea* (Great Idea), a term coined in 1844, motivated Greek nationalists to unite all “Hellenes” from the Peloponnesus to the Pontus and from Xanthi to Cyprus under a single state. In the words of a nineteenth-century Greek nationalist, Greeks had the moral obligation to once again stand up to the “Persian dogs” (i.e., Ottoman Turks) and recapture Constantinople.³ Just as ambitious in its expansionism as Manifest Destiny, the *Megali Idea* faced stiff resistance from the Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria, Britain, and nationalists in Macedonia and Albania because they either had large numbers of Greek Orthodox citizens or because they desired the same territories. The great powers of Europe restrained Greek nationalists, too: They did not seek the sudden disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and a dangerous explosion of “the Eastern Question.”

Proponents of the *Megali Idea* held contradictory ideas. They drew from the Western concept of nationhood but they also aimed to resuscitate the Byzantine Empire. Modern Greece would be a Greek Orthodox nation but it would also rule over non-Orthodox Christians as well as Muslims. Furthermore, the debate over what sorts of ideas and institutions Greece should adopt from Western Europe also stirred much controversy, pitting the royal family and the Church against constitutionalists and liberals.

Significant outside challenges also tested Greece’s national mission. As Miller points out, except for British and French support for the Confederacy during the American Civil War (1861-1865), “the United States has never had its exceptionalism tested as deeply as has Greece” (15). In the face of successive defeats and setbacks from independence in 1832 until the Asia Minor “catastrophe” in 1922, implementation of the *Megali Idea* did not go as smoothly as the expansion of the United States from the Louisiana Purchase in 1804 through the end of the war against Mexico in 1848. Despite the travails, however, Greek people resolutely held onto their national creed.

At the onset of the Cold War, the United States and Greece had an interest in forging closer relations. Athens turned to Washington for postwar reconstruction and containing Communism. The Truman administration saw the civil war in Greece as part of Soviet grand strategy to wrest control of key parts of Eurasia.⁴ The United States was only too glad to help the conservative government in Athens fight the communist insurrection and rebuild the Greek economy. On the other hand, political reform, an essential step in stabilizing Greece, never materialized. “The U.S. shelved its efforts to ‘reform’ Greek political practice, recognizing that the American presence already was so overwhelming that it threatened to repress essential Greek initiatives” (21). Nonetheless, a modicum of stability emerged with Greece’s membership in NATO alongside Turkey in 1952.


Ironically (and partially validating Acheson’s remarks twelve years later), Greece’s attention turned to Cyprus once it entered NATO and felt more secure vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and Turkey. Relinquished to Britain by the Ottoman Empire in 1878 and a crown colony after 1925, the island’s population was 80 percent Greek Orthodox and 20 percent Muslim. Ethnic nationalism emanating from Greece and Turkey deepened the divide between the two communities and transformed them into two separate national groups by the middle of the twentieth century. Greek Cypriots demanded *enosis* (union with Greece) and Turkish Cypriots sought *taksim* (division of the island).

In the mid-1950s, the Greek and Turkish priority – mainland as well as Cypriot – was not containing Communism (since their NATO allies did that for them) but “winning” Cyprus. In the aftermath of the Suez crisis of 1956, which significantly decreased the island’s strategic value, Britain looked for a way to wash its hands of Cyprus. London, Athens, and Ankara all turned to Washington for a solution. Setting a precedent for future U.S. policy toward Cyprus, the Eisenhower administration hesitated to privilege the case of one NATO ally over another and nudged Britain to take charge.\(^5\)

As Britain’s global position weakened after World War II, a powerful force in the person of an Orthodox priest emerged. Michael Mouskos, who assumed the name Makarios III upon his election as archbishop of the Cypriot Orthodox Church and *etnarch* (de facto leader of Greek Cypriots) in 1950, became the champion of *enosis* in Cyprus. Makarios mobilized Greek Cypriots to realize the cause of *enosis* so adroitly that British authorities deported him to Ceylon in 1957. Interestingly, Miller tells us, “as the leader [of the Greek Cypriots, [Makarios] would not simply hand over the island to the political class in Athens and permit Cyprus to become a backwater in the Greek state” (55). In the 1950s, while leading pro-*enosis* groups in Cyprus, Makarios came to realize that being the head of an independent church and an independent country was more important to him than delivering his island to the “motherland.”

Greek Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis, a moderate man by disposition, was not too keen on rapid *enosis* either. He had made a name for himself by ably managing infrastructure projects as minister of public works in his predecessor’s cabinet. Although he did seek to unify Cyprus with Greece, Karamanlis’s first priority was to put his house in order. To that end, he struck a deal with Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes in 1958. The final result, the London and Zurich Accords of February 1959, granted independence to Cyprus but barred *enosis* and *taksim* and gave the Turkish Cypriot community the right to veto all legislation. Unsurprisingly, the creation of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 disappointed many pro-*enosis* Greeks and Greek Cypriots.

In the 1950s and early 1960s, Constantine Karamanlis aimed to foster economic development and improve his country’s ties with the nascent European Community (EC). In

an ideal world, these policies would have also served U.S. interests because the United States had been busy with more pressing issues: Berlin, the Middle East, and South East Asia. But public opinion in Greece continued to clamor for enosis while King Paul and Queen Frederika angled to oust the prime minister for his successful marginalization of the palace from the decision-making process. With the rise of George Papandreou's Center Union, Karamanlis lost the elections of 1963.

The ouster of Karamanlis, the prime ministry of enosis-enthusiast Papandreou, and the deterioration of the dysfunctional political system in Cyprus presented Makarios (now president of Cyprus) with the opportunity to end the London-Zurich arrangements and assert full independence. To that end, he encouraged pro-enosis Greek Cypriot forces to attack the Turkish Cypriot minority from late 1963 until the fall of 1964. When the Johnson administration asked Acheson to find a middle ground between Athens and Ankara, which would have terminated the Republic of Cyprus, Makarios backed down to fight another day.

With their dreams of enosis frustrated once again, ordinary Greeks began to question the merits of their alliance with the United States (something very similar was happening on the other side of the Aegean). Against this background, an unlikely character in the person of Andreas Papandreou began exploiting these sensitivities. The younger Papandreou had a Ph.D. in economics from Harvard University. During World War II, he had acquired American citizenship, served in the U.S. Army, and married Margaret Chant, an American. In the 1950s, Papandreou returned to Greece to assist his father's burgeoning political career and renounced his U.S. citizenship.

The younger Papandreou's political skills soon became evident. When he failed to secure the Kennedy administration's support for his father against Karamanlis in 1961-1962 (and his efforts became public knowledge soon thereafter), Andreas Papandreou simply denied that he had ever asked for Washington's help. He also irked conservatives with his left-leaning policies as deputy minister of economic affairs. So, when a conspiracy tying Andreas Papandreou to a leftist network within the Greek army came to surface in 1965 (the ASPIDA affair), his political career seemed to be at an end. Quite soon, however, Andreas Papandreou mustered an anti-U.S. and anti-NATO discourse in his defense and complained about “American intervention” in Greece and Cyprus. Many Greeks listened.

As Andreas Papandreou increased his verbal attacks against the United States and the palace, weakening his more moderate father along the way, political instability deepened in Greece. In this context, the American embassy was uneasy about the prospects of a government dominated by Andreas Papandreou and hoped to limit his influence. But Washington was less apprehensive and refrained from interfering. Unfortunately, before Greek politicians could find a way out of the deadlock, a group of Greek army colonels came up with their own solution and carried out a coup d'état in April 1967. The junta imprisoned Andreas Papandreou (he was exiled to France the following year) and ended parliamentary democracy in Greece, ushering the most damaging period in U.S.-Greek relations. A more hard-line wing within the junta took over in November 1973 and overthrew Cypriot President Makarios to achieve enosis in July 1974. Turkey invoked its status as a guarantor state under the London-Zurich accords and sent its forces to Cyprus.
Many observers – Greek and foreign – blame the United States for engineering both the coup of 1967 and the Cyprus crisis of 1974. Miller emphatically denies that the United States supported the overthrow of Greece’s democratic government even though he finds the Johnson administration partially responsible. “Confronting the likely collapse of a friendly constitutional regime,” we read, “U.S. officials failed to make their opposition to a coup firm enough to discourage the Palace and the military” from carrying out the coup. According to Miller, “what Greek leaders heard was a confusing ‘no, but’ that encouraged them to interpret U.S. intentions to serve their particular interests” (135). In the final analysis, even though irresponsible Greek leaders, especially Andreas Papandreou, are to blame, the Johnson administration’s post facto approval of the coup was self-defeating. A serious public break with the junta, argues Miller, “would have placed heavy pressure on the Colonels to depart the stage quickly and would have given the Greek people both hope and a point of reference in their resistance to the dictatorship.” “The patron would have delivered for its client” and, upon the liberation of Greece, the United States would have maintained the respect of Greek people (149). Instead, the partial arms embargo against Greece (the junta continued to receive the small arms necessary to maintain public order and suppress the opposition), probably prolonged the junta’s life-span.

Miller is even more critical of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger for their close relations with the junta. Upon entering the White House in January 1969, the new president and his national security adviser saw that the previous administration’s policy had failed to move Greece back toward constitutional government. The leader of the junta, Colonel George Papadopoulos, never hid his displeasure whenever the American side urged him to restore democracy or liberalize his regime. To make matters worse, the Greek army's fighting prowess had deteriorated because of the embargo. Nixon got the message. He had already decided to resume shipment in July 1969 but had timed his action carefully. A year later, the U.S. arms embargo ended. The Nixon administration continued its predecessor’s misguided policy for which the United States would pay a heavy price later.

Miller's rebuttal to the allegation that the United States supported the Greek junta’s move against Makarios in the summer of July 1974 is also plausible. With the commencement of inter-communal talks in Cyprus in 1968, Makarios, now more openly opposed to enosis, began to appear as a source of regional stability. According to Miller, U.S. officials improved relations with Makarios by the early 1970s because "his replacement, especially if achieved by violence, would likely bring about a conflict between Greece and Turkey and open the door to Soviet involvement on the island" (181).

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Thus, the origins of the coup that overthrew Makarios in July 1974 are to be found in the simultaneous political crises that rocked Washington, Athens, and Nicosia in 1973-1974. President Nixon was in trouble for his role in the Watergate scandal. General Dimitrios Ioannides, who had replaced Papadopoulos in November 1973, needed a quick fix (enosis) to strengthen the junta’s domestic position. Makarios, in turn, stood on thin ice because of Athens’s renewed efforts to depose him with the help of pro-enosis groups in Cyprus.

Makarios was finally overthrown with Athens’s backing on 15 July 1974. Kissinger, whose shuttle diplomacy had successfully disengaged Israeli and Syrian forces from the Golan Heights earlier in the spring, was in no position to repeat that successful feat. Increasingly aware that his boss’s days as president were limited, Kissinger tried to contain the Watergate scandal as much as possible. Like previous American officials who expected London to take the lead in Cyprus, Kissinger tried to get Britain to resolve the new crisis.

Without Kissinger reining in on Athens and Ankara, British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan failed to offer any meaningful incentives to Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit. Fed up with the treatment of Turkish Cypriots at the hands of Makarios for the past fourteen years and even more apprehensive about their grimmer prospects at the hands of the Greek junta, Ecevit gave the green light to the Turkish army on 20 July. Turkish military action in Cyprus unintentionally exposed the Greek junta’s helplessness. Unable to protect Cyprus, the military regime in Athens crumbled, enabling Constantine Karamanlis to return from exile and restore civilian rule.

In the final analysis, even though Karamanlis oversaw the consolidation of democracy in Greece and its accession to the EC in 1981, Andreas Papandreou and his narrative emerged as the long-term beneficiary of Greece’s return to democracy. The “Andreas version” of modern Greek history, blaming the United States for most (if not all) of Greece’s troubles, gained wide currency when Papandreou led the opposition in the late 1970s and served as prime minister in 1981-1989 and 1993-1996.

The greatest strengths of this book are Miller’s lucid prose and his skillful use of archival material from the United States, France, Britain, Italy, and Greece. Miller’s direct response to the “Andreas version” in Greece and indirect response to other nationalist history-writing that tend to emanate from Turkey and Cyprus, scapegoating the United States for local politicians’ mistakes, demonstrates the value of objective scholarship in the face of self-serving narratives.

But two points about The United States and the Making of Modern Greece need to be addressed. Miller is justifiably critical about the negative role that Greece and Turkey played in exacerbating conditions in Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean. But the way he criticizes Greek and Turkish nationalism by contrasting them with their American counterpart is confusing. Miller states that when “Greeks and Turks were disputing

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dominance over a small island [in the 1950s], the United States was peacefully absorbing two large territories with multiethnic populations, Alaska and Hawaii.” “The American ‘empire,’” he continues, “grew on the basis of the free choice of territories to seek association and with the understanding that new member states of the union would be largely self-governing” (56).

U.S. territorial expansion in the nineteenth century does look like a peaceful affair. But looks can be deceiving. The Polk administration’s dangerous saber-rattling with Britain during the Oregon boundary dispute in 1844-1845, its subsequent war against Mexico in 1846, the overthrow of Hawaii’s Queen Liliuokalani by American businessmen in 1893, and the Spanish-American War of 1898 are sober reminders that the geographic growth of the United States was anything but a peaceful affair.8 This brief diversion toward a nationalist narrative at a critical part of the book does a disservice to Miller’s fine scholarship.

Miller’s use of Manifest Destiny in explaining the conduct of U.S. foreign policy is also debatable. In the 1950-1974 period, successive U.S. governments did not always act in accordance with the stated principle of “spread[ing] democracy and free enterprise to a world that lacked both” (2). Miller’s own book is replete with examples proving that point. The quote by New York Times correspondent C.L. Sulzberger on the April 1967 coup sheds light on the contradiction between ideals and realpolitik: “All the U.S.A. stands for has been hurt by [the coup]; but not our national interests” (147). As Miller indicates, even though American policy makers “were highly sympathetic to the plight of Greeks, they had a hard time reconciling their concerns about international stability with support for the restoration of democracy in Greece” (155). But if the U.S. government failed to act according to its stated principles and behaved like any other great power – favoring stability over liberty in Greece and elsewhere – how exceptional was the United States? In other words, how useful is Manifest Destiny and/or American exceptionalism in explaining the history of U.S. foreign relations?

Notwithstanding these criticisms, Miller’s important study will set a high standard for future works. In good time, The United States and the Making of Modern Greece will become the authoritative guide on the history of U.S.-Greek relations and modern Greek history for experts, students, and the interested public.

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The close American relationship with Greece has deservedly attracted the interest of a number of scholars, academics, journalists, politicians and eye-witnesses alike. The hard and soft power supremacy that the United States amassed vis-à-vis Greece for several decades in the post-Second World War era became manifest in a number of ways, including massive financial injections administered by the Marshall Plan, substantial military aid, mainly under the NATO umbrella, and American efforts to influence Greece’s modernization and state-building process. In light of the undisputed preponderance of the United States in Greek affairs, the burgeoning literature has often equated the involvement of various U.S. administrations, although admittedly some more than others, to patronage.

Against this fertile ground, it falls within James Edward Miller’s scope to untangle such assertions, and readdress the degree of American involvement in Greece’s recent political history. The author teaches at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute. Of even greater relevance to this book is his capacity as the editor of the State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States series with jurisdiction over the volumes on Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. This engagement effectively means that he has had access to all State Department and CIA files pertaining to Greece, a ‘privilege’ that places him in the optimal position to analyze the complexities of American foreign policy towards Greece during the period covered in his book – and he fulfills this task by delivering a carefully researched, thoroughly argued account.

Miller’s book makes a very significant contribution to this hotly debated field as it provides the first comprehensive account of the vexed and vexing ways in which the two countries interacted in the twenty-five year period spanning the end of the Greek civil war and the collapse of the Greek Colonels’ regime. Of equal importance are the author’s sincere attempts to debunk in an unbiased manner the popular distortions regarding America’s handling of the complex political, diplomatic, military and economic issues that underpinned its relations with Greece in the era under examination.

Miller has made discerning use of the voluminous archival sources of not only the U.S., but also Britain and France among other countries, while integrating the plethora of relevant secondary sources, including a number of memoirs and documentary collections, in a balanced fashion. His lengthy footnotes clearly document the breadth of his archival research and convincingly solidify his arguments. In fact, his attention to specifics is another major strength of this book in contradistinction to other accounts dealing with the otherwise familiar parameters of American-Greek relations. Furthermore, among its several strong points one needs to include the nuanced reconstructing of the historiographical background that greatly enhances the contextualization of the author’s arguments. Although at times executed in a rather detailed manner, the clarity of the text and its lively narrative is not compromised.

The main axes around which it revolves include the aftermath of the Greek civil war, the volatile Cyprus issue and the Colonels’ dictatorship; in fact, the two latter periods are most
masterfully investigated by the author. For instance, his examination of American policies towards Cyprus, a parameter that greatly influenced Greek-American relations, accurately reflects their fluctuation from indifference to crisis management, and from the grudging acceptance of Makarios to his embrace as a critical factor in eastern Mediterranean stability.

The book skillfully highlights the struggles of the various American officials to find a *modus vivendi* with the kaleidoscope of administrations, which governed Greece between 1950 and 1974. From America’s geostrategic point of view, Cold War exigencies made it imperative to promote Greece’s economic modernization and political reform with the ultimate aim of making it less vulnerable to the Communist threat. Although in the period between 1950 and 1967, the various American attempts at modernization did enjoy some success, their hopes for Greece’s political reform failed to materialize, though mainly due to the shortcomings of the Greek establishment according to the author’s accurate political analysis.

He places under his microscope the observation of a number of key players, including the American Presidents and their Foreign Secretaries as well as Greek and Cypriot protagonists. Another of this book’s many strengths includes the balanced elaboration of the formation of state policies and the specific contribution to this process of a number of individuals, for instance Ambassador Tasca’s policies during the second half of the Colonels’ regime and Henry Kissinger’s stance during the Cyprus 1974 imbroglio. Their motives and tactics are thoroughly examined and their effect in the context of a number of Greece’s recent historical milestones successfully highlighted. At the same time the almost constant interplay of domestic and international factors influencing both countries’ decision-making process is efficiently accounted for.

Miller’s book clearly argues that American interference in Greek affairs was more limited than widely believed. From early on he asserts that “the US footprint in Greece internal politics was drastically reduced” (p. 42). However, despite his claims of a relatively limited American involvement, he does admit that the United States “remained by far the most significant foreign presence in Greece” (p. 111). Given this exceptional power, the author does not fail to observe that even omissions on behalf of the various American administrations had ramifications on a number of occasions; for instance, Johnson’s “failure to confront the junta” (p. 203) had an important impact on the regime, as the author rightly reckons. Although arguing that the Greeks were responsible for their failure to create a stable democracy, the author admits that the United States should not “escape some burden of responsibility for what went wrong”. As he concludes his main argument, it was the Greeks, who often “drove their political system over an embankment; the Americans did nothing to help get it out of the ditch” (p.207).

In light of this argument, Miller places strong emphasis on calibrating the right amount of responsibility not only on America’s shoulders, but also on the Greek political and military establishment as well as the monarchy. However, the bureaucratic filibustering that hinders the unrestricted access to Greek primary sources might have compromised the historical accuracy of the Greek perspective, as even the author tacitly acknowledges right
at the beginning. And while this shortcoming stemming from Miller’s limited access to Greek archives is not a setback suffered only by this study – rather it constitutes an inescapable impediment to any scholar researching similar periods – a few other shortfalls are specific to it.

One of the first flaws is the lacuna of relevant bibliographical analysis. The absence of discussion on the recent meticulous and highly unbiased accounts of a number of prominent Greek historians, including Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Sotiris Rizas and Ioannis Stefanides, to whom Miller in passing refers as ‘small and quite competent band’ (p.16), is rather trivializing.

Among other minor faults, one should include a few rather generalized assumptions. The author claims for instance that American policies towards Greece caused “limited damage” to American-Greek relations (p.104), an argument, which can certainly be contested by the strong tides of Anti-Americanism, which swept Greece in recent decades – on five occasions having even cost the life of American diplomats.

Moreover, I would have liked to see more emphasis placed on the military and strategic parameters, including the American bases and nuclear weapons, which often undergirded American policy towards Greece. Another noticeable omission relates to sources, and the dearth of oral testimonies, which given the relatively recent nature of the events, could have been gathered through the conduct of interviews with a number of protagonists. Finally, some spelling mistakes have occasionally sprung up, including Makarios’ family name on page 50.

All in all, Miller’s study of the repercussions of American foreign policies on Greece’s post-Second World history is one of those very few coloured by revisionist approaches. It therefore constitutes an essential read both for the tortuous histories of American-Greek relations and post-Second World War Greece as well as the effects of the Cold War on a country on Europe’s periphery.
This work is an honest attempt to revisit a highly contentious period of history. It begins in the wake of a devastating civil war whose divisive heritage marks the entire book. It ends with the deliverance of the Greeks from their military dictatorship and finally from their civil war divisions.

Andreas Papandreou’s attempt to revive the cleavage did not last, nor did his “grand narrative” concerning Greece’s role in the periphery. As Miller rightly observes: “Papandreou wisely retreated behind a smoke screen of nationalist verbiage. His essay at economic nationalism (Greek socialism) turned out to be a return to policies of financing economic expansion by building national debt.” (p. 209).

The author’s appraisal of American world influence is on the whole sound. However, the Afghanistan and Iraq entanglement is not a unique case of foreign intervention. In the dawn of American power the policy-makers were split between those who favoured imperialism and those who opposed it. The people of the Philippines, who had been recently freed from Spanish rule, rose in 1899 against their new occupation. By 1902 the insurgents had lost 200,000 dead to 5,000 Americans. The U.S. gave the Philippines their independence in 1946. Incidentally, Rome was not “only a major military power.” (p. viii). It granted Roman citizenship to people of its vast empire and had an unmistakable civilizing influence on the less developed lands it conquered. Aqueducts, baths, theatres and a network of roads that still survive, testify to that.

Miller is right in asserting that “a central belief of the US elites is that their nation constitutes something of a universal social model” (p. ix). Yet American democracy is impossible to emulate because it is based on a general consensus over the values of a single ideology: Lockean Liberalism. European parliaments include a variety of political traditions that the U.S. has never known in its own history: Conservatism, Socialism, Communism, even Fascism, along with Liberalism. American popular culture is another thing. It has travelled far and wide and continues to leave its mark everywhere.

In assessing Greek perceptions of history the author has done his homework, although he has given undue credence to the scant influence of social scientists and transient journalism. He deserves credit for taking notice of “the small and quite competent band” of historians but has missed representatives of the younger generation, such as Evanthis Hatzivasileiou, Dimitris Livanios, Iakovos Michailides and Sotiris Rizas, to mention only a few.

Although he has not examined Greek archival material, Miller relies on American primary sources such as the Declassified Central Intelligence Records and the General Records of the Department of State. He is therefore competent to discuss relations between American officials in Athens and Greek governments.
Between 1950 and 1954, American Ambassadors sought to admonish Greek officials to prepare for the end of U.S. military and economic aid. This did not diminish their involvement in Greek politics nor the relationship of Americans with Greek royalty. Although the Korean war and Greece’s participation gave the issue of U.S. aid withdrawal a respite, the discussion was resumed after the end of the war. The electoral victory of the “Greek Rally” under Field Marshal Alexandros Papagos, created, according to Miller, “the basis for a decade of stable rule by conservative Greek politicians who shared most US objectives on both the international and the domestic plane” (p. 39). Cyprus would upset the relationship.

Limited U.S. backing to Greece’s Cyprus initiatives against Britain and arduous negotiations over the Greek debt to the U.S. may explain Karamanlis’ future tilt towards Europe. The author furthermore points out that the Americans never fully understood the impact of their “even-handed” response to the 1955 anti-Greek riots in Istanbul and Izmir. Miller’s presentation of George Papandreou’s “unrelenting struggle” confirms much of what appears in the book of Alexis Papahelas’ *Rape of Greek Democracy* (Athens: Kolaros, 1997).

There are no heroes in Miller’s evaluation of the sixties. He debits George Papandreou with a populism that was mostly narcissistic and the royal family with a syndrome of self-destruction. Andreas Papandreou is his primary target of criticism: “Andreas Papandreou’s mixture of unbridled ambition, irresponsible action and explosive rhetoric created a situation that the Colonels exploited...” (p. 134). Miller reserves most of his ire for the military dictatorship but has few kind words for U.S. agencies. “The CIA had scant information on the coup’s leader” (p. 149). “The United States got exactly the solution it had wanted to avoid”.(p. 135) All in all the U.S. was straddled in Greece with a regime that gave the Americans a bad name with little gain.

Of all his views the one that will endear the author to the hearts of most Greeks is his analysis of the arrogance, complacency and ultimate failure of Henry Kissinger in Cyprus. Nevertheless, his analysis of the junta’s policy vis-à-vis Makarios needs refinement. The “Colonels” were an assortment of amateurs differing widely in their views. Miller has not identified the fanatical pro-loannides officer by the name of Papapostolou, responsible for the first attempt against Makarios’ life. There is a misunderstanding of dictator George Papadopoulos’ position as well as that of his mentor, Panagiotis Pipinelis. Both finally realised that their best bet in Cyprus was not “enosis” (union), but the status quo. George Grivas was a loose cannon rather than an agent of the military, and took it upon himself to bungle inter-communal relations on more than one occasion.

Secretary of State William Rogers came to the realization that Makarios was not the worst choice for the U.S. Kissinger came into his office as Secretary like a bull in a China shop. Many of today’s problems in Cyprus are of his own making.
Peer review is always a useful experience. I am pleased that my four readers find that *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece* has largely succeeded in achieving my objectives and I thank them for that positive judgment. I am going to divide my reply into two sections. In the first I will comment on a few points in their critiques that seem to me require a response and then use an observation by Barin Kayaoglu to discuss an issue that he rightly points out haunts U.S. diplomacy and has had its role in muddying US-Greek relations: reconciling ethical considerations and the pursuit of national interest. In the process I hope also to address comments by Professors Maragkou and Iatrides.

Let me begin by acknowledging the correctness of a criticism that Professors Iatrides and Maragkou jointly make. I erred in not giving more emphasis to the work of Evanthis Hatzivassilou, Sotiris Rizas and Ioannis Stefanides and other Greek scholars. The cause of this apparent slighting of these scholars’ very competent work lies, as Professor Iatrides suggests, in part in my unusually complete access to and familiarity with American sources. Moreover, as both readers note, the issue of American involvement in Greece is highly controversial. As I explain in the Preface (pp. xi-xii), I wanted to make my arguments on the fullest documentary basis and chose to limit my reliance on secondary materials. In creating my study from the ground up, I relied heavily on archival materials –including whatever Greek materials I could find--combined with a careful employment of oral histories, particularly the Foreign Affairs oral histories series, and memoir literature. I was not going to make a potentially controversial claim without the documentary resources to back it up. I also hope the footnotes provide a rough guide through the thicket of U.S., British and French documentation for future scholarly research.

Professor Veremis’ comments provide lots of food for thought. I can agree with most of what he says and would greatly enjoy exchanging views on the nature of the Roman Empire. I can not share completely his optimism in regard to the historical education the Greek people receive. The analytic work he and his colleagues at ELIAMEP do is quite impressive. The political leadership of Greece has repeatedly shown a high degree of realism and sophistication in dealing with the United States and with their European partners. On the other hand, the last years are replete with cases illustrating the degree that an extremely nationalist press, social science modeling and an activist clergy continue to distort the national narrative and through this cause Greece serious problems. The debate over primary school history texts (pp.16-17) is one worrying sign. In recent months, equally distressing evidence has been available on the web site of the “Hellenic Professors.” In October, this supposedly sophisticated cross section of educators was in an uproar over a “report” that two (fortunately fictitious) Georgetown history professors claimed to have “invented ancient Greece.” Some days passed before a bemused American member of the blog explained to outraged colleagues that the source of this “story” was the weekly satirical review The Onion. This silly business should be of no consequence, but it is part of a daily pattern of Turk bashing, conspiracy theory, hyper nationalism, anti-minority
commentary, and the propagation of long discredited historical myth. Since the Greek debt crisis, the “Hellenic Professors” have discovered a new national enemy. Germany achieved the level of opprobrium usually reserved for the Turks. Uninformed discourse by the individuals entrusted with the education of younger Greeks (and the Diaspora) harms Greece’s relationships with its European partners, with its Muslim and non-Orthodox Christian neighbors, and undercuts efforts by the country’s political leadership (and ELIAMEP) to construct cooperative relationships with other peoples. Coming from the land of Tea Party blogs, Fox News, and the Texas State Book Commission, I would add that Greece is not alone in experiencing these sorts of hyper nationalist assaults on common sense. It is a matter of degree and I think Greece more vulnerable to the bad effects for a variety of reasons outlined in the book (pp. 14-19) and a December 2009 article in the *Athens Review of Books*.

Barin Kayaoglu raises two issues of interest. I feel he misinterprets some of my comments on the nature of American nationalism but as the author, it is my responsibility to make my meanings clear. I may have failed in this case. Kayaoglu has taken my comments about American “civic” nationalism (p. 56) in a direction I find startling. My comment was made in the context of a discussion of the reasoning that prompted the Eisenhower Administration to decline to endorse Greek Cypriot claims to dominate the island with arguments largely based on a “racial” or ethnic nationalism. In seeking to explain the origins of American “civic nationalism” I looked to the legislative actions of 1785-87, commonly lumped together as the Northwest Ordnance, pointing to the ways in which these laws provided a means for permitting territories (and through them, individuals) to enter the Union on a base of equality. The Ordnance predates the era of Manifest Destiny, served as a template for absorbing the individual states through 1960, and, ironically, also for U.S. occupation policy. The ways in which the United States acquired territory were varied (war, diplomacy, purchase, etc). The Ordnances did not mandate any means of expansion but helped to successfully incorporate a variety of peoples and territories after expansion. I have not endorsed Manifest Destiny or the wars of 1848 and 1898. In fact, I give a critical judgment of the idea/ideology (p 2). My point was to compare U.S. nationalism with Greek and Greek Cypriot versions as a way of elucidating policy making in the 1950s.

II

Kayaoglu comments on the degree to which both Greece or Turkey have shared the experience of America preaching about international ethics and then practicing a form of “even handed” diplomacy that seemed to injure their specific national interests. They are hardly the only examples.

The United States has been caught up in this contradiction from the beginning. How could the “model” for all mankind not practice a “moral” foreign policy? How could the rest of mankind not be put off by these pretentions? American leaders have felt compelled to offer such visions to their electorate and to the world because of political necessity and because in certain circumstances it has been effective. Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points and FDR’s Atlantic Charter and gradually evolving notion of a permanent “United Nations” coalition won domestic and foreign support, thus consolidating war efforts. Jimmy Carter
and Ronald Reagan utilized human rights rhetoric effectively during the Cold War because they appealed to a widespread desire for the new diplomacy that Wilson promised in 1917.

The United States inevitably gets caught up in the consequences of “moralizing” international relations. The gap between Washington’s rhetoric and its actions are frequently too wide to ignore at home or abroad. On the other hand, once embarked on the slippery slope of moralizing foreign affairs, America has been hard put to figure out a way around the consequences of its actions. Greece was one example of this issue. Having established a presence in Greece, aided “its Greeks” to win a bloody civil war, and largely paid for Greek economic reconstruction, U.S. officials found they had created a “special relationship” of obligations to the Greeks that Washington did not contemplate but which Greece’s populace certainly believed existed. One unmanageable U.S. obligation was to intervene in support of whatever faction or policies “the Greeks” supported. Since the Greeks were usually divided, particularly on internal affairs, and Greece was only a small part of the web of alliances in which the United States operated, Washington could rarely satisfy its impatient clients. Between July 1965 and April 1967 the Greek political establishment tore itself apart while Washington largely stood on the sidelines. The Colonels’ coup placed the United States in an untenable position. As a democracy, as “leader of the free world,” and as Greece’s big koumbaros, it should have acted to restore democracy and its allies to power. Instead, it consulted political realities at home and abroad and avoided action. Robert Keeley thinks a show of force would have brought down the Junta. I doubt it. The Colonels, as Thanos Veremis comments, were an “assortment of amateurs” but they were also a band of survivors who had wagered their futures on succeeding in a coup and were quite unified in the days following it. These ultranationalist military men were unlikely to crumble before a show of force by a power that they knew was fully engaged in an increasingly unpopular Vietnam War. Johnson administration documents show that the U.S. immediately decided to live with the Colonels and wait upon events inside Greece. It was, I would argue, a rational decision. Lacking any American public support for any further use of force abroad, especially against a small ally, a U.S. show of force would have been bluffing and the Junta could easily have called that bluff simply by doing nothing. The comments to American officials of coup maker Stylianos Pattakos show how accurately the Colonels read the U.S. dilemma (pp. 134-35, 147-50). The idea of U.S. naval and air forces bombarding Greece and landing troops under fire to fight a NATO ally was pretty far-fetched and pregnant with the sort of major problems the politically besieged Johnson administration could not tolerate.

Such a decision, no matter how practical, left the emperor with no clothes. The U.S. had abandoned the concept of “democracy” in Greece while claiming to be fighting for it in Vietnam. Greeks (and others) could easily see the contradiction. And the United States paid a stiff price, although one it could afford (due to its preponderance of power), with Greek public opinion and the post-Junta Greek state. Washington absorbed the blow and kept on preaching. I am always struck by the degree to which the United States seems able to renew its credibility with large segments of world public opinion after squandering it in a morass of contradictions a few years earlier. While Greek public opinion may have grown weary of U.S. epiphanies, other societies have not. (David Ellwood’s forthcoming book on the impact of the United States on Europe demonstrates this convincingly) Ironically,
Greece as member of a European Union now joins in the same activities. “Europe” delights in out-moralizing the United States. Representative democracies may not be able to resist the urge to satisfy their domestic public opinions by taking ethical stances.

The United States is unlikely to change. Morality and foreign policy are closely linked in that part of its past that it chooses to recall. The supposedly “realistic” right is as fully caught up in this as the “idealistic” left. The policies of Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush testify to the right’s commitment to its understanding of America as a moral force in world affairs. Barack Obama’s efforts to put some restraint on idealism have landed him in hot water with his liberal constituency and in the case of Iran, apparently with a broader swath of U.S. public opinion. His use of militarily effective and low cost (in human lives and cash) drones is a potential source of more trouble with U.S. and international public opinion. This year, some of my colleagues in our Master of Foreign Service program decided to confront this dilemma by creating a required course in ethics and foreign policy for the international affairs concentration. The faculty was delighted. The course is designed to address concrete problems such as responding to genocide in Rwanda and the Sudan, trafficking in women, the international drug trade, in which American policy makers face judgments that combine power considerations with moral ones. Ironically, as I headed home after the faculty meeting “roll-out” of the course, I overheard a number of our students complaining that the idea was another hurdle to successful completion of their degree.

The students’ frustrations underline the complexity of trying to moralize foreign policy. Such ideas sound fine in theory but often imply costs that democratic societies are unwilling to bear. If the ultimate price of stopping genocide is the use of American combat troops, neither the military nor a broad part of American public opinion is likely to go along willingly. We return to the Greek issue. How should the United States have proceeded to dislodge the Colonels? Did it have an ethical responsibility to oust a regime that was in power largely because of the blundering of Greek politicians? Could it use force? What were the effective limits of its commitments to Greek democracy and correspondingly what means should it have used to end the dictatorship? I would certainly want to revisit this issue in any revision of the United States and the Making of Modern Greece but I am not sure that I would come up with any more satisfactory conclusions than I did in my last try.

With this confession of my limitations, I would like to thank my reviewers. Perhaps someone else should take up the revision of my arguments—and I hope someone will—with the aid of the missing link, a fuller base of Greek documentation, to support their effort.