

Contents

- Introduction by Thomas Maddux, California State University, Northridge .............................. 2
- Review by Charles Cogan, Harvard University ........................................................................ 5
- Review by Kaeten Mistry, University of East Anglia ................................................................. 9
- Review by Leopoldo Nuti, Università degli Studi Roma Tre ................................................... 14
- Review by Irwin Wall, University of California, Riverside, and Visiting Scholar at the Center for European and Mediterranean Studies, New York University ........................................... 18
- Author’s Response by Alessandro Brogi, University of Arkansas ........................................... 26

*Copyright © 2011-2012 H-Net: Humanities and Social Sciences Online.*

H-Net permits the redistribution and reprinting of this work for non-profit, educational purposes, with full and accurate attribution to the author(s), web location, date of publication, H-Diplo, and H-Net: Humanities & Social Sciences Online. For other uses, contact the H-Diplo editorial staff at h-diplo@h-net.msu.edu.
The end of the Cold War has brought not only a re-examination of topics such as Soviet-U.S. diplomatic relations and case studies of Soviet and U.S. competition on a global basis from Asia to Latin America but also an increasing broadening of perspectives and the inclusion of topics extending far beyond the early studies. This transformation is captured in the three volumes of The Cambridge History of The Cold War, which by the third volume shifted to look at topics such as “The biosphere and the Cold War” and “Consumer capitalism and the end of the Cold War”. 1 Alessandro Brogi’s Confronting America: the Cold War between the United States and the Communists in France and Italy reflects this evolution of Cold War studies as his evaluation moves far beyond looking at diplomatic relations between Washington, Paris and Rome and exploring Central Intelligence Agency efforts to weaken the French and Italian Communist Parties (PCI, PCF). Brogi examines the broader intellectual, cultural, political and diplomatic developments that shaped the Cold War competition in France and Italy.

The reviewers are impressed with many aspects of Brogi’s study. Leopoldo Nuti, for example, considers the author’s comparative approach of France and Italy in a broader European context as “particularly rewarding, as it allows the author to draw some intriguing and perceptive analogies.” Irwin Wall concludes his extensive review of Brogi by emphasizing that the author “has told us a unique and fascinating story and illuminated an otherwise unexplored yet critical aspect of the Cold War.” Charles Coogan appreciates not only the analysis of U.S. policies and cultural influences in Europe but also Brogi’s “analysis of the rationale of the PCF and PCI in their agit-prop activities. It illustrates, in a way I have not seen before, the efficiency and resourcefulness of the Communist propaganda operation, notably in the peace offensive starting in the 1950s.” In noting Brogi’s impressive archival research on both sides of the Atlantic, Kaeten Mistry emphasizes Brogi’s contribution to the Cold War story in “exploring the diplomatic and political battle ... “ along with the “tremendous cultural struggle between the three protagonists, especially over modernization, consumption, and mass culture.” 2

Brogi’s central thesis on why the U.S. was successful in the competition with the PCF and PCI receives considerable attention from the reviewers. As Nutti suggests, the U.S. achieved success “neither by its strength nor by a propaganda effort, but by projecting its flexibility and even by exposing its most controversial and contradictory aspects.” In a detailed discussion, Wall discusses Brogi’s analysis of how the U.S. competed with the Soviet Union and its communist allies in Italy and France and suggests that “perhaps the

1 For the H-Diplo Roundtables on the three volumes, see http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/

2 For a related study on the impact of American propaganda and cultural impact on Western Europe, see the "Special Issue: Europe Americanized? Popular reception of Western Cold War propaganda in Europe," Cold War History 11:1 (February 2011): 1-83 which received a H-Diplo Article Roundtable which may be accessed at http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-XIII-4.pdf. Several of the reviewers emphasize the difficulties of determining the impact of propaganda and cultural influences.
strangest and most interesting part of Brogi’s story ...was not how the American government but rather America itself and its culture of self-criticism and pluralism, defeated Communist parties during the cold war.” Although U.S. foreign policies from Cuba to Vietnam provided evidence for PCF and PCI critiques of American imperialism, the two parties had little grounds for an effective response to the contrast between a closed, uncritical and repressive Soviet regime at home and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the tumultuous challenges in the U.S. displayed on television of Martin Luther King and the civil rights movement, the anti-Vietnam war movement, feminism and environmentalism. Mistry does raise questions about Brogi’s thesis and the importance of American modernization. In highlighting the growing appeal of the PCI in the 1970s, Mistry questions whether opposing the U.S. was as important to the PCI’s appeal as were other domestic issues. Mistry also suggests that Brogi’s analysis of anti-Americanism would have profited from more consideration of the different ways in which “groups and individuals interact with America as a state, model, and cultural icon.”

Eurocommunism in the 1970s, which involved the renunciation of the Leninist dictatorship of the proletariat and criticism of the Soviet Union, contributed to a revival of the PCF and PCI with increased membership and cooperation with socialists in France and with the Christian Democrats in Italy. Several reviewers would have welcomed more assessment of this period and the impact of the end of the Cold War. Cogan suggests that the differences between the PCF and PCI account for their different degrees of success in the 1970s; Wall notes the opposition of both Washington and Moscow to Eurocommunism which unraveled under the impact of the decline of détente and political developments in both countries including the domineering position of Socialists in the French coalition and the impact of the left-wing terrorism of the Red Brigades in Italy. Mistry would have preferred more analysis after the 1970s of how some PCI leaders adjusted to play significant roles in Italian politics.

Each reviewer has some reservations about aspects of Brogi’s analysis. Cogan notes a few “anomalies” in Brogi’s terminology, and Wall questions several specific interpretations such as Brogi’s interpretation of strikes in France and Italy in November-December 1947 as insurrectionary. Brogi’s presentation of U.S. policy-making and policymakers is questioned by Nuti and Mistry. “The policies to be adopted to face the Communist threat in Italy and France were much more fragmentated and confused” than Brogi’s interpretation suggests, Nuti writes, as he views Washington stumbling along, never really able to integrate public diplomacy, and displaying a tactical flexibility which resulted more from a “protracted diplomatic and bureaucratic wrangling, rather than the implementation of a coherent strategy decided from above.” Nuti applauds Brogi’s extensive analysis of the cultural battleground but is critical of his treatment of U.S. and Soviet manipulation of the cultural dimension of the Cold War. Mistry also would have preferred more analysis of U.S. policymakers beyond George Kennan to introduce more contingency in the narrative by discussing the degree of “improvisation in decision-making, the mistakes, and the fact that events are often hard, if not impossible, to control.”

Brogi’s extended response to the reviews provides a number of additional insights to his study.
Participants:

Alessandro Brogi is Professor of History of U.S. Foreign Relations at the University of Arkansas in Fayetteville, AR. He also held positions as Olin Fellow and Lecturer at Yale University, Visiting Professor at Johns Hopkins University – Bologna Center, and, most recently, Fellow at the Nobel Peace Institute in Oslo. His previous books are L’Italia e l’egemonia Americana nel Mediterraneo (1996, finalist for the Acqui Storia Prize, 1997, and the OAH foreign language book prize, 1998), and A Question of Self-Esteem: The United States and the Cold War Choices in France and Italy, 1944-1958 (2002). He has also published several essays on U.S.-Italian relations and comparative ones on U.S. relations with France and Italy. Currently, he is working on an interpretive history of U.S.-Italian relations since 1945.

Charles G. Cogan is an Associate at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. A graduate of Harvard, then a journalist, and then a military officer, he spent thirty-seven years in the Central Intelligence Agency, 23 of them on assignments overseas. His fifth book, French Negotiating Behavior: Dealing with “La Grande Nation” (United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), was published as part of USIP’s “Cross-Cultural Negotiations Project.” His most recent book, “La République de Dieu,” (Éditions Jacob-Duvernet, 2008), is a collection of essays on the idea of God; on evangelism (“La République de Dieu”); on Islamic fundamentalism (“L’Islam médiéval”); followed by chapters analyzing a number of conflicts between the Muslim world and the non-Muslim world. He is currently in the process of adapting this book into a memoir, in English.

Kaeten Mistry is a Leverhulme Research Fellow and Lecturer in American History at the University of East Anglia. He completed his Ph.D. at the University of Birmingham and has held has faculty positions at University College Dublin and University of Warwick. He is currently finalising a book on US-Italian relations and American political warfare in the early Cold War. His work has been published in journals including Diplomatic History, Cold War History, Modern Italy, and he has guest-edited a special issue of Intelligence and National Security on the CIA and US Foreign Relations. His new project examines the conceptualisation, framing, and narratives behind covert action.

Leopoldo Nuti (Siena, 1958), is Professor of History of International Relations at the University of Roma Tre and Director of CIMA, an Italian Inter-university Center for Cold War Studies. Nutti has published extensively in Italian, English and French on US-Italian relations and Italian foreign and security policy. His latest books are a history of nuclear weapons in Italy during the Cold War, La sfida nucleare. La politica estera italiana e le armi nucleari, 1945-1991 (September 2007) and, as an editor, The Crisis of Detente in Europe. From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985 (London: Routledge, 2008).

Irwin Wall is currently Professor of Graduate Studies at the University of California, Riverside, and Visiting Scholar at the Center for European and Mediterranean Studies, New York University. He is the author of The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-54, and France, the United States, and the Algerian War. He is currently working on European-American relations and the détente in the cold war during the 1970s.
At the end of World War II, with Josef Stalin having walled off Eastern Europe ‘from Stettin to the Baltic,’ as Winston Churchill put it, two countries on the western side of the line stood out in a quasi-questionable status. Both had strong Communist parties; both, in different ideological and cultural aspects, had been involved with authoritarian rule. These were France and Italy. The latter, a Fascist country beginning in 1922, had first joined the war in the spring of 1940, then dropped out of it in 1943, joining the Allies and as a result experiencing a civil war in 1943-1945 between Fascists and anti-Fascists. France, on the Allied side at the beginning of the war, dropped out of it with the June 1940 armistice that followed the rout of the French Army. The Vichy regime that was voted into power in July 1940 adopted in its Unoccupied Zone the ways of the Third Reich, notably in its persecution of the Jews, starting in October 1940.

By contrast, other countries in Western Europe did not constitute a political threat to the Allies on the order of what had emerged after the war in France and Italy. Germany was prostrate as a result of the war; Spain was in the grip of a Fascist regime; and the smaller countries did not represent the same political stake as did France and Italy.

In the Soviet dialectic, Western Europe was one goal in the march toward world Communism and had to be continually considered as such; but at the same time Stalin was seemingly realistic enough to realize he could not take over Western Europe directly by military means.

Stalin had already aroused the suspicion, not to say the hostility, of the Western powers by his takeover in Poland, which had been the chief issue at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. By the end of the conference, the Soviets had advanced their client, the Lublin Committee, to the same level of status as that of the Polish Government-in-exile in London. In fact, there was little the western Allies could do to prevent Soviet advances in Poland, as Soviet troops were already in occupation of the country.

Alessandro Brogi’s “Confronting America” seeks to analyze the stakes that emerged in Western Europe – specifically in France and Italy – with the onset of the Cold War, starting in 1946-1947. He emphasizes the cultural and ideological wars between the two sides – the Communist parties in the two countries on the one hand [the Parti communiste français (PCF) and the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI)], and the Western efforts, largely led by the United States, to counteract Communist propaganda and labor agitation. The book is particularly valuable as an analysis of the rationale of the PCF and the PCI in their agit-prop activities. It illustrates, in a way I have not seen before, the efficiency and resourcefulness of the Communist propaganda operation, notably in the peace offensive starting in the 1950’s.
It may seem artificial, as it obviously is, to treat the Italian and French Communist movements as a phenomenon separate from the rest of Western Europe. There were at the time leftist and anti-American movements in other countries, notably in West Germany. But, as noted above, France and Italy were the only large countries in western Europe where the Communist movement constituted a political threat. These two countries, Catholic at the base, constituted a political climate in which it was seemingly easier to go back and forth between the two authoritarian credos of Catholicism and Communism than was the case with their more liberal Protestant counterparts in northern Europe.

Stalin and his lieutenants followed an ambiguous line toward these two Communist movements. Regarding France, he signed a Treaty of Cooperation with General de Gaulle in December 1944, an initiative that had come from de Gaulle and, as part of the bargain, de Gaulle allowed the French Communist leader, Maurice Thorez, an army deserter who had spent the war in the USSR, to return to France and take charge of the French Communist Party. Thorez even entered de Gaulle’s short-lived coalition government.

In Italy, the intellectual abilities of its founding leaders such as Antonio Gramsci and Palmiro Togliatti helped in the astounding growth of the PCI from a few thousand members of an underground party before the war to the fastest growing Communist party in the west [1.7 million at the end of the war and 2.5 million in 1947, making it second only to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] (14). Togliatti, also a returnee from exile in the Soviet Union, “refounded” the PCI in 1944 as a national mass party. At the same time he was persuaded by Stalin to “temporarily set aside the party’s anti-monarchy stance and subordinate revolutionary goals to the necessity of national unity against Germany and Fascism” (15).

Anti-Americanism

There were many reasons why the Americans, who thought they were fighting their way into Europe as liberators, were confronted by a wave of anti-Americanism (particularly in France and Italy but also, for obvious reasons, in Germany) that left the new arrivals chagrined and mystified. The fact was that there was a substratum of anti-Americanism that existed independently of the rise of Communism. As Brogi puts it, “…the United States failed to understand all the elements and subtleties of anti-Americanism, communist and noncommunist, in France and Italy” (61). Notably, “injured national pride was the most directly recognizable feeling behind any sort of anti-Americanism” (63).

France had earlier had its spells of anti-Americanism, most notably in the 1920’s, when the perceived money-mad individualism of American culture clashed with French collectivism, expressed in theories of social equality and the supremacy of the general will. The distaste for American ways not only permeated the French Left, it was also prevalent on the Right, where rural and largely Catholic France was repelled by American materialism and modernism and by the Protestant ethic of commercial success as a hallmark of Christian virtue.
Much of the same attitudes toward the United States prevailed in Catholic Italy. In contrast to France, Italy was a country of massive emigration to America. But Italians, like earlier nineteenth-century immigrants to America, though even more so, were subject to discrimination, of which the emblematic event was the execution of two Italian anarchists, Sacco and Vanzetti, for the murder of a postal driver. So the presence of millions of Italians in the United States, most of whom in the early years of their immigration constituted an underclass, did less than might have been expected to burnish the image of the United States in the mother country. Nevertheless, and partly because of the immigration factor, anti-Americanism was more intense in France than in Italy (131). As Brogi puts it, “Anti-Americanism has had a long and eloquent tradition in France” (33). Indeed the public intellectual most prominent in postwar France was also the most anti-American, Jean-Paul Sartre, who was to describe the United States as “rabid” in the aftermath of the execution of the Rosenberg’s in 1953.

The Internal Dynamic

Both the French and the Italian Communist parties had a strong internal base by the time World War II had ended. The French Communist Party (PCF), the self-designated “party of the executed” (“le parti des fusillés”), played a prominent, not to say dominant role in the French internal resistance during the war as well as a leading role in the civil war in France in 1944-1945 and the vast purge of collaborators that followed. A civil war also raged in Italy after the fall of the Mussolini Government in 1943, between Fascists on the right and Italian partisans on the left.

The fact that France and Italy had strong Communist parties at the end of World War II made it easier for the Soviet Union to make its political and cultural presence known in these countries. Moreover, identification with the Kremlin, as Brogi wrote, “was intrinsically part of a dialectic process that confirmed the connection between democratic nationalism and proletarian internationalism” (23). This was particularly the view of Togliatti, who had returned to Italy after an absence of 18 years. Togliatti saw the pursuance of these two dialectical components, nationalism and proletarian internationalism, as leading to a “unity of the democracies,” which was in itself a “guarantee of peace and independence” (23).

In conformity with France’s long absolutist tradition, the French Communist Party was more hierarchical, not to say Stalinist, than its Italian counterpart. Moreover, in Italy, because of the experience of Fascism, nationalism was less dynamic than in France as a state ideology (132). Additionally, Brogi points out “the Italian peoples’ natural inclination toward a modern form of cosmopolitanism” (133).

These differences between the two parties was to have a profound effect in the later years of the Cold War, on the issues of criticism of the Soviet Union, on the validity of EuroCommunism, and the question of Communist support of, or entry into, non-Communist governments in the two countries. The Italian Communist Party, under the leadership of Enrico Berlinguer in the 1980’s became “the real magnet of EuroCommunism” (328).
There are a few anomalies here and there in this otherwise exhaustive, thoroughly researched, and reflective study. One is the peculiar, and recurrent, usage of the word “diffidence” to indicate an opposition to something, as in “the Western nations’...diffidence toward American expansionism” (204), or “French and Italian Communists from the start fused political and cultural diffidence toward the United States” (38). Additionally, there is the use of the words “organic” and “organicist” which are unfamiliar terms, at least to the general reader in the United States.

In addition, I’m not sure that “wooed” is the best word for conveying Charles de Gaulle’s approach to the Western Allies at the end of World War II (19). Though indeed de Gaulle and Dwight Eisenhower had a relationship generally of mutual respect (which de Gaulle probably enjoyed with no other American official), I am sure he would have bridled at the thought he was in the process of “wooing” Washington in order to obtain American financial and diplomatic support in the immediate postwar period.

Over the years, as the non-performance of the Soviet system and the misdeeds of Soviet policy became more and more evident, defections from the Communist parties in Europe increased. This was a slow process. The Hungarian revolution of 1956 failed to elicit public criticism from the PCF and the PCI. But the revelations of conditions in the Soviet labor camps by Alexander Solzhenitsyn and others, which reached a crescendo in the early 1970’s, proved to be the watershed event that put an end to the thrall the Soviet Union had held over leftist opinion in Europe since the Second World War. What logically was to follow, though few saw it, was the breakup of the Soviet Union late in the next decade.
One would be hard pressed to find a more suitable candidate than Alessandro Brogi to write a comparative account of the Cold War relationship(s) between France, Italy, and the United States. The author of two previous monographs on the intricate partnerships and tensions among the nations in the early Cold War, Confronting America confirms Brogi’s reputation as one of the leading historians on the subject. In fact, this latest work is perhaps better suited to a trilateral approach given that the strategies of the communist parties in France and Italy, the Parti communiste français (PCF) and the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI), vis-à-vis America were more similar – at least up to the late 1960s – than those of ruling elites in either country. Having mined numerous archival collections on both sides of the Atlantic, Brogi has produced an exhaustive account of the various statements and positions of the Western European communists in opposing the United States, alongside the multiple ways that American officials sought to undermine the strongest and most prominent communist parties outside the Soviet sphere of influence in Europe. In addition to exploring the diplomatic and political battle, Confronting America highlights the tremendous cultural struggle between the three protagonists, especially over modernisation, consumption, and mass culture. The result is an impressively-researched book – drawing on a wide-range of policy documents, memos, newspaper articles, as well as the works and theories of Antonio Gramsci and Jean-Paul Sartre – which argues that the two communists parties toiled under the weight of modernising forces, both American and domestic, while the U.S. eventually found the right formula to overcome two determinedly anti-American foes through a combination of subtle diplomacy and encouragement of mild forms of dissent inside France and Italy. The twist Brogi provides this Cold War story is to simultaneously highlight communist fascination for the U.S. culture of dissent and the reassessment of American policy, strategy, and even identity during the confrontation with the PCF and PCI.

Brogi’s study speaks to several themes that currently occupy scholars of U.S. foreign relations, including how to write international and transnational history, the interplay between domestic and international factors in decision-making, and the struggle over modernisation. His contribution to these conversations is revealing on several levels, if not always intentionally so. Rather than list the accomplishments and strengths of Confronting America (which are many), my comments will, in the spirit of academic engagement, be framed with respect to the three broad conclusions Brogi puts forward. These are: 1) “the American response to the communist threat in France and Italy, and even the effects of Americanization broadly speaking, were most successful when the United States combined its ‘psychological warfare’ with a more subtle use of diplomatic actions”; 2) the effectiveness of the PCF and PCI’s anti-American campaigns were greatest “when they conflated their own ‘psychological warfare’ with actions that enhanced their international presence”; (3) the issue of ‘Americanization,’ in particular the American model of

1 See his L’Italia e l’egemonia americana nel Mediterraneo (Scandicci: La nuova Italia, 1996); (and especially) A Question of Self-Esteem: The United States and the Cold War Choices in France and Italy, 1944-1958 (Westport, CT.: Praeger, 2002).
modernisation, ultimately “undermined communist orthodoxy, protest, and power” and revealed the “pluralistic and multifaceted character” of the U.S. hegemon (10-11).

In stressing the effectiveness of American diplomatic manoeuvring over aggressive covert meddling in Italian and French affairs, Brogi reasserts the primacy of political nuance and local knowledge in realising foreign policy goals. In so doing he offers a useful reminder amid a historiographical trend that explores underhanded American activities in each country. His point is certainly true although tends to simplify the function of political warfare and exaggerate the innovativeness of U.S diplomacy. First, the assertive American role in France and Italy during the late-1940s and early-1950s was of course designed to tackle communist strength, but equally, was a response to the supposed passivity of governing parties. The inability, or unwillingness, of ruling Christian and Social Democrats to challenge the Marxist left was a key factor in causing greater U.S. attention to psychological warfare and covert activities. Second, devising indirect ways to shape circumstances in one’s favour is always preferable to more direct action and, furthermore, effective diplomacy works in tandem with – not separate from – clandestine and propaganda measures. Covert tactics are unlikely to be successful on their own, in the same way that diplomacy will rarely bring about key objectives in and of itself. This was certainly the point stressed by George Kennan, whom Brogi regularly cites, from the opening pages of the book and in almost every chapter. The policy planner (he was no architect of ‘containment’ and certainly far from influential in the White House, especially in 1949) was one of the first to identify the necessity of a coordinated foreign policy approach to combat Soviet communism. Kennan expressed this through the concept of political warfare; defined as the utilisation of all means short of war in foreign relations, which Brogi, like numerous other authors, conflates with psychological warfare. The terms are not synonymous, with the latter relating primarily to tactics and coming under the rubric of political warfare, which emphasises an integrated application of diplomatic, economic, cultural, ideological, propaganda, and covert tools. Although Kennan’s frequent critiques of U.S. society and foreign policy were never on account of any communist anti-American campaign, Brogi is less accurate with the suggestion that he “took the cue... from his reflections on the communist adversaries” (2-3). Kennan knew little about communist ideology – he was, and remained, a Russian expert – and knew even less about communism in Italy, as was evident in his ill-fated 1948 proposition to outlaw the PCI.2

Yet Kennan’s repeated appearance in the text is telling with respect to our (and I include myself here) continued, perhaps excessive, historiographical fascination for a figure who was insightful but far from pivotal in terms of the trajectory of the Cold War. Much, I would wager, is due to his gift as a writer and distinctly scholarly perspective yet as an influential government voice he was, at best, mediocre. Kennan pops up regularly to express doubt – there was rarely a moment in his long life when he was not perturbed about one thing or another – although one wonders the extent to which he reflected the nature of America’s

---

struggle, especially regarding policy and strategy, with Western communist parties?3 Those officials carrying more weight – the Achesons, Nitzes, Dulless, Bundys, Kissingers, Nixons, Reagans – appear only fleetingly, if at all. That is not to champion traditional top-down diplomatic history over Brogi’s useful and important political-cultural approach, but rather, to highlight the absence of contingency in the narrative. At times Confronting America fails adequately to reflect the improvisation of decision-making, the mistakes, and the fact that events are often hard, if not impossible, to control. Furthermore, the degree to which leading American officials were forced into self-analysis by the cultural struggle in places like France and Italy – important arenas but far from the frontline of the Cold War, especially after the 1940s – is not clear. Did the actions of the PCF and PCI compel U.S. leaders and diplomats to question the projection of capitalist culture and American ideology? The size of the Western communist opposition was incongruent with the magnitude of the challenge it apparently posed. Every U.S. administration asserted faith in capitalist culture and American ideology but were these ever analysed; or to pose the more pertinent question, did political elites even acknowledge that the U.S. and its actions were ‘ideological’? Brogi’s analysis of the intellectual debate in this context is useful although less persuasive with regard to senior policy-makers.

The effectiveness of communist attacks on the United States was, according to Brogi, sharpest when tied to international developments such as the pacifist campaigns against NATO, the European Defence Community, and during the Eurocommunist experiment. He does an excellent job of compiling the PCF and PCI campaigns in this period. What is lost, however, is a sense of the importance of international affairs in the Western communist programme, especially at home. Where did foreign affairs rank in the priorities of party leaders and, perhaps more significantly, committed members and potential supporters? Was opposing America more or less important than ensuring labour, agricultural, and social rights? The answers may – and I stress may – better define why the PCI’s appeal continued to grow in the 1970s (the party registered its best general election result in 1976), as well as its repeated successes in regional elections. For Brogi the period is most significant in marking the beginning of a difficult era of decline for the PCI and PCF. This is certainly true in terms of international developments but does not account for the continued popularity of the Italian communists, who still polled over a quarter of the electorate in the two general elections before disbanding in 1991 (into the progressive Partito Democratico della Sinistra and the small Partito della Rifondazione Comunista, which remains active today). Simply put, opposing America may not have been the cornerstone of communist attempts to win office.

The book makes an important contribution by analysing the shortcomings of the PCI and PCF in adapting to the changing times, especially during the social and cultural upheaval of the late 1960s. Regrettably the narrative moves little beyond the late 1970s. This may relate to the difficulty of locating primary sources for this period although there would

---

3 The large, and ever-expanding, school of Kennanology has recently witnessed the long-anticipated release of the official biography by John Lewis Gaddis, George F. Kennan: An American Life (New York: Penguin, 2011).
presumably be plenty of newspaper articles and secondary sources – as Brogi employs to great effect up to this point – that would facilitate a more extensive discussion of this critical period. Alas, the end of the Cold War arrives in a hurry and with a sense of inevitability. Given that close to six of the eight chapters cover a period Brogi has previously written on (Confronting America is, of course, a quite different book), a more balanced weighting taking in the 1980s and early-1990s would have been useful. It would have been interesting, for instance, to learn more about the fallout from the collapse of Eastern and Soviet communism in 1991 and why former-communists like Massimo D’Alema, Giorgio Napolitano, and Walter Veltroni came to play such prominent roles in post-Cold War Italian politics. The PCI as a whole may have struggled in the face of Globalisation and American models of development but certain factions and individuals clearly did wrestle with these issues, albeit after the Cold War, in opposition and in power. (Indeed, at the time of this writing, the task of ensuring that Italy’s dysfunctional political system appeases restless global financial markets has, with little sense of irony, fallen chiefly to President of the Republic Napolitano).

The potentially most innovative aspect of Brogi’s study is his analysis of American modernisation and anti-Americanism. He offers several insightful points on these issues although the discussion is largely woolly with as many questions raised as answered. On anti-Americanism in particular some of this can be attributed to the inherent slipperiness of the topic, with Brogi noting “there are as many forms of anti-Americanism as there are ways to be American” (6). Fair point although what follows is a quick-fire and largely unconvincing sweep of anti-Americanism in the U.S. historical experience that does little to define the concept: “In the most general sense then, anti-Americanism can be explained as the expression of repeated disillusionment after ever rising expectations about the New World, and as the mirror opposite of the ‘American creed,’ of the U.S. pretense to universalism and perfectibility” (7-8). Brogi does an excellent job of showing how the PCF and PCI were often ahead of Moscow in defining the grounds on which to tackle the United States, as well as citing moments of friction between the two parties and with the Soviet leadership. Since the movement was far from monolithic, a more extensive discussion of the fissures in the communist world could have provided an important angle to the study. Although Brogi effectively outlines the contradictions and weaknesses of communist efforts, the difficulty of pinning down the concept of anti-Americanism resurfaces. The problem, as expressed by the PCI’s Pietro Ingrao in 1966, would prove prescient: “the Left was messy, nerve-rack[ed], and divided against American imperialism” (387). One can simultaneously oppose American foreign policy and like Hemingway yet does this constitute a form of anti-Americanism? Or does it instead reflect the dilemma of negotiating one’s position vis-à-vis ‘America’? While the former reasoning may be expedient, especially politically, the latter appears more useful in exploring how groups and individuals interact with America as a state, model, and cultural icon. Brogi’s conclusions reassert the need for subtle U.S. diplomacy and self-reflective policies in the face of contemporary anti-American challenges. The book was written during the years of the George W. Bush administration, which has clearly informed its prescription, although this also returns the debate to whether opposing U.S. policy is tantamount to anti-Americanism. Again, these are big issues that are beyond the scope of this work and Brogi is to be praised for taking them on and posing some important questions.
Confronting America admirably reconstructs how the PCI and PCF drew on politics and culture to oppose the U.S., although one must query the allusion that the American path to modernisation was the only challenge they faced. Brogi does not say this of course although the equally, if not more, prominent Catholic model is unfortunately missing from the discussion. This is a shame since the Catholic Church was as hostile to American designs as it was toward communism. A comparative angle would have helped to determine whether the political and social models pressed by the Vatican posed more of a threat to Western European communists than the U.S., as well as to understand a more credible challenge to American modernisation projects. Finally, there is little on the key political hurdle to the PCF and PCI: centrist and centre-right Christian and Social Democrats in France and Italy. The crucial battleground on which the French and Italian communists repeatedly fell short was in trumping domestic rivals and winning over the electorate. Both communist parties, but especially the Italian one, remained fixated on re-entering government. Ultimately their battle to defend national sovereignty in the early Cold War and the pacifist campaigns of the 1960s were against the Christian Democrats and Charles de Gaulle. Thus, for all the political, economic, and cultural power it wielded, the U.S. did not have a “veto on a communist sharing of power” (319). Centrist and centre-right political elites had the final say on who entered coalition governments, ensuring that any communist ascension to a position of power after 1947 could only ever be as a minor partner.

Such critiques should not detract from the insightful and original work Brogi has produced. As scholarship increasingly internationalises and globalises our understanding of the Cold War beyond traditional core arenas, Confronting America is testimony to the fact that work in Western archives continues to bear rich fruit.
Confronting America is a massive, thorough investigation of the ideological, political, and cultural confrontation that pitted the United States against the Communist parties of Italy and France for the four decades of the Cold War. In almost 400 dense pages, a length that is becoming more and more unusual in current publishing patterns, Brogi presents a multilevel analysis of the two parties' deeply ideological anti-Americanism as well as of the evolution of the policies devised by different U.S. administrations to counter this crucial threat to the achievement of their objectives in France and Italy.

Squaring all the impressive details he has mustered into a single overarching narrative is no simple thing, and the book sometimes oscillates between lumping and splitting. A former student of John Lewis Gaddis, who in his introduction to Strategies of Containment famously categorized historical analyses in these two patterns, Brogi has inherited from his mentor the ambition to paint with a broad brush on a very wide canvas, which seems only too logical when dealing with forty years of history. He plainly states that his book “is not a detailed account of US Cold War politics and culture, or of every US intervention against Western Europe’s Communist. A survey of that sort would be either too diffuse or, if it accounted for most details, too lengthy”. (9) At the same time, however, he seems unable to resist the temptation to leave any stone unturned, which gives the book a rather encyclopedic flavor as well as a rather uncertain nature, as the reader sometimes wonders whether he is reading an in-depth analysis or a large synthesis – or both. Throughout the volume Brogi is very good at keeping his eye on the ball, constantly reminding the reader of where the book is aiming. Sometimes, however, the sheer ambition of the whole enterprise adds a bit too much weight to the reading. Overall, the book is an extremely rich survey of forty years of transatlantic relations, trespassing the limits of the Cold War and delving into cultural history, theories of modernization, patterns of Americanization and much more. Confronting America is not an easy read, but it is always a highly stimulating one.

The main argument of the author seems to be that the U.S. won its long confrontation with the Communist parties by France and Italy neither by its strength nor by a propaganda effort, but by projecting its flexibility and even by exposing its most controversial and contradictory aspects – uncovering its naked self, warts and all. After the failure of the economic/reformist approach of the early postwar years as well as of the highly aggressive repression of the first half of the 1950s, Brogi argues, the United States learned to project a more sophisticated image of itself and to elevate the tone of its communication above the somewhat simplistic propaganda of the previous years. Eventually, a more nuanced approach was adopted, based on a new diplomatic flexibility that tolerated a certain amount of dissent from the moderate nationalist forces of both countries, and combined with the skillful promotion of an advanced intellectual dialogue with their emerging elites. (178-79)

Paradoxes abound throughout this narrative. According to Brogi, one of the many side effects of the the U.S. war in Vietnam was that it provided a rallying point for the French and Italian communists, who were already reeling under the blows of a growing
consumerism slowly detaching the working classes from their previous class ethos and identification with the Marxist parties. Thus in the short term the war in Asia, fought by the U.S. to demonstrate to its European allies how reliable a partner Washington was, granted an extended lease on life to two parties that might have lost most of their relevance earlier on: in turn, this prolonged the confrontation in Europe, the very prize for which the Cold War had started and continued to be waged. The ultimate paradox, however, was the long term impact of American dissent on Western Europe: the revelation of a multifaceted U.S., Brogi writes, reinforced western European communists’ fascination with American pluralism (294) and, above all, weakened their grip on the rebellious youth of the 1960s.

By demonstrating flexibility and the capacity to tolerate and even encourage dissent, the U.S. proved far more resilient, elastic and attractive than its Soviet counterpart, whose sclerotic rigidity gradually lost most of its appeal to the new generations of baby boomers in Western Europe. Modernity, not curiosity, killed the Communist cat, or at least its French and Italian species.

By presenting the US approach to Communism as a series of neat different phases that follow each other seamlessly, however, the author does not offer a persuasive assessment of the often riotous nature of the U.S. decision-making process in this field. The policies to be adopted to face the Communist threat in Italy and France were much more fragmented and confused – with each historical phase often featuring elements of the other ones. I am not persuaded, for instance, by Brogi’s statement that in the immediate postwar years, once alerted to the dangers of Communism, the U.S. swung into an action that was bound to fail as it forgot to coordinate the search for political influence with international grand diplomacy. (86) As a matter of fact, it seems to me that most US policies in those years had the very dual nature the author advocates as a recipe for success. Nor was the transition to a softer, less confrontational approach after the asperities of the 1950s – such as in the case of the opening to the left in Italy - the result of what the author describes as a cunning maneuver: “the US devised some of its most subtle forms of indirect action aimed at curbing communist influence” (202). This definition portrays as a smooth, astute approach what was instead the result of a highly disputed, controversial and never fully developed new course. Rather than walking easily into it, the U.S. stumbled into this course and somewhat recalcitrantly continued to follow it, but without the coherence that Brogi seems to attribute it. Public diplomacy and tactical flexibility were the result of a protracted diplomatic and bureaucratic wrangling, rather than the implementation of a coherent strategy decided from above. Finally, what about the central thesis that the U.S. willingly displayed a subtle flexibility in the 1960s and in the 1970s? My impression is that there is very little evidence in the book that the U.S. government was willing to use this new suppleness as a weapon to isolate or weaken the Communist grip on Western European culture. There are a few sample citations here and there –from Sargent Shriver’s advocacy of a “US policy... as sophisticated about the Communist danger as Communist danger itself” (326) to Zbigniew Brzezinski’s suggestion that the U.S. rely on “prodding, cajoling, consulting, and a lot of stroking” (338) – which are tantalizing hints that people were actually discussing the adoption of such an approach, but not enough to conclude that there was a determined U.S. grand strategy.
My other perplexities are related to the central issue of culture. Culture is indicated in chapter 5 as one of the central battlegrounds of the Cold War; and Brogi does excellent work in reconstructing the mentalities of all parties involved, devoting large portions of the book to analyzing the cultural confrontation, the reflections of the intellectuals in both France and Italy, the fears, and in a few cases also the interests, generated inside the two Communist parties by the apparently overwhelming projections of American values and ways of life. This approach allows Brogi to highlight in very stark terms the wide mental gap that separated the two sides and made them for a long time irreconcilable enemies. It also provides a number of fascinating, if somewhat embarrassing for those who uttered them, mementos of Communist stolidity vis-à-vis the new phenomena it had to confront, such as the deprecation of modern jazz, no longer perceived as “a powerful educational tool for the masses” (47) or the fear of the “lascivious mimicry” of Elvis Presley (171). My main criticism here concerns the fact that Brogi decides to discuss culture as an almost independent variable, taking it at its face value. It is the very pervasiveness of the Cold War that makes this issue one which is particularly difficult to handle and which has already sparked a number of controversies. On the one extreme, there are those who regard culture as purely one more instrument in the large orchestra of covert and overt operations practiced by both sides, as exemplified by Frances Stone Saunders in Who paid the piper?1 On the other, there are those who, like Pierre Gremion, minimize the role of the governments and the secret services, emphasizing the autonomy of the intellectual and cultural elites and arguing that they would have acted exactly the same way even without any government support.2 Brogi seems to belong to the second group: he discusses the intellectual debates but does not discuss the political maneuvering that supported his intellectuals’ activities. Yet I think that any satisfactory analysis of the U.S. and Soviet impact on the shaping of the intellectual debate in Europe cannot be done without taking into account the full spectrum of American and Soviet activities, something which is very difficult to do as we are still far from having a broad enough database of what the U.S. and the USSR did and did not do in France and Italy. The book tells us very little about what kind of instructions the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI) received from the USSR, or how much money the U.S. channeled in supporting intellectual projects. Brogi does hint to some of the U.S. interventions in Italy, but he explicitly states that he does not want to reconstruct every single one of them; similarly, he describes the constraints placed on the PCI by its dependence on Soviet funding, but this crucial aspect is not explored in depth. Yet without a more detailed reconstruction of what the U.S. and the Soviet Union did and not do in the cultural realm it is difficult to come up with a plausible assessment of the Communist intellectual activities and of the superpowers’ impact on the Franco/Italian mentality and on Franco/Italian politics. How many of the splinter groups in the French and Italian left, for instance, were the results of autonomous intellectual developments and how many the outcome of some subtle political maneuver?


A final comment on the author's intention to frame his analysis in the broader European context: from this point of view, the comparison between France and Italy, a methodological approach that Brogi had already used in his previous book *A Question of Self-Esteem*, is particularly rewarding, as it allows the author to draw some intriguing and perceptive analogies. True, not all the similarities between Italy and France are equally persuasive, but by and large the approach is insightful and very useful.
Diplomacy was once regarded as relations conducted between states, but the advent of the USSR and the Cold War changed all that. As an expression of the revolutionary dynamic of Soviet ideology there came into existence an international organization of Communist parities, the Communist International, or more sinister-sounding ‘Comintern’ for short, which Lenin was able to insure would be centrally organized to conform to his tactic of democratic centralism. The Comintern became less an international organization for revolution than an expression of Soviet diplomacy. Hence its various shifts and turns in policy internally in the many countries, over 80 of them, where Communist parties existed between the wars. The USSR, as a state, occasionally had interests in pursuing good relations, even alliances with countries abroad, in which case a pro-Soviet revolutionary party seeking to destabilize the government in those countries would prove to be a drawback. In such cases, Communist parties shifted to ‘popular front’ tactics, forming alliances with moderate parties of the left in democracies and foregoing revolutionary tactics.

The most famous of such shifts were the turns to Popular Front policies in 1934 in most countries, when the Soviet Union adopted an “anti-fascist” mode in fear of the Nazi state and in recognition of the earlier blunder of the German Communists’ ‘class-against-class’ revolutionary dynamic which had divided the left and paved the way for Hitler to come to power. Renewed popular fronts followed the Nazi invasion of the USSR in June 1941, and the Comintern was itself formally abolished in 1943, as the Soviets sought to placate their allies in the Second World War. But in the interlude of 1939-1941, following the Nazi-Soviet pact, the Comintern had been forced to revert to ‘revolutionary’ tactics, repudiate the popular fronts, and renounce taking sides in the newly labeled ‘imperialist’ conflict between Hitler and Churchill, while Stalin in the meanwhile signed a treaty of non-aggression with Hitler and gobbled up the Baltic countries and Eastern Poland in the process. The period of the alliance between Stalin and Hitler from 1939-1941 was not forgotten in the West during the Cold War.

In the postwar period the Nazi-Soviet pact tended to be eclipsed, however, as Communist parties capitalized on their roles in the Resistance, and the French and Italian Communist parties achieved all-time highs in popularity in the two countries. The French party [the Parti communiste français (PCF)] received 28% of the vote in 1946, the Italian party the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI) 19%; both parties entered alliances with the left and the newly-formed Christian Democratic parties in Italy and France, participated in governments in the two countries, and helped in the legislation of postwar reforms which in France in particular led to the creation of an extensive social security and medical insurance program that remains to this day the foundation of the French welfare state. Meanwhile Maurice Thorez, the PCF leader, and Palmiro Togliatti, the head of the PCI, both enunciated French and Italian paths to Socialism through the democratic process, differentiating themselves from the USSR, which in other respects, however, remained their model. But while the Western Communist leaders behaved like democratic statesmen,
their parties remained dictatorial and centralized, and the Communist-dominated peoples’ democracies of East Europe remained their ideal. In the countries that became known as Soviet satellites during the Cold War, ‘bourgeois’ democratic parties like Socialists and Christian Democrats had become rump parties more or less serving as cover for Communist dictatorships, while the transition from Communist-led democracy to Communist dictatorship in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 provided a chilling example of where coalitions with powerful Communist parties might lead. Indeed, in anticipatory fear of such an outcome, the Christian Democrats in France and Italy managed to expel the Communist parties from their respective coalitions in May 1947. The Communists in both countries saw the guiding hand of the United States behind these expulsions: the Marshall Plan was announced the following month, and the Truman doctrine had been articulated two months before. But anti-Communists in Italy and France, as Brogi points out in *Confronting America*, were perfectly capable of handling the expulsions on their own when they judged that the time was right.

The huge French and Italian parties, now once again in ‘class-against-class’ revolutionary mode, struck fear in Washington that they might come to power in Italy or France, and the Americans tried to fashion a response to them. The Communists, in turn, focused heavily on anti-American propaganda, and anti-American activities of various kinds became staples of their postwar existence. The confrontation between Washington and these two powerful parties is the subject of Brogi’s book, which makes it a unique study of its kind. And a critically important one too, for Brogi not only sheds light on an otherwise neglected aspect of the Cold War, but he manages to come up with a contribution to an overall explanation of why the Communist world “lost” the Cold War as well. It seems to me not to be in question whether the Communists indeed lost the Cold War, but much more doubtful, however, that this means that the Americans won. Nor am I sure that Brogi would put it that way either; or if the Americans did win against the communists in Italy and France, it was not so much because of but rather despite themselves. This book, therefore, is not a contribution to ‘triumphalist’ literature on the Cold War.

The struggle between the two communist parties and Washington was not entirely a propaganda war either, although much of it was that. Communists found fertile ground in their national traditions for anti-Americanism. A host of writers in France had fashioned a picture of America, from the Civil War on, as imperialist, aggressive, materialistic, built upon greed, and bent upon mechanization and a mass culture of totalitarian uniformity. It did not help either that America was Protestant in heritage, in contrast with the two old Catholic nations, and devoid of spirituality, racist toward blacks, and hospitable to Jews; Uncle Sam was also Uncle Shylock, and anti-Americanism even tended to be fused with anti-Semitism. In the postwar period America became visible everywhere in Europe; its troops of liberation stayed on under NATO to become ‘armies of occupation’, its films seemed to dominate French entertainment with a culture of eroticism, gangsterism, and violence, and its vulgar comic books spawned their French imitators and translators. Its overbearing presence became intolerable when its financial support through the Marshall Plan was used to sustain a tired old bourgeoisie in power and remilitarize France and Italy, which were, according to communist propaganda, forced into an anti-Communist postwar military alliance in NATO, thus becoming virtual American colonies.
The Communists were unarmed but not without means of struggle against the Americans. They mobilized a propaganda apparatus built upon an extensive press, control of the labor unions, and a powerful presence at all levels in French society and bureaucracy, and they enjoyed broad sympathy among intellectuals and a capacity for mass mobilization. Their selective use of strikes in 1947-48 appeared to be an effort to destroy the Marshall Plan before it had a chance to get off the ground, fomenting what seemed to outsiders to be a mini-civil war. Here I differ with Brogi on two counts. First he seems to buy the so-called Black Legend surrounding the Blum-Byrnes agreement of 1946, which established a maximum quota on the importation of American films at 50% of French screens and reserved a minimum of 25% for French films. These accords did not destroy the French film industry, which recovered brilliantly in the 1950s. The reality was that the 25% minimum of screen space reserved for French film production in the postwar was beyond the capacity of the French industry to fill anyway, because the movie industry was totally ignored in the budgeted expenses of the Monnet plan, whose Stalinist-like bureaucrats could not understand investing in films when there was a shortage of cement in France. Secondly I do not agree that the November-December 1947 strikes in France and Italy, which were rhetorically aimed at the Marshall Plan, were in any sense “insurrectionary.” The term is frequently used to describe them in the historical literature and Brogi follows suit; but the reality was that once Communists were expelled from the government and the Marshall Plan announced, the postwar consensus on the necessity of wage restraint and austerity in the interest of reconstruction collapsed. The winter of 1947 was one of the coldest on record, the harvest was among the worst ever, and prices of coal and grain shot up beyond the reach of working class wages which authorities attempted to freeze. The strikes were about traditional working-class issues, wages and working conditions, and they were not necessarily violent; they were rather repressed violently by a brutal government, under a Socialist anti-Communist Minister of the Interior Jules Moch, who used the army to comb the facilities, the workers, and the bureaucracy of the coal industry to purge it of communists who had ‘infiltrated’ it in the earlier period.

The strikes, moreover, did nothing to stem the Marshall Plan, but rather served to convince the Americans that aid to France was necessary. The Marshall Plan was less important economically to the growth of France than was once widely believed, but it did provide an important margin for investment and in the long run strongly influenced the European movement toward integration. My own take on this is that the effects of the Marshall Plan and military aid programs in France that followed were largely spent on a vain prosecution of the Indochina war. The war early in its French phase became a staple of Communist anti-Americanism because Washington helped France, and the conflict gave the French Communist party a new lease on life in the 1960s and 1970s in its American phase. But that became a historic opportunity that the parties squandered when they failed to appeal to postwar youth who rather turned from the Communists to new and old forms of leftism from Trotskyism and Maoism to Anarchism and ‘Situationism.’

The irony of the period of communist ‘class-against-class’ tactics during the Cold War, which lasted from 1947 until 1956, was that strikes anyway soon ceased as what the French called the ‘trente Glorieuses,’ and the Italians their ‘economic miracle’ began.
Communist energies were largely diverted into the Soviet sponsored ‘Peace Movement,’ and took the form of collecting signatures to ban the atomic bomb, which swiftly became the symbol of American militarism and aggression. The Peace Movement frightened the Americans because of its widespread public appeal, which extended far beyond the membership and even voters of communist parties themselves. It was neither destabilizing nor a threat to the political systems in Italy and France, however; I tend to see it as symptomatic of the limits of what ‘revolutionary’ parties can do when constrained to operate within democratic systems. As became clear later, communist parties in the west functioned democratically for so long that they evolved into social democratic parties despite themselves.

But for the moment Washington was frightened, and as Brogi skillfully shows, it fashioned two responses. The first, rather brutal and inept, if not stupid, was through the ‘Psychological Strategy Board (PSB),’ which actually fashioned plans for the ‘reduction’ [read “extirpation” according to Brogi; (156)] of Communist influence in Italy and France. An expression of American McCarthyism, which had a very deleterious effect on the American image in Europe, it consisted of urging European non-Communists to fashion their own peace movements while their governments conducted raids on communist party headquarters and made arrests, as a prelude to suppressing the parties altogether. But neither the French nor Italian governments dared go that far, either because they took their democratic credentials more seriously than the Americans did or they feared that the effect of driving communists underground would only further destabilize their regimes. As far as I can see the PSB accomplished little. Brogi shows that did reveal, however, that the Americans had become a bit more sophisticated about communism, which they no longer saw as a simple expression of poverty. And indeed, communism did not immediately show signs of disappearing as France and Italy entered the consumer society. In fact in Italy its influence grew.

Brogi shows us that it was American public diplomacy rather than covert operations within Italy and France that was effective in diminishing the communist threat—aided, of course, by the bizarre and opaque nature of the communist phenomenon itself. Eisenhower, for a warrior strangely effective as a spokesman of peace, offered ‘Atoms for Peace’ and ‘Open Skies’ proposals publicly and then sought to negotiate a test ban treaty. The first two proposals were stillborn, but the test ban became law under the Kennedy administration. Eisenhower pursued détente with the Soviets and attended a summit, although American peace policies were undercut by the plan for a multi-lateral nuclear force (MLF) and the more realistic approach to nuclear war in the strategy of flexible response. The U2 spy-plane over the USSR, which the Soviets managed to shoot down, did not help either. But all of this was overshadowed by Khrushchev’s revelations of Stalin’s crimes at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956. The ‘secret speech’ made its way to the front pages of the New York Times and Le Monde, and the Communist world was thrown into disarray. The PCF and PCI diverged in their reactions. Relations between “the two T’s” as one writer termed them1, Thorez and Togliatti, were never good, but following the secret speech, they

---

became worse, as the PCI distanced itself from the Soviet experiment and declared a policy of ‘Polycentrism’, multiple poles of authority in the communist world, with one obviously in Rome. The French party meanwhile briefly aligned itself with the ‘anti-party’ group in Moscow that tried to overthrow Khrushchev and remain loyal to the vision of Stalin. The Soviet suppression of the revolution in Hungary followed soon after (October 1956), causing many defections in both the PCI and the PCF.

The two parties were thus weakened as they faced the challenges of the 1960s, and these turned out to be beyond them. I have to express my unabashed admiration here for the way that Brogi has weaved these diverse phenomena in order to put together a coherent picture of how the international communist movement in Europe was undermined in the new age that dawned in the 1960s. Domestic developments in both Italy and France brought more stable governments to power than had been the case in the immediate past. In Italy Amitore Fanfani, scion of the left of the Democrazia Cristiana (DC) party, fashioned an opening to the left or coalition with the hitherto communist-leaning Socialist party of Pietro Nenni. The Eisenhower administration was at first fearful of this operation, but learned to tolerate it while Kennedy welcomed it, recognizing its apparent potential for undermining the PCI by accomplishing critical social reforms. Fanfani’s independent foreign policy in the Middle East, seeking to make Italy the West’s interlocutor in relations with the Arab states, could be accommodated if it meant stabilizing the Italian government against the communist threat. The same was true for de Gaulle in France; he was more blatantly anti-American than Fanfani and chafed at what he saw as French subordination to “les Anglo-Saxons” in NATO, but his anti-communist credentials were clear and un tarnished and he promised to take the French out of Algeria, yet another senseless French colonial war that was an embarrassment to the West. It took him four bloody years to accomplish that, but the Americans learned to put up with him even when he took France out of NATO’s integrated command. Not only Washington, but the PCF too, was embarrassed by the Algerian war; the party could not easily bring itself to abandon the European population of Algeria and endorse Algerian independence. The party was French, after all; would not Algeria be better off under an eventually communist and modernized France than cut loose under the domination of tradition-bound Muslims? To be sure, the party eventually rallied to the cause of Algerian independence, but too slowly for the radicalizing generation of young people who came upon the scene in the 1960s and became attracted to new, more revolutionary models than those offered by their elders in tradition-bound parties of the left, moderate or radical, social-democratic or communist, as the case might be.

Brogi goes on to show us how a PCF newly aligned with the Socialists against de Gaulle, and a PCI evolving toward social-democracy, looked tired and uninspiring as revolution moved the third world in the decade of the sixties. Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, Mao Tsetung, and Ho Chi Minh offered fresh alternatives to Khrushchev’s blustering and Eurocentric focus on Berlin. Brogi misses commenting on the Berlin crisis, however, and its resolution through the building of the wall; East Germany may have been thus saved, but the building of the wall represented a failure of Soviet diplomacy while it became an ugly symbol of a communism that repelled rather than attracted new generations of young people, already tired of the Cold War. Polycentrism became a reality with the Sino-Soviet
split, but Mao was infinitely more exciting than Togliatti. Much of the New Left, to be sure, was old in new disguise: Trotskyism for one thing, Anarchism for another. Marx, modernized and ‘psychologized’ for a new generation, which read the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* rather than *Das Kapital*, and preferred the term ‘alienation’ to ‘exploitation,’ was not new for all that either. But there were a fascinating cluster of New Left theorists: Jean-Paul Sartre, never a disciplined communist although he aligned himself for a time with both Stalin and Mao, married his Existentialism to Marxism, while Herbert Marcuse effected a union of Freud and Marx and fused the call for economic liberation with that of sexual revolution. It was the issue of sexual freedom in the dormitories that touched off the student revolution in France. Franz Fanon meanwhile put the locus of revolution in the third world, and joined Marcuse in divesting the European proletariat of its revolutionary mission, but here was the rub: both came from across the Atlantic in the New World, and while Fanon, originally from Martinique, settled and wrote in Algeria and became the theoretical voice of the revolution there, Marcuse became the standard-bearer of the students from his academic perches at American universities, first Brandeis and then the University of California, San Diego.

What appears ultimately as perhaps the strangest and most interesting part of Brogi’s story, symbolized by Marcuse’s clarion call from the beaches of sunny California, was how not the American government, but rather America itself and its culture of self-criticism and pluralism, defeated Communist parties during the Cold War. Washington itself became bogged down in Vietnam, ruining the promising era of détente that briefly followed the resolutions of first the Berlin crisis in 1961 and then the Cuban crisis of 1962. The ugly face of American imperialism returned, and it was never really to disappear for Europe’s left, from Johnson through Nixon-Ford, Carter, and Reagan. These were excellent targets of communist anti-American propaganda, better ones in their way than either Truman or Eisenhower had been. But the struggle against them was spearheaded by new forces that emerged from America itself and in parallel with the consumer revolution itself accomplished a real transformation of Euro-American society to which the Communists ultimately proved incapable of adjusting.

The American student movement brought with it new forms of protest appropriate to a new age. The civil rights movement, a social revolution of non-violence that managed in large part to integrate America, elevated Gandhi and Martin Luther King above Trotsky and Lenin. The anti-war movement in America dramatized the nature of American involvement in Vietnam more effectively than volumes of propaganda were able to do. The first war to be fought on television, and undercut by the images of violence that appeared on screens at home, dramatized the communists’ inability to master new forms of communication as their parties continued to struggle with the print media, newspapers and books. American mass culture spawned new and revolutionary-sounding voices and models: Communists did not know had to react to the popular fascination with Marilyn Monroe, the Kennedy myth, the hippie and youth culture with drugs as their accompaniment, and finally, even the sound of rock and roll, all of them subversive in their own ways. Communist parties fought the sexual revolution and missed the importance of feminism. They ignored the ugly consequences on the environment of untrammeled economic growth in the capitalist and communist worlds alike. Wedded even to an obsolete brand of Marxism they
succumbed to a new world of consumer capitalism and its mass communications, to which they never succeeded in fashioning a response. They missed the significance of the student movements in France and Italy, all this best symbolized when in May 1968, with students having succeeded in paralyzing the French economy, the Communist leader Georges Marchais denounced the student leader Daniel Cohn-Bendit as a ‘German anarchist.’

To be sure there was a brief revival in the 1970s that took the form of Eurocommunism. Both parties experienced an influx of members and the Italian Communists brought their vote total to an all-time high, 34.4 percent in the elections of 1976. Both parties, joined by the Spanish party after the death of Franco, announced their commitment to the democratic process and renounced the Leninist dictatorship of the proletariat, criticized the suppression of freedom in the USSR, and declared that they were ready to assume the responsibilities of government. The PCF partnered with the Socialists in a union of the Left, and the PCI joined with the Christian Democrats in a ‘historic compromise.’ Newly emboldened, Enrico Berlinguer, the head of the PCI, endorsed not only the European Economic Community, but even the NATO alliance, telling Cyrus Sulzberger of the New York Times that it was NATO protection from the USSR that allowed Eurocommunism to exist in Western Europe. While their anti-Americanism was attenuated in the aftermath of Vietnam, both parties, however, continued to criticize Washington’s imperialism in the third world.

Kissinger and Ford warned against the new and revived threat of Europe’s left, but the Carter administration was much more restrained about interfering in Europe’s internal affairs. When the PCI came close to participating in the Italian government in January 1978, Carter did issue a warning, but to little effect. The Communists agreed to support the Italian government without participation but as part of a majority headed by the DC. Not only Washington, but the USSR too, issued dire warnings against the Eurocommunist phenomenon, while the détente that underlay it began to unravel under the impact of Carter’s human rights policy, and internal politics in France and Italy delivered the coup de grace. I particularly liked the way Brogi shows that the threat of the left coalition in France being dominated by the Mitterrand Socialists caused the communists to withdraw from their coalition, while in Italy the alarming resurgence of left-wing terrorism in the form of the Red Brigades, many of whose members were disillusioned ex-members of the PCI, hurt PCI popularity. The Red Brigades delivered the coup de grace to the Communist-PCI coalition when it kidnapped and murdered the DC leader Aldo Moro, leaving his body in a van on the street equidistant between PCI and DC headquarters. Disagreements about how to deal with the consequences of the murder disrupted the coalition, unpopular in any case for its politics of austerity.

Two savvy Socialists, Francois Mitterrand in France and Benito Craxi in Italy, dominated the politics of their respective countries in the 1980s while both the PCF and the PCI went into decline. The two parties’ different natures were revealed in their differing responses to the Gorbachev phenomenon; the PCI was enthusiastic while the Stalinist PCF remained wary. Gorbachev’s failure, however, damaged them both, neither having entirely wedded itself from its Soviet ties. The PCI chose the path of liquidation, reforming itself as the democratic party of the left; the PCF lingers, a marginal remnant in French politics. Brogi
effectively sums up how intellectual trends in the West, from structuralism to postmodernism, helped render traditional Marxist thought obsolete; intellectuals today in neither France nor Italy go through the long apprenticeship with Marxist thought before coming of age. He leaves us hanging, however, because in the end, how effective were the tactics of the Americans in eliminating or defeating the communist phenomenon in France and Italy? In terms of conscious policy, it would seem to me, they were not effective at all, except in being responsive to Soviet initiatives of détente; even Eisenhower and Reagan get high marks on that score. But America overwhelmed and fused with a new non-Communist left that now expresses itself in issue oriented politics: feminism, ecology, immigration, and multiculturalism. Communism would seem to have meanwhile drowned in the politics of pluralism. Brogi has told us a unique and fascinating story and illuminated an otherwise unexplored yet critical aspect of the Cold War.
Before I started my research for this book, I went on a diet of French and Italian literature and literary criticism from the mid to late twentieth century. It was especially from reading those Italian leftist authors who, during fascism, had reviewed or translated American literature that I got my first inspiration for this work. Their ambiguous fascination continued in the immediate post-war, when the United States was already becoming the Cold War enemy. In 1946, Cesare Pavese, one of Italy’s prominent post-war Communist writers, suggested that America was “an immense theater where our common drama was played out with greater frankness than elsewhere.” This “dictum” was one of the cues that led me to explore the complexity of French and Italian Communist propaganda aimed at their internal adversaries and at American influence; and then, from that complexity, to analyze, largely through archival sources, the equally complex evolution, with all its variations, of the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the two most powerful Communist Parties (PCF and PCI) in the West.

So I must express my appreciation that these thorough and perceptive reviews have, with such level of sophistication, directed the discussion toward the major points I was hoping for: the revealing qualities of a comparative, multilateral approach; the important role of non-governmental, opposition forces in the Western alliance and its effects on national identities and the U.S. response; the advantage of weaving diplomatic history with cultural constructs by way of interpretation or by including the multifaceted reflections on modernization and anti-Americanism by this story’s protagonists. The reviewers also indicate, as I had hoped, that, unlike many works on anti-Americanism, or on the two Communist Parties, this study skirts polemics, taking each actor from all three sides seriously.

The reviewers have all correctly identified my main themes: from the two Communist Parties’ confrontations with modernizing forces (indigenous or driven by American influence) to the various forms and adaptations of U.S. influence in both countries; from the issues of identity and exceptionalism that characterized this interaction to the effects of social and intellectual forces, especially during the 1960s and 70s, that Communist leaders ignored or failed to control from above; from the relevance of Communist influence when its anti-Americanism was in its most discerning and targeted phases, to the equally relevant impact of the image and practices of a divided, controversial, seemingly weakened, but thus pluralist America. To these issues and dichotomies, I would add the importance – only briefly mentioned in the reviews -- of the most subtle of U.S. diplomatic and cultural tactics: they consisted of not only tolerating but, at crucial moments, also encouraging a certain amount of anti-American criticism from the moderate leftist or nationalist groups in France and Italy, in order to bolster their political ascendancy and to marginalize the forces (namely, the Communists, or the extreme nationalists) that upheld the most unconditional and virulent forms of anti-Americanism. In the end, allowing ‘manageable’ forms of dissidence turned out to be the best weapon against the unmanageable ones.
Being a work of broad thematic and chronological scope, the book lends itself to various interpretations.; and since these four interpretations, appreciations, and critiques often diverge on the very same points, “in the spirit of academic engagement,” as Kaeten Mistry put it, I will here discuss each main point, especially the most controversial ones, by comparing the views of each reader. Before addressing those issues, I will start with four general points about my decision on where to focus my attention, and then (in response to Leopoldo Nuti) explain my methodology.

First, as Charles Cogan notes, I highlighted the importance of the French and Italian Communist Parties (PCI, PCF) at both the internal and international levels. The two parties mattered greatly in the Cold War confrontation, and transcended the specifics of French and Italian politics. Their political resilience and their anti-Americanism addressed global as much as local realities; they affected public opinion beyond their party affiliation (although I think Cogan slightly overstates the importance of the dialogue between Communism and Catholicism in France), and beyond the confines of France and Italy; those assets also prompted political, economic, and intellectual representatives of the United States to reflect and remedy their dialogue with and management of their counterparts in Western Europe.

Second, while an extensive literature has now clarified the degree of coordination between Moscow and Western European Communists, as well as the combination of myths and realities in this often tormented relationship, my study is founded on the assumption that the ultimate confrontation for Communist Parties in Western Europe was with capitalism, consumerism, modernization, and mass culture. Thus I intended to fill this gap, a crucial one in my opinion.

Third, as I did with my previous work on diplomatic relations among the three countries, I used a comparative analysis to show the developments and characteristics in U.S. relations with France and Italy that tend to remain hidden or ignored in separate treatments of U.S. bilateral relations with either one of them. Furthermore, through this comparative dimension, I intended to provide a source to better understand today’s currents of anti-Americanism, not only in Europe.

Fourth, since most works on anti-Americanism have focused on either the elites (intellectuals and media), or popular perceptions (using statistical data, polls, social analyses), I thought that my study of the confrontation between the United States and Western European Communism would find its best answers by striking a middle path, privileging archival sources. Those sources reveal how party leaders in France and Italy, or policy-makers in the United States assessed, followed, or guided the voices from below; they also allowed me to compare and contrast mutual perceptions of all three sides’ political outlooks and to evaluate their accuracy. My other main primary reference, intellectual writings, which required scrutiny and interpretation, complemented the archival sources and helped reveal the complexity of anti-Americanism.

Regarding my methodology, I have never claimed to be an absolutist lumper. In fact, in cases like this one, where new evidence is abundant, some detail is necessary both to
illustrate new findings and to support the interpretive framework. But my study remains largely interpretive, addressing broad questions that help make sense of the evolution of all three sides of this story over such a broad chronological spectrum. Even Gaddis' *Strategies of Containment*, which coined the lumping-splitting definition, is not a short book: while interpreting the meaning of U.S. grand strategies, it also accounts for the complexities of several administrations' Cold War policies. I consider Marc Trachtenberg's *A Constructed Peace* and Odd Arne Westad's *The Global Cold War* as two other examples of this hybrid approach. Richard Kuisel’s *Seducing the French* (which in part inspired my work), is another fine instance of synthesis which also dwells on key aspects (such as the productivity drives and the Gaullist approach to modernization) that demonstrate the core arguments of the author's thesis. Other historians, such as Frank Ninkovich and Michael Hunt, who have proposed broad interpretations of U.S. foreign policy, but have based their themes on mostly archival evidence, have found it necessary – to put it with Ninkovich’s words – “to pay closer attention to specific policy issues,” while not “pretend[ing] to deal comprehensively with the various crises touched upon,” especially if previously narrated in detail by other historians.¹

All these examples illustrate that the main purpose of most “lumping” accounts is one of reinterpretation, rather than synthesis. Reinterpreting often requires, as Irwin Wall points out in his review, the “weaving of diverse phenomena” (which can only be done with some “in-depth analysis” [Nuti] complementing the synthesis) “in order to put together a coherent picture,” -- in this case of how the international Communist movement in Europe or the transatlantic dialogue between the United States and Western Europe evolved. Finally, as Nuti correctly indicates, in order to explain the complexity of that dialogue, I had to correlate aspects (cultural especially) that seemingly “trespass the limits of the Cold War.”

**THE AMERICAN SIDE**

The one main theme of the book that all four readers address is the role, importance, and limits of American influence. The general point I tried to convey is that American influence was more effective when U.S. society appeared divided and conflicted (I like Nuti’s description of the U.S. “uncovering its naked self, warts and all”) than when it enjoyed widespread consensus; divisiveness became an asset because, in the eyes of most Europeans, it reflected the most worthy trait of Western societies, best represented by the American experience: their pluralism.

Mistry, as an expert on U.S political warfare,² indicates that I might have confused it with

---


psychological warfare. In fact, I think I made clear the distinction between the two, illustrating the permanence of political warfare from the time it was first developed in the late 1940s, and the mostly contingent nature of the psychological warfare tactics of the early 1950s. Also, I have never asserted that effective diplomacy (aimed at affecting the interplay between foreign and domestic policies in France and Italy) emerged independently from other approaches, such as economic measures or covert tactics. I just emphasized how Washington gave more weight to one or the other of those measures according to the circumstances, and that it was not until the mid-1950s that the use of diplomatic means became so prioritized, and reached a level of sophistication attuned to the complexities of French and Italian politics, as well as to the likewise more sophisticated nature of Communist propaganda in both countries (and we should add to this that U.S. officials came to understand how incorrect were their previous assumptions on Communism thriving solely in situations of economic distress or lax governmental bureaucratic controls over subversive activities). In that sense, I cannot agree with either Nuti’s or Mistry’s suggestion that in the immediate post-war period, the United States had fully adopted a “dual” approach, “coordinating the search for political influence with international grand diplomacy” with the same consistency and astuteness as in later years. It is true that some diplomats, like Jefferson Caffery (Paris) and James Clement Dunn (Rome) advocated political and diplomatic flexibility from the start – including the possibility of favoring or coopting forces (Gaullist or Socialist) which expressed dissent from Washington in order to counter the nationalist or economic appeal of the Communists. But this strategy was far more tentative and less endorsed from the top than subsequent ones starting from the late 1950s. To cite one example of this apparent evolution, at first U.S. labor diplomacy to a considerable extent relied on the conservative approach of the strongly anti-Communist American Federation of Labor, and on that union’s faith in the politics of productivity and apolitical trade unionism as ways to defuse class conflict in Europe; by the late 1950s, the State Department rejected the AFL’s frontal attack approach and rather worked in cooperation – this time guiding firmly from above – with the more flexible tactics advocated by the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) representatives: see for example Walter Reuther’s contribution to the cooption of the Italian Socialists during the Opening to the Left in the early 1960s.

This is not to say that, from the last years of the Eisenhower administration, the United States had a master plan on how to confront Communism or anti-Americanism in France and Italy. Bureaucratic wrangling persisted, and I believe that is obvious, for example, in the ways in which the CIA’s Allen Dulles tended to disagree with ambassador to Italy Clare Boothe Luce, or in the ways U.S. diplomats debated political reactions (from the center or the left) to the Vietnam War in both Italy and France, or finally, in how uncertain and tentative the U.S. approach to Eurocommunism was, especially during the first year of the Carter administration. My narrative shows a great deal of precisely that “improvisation of decision-making” that Mistry contends is not sufficiently highlighted in the book.

Furthermore, not certainty, but the opposite -- doubt, if not even despair -- often reigned in Washington, as in 1968, when, incorrectly, U.S. officials deemed events in Paris to be of more consequence than events in Prague, or during the peak of Eurocommunism, when U.S. officials feared the drift of NATO allies. Through most of the 1970s, Washington was more concerned about American decline than prescient on the Communist one. Most U.S. top officials perceived Eurocommunism's political ascendancy, while they failed to fully understand the simultaneous cultural (in the broadest sense) decline that affected the political fortunes of the movement.

One of main threads of my account is that outside the supple use of grand diplomacy, what the United States achieved in both France and Italy was indeed the result of “stumbling” into success (Nuti), and, in the end, as Irwin Wall for the most part correctly interprets my thesis, “if the Americans did win against the Communists” in both countries “it was not so much because of but rather despite themselves.” Nuti suggests something similar in reference to the cultural impact of youth protest on both sides of the Atlantic during the Vietnam War. I would counter Mistry's sensing of a certain “inevitability” of an American victory at the end of my book with Wall's more correct view that the book “is not a contribution to 'triumphalist' literature on the Cold War.”

I underline that Wall's interpretation is accurate “for the most part,” because, despite the tentative, and even inadvertent ways in which American influence worked its way through in France and Italy, what remains remarkable is that several U.S. officials did develop a growing awareness of how important it became to project a pluralist image of the American experience. The relevance of this development is demonstrated by the fact that it did not remain confined to liberal thinkers such as William Fulbright or Arthur Schlesinger, who, explaining the tactics of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, acknowledged the importance of civil liberties, and admitted that conflict and contradiction were the truly creative aspects of a free society (182). This development also affected the views or approaches of other officials who were better known for their rigid anti-Communism and for their faith in American consensus: if Clare Luce, for example, accepted, a bit reluctantly, to re-orient U.S. cultural diplomacy toward an increasing dialogue with some of Italy's leftist intellectuals, that was a clear sign of progress in American flexibility; the same conclusion may apply to Henry Kissinger's rejection in 1969 of a plan by the French government for an “advertising campaign” in support of U.S-French relations, as he argued that it would backfire and that the use of more indirect diplomatic tools would give Washington the expected clout in France's internal affairs (Kissinger's faith in the most indirect form of intervention – again, here I underline the wavering character of U.S. diplomacy and the importance of “bureaucratic wrangling” -- was not without contradiction, as, for a while, he then opposed the dominant view at the U.S. embassy in Paris that François Mitterrand, not the Gaullists, was the real catalyst for change and political stabilization in France – a view which, in the end, prevailed in Washington, too).

My account also shows that the shift in priorities that favored a more subtle use of diplomatic strategies to counter Western Communism was made possible by the degree of endorsement that it received from the top. The key decisions ultimately rested on "officials carrying more weight" (Mistry). If their appearance is less frequent than that of the various
embassy officials, it is not because of their lack of interest in these issues, but because, as any archival source would reveal, that is how the decision-making process occurs, with the heavy work, even during the highly centralized Psychological Warfare tactics, delegated to the embassies. There are few exceptions, all accounted for in the book, showing the close involvement in these strategies of leaders such as Eisenhower, Kissinger, or Brzezinski, to name a few.

My thesis on the Americans’ increasingly discerning use of diplomacy also highlights the importance of a multilateral approach. The United States did not enjoy a “veto” power over the French or Italian governments’ choices, as Mistry suggested I claim by extrapolating one of my quotations. In almost all instances, starting from the simultaneous expulsion of the PCF and PCI from the French and Italian governments to the debate over Eurocommunism in the mid-1970s, U.S. officials found their influence mitigated, adapted, or even rejected by the local ruling elites, ranging from the Christian Democrats in both countries to the Gaullists in France. Indeed, the resistance to U.S. influence is underlined from the beginning of the book, not only from the “usual suspects” (De Gaulle, or some of the left-wing Christian Democrats in Italy), but also from those who most sedulously invited American influence, such as Alcide De Gasperi or Mario Scelba in Italy, or Georges Bidault in France. American agency was never univocal; at its best, it pursued symbiosis with rather than direct influence over Western leaders. Examples abound, starting from the way Washington tried to overcome Cold War uncertainties in France and Italy by emphasizing the political, more than economic, significance of the visits of Léon Blum and Alcide De Gasperi to the United States. But suffice it here to think of another example from the years of apparently centralized détente between the two superpowers: Kissinger, in 1975, may have deluded himself, thinking that Washington could guide German chancellor Helmut Schmidt or French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, within the framework of the G-7, into finding economic and diplomatic remedies to ostracize the Eurocommunists; in fact, the European leaders followed their own initiatives to a great extent, finding themselves in agreement with rather than coerced by the United States.

Finally, on the U.S. side of the story, the towering figure of George Kennan has been, as Mistry points out, perhaps overused by academics (including himself), because we tend to be fascinated with his scholarly perspective. I agree that his political influence, once we get past the Marshall Plan, appears much less strong than in his years as director of the Policy Planning Staff. With Gaddis’ new account, we might, as I think we should, now reevaluate his political clout in subsequent decades as well. But my main purpose, following the academic line, has been to draw the reader’s attention to Kennan’s perceptive analyses, regardless of how influential they might have been in Washington, as an “iconoclast” whose


“ideas, both as an insider and, later, an academic outsider of U.S. foreign policy, are so often heavily scrutinized because they cast a critical light on conventional America, penetrating its surface, clarifying its idiosyncrasies, its will to power, and making sense of its world role” (3). So, it is not on account of his expertise, or lack thereof, on Western Communism, that I chose to analyze him, or to analyze, for example, Dwight Macdonald or Reinhold Niebuhr, but rather because of what these intellectuals had to say about the United States as world leader in every sense. Likewise, the book features prominent European intellectuals, such as (just among those outside the Communist ranks) Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Raymond Aron, Michel Foucault, Alberto Moravia, Nicola Chiaromonte, Umberto Eco, Italo Calvino (no longer in the PCI from 1956), who assisted these interpretations, whether from a critical or a sympathetic standpoint (and sometimes a hybrid of the two for the same person).

THE COMMUNIST SIDE

Anti-Americanism is a slippery concept. Mistry and I agree more on this point than he makes it seem. Finding common denominators – such as the contrast between a self-proclaimed American perfectibility with its corollary of rising expectations, and the consequent disappointments it has caused abroad and at home -- as I do in my introduction, is simply a way to frame the more complex discussion that follows in the next chapters. It would have been easier to dismiss Communist anti-Americanism as always expedient or, the opposite, prejudicial and ideologically driven. But, first, in order to explain the widespread appeal of Communist anti-Americanism, often well beyond the two parties’ ranks, I found it useful and compelling to show the connections of their perceptions or propaganda to the varieties of anti-Americanism rooted in French and Italian cultural traditions – the “substratum of anti-Americanism that existed independently of the rise of Communism,” as Cogan summarizes the point. Secondly, besides the regimented forms of Communist anti-Americanism, I emphasized the even more important forms of ambivalent anti-Americanism during crucial phases of the Cold War. I stressed the importance of not only breaking down the various forms (Communist or not) of anti-Americanism – political, social, cultural – but also of how even the groups that opposed transatlantic integration in all its forms, debated these issues (and were fascinated, for example, with the America of dissent, not just in search of political scores) precisely because, as Mistry suggests, they were “negotiating their position vis-à-vis ‘America’.” America, for them, too, had to be engaged as a “state, model, and cultural icon.” That is why I underlined several reflections by French and Italian Communist leaders or intellectuals that echoed the conclusion by Cesare Pavese on America as the “immense theater” of our “common drama.” It may indeed be argued that Americanization operated inside a constituency it was most likely to threaten.

As Irwin Wall notices, Communist ambivalence toward U.S. cultural – and countercultural – influence drew my attention also because it helped explain, to a large extent, the failure of the rather orthodox PCF, and, to a greater extent than once thought, the more flexible PCI as well, in the 1960s-70s to appeal to postwar leftist youth that nurtured new radical views, whether neo-Marxist, or anarchist, or libertarian; all these forces, together with the social developments associated with modernization and consumerism -- as all four
reviewers recognize -- did divest “the European proletariat of its revolutionary mission” (Wall). And Wall is correct in noting the American academic roots of some of the intellectual catalysts of this change, such as Herbert Marcuse and Franz Fanon – to which I would add the interconnectedness between American academia, Structuralism, Post-Modernism, and what Italian intellectual Biagio De Giovanni identified as the transformation of leftist thought in Europe from historicism to cultural relativism.

The PCF’s and PCI’s international agenda was of crucial importance (to themselves and to the United States) according to Irwin Wall, and not ranking “in the priorities of [Communist] party leaders,” according to Mistry, especially during Eurocommunism, which represented their best shot at a power share in the government. I am not the first to underline the relevance of the Eurocommunist international agenda: Silvio Pons’ recent “Berlinguer and the End of Communism” shows its connection with the response and evolution of Communism in the Soviet camp, also noting its “prejudicial anti-Americanism”; my account shows the interplay of the PCF-PCI’s opposition to America (not an absolute priority per se) and the PCI’s new European agenda, in search of a “third way” between Soviet Communism and Western Social Democracy. This strategy constituted what I would call an attempt at forging a notion of European “exceptionalism” as a counterpoint to a proselytizing American exceptionalism. No doubt, the PCI’s growth in the 1970s was due mostly - as Mistry contends it “may” have been – to its domestic, economic agenda, including, I would add, its fight against moral corruption in the government. But this political rise was Pyrrhic; it concealed a steady cultural – then ultimately political -- decline, as the PCI could no longer monopolize the new radical forces of the left, or face the decline of traditional class conflict. Furthermore, opposing America meant not just criticizing the United States as a country or the Cold War as an artificially bipolar construct; it was in the 1970s, as in the previous eras, for both the PCF and the PCI, mainly a way to decipher and confront the forces of modernization, which even they did not identify absolutely as forms of Americanization, but rather, I stress again, as a resulting (deleterious) symbiosis – often leading to distortions of American models, too -- between U.S. influence and the two countries’ social or political leadership. So yes, Communist anti-Americanism mattered both in its international dimension (especially in its correlation with Communist attempts to influence European integration or to radical movements in Third World countries), and in its instrumentality to debates largely revolving around domestic issues.

What about the East? Both Nuti and Mistry invite a more thorough analysis of the “fissures in the communist world” (Mistry) or even of the amounts of “Soviet funding” (Nuti). As I state in my introduction, I am indebted to the numerous accounts that have thoroughly analyzed the relationship between the two parties and their Soviet “sponsors” (the Soviets appear as such more and more, in light of evidence gradually emerging from the East).6

---


While I amply refer to those findings (a privilege that, for example, Stephen Gundle could not have when he wrote *Between Hollywood and Moscow*), I did not find it necessary to revisit them in detail in a work that is meant to fill an important gap, showing the relevance of Western Communism’s confrontation with American and Western European modernization. That confrontation more than the two parties’ relationship with Moscow, in my opinion, reveals the most crucial reasons for the political/cultural ascendancy and decline of Communism in Western Europe (and, of course, this line of argument integrates the discussion of the two parties’ handicaps and contradictions caused by their relationship with Moscow). This also suggests another relevant point in assessing anti-Americanism in Western Europe. Mistry acknowledges that I effectively show how the PCF and PCI were often ahead of Moscow in defining the parameters of opposition to the United States in Western Europe; and this is an important distinction, not so much in the way it demonstrates a certain margin for maneuver for the two parties while loyal to Moscow, but because it shows the contrast between the Soviet Union’s anti-Americanism, largely regimented or adapted to the necessities of the moment in superpower relations, and Communist anti-Americanism in Western Europe, which had to be attuned to an electorate and also responded to American dominance firsthand.

Focus on the West also helped me adjust the perspective on the two parties’ relationship with Soviet Communism, which so far has been mostly analyzed in a vacuum. It is one thing to show that they followed Moscow’s orders (and this is most clear until the late 1950s, even for the PCI); it is another thing to see how, in the specific national contexts, this pro-Soviet allegiance did not necessarily produce a single-minded, dogmatic, *Eastern European* brand of reaction to America. Consequently, it is still correct to say that, while in lockstep with Moscow, both parties, but especially the PCI, starting from the immediate post-war period, formed an identity, if not a policy, which, on certain important issues, on certain peculiarities of American or Catholic influence, and on certain cultural and modernization themes, could be at odds with the motherland of Socialism they worshipped.

Wall, whose knowledge of French politics and culture I do not pretend to match, expresses two disagreements: one with the way I apparently bought into the “Black Legend” surrounding the Blum-Byrnes agreement of 1946, which required the lifting of most of the French quota on U.S. films, and led, according to legend, to the decline of French movie industry; and one with the way I equally bought into the commonly used definition of the anti-Marshall Plan strikes as “insurrectionary.” On the latter point, the answer is simply that, yes, I may have abused the expression, largely drawing from Washington’s expressed opinion at the time. But I also concur with the dictum “Thorez had decided to be France, but workers just wanted to be workers,” with which the historian Annie Kriegel famously

---


---

explained the contrast between the Cominform’s anti-American design under the pretense of nationalism and the workers’ expectation to use protest for immediate improvements. My references (in more than one chapter) to the fortune and inspiring quality of the French and Italian film industries, including the famed neorealism, the “film d’autore,” the nouvelle vague, and even the popular comedies (e.g. Jacques Tati’s movies or the commedia all’italiana), far from endorsing the “Black Legend,” show both the resilience of the two countries’ movie industries and their peculiar way of absorbing and transforming lessons from overseas.

THE OTHER PARTIES

All reviewers rightly acknowledge how the account does not place Communist anti-Americanism in isolation, whether it derived its themes from arguments previously articulated by other groups, or intersected its arguments with those of other parties or individual rulers in both countries who expressed dissatisfaction with U.S. politics or society in one way or another. The Communist critique of the United States was often irresponsible and dogmatic; but for a great part of the Cold War, also sophisticated, clever, and at times even stinging and accurate. This critique influenced a wide spectrum of Europeans, including many who were far from Communist positions. That is why I am frankly puzzled by Mistry’s observation that, in presenting the confrontation between Communism and the United States, I may have dismissed other paths to modernization represented by the Catholics in Italy, and, I would add, the Gaullists or the Socialists in France. Although it is an exaggeration to state that “the Catholic Church was as hostile to American designs as it was to communism” (Mistry), the book has abundant references to the Catholic critique of the United States: from the leaders of the Christian Democrat group led by Giuseppe Dossetti to other Christian Democrats, such the state oil industry director Enrico Mattei, or President Giovanni Gronchi, or Florence mayor Giorgio La Pira. This last one (who could not be defined as straight out anti-American) prominently voiced his doubts about American unilateralism in the Middle East, then more vocally opposed the U.S. conduct in Vietnam (even Pope Paul VI ended up endorsing a peace initiative in North Vietnam led by PCI’s Enrico Berlinguer in 1966). By the 1980s, Catholic thinkers such as Ernesto Balducci took a leading role in the Communist-inspired campaigns against the installation of intermediate nuclear missiles in Italy. The case of French official dissent from the United States is even more obvious, when one thinks of not only the international and economic choices of Charles de Gaulle, but also of the contributions, all mentioned in the book, by non-Communist thinkers and officials such as Hubert Beuve-Méry, Emmanuel Mounier, Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, and André Malraux.

Even those French or Italian rulers who embraced Atlanticism and the U.S.-styled politics of productivity imposed serious limitations on the American model. One main example I used to describe such resistance – as noted in Wall’s review – is that of the Christian Democrats’ guarded response to the American Psychological Warfare tactics in the early 1950s. The same can be said about Christian Democrat Aldo Moro’s decision to debate and largely ignore U.S. demands not to establish any cooperation with the PCI during the first phase of the Historic Compromise, or about the even more independent attitude of François Mitterrand while he planned his coalition government with the PCF. These and other forms
of resistance to U.S. influence demonstrate, as Mistry correctly observes, that the “crucial battleground” for the PCI and PCF was with the center and center-right forces ruling their countries. My account does not deny that; it shows, from the many instances of the PCF’s and PCI’s debates on the American presence in their countries and the adaptations of that presence under respectively Gaullism and the Church or the Christian Democrats, that the two parties (and the U.S. officials who observed them) fully understood that the most important aspect of their anti-Americanism was its correlation with domestic politics, and with the ways in which the ruling groups adapted American influence. The Communists’ analyses are important also to illustrate their flaws, when, in many instances they exceedingly conflated the United States with the indigenous forms of modernization that were transforming their societies.

ON CULTURE, POLITICS, AND DIPLOMACY

Another observation, in this case by Nuti, in which I do not recognize my work, is that I may have often used culture as an “independent variable.” By that, Nuti means that I may have shown the intellectual and cultural elites making their choices independently from the political maneuvering from governments or parties. In fact the interaction between the two spheres, intellectual and political, is exactly one of the central points of my book. There is no need here to reiterate the control the PCF or the PCI exerted over culture – indeed this policy was a firm tenet of PCI founder Antonio Gramsci. I showed the interaction, or, as I would rather put it, juxtaposition of culture and Cold War politics by framing, as I do for example in the beginning of chapter two, the philosophical (and politically influential) views of Niebuhr, Sartre, Italo Calvino and others on anti-Communism and pro-Sovietism, in an interpretive argument that illustrates the contrast of utopias and ideas of exceptionalism.

But I think Nuti indicates, without necessarily endorsing Frances Stonor Saunders’ thesis, that much of the cultural diplomacy of the United States benefited (or suffered) from orchestration from above. Almost every chapter of the book, but especially chapter five, presents the variety of ways in which the State Department or the Rome/Paris embassies, through the United States Information Agency or its overseas United States Information Services USIA and USIS, almost micromanaged America’s cultural initiatives in both countries. I also describe several government initiatives aimed at intellectuals, starting from the Office of War Information sponsored trips to the United States by French intellectuals. The story of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, described in chapter five, shows a mixture of invitation by and government guidance of intellectuals who, despite sporting their idea of “apolitical culture,” could not escape the contradiction of their highly politicized and highly controlled message (and would end up feeling a bit “duped” when they found out about the heavy hand of the CIA and the U.S. government behind their presumably independent initiatives). Following the “money trail” may be informative, but it has been impossible (even for authors who dealt with that aspect) to trace exactly how much aid the United States or the Soviet Union disbursed for cultural initiatives, and therefore to discern how those initiatives took the route they did depending on the amounts received from their financial sources. Even if I had painstakingly found out the actual dollar figures, it would not have changed my argument significantly. Between the
“conspiratorial” thesis of Saunders and the “autonomous elite” thesis of Grémion, I place myself mostly in agreement with authors such as Volker Berghahn and Giles Scott-Smith, who similarly show the “two-way” flow between governmental and intellectual initiative.\(^8\) Rather than hierarchically ordered, politics, diplomacy, and culture were juxtaposed in this whole confrontation between the United States and Western European Communism.

**FINAL CHAPTERS AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR**

Mistry identifies almost six out of eight chapters covering a period (1945-1960) on which I have previously written. The narrative, in fact, is less lopsided than that statement makes it out to be. First, rather than strictly chronological, the approach is also thematic, addressing new issues (especially in culture, the economy, and European integration) not treated in my previous accounts. The section from the end of chapter six through the beginning of chapter nine, which largely spans the eras of the 1960s and 1970s, is as long as the preceding five chapters. The epilogue – in fact, chapter nine (the re-naming of the chapter was an editorial choice) --, with its thirty-five pages, far from being “rushed,” was for me a tour de force, in which cultural, political, economic, and diplomatic factors are interwoven even more than in the rest of the book; for only in this way could I connect the long-term to the contingent reasons for the decline of Western Communism that, especially in the cultural fields, began in the 1970s, and politically did not become fully evident (at least regarding the PCI) until the years of Mikhail Gorbachev.

I think that Mistry’s acute observation about the risks of hindsight in recent Cold War historiography is well put. But, in reference to my account, that observation confuses the (generally beneficial) explanatory power of hindsight with a sense of inevitability. Hindsight can help us place into perspective (through new evidence or interpretive frameworks) the story of a success or failure. Neither result, as explained in the last chapter of my book, suggests U.S. triumphalism or a Communist pre-determined defeat. In chapter nine and in my conclusions, I tried to convey a persistent sense of uncertainty among U.S. officials regarding the meaning and purpose of American influence abroad and about notions of U.S. exceptionalism, while also explaining the enduring legacy and adaptations of Marxist-led anti-Americanism in Europe long after the Western Communist Parties lost their political relevance or identity.

Chapter nine and the Conclusions explain the connections between the Western Communists’ anti-American campaigns in the Cold War and the current assaults by relevant sections of Western European public opinion against American presence, policies, and globalization in general. The analysis of the Communists’ failure to connect significantly with the new forms of protest, alienation, and cultural debate (youth movements, feminism, post-1968 and post-modernist currents) sets the argument for the

---

epilogue on the 1980s, the decline of Communism in the East, and the transformation (the PCI into Partito Democratico della Sinistra) or obsolete orthodoxy (the PCF) that limited the influence of both parties’ pacifist campaigns as well as their attempts to undermine laissez-faire approaches to international economic cooperation. At the same time, and in no small part under pressure from those critics in Europe, the United States forced itself into considerable self-analysis and re-examination. These reconsiderations, among Democratic ranks especially, produced a combination of nationalism, persistent exceptionalism, and multiculturalism, redefining not only American policies, but also American identity altogether. This redefinition in turn revitalized the ambivalent fascination the European Left had frequently nurtured toward liberal America and the transformative qualities of its society and politics.

All these reviews suggest that my contribution to the multiple themes I addressed is “revealing on several levels” (Mistry). I could not (and which historian could?) provide all the answers to each new question I raised. I may have left a few questions unanswered; but, as acknowledged by Mistry, they tend to address issues beyond the chronological or thematic scopes of the book. But by raising all those questions, and by providing a comparative dimension from recent European history and its confrontation with America, I hope I have opened new venues of debate on anti-Americanism (not only in Europe), and on the complex nature of transatlantic relations through the Cold War until the present.

Copyright © 2011-2012 H-Net: Humanities and Social Sciences Online. H-Net permits the redistribution and reprinting of this work for nonprofit, educational purposes, with full and accurate attribution to the author, web location, date of publication, H-Diplo, and H-Net: Humanities & Social Sciences Online. For any other proposed use, contact the H-Diplo Editors at h-diplo@h-net.msu.edu.