

**Contents**

- Introduction by Thomas Maddux, California State University, Northridge ............................... 2
- Review by Pierre Grosser, Sciences Po, Paris ........................................................................... 6
- Review by James I. Matray, California State University, Chico ............................................... 10
- Review by Balázs Szalontai, East China Normal University .................................................... 17
- Review by Qiang Zhai, Auburn University Montgomery ........................................................ 22
- Response by Matthew Jones .................................................................................................. 26

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*Roundtable Editors: Thomas Maddux and Diane Labrosse*

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*Introduction by Thomas Maddux*
U.S. policy toward Asia after World War II and through the Cold War has received substantial attention on a range of subjects from the effects of the erosion of the Yalta system on Asia to the resumption of the Chinese Civil War, the Korean conflict, Vietnam, decolonization, and overviews on the Cold War in Asia.¹ The full range of historical interpretations have been applied to the subject from the traditional diplomatic history perspective, involving subjects such as the postwar policy deliberations on China and special initiatives like George Marshall’s mission to broker the erupting Chinese civil conflict; the vast literature on the Vietnam conflict after 1945 and its impact on the Southeast Asian decolonization struggle; broader studies of the U.S. campaign to promote modernization and development as an alternative to the communist model; and an increasing number of articles and books that emphasize the agency of Asian leaders and states in dealing with the Cold War antagonists.²

Matthew Jones’ After Hiroshima: The United States, Race and Nuclear Weapons in Asia, 1945-1965 arrives in a well-developed field but the reviewers agree that Jones has added a fresh and valuable perspective. By focusing on U.S. policy with respect to nuclear weapons in Asia from Hiroshima to China’s development of nuclear power with a test in October 1964, Jones not only covers a relatively neglected topic but significantly shifts the focus to consider how racial issues influenced Washington’s policy development and contributed to problems in American relations with Japan, India and other Asian states. “Jones succeeds in using nuclear history as a prism,” Qiang Zhai favorably notes, “through which to reconstruct the evolution of American opinions on their troubled encounters with the peoples and states in Asia.” As Balázs Szalontai emphasizes, Jones persuasively demonstrates how “race-centered perceptions played in the formation of Asian attitudes towards the bombing of Japan as well as America’s subsequent steps to deploy, test, and possibly use, nuclear weapons in Asia.” On the other side, Szalontai applauds Jones’ use of “extensive quotations from the private statements made by various U.S. policy-makers whose views were also considerably influenced by racial stereotypes about Asians.” From Pierre Grosser’s perspective, Jones’ study “makes a crucial contribution not only to the

¹ Two recent studies that demonstrate the broadening of focus in Cold War scholarship on Asia were featured in recent H-Diplo roundtables: Tuong Vu and Wasana Wongsurawat, eds., Dynamics of the Cold War in Asia: Ideology, Identity, and Culture (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), and Zheng Yangwen, Hong Liu, and Michael Szonyi, eds., The Cold War in Asia: The Battle for Hearts and Minds (Leiden: Brill, 2010).

history of the Cold War and nuclear policy, but also to the historiography of international relations and strategic studies."

Jones devotes extensive attention to U.S. leaders from President Harry S. Truman and his advisers through John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson and their efforts to develop a viable strategy that included nuclear weapons to advance U.S. interests in East Asia. James Matray follows this theme and notes ten different contributions that Jones makes, starting with an assessment of Truman’s racial views that contributed to “Truman’s tardy advocacy of Indonesia’s independence and support for French colonialism in Indochina, as well as an uncertain and shifting policy toward a China under Communist rule.” With respect to the Korean War, Matray highlights several strengths, most notably the serious consideration given in Washington to the use of atomic weapons as well as a growing reluctance to use the weapons in the face of increasing Asian criticism of U.S. bombing of Korean civilians similar to wartime bombing of Japan. Furthermore, Matray notes Jones’ finding that U.S. officials increasingly worried about the negative political repercussions of any use of nuclear weapons in Asia at the same time the military pushed for bases and nuclear weapons as central to the U.S. Asian security strategy with continuing nuclear tests and consideration of the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the latter stages of the Koreans conflict which intensified criticism from Japan and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Matray also finds significant contributions in Jones’ assessment of Dwight Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles. Jones points out that Dulles discovered very quickly that the rhetoric of massive retaliation antagonized Asian critics during the first Taiwan Strait crisis and at the Bandung Conference and put Dulles and the State Department at odds with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Jones suggests that Eisenhower sided with Dulles but failed to change U.S. security strategy and develop a limited war capability. Finally, Matray, Zhai, and Pierre Grosser are impressed with Jones’ linkage of China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons with Washington’s decision to escalate in Vietnam. According to Jones, the Kennedy administration anticipated that a nuclear China would encourage communist expansion in Asia and the U.S. had to expand its conventional forces to meet this new challenge. In Washington’s deliberations on escalation in 1964-65, Jones suggests that the Chinese nuclear test cast a shadow over the deliberations on the importance of Washington’s stake in the Vietnam conflict. (429-438)

The reviewers do raise some questions on Jones’ study. Matray, for example, would have welcomed more succinct assessment on the impact of policy papers and other sources on policy as well as less description of familiar events. Szalontai suggests that Jones’ “analysis of the shift from the doctrine of massive retaliation to flexible response has some problematic aspects,” most notably in viewing Washington’s response as part of a comprehensive review of nuclear strategy in the Far East when the U.S. retained “an intense reliance on the early use of nuclear weapons” in any Korean conflict and deployed nuclear bombs in Taiwan. Szalontai suggests that the “shift from massive retaliation to flexible response may not have been as comprehensive and clear-cut as Jones suggests, since in Korea, the conception of early nuclear retaliation remained in force, whereas in Southeast Asia, signs of a more limited nuclear commitment appeared.” Szalontai detects a naval strategy to maintain the Pacific as an “American Lake, rather than simply a policy to contain and deter China.”
Grosser believes that Jones could have strengthened his study in several ways with more attention to several important issues and the historiography. Jones examines the State Department's struggle to influence nuclear strategy and counter the Pentagon's determination to rely on nuclear weapons regardless of the consequences in U.S.-Asian, but Grosser would have appreciated a general discussion on civil-military relations and the relationship of Jones' findings to existing literature on the subject. Furthermore, Grosser would have "welcomed more sensitivity to the broader historiography" on the nature of bilateral alliances in Asia, the stakes of nuclear proliferation, and the possible influence of transnational anti-nuclear movements, as well as some theoretical analysis of different factors shaping why the U.S. did not use the atomic bomb again in Asia.

Participants:

**Matthew Jones** is a Professor of Modern History in the School of American and Canadian Studies, University of Nottingham, UK, where he teaches courses on twentieth-century US foreign policy, with a particular emphasis on East and South East Asia. His articles have appeared in many different journals, including *Diplomatic History*, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, *English Historical Review*, and *International History Review*, while previous books include *Britain, the United States and the Mediterranean War, 1942-1944* (1996), and *Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961-1965: Britain, the United States, Indonesia, and the Creation of Malaysia* (2002). He is currently researching aspects of Anglo-American nuclear relations and British nuclear policy in the 1960s and 1970s.

**Pierre Grosser** teaches International History and World Politics in Sciences Po, Paris. In the Centre d'Histoire of Sciences Po, he is researching Cold War history, world history and historiography and theory of modern international relations. His PhD (2002) is about French policy towards Indochina from 1953 to 1956. From 2001 to 2009 he was in charge of the Diplomatic Institute of the French Foreign Ministry (dedicated to the formation of mid-career diplomats). Among his publications are: *Les Temps de la guerre froide. Réflexions sur l'histoire de la guerre froide et les causes de sa fin* (Brussels, Complexe, 1995), *Pourquoi la Seconde Guerre Mondiale?* (Brussels, Complexe, 1999), and most recently *1989, l'année où le monde a basculé* (Paris, Perrin, 2009), who won the Ambassadors Prize 2010. He is currently writing a book on the Indochina War. Works on international history in East Asia and on the main currents of post-Cold War World Politics are in progress.

**James I. Matray** earned his doctoral degree in U.S. History at the University of Virginia in 1977, where he was lucky to study under the late and great Stormin' Norman Graebner. Since 2002, he has taught history at California State University, Chico, and is currently conducting research in preparation of a book on the "Battles of Pork Chop Hill" under contract with Indiana University Press. His most recent publications are a historiographical article in *Cold War History* titled "Korea's War at Sixty: A Survey of the Literature" and "Beijing and the Paper Tiger: The Impact of the Korean War on Sino-American Relations" in *The International Journal of Korean Studies.*
Balázs Szalontai is Guest Professor and Research Fellow at East China Normal University in Shanghai, China. Having received a Ph.D. in Soviet and Korean history, he has done archival research on the modern history of North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, Mongolia, India, the USSR, and Eastern Europe. His publications include *Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953-1964* (Stanford University Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005), and book chapters on North Korean and Southeast Asian economic and cultural policies. His current research projects are focused on the Korean War, Indochinese-ASEAN relations, North Korea’s involvement in the Vietnam War, DPRK-Middle Eastern relations, and nuclear proliferation.

This work by Matthew Jones will certainly become required reading for those studying the Cold War. The author effectively enlarges the geographical bounds of this all too Euro-centric history. Thanks in part to the extensive archival research he has conducted, Jones is able to offer an illuminating account of the development of nuclear strategy. He provides insights into its bureaucratic politics, the role of its personalities (in particular Dwight Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles), and the relationships between the allies pursuing it. The author moves beyond traditional studies of nuclear policy by taking into account the racial dimensions of political decisions of the time, and thus reminds readers that the Cold War was about more than simply a confrontation between West and East. I will underline several of Jones' contributions to the debate on the history of the Cold War (though my list must not be considered exhaustive, for the author's contributions are numerous), before turning to several areas in which his ideas should be clarified or deserve to be expanded.

Too often studies of the Asian continent during the Cold War focus on just one issue (Korea, China, Japan, Taiwan, Indochina, etc.). It is true that scholars have recently become interested in the efforts of Chinese and South Korean nationalists to establish some sort of Asian anti-communist alliance and in the CIA-backed clandestine operations against communist China launched from Taiwan, Burma or Tibet. But what After Hiroshima so effectively demonstrates, is the American fear of a military offensive – orchestrated by the communist “bloc” – either in Korea, Taiwan or Indochina, as well as the possibility that the United States might respond to such an offensive on an entirely different front. Once negotiations over Korea had begun, the French pushed for the adoption of a contractual clause within a broad deterrent declaration, to be signed by all of France's allies, stating that a Chinese “aggression” in Indochina was not to take place once the Korean War had come to an end. However, they also feared an extension of the American war against China that could have repercussions in Indochina. Jones clearly shows how America was consistently one step ahead of its Asian allies, constantly anticipating every possible way in which they might respond to developments in the region. The author establishes a link between the escalation of the war in Vietnam and China's acquisition of the atom bomb – a link that is often neglected in studies of the origins of the Vietnam War. It would have been interesting had Jones included maps outlining the American vision of Asia's geopolitics, listing potential nuclear targets, the “fronts” that had to be held at all cost, and the military bases in the region.

After Hiroshima will undoubtedly become a standard work for those studying the history of nuclear strategy. The author shows that a knowledge of nuclear strategy in Asia is indispensable to understanding the quickly revealed impasses brought about by a policy of massive retaliation, and the eventual movement towards a doctrine of flexible response. The question of when to use tactical nuclear weapons is again upon us, bringing new relevance to the debates of the 1950s over the possibility of fighting a limited nuclear war. The same can be said of the first use of nuclear weapons and preemptive attack (we are still waiting to hear more about American plans to target Chinese nuclear facilities, and their
contacts with the Soviets in the context of such preemptive projects aimed against China). Jones confirms Eisenhower's ambivalent character – he always tried to consider the atom bomb as a weapon like any other, and he resolved to take into account the political implications of its use. Much insight is to be found in the study's account of the struggle by the State Department to have its say in the devising of military strategy (and most notably nuclear strategy) as well as in the decision-making process. It would have been interesting to have brought together in one section the various conclusions drawn about civil-military relations, the power balance between the Pentagon and the Department of State, the role of regional commands, and of the importance of individuals in charge of certain institutions (the Policy Planning Staff is much more important than the National Security Council in this regard). These conclusions could have drawn from the extensive literature on the subject, validating or contradicting a number of findings. Similarly one would have expected the author to take a stand on the historiographical debates surrounding the personalities and roles of Eisenhower and Dulles.

Jones could have made use of theoretical works on nuclear strategy to better accentuate its psychological dimensions, and outline the different ways in which its history has been interpreted. Examples that come to mind include the failure of the United States to deter China in 1950 (and the possible consequences of Acheson's speech that placed Korea beyond the United States' security perimeter), and how the Korean armistice and the conclusion of the Quemoy and Matsu crises were considered the result of American's firm, or ambiguous, posturing.

I would also have welcomed more sensitivity to the broader historiography in the following three key areas. First, the discussion over the nature of bilateral alliances in Asia. In what way do they exhibit classical policy dilemmas (fear of entrapment/fear of abandonment); to what extent were they truly intended to protect the ally (linked to the issue of credible extended deterrence), to what extent were they meant to control and rein the ally in (Taiwan, South Korea and Japan vis-à-vis her former “victims”); and to what extent did this produce a unique form of client state? Second, the analysis of the stakes of nuclear proliferation. Chapter 11 is a bit frustrating, as I would have liked to learn more about the discussions taking place over the supposedly inherent risks to China’s acquisition of the atom bomb. With today's geostrategic situation in mind, it is interesting to note that a number of experts at the time argued that Chinese policy could become more prudent as a result of having acquired a nuclear weapon, and that her decision to join the nuclear club might have been the result of both non-military (e.g. racial affirmation, international status, and progress towards “modernity”) and military considerations. In addition, yesteryear's policy makers did not unequivocally see a relation between China’s regime type (and the suspected psychological state of her leaders) and the risk that the People’s Republic might put its nuclear arms to use. Finally, it is difficult to measure the influence of transnational anti-nuclear movements on Washington’s policy making from the material presented in After Hiroshima.

We come now to one of the major contributions of this work: the inclusion of the issue of race into the study of the nuclear-strategic decision-making process. I am strongly convinced that the racial considerations of world leaders of the 1950s greatly influenced
the way in which they went about conducting international relations, and that these
underlying racial visions have far from disappeared. The West’s fear of being shut out of
Asia is a constant in recent history, and its origins can perhaps be found in the opening of
the Far East in the nineteenth century. This fear bred the image of the “Yellow Peril” –
Japan’s reinvigoration of China with hopes of turning her against the West and expulsing
the British, the French, and the Russians from the Asian continent. The very idea of an
Asian bloc is a nightmare to the West – and a recurring one at that, ever since the 1980s -
whether such a bloc be led by Japan or directed by China. Western intruders are regularly
accused of having willfully shattered Asia’s unity and set Asian nations against one another.
“Westernized” Japan has allegedly developed imperial ambitions, while Korea has paid a
high price for Asia’s westphalianization. Hence the “Asia to the Asians” rhetoric, the critical
stance towards alliances built by the United States (most notably towards SEATO), and the
euphoria at the Bandung conference, as Western powers at first anxiously tried to use their
Asian allies to mold the course of the conference before finally concluding that the
gathering did not endanger their interests. What is more, Jones shows that the atomic
bombings of 1945 were perceived as proof of the West’s disregard for the lives of Asians –
similar to the popular discourse in today’s Muslim world over the American embargo on
Iraq or the “collateral damage” of U.S. bombing campaigns in Afghanistan. The author could
have explained in greater details how these Asian reactions were interpreted in the West as
displays of xenophobia (as in the days of Asia’s “opening” in the nineteenth century). It was
a xenophobia ostensibly fueled by the Soviets, who were themselves suspected of being
Asian, while any détente in Western relations with Moscow was inevitably seen, much as it
is today, as the result of Russia’s growing fear of “yellow” China.

The book’s subtitle seems to indicate that Jones considers the issue of race to be central.
The author does not overstate this case, even though he cites a number of documents to
show that one of the major reasons the United States never resorted to the atom bomb in
Asia after 1945 was the fear of provoking a public backlash in the region. The problem, in
methodological terms, with the citations selected by Jones is that it is difficult to discern
whether they are truly revealing their authors’ mindsets and convictions and it is not clear
to what extent Jones has succumbed to cherry picking his evidence. How does one weight
this factor in determining why there was not another nuclear strike in Asia after 1945?
What is the hierarchy of factors behind this situation? Political science methodology would
suggest discarding other factors as being insufficiently pertinent. This method was not
used. Moreover, Nina Tannenwald’s hypothesis of a “nuclear taboo” and T.V. Paul’s theory
of a “tradition” of non-use are hardly mentioned.¹ In short, it would be interesting to read
an article by Jones in a political science periodical (perhaps International Security?) that
focused on a theoretical analysis rather than on a historical narration of this aspect of
nuclear strategy. Jones would also have to weigh the importance of Britain’s intermediary
influence (particularly Anthony Eden’s) on America’s nuclear policy, a factor upon which he
quite rightly dwells. Ever since Great Britain’s Cold War archives were opened in the

¹ Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo. The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945,
University Press, 2009
1970s, a debate has been raging over Britain’s true geopolitical role. Some say that the intensified use of the now easily accessible official sources has led to an overestimation of Britain’s strategic influence and importance, a position others see as overlooking a simple commonality of Anglo-American interests.

Perceptions and misperceptions are, of course, the crux of history’s interpretation and of international relations theory. Jones certainly does not fall for the “easy answer” of invoking culture when other factors do not provide for an altogether satisfactory answer. In fact, the author might even have introduced additional representative categories – gender, for example. But he does frequently insist on officials’ perception of a “global” or “Asian opinion,” and it would have been important to know how this was constructed by diplomats and politicians. In a similar vein, the recurrent theme of a possible “defection” of America’s allies (particularly of Japan) merits a genuine world-historical examination spanning the Cold War period in its entirety. Such a study would have to find place for a multitude of facets, including emotional considerations (combining racializing and feminizing currents), calculations of risk (linked to the domino effect and the “credibility enigma”), and anticipation of a “worst-case scenario”. One can also look at the “defection” theme from another angle: how many alliances were torn apart by an overly assertive American foreign policy? And how many Asian leaders – from Jiang Jieshi to Diem – hoped that this very policy would have become even more assertive?

These remarks hardly do justice to the wealth of insight provided by Jones’s work, a study that makes a crucial contribution not only to the history of the Cold War and nuclear policy, but also to the historiography of international relations and strategic studies.
Matthew Jones, a professor at the University of Nottingham, has little good to report in his assessment of U.S. policy in East Asia during the two decades following World War II. In this important respect, his *After Hiroshima: The United States, Race and Nuclear Weapons in Asia, 1945-1964* reminded me of the book Christopher Baxter, another British scholar who teaches at Queen’s University in Belfast, published in 2009 titled *The Great Power Struggle in East Asia, 1944-50: Britain, America and Post-War Rivalry*. Both authors suggest that events would have developed more beneficially for all concerned had U.S. leaders not ignored Britain’s advice and example. For Baxter, U.S. postwar policy in East Asia “was inevitably fragmented” because, unlike Britain, it had “no cabinet to formulate a common” (p. 179) strategy. Jones advances a simpler explanation for American difficulties. U.S. leaders were simple-minded racists.

Jones presents a welcome examination of a previously underappreciated issue, explaining in detail how “the use of the bomb against the Japanese possessed a racial dimension” (pp. 1-2) that had a powerful negative impact on U.S.-East Asian relations from 1945 until the People’s Republic of China (PRC) tested a nuclear device in 1964. “Although not subscribing to the idea that a kind of crude racism informed the American decision to use the bomb in 1945,” he writes, “this book nevertheless endeavors to trace the recurring appearance and operation of this . . . theme, and its impact on American policy, as the Western powers tried to curtail what was seen as the growing threat from Communist China in East and South East Asia, in a process which was to culminate in the escalation of American involvement in the Vietnam War” (p. 2). Jones supports his conclusions with references to numerous secondary sources and the *Foreign Relations* series, but also his exhaustive research at a long list of archival collections across the United States and in Britain. In his final judgment, he concludes that after twenty years, nuclear weapons no longer were “the embodiment of American ascendancy in Asia, but . . . a political encumbrance, symbolic of a destructive imperial hubris” (p. 464).

*After Hiroshima* describes the efforts of three successive U.S. administrations to develop a military strategy that incorporated nuclear weapons for protection of American security interests in East Asia. Military factors created initial difficulties in accomplishing this goal, including a small nuclear arsenal and a lack of suitable targets. As important, U.S. leaders feared that ineffective use would discredit deterrence of the Soviet Union in Europe. Political factors also created problems that quickly grew in intensity. The State Department became increasingly more assertive in opposing the U.S. military’s desire to make nuclear weapons the primary means to deter or defeat aggression in East Asia, insisting that this would dishonor the United States throughout the region. According to Jones, after 1945 “a ‘colour consciousness’ infused the world-views of senior US policy-makers, making them responsive to the accusation that their actions were underpinned with the racism that then featured in American society, or that they would be seen to be demonstrating indifference towards the lives of ‘non-white’ Asian peoples” (p. 3). State Department rejection of a nuclear strategy climaxed in the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis.
Jones thus introduces an important new element in understanding the troubles that the United States experienced in pursuing its foreign policy objectives in the Pacific during the two decades after World War II. Over eleven chapters, he describes in detail how the U.S. use of atomic bombs and then reliance on nuclear weapons in the formulation of national security policy had “complex repercussions” (p. 4) on relations with East Asia, “marking the beginning of a new, contested phase of American engagement across the Pacific frontier” (p. 5). Jones identifies ethnocentric racism in American attitudes toward the region from the outset of the postwar period. U.S. military leaders, for example, cast “covetous eyes at a network Pacific island bases” for security in a demonstration of how “many Americans seemed to see little contradiction in their own pursuit of advantage, as if the virtues inherent in the American people could cancel out the practical effects of their actions” (p. 12). U.S. wartime efforts to elevate China to world power status were “ultimately half-hearted gestures,” reflecting an American inability to grasp how Japan, in “humbling of the white powers,” had unleashed racial forces ensuring the rise of pan-Asian solidarity if “the colonial powers attempted to reassert their authority” (p. 17).

Several new interpretive contributions elevate the importance of this study. First, Jones characterizes as reluctant the American commitment to achieving racial equality inside the United States after World War II. President Harry S. Truman exemplified the typical defensive outlook that considered racial discrimination morally repugnant and demanded reforms. “This kind of reserved and highly circumspect attitude to change,” Jones perceptively argues, “found its international counterpart in the American response to the revolutionary upsurge seen in East and South East Asia in the latter 1940s” (p. 46). Racist habits contributed to Truman’s tardy advocacy of Indonesia’s independence and support for French colonialism in Indochina, as well as an uncertain and shifting policy toward a China under Communist rule after October 1949. With an accentuated fear of revolutionary change, U.S. leaders struggled to find “a coherent policy towards the region as a whole, . . . an area which had hitherto been largely regarded as a European preserve, but whose raw materials and markets now seemed newly vulnerable” (p. 52).

Second, Jones establishes clearly how American “use of the [atomic] bomb as a point of moral friction and debate in the Western relationship with a newly assertive Asia [became] a distinctive feature of the post-war years” (p. 29). His discussion of this point with respect to the Korean War is especially revealing, as he explains how, as in World War II, the United States attempted to compensate for a manpower disadvantage with technology in the serious consideration it gave to using atomic weapons throughout the war. The Truman administration’s extreme hesitance to do so revealed how “negative evaluations of Asian reactions were beginning to form a consistent part of American appraisals of the outcome of nuclear use, where political factors would also need to be weighted alongside more purely military requirements . . .” (p. 59). Massive American bombing that killed countless civilians was a reminder of wartime raids on Japan and Hiroshima, transforming the conflict in Korea into a white man’s war to inflict suffering on Asians.

Third, historians now agree that the Korean War was a turning point in the Cold War, militarizing the Soviet-American confrontation. Jones also identifies the conflict as a watershed, but in the ironic way of confirming in East Asia a rejection of U.S. reliance on the
methods of mass destruction warfare. “What is striking about the comments of so many US officials and commentators (and their British counterparts),” he asserts, “is how entrenched by late 1950 had become the belief that nuclear use in Asia would have such adverse political effects: the view of many Western officials was clearly that, in the five years since 1945, Asian perceptions of nuclear use against Japan had become thoroughly informed with the belief that this was an act with a racist dimension” (p. 99). Anger in Asia followed Truman’s suggestion about using atomic weapons in Korea after Chinese intervention, causing his administration to become preoccupied with regaining Asian support. Nevertheless, U.S. racial insensitivity persisted with talk of using tactical nuclear weapons in Korea and public efforts to weaken and humiliate the PRC.

Fourth, Jones documents how U.S. postwar policy toward Japan intensified racial tensions in East Asia. Significantly, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s refusal to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty infuriated U.S. leaders, who saw the reemergence of an “Asia for the Asiatics” movement as inimitable to American interests. They feared that India would join with Communist China “to expel Western and white presence from the region . . .” (p. 123). But U.S. security strategy in East Asia ignored racial implications, as the security treaty with Japan revealed. The basic dilemma the United States faced “as it tried to confront Communist power in Asia,” Jones writes, “was that the military's requirement for an extensive base network and the rights that went with it, combined with the strategic imperative to plan for the use of nuclear weapons as these increased in both number and efficiency, created local unease, resentment and opposition, and were a boon to Communist propaganda keen to remind an Asia audience of the callous indifference of the Americans to the lives of non-white people” (p. 129). The answer for John Foster Dulles was the “New Look” because it would allow for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Japan and elsewhere, ending the friction that was weakening Asian alliances.

Fifth, Britain, according the Jones, played a decisive role in changing Dwight D. Eisenhower’s position on the place of nuclear weapons in his Asian security strategy. “The greater propensity of the Eisenhower administration to be prepared to use nuclear weapons, connected in any Asian context with the issue of race, and its willingness to make this posture public,” he observes, “was one more source of tension between the United States and its potential Far Eastern friends and allies” (p. 161). Eisenhower at first favored the position of Admiral Arthur W. Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), that immediate use of nuclear weapons should be the U.S. response to Chinese Communist aggression. Britain persuaded him to abandon this stand, Jones contends, after its leaders voiced fears and concerns at the Bermuda Conference in October 1953. Like Truman before him, Eisenhower had learned that placing nuclear weapons at the center of Asian security strategy meant the loss of allied support.

Sixth, coverage of the Bravo nuclear test and the Lucky Dragon incident strongly supports this study’s main thesis.¹ Their “regional relevance,” Jones argues, “served to connect the

¹ The Bravo test took place on March 1, 1954 on the Bikini Atoll and the Lucky Dragon was a Japanese tuna trawler that was outside the established danger zone set up for the Bravo test but encountered radioactive fallout and the crew suffered radioactive sickness. See Jones, After Hiroshima, pp. 181-192.
legacy of Hiroshima with an identification of the United States with policies of racial
discrimination, as Asian leaders . . . vented their suspicions that Americans were dismissive
of the lives and welfare of those whose skin colour differed from their own” (p. 198). That
these events occurred simultaneously with the crisis in Indochina was significant because it
ruled out U.S. consideration of a military, let alone nuclear, response to save Dien Bien Phu.
“In terms of the overall relations between the United States and Asia,” Jones adds, “the
repercussions of the Bravo test and the Indochina crisis were thereafter indelibly
connected” (p. 235). Bravo not only moderated Dulles’ views toward Nehru, but weakened
his confidence in his massive retaliation strategy. By 1957, he doubted that tactical nuclear
weapons even could be used in limited war.

Seventh, Jones presents an important corrective to the traditional assessment of Dulles as a
consistent advocate of a belligerent and inflexible policy in Asia. During the first Taiwan
Strait Crisis, he writes, the Secretary of State “may also have gone through a modest nuclear
epiphany” (p. 269), because in response to the Bandung Conference, the “considerations of
the impact of nuclear use on allied opinion, and increasingly on a watching Asian audience,
played a significant role in persuading [him] that the political costs of limited war would be
prohibitive” (p. 281). Within months after his enunciation of it, Dulles had concluded that
massive retaliation “lacked credibility and represented a handicap to the pursuit of
American diplomatic objectives” (p. 335). His change of heart aligned him against the JCS,
who “had a far more expansive conception of the way they would use the atomic power
now at their fingertips” (p. 310). Dulles had found that the ambiguities of the New Look
created dilemmas exposing “the wholehearted embrace of a national security policy based
on nuclear weapons as detrimental to the wider goals of US foreign policy, especially in a
context where worldwide anti-nuclear feelings showed no signs of abating” (p. 334). His
influence led Eisenhower to the same conclusion.

Eighth, Japan, Jones reveals, was at the center of the State Department’s fears after 1953
about the adverse political impact of a nuclear security strategy in East Asia. Japanese
criticism of nuclear tests that threatened lives and restricted fishing grounds intensified
existing hostility toward U.S. military bases. JCS pressure to place nuclear weapons in
Japan revealed the basic dilemma its Asian security strategy created: “It was viewed as
essential to stand firmly by Asian friends and allies, and to contribute to their defence
against the local conventional military threat presented by China, but the pressures on the
defence budget, and the belief that [U.S.] overseas garrisons attracted nationalist
resentments and anti-American feelings, also meant that there was a growing imperative
from the mid-1950s onwards to withdraw conventional [U.S.] military forces from their
overseas bases . . .” (p. 361). Angry Japanese public reaction to the renegotiated security
treaty allowing U.S. troops to remain “was a stark illustration of the likely consequences if
it was necessary to use the bases in a limited war context where the main target for US
nuclear strikes would be the Chinese mainland” (p. 386).

Ninth, most previous studies of U.S. defense policy in the 1950s have attributed shifts in
approach to altered administration assessments of the strategic balance and to Soviet
achievement of the capacity to deliver a nuclear attack on the United States. But Jones adds
another critical, but overlooked factor, arguing that because the Eisenhower administration
understood “the racial connotations nuclear weapons carried in Asia as a symbol of ‘white superiority’,” the State Department came “to believe that any nuclear use, in however limited a fashion, would alienate large swathes of public opinion and could prove disastrous to US interests in Asia” (p. 398). Despite recognition by spring 1958 of the need to expand conventional capabilities and adopt a formal limited nuclear war doctrine, U.S. security strategy did not change. Eisenhower failed to act because of “intellectual laziness” (p. 390), Jones states, despite his awareness of the catastrophic consequences that existing security strategy invited. His successor, John F. Kennedy, instantly faced paying a high price for his predecessor’s mistake in the Laotian Crisis.

Tenth, Jones convincingly argues that Communist China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons connected U.S. nuclear security strategy to the U.S. decision to wage war in Vietnam. Kennedy and his advisors expected the PRC to be more cautious once it had acquired atomic capabilities to avoid provoking a preemptive attack. China’s successful nuclear test therefore had more political rather than military impact, requiring the United States to expand its conventional capabilities in preparation to meet and defeat Chinese incited Communist expansion in Asia. “Any weakening of American resolve in Vietnam, . . . might be interpreted as a sign that China’s new nuclear status was having a direct pay-off as US policy became more timid” (p. 436), perhaps even causing Japan and India, Jones suggests, to develop nuclear weapons. Fearful perceptions about a nuclear China’s rising power and influence motivated Kennedy to provide his successor with the means to wage war. As Jones emphasizes, “the policy debates over escalation of American involvement in the Vietnam War witnessed in late 1964 and the first few months of 1965 were carried out in the shadow of the recent Chinese test” (p. 437).

For all of its strengths, After Hiroshima has several weaknesses. Most obviously, it suffers from extraordinarily long sentences and paragraphs, contributing to a profound lack of succinctness in explication. Jones seems determined to describe in detail every policy paper, cable, newspaper article, and speech. His habit of summarizing the views of assorted U.S. officials and diplomats without making clear if these opinions reflected or had a direct impact on government policy circumvents essential analysis. This is true especially regarding Loy Henderson and Chester Bowles, who draw frequent references as critics of U.S. policy. Jones inadvertently suggests lack of concern about information he presents without providing any measure of its importance in discussing one State Department report: “Determining how much influence was carried by Robert Johnson’s negative conclusions is difficult to gauge, and there is no evidence to show that the President was even exposed to his length arguments” (p. 432).

Occupying a huge amount of space in Jones’ account are descriptions of events well known to those familiar with wartime and postwar U.S. policy in Asia. For example, few will be surprised to learn that bitter fighting in the Pacific war paved the way for U.S. dropping of atomic bombs on Japan, as well as questions critics raised at the time and later about Japan’s readiness to surrender before Hiroshima. It is common knowledge that “probably the most important consequence of the Korean war for the overall course of US policy towards Asia was the transformation in attitudes toward Communist China, both official and on the part of the wider public, that it helped to instill and then entrench” (p. 58). Few
readers will not know that General Douglas “MacArthur’s mood oscillated between alarm and optimism” (p. 79) and General Matthew B. Ridgway, as U.S. Army Chief of Staff under Eisenhower, “tended to exercise a moderating voice throughout” (p. 271). The United States needed to stand against imperialism, but feared communism, Jones repeats, and Indochina was the place where “paradox was given its most graphic illustration” (p. 128). A host of other familiar issues receive coverage, but description of the Taiwan Strait crises in particular is extensive without adding much that is new.

Jones deserves high praise for exact description and bold analysis of the most controversial issues, with the exception of key points on the Korean War. For example, he makes the misleading assertion that “in the autumn of 1947, faced by the intractable problems of effecting a peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula under democratic elections, the State Department and JCS had agreed on a gradual withdrawal of US forces from occupation duties in South Korea” (p. 49). His description of Dean Acheson’s National Press Club speech rightly emphasizes—in a break from usual accounts—how it presented “a positive vision of an Asia now free from colonial oppression and external domination ready to face the future in self-reliant fashion” (p. 55). But he also reiterates the claim that South Korea’s “omission from the list of territories that would be offered direct American protection might have served to invite later Communist aggression” (p. 53), even though Soviet documents provide contrary evidence. Jones also ignores the writings of Chen Jian and other China scholars when he claims that “Beijing’s sense of its own strategic vulnerability, particularly the threat to the key region of Manchuria, . . . triggered the movement south across the Yalu of the . . . Chinese ‘volunteers’” (p. 75).

A more significant problem rests at the center of this study’s main argument that developments in the Civil Rights movement had a direct impact on formulation of U.S. nuclear strategy from 1945 to 1964. Descriptions of the views and actions of top African American leaders of the era regarding U.S. policy in Asia occupy precious little space in this lengthy treatment, save for a couple of W.E.B. Du Bois cameos. No documentation appears to verify the assertion that Acheson’s concern was so great about the negative impact on pursuit of U.S. goals in Asia of “domestic racial conditions” (p. 127) that his State Department was ready to offer support for court cases to end school segregation. Just as flimsy is his evidence connecting racial violence in Birmingham in 1963 with the Johnson administration’s opposition to primary reliance on nuclear weapons to defend South Korea. A grander allegation holds that “every act of escalation in South East Asia warranted some counterpoised act of domestic racial atonement.” According to Jones, Lyndon B. Johnson was “determined to minimize racial conflict on all fronts” (p. 407).

Similarly, Jones makes regular reference to Asian opinion, but relies for evidence almost exclusively on the statements of selected leaders, notably Nehru. “Intemperate comments from leading US political figures also contributed to Asian anxieties” (p. 85) is one of several descriptions of popular reactions in Asia to U.S. behavior that derive from logic rather than factual data. Another representative example holds that the growth “of American power and influence . . . brought increased exposure and interest in the racial mores of American society” (p. 199). Jones indirectly divulges his imprecision when he refers to the anxiety among U.S. leaders “in the heated atmosphere of late 1950” about “the
reactions of that amorphous concept ‘Asian opinion’ . . .” (p. 98). American military leaders properly included the attitudes of Jiang Jieshi, Ngo Dinh Diem, and Syngman Rhee in Asian opinion. Nguyen “Khanh’s views,” Jones admits, “showed the inherently problematic task of arriving at a settled and uniform reading of ‘Asian opinion’ regarding nuclear weapons when a variety of perspectives were present in the region” (p. 442).

These criticisms aside, Matthew Jones has written an impressive study that both expands and enriches existing understanding of U.S. postwar security policy in Asia. In addition, the author, perhaps unintentionally, presents abundant information challenging the main conclusions of Eisenhower revisionism. After Hiroshima affirms the accuracy of Robert J. McMahon’s judgment that President Eisenhower deserves poor marks not only for his grasp of the problems he confronted in the underdeveloped world, but also for how he chose to resolve them. Jones attributes his difficulties to an outlook reflecting “the casual ‘country club’ racism so typical of the time” (p. 277). As a result, the Eisenhower administration never gave priority to the views of Asian leaders like Nehru and India “did not figure in [its] scheme of things” (p. 212). His cavalier attitude about dropping atomic bombs on China was more troubling, especially after he accepted that nuclear weapons were not the same as other armaments. Thereafter, Eisenhower’s continued advocacy of a nuclear security strategy prompted more “widespread doubts and criticism over the administration’s position” (p. 259). Not surprisingly, by summer 1959, his “subordinates were still having problems implementing his wishes” (p. 383). Eisenhower simply could not accept the fact that “reliance on nuclear weapons to deter conflict across all levels of intensity and scope was simply not a viable basis for overall security policy” (p. 361).
This massive analysis of the racial dimension of American nuclear policies is first-rate scholarship comparable to John W. Dower’s seminal work, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (1986). On the basis of an immense amount of U.S. and British archival documents, contemporaneous Asian newspaper articles, and scholarly publications, it convincingly demonstrates the crucial role that race-centered perceptions played in the formation of Asian attitudes toward the atomic bombing of Japan as well as America’s subsequent steps to deploy, test, and possibly use, nuclear weapons in Asia. The notion that “the British and Americans ... may well have hesitated to use so devastating a weapon against fellow Europeans while not being averse to employing it against Asiatics” (21) emerged soon after Hiroshima, and became a major theme of Asian discourses on nuclear weapons. Jones’s description of such Asian attitudes is skillfully combined with extensive quotations from the private statements made by various U.S. policy-makers whose views were also considerably influenced by racial stereotypes about Asians.

Jones prefers to describe and explain, rather than critically examine, the race-centered perceptions which Asian observers had about America’s nuclear policies. At first sight, his overview about the impact that U.S. segregationist policies made on Asian public opinion may appear only indirectly related to the main subject of the book, but the attention he pays to this issue is entirely justified. The persistence of racial segregation in the United States obviously reminded Asians of their own colonial past, and, combined as it was with the blatantly racist nature of wartime American anti-Japanese propaganda and other factors, greatly shaped their image of America. Thus Washington’s nuclear policies seem to have reinforced, rather than constructed, this negative image.

The ample information the author provides about the diverse Asian reactions to American and non-American nuclear tests also confirms the significance of the “racial factor,” because these differences reveal that the intensity of “the aversion in Asia to the use of any type of nuclear weapon” (387) actually varied by country and situation. While Jones does not investigate whether in 1945 the atomic bombing of Hiroshima created a similar revulsion in China and Korea – which had been under brutal Japanese occupation before and during WW II – as in British-ruled India, he notes that the Indian press, which sharply criticized the American Bravo test, largely overlooked Soviet nuclear testing activities. China’s first nuclear explosion elicited positive comments from Pakistan and Indonesia, but was promptly condemned by New Delhi. That is, nuclear weapons, and the powers wielding them, were observed through the lenses of each country’s own specific threat perceptions and antipathies.

The author does not explicitly contrast Asian perceptions of the supposed racial biases of U.S. nuclear policies with facts contradicting this interpretation, though he repeatedly quotes American officials as lamenting that “no rational explanation will serve to overcome these visceral convictions ... that the ‘atomic bomb’ is the white man’s weapon which he is cold-bloodedly willing, if not eager, to use against colored peoples.” (365). Indeed, these “visceral convictions,” focused as they were on the Asian scene, did overlook the global
nature of the nuclear practices they considered to be inherently racist and anti-Asian. After all, the conception of “immediate strategic nuclear response against a conventional attack” was applied first to the European theater of the Cold War, having been concocted by NATO’s defense planners in 1949, temporarily abandoned in 1950-1952, and revived again by Britain and the United States in 1952-1954.\(^1\) Similarly, the Honest John and Matador nuclear missiles which the U.S. installed in Taiwan and South Korea in 1957-1958 had been first deployed in Western Europe a few years earlier. The Kremlin, as the massive Communist-led peace campaign in 1949-1950 showed, by no means harbored the illusion that the Pentagon might be less ready to use atomic weapons against the “white” nations of the Soviet bloc than against an Asian country. Nor was American nuclear testing confined to the Pacific: atmospheric tests were also carried out at the Nevada National Security Site until 1962, and Congress passed the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act as late as 1990.

Still, the Olympian disregard for local sensitivities with which the Pentagon implemented its global nuclear strategy, displayed as it was by a ‘white’ superpower, was naturally perceived in Asia as an attitude of ‘white superiority.’ The author’s colorful description of how insensitively the U.S. military authorities handled the *Fukuryu Maru* incident in 1954\(^2\) makes it clear why Asian observers felt that American power-holders considered Asian lives “expendable.” (73). Furthermore, the atomic bomb was widely regarded as a “weapon of last resort” (100) that a power should use only in a life-and-death struggle, and yet U.S. leaders, unlike their Soviet counterparts, repeatedly declared their readiness to use nuclear weapons not only in a global confrontation but also in local (primarily Asian) conflicts, against non-nuclear opponents.

Jones masterfully documents how the State Department, caught between the Pentagon’s nuclear ambitions and the anti-nuclear stance of public opinion in Japan, India and other diplomatically important Asian countries, tried to find compromise solutions, and how American diplomacy became increasingly responsive to the worries of the United States’ European and Asian allies. In the early 1950s, he states, “anxiety over the reactions of that amorphous concept ‘Asian opinion’” (98) was not yet decisive in the outcome of debates over the possible use of nuclear weapons, but British warnings and complaints were already taken seriously enough to rule out nuclear options during the Korean War and the siege of Dien Bien Phu. In the mid-1950s, Japanese public opinion also became a factor to reckon with. Emphasizing Dulles’s efforts to reassure Tokyo, Jones notes that “at no point did the State Department entertain the notion, floated by the Pentagon, that the nuclear components of atomic weapons should be introduced to American bases in Japan without the knowledge of the Japanese Government.” (285).

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\(^2\) *Fukuryu Maru*, or *Lucky Dragon*, was a Japanese tuna trawler that was outside the established danger zone set up for the *Bravo* nuclear test on March 1, 1954 but encountered radioactive fallout and the crew suffered radioactive sickness. See Jones, *After Hiroshima*, pp. 181-192.
The author’s careful description about Dulles’s initial opposition to the deployment of nuclear weapons in South Korea merits particular attention, all the more so because this opposition was considerably motivated by the realization that, as Dulles himself put it, “sending such weapons to Korea would be resented throughout Asia because [they] were identified ... with the hated doctrine of white supremacy” (345). On the other hand, Jones’s explanation of the State Department’s eventual acquiescence in the Pentagon’s demands – that is, the stress he lays on Dulles’s financially motivated insistence on reducing South Korean forces – may be combined with additional factors. Unfortunately, he does not investigate how American policy-makers evaluated the withdrawal of Chinese troops from the DPRK in 1954-1958, and why this step did not have any effect on the Pentagon’s nuclear policies in Korea. It also might have been worth examining what role the Matadors’ deployment in Taiwan played in the outbreak of the second offshore islands crisis.

Jones’s analysis of the shift from the doctrine of massive retaliation to flexible response has some problematic aspects. He certainly makes a significant contribution to the literature on this subject by rigorously documenting that signs of such a shift appeared as early as in the last years of the Eisenhower administration, as Dulles started to realize the limited applicability of his own doctrine. Still, it seems that Jones, in some respects, may have committed the error of over-extrapolation by presenting Washington’s responses to certain specific challenges, like the insurgencies in Indochina and the modernization of Soviet nuclear delivery systems, as a comprehensive re-examination of America’s Far Eastern nuclear strategy. For instance, he describes the Kennedy administration’s decision not to withdraw one of the two U.S. divisions stationed in South Korea as an “official and negative response ... to the JCS proposals for adoption of an overtly nuclear strategy in Korea” (422). While the American government did lay stress on the continued presence of US conventional forces in the ROK, it is necessary to point out that an intense reliance on the early use of nuclear weapons – which Peter Hayes aptly dubbed “Inflexible Response” – remained a central element of American military planning in Korea throughout the 1960s and afterwards, to a considerably greater extent than in Europe, let alone Vietnam.

To his credit, Jones recognizes the initial signs of this divergence between the Pentagon’s European and Korean strategies. In 1962, he notes, “Kennedy pointed out that adopting a

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3 For instance, Bruce Cumings argues that the deployment had a function of mutual deterrence, since Dulles feared that not only the DPRK but also Syngman Rhee might provoke a new war. See Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), pp. 478-79. This argument may be valid for Taiwan as well, because the United States, concerned that it might be entrapped in a conflict with the PRC, sought both to protect and restrain the ROC. See Steven M. Goldstein, “The United States and the Republic of China, 1949-1978: Suspicious Allies” (Stanford: Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, 2000), pp. 7-8.

4 On this subject, see Melvin Gurtov, “The Taiwan Strait Crisis Revisited: Politics and Foreign Policy in Chinese Motives,” in Modern China 2:1 (January 1976): 68-75. The Matador was a surface-to-surface cruise missile.

stance involving rapid escalation to tactical nuclear use in Korea represented in some senses a reversal of the emphasis in Europe” (412). Still, the continuities between Washington’s pre- and post-1960 nuclear policies in Korea might have been given a stronger emphasis. Nor does he mention that in 1960 – that is, years after the installation of the Matador missiles and during the “advent of the flexible response” – the United States deployed nuclear bombs in Taiwan, and did not withdraw them until 1974.

It also appears possible that the author, figuratively speaking, compares apples and oranges when he contrasts Washington’s pre-1960 nuclear policies toward China and the DPRK with its later military strategy in Indochina. While it is certainly true that the magnitude of post-1965 American military involvement in Vietnam far surpassed what NSC 5501 – which, in January 1955, called for “highly mobile U.S. forces suitably equipped for local war … [and] not dependent on use of atomic weapons for effective action”6 – ever envisioned, the fact that the United States never deployed nuclear weapons in Mainland Southeast Asia deserves attention. In 1957-1958, the deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear missiles and atomic cannons in Taiwan and South Korea was not accompanied by the installation of comparable weapons in South Vietnam and Thailand, the two cornerstones of American policy in that region.7

Thus the shift from massive retaliation to flexible response may not have been as comprehensive and clear-cut as Jones suggests, since in Korea, the conception of early nuclear retaliation remained in force, whereas in Southeast Asia, signs of a more limited nuclear commitment appeared as early as the Eisenhower era. The geographical patterns of deployment – the absence of nuclear weapons in Mainland Southeast Asia, and their presence in South Korea, Okinawa, Taiwan, the Philippines and Guam – seem to have reflected, above all, a naval strategy aimed at making the Pacific, as Hayes put it, an ‘American Lake,’ rather than simply a policy to contain and deter China. From the perspective of a Pacific-centered strategy, the military importance of South Vietnam must have appeared more limited than that of the aforesaid bases.

Carefully analyzing the pre-1960 Asian crises during which U.S. military and political leaders considered nuclear options, Jones enumerates the following factors which dissuaded them from crossing the nuclear threshold: America’s limited nuclear stockpile; the risk of Soviet nuclear retaliation; the fear of escalating a limited conflict into a wider one; different strategic priorities; the absence of suitable targets; and, last but not least, the opposition of the allied Western and Asian countries. With the exception of the first one, these factors were also in operation during the Vietnam War (Jones, among others, 6 Memorandum from the Department of State Representative on the National Security Council Planning Board (Bowie) to the Secretary of State, 6 June 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, Vietnam, III (Washington, DC, 1984), p. 694.

7 On the Pentagon’s opposition to any commitment to action on the Southeast Asian mainland, and its initial criticism of Dulles’s efforts to establish SEATO, see, among others, Roger Dingman, “John Foster Dulles and the Creation of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization in 1954,” in The International History Review 11:3 (August 1989): 461-462.
correctly highlights the effects that China’s first nuclear test produced on Washington’s Asian strategy), which, in this respect, may actually fit into the model which the author draws about pre-1960 U.S. nuclear decision-making.

Still, Jones rightly emphasizes that during Eisenhower’s first presidency, there was a perceptible shift in U.S. policies toward a greater readiness to use nuclear weapons in local conflicts. It is quite chilling to realize that this shift seems to have been at least partly based on a misinterpretation and motivated by impatience. That is, Eisenhower apparently genuinely – but mistakenly – believed that his nuclear threats in May 1953 brought the Korean War to an end, though, as the author points out, “more flexibility in the Communist position was already evident in late March” (158), or rather even earlier. Since his ‘nuclear signals’ were not inspired by a heightened threat perception but rather by a desire to put a quick end to a protracted war and thus spare American lives (a factor that also played a decisive role in the atomic bombing of Japan), the ‘visceral convictions’ of those Asian observers who stressed that U.S. policy-makers considered Asian lives more “expendable” than American ones may not have been as unfounded as the U.S. diplomats claimed.

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Review by Qiang Zhai, Auburn University Montgomery

U.S. policy toward Asia during the early Cold War has been a well-trodden scholarly ground, but as a result of Matthew Jones’s impressive illumination, the familiar landscape takes on new colors. Jones’s rich and meticulously researched study charts the course of American nuclear history in Asia from Hiroshima to China’s achievement of nuclear status and analyzes the political challenges and dilemmas experienced by Washington in executing its nuclear decisions, highlighting how the issue of race figured in policy deliberations. He convincingly demonstrates that in addition to its more familiar strategic dimensions, U.S. nuclear experience in Asia during the two decades following the dropping of nuclear bombs on Japan in 1945 also possessed a racial aspect, representing one extra factor responsible for generating frictions in post-war American relations with countries of the non-Western world. Jones succeeds in using nuclear history as a prism through which to reconstruct the evolution of American opinions on their troubled encounters with the peoples and states in Asia, where criticisms were often voiced over a widening gap between the “white” United States and an Asia searching for its own sense of identity after the conclusion of Western colonial control. He has produced a highly revealing account on not only the sources of American perceptions of Asians but also the construction of American identity.

Jones points out that during the two decades after the end of WWII, U.S. leaders displayed acute awareness of the racial issue in their discussions of nuclear policy in Asia and that they were sensitive to the criticism that their actions were influenced by the racism that occurred in American society at the time. He contends that the use of nuclear bombs and the later emphasis placed on nuclear deterrence in American foreign policy strained U.S. ties with Asia. By employing race as a central category of analysis, his research meshes with other areas of inquiry that are currently giving much energy and liveliness to the field of American foreign relations.¹

Jones observes that a consistent theme in American thinking about Asia from the Pacific War to the Cold War was the fear of a pan-Asian movement against the West, whether promoted by Japan before 1945 or advocated by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the 1950s. In this context, Washington’s choices of allies over time took on new meanings. According to Jones, the role of Chiang Kai-shek’s China as a partner in the war against Japan became crucial to the United States because it undermined Japanese claims that the white West could never cooperate with another Asian state on an equal footing. Similarly, when John Foster Dulles was handling the preparation of the Japanese peace treaty, one of his

major concerns was how to treat Japan as an equal so that he could undercut the PRC’s effort to mobilize a pan-Asian campaign to expel Western and white presence from Asia. In the eyes of Dulles, to use Jones’s summary, “treating the Japanese not as racial inferiors but as equals in the struggle against Communist imperialism would become the most effective riposte to those who would try to castigate U.S. foreign policy as infused with the racism that was still endemic to American society.” (p. 123)

Jones shows that in the early 1950s, officials like Dean Acheson and Chester Bowles fully recognized the huge burden on U.S. relations with Asia created by racial conditions at home. Acheson’s 1952 reference to the harm that was being inflicted on American purposes in Asia by domestic racial injustice helped to account for the willingness of his department to support the civil rights cases that were under consideration by the Supreme Court at that time, and were to culminate in the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision in May 1954. Jones’s incisive treatment of how the awareness of domestic segregationist practices conditioned the approach of State Department officials to Asian conflicts and crises flows naturally into the stream of recent studies on the intersections of domestic race relations and foreign policy.2

Scholars such as Gordon Chang and James Peck have previously indicated how deep-rooted racial fears of Asians helped to shape the attitudes and choices of American leaders toward China during the Cold War,3 but their discussions of the racial role in American policymaking are brief and unsystematic. Jones is the first scholar to provide a consistent and comprehensive analysis of race as a causal factor in the formation of American nuclear policy toward Asia during the first two decades of the Cold War. Chang and Peck have argued that racial discrimination against Asians colored the views of U.S. policymakers during the Cold War, and expressions of racial fear and mistrust could frequently be heard in official discussions in Washington. American leaders were convinced that the Chinese valued life less than Westerners did, including the Russians. They believed that no matter what differences in culture and tradition, beliefs or language, the Russians were human beings, and wanted to stay alive. The Chinese, according to their conviction, were different, often fanatical, irrational, unfathomable, and caring little for human life. In U.S. official


circles, the Soviet Union was treated as white and still part of ‘us’ (i.e., Western civilization) while China was regarded as the other.

Reaching similar conclusions as Chang and Peck regarding Washington’s differentiated perceptions of Beijing and Moscow, Jones offers a fuller explanation of how this happened. He explains how events in 1962 (the Geneva Agreement on Laos and the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis) led officials in Washington to believe that they could reach agreement with the Russians in reducing tensions in the world. The Soviet party chief Nikita Khrushchev’s willingness to adhere to the neutralization of Laos and to back down from the nuclear brink in Cuba convinced American leaders of the basic rationality of the Kremlin’s policy. But they ascribed no such attributes to Beijing’s international approach. Mao’s militant, belligerent, and unremitting barrage against imperialism, his disregard of the destructiveness of nuclear war, and his split with the Soviet Union reinforced the impression of American officials that the Chinese were unpredictable, unreachable, and dangerous. The large-scale famine in China in the early 1960s, following the disastrous failure of Mao’s ill-conceived radical experiment, the Great Leap Forward, reminded the Americans that the government in Beijing was indifferent to human suffering.

Jones’s scrutiny of Washington’s response to Beijing’s nuclear program is judicious. His investigation of the connection between China’s nuclear test and the Americanization of the war in Vietnam sheds new light on the Johnson administration’s decision to escalate American entanglement in the Indochina conflict. According to Jones’s revelation, China’s explosion of its first nuclear bomb in October 1964 triggered a sense of urgency among American officials that the United States must stand by its commitments and maintain “credibility” in Southeast Asia in order to relieve the perceived anxiety among non-Communist states there that the development of a Chinese nuclear capability would increase China’s assertiveness and make the United States more reluctant to use military force in their defense. Jones writes: “Perceptions of the rising power and influence of China, underlined by its new nuclear status, lay behind much of the American involvement in Vietnam.” (p. 448)

Jones’s multi-archival efforts yield many benefits. By juxtaposing American and British parallel calculations, he is able to show that the apprehensions of American officials about the detrimental political consequences of the use of nuclear weapons against Communist forces in Asia was also shared by their British counterparts. While focusing on Western views of the issues surrounding nuclear weapons, Jones also incorporates contemporary Asian opinions, particularly those of India and Japan. He indicates that American policymakers, who realized that many Asian commentators considered the atomic bomb a “white man’s weapon,” were afraid that if the United States employed nuclear weapons again in Asia, even low-yield and targeted at military facilities, it would produce extremely harmful political results for the overall U.S. position in Asia. They feared that important allies like Japan would switch to a neutralist or even Communist orientation and that key non-aligned countries such as India would turn their backs on the West. Jones concludes that “the issue of race played a demonstrable role” in discrediting the massive retaliation doctrine during the limited war debate in the late 1950s. (p. 460)
While trying his best to fathom Asian perceptions, Jones also recognizes the difficulty in reaching a settled and uniform reading of “Asian opinion” with regard to nuclear weapons because diverse notions and perspectives existed in the region. Jones reveals that Chiang Kai-shek and the South Vietnamese leader Nguyen Khanh reacted differently to American suggestions of employing nuclear weapons in Asia. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in a meeting with Chiang in April 1964, implied that the United States might use nuclear weapons if the PRC decided to intervene directly in Indochina. To Rusk’s surprise, the Chinese Nationalist leader opposed the employment of nuclear weapons in the region. Two months later, when Rusk informed Khanh that if the Chinese Communists intervened in response to U.S. escalation of the war, Washington might apply a nuclear strike, Khanh replied that he had no problems with American use of nuclear weapons.

Jones has exploited the rich vein of Anglo-American primary sources and is well informed by the secondary scholarship on the subject. His work illuminates previously ignored areas in need of greater attention. He pushes the frontier of our knowledge about the relationship between race and policy in American interactions with Asia farther than anyone else has to this point. Although densely written and with a plodding pace, his book will repay close reading. After reading his volume, no one will view the period in quite the same way.
A n opportunity to respond to the reviews of After Hiroshima is welcome first, and most importantly, because it allows me to extend my very warm appreciation to the organizers of the roundtable, and to the four readers who have engaged so substantively with the book. I was encouraged and gratified to find its core arguments had been acknowledged in all the reviews, which convey very generously and fairly what are seen as the strengths and weaknesses of the study. They even, as in Pierre Grosser’s case, use the book as a platform to raise several exciting new research agendas and topics.

To summarize, the book provides a detailed examination of US nuclear strategy, planning and deployment in Asia, against a historical setting where being branded as ‘racist’ in outlook and disposition carried increasing political costs. Its basic contention is that American (and for that matter British) leaders shared a perception that many elements of Asian opinion believed that the white, Western powers were temperamentally more inclined to consider the use of nuclear weapons in the region because of their relative indifference to non-white peoples. The book offers an account of how this arose and whether it influenced US policy during such episodes as the Korean War, the Indochina crisis of 1954, the Taiwan Straits crises of 1954-55 and 1958, and the debates conducted over limited war strategy in the late 1950s. Many previous studies have examined the way ‘massive retaliation’ was supplanted by ‘flexible response’ in US national security strategy (and indeed, whether this rhetorical change had much practical effect), but these have largely focused on the shifting strategic balance between the US and Soviet Union. There is however an important distinction to be made over how this change occurred in the Asian context, where the utility of nuclear weapons had to be considered within a frame of reference which recognised the prohibitive political costs associated with their use in limited war, not least in terms of US relations with Japan.

The final part of the book, as Qiang Zhai and James Matray note, explores connections between the Americanization of the war in Vietnam in 1964-65, and the repercussions of the Chinese nuclear test of October 1964. Although Washington policymakers discounted the immediate military threat that a Chinese nuclear capability could represent, they were very concerned by the psychological and political impact of this long-anticipated event. Amid the anxieties of some Asian states that they might be drawn by the US into some kind of nuclear confrontation with China, it became all the more important that the US stand by its Asian allies, and show it was not intimidated by China’s new status into a reluctance to use conventional military power. It was in the wider, nuclear context that the United States embarked on limited war on the Asian mainland for the second time since the end of the Second World War.

As the reviews recognise, a key feature of After Hiroshima is its contribution to the growing literature on race and US foreign policy through exploring the racial sensitivities generated by the use of the bomb in 1945 by a white power against a non-white people, not least as seen by US policymakers themselves. Grosser suggests that by including “race” in the subtitle of the book I saw this factor to be “central”. Actually, inclusion of the term in the
subtitle was not taken lightly, as I did not want the reader to leap to the mistaken conclusion that I considered that racial factors played the leading role in determining nuclear strategy in Asia. But as the reviews bear out, US nuclear policy in Asia did carry a ‘racial edge’ during these crucial years, and which though overlooked in the literature, merits detailed examination. Moreover, it was one factor amongst several others that could, in certain instances, exercise an influence over how the consequences of US policies and attitudes were viewed. Though essentially sympathetic to this argument, Grosser wonders if the citations are “truly revealing of their authors mindsets and convictions”. This was one reason why I present a great deal of evidence, drawn not just from government documents and archives, but from contemporary newspaper sources. These taken together help to demonstrate that this material was not merely ephemeral, but formed part of a recurring pattern of perceptions that underpin the arguments developed in the book. All historians are selective in their use of evidence, but they also have a responsibility to be balanced and nuanced in their arguments and judgements, having due regard for information or opinion that might contradict their case. There are always doubts over whether evidence has been “cherry picked” (to use Grosser’s phrase), but I believe the whole picture of racial sensibilities assembled in the book is quite consistent, widespread and compelling.

In the book I have endeavoured not to over-state the argument. Where contrary and countervailing evidence has been found it has been mentioned or quoted. As Balazs Szalontai observes, I make clear, for example, that considerations of ‘Asian opinion’ did not weigh heavily in official attitudes toward nuclear use during the early stages of the Korean War. However, once the non-aligned movement began to make its voice heard more steadily in the mid-1950s, and the Cold War in Asia came to be seen as more concerned with struggles for allegiance, where ideas and images might play a greater role, then the significance of Asian anti-nuclear feeling increased. Does one take it as “truly revealing” of his mindset that John Foster Dulles told a Department of Defense meeting in June 1957 of the “hate the yellow man has for the white man”, that racial conditions in the US were a “very grave problem” which affected “our whole military-political strategy particularly in Asia”, and that “the masses” in Asia linked the atomic bomb with “this white supremacy and its having been used first by the United States against members of the so-called yellow race” (p346)? I certainly found this an arresting statement, and it becomes even more significant when one considers that Dulles was uttering such remarks at the very same time as he was cautioning the NSC that deploying nuclear weapons in Korea “would be resented throughout Asia” because they were “identified with the West and with the hated doctrine of white supremacy, quite apart from the weapons effects themselves” (p345). This was not, I would add, an isolated sentiment on Dulles’ behalf, but reflected a common State Department position by the late 1950s.

Dulles’ comments also indicate why I feel obliged to depart from James Matray in the opening paragraph of his otherwise excellent and comprehensive review when he says that my explanation for US problems in the region can be condensed into the point that “U.S. leaders were simple minded racists.” This could be taken to imply that the book is somehow arguing that individuals such as Truman, Eisenhower or Dulles - because of their views on race - were itching to use nuclear weapons in Asia (and the rest of Matray’s
review – if I have read him correctly - shows this was not what he meant). In fact, in his next paragraph he uses a quotation from the book where I disavow the idea that racial callousness played a role in the atomic attacks of 1945, and more generally I see no strong evidence to show that racism per se made American officials more willing to contemplate nuclear use against Asian peoples than any other group.

It was especially frustrating to US officials that they should have such accusations levelled at them when in the European setting early and widespread nuclear use in the event of a Soviet attack was anticipated. Indeed, as alluded to in Balazs Szalontai’s review, US military planning for the defence of Western Europe, embodied in the NATO document MC 48 officially adopted in 1954, called for a tripwire strategy, where nuclear weapons would have been used in overwhelming fashion from an early stage following any Warsaw Pact incursion. With strikes behind the front line of advancing Soviet forces and into the rear areas of the Warsaw Pact states, NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons would in all probability have killed millions of Germans, Poles, and Czechs, let alone Russians themselves (witness, for example, the controversy that surrounded the ‘Carte Blanche’ NATO exercise in 1955, which saw many West German urban areas pulverized by hundreds of imaginary nuclear strikes, causing millions of estimated civilian casualties).

What is important for the purposes of After Hiroshima was the belief common amongst US policymakers that many Asians saw the US as more ready to employ such weapons against non-white peoples, and the political consequences that could then follow. Notwithstanding the use of the Nevada test site after 1951, this was a notion reinforced by the prevalence of atmosphere nuclear testing (of high yield weapons) in the Asia-Pacific environment, exemplified by the Bravo test in March 1954. The other crucial point to note in this context was that US nuclear threats were often levelled against a state, the People’s Republic of China, which did not have the means to retaliate in kind for most of the period. The Soviet Union might be prepared to intervene on China’s side in a conflict involving the United States – and this was a subject of some fascinating conjecture by the US intelligence community after 1950 - but this could by no means be taken as automatic, especially if US nuclear weapons were selectively delivered against Chinese military targets, such as airfields or ports. All sides recognised, in short, that the victims of American nuclear strikes in conditions of limited war in the Far East were likely to be Chinese, Korean, or Vietnamese (and indirectly Japanese, if the Soviets were to launch some form of nuclear retaliation against US bases in Japan).

In the book, I certainly try to reflect the racial world views of a Truman, Eisenhower, or Dulles, which were undoubtedly informed by prejudice and bias, though the ‘simple minded’ tag employed by Matray above is incongruous in this context. American leaders, it should go without saying, were the products of the society from which they emerged, permeated as it was with ideas of racial difference and hierarchy. As I highlight, Eisenhower was deeply sceptical regarding the prospects for racial integration, as his reactions to the Brown decision of 1954 gave elegant testimony (pp236, 277). While

1 See, for example, Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge, MA, 2001), 41, 50-52, 85-9, 94-5.
accepting of the legal fact of equality, Dulles was largely silent while in office on the need for domestic racial change. His choice in 1953 of Walter S. Robertson as Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, an old-style Southern gentleman from Virginia, closely identified with the cause of Nationalist China, was predicated on his reading of the China lobby in Congress, not the need to appeal to the emerging nationalist and anti-colonial consciousness of Asia. Yet I also quote Dulles in 1948 decrying the “discrimination against colored persons practised by much of the white population of the United States” as a “great blot on the escutcheon of the democracies”. In 1951 he was to warn Dean Rusk that “if it is demonstrated to all Asia, which is intently watching, that Westerners as represented by the United States find it impossible to deal with Orientals on a basis of respect and equality, that will have grave repercussions throughout all of Asia. It will make it likely that all of the Asiatics will unite, under communist leadership, against the West” (p123). In a similar fashion, Dean Acheson’s attachment to notions of racial hierarchy is evident to anyone who had read his private statement and views, but in more practical fashion he was ready to advise Truman in 1952 concerning the future US-Japanese relationship that, “The one great issue which will be decisive in setting the basis of our future relations with Asia will be questions of equal treatment. Our discriminations at home are a great burden upon our relations with Asia: an attempt to practice similar discriminations officially in our relations with the Governments of Asia would be considered by them to be intolerable” (p127).

For the purposes of the book, the essential point is the pragmatic defensiveness of American policymakers which was now on display, as they confronted a post-war world where the transnational significance of the issue of race in international politics had increased, and the white powers would have to deal with a whole clutch of newly independent states and peoples as sovereign equals. In this environment, the racial resonance of nuclear use, planning, testing, and deployment, could have wider political consequences for how the US was regarded in Asia; it was seen as increasingly essential for external US policy to at least appear to operate in a ‘colour blind’ fashion.

Moreover, it was never the ‘main argument’ of the book, as Matray suggests, that “developments in the Civil Rights movement had a direct impact on formulation of U.S. nuclear strategy from 1945 to 1964.” Making a case for any such “direct impact”, through an attempt to connect specific episodes in nuclear policy-making and developments in the Civil Rights Movement, would be stretching the point too far (and so it would be diversionary to cite the specific views of African American leaders regarding events in Asia, however interesting those would be). Nevertheless, as Qiang Zhai and Balazs Szalontai have seen, examples of racial discrimination in the United States had a wider impact in Asia, holding ramifications for the political environment in which nuclear policy had to be made and implemented. Knowledge of racial practices in American society made it that much easier for Communist propaganda to forge a link between race and US nuclear policy, not least when superior forms of Western firepower began to be employed in the Korean War (pp72-3). It is in this sense that the book suggests that the Civil Rights scene in the United States, such as the events at Birmingham in April-May 1963(p406), formed the general backdrop against which US officials might express their concerns that, for example, early recourse to nuclear use in Korea would appear to be a “racist strategy”, a term employed at the time by U. Alexis Johnson, the Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Political
Affairs at the State Department (pp420, 423). This is not to make a direct connection, as Matray contends, but merely to underline the point that events at home were an additional reason why the US might be susceptible to such accusations by Asian commentators.

On a matter of accuracy and attribution, I should point out that Matray quotes me as making what he calls the “grander allegation” (?) that “every act of escalation in South East Asia warranted some counterpoised act of domestic racial atonement” and that “according to Jones, Lyndon B. Johnson was “determined to minimize racial conflict on all fronts” (p407). The first quotation actually begins, “It was as though every act of escalation…”, a phrasing which softens the “allegation” somewhat; this was, after all, merely an impressionistic statement which reflects a commonly-held view that there were strong links between Johnson’s Great Society and Vietnam policies. The second point about Johnson’s wanting to minimize racial conflict on all fronts is not my wording, but a directly attributed quotation from Borstelmann’s Cold and the Color Line.2 Even though agreeing with Borstelmann’s observation here, I would not want any confusion to arise.

There was an obvious need in the book to add qualifications and caveats to some of its findings. One example is the problems involved in trying to identify and locate ‘Asian opinion’ on the subject of race and nuclear weapons. This is a book very much about perceptions, and in no sense an attempt to compile a comprehensive examination of various Asian attitudes towards nuclear weapons, something which would represent a quite different task. For their part, Western officials certainly engaged in generalised assertions about Asian opinion, but in the introduction (pp4-5) I tried to point out the problems in using the term to cover the views of a region so diverse and different in religion, ethnic background, and national dispositions. Thus it is perplexing why Matray finds fault with a selective use of evidence when reference is being made to Asian opinion, as though the book’s concern was to provide an accurate barometer of region-wide feelings (for example, far from “indirectly divulging” my “imprecision”, as he puts it, by referring to that “amorphous concept ‘Asian opinion’” on p98, I was instead, and rather directly and self-consciously, flagging the problems with employing any such notion in any objective sense, as had already been explained in the book’s introduction). In fact, such selective ‘soundings’ were often referred to in contemporary commentaries on the state of opinion in Asia, and constituted one reason why Western policymakers formed their impressions of how ‘the West’ was being perceived at the time. Indeed, as Matray acknowledges, in order to show the multiplicity of views on offer, and to offer balance, I also cite Asian leaders who were more sanguine about nuclear use against what they saw as the menace of Communist China; admitting the problems of coming to any accepted or stable view of Asian opinion do not detract from the argument of the book, founded as it is on American perceptions and attitudes.

Balazs Szalontai quite rightly notes that attitudes toward nuclear weapons were often formed “through the lens of each country’s own specific threat perceptions and antipathies.” In this regard, a major theme of the book is the problems that anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan created for US nuclear planners, often pitting the State Department

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2 Borstelmann, Cold War and Color Line, 194-5.
against the Pentagon. This feeling in Japan, it is apparent, was not reducible to the belief
that the bomb was emblematic of white, Western power, but was grounded in the simple
fact of already having been subjected to nuclear attack, and the fear of becoming a nuclear
target again through the presence of American bases on Japanese territory.

It is impossible in the span of this response to do justice to the many other observations
made by the reviewers. Some of the suggestions for extra dimensions to the work –
including a firmer connection to the theoretical literature on nuclear strategy, greater
attention to the nature of American alliances, the influence of transnational anti-nuclear
movements - could spawn a half-dozen additional studies which would enrich the field, but
would have formed digressions from what I saw as the main themes of the book. When
putting together the section of After Hiroshima dealing with US responses to China's coming
acquisition of a nuclear capability, along with Pierre Grosser, I too was drawn to the
contemporary parallels one could make with the Iranian nuclear programme, and the
predisposition of American analysts in the early 1960s to put aside the ideological rhetoric
of the Chinese regime and to consider instead the additional geostrategic caution this new
status might actually induce in Beijing’s leaders. As several of the readers have
commented, there is food for thought in the text for both detractors and supporters of
Eisenhower’s performance as national security manager, though more for the former than
the latter. His failure to come to grips with the exponential increase in the size of the US
nuclear stockpile from the mid-1950s onwards was lamentable, while in the decolonizing
world, along with many others, he too often superimposed Cold War patterns of thinking
on the desires for national independence expressed by many leaders. And yet, one also has
to recognise his sharp and realistic sense of the limitations of US power, his ability to keep
more intemperate subordinates in line, and his keen awareness of the disastrous
consequences of nuclear war.

Pierre Grosser asks a key question, “why was there not another nuclear strike in Asia after
1945?” to which there are, of course, many answers, and no overriding and determining
factors can account for such a ‘non-event’. After Hiroshima helps to show that alongside
more traditional approaches to this issue, which might focus on the strategic nuclear
balance, or the operational aspects of military planning, there was also a political
dimension to consider, and that issues bound up with race contributed to the picture that
Washington had of its presence and policies in the region. As Qiang Zhai observes, one of
the book’s principal aims was also to use nuclear history as a new prism through which the
“troubled encounter” between the United States and the peoples and states of Asia after the
Second World War could be viewed, and it is on this basis that I hope it will come to be
judged.

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