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some, perhaps even many, readers of Patrick Lennox’s intriguing and highly original new book, *At Home and Abroad: The Canada-US Relationship and Canada’s Place in the World*, are likely to find it to be a very “un-Canadian” kind of work. This is because Lennox nails his colours to the mast from the very start – colours that will have those selfsame readers seeing red. Their ire, as well as perplexity, will be triggered by the theoretical approach the author has chosen to adopt, one that is not only in harmony with an International Relations (IR) perspective known as “realism,” but is further associated with a subset of that perspective usually labelled “structural realism” (sometimes “neo-realism”). It is no exaggeration to say that if in the Canadian IR community unalloyed realism has a distinctly bad odour, its structural offshoot is often held to be tantamount to devil worship.¹ I have always found this national allergy to realism (modified or otherwise) to be mildly curious, particularly given the analytical obsession so many foreign-policy analysts appear to have with locating Canada as a “middle power,” which when you think about it, turns out to be an unambiguously structuralist manner of construing the country’s foreign-policy setting and interests, given that what is typically associated with structural realism is the in-your-face assertion that “relative capability” is the most valuable single clue for deciphering a country’s foreign policy role and behaviour.

Now, while Lennox may tear a page or two from the structural-realist book of Kenneth Waltz, he is far from swallowing the entire volume.² Instead, he offers a modified version of structural theory, what he calls “structural-specialization theory” (SST). In other words, the “system” in which Canadian-American relations take place is not just the familiar Waltzian “anarchy”; there is also, on the regional (North American) level very much of a “hierarchy” in operation, and it is the tension introduced by these two systemic ordering principles that can make Canada’s policy toward the United States seem to be so confusing and contradictory, ranging as it does from the cooperative to the rebarbative. To Lennox, there really is little mystery about this behavioural dichotomy. It is an unavoidable resultant of competing structural forces that can and typically do whipsaw Canadian policy, forcing the country’s decisionmakers constantly to debate whether to cooperate closely with the U.S. so as to safeguard interests or to draw back from cooperation in a bid to assert and defend the country’s “sovereignty.”

Now, our three reviewers on this roundtable – one an historian (Greg Donaghy), and the other two political scientists (Petra Dolata-Kreutzkamp and Veronica Kitchen) – are unperturbed by structural accounts of Canadian foreign policy, even if they might not

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¹ A survey of IR practitioners in North American universities, conducted four years ago, found that only 15 percent of Canadian professors self-identified as working within the “realist” paradigm, as against 25 percent in the US. See Michael Lipson, Daniel Maliniak, Amy Oakes, Susan Peterson, and Michael J. Tierney, “Divided Discipline? Comparing Views of US and Canadian IR Scholars,” *International Journal* 62 (Spring 2007): 327-43, cite at p. 332.

subscribe wholeheartedly to such approaches themselves. Still, they all commend Lennox for his daring. Donaghy praises the author for having "taken a familiar theme in the historiography of Canada-U.S. relations – cooperation and conflict – and given it a fine theoretical twist," in the process helping readers to understand better the workings of the bilateral relationship. Similarly, Dolata-Kreutzkamp applauds the refreshingly original manner in which Lennox approaches his topic, finding his book “one of the few theoretically inspired studies” in the area of Canadian-American relations. Kitchen concurs, judging Lennox’s book to be “internally coherent, well explained, and an important modification of structural realism [that] does a better job of accounting for Canadian foreign policy than existing structural realist theories.”

In a nutshell, Lennox's SST expects the regional hierarchy to compel Ottawa to grapple with subordination dilemmas vis-à-vis its dominant neighbour (hence, cooperation with Washington, even if often only reluctantly so), while at the same time the international anarchy requires that Ottawa be on a constant *qui vive* regarding its sovereignty (hence, conflict with Washington). Not only will the two systemic pressures yield these unavoidably divergent (or as Kitchen calls them, “illogical”) behavioural patterns, but they will also generate a need for Canada to seek and to find a specialized, and system-supporting, diplomatic role.

Once the theory has been articulated, Lennox moves to test its assumptions, through a series of a half-dozen historical and contemporary case studies. Some reviewers detect a tendency on the author’s part to pre-determine the meaning of the cases on the basis of the requirements of the theory. Donaghy finds Lennox's judgements to be at times “a tad exaggerated,” and also worries that he is too quick to deem certain outcomes as “contradictory” ones, rather than as simple matters of diplomatic, and noncontroversial, “ambiguity.” Dolata-Kreutzkamp also looks at the case studies, and argues that they do not clearly support the theoretical claim about the inevitable contrast in the two structural pressures. Indeed, she wonders whether those pressures might not often be self-reinforcing rather than self-contradicting, and concludes that systemic conditions, on their own, cannot adequately account for outcomes, since to understand the latter “you may have to leave the systemic level and go back to the state and the individuals.”

What Dolata-Kreutzkamp in her concluding remarks hints at, Kitchen makes a central focus of her assessment, namely the very meaning of “structure.” Framing her assessment from an explicitly constructivist coign of vantage, she disputes on ontological grounds Lennox’s assumption that international structures are based solely on material considerations (viz. relative capability, or “power”), and insists instead that “identity” must matter, for the "structures of power have no meaning until they are interpreted through the lens of identity”. In sum, she accepts that Lennox’s preferred level of analysis (the structural one, or what Kenneth Waltz would term the “third image”)

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instead elevating identity and insisting that Canada’s "strange foreign policy of sometimes supporting and sometimes opposing" America is better explained as a result of conflicts between three different “Canadian ‘Selves,’" each yielding its own preferred behavior.

Participants:

Patrick Lennox holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Toronto. He is a Senior Analyst in the International Affairs, Security and Justice Division with the Treasury Board Secretariat of the Government of Canada. He co-edited with Brian Bow “An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada: Challenges and Choices for the Future” (University of Toronto Press, 2008), a collected volume which was named to Embassy Magazine Top 20 Most Influential Books of 2008. His latest monograph will be published by the University of Calgary Press. It is entitled, “Inuit Art and the Quest for Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty”.

David Haglund is a Professor of Political Studies at Queen’s University (Kingston, Ontario) with a Ph.D. in International Relations in 1978 from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. From 1985 to 1995, and again from 1996 to 2002, he served as Director of the Queen’s Centre for International Relations. From 1992 to 1996 he also served as Head of Queen’s Department of Political Studies. Since 2003 he has been co-editor of the International Journal. His research focuses on transatlantic security, and on Canadian and international security policy. Among his books are Latin America and the Transformation of U.S. Strategic Thought, 1936-1940 (1984); Alliance Within the Alliance? Franco-German Military Cooperation and the European Pillar of Defense (1991); Will NATO Go East? The Debate Over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance (1996); The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: Canadian Grand Strategy at Century’s End (2000); and Over Here and Over There: Canada-US Defence Cooperation in an Era of Interoperability (2001). His current research project is on ethnic diasporas in North America and their impact upon security relations between the United States and Canada.

Petra Dolata-Kreutzkamp is lecturer in International Politics at the Department of Political Economy at King’s College, London, where she mainly teaches North American foreign and security policy. Before joining King’s she was assistant professor of North American History at the Freie Universität Berlin. She holds a Masters degree in American Studies from Ruhr-Universität Bochum, where she also received her PhD in International Relations with a study on US-German relations in the late 1950s, which was published in 2006 with Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften (Die deutsche Kohlenkrise in nationalen und transatlantischen Kontext). Her research focuses on international energy relations as well as Canadian foreign and arctic policy.

Greg Donaghy is Head of the Historical Section, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. He is the General Editor of its series, Documents on Canadian External Relations, and author of Tolerant Allies: Canada and the United States, 1963-1968. Most recently, he edited (with Kim Richard Nossal), Architects and Innovators: Building Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1909-2009 (Kingston & Montreal: McGill-Queen’s UP, 2009). The views expressed here are his alone and do not reflect the views of his Department or the Government of Canada.
Veronica M. Kitchen is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Waterloo and in the Balsillie School of International Affairs. Her current research focuses on inter-agency and cross-border co-operation in counter-terrorism, the ethics of security, mega-event security, and the evolution of NATO. Her publications include The Globalization of NATO: Intervention, Security, and Identity (Routledge, 2010); “Canada (En)Counters Terrorism: US-Canada Relations and Counter-Terrorism Policy” Terrorism & Political Violence 21(1), 2009 (with Karthika Sasikumar); and “Smarter Co-operation in Canada-US Relations?” International Journal 59(3) Summer 2004. Prior to joining the University of Waterloo, she was a SSHRC Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Centre of International Relations at the University of British Columbia. She completed her Ph.D in political science at Brown University, where she was a Fulbright Scholar, in 2006. She has an undergraduate degree in International Relations from Trinity College at the University of Toronto.
This is a welcome and refreshing book about Canada’s role in the world. Its originality lies in its successful attempt to locate the analysis of Canada’s foreign policy within an international relations approach. By doing so Lennox also manages to offer fresh insights into structural theories of the ‘international.’ The book revolves around an empirical puzzle that has dominated much of the debate in Canada about the country’s foreign policy: on the one hand, Canada enjoys a “special relationship” with its “culturally similar” (p. ix) neighbor to the South, but on the other hand, Canada pursues its own international agenda which frequently puts the two allies at odds. To understand the paradox between rhetoric and practice of that relationship Lennox revisits a number of pivotal events in Canada’s recent history.

The very aim to bring together the continental and international aspects of Canadian foreign policy is laudable as it promises to bridge the two sides of Canadian foreign policy analysis that oftentimes seemed irreconcilable. In the past, many authors writing about Canada’s international role felt compelled to choose one perspective over the other. In order to explain Canada’s role in the world, Ottawa’s foreign policy was either seen as dominated by its relationship with the United States or by its international, multilateralist agenda. Lennox sets out to transcend that analytical dichotomy. Feeling that part of the problem is the lack of systematic understanding, he wants to offer a “proper theory” that will expose the “underlying causal connection” between the international and the continental dimensions of Canada’s foreign policy introducing his “structural specialization theory” (p. x). This theory is based on an understanding that interprets Canada’s behavior in the world driven by the nature of the international system. What Lennox adds to this systemic level is a more sophisticated reading of the particular regional circumstances within that international system that Canada finds itself in. He agrees with Kenneth Waltz that the international system is anarchic, i.e. there exists no overruling power beyond states. Thus, the international system is ordered through the distribution of power among those states: multipolar, bipolar or unipolar (p. 2). Behavior of states in that system is determined by a state’s material capabilities within that system. However, for Lennox there also exist subsystems that are characterized by different ordering principles. These subsystems are not structured by anarchy but hierarchy, i.e. by a hierarchical relationship between two or more states with asymmetric material capabilities. Canada and the United States are one such example of a subordinate (Canada) and superordinate (United States) state. The added value of this modification of Waltz’ theory is that it allows for a combination of systemic factors influencing state behavior. Lennox convincingly explains that Canada’s international behavior is influenced by two overlapping systemic contexts: international anarchy and continental hierarchy (pp. 8-9). This creates foreign policy behavior which appears paradoxical, illogic and non-linear.

In order to “develop” and “test” his theory Lennox then revisits a number of foreign policy episodes during and after the Cold War: Vietnam War, Cuban Missile Crisis, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defence, War on Terror and Continental Security. Each chapter provides a well-informed synthesis of events using the full range of historical writing and sources.
His aim is to show how his theory will make some of the behavior appear less erratic and paradoxical, thus solving heretofore empirical puzzles of Canadian foreign policy behavior. As refreshing as these new perspectives on known historical episodes are I think there are also a couple of minor weaknesses that I will address in the remaining paragraphs.

I think Lenox should have elaborated more on the choice of case studies. More importantly, since the whole argument is about the systemic level it may have been more useful to talk about changes in the structure of the international system. If the two systemic levels – the international and the regional/continental – are interlinked through anarchy/hierarchy then changes in the one could affect the other. Thus, examples from the Cold War era may not be comparable to case studies from the post-Cold War era. The nature of anarchy and hierarchy at different times may have been structurally different. This brings me to a more general point and that is the lack of a more dynamic perspective. The theory shares some of the weaknesses of structural theories of the international which are sometimes criticized for their failure to explain the emergence and disappearance of deep structures such as bipolarity. Even if we accept that Canada is subject to systemic pressures that can be characterized by the duality of anarchy and hierarchy, one still needs to explain the historical development of that duality. The theory is also unidirectional in that it only focuses on restraints and opportunities offered by the systemic level but it fails to talk about how the two units – Canada, and specifically the United States – actively interact with and thus influence the very nature of that international order.

This is not to say that the idea of anarchy and hierarchy overlapping and determining Canadian foreign policy is not generally convincing. However, I think that this overlap should have been conceptualized in more detail. Lenox portrays anarchy and hierarchy as “contrasting structural pressures” (p. 9). Is this really the case? Could they not also complement and reinforce each other? It would depend on the kind of pressures. And these different kinds may be linked to specific historical circumstances. Of course, acknowledging this would make the theory less of a theory and more of an approach. It allows Lenox to better understand some about-turns in Canadian foreign policy behavior, but it does not explain when this happens nor does it support prediction of future behavior. There are just as many examples of consistent behavior as there are of paradoxical behavior. Obviously, the systemic conditions exist, yet they do not always lead to the same outcome. The timing of Canada’s about-turns in foreign policy still needs to be explained and for that you may have to leave the systemic level and go back to the state and the individuals.

Another strength of Lennox’s argument is the systematic discussion of Canada’s attempt to “specialize” within the international system (p. 11). This specialization is not interpreted as a result of anarchy but of hierarchy. Here, I agree with his free-riding argument, which reminds us that subordinate states can gear their limited resources to specialized roles in the international because these resources are freed up by the hierarchical relationship with a dominant power. Hence, hierarchy becomes a necessary prerequisite for specialization. But then, Lennox seems to contradict himself. He states that specialization becomes necessary for the subordinate state “to maintain its sovereignty and survive” vis-à-vis the dominant power (p. 11) but at the same time it is its “dependency on another sovereign state” which allows it to become specialized. Finally, it is equally convincing to interpret
this specialization or search for functionalist niches in the international system as a result of the anarchic structure and not hierarchy. It is Canada’s medium size and material capabilities within the larger system that determine its specialized and multilateralist approach.

If seen as an approach to studying past episodes of Canadian Foreign Policy, Lennox’s study offers original and convincing insights. Yet, there is a caveat. Like many studies inspired by International Relations theories it aims to offer more general observations using systemic variables. However, generalization takes away historical complexity. Thus, other equally important levels (national/domestic, individual) are subordinated to the systemic level, multidirectional causal links are simplified and foreign policy behavior is portrayed as monolithic. Hierarchy itself is portrayed as the asymmetric relationship between two states that have different material capabilities. This may not be the only way to characterize the Canada-United States relationship. The higher the degree of institutionalization of that relationship the more likely we are to see convergence of certain values and norms but also the ability of the subordinate partner to punch above its weight in that hierarchical relationship.

Despite some of the minor conceptual shortcomings, I do believe that everyone interested in Canadian diplomatic history since 1945 should read this book. Lennox’s systemic approach is original and extremely insightful and it remains one of the few theoretically inspired studies in the subject area.
Since the mid-1940s, Canada’s relations with the U.S. have easily figured as Ottawa’s most important foreign policy concern as well as its most frustrating and difficult one. Many Canadians, nurtured under the great American postwar shadow, have been understandably tempted to reach for and embrace the One Big Idea that would “solve” Canada-U.S. relations. Pressure for more independence in the 1960s and 1970s gave way to demands for comprehensive free trade in the 1980s, a transformation that historian J.L. Granatstein celebrated as signalling the death of anti-Americanism in Canada. But trouble persisted on both sides of the border. In the long aftermath of 9/11 and the global recession of 2008, there were renewed demands for grand bargains and deeper integration, each hinting at the bilateral bliss to follow.

Patrick Lennox is wiser than that, and his new book, At Home and Abroad: The Canada-U.S. Relationship and Canada’s Place in the World, offers a theoretically sophisticated explanation for the tensions, both creative and destructive, that form the core of this vital North American partnership. Contradiction and conflict, insists this political scientist, are inescapable.

Lennox’s treatise starts with two key questions. How is it, he asks, that two countries, apparently joined in a long and close “special relationship,” so often seem to end up “at odds” over their foreign policies? He wonders too why postwar Canada has frequently played a global role as a “helpful fixer”?

His answers are structural. In language that is admirably clear and logical, Lennox outlines the shortcomings of existing neo-realist, liberal-internationalist, and constructivist international relation theories in explaining the nature of Canada-U.S. relations. He accepts the Waltzian notion of international anarchy that lies at the heart of all these theoretical explanations, but rejects them as incomplete. He contends instead that these theories are unable to account for the full range of international interactions, particularly relations between large states and their smaller neighbours. These relationships are ordered not by anarchy, he explains, but by hierarchy, whose structures form within the inter-state system and exert their own independent effects on state behaviour.

In At Home and Abroad, Lennox combines elements of structural neo-realism with the principle of hierarchy to create his own explanatory model, Structural Specialization Theory (SST). Lennox’s model suggests that the hierarchical pressures in a relationship like the Canada-U.S. dyad will compel the smaller, subordinate state to submit to the will of its superordinate partner, whose own behaviour is largely shaped by the global anarchy around it. At the same time, the pressures created by the state of international anarchy,

\[ \text{Source: Granatstein, J.L., } \text{Yankee go home?: Canadians and anti-Americanism} \text{ (Toronto: HarperCollins, 1996)} \]
notably the need to preserve its formal sovereignty, will simultaneously push the smaller state in the opposite direction, towards a limited set of independent initiatives.

The implications are twofold. First, “hierarchy in anarchy” (p. 8) will create an “oscillating pattern” of behaviour as the subordinate state submits to its larger partner (following the dictates of hierarchy) and then reacts with gestures of independence (anarchy), while the larger power demands submission (hierarchy), followed by “moves of respect” for its smaller partner's formal independence (anarchy). This “paradoxical interaction pattern,” Lennox predicts, will lead “to contradictory policy outcomes.” (p. 11)

Second, the dual pressures of hierarchy and anarchy will force the subordinate state to seek out “system-ameliorating roles unsuited to great powers.” These roles include (but are not limited to) international mediation and peacekeeping; support for multilateralism; global problem-solving; and information sharing. The subordinate state is driven to these roles since they help reinforce its formal sovereignty, not least by giving it a distinct identity at home and abroad. Subordinate states, Lennox argues, will fill these roles when they contribute to this sense of coherent national identity, when they meet the needs of the greater power, or when they help the international system function better. At least two of these three factors need to be present, Lennox cautions, for the subordinate state to pursue a specialized international role.

Lennox is clear about the limitations of his model, which he acknowledges is applicable only to the high politics of war and peace, rather than social and economic questions. He demonstrates its utility in six well-grounded case studies, beginning with an exploration of Canada's role on the supervisory control commissions in war-torn Vietnam between 1954 and 1973. He marches his readers steadily through several key incidents in this Southeast Asian conflict. These include the refugee crisis of 1955, the two mediatory missions of Canadian diplomats Blair Seaborn and Chester Ronning in the 1960s, Prime Minister L.B. Pearson’s call for a bombing halt at Temple University in 1965, and Canada's role on the commission established to oversee the U.S. withdrawal in 1973. Lennox establishes a recurrent pattern of oscillating behaviour, where the contradictory pressures of “hierarchy in anarchy” constantly push Canada and the U.S. towards both cooperation and conflict.

Lennox’s next four cases represent variations on this general theme, with some of his examples working better than others. He uses the Cuban Missile Crisis to suggest that SST holds true for events with shorter timelines. Perhaps it does, but given the massive weight of Canadian political and official opinion backing the U.S. in October 1962, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker’s appeal to the UN and his reluctance to place Canadian military forces on alert argue strongly for a model that gives more scope to individual actors and their unreasoned prejudices. That, however, may simply reflect the biases of the historian.

The book also include a critical exploration of Canada's ambivalent relationship with nuclear weapons from 1945 to 2009, the challenge of missile defence between 1983 and 2009, and the War on Terror. For Lennox, this case is especially important, because his model claims to have immediate policy relevance. Lennox traces the evolution of Canada's participation in this American-led conflict and underlines the inherent contradictions in the
country’s “3-D approach,” (defence, development, and diplomacy). He argues that hierarchical obligations to the U.S. have encouraged Canada to step outside its traditional global roles in Afghanistan and take on a non-specialized, military role in the southern state of Kandahar. At the same time, the anarchy of the international system has generated its own demands on the smaller, subordinate state. In response to these systemic demands, Canada has tried to maintain its traditional role as a peacemaker and peacebuilder. The resulting contradictions in Canadian policy, he concludes, have damaged Canada’s relations with the U.S., hurt its international reputation, and harmed its internal cohesiveness.

Lennox hammers home his argument in his sixth and final case study: continental security in the aftermath of 9/11. Given Canada's overwhelming economic dependence on the U.S. and the isolation of the North American relationship from the pressures of international anarchy, the dynamics of hierarchy operate unchecked in this environment. Policy on both sides of the border, his model predicts, will be free from “internal incongruity” (p. 116). Indeed, Lennox charts in considerable detail how Canada has responded in lockstep to the emergence of the U.S. “security state” (p. 130), mimicking its every legal, bureaucratic and strategic evolution.

There are occasional mis-steps in At Home and Abroad. Pearson is improperly identified at one point (p. 23), and its doubtful that the prime minister and John Kennedy were ever “close friends” (p. 64). And Foreign Minister Howard Green's controversial commitment to disarmament was driving his politics long before March 1962. Sometimes too, Lennox's judgements seem a tad exaggerated. How appropriate it is to use such a loaded term as “complicit” to describe Canadian policy in Vietnam when Canada's role was not freely chosen, at least according to his own model (p. 34)? Lennox similarly over-reaches when he claims that President Reagan's speech inviting Canada to join his Strategic Defense Initiative was “a serious intervention in Canadian domestic politics” (p. 78).

There are some elements in Lennox's narrative of seemingly inevitable contradictory outcomes that might be refined. Need outcomes always be contradictory? Are there not examples – the creation of NATO or cooperation during the Suez Crisis come to mind – when the pressures on both countries align? And if so, would it be possible to identify another, more exact mechanism that gives rise to contradictory outcomes?

I wonder too if it might be necessary (or possible) to distinguish more precisely between levels or degrees of contradictory outcomes. The Canada-U.S. diplomatic record suggests that governments in both countries are very capable of living with the ambiguities created by contradictory policies. Indeed, State Department files are packed with evidence of American readiness to accommodate Canada’s need for independent initiatives. Sometimes, Washington even encouraged those initiatives. Under what conditions, then, do these differences become problematic?

These are quibbles and conjectures. Patrick Lennox has taken a familiar theme in the historiography of Canada-U.S. relations – cooperation and conflict – and given it a fine theoretical twist. In doing so, he has given us the means to better understand the difficult challenge of maintaining a relationship vital to the welfare of both Canada and the U.S.
Patrick Lennox’s *At Home and Abroad* begins as a criticism of scholarship of Canadian foreign policy: too often, this scholarship focuses on domestic-level explanations or case studies which do not consider Canada’s position in the international system. In order to look for patterns in Canadian foreign policy, Lennox argues, scholars must understand the underlying structures which shape and limit the range of options Canadian policy makers have (ix-x). *At Home and Abroad* puts Canadian foreign policy in conversation with international relations theory in general, and realist IR in particular. Lennox’s structural specialization theory (SST) explains how Canada’s position as a subordinate state in an hierarchical subsystem with the United States, combined with its position as a smaller power in the international anarchy, generates Canada’s occasionally baffling foreign policy. Structural specialization theory begins as a critique of structural realism. In Kenneth Waltz’s theory, anarchy creates a self-help system, which means that units in the international system cannot be functionally differentiated. The only thing that matters is the distribution of power in the system. Building on John Ruggie’s critique, Lennox suggests that if we consider ordering principles other than anarchy, functional differentiation becomes a possibility. He hypothesizes that there are hierarchical subsystems, such as the one involving Canada and the United States, within the overarching international system (8). According to SST, the hierarchy-within-anarchy has two effects. First, it results in illogical foreign policy behaviour as the subordinate state is torn between the pressures of anarchy, which lead it to fiercely guard its independence, and the pressures of hierarchy, which lead it to bend to the will of the more powerful neighbour (9-10). Second, it drives the sub-ordinate state to choose specialized roles in the broader international community (11). To test the hypothesis, Lennox uses several high-politics case studies from Canada’s foreign policy history and concludes that SST holds up in these cases, and merits further testing.

Rather than engaging the case studies in this review, I will engage the underlying assumptions of the theory. The broader, underlying question in Lennox’s work is: What structures international politics? Waltz’s answer is anarchy and the distribution of power. Famously, he argued that international structures explain “a small number of big and important things.” In structural realism, the “big and important things” mostly involve the behaviour of great powers, which have the capacity to disrupt or stabilize the entire international system. In SST, anarchy and power still structure the international system, but by noting that the anarchical international system is characterized by regional hierarchies, Lennox is able to explain a slightly larger number of important things, notably

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the behaviour of medium-sized powers. Prudently, Lennox’s claims for his structural specialization theory are modest: it cannot explain the nuances of any particular policy decision—for that we must still supplement structures with individual or domestic-level analyses—but SST can tell under what conditions subordinate states are likely to guard their independence, and when they are likely to bow to the will of their more powerful neighbours (10).

In this review, I want to make an external critique of Lennox’s SST by problematizing his answer to the question of what structures international theory. Beginning from a thick constructivist perspective, I will suggest that it is not just power that structures the international system, but also identity. The content of an identity is partially explained by capabilities, but not entirely. Indeed, Lennox seems to sneak identity in the back door in his discussion of role specializations. Constructivists argue that a state’s security interests are constituted not just by its environment, but by its identity. Canada’s position in the regional hierarchy itself cannot explain Canada’s foreign policy behaviour. The structures of power have no meaning until they are interpreted through the lens of identity: structures do not come with instruction sheets.3 Because identities are intersubjective, they constitute the international system as much as the material structures of power do.4 A structural explanation of Canadian foreign policy based on identity, rather than power, might focus on the way in which Canadian and American foreign policy makers produce and reproduce the Canada-US relationship in key texts, speeches, or documents, generating structures of identity which then shape and constrain Canadian foreign policy by legitimating certain courses of action and ruling others out without even considering them.5 Such a study would probably explain more of the detail in Lennox’s case studies, but certainly would not do so as elegantly or parsimoniously as SST. It would still, however, provide a theoretical, structural explanation from which we can look for patterns in Canadian foreign policy. Canada’s strange foreign policy of sometimes supporting and sometimes opposing American policy would then be explained as the conflict between several Canadian “Selves”: one which is stridently not-American in the North American context, another which is in a special relationship with the United States, and a third which is a good international citizen.6


5 For examples of this kind of study, see Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (London: Routledge, 2006), Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006).

The specialization part of structural specialization theory is a realist variant of role theory. Lennox argues that three things influence the role specializations that medium-capability states choose. First, they are constrained by "dominant ideas about the state's place in world politics formed within its society as a result of its pre-existing patterns of behaviour in the international system"; second, they will choose roles in which they have a comparative advantage over their superordinate neighbour; and third, they will choose roles that fill a demand in the international system for their special skills (13-14). Lennox argues that all of these are "structural imperatives" (14). Again, I would argue that these material structures must be mediated through ideational ones to be understood; however, for now I want to focus on Lennox's first argument, because I think it is here that he inserts ideas into his theory. I absolutely agree with Lennox that foreign policy roles are constrained by dominant ideas about the state's place in the world, as reproduced through its previous foreign policies. But these dominant ideas are not always reproduced in the same way over time. For instance, Lennox argues that Canada's decision to take on an intensive combat mission in Afghanistan is an object lesson in why states should not take on roles that are beyond their capability (113). He explains the Canadian decision as a response to Canadian preferences for peacekeeping (hence the PRT in Kandahar) and as a result of the decisions to not support the American invasion of Iraq or to take part in continental missile defence (114). Lennox doesn't go into much detail in this case about why Canadians prefer peacekeeping, but one can guess that it's one of those dominant ideas based on pre-existing patterns. But the story is probably more complicated than the opinion polls Lennox uses to make his point suggest. Mark Neufeld argues that the importance of the Pearsonian legacy is taken for granted in Canadian foreign policy, but that it gets reproduced in the Afghanistan debate both to support and to oppose the Afghanistan mission.7

Structural specialization theory is a realist argument, and I am making a constructivist one. The differences are ontological if not epistemological, based on different assumptions of what structures the international system. It is no more possible to directly measure existence of deep ideational structures than it is deep material ones (8); in this case, each explanation might even predict the same outcome. More important than this debate in IR theory is the fact that Lennox's work is internally coherent, well explained, and an important modification of structural realism which does a better job of accounting for Canadian foreign policy than existing structural realist theories. It may well be generalizable to other states, allowing us to compare Canadian foreign policy behaviour to that of other states. The move to using systems-structural explanations to understand Canadian foreign policy is an important one, regardless of one's beliefs about the content of deep structures, precisely because it allows for such comparisons.

Before responding to my reviewers, I’d like to thank them for considering my book so seriously, and reflecting upon it in such positive ways. Unanimously, they deemed *At Home and Abroad* refreshing and original. I could not ask for higher praise. Only David Haglund, however, who wrote the introduction to this fine edition of the H-Diplo review series, was attuned to the book’s controversial side. Indeed, rooted in a modified structural realism my account of Canada-U.S. relations and Canadian foreign policy is sure to disturb some of the traditionalists and former practitioners who dominate the field in this country. But neither Petra Dolata-Kreuzkamp nor Veronica Kitchen could be accused of traditionalism in their scholarship, and as an historian Greg Donaghy has taken a high road in confronting the book on its own terms, as opposed to lamenting its foundations in political science and International Relations theory. As a result, the reader of this H-Diplo series is spared some fireworks in favor of three measured and insightful responses.

While Haglund punches up my book as tantamount to “devil worship” in Canada (Heather Reisman¹ should keep him on retainer), in the United States “Structural Specialization Theory” should be looked upon as a rather significant contribution to the growing research agenda which is seeking to understand the effects of hierarchical structures within the broader international anarchy.² As Kitchen notes in her review, it is possible that SST could serve to explain the dynamic interaction patterns of other hierarchical international relationships, as well as the general behaviour of other subordinate states in the international system. These are the two big and important things my theory parsimoniously explains in the case of the Canada-U.S. relationship and Canada’s place in the world over the last fifty-plus years. Future research would do well to test SST against other International Relations cases.

Both Donaghy and Dolata-Kreuzkamp raise questions about my case selection, however; both of which merit response. Donaghy wonders about the Cuban Missile Crisis case, and whether Diefenbaker’s own prejudices weren’t really behind Canada’s erratic behaviour throughout those tense thirteen days. Looked at in isolation, as this case most often is, it is difficult to not see Diefenbaker as the critical factor animating Canada’s paradoxical performance. However, when considered in the light of the other case studies, *At Home*...

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¹ Heather Reisman is the founder and chief executive of the Canadian retail chain Indigo Books and Music.

and Abroad makes clear that there is something else going on here. Structural variables played an underlying role in the crisis, just as they did in the other cases detailed in the book, such as Canada’s prolonged engagement in Vietnam and its ongoing involvement in what was once referred to explicitly as the War on Terror. Sure, Diefenbaker had his issues with Kennedy. How could he not have had issues with a man who was almost his polar opposite in everything including looks and brains? Those issues played their own proximate role in the unfolding of events. But Diefenbaker’s personal traits and perspectives were not ultimately responsible for the contradictory pattern of behaviour identified very clearly in the case study which forms the third chapter of At Home and Abroad. His biases only partially explain one side of his flip-flopping throughout the crisis and in its aftermath. Perhaps they were decisive in his initial resistance to following Kennedy’s lead. But they don’t explain why he ultimately acquiesced, nor do they explain why in the aftermath he bragged to reporters about how Canada played its full part in the cooperation between Western allies that led to the successful resolution to the crisis. For such an explanation we must look deeper into the structural variables which formed the context in which Diefenbaker was compelled to tragically flounder.

Regarding my methodological decision to select both Cold War and post-Cold War case studies, Dolata-Kreutzkamp wonders about the comparability of such cases given the change in the system that occurred as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. In response, I should point out that the shift from Cold War to post-Cold War was a shift in the distribution of power capabilities within the international system. Moving from bipolarity to unipolarity did not change the basic ordering principle of the system, which remains anarchic. Likewise, the end of the Cold War did not reorder the Canada-U.S. sub-system in any fundamental way. The hierarchy remained, and still remains to this day. Thus, the dynamics predicted by SST should hold despite changes in the distribution of power throughout the international system. Testing this was in fact an essential aspect of my case selection. The evidence displayed in the Cold War and post-Cold War case studies further strengthens the evidence in support of SST as it lends further credence to the argument that anarchy and hierarchy are in fact doing the work in producing the dynamics hypothesized by SST. The deep ordering principles of the realm continue to have their predicted effects, regardless of changes in the distribution of power.

Dolata-Kreutzkamp also questions my portrayal of hierarchy and anarchy as “contrasting structural pressures.” She wonders whether this is really the case, and posits that they might in fact “complement or reinforce” one another. It is difficult to know exactly what she means by this, but I’m inclined to see it as an attempt to problematize the patterns of behaviour expected under anarchic and hierarchic structural conditions. This would take us into the “anarchy is what states make of it” debate, which is territory well-trodden elsewhere and certainly beyond the scope of this response.² Yes, SST is based on some of the basic assumptions (with deep and firm roots in western political philosophy, I should add) about how actors are likely to respond to anarchic and hierarchic conditions if they

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want to survive. Under anarchy, actors must take care of themselves, for there is no one else to do it for them. Under hierarchy, actors can afford to specialize since their basic protection is no longer in jeopardy. Self-sufficiency and specialization are fundamentally opposed strategies. It is my humble contention that to problematize such basic reasoning leaves us theoretically adrift. Void of such basic starting points, meaningful insights into the causes of political behavioural patterns and outcomes will be few and far between.

Dolata-Kreutzkamp then goes on to accuse me of self-contradiction. I suppose such a sin would be easy enough to commit in a book about contradiction, but I have not done so in At Home and Abroad, and I will not, therefore, repent. Dolata seems to think that I contradict myself in asserting that specialization is the survival strategy for subordinate states compelled by the structure of hierarchy. But such is life for subordinate states that want to remain fully sovereign. Yes, their dependency on their superordinates enables them to specialize—and this may be the counterintuitive dimension of SST that is most difficult to grasp at first. But failure to specialize could easily lead down the road to vassal status. Minus the fulfillment of specialized roles, subordinate states lose their functionality not only to the broader international system, but to their superordinate state, and their own populations. They must, in other words, specialize to survive as a fully sovereign entity in the international system.

Kitchen raises some ontological questions about At Home and Abroad. Coming as she does from a “thick” constructivist standpoint, she accuses me of sneaking identity in through the back door, and wonders whether a discussion of a schizophrenic Canada, composed of several Canadian “selves” might not provide an alternative window into understanding the puzzle of the Canada-U.S. relationship and Canada’s place in the world. Graciously, I shall leave that research project to her. However, I will take this chance to elaborate a bit on the ontology of SST. A book is the sum total of thousands if not millions of minor and major decisions. One of the major decisions I had to make in writing At Home and Abroad was whether or not to include an explicit discussion of the ontology of SST. For the sake of my audience, I opted for an implicit discussion which takes a nuanced view of what structure is made of in International Relations (see pages 5-8). Material factors form the base of the structure, and even thick constructivists should have difficulty denying such material realities as the relative size of the U.S. and Canadian economies and militaries. But within this material context, institutions and identities indeed develop. They develop in the mould of their material foundations and reflect those foundations accordingly. This is to say that ideas matter, but they matter in the context of the material factors that shape and underpin them. To put the point in Kitchen’s terms, ideational variables, I contend, must be mediated through material ones to be understood.

In sum, it is heartening to read such a thoughtful collection of reviews, and I am far from disappointed that my work has not caused more in the way of controversy than it has to this point. Indeed, that it has only ruffled a few grey feathers is a very positive sign. The fact that terms like “structure,” “ontology,” “thick constructivism,” and even “neo realism” could be used in the context of a discussion of a book about Canada-U.S. relations and Canadian foreign policy is a giant step forward for a field that has been too long wedded to
a traditionalism that has isolated it from the broader discourse of Political Science and International Relations.