

Contents

Introduction by Fred Greenstein, Princeton University (Emeritus) .......................................... 2
Review by Erwin C. Hargrove, Vanderbilt University ................................................................ 5
Review by Scott Kaufman, Francis Marion University .............................................................. 9
Review by Robert A. Pastor, American University ................................................................. 14
Review by Robert A. Strong, Washington and Lee University ............................................... 21
If Betty Glad were alive, she could not fail to be pleased by the following largely favorable reviews of her final book. Alas, she died on 2 August 2010 at the age of 87.\textsuperscript{1}

\textsuperscript{1} OBITUARY of Dr. Betty Glad from H-Diplo, August 17, 2010

Written by Professors Daniel Sabia, Jr. and Laura R. Woliver Department of Political Science University of South Carolina, and Fred I. Greenstein, Princeton University

Dr. Betty Glad, 82, died August 2, 2010. She enjoyed a truly distinguished career as a scholar of American politics and foreign policy. Betty was the Olin D. Johnston Professor of Political Science and Distinguished Professor Emerita at the University of South Carolina. She was an exemplary scholar, an expert on the American Presidency, United States foreign policy, and political leadership. She was the author of _Jimmy Carter: In Search of the Great White House_; _Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusions of Innocence_; _Key Pittman: The Tragedy of a Senate Insider_, and most recently, _An Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American Foreign Policy_ (Cornell University Press, 2009). H-Diplo will publish a roundtable on this book in the Fall. Betty was also editor or co-editor of _The Psychological Dimensions of War_; _The Russian Transformation_, and other books. In addition, she published dozens of articles, book chapters and commentary. Her first book, _Charles Evans Hughes_, was nominated for a Pulitzer Prize.

Betty earned her B.S. degree magna cum laude, and Phi Beta Kappa, from the University of Utah. She received her doctorate from the University of Chicago in 1962. Afterwards she taught at Mt. Holyoke College, and Brooklyn College, then taught for many years at the University of Illinois - Urbana - Champaign. She also served as a visiting professor at New York University during the years 1986-1988. Betty was one of the first women to earn a Ph.D. in Political Science and then teach at a Ph.D. granting institution. She served as the first woman chair of the University of Illinois, Department of Political Science. In 1989, she moved from Illinois to the University of South Carolina.

Betty was a dedicated teacher and an exemplary mentor to untold numbers of graduate students whose careers were enhanced with her care and guidance. As a pioneer and role model for women throughout the Political Science profession, she also was one of the first women to challenge prevailing conventions and gender discrimination in the discipline, and one of the first to attain national and international stature. As a result, she won many awards for both scholarship and leadership throughout her long career, including the Frank D. Goodnow Award from the American Political Science Association for a lifetime of contributions and service to the discipline, and the Harold Lasswell Award from the International Society for Political Psychology for a lifetime of outstanding contributions to political psychology. In 2007, she received a distinguished alumna award from the University of Utah. She served many posts and positions, including President of the International Society for Political Psychology, President of the Presidency Research Section of the American Political Science Association, and Vice-President of the American Political Science Association.

Betty’s interests and her scholarly contributions were wide-ranging, but she was particularly interested in the social-psychology of political leadership. Her books and articles include analyses of the leadership styles of six recent American presidents as well as Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, Wilhelm de Klerk and Nelson Mandela, and many others. She was always fascinated by, attracted to, and yet wary of, both politics and political leadership. This was due in the main to her deep knowledge of so many political leaders and of the triumphs and tragedies of political history in which they play a part, but it was due also to her own experiences as an academic leader, political activist, and reflective citizen. Betty was a committed
She was born in Salt Lake City, received her B.A. from the University of Utah and Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, going on to teach at Mt. Holyoke College, Brooklyn College, and the University of Illinois. Her final appointment was at the University of South Carolina, where she was the Olin D. Johnson Professor of Political Science.

Professor Glad’s 1980 *Jimmy Carter: In Search of the Great White House* was a prelude to the work reviewed here. The book traces the life of its protagonist from his birth in 1924 to the summer of 1980, drawing heavily on contemporary journalism and personal interviews. *An Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American Foreign Policy* builds on the earlier volume, taking advantage of subsequent scholarship and many previously unconsulted documents.

Each of these reviews contributes to the understanding of Carter the man and the combination of successes and failures that mark his presidency. Two of them also provide new historical data. Erwin Hargrove draws on an instructive unpublished interview with the subject of this symposium in his analysis of Carter’s personality and leadership style. Robert Pastor draws on his service on the Carter National Security Council to question or qualify a number of Professor Glad’s assertions. As Pastor suggests, there remains a need for a comprehensive biography of the enigmatic thirty-ninth president of the United States. The author of such a work would be bound to profit not only from Betty Glad’s scholarship but also from the reviews that follow.

**Participants:**

**Fred Greenstein** is Professor of Politics Emeritus at Princeton University. His books include *Personality and Politics* (1969), *The Hidden Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader* (1982), *The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Barack Obama* (2009), and *Inventing the Job of President: Leadership Style from George Washington to Andrew Jackson* (2009). He is currently working on a book about the presidents of the Civil War era.


democrat, and also a committed Democrat, but her love of justice far transcended her other political commitments and fascinations. Intellectually vigorous to the end, Betty’s successful career as scholar and teacher, mentor and leader, was aided in no small measure by her personal courage, strength, and tenaciousness. These virtues also served her well in the last few years of her life, when she continued her work while combating a great many physical challenges.
Scott Kaufman is Associate Professor of History at Francis Marion University where he teaches courses on U.S. foreign policy and American military history. He has authored or co-authored six books including, most recently, Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration (DeKalb: University of Northern Illinois Press). He is currently finishing a manuscript on Project Plowshare.

Robert A. Pastor is Professor of International Relations at American University and Founder and Director of the Center for Democracy and Election Management and the Center for North American Studies. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University. Pastor has combined a career of scholarship, teaching, and public policy. He was Director of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs on the National Security Council (1977-81), was nominated to be Ambassador to Panama by President Bill Clinton, and was a consultant to the Departments of State and Defense. He is the author or editor of seventeen books, including The North American Idea: A Vision of a Continental Future, A Century's Journey: How the Great Powers Shaped the World, and Exiting the Whirlpool: US Foreign Policy Toward Latin America. For his bio, see http://www.american.edu/ia/staff/rpastor.html

Robert Strong is Associate Provost and Wilson Professor of Politics at Washington and Lee University. He earned his PhD from the University of Virginia in 1980 and has held visiting or permanent appointments at the University College of Wales, Tulane and Oxford. He was an American Political Science Association Congressional Fellow in the offices of Congressman Lee Hamilton and Senator Richard Lugar. He is the author of a collection of case studies in modern American foreign policy and books dealing with Henry Kissinger and Jimmy Carter. He is currently at work on a book dealing with foreign policy in the administration of the elder President Bush.
There are three narratives in this book. The first is a portrait of Jimmy Carter’s limitations in the personal political abilities that any president needs to be effective. The second theme is how Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s assistant for national security in the White House, took advantage of those limitations to steer the president toward the policies that he, Brzezinski, thought best. The third story is how Carter gradually moved away from Secretary of State Cyrus Vance’s thinking, and toward Brzezinski’s hard line views on the Soviet Union and related policies.

Jimmy Carter was a very determined man who understood clearly the kind of president that he wished to be. He and Herbert Hoover are the only engineers to have been president, and engineers often think that there are clear, exact solutions to problems with the application of intelligence and study. Carter did not admire other politicians, a judgment that he made when he served in the Georgia Senate. They seemed greedy for benefits for constituents and themselves. He saw U.S. Senators as rivals. He secured the reorganization of Georgia state government through his own persuasive powers and from that success he derived the idea that comprehensive policy proposals could be politically persuasive if they transcended particularistic interests to invoke a larger public interest. He thus rejected ordinary coalition building and incremental steps in policymaking in favor of big new ideas and big leaps. He told a group of political scientists in 1982:

“A lot of my advisors, including Rosalyn, used to argue with me about my decision to move ahead with a project when it was obviously not going to be politically advantageous, or to encourage me to postpone it until a possible second term and so forth. It was just contrary to my nature... I just couldn’t do it. Once I made a decision I was awfully stubborn about it. I think if I could have one attribute as the cause of my success to begin with, it would be tenacity. Once I set my mind on something I’m awfully hard to change. And that may also be a cause of some of my political failures.”

Carter wanted to be the first man to reach the top of the mountain. Betty Glad understands this need in Carter and attributes two of his great successes to his character, the securing of the Panama Canal treaties and the resolution of conflicts between Israel and Egypt at Camp David. She also sees that the ambition to do great things accounted for failure in the first arms negotiations with the Soviets and that his determination to normalize relations with China also delayed agreements of arms control. According to Glad, Carter’s lack of realism in foreign policy was a great shock to him when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and may have led to an overreaction.

A second aspect of Carter’s character was his strong sense of morality as essential to political action. His religious faith was central to his life in politics. He believed that with

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1 Jimmy Carter interview, Carter Presidency Project, volume 19, Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, George, p. 70.
God all things were possible. Politics was a moral activity. The cause of human rights in the world was the moral theme he chose to emphasize and it usually took precedence among his goals even when it conflicted with major policy objectives. For example, he preached to Soviet leaders about the need to respect human rights just as he was bargaining about arms control.

Carter’s intellectual self-confidence caused him to decide not to have a chief of staff in the White House. He would be his own chief of staff. This was a Democratic way of thinking. Previous Democratic presidents had not had chiefs of staff, but Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford had such help. Democrats, with their beliefs in a strong president, did not want any bureaucracy between the chief executive and his staff. Carter campaigned that he would not have a Henry Kissinger in the White House and that he would reduce the size of the White House staff. This often led to tokenism. For example, the staff of the Council of Economic Advisers was reduced from 15 to 13, an action that impaired its effectiveness. He wanted to be close to the policy options as they emerged and made clear to his policy staffs that he would make the final decisions. He liked to have competing presentations from advisors. His favorite meeting was the Friday morning breakfasts with Vance, Brzezinski, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, and Vice-President Mondale. Discussion and debate would often be followed by presidential decisions. Carter said that he valued Brzezinski for the fresh ideas that his staff would throw out and Vance for the institutional knowledge that would be provided by the State department. He was in a position to set the balance and decide. Such a view does not take account of the bureaucratic politics of the White House and the upper executive branch at which Brzezinski was a master. He wrote in his memoir that policy questions were too important for him to simply be a guardian of the president’s choices. Rather he acted as a player in his own right, often in contradiction to the Secretary of State. He pushed hard for the normalization of U.S. relations with China, emphasizing his own diplomatic role, despite Vance’s accurate prediction that the negotiation of SALT treaties would be delayed. Carter was preoccupied with other important questions during the 1978 Iranian revolution and Brzezinski acted to urge the Iranian military to take action against the revolution contrary to the State Department’s position. He was able to carry Carter with him on China because the president wanted a signal achievement. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Brzezinski carried Carter over to his hard anti-Soviet line and Vance eventually resigned on a pretext. Congressional committees periodically questioned who was running foreign policy but Carter was not mindful of the public perception because he was happy with what he was getting. He did not think of politics and policy as a seamless web.

Glad argues that Carter valued Brzezinski because the professor provided strategic analyses of foreign policy that the president lacked. This may have been true in the last year and a half but earlier Carter was more in tune with Vance who shared Carter’s wish to reduce the Cold War tensions with the Soviets and establish peaceful international relations with general respect for human rights. Carter was a Wilsonian who put these

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values above the realpolitik that inspired Brzezinski. Glad is correct to see a lack of realism in Carter along Wilsonian lines but Brzezinski never changed that. He was able to strengthen the universalism of Wilsonian thinking to return Carter to the Cold War crusade against the Soviets that he himself advocated.

If Carter had been more of a realist he might have sought to negotiate the agreements reached by President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger at Vladivostok as Ford’s term was ending. He would not have sent a first proposal to Moscow in 1977 which was more ambitious than Vladivostok and which the Soviets rejected. However, with persistence Carter did negotiate the SALT II treaty in 1979. He might have succeeded sooner but ultimately he did succeed. He did achieve normalization of relations with China. When you add the Panama Canal treaties and the Camp David accords one sees a number of substantial achievements in American foreign policy. Betty Glad does not appear to want to give him much credit at all. The fall of the Shah could surely have not been prevented. Nor was there any clear step that might have been taken to pacify the Ayatollah Khomeini or his revolution. American officials had little understanding of the new Iran.

Carter was defeated because of domestic problems. The rate of inflation was very high, 13 per cent at times in his last year. To curb inflation he contributed to a recession during the election season. He was caught in the "stagflation" of inflation and unemployment that economists did not know how to resolve. He attempted welfare reform that was too ambitious and failed in Congress. He was too conservative for Democratic interest groups, especially organized Labor and women's rights advocates. The congressional Democratic leaders did not want to hear his message that the Great Society level of expenditures was over and that fiscal moderation was the future requirement. Given his moderate approach to Democratic programs and the economic climate that he could not control, he was a one term president. His foreign policies did not hurt him politically except to reinforce the image that he was an ineffective president because of Afghanistan and the hostages in Iran.

Glad is right to take Brzezinski to task for his failure to be the “custodian” of Carter’s policy alternatives. Carter wanted it that way because he wanted disagreements between Brzezinski and Vance that he might resolve. But the national security adviser did not always play fair. If he had played a more detached analytic role would history have been any different? I think not. There would have been the SALT agreement and new relations with China. The Iranian revolution would have occurred. The Canal treaties would have been secured as well as the Camp David successes.

Three versions of the relations among the President, Assistant for National Security, and the Secretary of State have recurred in history since the presidency of John F. Kennedy:

1. A balanced system in which the Secretary of State is spokesman for foreign policy as well as the chief diplomat and the Assistant for National Security plays a primarily analytic role to ensure that all good policy alternatives are presented to the President. The best example is probably that of George H.W. Bush, Secretary of State James Baker, and Assistant for National Security, Brent Scowcroft. The latter was a policy adviser to Bush but there were no open conflicts with Baker. He and Baker worked in harness well in their respective
roles. President Clinton’s system also worked well with Anthony Lake, the White House adviser and Warren Christopher the Secretary of State, and in the second term with Sandy Berger and Madeline Albright taking the same positions.

This model did not work well with George W. Bush because National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice found it difficult to make peace between the Secretaries of State and Defense Colin Powell and Donald Rumsfeld. The system worked well in the second term because Rice, as Secretary of State, and Bill Gates as Secretary of Defense worked well with each other and with Stephen Hadley at the White House.

2. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger created the most highly centralized system in which even the Secretaries of State and Defense were required to take back seats. President Ford tempered the situation somewhat with Kissinger at State and Scowcroft in the White House. The highly centralized model prevents the president from receiving a sufficiently wide range of advice and encourages major policy errors.

3. Ronald Reagan had five National Security Advisers none of whom had much influence. George Schultz was a highly effective Secretary of State who was able to advise Reagan most effectively as they worked together. This was a variation of the centralized system in which the president relied primarily on one adviser but that person was the Secretary of State rather than a White House aide. This system was effective because it suited Reagan’s need for one adviser to guide him in the path he wished to take. It would not do for most presidents.

How does the Brzezinski pattern fit here? It lacks both the virtues and flaws of a centralized model. It was not a balanced system of mutual respect and cooperation. It was at times loosely joined because authority was unclear as in the case of Iran. There is little good to be said for it. It might be a mistake to appoint scholars, especially political scientists to the job of adviser. They may have too many policy ideas. One should look for an experienced person who knows policy and understands government well but is not a strong policy advocate. Brent Scowcroft is the ideal. It is the president’s responsibility to create a balanced system in making the key appointments and then ensuring balance thereafter. Policy imperatives will usually override an abstract concern for balance but history suggests that presidents are well serviced in the long run.
In his 1996 Bernath Lecture, the historian Douglas Brinkley lobbied for a reassessment of Jimmy Carter’s presidency. Scholars of Carter’s administration had depicted him as a leader who could boast some significant accomplishments but failed to achieve more because of his own apolitical tendencies, vacillation, lack of vision, and poor managerial skills, as well as internecine warfare among his chief aides. While Brinkley addressed to some extent what he saw as Carter’s successes in domestic policy, among them an avoidance of the large debt that his successor left behind, he focused much of his encomium upon Carter’s diplomacy. The thirty-ninth president, he commented, was a “hands on” individual whose accomplishments included the Camp David Accords, the Panama Canal Treaties, normalization of relations with China, boosting the defenses of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and restoring America’s reputation as a defender of human rights around the world.¹

Brinkley had a point. From the publication of Gaddis Smith’s *Morality, Reason, and Power*, (1986) studies of Carter’s foreign policy had been largely critical. Alexander Moens, Burton Kaufman, Timothy Maga, Richard Thornton, Joshua Muravchik, and others depicted a president who wanted to transform American diplomacy from one based upon containing communism to one focused instead upon human rights and the promotion of world peace. A combination of ineptitude, inconsistency, and bad luck prevented that transformation. With the full support of his National Security Council (NSC) adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter returned to a Soviet-centric foreign policy.²

By the time of Brinkley’s address, however, a revisionist critique had appeared. Rather than seeing Carter as indecisive or weak, scholars such as Erwin Hargrove, Steven Hurst, Robert Strong, and Jonathan Dumbrell praised him for involving himself in the intricacies of foreign policy, which made the Panama Canal Treaties and Camp David Accords possible; for promoting human rights; and for accomplishing as much as he did in an international environment largely anathema to what he desired to achieve. More recently, Mary Stuckey, though critical of Carter as an orator, has credited him with making human rights a central component of U.S. foreign policy.³

It is possible, however, that the scholarship on the Carter presidency is starting to return to the “orthodox” interpretation. My own work has been more critical of the thirty-ninth president than the revisionists. Betty Glad’s *Outsider in the White House* reaffirms that interpretation.

According to Glad, President Carter ran for the White House as a political outsider who would bring new ideas to Washington, including shifting the direction of America’s foreign policy. Following his election, he pursued an “ambitious agenda,” one aimed at deemphasizing the East-West confrontation in favor of “drastic reductions in the number of nuclear weapons and the protection of human rights around the world” (p. 19). By early 1978, however, this attempt to forge a new foreign policy had begun to falter. Seeing an ever-present Soviet threat, the White House gradually returned to one centered on containing communism.

The reason for the return to the old ways of doing things was the result of the rivalry between Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Whereas Brzezinski saw the Kremlin as “bent on world domination” (p. 25) and, accordingly, a threat to American interests, Vance concluded Moscow had no such grand design. Furthermore, the secretary of state believed it possible to find areas of agreement with the Soviets, such as on arms control. Glad insightfully asserts that Vance “appealed to one side of Carter’s brain, Brzezinski the other.” If Carter had a clear sense of his goal and how to achieve it, “Vance and his colleagues in the State Department would have an open field” (p. 39). But when it came to issues involving relationships between the superpowers, where the president saw areas of both competition and cooperation, Brzezinski came out on top.

Clarity of objective was apparent in at least two cases: the Panama Canal Treaties and the Camp David Accords. Determined to return the Panama Canal to Panama, the president, working closely with officials at the State Department, successfully got the Panama Canal Treaties signed. An intense lobbying effort, in which Carter played a central role, got those same agreements ratified. Similarly, there was a clear sense of purpose as the president worked closely with his advisers, including both Vance and Brzezinski, to get Egypt and Israel to sign the Camp David Accords.

Most of the time, however, it was Brzezinski who was victorious. Much less enthusiastic than Vance about the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT), Brzezinski in 1977 endorsed Carter’s demand for deeper cuts in the superpowers’ stockpiles than Vance favored or the Soviets were willing to accept. The NSC adviser supported Carter’s berating


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of the Kremlin for human rights violations, despite Vance’s concern that doing so would endanger SALT. When armed conflict broke out in the Horn of Africa that same year between Somalia and Soviet-backed Ethiopia, Vance took issue with Brzezinski’s contention that that clash was related to the Kremlin’s plan to take over the world. Moreover, the secretary of state was displeased with Carter’s decision to join Brzezinski in linking Soviet behavior in the Horn to SALT. What he saw as a growing Soviet threat prompted Brzezinski to urge Carter to normalize relations with China, a move the secretary of state believed would derail SALT; Carter in 1978 came down on the NSC adviser’s side. When the Shah of Iran fled his nation in early 1979 in the face of widespread opposition, Brzezinski saw the Soviet hand at work and apparently convinced Carter of that; in turn, the president refused any attempt to come to terms with the new Iranian leader, Ruhollah Khomeini. The “discovery” of a brigade of Soviet troops in Cuba later that year – soldiers who had actually been there since the 1960s – was proof again to Brzezinski of the Kremlin’s grand plan. While Brzezinski “endeavored to stoke the fires” (p. 191) on the brigade issue and urged Carter to engage in a hard-line response against Moscow, Vance sought to put those same fires out. To Brzezinski, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that December was yet another step toward communist domination of the planet; to Vance, it “was abnormal as regards Soviet foreign policy” (p. 204). Seeing Afghanistan as a threat to U.S. interests and “a test of his mettle” (p. 206), Carter sided with Brzezinski and took hard-nosed measures against Moscow. A few months later, the president authorized a mission by the U.S. military to rescue Americans being held hostage in Iran. Not only did Brzezinski favor the rescue mission, but the president made his decision while Vance was away. Infuriated, the secretary of state resigned. While Glad attributes Vance’s resignation to the rescue mission, “his pessimism about the future course of U.S.-Soviet relations must have played a role in his decision” (p. 215).

So why was Brzezinski generally victorious? Glad offers several reasons. One was Carter’s lack of “a well-developed strategic vision” (p. 1). Not having the same sense of clarity he did on specific topics, such as Middle East peace or the Panama Canal Treaties, the president found himself “vulnerable” (p. 1) to someone like Brzezinski, who had “an overall strategic concept” (p. 2). Second, Brzezinski had a more assertive personality than Vance. Third, the national security adviser could call upon the support of other top Carter advisers, among them Defense Secretary Harold Brown, Vice-President Walter Mondale, and First Lady Rosalynn Carter, particularly as U.S. foreign policy returned to its previous Soviet-centrism. Simultaneously, Brzezinski cut potential rivals, among them Central Intelligence Agency Director Stansfield Turner, out of the decisionmaking process. Fourth, Brzezinski used his position as a cabinet member and his knowledge of the bureaucracy to command much of the paper that flowed to the Oval Office. Fifth, at a personal level Carter liked Brzezinski. The NSC adviser, wrote Glad, “was one of the few people Carter never reprimanded” (p. 34). Sixth, the president preferred how Brzezinski presented information to him. Brzezinski’s Weekly Reports offered short, crisp summations of the issues of the day, whereas State Department summaries tended to be “highly sophisticated and complex” (p. 85). Finally, and maybe most important, Carter’s lack of experience made him dependent upon someone with foreign policy expertise. By relying so much “on an advisor who had his own political agenda and extraordinary skill in creating a political milieu” Brzezinski could “lead the president in the direction the [NSC] advisor desired” (p. 279).
On the surface, much of Glad's argument is not new. Others, including Jean Garrison, Gaddis Smith, Burton Kaufman, and this author have pointed to Brzezinski's influence over policymaking. What is intriguing is her suggestion that Brzezinski provided a strategic concept otherwise lacking. Scholars have debated whether Carter had a vision to guide his foreign policy. What Glad suggests is that rather than look at Carter, the focus should shift instead to his NSC adviser.

Glad bases her conclusions on an impressive amount of research. Not only did she consult materials at the Jimmy Carter Library but also the Cyrus Vance papers at Yale University. Additionally, she interviewed or corresponded with numerous Carter administration officials, including Brzezinski, Christopher, Vance, Leslie Gelb, Richard Holbrooke, William Odom, and Robert Pastor. Her discovery that the Carter administration asked Pope John Paul II to help stop El Salvadoran Archbishop Oscar Romero from promoting human rights in his nation is both damning and a further indication of how much human rights had become deemphasized in the name of combating communism.

Glad's work does have shortcomings. She argues that Andrew Young was one of Carter's "significant appointees" (p. 22), yet he receives virtually no mention in the book. Nuclear nonproliferation, also one of the president's major foreign policy goals, receives little attention. During his campaign for the presidency, Carter had promised to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea, and, in the face of intense opposition, tried to do so following his election. Glad devotes only one paragraph to this topic. She omits a discussion of Rhodesia, even though it would fit well into her thesis: It was a place where Carter sought to promote human rights, and where Brzezinski and Vance disagreed over how best to do so, with the NSC adviser favoring a cautious approach in the name of containing communism. Finally, Glad is on the mark that Carter deemphasized human rights. As early as January 1978, Anthony Lake, the head of the Policy Planning Staff, wrote Vance that insofar as applying human rights criteria to the multilateral development banks, U.S. human rights policy had come to focus almost solely upon Latin America. Still, Glad credits Carter with successes, among them an increase in the number of Soviet dissidents permitted to leave and liberalization in South Africa and Poland. There is no doubt that at a symbolic level, Carter created positive change. Trying to prove that other nations altered their internal policies as a result of pressure from Washington is more difficult. Even the White House commented that in "many cases," those improvements in human rights "reflected dramatic internal political developments.”

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6 Lake to Secretary, 16 January 1978, White House Central File, Box HU-1, Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, Georgia.

7 Inderfurth to Brzezinski, December 1, 1978, NLC-11-3-7-10-8, JCL.
Despite these criticisms, Glad has written an engaging work, one that will continue the debate over Carter’s strength as president.
Phillip Graham, the publisher of the *Washington Post* in the 1960s, was reported to have described journalism as “the first rough draft of history.” The implication is that historians would provide the final draft or, at least, an assessment after time had passed and the events and characters could be viewed with detachment in a wider context.

Few seemed better positioned to provide a final draft than Betty Glad, who was the Olin D. Johnston Professor of Political Science Emerita at the University of South Carolina, and a student of Jimmy Carter since publication of her book *Jimmy Carter: In Search of the Great White House*. Nearly thirty years after that book was published in 1980, and after exhaustive research, Betty Glad returned to her subject or, more accurately, to one dimension - the foreign policy of the Carter presidency.

Her thesis is that Carter’s foreign policy was ultimately the product of a clash between two titans - Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, a wise patrician-statesman, and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, a brilliant but manipulative strategist, who used his proximity to Jimmy Carter to tilt U.S. foreign policy toward a new Cold War. The thesis actually sounds like the first draft. During the Carter presidency and the immediate period after it, the conventional wisdom of journalists and pundits was that Carter’s foreign policy vacillated between the liberal diplomacy of Vance and the anti-Soviet tendencies of Brzezinski, who ultimately triumphed. After extensive research, Glad seems to have returned from whence she began.

To be sure, her book is much more than just a recounting of the personal competition between Carter’s two principal aides. With reference to de-classified documents, interviews, oral histories, and books, she covers almost all of the major issues and policies developed by the Carter Administration. The agenda was a formidable one, and the Carter presidency did not shy away from any of it. Indeed, Carter went where his predecessors feared to tread, and in the process, he negotiated and secured ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties and a bold new approach to Latin America that included the strengthening of inter-American institutions on human rights, the ratification of Protocol I of the non-proliferation Tlatelolco Treaty, and the reinforcement of democracy. He normalized relations with China. He mediated the Camp David Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. He moved human rights to the center of American foreign policy. He negotiated and signed the SALT II nuclear arms agreement. He negotiated the end of white rule in Rhodesia and a new approach to Africa. He forged a comprehensive energy policy and developed new policies on conventional arms control and nuclear non-proliferation.

Glad does a superb job in recounting the major decisions and events of some of these policies - e.g., on SALT, Panama, China, Africa, the Soviet Union. In other areas - e.g., human rights and Latin America - her footing is not as sure, and she makes numerous mistakes. But even at her best, she concludes a relatively balanced and astute description of the formulation of U.S. policy by a narrower assessment that reduces the debate to the Brzezinski-Vance clash, and in that, she does not conceal her sympathy for the Vance
approach. While giving Brzezinski credit for his tactics, she believes he was almost always wrong. The only credit she gives to Carter is pushing for the Canal Treaties despite the political cost and orchestrating the Camp David accords.

In the interest of full disclosure, I worked for Brzezinski as the Director of Latin American Affairs on the National Security Council for the entire four years of the Carter Administration, and have worked with Jimmy Carter at the Carter Center and on other projects for most of his post-presidency. I was also close with Cyrus Vance, whom I greatly admired. In brief, I believe I know all three protagonists well - their strengths, weaknesses, and the way in which they interacted. Glad’s reading of their interaction is sometimes quite good, but mostly, it is superficial or simply misses the mark.

There are four elements missing from her analysis: a fuller understanding of Jimmy Carter; the reaction by other countries to his initiatives; the change in world politics about half-way through his Administration; the evolution of the Vance-Brzezinski relationship; and Carter’s legacy. Let me describe how the incorporation of each of these elements would have produced a far more accurate final draft of Carter’s foreign policy.

1. Carter was the policy-maker. It is true that Carter arrived in the White House with little foreign policy knowledge or experience, and that he was an eager student, and Brzezinski was a persuasive professor. It is also true that Brzezinski tried to game the system, and this irritated Vance. Both he and Vance were confident, knowledgeable, and exceptionally intelligent, and Carter recruited them because of those characteristics and their contrasting world-views and temperaments, and because he was even more confident, intelligent, and determined than them.

It is also true that Carter preferred to deal more with paper than with briefings because paper was more efficient, and he could accomplish more by reading than attending meetings. Glad thinks this made it easier for Brzezinski to manipulate the process since all the foreign policy papers and the summaries of the meetings held under the National Security Council were either generated or passed through him. Carter insisted that the memos that went to him included the views of the State Department and other interested agencies, and in the cases in which there were differences, he would often check directly with Vance or other departmental secretaries. Therefore, Brzezinski’s credibility with Carter depended in part on the fairness in which he summarized other views. Glad found no evidence that Brzezinski abused his position to mis-characterize Vance’s views.

But the principal point that seems to elude Glad was that Carter wasn’t a cipher for anyone. Nor did he simply integrate the divergent views of his advisers as the first and last drafts of history suggest. Like every adept politician, Carter had a sense of America that was refined during two intensive years of campaigning at a retail level, and he integrated his understanding of America with his advisors’ knowledge of the world.

The foreign policy of the Carter Administration was fundamentally his policy - more than anyone else’s. He did not arrive with a complete policy or a well-considered strategy any more than Franklin D. Roosevelt or John F. Kennedy did. He arrived with several themes -
human rights; the pursuit of peace; the recognition of the importance of power but also the necessity of morality; and a desire to assist the developing world. He also had an agenda, which combined challenges that his predecessors hadn’t addressed or finished - like Panama, SALT, China, the Middle East, Cuba, Rhodesia - or which he felt were important - like human rights, non-proliferation, and arms control. His advisors urged him to tackle just a few of the issues and postpone the tough ones for a second term, but he was determined to do them all as soon as possible. And it turned out that he achieved more than anyone - except himself - thought was possible.

The debates, which Glad often quotes, were wide-ranging, and Carter sought them so that he would have the relevant information before he made a decision. Carter, in brief, was primus inter pares, but the public interpreted the gossip about the Vance-Brzezinski skirmishes as suggesting he was not. Carter’s problem was that he was so sure he was in charge that he did not bother to take the public perception seriously. Still, the documents confirm Carter’s perception, and one would have hoped that the final draft of history would have corrected the first draft.

2. Reaction by Other Countries. Glad blames Carter for the breakdown in U.S.-Soviet relations due to his rejection of Kissinger’s Vladivostok proposal on SALT II in favor of a more ambitious arms control policy and for his public criticism of Soviet repression and intervention in Africa. Of course, Carter had campaigned not just against Gerald Ford but also against Henry Kissinger’s diplomacy, and he had also promised a more ambitious goal - of eliminating nuclear weapons. It should not have come as a surprise to the Soviets that the Kissinger outline would be insufficient and that Carter would propose deeper cuts on nuclear weapons. The fact that Glad holds Carter rather than Brezhnev responsible for the breakdown in U.S.-Soviet relations is revealing, but it is a thread woven through the book. She focuses so much on judging the debate within the Carter Administration that she fails to ask - let alone answer - whether the policies of America’s rivals were wrong and possibly the cause of the failure to reach agreement.

Whether and when agreements were reached depended partly on Carter’s initiative but also on the response of the other countries. Panama responded the fastest to his initiative, and the Canal Treaties were therefore the first on the Senate’s agenda. China responded faster than the Soviet Union, and thus normalization preceded SALT II, and indeed, SALT II was never ratified. Cuba was slow to respond to Carter’s initiatives, and we’re still waiting for normalization.

3. The Return of the Cold War. Glad holds Brzezinski accountable for goading Carter to make critical statements about Soviet-Cuban interventions, but the documents show clearly that Carter was the initiator, hand-writing notes to State Department officials to make such statements. Carter was immensely frustrated that State failed to implement his instructions, and he encouraged Brzezinski to speak out on the subject. Of course, Brzezinski did not need a lot of encouragement.

On the issue of Soviet-Cuban involvement in the Horn, the three principal policy-makers had different perspectives. Like Vance, Carter wanted the U.S. to play a key role in Africa
negotiating peace and transitions such as in Zimbabwe, but like Brzezinski, Carter felt that Soviet-Cuban military intervention undermined such efforts. Brzezinski was more concerned with the geo-political implications: if the Soviet Union did not pay a price for military intervention, it might be tempted to move into other areas. In Brzezinski’s eyes, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan occurred, in part, because the United States had not found an effective way to restrain the Soviets in the Ogaden. Carter was not opposed to finding an effective way to raise the cost to the Soviets, but he did not think sending an aircraft carrier to the Horn, as Brzezinski recommended, would do the trick, and it could raise expectations of possible military involvement that Carter had no intention to undertake at the time.

Like Vance, Carter wanted to conclude a SALT agreement and wanted good relations with the Soviet Union. Like Brzezinski, Carter understood that selling a SALT agreement to the Senate would require that he be viewed as ready to stand up to the Soviets and publicly scold them on human rights and intervention. Carter’s policy, in brief, incorporated elements of both perspectives, but it had a logic of its own.

With the detachment of thirty years, it now appears that the late 1970s were a period when the Soviet Union was feeling as if it were on an upward trajectory and could begin to play the kind of global role that the United States had played before Vietnam. At the same time, Carter, who was viewed by the American public as more accommodating, was actually tougher on the Soviets than his predecessors, not just in buttressing NATO but in a new area - human rights - which was de-legitimizing and thus more threatening. Previous presidents had criticized the Communists for political repression, but Carter was the first U.S. President to enhance the credibility of the argument by applying human rights globally - against friendly, right-wing regimes as well as against unfriendly Communist regimes.

Americans were justifiably uneasy, if not just angry with the new assertiveness of the Soviet Union in Africa with Cuba, in Indo-China with Vietnam, and in Europe. Some saw a direct connection with the emergence of anti-American regimes in Iran, Nicaragua, and Grenada. This uneasiness reached a peak and exacerbated the division between Vance and Brzezinski during the artificial crisis of the Soviet brigade in Cuba in September 1979. It was artificial because the brigade had been in Cuba since the Missile Crisis, and it represented a threat only to the pretended non-aligned status of Cuba. But before the Administration could learn about its origin, the information was leaked to the press, and Senators Frank Church and Henry Jackson - representing the spectrum of the Democratic Party - both said that SALT could not be ratified unless the brigade was withdrawn from Cuba.

Of course, the Soviets had no intention of withdrawing soldiers that had been there for 17 years, and so the Administration found itself trapped and trying to find a way out that could save SALT. Both Vance and Brzezinski wanted to save SALT, but Vance thought that would be more likely if the incident were down-played, and Brzezinski thought the Administration would be in a stronger position if it pushed back against the Soviet Union. This was ultimately a political call and a no-win one at that, and Carter accepted some of Brzezinski’s recommendations while trying to move the treaty forward. The Soviets
concluded the Treaty would not be ratified, and thus felt un-constrained when they faced the decision on whether to intervene in Afghanistan, which was the demonstrative fact that made the Cold War colder.

4. Evolution of a Relationship. It will come as a surprise to the reader of the book that Vance had recommended to Carter that he appoint Brzezinski as National Security Adviser and Brzezinski had recommended Vance to be Secretary of State. Moreover, for the first two years, while there were some tensions surrounding policy to the Soviet Union, China, and Africa, the two agreed on most of the foreign policy agenda. There were no significant differences on Panama, the Middle East, human rights, and Latin America.

The differences became pronounced as Cold War tensions rose - beginning in Africa and peaking with the Soviet brigade and the invasion of Afghanistan. U.S. foreign policy pivoted not because Brzezinski had out-maneuvered Vance, but because Carter needed to adapt to a changing world and be more forceful. The time for negotiations with the Soviet Union passed. Vance had tried to keep it alive, but Gromyko wouldn’t even meet with him after Afghanistan.

There was both a strategic and domestic political reason for the U.S. to pursue a more forceful approach, and Jimmy Carter understood that. Strategically, the invasion raised questions as to whether the Soviet Union would expand into the Persian Gulf, and the Administration responded with “The Carter Doctrine” that drew a clear line. In addition, the American public understood the dangers of Soviet expansion, and Carter - having already been painted as soft - needed to respond in a strong enough way to re-capture the confidence of the American people. That is why Carter swung toward the more determined policy enunciated by Brzezinski. Vance, the consistent diplomat and a person with great confidence in American superiority, believed that a more conciliatory approach was needed. He was isolated not by Brzezinski, but rather by world politics.

5. The Carter Legacy. The most unfortunate part of Glad’s focus on the Vance-Brzezinski debate is that she completely overlooks the central fact of Carter’s foreign policy. No president - with the possible exception of Harry Truman (1945-49) - accomplished more foreign policy achievements that were strategically essential yet politically costly than Jimmy Carter. Because this statement is so contrary to the conventional wisdom of the first draft and Glad’s last draft of history, it requires a fuller explanation.

From the moment he took office, Carter confronted without hesitation or equivocation a multitude of chronic problems that had languished or worsened since before Watergate.

All of his predecessors since Eisenhower understood the need for new Panama Canal treaties to transform a resentful neighbor into a partner, but only Carter was willing to invest the political capital needed to negotiate and ratify them. The Treaties enhanced America’s standing in Latin America and prevented the closure of the Canal, but it was the most politically costly treaty ever ratified by the U.S. Senate. Nearly one-third of the Senators who voted for the Treaty lost re-election as did the President, and Panama was an
issue in all of those elections. Moreover, the principal opponent of the Treaty, Ronald Reagan, won the Presidency.

Although Richard Nixon is credited with the opening to China, it was Carter who took the difficult step of establishing diplomatic relations and thus breaking relations with Taiwan. Though every U.S. president since Lyndon Johnson pledged peace in the Middle East, Jimmy Carter negotiated the region's first and most important peace agreement, the Camp David Accords, removing Egypt as a military threat to Israel.

Carter also convinced Congress to approve the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations. He proposed an energy plan, whose wisdom was questioned at the time but generally accepted as prophetic today. He negotiated SALT II, the establishment of interest sections with Cuba, and he made human rights the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy. The true test of presidential courage is the readiness to pay a high political price for a foreign policy of long-term importance to the country. Each of those decisions qualifies.

Most U.S. presidents had one or two key foreign policy accomplishments. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, building on Franklin Roosevelt’s proposals, Harry Truman presided over the creation of a new global structure that included the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the GATT, and regional security organizations like NATO and the Rio Pact. But aside from these extraordinary achievements, what other presidents achieved anything comparable to Panama, Camp David, China normalization, and human rights?

The limitations of Glad’s book are most evident in her obsessive criticism of Carter for “soliciting the help of the Vatican to oppose the human rights efforts of Archbishop Oscar Romero of El Salvador, politically isolating” him, and making him vulnerable to his assassination, which occurred in April 1980. Her evidence for this was a set of talking points sent by the State Department to the White House to communicate with the Pope, and she concludes that Carter was never serious about human rights policy and completely abandoned it by the end of his administration.

The truth is almost the opposite of her conclusion: Carter maintained his commitment to human rights in the region despite threats of Marxist revolution. The Carter Administration had a close dialogue with Romero since the beginning and sought to protect him from the violent right. The Administration, largely through Brzezinski, also maintained a dialogue with the Pope on international issues, mostly on Eastern Europe, but also encouraging him to mediate the territorial dispute between Argentina and Chile.

After the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua in July 1979, the simmering civil war in El Salvador began to boil, and once again, the Carter Administration found itself caught between a military regime it could not defend and a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group that it opposed. In October 1979, a group of young reformist officers seized power and asked a coalition of centrist and leftist politicians to join a government. They sought aid from the United States, but Carter personally chose to withhold aid until the new government
legislated fundamental land reform and ended the repression. The closer the Junta moved to land reform, however, the more violent the right became.

Archbishop Romero asked the President to stop all military aid, but the U.S. Ambassador explained that it was an important instrument to try to stop rightist repression and implement lasting reforms and democracy. Romero, having lost many of his priests and nuns to the violence, had lost all faith in the military, and finally, in his last sermon, called on soldiers to give up their weapons. As a result of the convictions of the assassins in the United States in 2005, we now know that this sermon triggered the assassination. In the week before the murder, the U.S. government promise of military aid finally convinced the army to approve land reform. Because of the assassination, however, Carter withheld the aid despite the promise. Similarly, at the end of the year, after the murder of four U.S. religious workers, Carter continued to withhold aid though the left was about to launch a “final offensive.” Napoleon Duarte, the courageous Christian Democrat, who was then a leader in the Junta, visited Carter in the White House and asked him to use the aid as leverage to get the military to undertake a serious investigation of the murders, dismiss several senior officers, and strengthen Duarte’s position. Only after the military acceded to the demands in the final days of the Administration and in the midst of the most violent insurrection did Carter approve the aid. Carter remained consistent in his promotion of human rights in Latin America throughout the administration.

With several exceptions, notably the case of Romero, Glad’s description of the formulation of the policy is better than her interpretation. The final draft of the history of the Carter Administration’s foreign policy should show that Carter had an exceptionally strong team but he remained the preeminent policy-maker. The return of the Cold War was due to Soviet assertiveness, not to Brzezinski’s tactics. Although Brzezinski influenced the shape and details of the policies, Carter’s policies adapted to the changes in the world, not to the whispers of his National Security Advisor.

The final draft of history needs another historian, who can discern better Carter’s unusual legacy - a president, who was viewed as weak, but was actually stronger than those presidents who appeared tough; a president, who was viewed as indecisive, but made more bold decisions than almost any other; and a president, who was viewed as a failure, but who accomplished more foreign policy in the twentieth century than anyone but Harry Truman, whose presidency eventually received the final draft that he earned.
Betty Glad has written a clear, compelling and conventional critique of foreign policy in the Carter administration. Her conclusions are easily summarized. A president with very little experience on the world stage, or in national politics, was poorly prepared to deal with the difficult international problems he faced. His key foreign policy advisers had fundamentally different views of the world, or at least radically different ideas about how to handle America’s principal opponent in the Cold War years. This was no “team of rivals.” Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski were just rivals. And the confusion caused by their conflicts, and the president’s apparent indifference to those conflicts, made it impossible for Carter to have consistent or effective relations with other nations—friends and foes—around the world.

Like everyone else, Glad gives Carter credit for his success at Camp David and in the negotiation of a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. She considers the formal recognition of China an important achievement and she recognizes the enormous political challenges involved in winning sixty-eight Senate votes for the Panama Canal treaties. But the items listed on the positive side of the ledger in Glad’s accounting do not make up for the deficits: the mistakes in dealing with the Soviet Union that delayed the SALT II agreement and eventually led to a breakdown in détente, the failures in Iran and in responding to the hostage crisis, the hypocrisy of standing up for human rights while turning a blind eye to Cambodia, El Salvador, and other places in the world that cried out for American condemnation.

While much of this praise and blame are part of the conventional commentaries on Carter foreign policy, Glad gives those commentaries a fresh face with interviews of key participants and observers and with references to recently opened documents. She should be praised, in particular, for her detailed retelling of the assassination of Archbishop Romero y Galdámez in El Salvador and for what that death tells us about the problems connected to Carter’s complicated commitments to human rights.

Glad notes, but may not emphasize enough, the fact that both Carter’s successes and failures are related to his lack of experience in national politics and international affairs. A more polished and practiced politician might well have postponed the controversial Panama Canal treaties until a second term. Carter was urged to do so, but ignored that advice. A president who fully understood the animosities and complexities of the Middle East could easily have kept some distance from negotiations unlikely to produce much progress. Almost all the experts on the Arab-Israeli peace process had low expectations for what would be achieved at Camp David. Carter had a confidence and optimism about those negotiations that experience and expertise would almost certainly have dampened. The pluses and minuses on the Carter foreign policy ledger may well involve measurement of the same presidential qualities. Inexperience and exuberance are good things when they lead to risk taking that pays off; not so good when they are connected to failures.
For Glad, and for most critics of Carter foreign policy, the crucial failure of the Carter years involves American relations with the Soviet Union. Carter was foolish to demand deep cuts in strategic arms, cavalier about his criticisms of human rights violations in the Soviet Union, incompetent in the reaction to reports of a Soviet brigade in Cuba and partly responsible for the breakdown of détente and for the reheating of the Cold War that characterized his last year in office and much of Ronald Reagan’s presidency.

That criticism of Carter’s handling of US-Soviet relations is almost always entwined with the discussion of conflict between Vance and Brzezinski and the failure of the administration to speak with one voice about some of the most important international issues facing the nation. There is merit in this criticism, but it is often taken too far.

Carter was fully aware of the negative news reports about differences among his foreign policy advisers. He periodically asked Vance and Brzezinski to work harder at working together, but he never accepted their early offers to resign and was not happy about Vance’s departure when it finally occurred after the failed hostage rescue mission. Carter’s clear preference would have been to keep both of them in their respective offices, despite the obvious public relations costs. This preference can be seen as evidence of a naïve and inexperienced politician in the White House; but it can also be read another way. Carter may have been more stubborn than naïve, excessively confident in his own ability to manage his advisers, grateful for their different points of view and indifferent to the commentary of the chattering class in Washington. He was also the leader of a deeply divided Democratic party that was conflicted about the future of détente, arms control technicalities, the use of force overseas, and specific applications of the widely held commitments to human rights. Had Carter clearly chosen Brzezinski’s hard line on the Soviet Union from the beginning of his administration or stuck with Vance’s more mild-mannered and softer stance he would surely have paid a political price for his choice. As it was, he mostly finessed the need to make a clear choice until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the uncertainties about the future of Iran made the harder line the only politically viable path.

Glad argues that long before the need for new Cold War rhetoric, higher defense expenditures and regional confrontations arose, the president contributed to the deterioration of Soviet American relations with clumsy foreign policy decisions. Chief among these was the proposal for deep cuts in nuclear arms that Vance took to Moscow early in the administration. This proposal was promptly dismissed by the Soviets and is widely seen as setting back the timetable for what eventually became the SALT II agreements. It is taken as clear evidence that having a president with limited foreign policy experience can have high costs.

But what would have happened in U.S.-Soviet relations if Gerald Ford had the won the election in 1976, which he almost did, or if a more experienced Democratic candidate had won the nomination and the presidency in that election cycle? Historians generally hesitate to engage in this kind of speculation, but if we take Glad’s thesis seriously that having an “outsider” in the White House mattered, it is worth turning that thesis around and asking what an “insider” might have done. It is probably fair to guess that a more
experienced president would not have endorsed a radical arms control proposal in 1977 and would instead have completed an earlier SALT II agreement more or less based on what had been agreed to at Vladivostok. Such an agreement would have led to an early summit, a signing ceremony, but not much meaningful arms limitation. The caps on nuclear-armed missiles contemplated at Vladivostok were equal for both sides and very high. The new weapon systems that were being developed and deployed—cruise missiles, intermediate range bombers, and highly accurate warheads—would probably have been set aside for later negotiations. Some might argue that in matters of arms control sooner is better than later and some agreement is better than none, but the growing uncertainties that improvements in accuracy, stealth and satellite surveillance would eventually bring to the fore could not have been addressed with conventional and cautious arms control negotiations. To some extent the Cold War arms race was driven by technological improvements that moved at their own pace and without much regard to diplomatic processes. And if that is true, it would have been true whether there was an insider or an outsider in White House.

So, would an early and modest SALT II agreement, arguably preferred by insider experts, have significantly altered the path of weapons improvement and the Cold War complications that those improvements were likely to cause? That is, of course, an unanswerable question. But there is some reason to think that Carter’s naive early preferences for deeper cuts and more ambitious arms control negotiations were not all that costly. Carter’s SALT II agreement, when it was finally signed in 1979, came somewhat later than many experts would have wished. But it was a complex treaty that gave both sides large numbers of nuclear warheads and very few roadblocks or safeguards against new technological developments. The differences between a Vladivostok SALT II and Carter’s SALT II were small. Neither agreement significantly reduced the size of superpower arsenals or the pace of technological change. Insider, outsider, it is hard to see what difference leadership experience might have made in Carter era arms control.

The harder question to take up regarding U.S.-Soviet relations in the 1970s is whether a different, and more experienced, president could have constrained Soviet behavior in Africa and Afghanistan and avoided the revival of Cold War rivalries that characterized the early 1980s. This is the crucial question about détente in general. Could frequent and regular summits, cautiously paced arms control negotiations, higher levels of international trade, and mutual respect for each other’s vital areas of interest have led Soviet leaders to behave differently, and better, in the Third World and in the weak nations on their borders?

Glad does not really take up this question. But she does suggest that the Carter administration exaggerated Soviet mischief in Africa and overreacted to the intelligence fiasco that mistakenly found a Soviet brigade in Cuba. Again the thesis is clear, more experienced hands on the White House levers of power could have avoided errors and dealt with Soviet Third World activities in a more measured and mature fashion. Whether the net result of more effective and experienced policy responses could have avoided the resumption of Cold War tensions is never claimed, but the implication is made.
Any analysis of how the Cold War progressed in the late 1970s is ultimately related to the subsequent questions about how the Cold War ended. Were the key players and variables in the later years of the Cold War in Washington or in Moscow? Did Ronald Reagan end the conflict or did Gorbachev? Betty Glad does not really weigh in on that question. She stays focused on the 1970s reviving and refreshing the early criticisms of Carter that hold him largely responsible for the deterioration of détente and the rise of Ronald Reagan. This was not what Carter wanted, but his mistakes, his missteps, his conflicted advisers, and his eventual drift toward Brzezinski’s worldview took America toward a temporary, but dangerous, reawakening of Cold War conflicts and confrontations.

Of course, those who give Ronald Reagan credit for ending the Cold War should probably admit that Jimmy Carter was, at least at the end of his administration, on their side. He increased the defense budget, drew a line in the sands of the Persian Gulf, hammered away at Soviet mistreatment of dissidents, ordered the MX missile and reexamined nuclear targeting doctrine. All of this generally moved the nation along the road that Ronald Reagan would subsequently travel. Those who think that it was Gorbachev, and not Reagan, who was the crucial player at the end of the Cold War can perhaps excuse the mistakes and missteps of the Carter era. Both the proposals for deeper arms reductions early on and the later complaints about Soviet actions in Cuba and Afghanistan were unlikely to have much impact on an old, feeble and calcified Soviet leadership.

But while we are playing games and speculating about what might have been, it is worth wondering what could have happened if Carter’s counterpart in the Soviet Union had been Mikhail Gorbachev. Reagan and Gorbachev achieved a great deal; but how much more would a Carter-Gorbachev matchup have accomplished? What would two “outsiders” have done if given the opportunity to reshape Soviet-American relations and the world?

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