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The collapse of Portuguese colonialism in Africa, most notably in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau, initiated revolutionary changes in Southern Africa with new African governments and liberation movements challenging white dominated regimes in Rhodesia, the South African control of Southwest-Africa (Namibia), and South Africa itself. This transformation brought an escalation of the Cold War to Southern Africa especially in the struggle for control of Angola which involved in varying degrees the Soviet Union, China, Cuba and the United States. In response to this crisis, the United States, led by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, launched a number of covert and overt policies to address both old problems such as the unwillingness of Rhodesia to accept full black participation in the political and economic life of the country as well as new challenges viewed, at least in part, through the Cold War prism. In the waning days of the administration of Gerald Ford, Secretary Kissinger, the shuttle negotiator on the Middle East, went back to shuttle diplomacy in April 1976 to win support for majority rule in Southern Africa and at the same time curb the growing influence of Moscow and Havana. Kissinger started in London, flew on to Kenya and Tanzania, met with Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia, and the U.S. client in Zaire, General Mobutu, and visited with African front-line ministers in Nairobi. On a second shuttle in September, Kissinger met with South African Prime Minister John Voster and Prime Minister Ian Smith of Rhodesia as well as with front line leaders.¹

Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy failed to achieve any lasting results on any of the major issues but it did set the stage for a deeper engagement by the U.S. in the ensuing decades of conflict in Southern Africa, the focus of Sue Onslow's collection of articles.² The collection explores the complexity of conflict in Southern Africa by focusing on South Africa, Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, and the struggle over Southwest Africa-Namibia. The articles explore a number of interrelated aspects of the conflict, most notably the efforts of local leaders to draw in the Cold War powers to support their objectives; the politics of race and the process of decolonization which worked against non-violent, evolutionary change; and the Cold War competition of the major participants which had a lasting destructive impact on the people and the South African region. Onslow explores many of these themes in the introduction and conclusion to the collection and also explores the combination of factors that led to “a remarkably peaceful transition to black majority rule” in South Africa. (242)

The reviewers are impressed with the overall quality of the essays, the reliance on archival sources, especially from South Africa, and the efforts of the authors to explore the interaction of the local powers in the Cold War context as well as the role of the Soviet Union, the U.S. and Cuba. Ryan Irwin and James Meriwether, for example, note how the authors make effective use of South African documents. Onslow, for example, in her article explores the significant shifts in South African policy toward Rhodesia, black nationalism, and so on.


² Five of the ten articles originally appeared in Cold War History 7:2 (2007)
and the prolonged conflict over Angola and Namibia. John Daniel evaluates how South Africa merged two paradigms—racist colonial overlordship with the Cold War—and argues that the latter “blinkered them from the realities of the South African struggle. For the apartheid regime, the Soviet Union was never the real problem. This was its failure to come to terms with the legitimate nationalist and democratic aspirations of a broad-based South African national movement.” (51) Anna-Mart van Wyk evaluates the nuclear program of South Africa and the U.S. perspective on the program with the Nixon administration exhibiting reluctance to probe reports on this activity whereas President Jimmy Carter stepped up efforts to stop the program as Prime Minister P.W. Botha pushed the program forward. Van Wyk provides a balanced and persuasive conclusion on the U.S. involvement. (76-77)

Tom Borstelmann, Jamie Miller, Irwin and Meriwether applaud the efforts of the authors to explore the interaction of the international actors and their objectives in Southern Africa. Vladimir Shubin, for example, offers an insider perspective to Soviet policy on the liberation of Southern Africa and the efforts of Soviet advisers on the ground in the Angolan conflict. Borstelmann recognizes the contribution of Soviet military advisers and Cuban soldiers to the defense of Angola against South African forces and in the pressure on South Africa over Namibia that contributed to Pretoria’s willingness to negotiate a settlement on Namibia that included Cuban and South African troop withdrawals. The reviewers do note disagreement between Piero Gleijeses and Chris Saunders on the 1988 battle at Cuito Cuanavale. According to Gleijeses, South African Defence Forces had unleashed a major attack in November 1987 on the Angolan army in southeastern Angola and had “cornered the best Angolan units in the small town of Cuito Cuanavale and was poised to destroy them.” (209) Fidel Castro responded by sending in 14,000 troops with Cuba’s best planes, tanks and anti-aircraft weapons without informing Moscow until November 19 as Castro considered Mikhail Gorbachev preoccupied with the forthcoming Washington summit and unwilling to challenge the U.S. According to Gleijeses, Castro’s strategy was to stop the South Africans at Cuito Cuanavale and then attack in the southwest to drive South African forces out of Angola. Cuban forces with Angolan troops and SWAPO guerrillas followed up the stand at Cuito Cuanavale by moving towards the Namibian border by March 1988 and ultimately contributed to a South African retreat out of Angola. “The New York agreements” stating that Namibia would become independent after a South African withdrawal and Cuban withdrawal from Angola “would not have been possible,” Gleijeses concludes, “without the Cubans’ prowess on the battlefield and skill at the negotiating table. Despite Washington’s best efforts to stop it, Cuba changed the course of South African history.” (216) Chris Saunders, however, puts more emphasis on the larger end of the Cold War as Botha in South Africa came to view SWAPO as a nationalist movement and no real threat to South Africa and Gorbachev moved to back a negotiated settlement with Angola. Saunders suggests that after clashing on June 26-27 South African

and Cuban forces backed off with South African leaders worrying about the costs of the conflict and the loss of fifty conscripts. When Washington refused to back an escalated war and Gorbachev indicated to Castro that Moscow would not support a Cuban invasion of Namibia, both Cuba and South Africa moved to negotiations, and at a negotiating session in Cairo in June, Saunders suggests, Moscow told Angola and Cuban to negotiate.4

The essays offer revealing assessments on the role of local leaders, both South Africans such as Botha and Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia. Andy DeRoche offers an informative assessment of Kaunda’s difficult position on the front line with Rhodesia and South Africa and his quest to obtain Chinese, Soviet and U.S. assistance to build a railroad for the export of Zambian copper to Dar es Salaam and to support intervention against Rhodesia. Neither Kaunda nor U.S. officials, DeRoche concludes, accepted the wisdom of each other’s stances: “To Kaunda, American non-alignment in the struggle against racism was at least as frustrating as the Zambian president’s non-alignment in the Cold War was to American officials.” (147)

Among the American presidents in this study that directed policies toward Southern Africa from Gerald Ford to Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter received a separate essay, Nancy Mitchell’s “Terrorists or freedom fighters? Jimmy Carter and Rhodesia.” In contrast with many historians who emphasize Carter’s lack of experience and inability to impose a coherent strategy, or resolve the escalating differences between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, Mitchell suggests that Carter assumed a mess from Ford and Kissinger on Angola and a bankrupt British policy on Rhodesia. Despite multiple pressures from Cold War concerns including a desire to keep Castro’s Cuban forces from moving further in southern Africa as well as criticism from Republicans in Congress, Carter effectively supported a new British initiative on Rhodesia and rejected recognition of elections in Rhodesia that excluded the Patriotic Front. Carter refused to lift U.S. sanctions on Rhodesia despite voluminous criticism from Congress and backed British negotiations that led to Zimbabwean independence. Mitchell suggests that Cold War concerns about Castro and his experience with racial injustice shaped Carter’s overall perspective and successful strategy. Miller suggests that Mitchell’s essay offers a persuasive thesis on why Carter rejected British and Congressional pressure to support the internal settlement arranged by Ian Smith, although Miller notes that newly released records in the Carter library reveal that some State Department and National Security Council officials also rejected Smith’s internal settlement. As Meriwether points out, Gleijeses is more critical of Carter over his opposition to sanctions against South Africa. The editor of the collection declined to write a response to the reviews.

Participants:

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Ryan Irwin is the Associate Director of International Security Studies at Yale University. He is currently completing a book about the postcolonial apartheid debate, entitled *The Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order, 1960-1970*, and beginning work on a manuscript about the ideological and political origins of the United Nations. He received his Ph.D. from Ohio State University in early 2010.

James (“Jim”) Meriwether received his PhD from UCLA and is professor of history at California State University Channel Islands. He has published “‘Worth a Lot of Negro Votes’: Black Voters, Africa, and the 1960 Presidential Campaign” in the *Journal of American History* (December 2008), and is the author of *Proudly We Can Be Africans: Black Americans and Africa, 1935-1961* (University of North Carolina Press, 2002). His current research project is on the United States and the decolonization of Africa.

Jamie Miller is a doctoral student in the Faculty of History at the University of Cambridge. His research focuses on South Africa’s foreign policy strategies in the context of the Cold War, 1974-1980. He recently won the Saki Ruth Dockrill Memorial Prize at the International Graduate Conference on the Cold War; the winning paper is forthcoming in *Cold War History*. He has also been published in the *New Critic* and has written several book reviews for the *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*. 
Latin America is not important,” Henry Kissinger once informed a Chilean diplomat. “The axis of history starts in Moscow, goes to Bonn, crosses over to Washington, and then goes to Tokyo. What happens in the South is of no importance.”¹ This is a view that scholars have often parodied or dismissed, but it reflects a still-common assumption about the distribution of power and influence in the making of world history. The essays collected by editor Sue Onslow in Cold War in Southern Africa remind readers of the significance of events in the global South, both for the more than 50 million people living in southern Africa at the start of the Cold War, and for the larger struggle between blocs led by the United States and the Soviet Union.

At the broadest level, the international politics of the second half of the twentieth century were defined by two overarching conflicts: the struggle for national independence among colonized peoples, and the ideological and security competition between Soviet-led communism and American-led capitalist democracy. The intersection of these two conflicts produced some of the bloodiest and most important events of the post-World War II era, including the wars in Korea and Vietnam. In southern Africa, colonialism took its last and most determined stand, and the struggle for national liberation and freedom from white supremacy became entangled with Cold War questions of political economy and the interests of outside superpowers.

White settlers were at the heart of the problem in southern Africa. Europeans, of course, had settled many other parts of the world as well. In areas with familiar and hospitable climates, they had largely displaced indigenous peoples, killing them off through disease and war. The resulting “neo-Europes,” as Alfred Crosby has called them, included Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, and Chile, as well as the United States.² For reasons of climate and disease, most European settlement in Africa remained peripheral: the French in Algeria; the British in the highlands of Kenya and in what was known sequentially as Southern Rhodesia, Rhodesia, and Zimbabwe; the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique; and the Dutch and later other Europeans in the four colonies (the Cape, Natal, Orange Free State, and Transvaal) cobbled together into the Union (later Republic) of South Africa in 1910. In Algeria and Kenya, the French and the British each fought brutal wars in the 1950s against indigenous aspirants to independence before giving up and leaving in the early 1960s. But in southern Africa the settlers were much more numerous and powerful, and they were determined to hold on to the extraordinary privileges accorded them by white supremacy. They made war on the Africans who resisted their domination, inflicting grave


human suffering before being forced to negotiate an end to white rule: the Portuguese in 1975, the Rhodesians in 1979-1980, and the South Africans in 1994.³

Of the authors of *Cold War in Southern Africa*, Piero Gleijeses best illuminates the human cost of white supremacy in the region. He pulls no punches in describing the 1978 South African air force raid that massacred more than 600 of the 3,000 Namibians living in the Cassinga refugee camp in southern Angola. “[W]hat happened in Cassinga must be described as criminal in legal terms and savage in moral terms,” reported visiting representatives of the UN High Commission for Refugees and the World Health Organization. “It reminds us of the darkest moments of modern history” (205). The injustice and suffering caused by the apartheid rulers of South Africa frame Gleijeses’s portrait of Cuba’s role in defending the newly independent Angolan government, twice saving it from being overrun by the South African armed forces (1976 and 1988). Gleijeses continues here the work he has been doing for years of telling the story of Cuba’s role in Africa, based on extraordinary multinational archival research and oral histories.⁴ His focus in this essay is on the struggle to end South Africa’s illegal occupation of neighboring South West Africa (Namibia), a campaign in which South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) guerrillas, Angolans, and Soviet advisers all contributed importantly. Gleijeses makes clear that Cuban military bravery and sacrifice were crucial to the final phase of defeating white supremacy in the region. It is a history that turns on their head the assumptions of most Americans about the relative virtues of Fidel Castro’s regime and the U.S. government.

The other essays offer various insights. Chris Saunders places more emphasis than Gleijeses on the role of the Soviet Union in his summary of the run-up to Namibian independence. Nancy Mitchell, in a fascinating and very well-written piece on Jimmy Carter and Rhodesia, credits the Georgian president’s peculiar combination of realpolitik analysis and racial guilt for his leadership in the negotiations that led to the creation of Zimbabwe in 1980. Mitchell also identifies the influence of Cuban military success close by in Angola as a critical factor for American, British, and South African policymakers. John Daniel notes how whites in the region used both anti-black and anti-communist arguments in their defense of Rhodesia and South Africa, although he does not fully explain why the anti-Soviet element in white rhetoric came to the fore in the early 1970s. Like Daniel, Donal Lowry, in writing about Rhodesia, highlights whites’ views of African insurgents as not indigenous but rather as supposedly external enemies and pawns of the Soviet Union.⁵ Lowry also offers an

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³ The best overview of the West’s long-term relationship with southern Africa remains William Minter, *King Solomon’s Mines Revisited* (New York: Basic Books, 1986), which goes uncited by the authors and editor of *Cold War in Southern Africa*.


⁵ This view of black insurgents as supposed outsiders and subversives will be familiar to students of the black freedom struggle in the United States. See, for example, Jeff Woods, *Black Struggle, Red Scare*:
intriguing portrait of longstanding anti-communist sentiment among white leftist Rhodesian labor leaders. Anna-Mart van Wyk fills in U.S. policy toward South Africa’s nuclear weapons program, at first supportive and only later, after 1976, resistant.6

Editor Sue Onslow provides an insightful overview of southern Africa in the Cold War in the introduction. She emphasizes the complicated politics of the region that went far beyond a simple black-white dichotomy, including rival black liberation organizations, traditionally accommodationist older black elites, newly independent African nations concerned about defending national sovereignty, economic links of the “front-line” states to the white-ruled states, arbitrary national borders created by colonial rule that conflicted with ethnic realities, and the preference of many new African nations for the non-aligned movement rather than either the Soviet or American camp in the Cold War. Onslow also offers a separate essay on the strategic relationship between Rhodesia and South Africa, which summarizes the three-pronged struggle of black Rhodesians for decolonization from white settlers, from South African regional imperialism, and from British imperialism. Andy DeRoche examines the peculiar economic vulnerability of the Kenneth Kaunda government of newly independent Zambia to neighboring Rhodesia. He notes the importance of financial assistance from the People’s Republic of China that built a new railroad from Zambia to Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, thus reducing some of that vulnerability. DeRoche also reminds readers of the very different political perspective of most Africans from U.S. policymakers: “To Kaunda, American non-alignment in the struggle against racism was at least as frustrating as the Zambian president’s non-alignment in the Cold War was to American officials” (147).7 V. Shubin’s essay highlights the significant contribution of Soviet military advisers to the liberation fighters in the region, although this piece—alone among the chapters in this book—suffers from a polemical tone (with several exclamation points), an unexplained reference to his own presence in Namibia, and an apparently unironical assertion that the Soviets “understood ‘the problems of the Third World’” (169) as a result of their war against Afghanistan. Soviet behavior in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 suggested an “understanding” similar to apartheid South Africa’s understanding of its black neighbors.8

Taken as a whole, Cold War in Southern Africa provides readers with several fine examples of the kind of multinational archival research and analysis that have recast the field of Segregation and Anti-Communism in the South, 1948-1968 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004).

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6 Van Wyk describes uranium mining in South Africa but does not fully convey the centrality of that ore for the 1950 U.S. commitment to working closely with the apartheid regime. This story can be found in Thomas Borstelmann, Apartheid’s Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), uncited in this essay.


international history and the particular subject of southern African history. These essays make clear how dramatically international actors impinged upon this region, from Cuba, the USSR, the United States, and China, to Eastern Europe, Scandinavia, and the Organization of African Unity. The essays also show that local events, in turn, impacted global relationships, most notably the negotiated independence for Namibia helped ease the end of the Soviet-American hostility of the Cold War. Political change came, for most of this period, only after white resistance to the liberation struggles “intensified into open violence and clandestine viciousness and brutality” (3), yet it was also true that in South Africa itself in the early 1990s there was “a remarkably peaceful transition to black majority rule” (242). And the book demonstrates once again that anti-communism was often a rhetorical cover—if one that its proponents came to believe—for anti-black and anti-democratic purposes. Marxists in the region undoubtedly supported the overthrow of white totalitarian rule; they were influential or even dominant in the regional liberation movements; and regional white intransigence combined with some U.S. and British sympathies pushed many Africans toward communism. But the liberation struggles remained grounded, first and foremost, in the campaign to end white supremacy, not capitalism.

Cold War in Southern Africa is an odd book, however. It is really more like a bound version of related journal essays, as six of the ten pieces appear to have been previously published, at least in part, in a 2007 issue of Cold War History. The contributors are not identified. There are no maps, despite considerable detail in the narratives about the geography of particular battles and other events. Misspellings (3, 62, 71) and mistakes of grammar and punctuation (99, 112, 113, 170) distract readers. Some essays have bibliographies; others do not. The long struggles for the liberation of Angola and Mozambique barely appear, as the editor notes, and Britain is mostly absent. Instead, the book is skewed toward South Africa and Rhodesia, and toward the years after 1975. The point here is not to ask for a different book than the one that has been written—the common complaint of reviewers—but to acknowledge what this volume covers and what it leaves out.

In 1989-1991, two great engines of totalitarian rule ground to a halt, one of communist totalitarianism and one of racial totalitarianism. The latter was the longer standing, the form of government that had shaped and misshaped more of the world. Was it a coincidence that Soviet-bloc communism and apartheid disappeared together? Perhaps it was partly coincidental, but the rise of an international human rights community by the 1970s helped undercut the ideological legitimacy of all undemocratic regimes, on the Left and the Right. The reality of Cold War competition for influence in southern Africa, which had bolstered white rule by partially hiding apartheid behind the screen of anti-communism, now disappeared, removing white supremacy’s last defense.9 Onslow

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concludes that both sides won, ultimately. The collapse of communism worldwide meant a victory for Western-style democracy, at least in principle, while the destruction of white supremacy marked a comparably principled victory for the Cubans and Soviets. In this sense, there was “a Cold War ‘draw’ in the Southern African region” (244).
Empire, Agency, & Documents

Odd Arne Westad opens the inaugural chapter of The Cambridge History of the Cold War (2010) with a declaration that captures the essence of contemporary cold war studies: “Historians have always believed that good sources make for good studies.”1 The sentence permeates Sue Onslow’s Cold War in Southern Africa. This book, in Onslow’s words, emerged directly from the current push to use newly available archival documents to glean fresh insight about the nature of the global cold war. Framed around the tension between local politics and superpower plans in southern Africa, the volume’s ten chapters—based on the contributions of historians from three continents—move between an assortment of viewpoints and topics, tackling not only South Africa’s controversial nuclear program and Zimbabwe’s circuitous road to independence, but also, among others, the intrigues of the United States and Soviet Union and the experiences of Namibia and Angola in the 1980s.

Cold War in Southern Africa is a welcome addition to the literature. The book provides a quick introduction to some of the interesting work being done today by scholars of this region. In a general sense, about half of the essays examine how local players navigated the opportunities and obstacles that came with the superpower contest. Pretoria played its hand competently, according to Onslow and Anna-Mart van Wyk, compensating for its diplomatic isolation by manipulating Washington’s insecurities after the Vietnam War.2 Lusaka, dealt a more challenging political hand in Andy DeRoche’s mind, struggled to walk the tightrope of nonalignment, pushing the United States to support decolonization without cutting off its access to American economic aid.3 Salisbury, as Donal Lowry shows, moved in the opposite direction in the mid-twentieth century, mixing anti-communism and racism to form the explosive cocktail of white nationalism.4 Piero Gleijeses’s Havana—residing on

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the other end of the ideological spectrum—reshaped the terms of regional exchange through military action in 1975-1991, sending an unprecedented number of soldiers to the region to fight on behalf of revolutionary change.\(^5\) Small states, in short, exercised agency in the global cold war. They pursued an eclectic set of goals with acumen and determination.

The essays look also at the aims and influence of Moscow and Washington in southern Africa. In Vladimir Shubin’s retelling, the Soviet Union played a pivotal role in generating the conditions for positive change in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. Drawing on untapped sources, as well as his personal experience as a U.S.S.R. official, he shows how Moscow’s “unsung heroes” provided financial and military aid to the liberation movements in the region.\(^6\) Other authors focus on the United States. Washington’s motivations are framed differently—with themes of race, economics, and security emerging at the forefront—but most contributors agree that the empire of liberty slowed progress toward regional majority rule. Even President Jimmy Carter, who Nancy Mitchell suggests empathized with calls for racial justice, found it difficult to transcend fully the cold war paradigm that dominated his nation’s capital.\(^7\) By the end of the 1980s, as Christopher Saunders explicates with élan, regional issues—specifically the Angola/Namibia crises—had become entwined with superpower agendas, amplifying the pressure to end apartheid while ensuring that change would be non-revolutionary.\(^8\) Washington and Moscow, for better or worse, shaped the pace of events in southern Africa. They opened and closed doors for regional players, influenced international discourse, and empowered their patrons to achieve certain ends in the global arena.

In many ways, Onslow’s book is a clarion call for international historians. Sitting at the nexus of decolonization and the cold war, southern Africa was one of the key social, cultural, and political entrepôts of the twentieth century. The richness of South Africa’s archives, moreover, makes the region one of the preeminent microcosms of modern world history—a place that reveals much about the contested nature of globalization, imperialism, and multilocalism before and after World War II. As Onslow readily acknowledges, her volume represents not the final word on its subject but the beginning of a soon-to-be-rich conversation. In her mind, work still needs to be done on the collapse of the Portuguese empire and the wars in Angola and Mozambique, as well as the political and economic interventions of China, Yugoslavia, and East Germany during this period. In West


Europe and North America, too, documents from the late 1970s and 1980s—the years when fighting and outside interest combined most violently—are only beginning to become available to researchers. Although unmentioned by Onslow, scholarship on nonstate organizations also deserves a prominent place in the literature, especially considering the wealth of information at the Liberation Archives in Alice, South Africa. Nonetheless her message emerges with clarity: Southern Africa’s sources and stories, good now, will undoubtedly grow better with time, distance, and debate.

With this in mind, the most glaring omission of Cold War in Southern Africa is historiographical. The book makes little effort to highlight the interpretive disagreements that separate its contributors and will continue to divide scholars in the coming years. Lowry’s anti-communists, for instance, emerge as Shubin’s rabid racists, while the 1988 battle of Cuito Cuanavale—a defining moment in Gliejeses’s story—appears mostly as Cuban propaganda in Saunders’ chapter. Beneath these disagreements resides a question at the heart of the contemporary South African experience: How should historians narrate the region’s complex path to the present? At a time when Africa’s chroniclers are developing increasingly sophisticated interpretations of postcolonialism, literature on South Africa seems occasionally bound by the now problematic liberation narrative. From a sociological perspective this makes sense, as it provides today’s South African leaders with governing legitimacy, but binaries that reflexively pit white power against black liberation conceal much about the historical record—as several authors in Cold War in Southern Africa demonstrate. As the novelty of new documents begins to fade, future

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accounts will likely take heed of these points and begin to blend the insights of political history with social and cultural methodologies. Onslow would likely agree, for instance, that southern Africa’s global importance predated the violence of the 1970s and continues beyond the momentous events of 1994. Future scholarship, no doubt, will focus less on challenging the stability of the bipolar framework in the late cold war and more on explicating the region’s relationship to the complex processes of migration, ideological transmission, and political polarization that swept through the international system in the twentieth century. Regardless, *Cold War in Southern Africa* is a step in a positive direction.
The ever-widening range of work on the Cold War era has brought a fuller engagement with once neglected areas, and this means that increasingly more work on Southern Africa is finding its way into publication. At last this has resulted in a volume that offers a range of essays devoted to that region, a break from the more common Cold War-oriented collections that, at most and almost out of a sense of obligation, include one essay on Africa. Indeed, here we have ten essays that are entirely devoted to a single region of Africa.

This collection may have a ring of familiarity to readers of *Cold War History*, for six of the ten chapters are either reprinted or substantially extracted from a 2007 issue of the journal. One other essay is extracted from a 2009 issue of the *Journal of Southern African Studies*. Yet having them collected and augmented by the additional essays makes the reading (or re-reading) well worthwhile, and not simply for those interested in Southern Africa. Here we see the “global Cold War” intersecting with race and decolonization in deeply significant ways.

Onslow groups the essays into two broadly thematic sections -- white minority nationalism and the Cold War; black liberation and the Cold War -- yet in truth the distinctions are rather indistinct, for the two are intimately intertwined. The essays could just as easily be grouped under other organizing frameworks, either “the Cold War, the State, and Southern Africa” -- for the essays generally deal most directly with governments, foreign policy officials, militaries -- or “the Cold War at work in South Africa, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, and Namibia.” This latter grouping would leave the DeRoche essay on Zambia and the United States with no real home, but it does reveal one of the limitations of this collection. All edited collections have omissions, and yet given the powerful changes that the independence of Angola and Mozambique brought to Southern Africa it seems unfortunate that this is not directly included in some way but rather is merely a subtext in a few of the essays. Mozambique is particularly marginalized, and one wishes there had been a contribution to remedy that.

Yet one rarely gets everything one might want in a collection of essays, and the absence of Mozambique shall be remedied elsewhere. Using Onslow’s division, the first set of essays is largely focused on the white minority governments of Rhodesia and South Africa. Onslow’s own chapter on “The Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Nationalism and External Intervention” makes clear that Cold War fears of communism were a real, if now underappreciated, factor in the thinking of white minority regimes. The aftermath of independence in the Congo, for instance, weighed on the minds of South African officials as they thought about how to respond to the UDI crisis in Rhodesia. Onslow makes clear, as does Donal Lowry in his chapter “The Impact of Anti-Communism on White Rhodesian

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1 For a full review of DeRoche’s chapter, see H-Diplo Article Review no. 239, 8 September 2009 at [http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/reviews/PDF/AR239.pdf](http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/reviews/PDF/AR239.pdf)
Political Culture," that as happened elsewhere, anticommunist rhetoric was not merely a concern, but also a tool used “to undercut the democratic space of the liberal element of the white community” (14).

Onslow argues that for a time in the mid-1970s the regime in South Africa adopted a strategy of accepting the idea of a “constellation of neutral states” in the region, but that Robert Mugabe’s coming to power in 1980 represented the nightmare scenario: a radical African nationalist movement triumphing through the ballot box (17). The South African government then became determined to hang on to Southwest Africa/Namibia and embarked on a devastating campaign of destabilization against its perceived enemies. Of course, the resistance of the white rulers in the region led many liberation fighters to see Marxist principles as of value, both philosophically and as a tactic to obtain outside support. With the pervasive influence of the Cold War, the U.S. administrations of Nixon and Ford provided support for ailing white regimes that in due course, ushered Cuban and Soviet involvement, creating a complex dynamic throughout the region that the white regimes helped bring on themselves.

While some of the contributions deal with the role of anti-communist beliefs indirectly, Lowry tackles head on the role they played in the mindset of Rhodesian leaders and supporters. Lowry argues that anticommunism was not simply a convenient device, but instead a central element of thinking that explains the failure to reach settlement with the African majority during the Unilateral Declaration of Independence years. White Rhodesians increasingly saw themselves as the sentinels of British greatness, defending the frontiers of an empire suffering from an increasingly decaying and decadent metropolitan heart. Threats from communism had to be resisted, and with Africans supposedly susceptible to communist manipulation, and the British heart in decay, many Rhodesian settlers were drawn to the American right-wing as natural allies -- and vice-versa. Tragically, Rhodesian anticommunism thus prevented a deeper understanding of grievances by the African population. Indeed, the whys and wherefores of the inability of white regimes to see the legitimate aspirations of Africans is one of the most important collective contributions of these essays.

In this context, John Daniel provides a compelling piece that examines the South African government’s views of the region. He finds two paradigms -- a racist one of colonial overlordship and then a Cold War one of anticommunism -- that served to bolster state power and yet ultimately made the government blind to the aspirations of its peoples, wrapped apartheid’s mission in the mantle of the Cold War fight, and caused a tragic embarkation on a path of counter-revolutionary warfare that caused tragic and horrific loss of life. His use of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) material illustrates the many ways that diplomatic history can now be enriched.

Anna-Mart van Wyk’s fine-grained uncovering of the post-WWII nuclear connections between the United States and South Africa focuses on two essential questions: what did Washington really know about South Africa’s nuclear development, and was Washington a willing ally because of South Africa’s strategic importance in the Cold War? Van Wyk concludes that with South Africa being seen as a Cold War ally, it was not until after the
nuclear test by India in 1974 that much scrutiny by Washington occurred, and by then it was too late to stem the tide of Pretoria’s nuclear development. As more material comes to light, this story may be deepened.

Examining more outside forces at work, Vladimir Shubin writes about “Unsung Heroes: The Soviet Military and the Liberation of Southern Africa.” In what might best be termed as a plea for a more visible spot for the Soviets on the program, Shubin reasonably complains that an issue often distorted or missing is the role of the Soviet military in supporting African liberation struggles and independent African nations. He works hard to fill in that role, providing valuable information and tapping unused sources while swiping away at those he finds faulty: “the truth is” (155); “the reality is contrary to these claims” (156); “these facts unequivocally rebuff faulty judgments” (159). Unfortunately at times his own work is somewhat diminished by unsubstantiated claims, as when after citing a figure from the Russian press that between 1963-1991 there were 1,501 ANC activists trained in Russian military institutions he then inflates the figure by 33% to arrive at an even higher, undocumented figure of “well above 2,000” (158). His chapter points to the need for more work in this area, notwithstanding his already welcome work.

Offering more research on the superpower roles, Nancy Mitchell analyzes President Jimmy Carter’s response to the crisis in Rhodesia in her deeply interesting essay “Terrorists or Freedom Fighters? Jimmy Carter and Rhodesia.” Mitchell argues that Carter ultimately was determined to view ZANU-PF as legitimate liberation fighters, and defied Congress to do so. Using an interview with Carter as a springboard, Mitchell connects him to a realpolitik concern about the Cold War and Cuba as well as to race and a struggle for justice that Carter himself witnessed in the American South.

The role of Jimmy Carter and his administration offers one way to see the value of placing these essays together, for many issues and elements transcend the individual pieces. Thus, whereas Piero Gleijeses in his “From Cassinga to New York: The Struggle for the Independence of Namibia” essentially dismisses Carter as the “self-styled champion of human rights” (205) who did nothing after South African troops slaughtered Namibians at the Cassinga refugee camp deep in Angola and who continued to oppose sanctions against South Africa, Mitchell applauds the work of Carter and his administration to ensure that the Patriotic Front and Robert Mugabe had a voice and, ultimately, the majority rule over an independent Zimbabwe.

Another issue that overlaps in the essays is the significance of the ongoing war on the Angolan-Namibian border, and the role played by external actors (Cuba, the USSR, the United States) in this last “global Cold War” battle (although at the time no one knew that such would be the case). Chris Saunders argues in his essay on “The Angola/Namibia Crisis of 1988 and its Resolution” that the South African Foreign Affairs ministry had reached the conclusion that a SWAPO-led government in an independent Namibia was something that South Africa could live with (228). Gleijeses, on the other hand, maintains that only Cuban intervention “changed the course of Southern African history” in preventing further destruction in Angola and preserving its government, in forcing Pretoria to accept the
independence of Namibia, and ultimately in helping free South Africa from apartheid (216-17).

All of which to say that this rich area is only now getting the fuller attention it deserves. This collection stands out for revealing in deep and varied ways the extensive effects of the Cold War in Southern Africa. The range of authors and sources brought together, based on work in the archives on three continents, interviews with officials and policymakers, and unusual sources, is impressive. What this collection ultimately shows, then, is the excellent work being done on Southern Africa and the Cold War, as well as the room for more of that work.
Even as the Berlin Wall was crumbling, Cold War historians were already salivating at the knowledge that newly accessible archives in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would soon provide a fresh dimension to a field that by necessity had become over-reliant on material from Western archives alone. Within a few years, archives in East Berlin, Moscow, and elsewhere began giving up their secrets, even if sometimes in frustratingly piecemeal fashion. Almost overnight, the field of vision of Cold War history widened dramatically. East European languages, visas, research trips, and know-how were all *de rigeur*. The discipline was never the same again. ‘We now know’, John Gaddis famously declared, and within a decade, the revelations from the ‘other’ side had indeed given Cold War historians a much broader, more textured, and deeper understanding of the Cold War rivalry that had long transfixed them.

However, a second wave of historians found these developments liberating in a quite different sense. They realised that the escape from the straightjacket of the Western-centric focus not only allowed Cold War historians to peer behind the Iron Curtain, but to survey fertile terrain much farther afield too. What about those states outside the major theatres, where conflicts, political and military, were often driven or inflamed by Cold War dynamics? Maybe their archives, these historians mused, might reveal how the superpowers interacted with - or through - developing states, providing a less bipolar and more nuanced conception of the Cold War. Certainly, pioneering works like Piero Gleijeses’ *Conflicting Missions. Havana, Washington, and Africa 1959-1976* (2002) and Odd Arne Westad’s seminal *The Global Cold War* (2007), with their emphasis on uncompromising multi-archival research and a broad geographical scope, suggested that this approach could indeed yield invigorating insights, and scholars have followed en masse ever since. Such has been the profusion of quality research focusing on the interplay between the Cold War and more localised political forces that in the past few years leading academics have been forced to try to harness, collate, and make sense of the dramatic transformations of their fields. In just the last couple of years, Hal Brands has synthesised *Latin America’s Cold War*, while Tsuyoshi Hasegawa has compiled *The Cold War in East Asia*.

It is within this context that Sue Onslow’s edited volume *Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation* positions itself:

> The new approach to Cold War Studies, drawing on a range of archives, is part of the current trend to look at global trends and connections to develop a more nuanced understanding of the pervasive and enduring impact of the Cold War environment upon the processes of political change in different regions of the world. (1)

In Southern Africa, that predominant process of political change was decolonisation, stillborn by the intransigence and power of the authorities in Pretoria, Salisbury, and Lisbon. Black nationalists sought political participation; white minority regimes were determined to deny them it. On both sides, “local actors had little interest in the confrontation between Washington and Moscow.” (1) For a while, this disinterest was
more or less reciprocated. Until the mid-1970s, Moscow was content to burnish its anti-imperialist credentials throughout the developing world through vocal diplomatic support for black nationalists, but without ever committing enough military or financial support to make a sustained or decisive difference. Washington, noting that the white regimes provided both regional stability and an effective bulwark against the expansion of communist influence, did everything it could to avoid any serious engagement with the issue of minority rule.

The sudden collapse of the Portuguese Empire in 1974-5 changed everything. For Moscow and Havana, the resulting power vacuum and regional instability provided an extraordinary opportunity to boost their ideological potency by throwing their military weight squarely behind the globally-popular cause of majority rule. Washington found itself on the back foot immediately. The collapse of Lisbon's authority removed at a stroke both rationales for the United States' policy of minimal involvement, as the white regimes overnight became lightning rods for volatility and communist pressure. Washington had to create a policy from scratch that combined support for the nationalists' claim to majority rule with firm opposition to the communist ideology they usually espoused. This was an excruciatingly complex task that was complicated further by both the reverberation of a black-white conflict with the American electorate and the dogged determination of the white regimes to retain power. It was a nightmare scenario: a major test of American power, credibility, and principles in an area of the world in which the U.S. had few interests of any kind and held a very weak hand. From the war in Angola (1975-6) onwards, the Cold War paradigm was to corrupt and warp what was predominantly a battle for enfranchisement, a legacy of European colonisation. After a few dress rehearsals in the Congo and the Portuguese colonies in the 1960s, the curtain had opened on the Cold War in Southern Africa.

There are very few historians who specialise in this extraordinary theatre, but many if not most of them are featured either in this book or as reviewers here. The Cold War in Southern Africa represents an attempt to collect much of the recent quality scholarship in this sparsely populated field in one place. The volume is more a collection of separate and sometimes disparate contributions, rather than one with a pervading or unifying theme. This is understandable: the collective span of the contributions is, after all, substantial, stretching geographically to cover most of the states involved in the conflict (Angola and Mozambique are covered only obliquely), and temporally from the early 1960s right up until the late 1980s. But the lack of a unifying theme perhaps reveals a more fundamental lack of consensus in the field over the big questions. It is difficult for this reviewer to argue with Sue Onslow's thesis that the Cold War's influence in Southern Africa was complex, subtle, and destructive, as the priorities of superpowers intersected with - and by no means always dominated - those of local state and non-state actors in a manner that was "pervasive and insidious, direct and violent" (241). But if the other contributors share this thesis, their contributions do not make this clear. Indeed, Gleijeses' chapter casts the Cubans in a heroic and faultless role, on a quest against the iniquity and brutality of white minority rule. Even peeling back the excessive polarisation of his dichotomous approach, for Gleijeses the Cold War was a liberating force for the black populations of Southern Africa, an argument not without merit. The difference between the two theses is
substantial; perhaps the time has come for some engagement on the major issues of how to conceptualise the Southern African theatre as a whole. For now, however, the reader of this valuable volume is unlikely to find much continuity throughout and is better off approaching each chapter on its own merits and in its own context.

Some of the chapters are undoubtedly important. John Daniel’s chapter on South African foreign policy is probably the most perceptive and judicious overview of this much neglected topic since Chris Alden’s *Apartheid’s Last Stand* (1996) – quite an achievement in just twenty pages. His ability to chart the evolution of Pretoria’s actions early in the volume also provides something of a chronological framework upon which the ensuing, more specialised contributions can attach themselves. The latter include an excellent outline of America’s attitude towards South Africa’s nuclear policy by Monash (Johannesburg) scholar Anna-Mart van Wyk, Andy DeRoche’s study of the Johnson Administration’s relations with Zambia, Donal Lowry’s fascinating profile of anti-communism in white Rhodesia, and two contrasting pieces on the South African withdrawal from Namibia by Chris Saunders and Gleijeses.

Yet there can be little doubt that the most challenging piece here is Nancy Mitchell’s attempt to unravel the rationale behind the Carter Administration’s decision not to recognise Rhodesia’s internal elections of April 1979. With London and Washington trying to promote their Anglo-American Plan for inclusive elections in Rhodesia, Prime Minister Ian Smith undercut them by arriving at his own internal settlement with moderate black leaders, keeping substantial political power in white hands and excluding the popular guerrilla forces. With the UK wavering in its commitment to bringing about genuine majority rule, Carter came under intense pressure to acknowledge the validity of the elections, lift economic sanctions, and enable the new government to prosper. Congress argued that the communist-backed leaders of the guerrilla war would find themselves marginalised from a flawed but functioning multi-racial political process and fall into insignificance. Much of the media and many of the voters agreed. In the event, Carter’s decision to defy Congress’ call to lift sanctions was courageous, controversial, and - as Mitchell illustrates – the product of a deceptively complex array of motivations and interests.

To explore these, Mitchell employs a two-track approach. First, she marshals an impressive amount of archival and oral evidence – including interviews with the President - to illustrate that Carter’s decision was merely consistent with American policy at the time. The elections were not free and fair as designated by internationally recognised observers, as Congress required. Instead, voter intimidation was widespread, the Constitution under which the elections were held was only subject to ratification by the three per cent of the population who happened to be white, and the internal wings of the guerrilla movements were forbidden from taking part regardless of their popular support. Furthermore, legalities aside, Carter did not believe, on balance, that the internal settlement was sufficiently inclusive to provide a stable, long-term solution to Rhodesia’s governance and to foreclose the possibility of increased communist intervention on the side of the guerrillas.
Then, Mitchell delves deep into Carter’s own experiences of race relations in Georgia and demonstrates how these enabled him to see Rhodesia “not as a forum for East-West conflict but as a struggle for justice, as a nationalist struggle” (193). In this paradigm, where his predecessors and Congress saw communist-backed ‘terrorists’, best excluded or eradicated, he saw nationalist freedom fighters who had to be included in any settlement for it to be durable or meaningful. Methodologically, this approach risked slipping into something verging on a psychoanalysis of Carter; diplomatic historians are not known to be especially tolerant of such liberties. But Mitchell performs the delicate balancing act clinically, providing a whole new dimension to the thesis and one which does indeed seem to provide key elements of the answer to her question. This is diplomatic history at its finest: engaging, original, enlightening.

If nothing else, the *Cold War in Southern Africa* will be celebrated for the extraordinary empirical foundation underpinning the volume as a whole. Several of the contributions are grounded in a bedrock of outstanding archival research, often conducted in uninviting African archives. Many also make excellent use of interviews conducted with surviving protagonists, be they Russian, American, South African, British, Angolan, or Cuban. All of the contributions delve into fascinating yet unconnected facets of the conflict, demonstrating both the fertility and versatility of the field. The rich archives, complex issues, and enthralling political dynamics on show in the contributions are all captivating.

But for many they may appear as merely the tip of an extraordinary iceberg, inviting further research. Indeed, some of the contributions leave the reader grasping for more. Daniel’s primer on South African foreign policy is a great skeleton. But the reader is left wanting some flesh, even some red meat, from the South African archives. Mitchell’s argument may be powerful and original, but it focuses excessively on Carter himself. Newly released files from the Carter Presidential Library reveal another dimension: not only were both the State Department and the National Security Council steadfastly and consistently opposed to recognising the internal settlement, but some of their officials even suspected [*Carter*] of being the weak link favouring recognition. Why did they think this? Did Carter’s instincts change between the time when the internal settlement was first mooted, in October 1977, when it was announced, in March 1978, and when he defied Congress, in June 1979? Mitchell does not say. Finally, those reading Gleijeses’ thorough account of Cuba’s role in Namibia’s independence cannot fail to notice an unrelenting and permeating contrast between the ‘brave’ Cubans fighting the noble cause thousands of miles from home and the pernicious apartheid regime thwarting them on its doorstep. The reality, as ever with the Cold War, was decidedly more complex than this – how was it noble for Havana to maintain a military commitment for nearly fifteen years to bolster the ideological power of the regime despite dire economic problems at home? - and one can only hope Gleijeses’ much awaited forthcoming book eschews this kind of approach.

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One senses that a major purpose of the volume was to put the study of the Southern African theatre on the map as a dynamic and thriving branch of Cold War history – and that it does admirably. *Cold War in Southern Africa* marches forth like David Livingstone himself to stake an intellectual claim for Southern Africa to the three “c”s: Cold War, communism, and conferences. No Cold War library will be complete without it.