H-Diplo Roundtable Review


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The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), launched just over twenty years ago, in the immediate aftermath of the ending of the Cold War in Europe, as an initiative to open the archives of the former Soviet bloc countries and try to unearth the documentary record of the “other side” in the Cold War, is now bearing fruit in a plethora of new monographs and edited collections that seek to marry numerous multinational sources of every kind to allow a more balanced and nuanced appreciation of the period. Despite CWIHP’s early focus on former Soviet bloc and East European archives, it soon broadened its catchment to Asia, particularly, perhaps, China and Vietnam. CWIHP has come to serve as the magnetic center around which revolve the members of a transnational community of scholars, young, old, and middle-aged, ranging from the most senior éminences grises in their profession to junior postgraduate students, of diverse national origins, teaching or studying at institutions around the world—more often than not based in countries other than those where they were born—and united primarily by a passion for their subject. Of none is this more true than those working on the Cold War in Asia, a field in which CWIHP itself is currently publishing extensively, as are other highly regarded presses, bringing out studies that make extensive use of new archival evidence from all actors in the Cold War.1

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa’s volume represents the outcome of no less than three conferences on the Cold War in East Asia, held by the Center for Cold War Studies of the University of California, Santa Barbara from 2005 to 2007, that between them sought to cover the entire Cold War period from 1945 to 1991. This is an ambitious undertaking. Inevitably, even with the benefit of an excellent and wide-ranging introduction by Hasegawa that sets the individual chapters in context and includes extended reflections on the role of the United States in the Asian Cold War and the impact and implications of the Vietnam War for East Asia, this can only be a sampling of the subject. Perhaps because it is the product of three conferences covering different time-periods, there are no chapters that provide an overview of the entire period from 1945 to 1991, seeking to assess it from the longue—or even the medium—durée. East Asia is defined as China, Korea, and Japan, and perhaps, even though this is never quite made explicit, the Soviet Union, undoubtedly an East Asian power in geographical as well as diplomatic terms. Taiwan, though it features significantly

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in several chapters, largely in terms of its role in Sino-Japanese relations, does not receive separate treatment, an omission that must be regretted.

The volume includes stimulating chapters on the multifarious forces driving Chinese foreign policy from 1949 to 1979, on Sino-Soviet relations in the 1950s and Soviet policies toward Asia in the early and late Cold War, and on Japan’s handling of relations with China and the Soviet Union during the 1970s and 1980s. Central, however, in one way or another to almost half the chapters is Korea, in terms of the impact of the Korean War on China, alliance relationships within the Western and Communist camps, comparisons between the two Koreas, and the Soviet-South Korean rapprochement of the early 1990s. It is therefore appropriate that three of the four reviewers of this volume—Bruce Cumings, James I. Matray, and Balázs Szalontai—are specialists on the history of Korea, the Korean War, or both, while the fourth, Marc Gallicchio, is particularly known for his expertise on the early Cold War in Asia, as well as his work on African American relations with Japan and China. Drawing on their own rich knowledge of the field, each provides carefully thought out and nuanced comments on assorted chapters, which are themselves significant contributions to the specialized debates on the subjects involved. Cumings, for example, queries Gregg Brazinsky’s argument that it was in the 1980s that North Korea fell dramatically behind the South in economic terms, positing that only in the 1990s, with the withdrawal of massive Soviet military aid, did the North’s disastrously lackluster performance become apparent.

The various commentators also direct readers to consider even broader questions about the Cold War in the East and its participants. Overall, these questions can perhaps be summarized as: What were the specific characteristics of the Cold War in Asia? And, still more comprehensively, was there a Cold War in Asia and, if so, when did it begin and end? And why was it that in Cold War Asia, as Marc Gallicchio presciently puts it, “all of the pieces never quite fell into place”? An interesting question, given that the two fiercest regional “hot wars” of the Cold War period, in Korea and Vietnam, complicated conflicts that each drew in a wide variety of participants from elsewhere, both took place on Asian soil.

In his introduction, Hasegawa suggests that, for both the United States and the Soviet Union, Asia was only the “second front” of the Cold War, ranking well behind the primary, European front, which from the mid-1940s until 1991 remained the principal focus of attention for both the United States and the Soviet Union. Warren I. Cohen, of course, long since took the same line in his widely used survey of Sino-US relations, now in its fifth edition, a volume that first appeared in 1971.2 In their chapters in this volume, Ilya Gaiduk, Vlad Zubok, and Sergey Radchenko alike argue that during both the early and the final years of the Cold War, Soviet policymakers focused first upon Europe, with Asia trailing well behind. Zubok and Radchenko further contend that even in the Soviet Union’s last years, President Mikhail Gorbachev still placed strategic considerations ahead of economic advantages, leading him to underestimate the tangible benefits his country might gain from rapprochements with both Japan and South Korea.

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Did Russia’s history of military conflict and competition with Japan perhaps affect Gorbachev’s thinking? It is perhaps worth remembering that Russian territorial interests on the Pacific dated back to at least the mid-nineteenth century, if not earlier, with Russian military adventurers and officials casting covetous if unavailing glances at both Taiwan and Hong Kong toward the end of that century, contemplating adding both to Russia’s territorial Pacific holdings and concessions further north, in Port Arthur and Vladivostok. Japan pre-empted Russia in seizing Taiwan in 1895 and after its victory in the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War took over the Russian concessions in Manchuria, including the Port Arthur naval base, as well as seizing Korea. In World War I, Japan sent troops to Siberia, in the not-too-well disguised hope of annexing additional Russian territories there. During the 1920s and even more the 1930s, the possibility of a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union seemed extremely high, at least until Russia’s defeat of Japan at the Battle of Nomonhan in August 1939 deflected Japanese military ambitions southwards.

Hasegawa’s statement that “the Soviet Union and the United States did not face each other directly in Asia until well into the 1970s,” (p. 3) when the Soviets acquired military bases in Vietnam, therefore begs various questions. By the end of World War II, under the Yalta agreements the Soviet Union had regained Russia’s old Port Arthur military base in Manchuria, while Soviet and American occupation forces faced each other directly across the Thirty-Eighth Parallel dividing line in Korea, where each big power soon set about establishing a client state reasonably congenial to itself. Admittedly, under the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance the Soviet Union returned its Manchurian military bases to the new People's Republic of China. But it was always a Pacific power, with Vladivostok and Sakhalin Island the site of numerous top secret military installations, whose continuing presence—whether or not Gorbachev realized this when he raised the idea in the 1980s—constituted a major impediment to the development of those areas as Asian tourist destinations. The still disputed Kuril islands, seized by Russia from Japan in 1945, were also home to assorted Japanese military facilities. From the end of World War II onward, when the United States occupied Japan and subsequently, under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, based American troops on Japanese territory, as well as in South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and for a decade or more, in South Vietnam, U.S. and Soviet forces were never that far removed from each other in East and Southeast Asia. Galling though it may have been for the United States—and, indeed, China—when the Soviets took over American bases at Cam Ranh Bay and elsewhere in Vietnam in the late 1970s, the Soviets were hardly newcomers to the Pacific.

Yet, at least from the Soviet perspective, Asia was not an area where there was much to be gained by allowing any crisis or confrontation to develop into outright military hostilities in which Soviet forces directly contended with those of the United States. Although gratified when the Chinese Communist Party seized power on the Chinese mainland in 1949, Stalin had been willing to acquiesce in the continued rule of Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) and the

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3 Michael Share, Where Empires Collided: Russian and Soviet Relations with Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2006).
Nationalists there. Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese communists had all fought beside and assisted each other during and after World War II, and there was a sense of solidarity among the different Asian radical nationalist movements. Admittedly, many though by no means all of the Asian communist or leftist leaders had spent appreciable periods of time in the Soviet Union. Even so, for a decade or more after 1949, Stalin and his successors were for the most part willing to cede leadership of Asian revolution to Mao Zedong and China.

Other Asian communists may not always have found this notional division of labor within the international socialist camp entirely palatable. Nor could they necessarily afford to mount major military operations without Soviet assistance. In 1949 and 1950, when Kim Il Sung, leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the northern communist half of the country, wished to invade the south, he sought permission from Josef Stalin, since only the Soviet president could provide him with the military supplies—though not the manpower—Kim needed to launch this offensive. Stalin’s eventual endorsement of Kim’s plans was predicated on the assumption that the United States would not intervene. When the Americans swiftly decided to send military forces to Korea, albeit under the guise of a United Nations contingent, Stalin hastily backed off, offering the North Korean and eventually the Chinese forces fighting there only equipment and limited air support. Yet even as he contemplated attacking South Korea, Kim failed to treat China as the recognized leader of Asian revolution. Although several million Chinese “volunteer” troops would within a few months prove crucial to ensuring the very survival of North Korea, and coordinating his military offensive with communist China’s efforts might have seemed a logical move, Kim failed to inform Mao of the date of the invasion, largely disregarded Mao’s strategic advice once fighting had begun, and quarreled with Mao over major military decisions on several occasions after Chinese forces had rescued his country from annihilation in late 1950.

On the other side of the Eurasian landmass, except in Yugoslavia, Soviet troops were responsible for not just the installation but the maintenance of communist regimes in what would become Eastern Europe’s Soviet bloc. In Asia, the situation was rather different. At the end of World War II, U.S. forces occupied defeated Japan and the American government determined that country’s permanent orientation in the Cold War, as a largely disarmed state that nonetheless provided the facilities to serve as a major platform for American military power in the Pacific. The north and south Korean states also represented outcomes of Soviet and U.S. military occupations, where on both sides the occupying power had originally hoped to establish a self-sustaining and friendly regime before departing. The history of both American and Soviet involvement in East and Southeast Asia would soon provide numerous object lessons in the difficulties of patron-client relations, and China too would encounter similar problems with its fraternal socialist neighbors. Had either China or the Soviet Union ever nominated candidates for the title of “most awkward ally,” North Korea and eventually North Vietnam might well have come in equal first. Both were notorious for their surly behavior toward Soviet and Chinese officials alike, and for their eagerness to wage war to reunite their countries, battles in which their larger patrons were far less eager to enlist. Indeed, in 1956 China and the Soviet Union united in an unsuccessful effort to dislodge Kim Il Sung of North Korea, a venture that rebounded
against both of them, if anything strengthening Kim’s ability to play off each against the other.

Growing differences between China and the Soviet Union only enhanced this pattern. Both North Korea and North Vietnam soon proved extremely skillful in exploiting to their own economic and military advantage the Sino-Soviet split and the consequent competition for socialist loyalties between the two communist great powers. From the Soviet perspective, by the late 1950s China too had joined them in the ranks of unreliable, erratic, and unduly aggressive allies, as Mao Zedong increasingly claimed to represent the cause of international revolution and attacked the Soviet Union for its alleged failure to live up to communist ideals. After the Korean War, Mao’s warlike rhetoric for public consumption was always far more bellicose than his actual performance, a crucial distinction that his increasingly apprehensive Soviet allies—who might have benefited from greater familiarity with the tactics of Chinese opera—rarely if ever seem to have appreciated. The domestic turbulence that periodically engulfed China from the late 1950s throughout the 1960s and beyond also had ramifications for its international relations: many a Soviet leader might at only too frequent intervals have been tempted to echo the Duke of Wellington and complain of his fractious Asian comrades: “They may not frighten the enemy, but by God they frighten me.” Soviet allies in East Asia, who had entered the socialist camp under their own volition, were, moreover, far less amenable to military pressure from their great patron than were its East European Warsaw Pact satellites. When pushed too far in the late 1960s, China even abandoned ideological purity and mended its fences with its former arch-enemy, the United States.

With the partial exception of Japan, which did little to hew an independent line in foreign policy but focused intently on making itself into an economic superpower while sheltering under the American defense umbrella, the United States was blessed with almost equally uncontrollable East Asian allies. South Korea and South Vietnam habitually absorbed large amounts of American military and economic aid, while largely rejecting the earnest and usually well-meant advice that accompanied it. Once the Korean War had ended, both South Korea and the Republic of China on Taiwan signed security treaties with the United States, with substantial American military forces based in each location. The leaders of both South Korea and Taiwan dreamed eagerly of reconquering and uniting the rest of their divided territory—in South Korea’s case Kim Il Sung’s Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the North, while Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan cherished hopes of recapturing the Chinese mainland—and hoped that the United States would provide the military muscle needed to fulfill these enterprises. Either would have been delighted to provoke a crisis that would have embroiled the United States in a major land war in Asia, one that might well have involved the Soviet Union. During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the South Koreans were so keen to take advantage of the opportunity to attack the North that, at the request of the U.S. embassy, South Korean military airplanes were grounded for the duration of the emergency, while American troops in bases near the Demilitarized Zone turned their guns south against their own allies, to prevent any southern invasion of the north. (It would be interesting to know if Kim Il Sung of North Korea saw the crisis in the same light.)
During the Vietnam War, Chiang Kai-shek offered to send troops to assist the Americans, hoping that these forces might encounter PRC units and expand the war into a full scale American attack on China. This was only one aspect of the extremely unhappy story of U.S. dealings with South Vietnam. In 1953, exasperated American officials in Korea contemplated sanctioning the assassination of the intransigent Syngman Rhee, South Korea’s president, whose obstinacy was blocking a potential peace settlement. Rhee survived, but other U.S. protégés elsewhere in Asia would be less fortunate. Ten years later, U.S. officials in Saigon and Washington ‘looked through their fingers’—as Queen Elizabeth I of England would have put it—as dissatisfied South Vietnamese officials launched a coup that overthrew South Vietnam's President Ngo Dinh Diem and his influential brother, during which both men were assassinated. This bloody change of government did not prevent a huge expansion of U.S. military commitments to Vietnam over the next eighteen months, first through major bombing raids against North Vietnam, and then in early 1965 through the commitment of substantial and ever expanding numbers of ground troops to the South. But even as American involvement in the war in Vietnam mushroomed, while China sent large numbers of support troops as well as supplies to the North and the Soviet Union provided heavy military equipment, China, the United States, and even the Soviets sought to prevent the conflict from escalating into the kind of full scale Sino-American confrontation that the Korean War had become. And, in the end, when the price of war became too high for them, the Americans abandoned their Southern allies and left, anticipating only a “decent interval” before Northern forces finally annexed the South of the country.

In his stimulating appraisal of this volume, Bruce Cumings suggests that in Asia the Cold War ended not in 1991 or thereabouts, but during the 1970s, with the normalization of China’s relations with the United States and the North’s 1975 victory in Vietnam. Conflict and tensions certainly did not end, especially Sino-Soviet rivalries. One major force propelling the full normalization of Sino-American diplomatic relations at the beginning of 1979 was shared Chinese and American concern over what each perceived as growing Soviet assertiveness in Asia and elsewhere. China, in particular, resented the treaty of alliance that Vietnam and the Soviet Union concluded in late 1978 and the Soviet military presence in Vietnam, as well as Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, which Chinese leaders perceived as extending Soviet influence within Indochina. For the United States, moving closer to China was a means of pursuing the Cold War, while integrating China into the existing international system. For China, which would soon briefly invade Vietnam, but was intent on promoting domestic economic modernization, full diplomatic recognition of the United States was primarily a means of obtaining access to American technology and capital, but also served to ensure American acquiescence in what proved to be a somewhat disappointing military campaign against Vietnam. In short order, the ever pragmatic Deng Xiaoping, China’s new leader, proclaimed a victory and withdrew Chinese forces.

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But, even if the United States perceived full diplomatic recognition of China as an important Cold War ploy, the question remains: By the late 1970s, to what extent was the Cold War still continuing in Asia? One may also, perhaps, enquire: Was the Cold War only an overlay, imposed upon and sometimes distorting other trends and patterns of development in Asia that predated the Cold War and may well have continued after it? Great power competition in East Asia was, after all, nothing new; since at least the mid-nineteenth century, Japan, Russia, Great Britain, Germany, France, and the United States had all to some degree contended for dominance and influence in the area. During the Cold War the great game perhaps had fewer big players at the table, but its antecedents went back well before 1945.

In the early days of the Cold War International History Project, scholars from China and the former Soviet bloc, who as students had experienced political indoctrination on a near daily basis, re-emphasized the importance of ideology in understanding the conceptualization and formulation of international affairs. More recently, Chinese scholars are drawing attention to the significance of traditional Chinese concepts of their country and its place in the world, if one is to comprehend the worldview of Mao and his peers. It is worth remembering that China’s decision-makers during the Communist period were all products of a period of intense scrutiny of China and its relationship to the modern world, dating back to at least the late nineteenth century, that sought to restore Chinese pride and make the country once more a great power by borrowing from other countries while retaining the essentials of Chinese culture. Communism, for them, was a means of implementing this objective, not necessarily an end in itself. If a cult of Mao still exists in China, it is probably because, as he himself stated in what was perhaps his most famous utterance, under his leadership: “China has stood up.” While Mao and Chiang Kai-shek undoubtedly disagreed as to which of them was best qualified and knew the most effective route to bring this about, this was a goal that both men shared.

Equally, the chapter by Steven Hugh Lee draws attention to the degree to which the American military authorities in South Korea in the 1940s and 1950s drew on the precedents of U.S. military occupation policies in Asia and Latin America in the late nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century. The Australian historian Ian Tyrrell has gone so far as to suggest that small-scale military interventions in other countries have represented the norm of U.S. warfare against other states, with the massive global commitments of World War I, World War II, and the Cold War a somewhat anomalous departure from the earlier template. Like Lee, Tyrrell also draws attention to the significance of non-governmental organizations, missionary groups, and other non-state actors in supplementing official American efforts to direct the future course of nations that have experienced U.S. military occupation and nation-building endeavors.5

Gallicchio has studied attempts by African American activists to build solidarity with China and Japan in the fifty years from 1895 to 1945. Did those endeavors leave any heritage behind, within the United States, China, or Japan, for the Cold War period?

In this context, it is worth returning to the first chapter of this volume, by Odd Arne Westad, that focuses upon Soviet advisers in Communist China during the 1950s, and their contributions in a range of fields, including the development of China’s military, education, town planning, and the treatment of ethnic minorities. Westad highlights the degree to which such advisers and their Chinese hosts shared, or at least believed they shared, a common cosmopolitan heritage, reinforced in many cases by Chinese contacts with Soviet and Western models in the pre-communist era. While Chinese sometimes adapted Soviet models for their own purposes in what Westad follows anthropologists in terming a process of “creative misunderstanding”—a phenomenon probably common to all appropriations from different cultures—and Soviet experts on occasion consciously tailored examples in such sensitive fields as the treatment of ethnic minorities so as to avoid giving offense to their Chinese audience, one nonetheless has a sense that a genuine transnational community existed among the specialists in these fields. How far did such patterns and networks of professional exchange transcend the Cold War, and perhaps even predate or outlast it? And were these cultural and professional bonds unique to the Sino-Soviet relationship, or did similar networks exist elsewhere, on both sides of the Cold War divide—or even, as in Sino-American relations, across the chasm—working through the vectors of bilateral relationships, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations of every kind? The majority of chapters in this volume concentrate on high-level diplomatic and economic interactions—though those on American-South Korean relations make some mention of non-governmental organizations and church groups—but any comprehensive history of the Cold War must include the intellectual, social, and cultural dimensions of international relations and the dynamics driving these underpinnings.

In his Introduction, Hasegawa rightly states “that there is no authoritative interpretation that integrates the fruits” of numerous monographs on different aspects of the subject “into a comprehensive synthesis, characterizing the uniqueness of the Cold War in Asia as a whole, as distinguished from its other fronts, and assessing the influence that the Cold War in Asia exerted on its other fronts.” (p. 28) Any such synthesis, he contends, will demand that far more attention be given to the roles of Korea, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States, as well as to the unique features of the Cold War in East Asia, especially the “intersection between revolution and national liberation.” (p. 29) If only because much of the archival evidence is still closed, with the doors are unlikely to swing open any time soon, it will almost certainly be many years before such a work appears. But, even before this becomes possible, there is nothing to prevent historians from engaging with the intellectual challenge of trying to decide whether the Cold War period in East Asia had unique features, in terms of the history of either the Cold War itself or of East Asia; whether

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what is termed the Cold War simply added peculiar twists, slants, and distortions to relationships, phenomena, patterns, trends, and networks in East Asia that predated and would outlast the Cold War itself; or whether the Cold War in Asia was just one aspect of a much broader and more complicated picture that can only be understood by viewing it in a global framework.

Participants:


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James I. Matray earned his doctoral degree in U.S. History at the University of Virginia, where he studied under Norman A. Graebner. Since 2002, he has been Professor of History
Matray has published more than forty articles, book chapters, and essay on U.S.-Korean relations during and after World War II. He is editor of the forthcoming *Northeast Asia and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman*. His most recent books are *Korea Divided: The 38th Parallel and the Demilitarized Zone* (2004) and *East Asia and the United States: An Encyclopedia of Relations Since 1784* (2002). Currently, Matray is writing a book on the Battles of Pork Chop Hill that Indiana University Press will publish.

**Balázs Szalontai** is Guest Professor and Research Fellow at East China Normal University in Shanghai, China. Having received a Ph.D. in Soviet and Korean history, he has done archival research on the modern history of North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, Mongolia, India, the USSR, and Eastern Europe. His publications include *Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953-1964* (Stanford University Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005), and book chapters on North Korean and Southeast Asian economic and cultural policies. His current research projects are focused on the Korean War, Indochinese-ASEAN relations, North Korea’s involvement in the Vietnam War, DPRK-Middle Eastern relations, and nuclear proliferation.
This edited volume adds to and in many ways surpasses the surprisingly thin literature on the Cold War in East Asia. Apart from volumes either written or co-edited by Akira Iriye in the 1970s, few scholars have sought a comprehensive overview of the Cold War in this region. One reason is that scholarly syntheses of East Asia in the modern period are also few; language and other barriers tend to limit the field to country studies—we have lots of books on Japan, China, Korea and Vietnam (a reasonable definition of East Asia, as the editor stipulates), but few that seek to comprehend and analyze the region itself. Another is the Eurocentric focus of so much work on the Cold War; the bipolar conflict between Washington and Moscow and the absence of a serious threat of global war after the Cuban Missile Crisis gave the Cold War a long, stable run in Western Europe and made it possible to look back on this conflict and imagine a ‘long peace,’ as if two devastating wars in Korea and Vietnam do not count.

We now know—or at least George Kennan thought he knew, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union— that core European issues between the U.S. and the USSR were essentially settled by 1950, after the Marshall Plan, the overcoming of the Berlin Blockade, and the formation of NATO, making another global war highly unlikely. But for most of the next twenty-five years East Asia was engulfed in war and turmoil, the main cause being the victory of the Chinese revolution. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa is right to see China at the center of the wars in Korea and Vietnam, especially in the eyes of American policymakers. Even as the U.S. dramatically deepened its involvement in two wars that proved unwinnable, yielding no exit from Korea to this day and a sudden, ignominious departure from Vietnam in 1975, the Soviet Union retained a central focus on (central) Europe, as several of the authors in this volume make clear, while no doubt realizing that the Americans had dispatched half a million troops to two countries that both sides saw as peripheral to their strategic conflict, and doing what it could to further encourage similar adventures.

The Soviet Union had been offering alternative paths to independence for the colonial world since the Bolsheviks achieved power, whereas the U.S., with its own empire in Central America and the Philippines, knew little and thought less about the problem of decolonization. Yet the postwar significance of this issue would rank only behind the recovery of the world economy and the confrontation with Moscow in importance. Professor Hasegawa is exactly right to see the merger of decolonization and social

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1 Kennan wrote in 1994 that containment, to him, was "primarily a diplomatic and political task, though not wholly without military implications." Once the Soviets were convinced that more expansionism would not help them, "then the moment would have come for serious talks with them about the future of Europe." After the Marshall Plan, the Berlin blockade, and other measures, he thought that moment had arrived by 1950. However, "it was one of the great disappointments of my life to discover that neither our Government nor our Western European allies had any interest in entering into such discussions at all. What they and the others wanted from Moscow, with respect to the future of Europe, was essentially ‘unconditional surrender.’ They were prepared to wait for it. And this was the beginning of the 40 years of Cold War." New York Times, Op-Ed page, March 14, 1994.
revolution as the key distinction between Europe and East Asia during the Cold War, and I would add, the original seed of two failed American wars (5).

The essays by Russian scholars—Ilya Gaiduk and Sergey Radchenko—on Soviet policies toward Asia in general and North Korea in particular, struck me as the most balanced ones in the volume. Using new archival materials, they fairly and judiciously show that Moscow never had the interest or involvement in East Asia that the U.S. did (Gaiduk), and that having an ally named North Korea was no one’s idea of a day at the beach (Radchenko). Professor Gaiduk’s conclusions on Soviet caution and relative moderation in East Asia, which was propelled especially by a desire not to provoke the United States, are based on close examination of Soviet documents, but they nonetheless resonate with the longstanding conclusions of the so-called “revisionist” school in the U.S., particularly Gabriel Kolko’s seminal 1968 book, *The Politics of War*.¹ I wouldn’t expect a Russian scholar to know much—or care much—about the older debates in the U.S. about the Cold War and its origins; his findings are just welcome confirmation.

What is the nature of the balance both scholars achieve? It is, I think, to stand outside, or above, the interests and concerns of one’s own country, examine the record, and let the chips fall where they may. Of course this is easier when that ‘country’ (the USSR) disappears. But it should be a fundamental point of method: do we write as Russians, or Chinese, or Americans? Or do we research and write as scholars? The two American scholars in this collection do not try hard enough to be similarly balanced. Steven Hugh Lee’s chapter on the U.S. Occupation of Korea, pre- and post-the Korean War, is not uncritical—indeed his title links occupation with empire building, and he usefully reminds us that Americans had a long history of previous military occupations, in the Philippines and Central America. He correctly sees that the Cold War arrived in Korea about a week after U.S. troops landed in September 1945 (101). But he offers nothing new in his quick reprise of an occupation more ‘forgotten’ than the Korean War itself, and errs in finding an end to the Occupation in 1948 and a new beginning with the war in 1950. Americans retained operational control of the Korean armed forces and the paramilitary National Police until July 1949, a 500-strong Korean Military Advisory Group remained after that, and their embassy and aid mission was one of the largest and most well-funded in the world in 1949-50. Lee is right, though, that various NGOs and Christian aid groups helped greatly in South Korea’s recovery from the war, a neglected subject that he nicely explores.

Gregg Brazinsky alludes in his chapter title, “Korea’s Great Divergence,” to Ken Pomeranz’s *magnum opus*,³ to try to explain why South Korea went one way and the North the other way, from 1972 to 1987. In the 1960s North Korea seemed so far ahead economically that American advisors wondered how the South would ever catch up, but soon Seoul created “a

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prosperous, forward-looking society" while the North stagnated. Yet both were under dictatorships in this period—authoritarian or totalitarian. Both also lost "firm support from their superpower patrons" (241-42). But South Korea was open to the world economy and especially the wide availability of developmental loans, whereas the North was not. In the early 1970s the south moved from light to heavy industries in a big way ("the big push"), whereas the North, with heavy industries from the start courtesy of Japanese colonialism, found it difficult to develop effective light industries. P'yôngyang did try to import 'turn-key' plants from Japan and elsewhere in the early 1970s, but later on it seemed almost to give up on trying to upgrade its capital and technology. As late as 1978 the CIA published studies showing that per capita GDP was about equal in the North and South; since the South's economy entered a crisis in 1979 and lost 6 percent of GDP in 1980, the real divergence probably began around 1983, not in 1972. By going against the advice of most of its American advisors, the regime of Major General Park Chung-hee developed steel, automobiles, petrochemicals, machine tools and oil tankers that soon proliferated in world markets, and got the South's growth rate booming again at double-digit rates from 1985 onward.

Still, by any estimation the North Korean economy in the 1980s was far better developed than it had been thirty years earlier, and gave many travelers the impression of being more affluent than China. It is an instructive lesson in how quickly such perceptions can change, because I had this relative impression of North Korea and Northeast China during one visit in 1981, yet just six years later it seemed to have been reversed: by 1987 China's export-led development was bringing much new wealth to the cities, whereas North Korea had barely changed. It did not seem worse, just more or less the same. P'yôngyang was still the model city, lit-up at night with all manner of slogans. The harvests were among the highest in the country's history. Then everything went south: the energy sector, chemical factories that made huge amounts of fertilizer, cascading into a general collapse of agriculture and industry. The withdrawal of Soviet aid after 1991, tensions with China over its recognition of Seoul the following year, and a kind of paralysis among the elite after Kim Il Sung died in 1994, plunged the economy into an abyss and the population into a late-1990s famine from which the country has never fully recovered, and never will until profound changes take place. But from 1972 to 1987, I do not see any 'great divergence' between the two Koreas—it happened in the 1990s.

The mote in Professor Brazinsky's eye is to postulate that both Seoul and P'yôngyang were set adrift by their big-power guarantors after 1972. First, even if true, that would ignore the enormous aid that the U.S. had already provided to the ROK from 1945 to 1972, comparable only to that going to Taiwan and Israel, and far beyond anything the North got from anybody.⁴ It ignores the 40,000 American troops that remained after the Nixon Doctrine presumably let South Korea go it alone. It ignores the parallel imbrication of American advisors, experts, and professionals of all types in all important walks of Korean life, from the government to the military to the corporations to education. The author

mentions the tight election in 1971, nearly won by Kim Dae Jung; he does not mention the $7 million in campaign funds provided to President Park by Gulf Oil and Caltex Petroleum (according to Senate hearings in the mid-1970s). Nor does he mention the $4 billion package of loans and credits provided to the regime of Major General Chun Doo-hwan in 1983 by Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (under prodding from President Reagan), constituting ten percent of South Korea's total debt burden (then third in the world). Finally, when the ROK economy was bankrupt in November 1997, American officials at the highest level orchestrated an IMF bailout that ultimately totaled $70 billion. And all through these decades, the U.S. maintained a blanket of embargos against the North Korean economy. Unfortunately Professor Brazinsky recuperates a common trope in American accounts of modern Korean history, which is to see Americans as innocent bystanders who happen along to watch the two Koreas fight it out. Having said all this, Brazinsky is right that South Korea accomplished a sea change in its economy, while the North stagnated, dithered, and then essentially fell apart. It just isn't a particularly novel finding.

Most of the authors in this volume represent a younger, in many ways post-Cold War generation of scholars, eager to exploit newly-opened archives (most of the chapters are well grounded in primary sources), and to forget that we knew something about the various problems they take up before they arrived on the scene. In spite of their youth, the editor declares them to be the "foremost authorities" in their respective fields (12), something no editor should say, and reminding me of Professor Irwin Corey's comedy act, where he began by declaring himself "the world's foremost authority." Still, these are fine scholars. One of them, Odd Arne Westad, has an excellent chapter on the heyday of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, rightly drawing attention to the many blueprints, technologies and modes of organization that Soviet advisors brought to China, something true also of communism in Korea and Vietnam—in 1945, who but the Soviets had a model of a full-blown, ongoing socialist state? But his analysis should be read alongside Franz Schurmann's Ideology and Organization in Communist China, a prescient 1966 book that homed in on fundamental differences between Soviet and Chinese communism (one-man management and the like) that manifested themselves in the mid-1950s and proved predictive of China's path thereafter.

Likewise Chen Jian offers "five key findings"(81) about China and the Korean War that are entirely valid: first, the PRC's founding had a huge influence on the Korean War; indeed in 1949-50 the North Koreans trumpeted this victory as one of their own, and undoubtedly saw their impending triumph over the South in the same light. The second finding is that China entered the Korean War primarily to show its revolutionary solidarity with Korea and, by implication, anti-colonial movements the world over. Other findings include the Mao-centered nature of PRC decision-making, that its treaty with Moscow gave it at least the perception of big power backing or grounding, and last, P'yŏngyang's relationship with China was never entirely harmonious. I strongly emphasized four of these points in my 1990 book,5 based on North Korean and Chinese materials, and the other one, about Mao's

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singular decision-making, has been known for at least twenty years. But so what? I welcome Chen Jian's interpretations, because they succinctly summarize a relationship quite vexed and ill-understood in the literature, and also have the virtue of being correct.

Surprisingly, the editor and the various authors miss an opportunity to locate the end of the Cold War in East Asia. Given the subtitle of the book, a reader might think the year was 1991. But the beginning of the end was the Nixon-Kissinger demarche to Beijing in 1971-72, and the end of the beginning was the conclusion of the Vietnam War in 1975. Hasegawa notes the importance of both events in distinguishing East Asia from Europe during the Cold War, but thereafter does not go beyond analyzing the "strategic triangle" that developed between Washington, Moscow and Beijing (9). Rather quickly, however, region-wide economic exchange began to push one Cold War barrier after another out of the way, bringing China and Vietnam into a welcoming world economy, especially by former local adversaries like Japan and South Korea. (Tokyo normalized relations with the PRC seven years before the U.S. did, and Seoul was a very early investor in Vietnam.) A backward glance at this region in the past six decades gives us fifteen years of hot and cold war and five decades of rapid economic growth, as Japan's model of state-driven export-led success, beginning in the 1950s, migrated to Korea, Taiwan, and after 1979, to the seemingly infinite resources of China. Today only the Korean peninsula remains as an unfortunate museum of Cold War confrontation. But it is also the only place like that in the region; Taiwan, for example, has dramatically deepened its economic ties with the mainland, and it is not hard to imagine an eventual "one country, two systems" solution to that problem, along the lines of Hong Kong in 1997. I agree that it is "difficult to say that the Cold War in East Asia ended in 1991" (11), but would argue that is because it effectively ended in the 1970s, albeit with an overhang of unresolved problems (which was also true of Europe after the Berlin Wall fell). But if we remember Professor Hasegawa's linkage of decolonization and social revolution, had the U.S. refrained from intervening in the revolutions on the mainland after 1945, there might never have been hot wars, or even a serious Cold War, in East Asia—just a much earlier reintegration of China, Vietnam and Korea into the world economy.

The volume also includes well-argued essays on Japan during the Cold War by Kazuhiko Togo and Professor Hasegawa, but as enjoyable as they were, I did not learn much that was terribly new from them. I think that is predictable, in that Japan's Cold War position was fixed in the same period that Kennan thought Europe was fixed and stabilized, from 1947 to 1950. With the "reverse course" at the start, the fixing of the yen at 360 to the dollar in 1949, the NSC-48 "Policy for Asia" approved at the end of the same year (linking Southeast Asia to the revival of Japan's economy, and sending arms to the French in Indochina), and the permanent stationing of tens of thousands of American troops in Japan from 1950 onward, Japan was to be the economic motor of the East Asian region, while swaddled in a defense dependency that sharply restricted its autonomy of action, whether six decades ago or today—when cabinets fall because they cannot even get the Americans to agree on the smallest changes (like relocating the Futenma base) to their massive deployment on Okinawa. And here again we are back to central books on Japan's postwar positioning as the Cold War developed, written by William Borden, Andrew Rotter, Michael Schaller, and
yours truly, the findings of which make no appearance in this volume—but then I guess when you get old enough, you are no longer one of the “foremost authorities.”

Still, this literature makes eminently clear that Professor Hasegawa is wrong to say that South Korea was “peripheral to American strategic thinking” in 1947, whereas by 1953 it “was a frontline state in the containment strategy” (13). South Korea gained its critical significance in Dean Acheson’s eyes in January 1947, when he and Secretary of State George C. Marshall linked a separate government in Seoul to the revival of the Japanese economy (and heavy industry); some weeks later Acheson told the Senate, in secret session, that the U.S. had drawn the line in Korea. Acheson was the prime mover in the American intervention in 1950, following on the logic he developed three years earlier. But by 1953 the fundamentals were settled, as in Japan; Korea was permanently divided and heavily militarized, and nothing much changed in this strategic situation for fifty years, until P’yôngyang developed nuclear weapons.

The authors of this volume should be applauded, however, for paying as much attention as they do to North Korea, a country often overlooked in studies of Cold War East Asia. Nobuo Shimotomai’s essay on “Kim Il Sung’s Balancing Act” between Moscow and Beijing is fascinating throughout, and begins with a joint Sino-Soviet attempt to overthrow Kim in 1956. The author rightly depicts Kim as “traumatized” (123) by this incident, but one should also ask how the Russians and the Chinese could have been so stupid as to think their intervention would work. Kim and his close allies among the former guerrillas who fought the Japanese in the 1930s had thorough control of the massive armed forces and secret police, whereas none of the putative Korean co-coup-makers had either the nationalist credentials or the monopoly of force that Kim had, and would be relying on foreign power to get this coup done. Furthermore in 1955 Kim had already moved toward his signature “chuch’ê” or self-reliance ideology, as Shimotomai makes clear. This Sino-Soviet blunder merely lit more fire under Kim’s desire for and claims of independence, and, as this chapter shows, he made both sides pay dearly in decades to come.

First his son and now his grandson were seated at the helm in North Korea, with an uncounted number of atomic bombs and, if recent news reports are true, a growing capability to fit their medium and long-range missiles with nuclear warheads. So the Cold War in East Asia is reduced to this small mountainous peninsula, recalling President Dwight Eisenhower’s purported remark, “why does this little teat of a country keep giving us so many problems”?

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7 I first heard this from Stephen Pelz, now Emeritus at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, at a 1982 conference in Seattle. My recollection of this event was recently confirmed by Barton Bernstein of Stanford University.
This important volume advances our understanding of international relations in Asia in several important ways. First, as Tsuyoshi Hasegawa explains in his introduction, the ten essays illuminate a region often neglected by historians of the Cold War. The authors also make welcome use of recently declassified documents in the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) and the former Soviet Union to develop a more textured and nuanced view of decision making in those countries than previously available. Another important accomplishment is the way in which several of the essays treat North and South Korea as active participants in the region’s politics. The chronological sweep of the volume is also a plus. Moving beyond the crisis-driven diplomacy of the early Cold war, many of these essays address the more subtle workings of diplomacy in the era of détente and the end of the Cold War in Europe.

As Hasegawa notes in his introductory essay, the Cold War in East Asia differed from the European version for several reasons. To begin with, the strategic picture was complicated by the emergence of the PRC as an ally and eventually a competitor to the Soviet Union. Indeed, it was not until the 1970s, he notes, that the United States and the Soviet Union directly confronted each other in the region in a significant way. (3) Decolonization and the rise of revolutionary nationalism further distinguished the region’s politics from Europe’s.

To these, I would add another difference. In Europe the experience of two wars had led American and Soviet officials to develop a clear understanding of their vital interests in the area. The spheres of influence controlled by the wartime allies coincided with those interests and made further aggrandizement not worth the risk of another war. In Asia, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had been deeply involved in the politics of the mainland before World War II. Hopes for independent and friendly regimes substituted for hard calculations about what was absolutely necessary for Russian or American interests. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Premier Josef Stalin sought to define those interests more clearly in the secret Yalta agreements but that understanding, if indeed it was one, did not survive the defeat of Japan. In its place, improvisation and opportunism prevailed.

Another difference between the two theaters in the Cold War is the persistence of territorial disputes in Asia two decades after the end of the Cold War in Europe. Some of these disputes, such as the division of the Korean peninsula and the Northern Territories (Kuril Islands) controversy, arose from hasty actions at the end of World War II. Taiwan, on the other hand, was not detached from the control of mainland China until the outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950. The potentially explosive Senkaku/ Diaoyutai Islands dispute did not develop until the United States restored Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty in 1972.

The first three essays in this collection look at China’s role in regional affairs in the 1950s. The first by Odd Arne Westad reminds us that that for most of that decade Soviet and Chinese elites worked together to modernize China. Moving away from international
politics, Westad surveys the activities of experts in military and educational reform, urban planning, and policies on minorities. Instead of seeing Chinese nationalists struggling to find a Chinese way towards modernization, Westad emphasizes the common intellectual inheritance of Chinese and Soviet experts. Influenced by the intellectual ferment of the 1920s and 1930s they sought to make China modern in a way that would be recognized in the West. Disagreement arose because Chinese experts could draw inspiration from two different aspects of the Soviet experience. Chinese experts could identify with a gradualist school in Soviet thinking that emphasized careful planning. On the other hand, those Chinese who hoped for more rapid advances could point to periods of accelerated change. Westad refers to these competing approaches as “the Plan and the Leap.”  (36) By the end of the decade, frustration with China’s slow progress gave advocates of the “Leap” the upper hand against the advice of the Russians who favored more cautious planning. It was this search for “a model that could overcome the gradualism of Stalinist planning that in the end did more than anything else to destroy the Sino-Soviet relationship.” (57)

In reaching that conclusion, Westad cites similar observations by Chen Jian and Yang Kuisong. Chen’s contribution to this volume, however, presents a view of the modernization experience that in terms of timing differs from Westad’s. Focusing on Mao’s role in reorienting Chinese politics, as opposed to the lower level experts studied by Westad, Chen highlights the importance of the Korean War in elevating Mao to an unassailable position in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Coming out of the war in such a strong position enabled Mao to act on his utopian dreams. According to Chen, “China’s state building and social transformation became increasingly entangled with the development of his personal cult.” (89) The Korean War also planted the seeds of the Sino-Soviet schism by confirming Mao’s view of China as the leader of international revolution in Asia. Viewed from the Soviet perspective, however, it is not clear why that development should have led to a break-up of the alliance. According to Ilya Gaiduk’s essay on Soviet policy toward Asia in the early Cold war, Stalin and his successors consistently relegated Asia to secondary status and were content to let China take the lead.

To this point the book examines Korea primarily in terms of how the war affected Mao’s hold on power or relations between the PRC and Russia. The next essay takes a novel approach to the familiar subject of the American military occupation. Viewing American military officers as agents of informal empire, Steven Hugh Lee identifies a pattern in military occupations dating back to the early twentieth century in Latin America and the Caribbean. In Korea, according to Lee, there were actually two occupations, the first occurring from 1945-1948 when the U.S. sided with Japanese collaborationists over locally organized left wing groups, and the second taking place from 1950-1953 when in the midst of war Korea became a protectorate of the United States. One interesting feature of both occupations was that the American military sought the assistance of non-governmental volunteer agencies to aid in civil affairs programs. In this respect the Korea experience served as a model for later U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

After the armistice, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung pursued a Stalinist modernization plan based on collectivization. Kim’s ultimate object was to strengthen the North in preparation for renewing his campaign to unify the peninsula. Kim’s desire to continue the
war ran counter to Soviet desires for peaceful coexistence and nearly led to his ouster in 1956. From that point on, according to Nobuo Shimotomai, Kim exploited the growing Sino-Soviet split and steered an independent path internationally while pursuing a policy of autonomy (chuce) at home. Kim remained a troublesome ally, soaking up loans and relying on military aid from Moscow. Moscow’s worsening relations with Beijing and Mao’s obstreperous tendencies towards détente with the U.S. forced the Russians to tolerate their obdurate partner even as they sought to avoid conflict in Asia. For Kim this is what passed for success; he survived even if his country did not thrive.

In a later chapter, Gregg Brazinsky clearly describes the limitations of Kim’s survivalist policies by comparing the political and economic development of the two Koreas in the era of détente (1972-1987). During this period the United States and Soviet Union became increasingly reluctant to lavish aid on their clients. In comparing how the two Koreas adapted, Brazinsky notes interesting parallels in their situations. Both countries were governed by repressive regimes whose initial response to the U.S.-PRC rapprochement was to crack down on dissent at home. Kim and ROK president Park Chung-Hee both looked to lesser powers for aid to substitute for lost support from the superpowers. Despite these similarities the differences between the two countries’ policies were more significant. The ROK pursued state directed policies that aimed at integrating South Korea into the emerging global economy. The ROK embraced interdependence, the DPRK sought to preserve its independence. The South also proved more successful at cooperating with former enemies. In part this was because the PRC and Japan were more willing to work with the South than the U.S. was with the North. But North Korea contributed to its own failures by engaging in aggressive actions that made a rapprochement undesirable to Washington. By the late 1980s North Korea had become an international deadbeat. The Stalinist model of development lost all appeal as developing countries in Asia began to view the South Korean model of state planning, autocratic government, and markets as worthy of emulation.

Brazinsky speculates that South Korea’s success may have inspired even the PRC to adopt market policies but Lorenz Lüthi finds the roots of China’s transformation in the pragmatic trade policies of the 1960s. He notes that during that period as much as thirty percent of China’s foreign trade was with Japan, Great Britain, and West Germany and that Beijing was willing to sacrifice some revolutionary principles to improve that trade. In this respect, “Mao’s ideological radicalism of the 1960s concealed an economic pragmatism....” (171) During the 1970s Beijing continued its policy of “wooing the intermediate zone.” (166). Once Mao passed from the scene cooperation with Washington and integration into the world economy could be more readily pursued.

Although the Nixon administration surprised Tokyo when it announced that the president would visit Beijing, the Japanese government recovered quickly from its initial shock and moved to normalize relations with the PRC. Kazuhiko Togo, a former head of the Treaties Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, closely analyzes the negotiations between Beijing and Tokyo on key issues such as the status of Taiwan and Japanese regional commitments under its security treaty with the United States. Because both parties expected to benefit from improved relations they agreed to a Joint Communiqué of 1972 that finessed those
issues. The government of Kakuei Tanaka also hoped to improve relations with the Soviet Union by finally signing a peace treaty ending World War II, but they made little progress and were unable to settle on the language of a Joint Communiqué. Togo concludes that Japanese and the Soviet officials came to the talks with conflicting ideas of their nation’s standing in the world and that neither side was able to understand the other’s perspective. The Russians were intent on improving economic relations but the Japanese placed a premium on settling the Northern Territories dispute. Unfortunately we can only speculate about the actual Japanese negotiating position. We have even less information on what the Russians intended or said about the islands in their meetings with Tanaka. The Japanese alleged that Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev agreed that “the issue of the four islands” remained unresolved. (201) In doing so, the Japanese argued, he acknowledged that Russian sovereignty over all four of the islands comprising the Northern Territories was subject to negotiation. The Russians later denied making that statement and insisted that their sovereignty over Etorofu and Kunashiri was not in dispute.

Unfortunately, it is impossible to satisfactorily reconstruct what happened without access to the records kept by both sides. Although the Russians never put their alleged statement on the Northern Territories in writing we would have a better idea of what occurred if we had access to records kept by both sides. Instead, we are left with oral histories and personal recollections. Togo uses these sources carefully but they cannot replace the archival record. Togo is not alone in facing this problem. Other authors, for example Hasegawa and Gaiduk acknowledge the problems created by restricted access to the records. Nobuo Shimotomai creatively uses Russian and Eastern European sources, made available by the Cold War International History Project, to lift the veil on North Korean decision making, but that leaves us relying on what is at best second-hand information.

None of the governments in the region have been especially forthcoming in opening their archives for this period. We know more about policymaking in the United States because the National Security Archive has been able to use the Freedom of Information Act to pry loose materials. We can hope that international forums such as the ones that led to the publication of the book under review will lead to greater access to closed archives. There is some precedent for believing that a little professional pressure might help. At a similar conference held in 1987 the historian Warren I. Cohen chided Russian, Chinese, and Japanese historians for not being able to ground their work in the standard sources used by diplomatic historians.¹ The collapse of the Soviet Union several years later led to greater access to Moscow’s archives. The PRC also found it useful to make some materials available. Japan, however, lags far behind the others. For the most part, historians must rely on memoirs and oral histories for insight into Japanese policymaking.

Although it is difficult to generalize about overarching conclusions in a collection of essays, one important theme that emerges from the essays by Gaiduk, Hasegawa, Vladislav Zubok, and Sergey Radchenko, is that the Soviet Union’s relegation of Asia to secondary

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¹ The papers from this conference were published as Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye, eds. The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953-1960 (New York, 1990).
importance led to a caution bordering on stagnation that contrasted with the more flexible and adaptive policies of the PRC, United States, Japan, and South Korea. By the late 1970s, regional politics had become complicated by the PRC’s emergence as an independent force. Noting Japan’s dramatic economic growth during this period, Hasegawa argues that Japan’s role in these strategic developments has been understudied. After the Nixon shocks, the Japanese followed closely the internal debates over China policy within the administration of President Jimmy Carter. They were stunned, however, by Carter’s surprise announcement of his intention to withdraw ground troops from South Korea. The Americans eventually allayed Japanese fears, but it appears that the Chinese recognized Tokyo’s discomfort and sought to exploit it by pitting Japan and the U.S. against each other in a race to normalize relations. The Japanese beat the Americans to Beijing by completing a Peace and Friendship Treaty in September 1978. As with the earlier Joint Communiqué, the treaty glossed over key areas of disagreement, notably the question of sovereignty over the Senkakus. As Hasegawa notes, the Soviets were unable to compromise with Japan in a similar way over the Northern Territories. To Soviet leaders, the Northern territories were important symbols of Russia’s victory in World War II that could not be bargained away. Moreover, the tendency of Soviet leaders to view power primarily in military terms led them to treat Japan’s claims with contempt. Finally, by the late 1970s the islands were crucial defensive positions in Moscow’s maritime strategy. (234)

By hunkering down in Cold War mode the Soviet Union further isolated itself in Asia. When the United States recognized the PRC in 1979, China’s victory in the Asian sweepstakes was complete. After coming to power in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev sought to repair the Soviet Union’s position in the region. Nevertheless, as Vladislav Zubok shows, Gorbachev never tackled Asian policy with the same energy and innovation that he employed in dealing with European issues. Once again, Asia’s secondary status led to procrastination. Although close advisers recommended settling the Northern Territories dispute in Japan’s favor, Gorbachev was never willing “to bite the bullet” and propose an agreement. (282) In part, Gorbachev’s reluctance stemmed from uncertainty that such a gesture would significantly alter Japan’s reliance on U.S. security. Perhaps even more important, however, was Gorbachev’s belief that Asia was less important than Europe and thus not worth the political risks. For their part, the Japanese contributed to this stalemate by unimaginatively holding fast to their insistence on all four islands and failing to entice Gorbachev into taking chances. Zubok argues that had the Japanese desired it, more was possible.

Gorbachev’s curious blend of caution and opportunism made him responsive to diplomatic overtures from dynamic leaders who demonstrated a willingness to deal. South Korea, which established formal relations with Moscow, demonstrated that Gorbachev was willing to “acknowledge ‘new realities’ when they were generated by the energy from the other

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2This was actually the third time that the Americans shocked Japanese officials by unilaterally announcing major policy changes without consulting Tokyo. The first, less well-known incident occurred in 1968 when President Lyndon Johnson announced that he would not seek reelection, a statement widely viewed in Tokyo as an admission that Washington’s policy toward Vietnam and the PRC was a failure. Marc Gallicchio, "Occupation, Dominion, and Alliance: Japan in American Security Policy, 1945-1969," in Akira Iriye and Robert A. Wampler, eds. Partnership: The United States and Japan, 1951-2001 (Tokyo, 2001), 131.
side." (284) Even in the case of Korea, according to Sergey Radchenko, Gorbachev’s foot dragging delayed agreement and deprived the Soviet Union of some of the political benefits it could have reaped earlier. More importantly, the Soviet Union’s opening to South Korea came too late to contribute to peace on the peninsula. By the time the agreement was made in 1991, the Soviet Union was circling the drain. Gorbachev’s problems would become Boris Yeltsin’s. They continue to this day.

The U.S.-PRC rapprochement in the 1970s initiated a flurry of diplomatic maneuvers that continued to the end of the Cold War. Yet despite the collapse of the Soviet Union and the integration of the PRC and South Korea into the world economy, all of the pieces never quite fell into place. The essays in the volume do a great deal to help us understand why that was the case.
Tsuoyoshi Hasegawa highlights an obvious, but important point when he titles his introductory essay in this valuable anthology “East Asia—the Second Significant Front of the Cold War.” He correctly describes the volume as “a collection of overviews that examine various aspects of the Cold War in Asia based on the new evidence” (12). Less persuasive is his claim that this anthology purposefully presents findings that establish the uniqueness of the region’s historical experience. The Cold War in East Asia 1945-1991 contains eleven essays first presented at three conferences on this topic that the Center for Cold War Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara, sponsored in 2005, 2006, and 2007. Reflecting a fundamental and welcome shift over the previous two decades in Cold War studies, almost all of the contributors are not American-born scholars. Furthermore, they interpret events from perspectives outside the United States relying primarily on non-U.S. primary sources.

Hasegawa, who edited the volume, provides solid factual context in his introduction, surveying major trends during “The Beginning of the Cold War in Asia, 1945-56,” “Toward Multipolarization, 1956-72,” “Detente and East Asia, 1973-79,” “The New Cold War in Asia, 1979-85,” and “Gorbachev’s Perestroika, 1985-91.” He stresses how the Cold War created in East Asia “a more complicated situation than in Europe, where the East/West fault line was clearly delineated” (2). First, the decolonization process was different because Japan was the defeated colonial power. Second, the United States aligned mostly with authoritarian regimes in opposing the perceived threat of Soviet expansion. Third, Hasegawa invites debate when he contends that there was no direct clash of interests between Washington and Moscow in Asia prior to the 1970s. Fourth, the United States focused in East Asia on isolating the People’s Republic of China (PRC) after it became the champion of liberation and revolutionary nationalism. “Its policies toward Japan, South Korea and North Korea, and Southeast Asia, including Vietnam,” he concludes, “were mainly derived from [the] overarching question” (17) of how to balance its strategies for dealing with Moscow and Beijing.

Odd Arne Westad’s opening article titled “Struggles for Modernity: The Golden Years of the Sino-Soviet Alliance” discusses insightfully the debate in China from 1949 to the end of the 1950s over how to build a Communist state. Deliberations early in the Cold War among Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders and nonparty elites on how to proceed “increasingly oriented toward the experience of the Soviet Union” (36), resulting in dual and contradictory responses. PRC planners admired Soviet emphasis on “planning, procedure, and gradualism” (36) but detested the prospect of a long wait to reach pure communism. Westad describes how the clash between the Plan and the Leap dominated debate in four specific areas: concepts of war and warfare; education; domestic planning; and minority policies. State-building after 1949 followed a pattern set in the 1920s and 1930s, when Chinese Communist leaders “read the Soviet Union in a way that made sense for their own visions of China’s future and based on experiences the CCP cadre could understand” (37).
Westad benefits from the wider array of primary sources available on Sino-Soviet relations in the early Cold War years in providing strong support for his central argument. Despite its emphasis on guerrilla warfare, he argues, the Red Army guided CCP “visions of a future military machine” (38) because of the belief that emulating the Soviet model would result in “the construction and the socialization needed to create a modern state” (41). During the Korean War, the army became not just an effective fighting force, but a vehicle to train young men in socialism and build social improvement projects. Education also revealed this duality in state building of Plan and Leap, as students had to be both bright and Red. The PRC relied on Soviet advisors, as well as importing its patron’s pedagogy and instructional techniques wholesale. China followed Soviet theory in promoting urbanization, using central planning and regularity to serve the interests of society and improve conditions of inhabitants. Following “rediscovery of China’s ethnic minorities during the civil war” (52), the CCP again used Soviet methods, categorizing and civilizing these people as citizens of a unitary state. “The Sino-Soviet elite that commanded China’s struggle for modernity in the [PRC’s] first decade,” Westad incisively concludes, “was not driven apart by ethnocentrism or cultural differences” (57), but by arguments related to the PRC’s desire to overcome the gradualism of Soviet planning.

Ilya V. Gaiduk’s title—“The Second Front of the Soviet Cold War: Asia in the System of Moscow’s Foreign Policy Priorities, 1945-1956”—summarizes nicely his main thesis. He attempts to explain the reasons for this neglect and identify when the shift occurred to more active involvement. Gaiduk stresses how Moscow early in the Cold War was concerned about events in both China and Vietnam, but instructed its diplomats not to interfere in the political affairs of its allies. This was the product of its desire to limit the points of aggravation with the West, explaining as well why Moscow kept secret its ties with Asian revolutionaries. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin urged patience and caution in following the PRC model. He voiced sympathy for the oppressed in hopes they would challenge European colonial powers, but offered only advice and almost nothing substantial in support of revolutionary nationalism. Soviet policy began to shift, Gaiduk explains, in the last months of Stalin’s rule. “The most dramatic sign” (74) that Moscow was finally paying attention to Asia came with Nikita Khrushchev’s and Nikolai Bulganin’s highly publicized regional tour in 1955.

Gaiduk initiates a pattern emerging with regularity later in the volume of noting how “a scarcity of primary research materials” (63) limits the certainty of his conclusions. Nevertheless, he shows little restraint in advancing some rather extreme judgments. For example, Gaiduk attributes Stalin’s passivity in Asia to his conviction that Soviet policy could not achieve any successes in the region. Because he also allegedly distrusted Asian leaders, East Asia was not even a second front for the Soviet Union in first years of Cold War. As a result, it was the United States that first made it an area of confrontation. Abundant evidence contradicts this conclusion, as well as Gaiduk’s claim that “although the USSR lent its support and assistance to North Korea and China, it was not directly involved in the hostilities, and its role in the war [in Korea] remained passive at best.” Soviet involvement elsewhere in Asia, he adds, was “virtually absent” (69). The Khrushchev-Bulganin trip constituted “virtually a discovery of Asia” (74), but Soviet policies there remained complacent and agreeable with the West on key issues. Moscow continued to
concede leadership in Asia to the PRC, only later becoming fully involved and demanding allegiance.

In “Reorienting the Cold War: The Implications of China’s Early Cold War Experience, Taking Korea as a Central Test Case,” Chen Jian insists that “China’s position in the Cold War was not peripheral but central,” which “helped create the conditions whereby the Cold War remained ‘cold’” (81). Chinese involvement in the Korean War, he argues persuasively, supports five findings and five implications. Regarding the former, first, the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War greatly increased the Soviet Union’s prestige and power in Asia. Had this not occurred, there would have been no Korean War. Second, Mao Zedong’s decision to intervene in Korea was “an integral component of his ‘continuous revolution’” (84) that sought “to transform the challenges [Korea created] into the dynamics for enhancing the CCP’s control of China’s state and society, as well as to promote China’s international prestige and influence” (83). Third, Mao dominated Chinese decision-making. Fourth, the Soviet alliance was the cornerstone of the PRC’s war efforts. Fifth, Beijing’s prewar “relationship with North Korea was substantial yet never harmonious” (86).

Stalin acted ambivalently during the Korean War, Chen Jian explains, because avoiding a clash with the United States was more important than the Soviet alliance with the PRC. Less persuasive is his claim that the Sino-Soviet partnership became closer and stronger because of Korea, not least because of his five implications. The first holds that Chinese military victories in Korea made Mao’s political power virtually indisputable, leading to the emergence of a personality cult that allowed him to implement his utopian plans. Second, the Korean War made China more revolutionary in both domestic and international affairs. Third, Korea intensified the PRC’s revolutionary nationalism, creating discord in the Moscow-Beijing alliance that led to the Sino-Soviet split. Fourth, the Cold War intensified because ideology became “the basic reason to make and legitimize critical policy decisions” (91). Fifth, Asia became the focus of a global Cold War that now was more likely to remain cold because President Harry S. Truman shifted his energies to Asia, acting on “the assumption that China was a more daring enemy than the Soviet Union . . .” (93). Chen Jian repeats here his argument that China had decided to intervene at the start of the Korean War to assert its central leadership in Asia. Contradicting himself, he reports that in October, “Mao and his comrades were engaged in crucial deliberations concerning whether to send Chinese troops to Korea” (85.)

Steven Hugh Lee, in “Military Occupation and Empire Building in Cold War Asia: The United States and Korea, 1945-1955,” examines this topic “in a new light” in an attempt to expose ignored “broader continuities” (98). U.S. occupation of Korea, he contends, “differed from traditional colonialism in that American troops were not meant to stay in the country indefinitely” (99). A wartime U.S. Army manual on occupations stipulated as the goal in liberated nations of training the native population for self-rule, but elsewhere of upholding local laws and practices, an approach that was not specifically anti-leftist. In Korea, however, anticommunism dictated policies that prevented decolonization and independence. “One of the keys to understanding [U.S.] occupation of Korea,” Lee argues, “was the ways in which American concepts and forms of political and socioeconomic
modernity shaped the structures of power… established in southern Korea” (103). An American desire to impose democracy and a system compatible with U.S. international goals led to the violation of civil rights and popular suffering that resembled “Japanization” under prewar colonial rule. "The United States," Lee asserts, “maintained its own informal empire in Korea…” (107) after its forces first landed, he mistakenly reports, at Pusan.

For the most part, Lee covers familiar ground in explaining how U.S. occupation of southern Korea “perpetuated important vestiges of colonialism” (106). Repeating common knowledge, he stresses popular anger over the reliance of American occupation officials on collaborators, especially the U.S. partnership with the colonial Korean elite in managing Japanese assets. That 85 percent of the police force that brutally punished anyone objecting to political repression had served under Japan is also well known. But Lee’s explanation for American actions is original. “Koreanization” was a “particular U.S. version of modernization,” he writes, “associated with a specific developmental project that was political in character” (108). “The ‘ization’ process is… well suited to America’s own version of empire” that seeks to create proxy partners in the developing world who will “retain a subordinate status within a global capitalist framework” (109). Setting South Korea apart was an unprecedented second occupation beginning in the Korean War that allowed not just the U.S. Army but also nongovernmental organizations—especially Christian groups—to manage rehabilitation. For example, U.S. educational reform in South Korea, he claims, created a passive and obedient citizenry supportive of anticommunist policies.

Nobuo Shimotomai provides an enlightening account of “Kim Il Sung's Balancing Act between Moscow and Beijing, 1956-1972,” explaining how North Korea’s leader “maneuvered between Moscow and Beijing” and exploited “the emerging Sino-Soviet conflict, in order to consolidate his power and pursue his own foreign policy” (123). According to the author, “a decisive turning point in Cold War history” (122) came in 1956 when Soviet and Chinese leaders considered removing Kim Il Sung from power after he purged his political rivals. In response, Kim pursued industrialization and collectivization through national mobilization and the development of a personality cult to achieve self-reliance, defying Moscow’s objections. Khrushchev and Mao then began to court North Korea in their contest for leadership of the Communist movement, giving “Kim the green light to consolidate his power by 1958” (128). North Korea’s need for food and technology, Shimotomai emphasizes, explained why Kim replicated the Soviet economic model, rather than China’s “Great Leap.” However, Kim “faced a dilemma” (132) because of lost leverage if he ignored the PRC.

Shimotomai carefully describes Pyongyang’s interactions with Moscow and Beijing from 1960 to 1972, showing how Kim Il Sung avoided “completely committing himself to either side” (147). An opportunist lacking fondness for either patron, he signed treaties with both allies to sustain rivalry, not to build solidarity. Shimotomai often fails, however, to discuss the impact of key events on this triangular relationship, ignoring, for example, the Cuban Missile Crisis when explaining how North Korea in October 1962 became a legitimate ally of the PRC. Instead, he claims that a new Soviet demand to pay for arms “broke the camel’s back” (139), although he speculates that Khrushchev’s refusal to provide nuclear...
technology caused the shift. How U.S. intervention in Vietnam shaped developments escapes systematic coverage. What Shimotomai does make clear is Kim Il Sung’s unwavering pursuit of reunification. In June 1960, his “proposal for a confederation was meant to pay lip service to Khrushchev without really changing his postwar policy of unifying Korea by force” (133).

The *Pueblo* Incident in early 1968 revealed how “Kim’s détente with Moscow remained illusory” (142) because their “mutual expectations never meshed” (143). Kim Il Sung took cosmetic steps to satisfy the Soviet desire for North Korea to focus on economic recovery and peaceful diplomacy, but his distrust of both Moscow and Beijing required devotion to militancy and militarism.

Examining “Chinese Foreign Policy, 1960-1979,” Lorenz Luthi astutely notes how before 1960, the PRC was one of the few nations “unfettered by the existing international system” (152). He explains its transformation over the next two decades “into a globally integrated, status-quo oriented” (170) world power. Luthi describes the domestic causes for this transition, contending that ideology and modernization dictated this transition with competition between a “Radical Line” and “Moderate Line” governing PRC policy deliberations. In the fall of 1962, Mao installed anti-Soviet struggle, promotion of national liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, “and limited cooperation with non-socialist states exclusively in the spheres of the economy and society into the guiding principles of China’s foreign policy” (154). Two years later, Zhou Enlai favored a strategy he first proposed in 1954 calling for *sihua*—economic opening to the West for the modernization of industry, agriculture, defense, and transportation. Instead, as is well known, the Proletarian Cultural Revolution after 1965 radicalized foreign policy and “the increased militancy of domestic politics” (155) led to the PRC’s “political self-isolation in the world” (156).

Luthi confesses that the evidence “is still very fragmentary” (153), but nevertheless claims that the PRC’s foreign policy shift came in response to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Mao now adopted *sihua* for three reasons. First, he realized that he had led China “into a global dead end” (170). Second, Mao’s ideological radicalism in the 1960s concealed his realistic desire to integrate China into the world economy. Third, he was responding to global advocacy for the PRC’s entry into the world community. Luthi suggests, however, that the transition came earlier with a sharp rise in Chinese trade with Japan and West Germany, showing how “economic pragmatism had trumped political radicalism” (159). Mao’s decision to shift policy also seemed to lack firmness and clarity. “The available Chinese evidence,” Luthi explains, “does not reveal precisely what Beijing had hoped to obtain from rapprochement with Washington beyond some progress on the Taiwan issue and some sort of strategic realignment” (166). However, he clearly demonstrates that China, after 1973, pursued economic development and global cooperation, rather than revolution and confrontation. Under Deng Xiaoping, China’s new policies led to formal adoption of *sihua* in 1978. The triangular superpower relationship was not as important, Luthi concludes, as domestic factors in producing this outcome.
In “Japan’s Foreign Policy under Détente: Relations with China and the Soviet Union, 1971-1973,” Kazuhiko Togo argues that these years marked the end of Japan being preoccupied with resolving issues left over from World War II. Japan’s pursuit of reconciliation with the PRC and the Soviet Union signaled its reentry into world affairs. Togo explains why Tokyo succeeded with Beijing, while failing with Moscow. In 1972, “conditions were ripe for normalizing” Sino-Japanese relations because of “the changing Cold War structure of détente, the accumulating wishes of mainstream Japanese businesses to establish fully open economic ties, and longtime uneasiness on the part of many Japanese of having wronged China” (187). Taiwan was the last issue preventing a treaty once the PRC did not demand reparations and accepted the U.S.-Japan pact. Although Prime Minister Sato Eisaku had outlined the terms, Tanaka Kakuei, his successor, made the key decision in defiance of U.S. preferences to break relations with Taipei. “It is possible to conclude,” Togo reasons, “that Tanaka reached a tacit agreement with the United States on his China policy without sacrificing Japan’s independence” (190). References to Taiwan in the treaty were “obscure and vague” (191), but Tanaka privately assured Washington that Japan would continue economic and other practical relations. Interpreting the provision differently met each nation’s desire to maintain status quo.

“Tanaka had no choice but to act on China” (205), Togo perceptively explains, but, unlike Beijing, Moscow had no Japanese boosters. In fact, there was popular pressure on Tanaka to demand the return of the Northern Territories that the Soviets had occupied after World War II as a condition for a treaty. In 1956, Moscow had agreed to return Habomai and Shikotan, but Tokyo insisted on recovering Kunashiri and Etorofu as well. Togo contends that the perfect moment to resolve this dispute came in July 1972 when Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev congratulated Tanaka on his election as Prime Minister and declared his desire to improve relations. After achieving the more important treaty with China, Tanaka met with Brezhnev in October 1973, where the Soviet leader at first rejected Japan’s claim to all four Northern Territories, but then agreed “for the first time . . . that Kunashiri and Etorofu were unresolved issues from World War II” (199). Later, Moscow denied that Brezhnev had conceded this point. Japan failed to secure a written commitment because, Togo speculates, Tokyo decided “it was better to have an agreement based on an oral exchange . . . than not have an agreement at all . . .” (201). Treaty negotiations collapsed not because of a personality clash, Togo concludes, but because the territorial dispute, not economic cooperation, defined the Soviet-Japanese relationship.

In “A Strategic Quadrangle: The Superpowers and the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 1977-1978,” Hasegawa utilizes “Japan as the analytical pivot” in assessing how during these years “the United States, China, and the Soviet Union . . . responded to the changing circumstances” (214). Steps toward ending the Cold War had stalled after 1973, he explains, and by 1976 “all four powers found themselves in a stalemate” (217). Despite not having “access to Chinese archives” (225), Hasegawa confidently attributes the absence of further progress in PRC-Japan relations to Beijing’s displeasure with Tokyo’s refusal to target the Soviets in its definition of anti-hegemonism. The Carter administration at first was more reluctant to alienate Moscow and less interested in normalizing relations with the PRC. Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo changed the dance late in 1976 when he initiated an “‘omnidirectional’ foreign policy” (219), prompting both the Soviet Union and the PRC to
begin courting Japan. "China conducted more skillful diplomacy" (220) thereafter, Hasegawa writes, while "the manner in which the Soviets [acted] was clumsy and counterproductive" (223). Early in 1978, Tokyo dismissed Moscow’s proposal for a friendship treaty because it did not provide for resolution of the Northern Territories dispute. According to Hasegawa, the Soviets foolishly thought profiting from Siberian projects would cause Japan to acquiesce.

Hasegawa suggests that Soviet behavior was one of two key factors in the successful signing of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty (PFT). Fukuda dropped his initial refusal to include an anti-hegemony clause after the Soviet Union displayed "shortsightedness" (226) in not acting to resolve its territorial dispute with Japan. A second factor was the Carter administration’s decision to pursue normalization of relations with the PRC as part of a strategy to create an anti-Soviet alliance in East Asia. Washington now pressed Japan to sign a treaty with China that included an anti-hegemony clause. Economic gain was another incentive because Tokyo saw more appealing opportunities in the PRC as opposed to a struggling Soviet Union. Normalization with both Japan and the United States made China the clear winner in this round of the Cold War in East Asia, while the United States gained an ally but “at the cost of détente” (232). Japan hoped the PTF would enhance stability in region, but it led instead, Hasegawa argues, to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia. Moscow was the big loser because its “top priority in the Pacific was the need to counter the U.S. strategic threat” that made it “impossible for the Soviet Union to craft an independent Japan policy” (234). It also could not play the “Japan card” because it had to retain the islands as a symbol of its victory in World War II.

Gregg Brazinsky provides a thoughtful description of “Korea’s Great Divergence: North and South Korea between 1972 and 1987.” Early in the 1970s, economic conditions in the Koreas were similar, plus neither allowed political freedom. “By 1987,” he observes, “the Korean version of capitalism, “had been far more successful at creating a prosperous, forward-looking society than had the Korean version of communism” (241). His explanation for this outcome was that South Korea adapted to become an active participant in global economic affairs, while North Korea opted for isolation. Initiating this process was détente, which “marked the beginning of the end of superpower indulgence” of “their sometimes-prickly Korean allies” (243), as the Nixon administration, after allegedly assuming power in 1968, withdrew troops and ended economic aid to South Korea and the Soviets limited military support to North Korea. The thawing of the Cold War “created an atmosphere of crisis in both [Koreas] that the authorities tried to solve by deepening their own political dominance” (246). More important, Seoul made strategic use of loans to promote economic development, while Pyongyang built factories, but lacked the technological skill to operate them efficiently and productively.

Brazinsky describes how both Koreas after 1972 pursued limited mutual dialog and established favorable relations with neutral nations. “Ironically,” he writes, “South Korea’s approach ultimately enabled it to gain greater autonomy and self-reliance, [while] North Korea’s left it perpetually dependent on foreign sources of support” (249). Seoul’s financial settlement with Japan provided key funding for economic growth, Brazinsky admits, but this came in 1965 and at Washington’s insistence. U.S. interest in South Korea, he claims,
declined after 1972, ignoring a continuation of favorable economic policies. But Seoul acted on its own to reconcile successfully with Moscow and Beijing, persuading them to ignore Pyongyang’s protests. North Korea sought limited contacts with the United States, Brazinsky explains, but the reason this “did not develop into a more significant informal relationship . . . is unclear” (254). South Korea’s establishment of global economic partnerships led to “a rapid expansion of [its] influence in international affairs . . .” (255). Its firms also invested “in a broad range of foreign countries” (259). Seoul, Brazinsky incautiously concludes, helped facilitate the demise of communism in Asia and the developing world.

Vladislav Zubok describes how Mikhail “Gorbachev’s Policy toward East Asia, 1985-1991” played a secondary role in his plan to end Cold War. There, Soviet policy was “gradualist and inertial” (265), as Moscow’s negotiating partners were the more important actors. Zubok briefly describes how Soviet policy toward China after 1949 created in Beijing a sense of encirclement. By 1985, Chinese leaders demanded as conditions for normalizing relations Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Vietnamese evacuation of Cambodia, and the demilitarization of Mongolia. Gorbachev showed disinterest toward both China and Japan, focusing his pursuit of a nuclear free world in Europe. New Soviet representatives in Beijing and Tokyo pressed for actions toward reconciliation, resulting in Gorbachev initiating steps in 1986 to satisfy the PRC’s conditions, but Japan’s “disputed islands remained a taboo topic” (270). A preference for China reflected his generation’s desire to repair “historic links” (272) with old friends. A “bizarre combination of remarkable optimism and a congenital lack of long-range strategic planning,” Zubok contends, led to “a drifting, ad hoc approach” and unclear “rhetoric that was not followed by actions . . .” (273). For example, Gorbachev did not act on his praise for Japan’s economic miracle to negotiate deals to develop Siberia and did little to build improved relations.

Zubok’s description of events supports his argument that Gorbachev’s East Asia policy “remained to the end a mixture of a grand vision of the ‘new thinking,’ procrastination and inertia, and miscalculation on the timing and tempo of changes” (286). For example, his vigorous pursuit of normalized relations with the PRC came after he recognized in 1987 that a financial crisis was imminent. “It is tempting to interpret Soviet initiatives, such as reductions of troops in Mongolia and Afghanistan, as responses to this crisis,” he explains, “yet the existing records do not supply any definitive linkages” (274). A more important factor “was the growing political consensus in Beijing to shift from the ideologically driven anti-Soviet stance to a pragmatic foreign policy” (275). In achieving reconciliation with Beijing, Gorbachev eliminated China as a card to play against the Soviet Union, but his policy toward Japan ended in deadlock because he continued to view Tokyo as a loyal U.S. ally. Personal inhibitions and a reluctance to discuss the Northern Territories “indicated the limits of the ‘new thinking’” (279). Waiting until April 1991 when his power was in steep decline to begin negotiations for a treaty, Gorbachev encouraged Japan to be inflexible, unlike the Chinese, thereby preventing normalization of relations.

Sergey Radchenko begins his essay “Inertia and Change: Soviet Policy toward Korea, 1985-1991” with a discussion of Kim Il Sung’s visit to Moscow in May 1984. Mutual interests were motivating movement toward rapprochement, as Pyongyang needed a source of
credit and Moscow wanted to create a hole in the Chinese-led anti-Soviet front in East Asia. In return for its support, North Korea received a Soviet commitment to help build a nuclear power plant and a protocol to develop bilateral trade. In October 1986, the two nations conducted a joint naval exercise. Meanwhile, Soviet relations with South Korea were not just bad, but non-existent. Three years later, Soviet policy toward Korea had experienced a “complete and profound transformation” (291), as Moscow established relations with South Korea and abandoned North Korea. “New Thinking,” Radchenko asserts, had “much less significance” in motivating this reorientation “than the promise of South Korean credits” (291). This change came too late to save the Soviet Union, but among its negative consequences was that North Korea pointed to the end of Soviet protection as an excuse for violating its agreement with South Korea to denuclearize the peninsula.

Radchenko makes the sweeping assertion that “a closer examination of the [Soviet] decisionmaking process [in the 1980s] (something that is only now becoming possible with the declassification of archival materials) reveals that key decisions were often taken for reasons that had nothing to do with the ‘new thinking’” (313). Moscow, for example, sought contacts with South Korea as a direct result of stalemate in relations with Japan. Siberia’s economy was in shambles, but Tokyo was reluctant to invest there because of Soviet economic restrictions and Moscow’s refusal to resolve the Northern Territories dispute. “Thus, by mid-1988, more and more experts eyed prosperous South Korea . . .” (294) as a suitable alternative. Defying protests from North Korea, the Soviet Union participated in the Seoul Olympics. To reassure Kim Il Sung, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze visited Pyongyang in December 1988. “Though records of these talks are not yet available,” Radchenko explains, “the foreign minister reportedly gave Kim his ‘Communist’s word’ that Moscow would not have any dealings with Seoul detrimental to the interests of the North Korean regime.” Thereafter, “Gorbachev, with characteristic ambiguity, trod the middle ground” (302). This “dysfunctional policy” (314) meant that he delayed meeting with South Korea’s President Roh Tae Woo until June 1990 when his financial situation was desperate. Radchenko praises both leaders for discarding “bloc logic,” but adds this more astonishing exaggeration: “The Soviet-South Korean rapprochement went a long way toward ending the Cold War in Asia” (313).

Robert McMahon’s dustcover endorsement rightly observes that The Cold War in East Asia 1945-1991 meets “a real need” in the literature on this subject. As Hasegawa explains, the essays in this book “represent the state of the art for current scholarship on the Cold War in East Asia” (17). But many of the arguments these scholars present, as discussed in this commentary, rely on partial and incomplete access to historical records. Certainly, the inability to reference Foreign Relations of the United States constitutes a major weakness of most of these articles. Another limitation, as Hasegawa admits, is exclusion from consideration of events in Southeast Asia and South Asia. Nevertheless, all the essays are factually informative and analytically challenging. Careless errors are few, but “Chun Don Hwan” (10) deserves special mention. Also mistaken is this conclusion: “More than anything else, misperceptions held by both the United States and the Soviet Union were responsible for the outbreak of the Korean War” (4). A strength of this volume is that the authors discuss a “fourth front,” noting how “domestic politics of each nation developed in close connection with the external Cold War . . .” (2). “It is . . . difficult to say that the Cold
War in East Asia ended in 1991,” Hasegawa thoughtfully concludes. “It is probably more accurate to say that East Asia gradually entered a post-Cold War era, with most of the key regional conflicts remaining unresolved, thereby leaving many dangerous legacies for our own time” (11).
Based on the materials of three successive conferences organized by the Center for Cold War Studies of the University of California, Santa Barbara, and published by the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) of the Woodrow Wilson Center, this magnificent collection of essays is of a similar scholarly significance as an earlier CWIHP volume edited by Christopher E. Goscha and Christian F. Ostermann, Connecting Histories. Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945-1962 (2009). First of all, it pays equally extensive attention to the motives and steps of every local actor (with the partial exception of Taiwan, which is covered only passingly in chapters devoted to China and Japan), rather than disproportionately focusing on the activities of the diplomatic and military heavyweights. Of the eleven chapters, two are devoted specifically to North and/or South Korean foreign and domestic policies, while three others show the two Korean states as objects – though by no means as passive tools – of Chinese, U.S. and Soviet actions. Similarly, two chapters are focused on Japan, but also the introduction and a third chapter, written by Vladislav Zubok, carefully analyze Soviet-Japanese relations and other aspects of Japanese diplomacy.

Secondly, the book’s chapters meticulously describe each country’s bilateral relations with almost every other regional actor. Odd Arne Westad, Ilya V. Gaiduk, Chen Jian, Lorenz Lüthi, and Zubok cover Sino-Soviet relations; Kazuhiko Togo and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa analyze Japan’s relations with China, the USSR and the United States; while Chen Jian, Steven Hugh Lee, Nobuo Shimotomai, Gregg Brazinsky, and Sergey Radchenko examine the two Koreas’ relations with China, America, Japan, and the Soviet Union, respectively. Some authors, particularly Hasegawa, Gaiduk and Luthi, also provide valuable additional information about U.S., Soviet and Chinese policies toward non-regional countries, such as India, Vietnam, and Indonesia. Their arguments are skillfully backed up by a wide range of declassified primary sources – mostly U.S., Russian and Chinese archival documents, but also some East German and Swiss files and a few published collections of Japanese diplomatic materials – and by references to a high number of excellent scholarly publications and revealing personal memoirs written in English, Russian, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and German.

Thirdly, many authors make intense efforts to investigate the interconnectedness of foreign and domestic policies in the countries under analysis. As Chen Jian aptly points out, “Mao never drew a clear boundary between ‘domestic’ and ‘external’ issues in his management of China’s international affairs” (90), and therefore the interdisciplinary approach adopted by these scholars is highly commendable. Westad examines a particularly broad range of fields, including military organization, education, urban planning and minority policies, to demonstrate that in the “golden years” (35) of the Sino-Soviet alliance, Soviet and Chinese Communist conceptions of modernity were not in binary opposition to each other. On the one hand, the influence of Soviet theoretical models and actual practices was remarkably
extensive, and thus an over-emphasis on the 'Yan’an way’¹ in the analysis of CCP policies would create a distorted image of the real situation.² On the other hand, the disagreements that did occur did not necessarily reflect clear-cut dividing lines between ‘Soviet’ and ‘Chinese’ visions: as the author notes, “often there was as much debate within each group as between them.” (56) Westad also provides extremely valuable information about some lesser-known aspects of CCP policies and plans, such as the 1950 Politburo debate over whether it would be advisable or not “to abolish Shanghai altogether and send all its prerevolutionary inhabitants for ‘rectification’ in the countryside” (45-46) – an idea that might provide researchers with further insight into the motives behind the Khmer Rouge’s decision to forcibly evacuate the ‘liberated’ Cambodian cities. His description of the treatment of ethnic minorities in the PRC carefully analyzes when Chinese ethnographers and policy-makers were willing to follow Soviet guidelines and when they decided to act otherwise. One point of divergence was the CCP leadership’s insistence that “New China was to be a unitary and not a federal state,” which, in Westad’s opinion, reflected the fact that “the CCP had been born as a reaction against perceived imperialist designs to break up China.” (52) It would also have been worth investigating, however, whether this divergence might have been at least partly inspired by the negative consequences of the minority policies the CCP had pursued in 1931, at which time the party, following the directives of the Soviet-dominated Communist International, declared the minorities’ right to self-determination, including the right to secession from China.³

While Westad describes how external factors influenced Chinese domestic policies in the 1950s, Lüthi investigates how the CCP’s internal debates shaped Chinese diplomacy in the 1960s and 1970s. He draws a highly nuanced picture about the contradictory aspects of the Cultural Revolution, including the fact that while Red Guard violence “virtually paralyzed the institutional and human resources of China’s diplomatic apparatus, the Foreign Trade Ministry seemed to have escaped much of the political unrest” (159), and Chinese trade with such non-Communist countries as Japan, West Germany, and Britain kept growing until 1967. Throughout his chapter, he skillfully describes both the effect that the various leaders’ economic visions produced on Chinese diplomacy – such as the economic motives behind the rapprochement-oriented policies pursued by Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping – and the impact of external events on domestic economic development (like the role of the Vietnam War in the post-1965 relocation of industries). Similar observations are made by Chen Jian with regard to the impact of the Korean War on Chinese domestic policies: “In the

¹ The term Yan’an Way refers to Mao Zedong’s adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to the specific social, political and cultural conditions of China. These ideas and practices were developed in the mostly rural environment of Yan’an (Shaanxi province) where the CCP had its headquarters from 1936 to 1948.

² Hua-yu Li made a similar argument in her pioneering monograph about the influence of Stalinist models on Mao’s economic policies, Mao and the Economic Stalinization of China, 1948-1953 (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006).

wake of China’s entrance into the war,” he states, “Mao’s Communist regime found itself in a powerful position to penetrate almost every area of Chinese society through an intensive mass mobilization under the banner of ‘Resisting America and Assisting Korea.’” (89)

The essays of Chen and Gaiduk form a fascinating contrast with each other in various respects. For one thing, Chen selects the Korean War as a case study of Mao’s foreign policies, whereas Gaiduk devotes far less space to this event than to other fields of Stalin’s Asia policy, such as his relations with the Chinese, Vietnamese, Indian, and Indonesian Communist parties. Secondly, Chen emphasizes the prominent role of revolutionary ideology in Mao’s decision to get involved in the Korean conflict. As he points out, “only two weeks after the outbreak of the Korean War (and long before the war had caused a direct threat to China’s border security), Mao and the CCP leadership began preparations to enter the war.” (83) In contrast, Gaiduk stresses that Stalin’s evident unwillingness to pursue a policy of fomenting ‘world revolution’ in Asia – such as his efforts to dissuade Indian and Indonesian Communists from embarking upon guerrilla struggle and his realization that Indian Premier Jawaharlal Nehru, unlike Bao Dai in Vietnam, was not a ‘puppet’ – indicated that Europe-centrism and “the factor of ‘geographical security’ played a more powerful role in the Kremlin’s considerations” (69) than ideology.

In fact, these two approaches may be partly reconcilable with each other if we further refine the conception of geopolitics that Gaiduk uses. That is, both the Soviet and Chinese leaders seem to have wanted to concentrate their efforts on certain countries and avoid a simultaneous involvement in other regional crises. For instance, in 1951 – that is, in the very period when Stalin instructed the Indian and Indonesian CPs to refrain from armed struggle – the Kremlin kept encouraging the Japanese CP to pursue a policy of violent confrontation with the authorities. Similarly, in August 1950, at which time Mao was becoming increasingly concerned about the wars in Korea and Indochina, the PRC expressed its intention to cultivate good relations with Burma and Indonesia by sending ambassadors to Rangoon and Jakarta. In any case, Chen and Gaiduk are in agreement with each other in stressing that both Mao and Stalin paid great attention to maintaining the Sino-Soviet partnership – an opinion that is fully in accordance with Westad’s observations.

Lee’s approach is similar to Westad’s in that he studies how the U.S. military occupation of South Korea shaped the political, economic, and cultural evolution of Korean society, a situation he correctly places into the global context of previous and simultaneous American occupations of various Latin American, Asian and European countries and of the post-WW II process of de-colonization. While relatively little new factual information is provided in his chapter, and some of his statements are somewhat vague and inaccurate (see, for instance, the following claim: “In 1950, Korea became a protectorate of the United States.,” 112), the conceptual framework he offers, such as the parallel drawn with U.S.-occupied Japan and West Germany, is certainly worth pursuing. Among other matters, Lee rightly draws attention to the importance of the American-inspired establishment of a provisional South Korean government and an interim National Assembly in 1946.

In his analysis of North Korean actions in 1956-1972, Shimotomai carefully documents how Kim Il Sung’s domestic and external policies influenced each other. For instance, he
describes a number of episodes when the dictator’s efforts to purge his intra-party opponents and pursue radical economic policies caused friction with his strategic allies and aid donors, the USSR and China, or when the deterioration of Soviet-DPRK relations induced Kim to take additional repressive measures. An especially valuable part of this chapter is the new and revealing information Shimotomai provides about the background of the treaties which Pyongyang concluded with Moscow and Beijing in mid-1961. He demonstrates that North Korean calls for such a treaty, which started as early as January 1959, were at first unheeded by the Kremlin, and Kim had to conceal his desire to sign a similar treaty with China, lest the conclusion of the Soviet-DPRK treaty be further hindered by this act. One wonders if Moscow’s long-standing reluctance to sign a treaty with Pyongyang – which appears somewhat peculiar in the light of the fact that the U.S.-ROK treaty, as Shimotomai aptly notes, had been concluded as early as 1953 – might have been at least partly motivated by an intention to refrain from acts that could encourage Japan to renew its own security treaty with America. The timing of the Soviet-DPRK treaty seems to be in accordance with such an explanation, since in the spring of 1960, the renewal of the U.S.-Japanese treaty did encounter strong domestic opposition in Japan, and such critics of the treaty as the Socialist Party and the JCP managed to gain votes in the Diet elections held in November. Indeed, Shimotomai does note that “Japan’s decision to renew the security treaty with the United States alarmed Kim, and pushed him closer to the USSR.” (132).

Yet another Korea specialist, Brazinsky, also pays equal attention to the foreign and domestic policies which the two Korean regimes pursued in the 1970s and 1980s. His elaborate analysis of the interconnectedness of South Korea’s economic modernization, foreign trade, and diplomatic strategies is particularly praiseworthy, all the more so because he also examines the role these factors played in such events as the imposition of Park Chung Hee’s Yushin system, Japanese-ROK cooperation, and South Korea’s diplomatic victories over the DPRK. For instance, he persuasively explains how Sino-American détente increased Park’s threat perceptions, and motivated him to introduce Yushin. In contrast, his attempt to apply the same formula on the DPRK (“the North Korean regime’s effort to clamp down on dissent in the wake of Nixon’s visit to China presents a striking parallel to the sudden increase in political repression that occurred in South Korea at the same time,” 248) may be less convincing. In North Korean domestic politics, the period of 1971-1972 was actually more relaxed than, say, 1967-1969 or 1977 when the KWP leadership was hit by massive purges. Anxious to make a good impression on the southern population at a time of inter-Korean rapprochement, Kim Il Sung instructed cadres to collect Buddhist cultural objects for museums, improve the supply of

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4 The Yushin system refers to an openly authoritarian system of rule imposed by Park Chung Hee in October 1972, which eliminated direct presidential elections, and thus de facto enabled Park to ensure his own re-election for as many consecutive terms as he saw fit.

consumer goods, and show greater tolerance toward what had been previously regarded as ‘bourgeois lifestyles’ (like the wearing of fur coats and colorful dresses).°

Actually, certain details in Brazinsky’s sophisticated description of the effects of Sino-American rapprochement help to explain the aforesaid contrast between North and South Korean internal policies. That is, in 1970-1972 Seoul had more reason to fear abandonment by its allies than Pyongyang. While the Nixon administration withdrew one-third of the American troops stationed in the ROK, and “virtually eliminated all nonmilitary forms of aid” (243), Chinese economic and military aid to the DPRK underwent a massive growth in the same period, though, as the author correctly points out, the KWP leaders still remained dissatisfied with the extent of China’s support to their unification policy.

Fears of abandonment were also strong in Japan, which, as Brazinsky notes, reinforced Japanese-ROK cooperation. Togo’s colorful analysis of the ‘Nixon shock,’ rich in quotations from the informal comments the various Japanese policy-makers made on Nixon’s unexpected decision to visit China, is masterfully placed into the context of Japanese parliamentary and intra-party politics and of Sino-Japanese relations. He demonstrates that a shift toward moving closer to the PRC at the expense of Taiwan appeared in Japanese diplomacy as early as the premiership of Sato Eisaku, and thus Sato’s replacement by Tanaka Kakuei was a precondition of Sino-Japanese normalization only in the sense that the CCP leaders, having been displeased by Sato’s earlier actions, preferred to reach an agreement with his successor. Some other authors, particularly Chen Jian, Gaiduk, Hasegawa, Zubok and Radchenko, also pay great attention to personal factors, describing how the ideas, preferences, and working style of such important actors as Mao, Stalin, Gorbachev, and Sonoda Sunao shaped the course of Chinese, Soviet, and Japanese foreign policies.

As many as three authors – Togo, Hasegawa, and Zubok – seek to answer a question of crucial importance: “Why did Japan succeed in its rapprochement with China but fail in its relations with the Soviet Union?” (204) Togo correctly points out that the Japanese government attributed greater importance to Sino-Japanese reconciliation than to Soviet-Japanese normalization, which, in the light of the fact that Moscow’s main motive to adopt a cooperative attitude toward Tokyo in early 1972 was to prevent Sino-Japanese rapprochement, was bound to adversely affect Soviet-Japanese relations. He raises the question whether Tanaka missed a chance to reach an agreement with the USSR, but concludes that Japan’s options were too limited to achieve a breakthrough. In their analysis of the 1970s, both Togo and Hasegawa lay the main emphasis on Soviet inflexibility. “The Senkaku formula that the PRC and Japan were later adopt to resolve their territorial dispute could have served as an example for solving the Soviet-Japanese territorial dispute,”

Hasegawa stresses. “But the Soviets, preoccupied with China’s threat, could not see it that way, which demonstrated the shortsightedness of Soviet thinking.” (226) Concerning the failure of reconciliation attempts under Gorbachev, Hasegawa is more inclined to highlight Japanese inflexibility, an opinion with which Zubok is in agreement. While Zubok, similarly to Radchenko, readily admits that the weaknesses of Gorbachev’s peculiar decision-making style considerably hindered the effective handling of various crucial issues, he aptly highlights two fundamental obstacles that dissuaded the Soviet leaders from making the territorial concession demanded by Tokyo. For one thing, they could not expect the Japanese side to reciprocate this concession by loosening its ties with the U.S. Secondly, Moscow would have to give up an area over which it had maintained direct control ever since 1945: “In Gorbachev’s view, Eastern Europe and East Germany belonged to the Eastern Europeans and Germans, and the disputed territories belonged to the Russians.” (283)

Indeed, it is worth noting that in the successful cases of reconciliation described by Togo, Hasegawa and Zubok (that is, the normalization of Sino-Japanese and Sino-Soviet relations in the 1970s and late 1980s, respectively), a substantial part of the concessions made by one side or the other were made at the expense of a third country (Taiwan, the USSR, Mongolia, Afghanistan, and Vietnam, respectively), rather than directly affecting their own territory. On that point, Zubok mistakenly concludes that “in May 1988, the leadership in Hanoi decided – presumably on its own, without Soviet pressure – to end the occupation of Cambodia.” (273-274). Actually, as early as March 1987 Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, having stressed the urgency of solving the Afghan and Cambodian questions, prodded the reluctant Vietnamese to allow the “masses of the Khmer Rouge,” save its high-ranking leaders, to participate in the Cambodian peace process.7 In other respects, however, Zubok masterfully compares Gorbachev’s perceptions of China with his attitudes toward Japan, and persuasively explains why Sino-Soviet reconciliation was successfully accomplished and Soviet-Japanese normalization was not.

Yet another reconciliation process, the gradual improvement of relations between South Korea and the various Communist powers, is carefully analyzed by Radchenko and partly also by Brazinsky. Similarly to Togo and Hasegawa who examined the economic factors of Sino-Japanese reconciliation, Radchenko accurately and colorfully describes the paramount role of economic considerations in Gorbachev’s decision to move toward the diplomatic recognition of the Republic of Korea, comparing this step with Soviet-Japanese relations. Through this case study, he provides a most interesting insight into the gravity of the Soviet economic crisis in the early 1990s. The sentences he quotes from the diary of Anatolii Cherniaev, one of Gorbachev’s aides, speak volumes: “Scraped the closets to find foreign exchange and credits and buy [food] from abroad. But we are already insolvent. Nobody is giving credits; the hope is that Roh Tae Woo will.” (312) A particularly praiseworthy element of his analysis is that instead of presenting Soviet-South Korean reconciliation as a

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wholly beneficial process, he also draws attention to those controversial aspects of
Gorbachev’s policies which prevented the Soviet side from fully utilizing the new
opportunities, and even contributed to the post-1991 North Korean nuclear crisis.

The sole minor inaccuracy in Radchenko’s description is the statement that in the pre-1985
period, “Soviet relations with South Korea were not just bad – they were nonexistent.
Having been vilified by Soviet propaganda as a reactionary puppet of U.S. imperialism,
South Korea existed, for all intents and purposes, only a theoretical concept, a bogeyman of
Asia.” (291) While it is certainly true that the USSR did not establish any economic or
political relations with the ROK in the pre-Gorbachev era, Brazinsky rightly emphasizes
that as early as the 1970s, Sino-U.S. rapprochement induced both Seoul and Moscow to
make some tentative steps toward each other. Notably, in December 1979 M.S. Kapitsa, the
head of the Far Eastern Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, told a Hungarian
diplomat that if the North Korean press again published explicitly anti-Soviet articles, “they
will authorize those Soviet officials who, as employees of various international
organizations, have valid invitations to South Korea, to visit Seoul.” 8

All in all, this book is a must-read for those doing research on the history of the Cold War in
Asia. Both its overall structural organization and its individual chapters deserve the highest
praise; Hasegawa’s introduction is not merely a summary of the book but a sophisticated
analysis in itself. As usual in the books of Woodrow Wilson Press’ Cold War International
History Project series, the volume is very carefully edited, with only a few minor mistakes.
That is, there are certain inconsistencies in the transliteration of Korean names, as it
occasionally occurs that in the same chapter, certain names are Romanized on the basis of
their Russian pronunciation, whereas others use the McCune-Reischauer system, and
sometimes even the same name appears in various forms (see Yi Sin Pkhar/Li Sin-p’al/Li
Sin-p’ai, 130-131; Pak Son-ch’ol/Pak Son Chol, 137-138). These problems are, however, of
very little significance, since in the well-written Index, only the appropriate forms of these
names are listed.

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8 Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Memorandum, 2 January 1980, XIX-1-j (Top Secret Documents),
South Korea, 1980, 85. doboz, 82-20, 0019/1980.
In this response, I will touch on the general themes that the reviewers have raised, letting each author, if they so choose, respond to specific points.

In the introduction to the volume, I state that although historians have recognized the importance of the Cold War in East Asia, and although they have produced numerous books focusing on specific topics, “there is no authoritative interpretation that integrates the fruits of these monographs into a comprehensive synthesis.” (28) This volume aimed to provide such a synthesis as the first step toward generating further discussions. I am gratified to know that all the reviewers think that this volume makes a contribution to the general discussion on the nature of the Cold War in Asia.

I state that the Cold War in Asia represented the significant second front, with unique characteristics that did not exist in the East-West conflict in Europe, which was the Cold War’s first front. I single out two specific features. First, China played a unique role, at first as an important Soviet ally, and then as a hostile power against the Soviet Union, thus complicating strategic configurations in East Asia. Second, the Cold War in East Asia was integrally connected with the process of decolonization and social revolutions associated with that process. Thus, the competing models of modernity—the Soviet socialist model and the American liberal-capitalist model—were even more fiercely contested in Asia than in Europe. Third, precisely because Asia was not the first front of the Cold war, the Cold War did not remain “cold,” but became “hot,” with two wars—the Korean War and the Vietnam War—fought in Asia. I am happy to know that these hypotheses are more or less accepted by the reviewers.

Marc Gallicchio adds two additional differences. First, he states: “neither the Soviet Union nor the United States had been deeply involved in the politics of the mainland before World War II,” and hence, “hopes for independent and friendly regimes substituted for hard calculations about what was absolutely necessary for Russian or American interests.” The second difference was, according to Gallicchio, the persistence of territorial disputes in Asia. In my view, these points, mutually related, are more complicated than Gallicchio indicates, since they both involve the role of the Japanese empire and its collapse as well as the Soviet and the American reactions to the Japanese expansion in China. It was not that the Soviet Union and the United States were not deeply involved—in fact, they were--, but the context in which they became involved was vastly different from that in Europe, not merely before World War II but also in the postwar period as well. In a way, reconfigurations of great power contests during the Cold War can be seen as an extension of the imperialist contests over China and Korea and attempts by China and Korea to resist and emancipate themselves from the imperialist encroachments.

This raises an important question about both Soviet and U.S. policies: what was the relationship between their respective policies toward Europe and Asia? We know that the first and foremost priority of both Soviet and U.S. policy during the Cold War was in
Europe, but to what extent were their policies toward Asia driven by their policies toward Europe and to what extent did the events of Asia influence their policies in Europe? We do know some specific examples, such as the impact of the Korean War on European defense, Nikita Khrushchev’s secret speech in 1956 triggering the Sino-Soviet split as well as Kim Il Sung’s balancing act between Moscow and Beijing, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia triggering the Sino-Soviet border clash in Zhenbao Island, the influence of the strategic triangle on SALT negotiations, the European-Asian nexus of the INF issue, the influence of the Tiananmen Incident on the East European revolutions, the inability of Japan and the Soviet Union to resolve the Northern Territories dispute derailing the ultimate East-West reconciliation during Gorbachev’s perestroika period. But we need more systematic and comprehensive analysis of how both in the Soviet Union and in the United States policies toward Europe and Asia were coordinated (or not coordinated) and influenced each other.

All the reviewers applaud our efforts to bring in Korea and Japan as major players in the Cold War in Asia. We are pleased to note that the issues involving the Korean peninsula to which five chapters are devoted in this volume have never been so prominently and comprehensively covered. Bruce Cumings singles out Gregg Brazinsky’s chapter as erroneously presented. Although I stand by Brazinsky’s argument, I will let him defend his position separately. As for Japan, Cumings states that he did not learn much, perhaps because “Japan’s Cold War position was fixed in the same period that George Kennan thought Europe was fixed and stabilized, from 1947 to 1950.” In a broad brush it is true, but both Kazuhiko Togo and I are more interested in injecting a more nuanced treatment of Japan’s role in the Cold War, not always one of bowing to U.S. strategic interests, but rather attempting to steer its independent course within the Cold War constraints. By comparing Japan’s policy during the Cold War when it navigated its relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, and China with West Germany’s policy, we can appreciate fundamental differences in dynamics between Europe and Asia.

We recognize two important omissions in this volume. The first is a comprehensive overview of U.S. policy toward Asia, and the second is the omission of Southeast Asia. To compensate for these omissions, I added brief sections dealing with U.S. policy toward Asia and the impact of the Vietnam War in the introduction rather than commissioning two separate chapters. Admittedly this is not a satisfactory solution, but I hope the tentative hypotheses I developed in these sections will provoke further discussions.

As Gallicchio and Balazs Szalontai point out, another area missing in our volume is Taiwan. We briefly touched on the Taiwan issue in the context of the Korean War, in the Sino-Japanese normalization process, and the U.S.-Chinese normalization process. Nevertheless, we recognize that a more comprehensive treatment is needed.

There is a question about the ending of the Cold War in East Asia. There is no consensus among the contributors on this question. Bruce Cumings, while agreeing with my assertion that it is “difficult to say that the Cold War in Asia ended in 1991,” locates its ending in the 1970s. According to Cumings, “the beginning of the end was the Nixon-Kissinger demarche to Beijing in 1971-1972 and the end of the beginning was the conclusion of the Vietnam War in 1975.” If we take U.S.-China relations as the central piece of the Cold War in East
Asia, this may well be correct. But it was precisely when the United States and China—as well as Japan and China—achieved rapprochement, that the Soviet Union and the United States for the first time since 1945 directly confronted each other in East Asia. In fact, it was precisely the U.S.-Chinese rapprochement and the Sino-Japanese rapprochement that exacerbated U.S.-Soviet conflict in the Asia-Pacific region. The Sino-Soviet conflict was over when Mikhail Gorbachev visited Beijing in 1989, but the collapse of the Soviet Union did not markedly change the international system in East Asia. The Korean division became more serious, as North Korea was abandoned by its two powerful patrons. The Northern Territories dispute between Russia and Japan further complicated the rapprochement between the two countries even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. We generally assume that the Cold War is over in East Asia as well, but when it ended and how it ended is a murky question that requires further debate. I would add also that this is not merely an academic question since the legacies of the Cold War as well as questions left over from World War II are now coming to the fore with a vengeance, making it difficult to establish a peaceful new international order in the region.

I echo Gallicchio’s call for more open access to archives. Although some Russian archives and to some extent Chinese archives have become available, they are trickles compared with U.S. archives. More importantly, not only are the Japanese archives closed to researchers, but more alarmingly, there are indications that the Japanese government is engaged in the destruction of archives. Historians should voice their objections loudly to prevent further destruction of Japanese archives.

Finally, I would like to express my profound sadness for the sudden and untimely death of our colleague, Ilya Gaiduk, in September 2011. Ilya contributed one chapter to our volume, and actively participated in Santa Barbara Conferences, enlivening our discussions with his profound knowledge of Cold War historiography in Russia. His chapter in this volume turned out to be one of the last articles he published. His passing is a great loss to Cold War studies. We sorely miss him.
In his generally positive review of *The Cold War in East Asia, 1945-1991*, Bruce Cumings singles out my essay “Korea’s Great Divergence: North and South Korea from 1972 to 1987” for criticism. Many of his objections concerning the validity of my arguments are either irrelevant or misleading. In my chapter in the volume, I argue that a great divergence occurred in the economic and political trajectories of North and South Korea during the years between 1972 and 1987 with South Korea moving toward greater prosperity and international prestige and North Korea moving toward stagnation and isolation. Cumings criticizes the “American” scholars in the volume—by which he means me and Stephen Hugh Lee, who is actually Canadian—for writing within a U.S.-centric perspective and not trying hard enough to produce “balanced” work. He can see no “great divergence” between North and South Korea until the 1990s and writes that the “mote” in my eye is my failure to take into account various forms of American assistance to the ROK during the period. But I fear that Professor Cumings is so focused on discerning the mote in his fellow scholar’s eye that he might be missing the beam in his own.

If Cumings can see no great divergence between North and South Korea it is because he does not look at a very broad array of evidence. He assembles data in a misleading way and, at times, relies on highly subjective impressions of North Korean life to show that such a divergence did not occur. He notes that “as late as 1978 the CIA published studies showing that the per capita GDP was about equal in the North and South.” Calculating the per capita GDP for North Korea has always been a very difficult task both because Pyongyang has not published complete economic data since 1965 and because of the distorted nature of its economy. This is the reason I was reluctant to use statistics in my essay. But since Professor Cumings introduces such statistics in his review I think it is appropriate to analyze those that he presents alongside a fuller panoply of economic data derived by scholars who focus on the issue. First, it is important to remember that CIA calculations of GDP most often reflected the situation at least one year and often two years before they were published. So the statistics cited by Cumings that were published in 1978 likely reflected data the agency collected in 1976 or 1977. When this caveat is kept in mind, the CIA’s estimates for the mid 1970s do not look that different from those of most scholars who have analyzed the DPRK’s economic growth rates (although most studies do show the ROK moving slightly ahead in these years). What Cumings neglects to mention, is that the vast majority of economists have also calculated that Seoul had greatly outstripped Pyongyang by the late 1980s. Using 1987 U.S. dollars, Taik-young Hamm estimates that North Korea’s per capita GDP went from $990 in 1972 to $1188 in 1987 and declined slowly from 1980 onward. By contrast, the South Korean per capita GDP expanded from $819 in 1972 to $3218 in 1987. Along similar lines Angus Maddison, a leading scholar on quantitative macroeconomic history estimates that the per capita GDP of North Korea was at $2561 in 1972 and $2824 in 1987 (based on 1990 dollars) while that of the South went

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from $2456 to $6921 during the same period.² When two countries start out being roughly equal economically but within fifteen years one has a per capita GDP that is almost triple that of the other, I would say that it constitutes a great divergence. This divergence is illustrated by the chart below, which is based on Hamm’s statistics. It shows the drop off in South Korea’s GNP in 1979 mentioned by Cumings. But also shows that the crisis did not bring the two Koreas back to economic parity and did little to arrest the widening gap between the two. Cumings is right to note that the North Korean economy did not completely fall off the cliff until the 1990s. But the growing disparity in wealth between the two Koreas during the 1990s reflected the continuation of a trend that began during the 1970s. It did not appear overnight.

Cumings’ review obfuscates what economists have made clear by relating his view of Pyongyang in the late 1980s as a “model city lit up with all manner of slogans.” While this might be what stands out most clearly to Cumings about North Korea during the period, it is worth noting that the recollections of some of the people who lived in the country at the time differ starkly from what he describes. Several North Korean defectors interviewed by Bradley K. Martin in his book Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader have described North Korea as a country plagued by increasingly dire food shortages in an era where Cumings claims there were bumper harvests. One defector recalled that by 1987-88 “all the people were hungry but the media said that each year North Korea was harvesting 8.8

² Maddison’s statistics are kept online by the Groningen Growth and Development Center (http://www.ggdc.net).
million tons of grain.” Another remembers receiving grain rations every fifteen days but even “if you ate sparingly, you could only live on the ration for twelve days. So for three days you could starve or hunt for roots to eat.” Such descriptions stand in contrast not only from the more roseate depiction of the North rendered by Cumings but also from the increasingly prosperous South that was enjoying a major boom as it prepared to host the 1988 Olympics.

As for the proverbial “mote” in my own eye—failing to mention some of the forms of assistance that South Korea received during the 1970s—I am not persuaded that most of the items that Cumings brings up are relevant. I sought to wrestle with causality in my essay and explain how South Korea came to greatly surpass the North economically after 1972. The details that Cumings believes I should have included—American aid to South Korea before 1972, the continuing presence of American advisors in the ROK, the 1997 IMF bailout, and the deployment of American forces in the country among others—generally do not help to explain the divergent trajectories of North and South Korea during the 1970s and 1980s. I am well aware of the significance of American economic assistance prior to 1972. I cover this in detail in my book, *Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans and the Making of a Democracy*. The bulk of this aid was dispensed before 1961 and no small portion of it was squandered in one way or another by Syngman Rhee’s government. South Korea’s economic take off occurred in the 1960s despite drastic reductions in American assistance. Unquestionably, American aid contributed to South Korea’s survival after the Korean War and the United States played a critical role in nation building in the country. But economic aid was not offered in significant amounts after Richard Nixon took office and it does not explain why the South achieved such rapid growth during the 1970s and 1980s. Cumings also criticizes me for ignoring the “advisers, experts and professionals” dispatched by the U.S. to South Korea during this period. But he does this only a paragraph after noting that Park Chung Hee’s government developed heavy industries “by going against the advice of most of its American advisers.” I don’t see how the mere presence of these advisers can be considered pertinent to Seoul’s relative success during the 1970s and 1980s if—as many of the advisers themselves frequently complained—they were being ignored. Finally, the 1997 IMF bailout took place long after the time period covered in this essay but like the other items brought up by Cumings had little to do with South Korea’s continuing economic development. Leading economists such as Joseph Stiglitz have contended that the bailout actually exacerbated the crisis and that South Korea recovered more quickly than the other Asian countries because it evaded some of the IMF’s prescriptions. This is not to say that the American presence in South Korea disappeared. It continued to pervade many aspects of Korean society. But it is the

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policies of the South Korean government not the continuing American presence that best explain the country's economic development.

Finally, Cumings is wrong to assume that I did not seek to be balanced. As historians, we should judge whether work is balanced not only by whether its author can set aside his or her nationality but also by whether it manifests an adequate skepticism toward all meta-narratives. In writing this essay, I tried to avoid the competing orthodoxies that have so often skewed our understanding of the Cold War. Adherents to the traditional Cold War orthodoxy have been and will be critical of the thesis I propose because they assume that Korea's "great divergence" began in 1948 or 1953. They have trouble recognizing the fact that, until the 1970s, North and South Korea were both considered fairly successful examples of nation building by their respective Great Power patrons. On the other hand, scholars on the left have difficulty accepting the irony of South Korean military dictatorships that were highly successful at promoting rapid economic growth and enabling some of the prerequisites for democracy to develop even while they at times committed inexcusable transgressions against human liberties. At the same time, they insist that the North's relative decline had nothing to do with the misguided policies of Kim Il Sung and blame outside factors such as North Korea's abandonment by Moscow and Beijing, American sanctions and even bad luck. In my essay I chose to reject both of these ideologically predetermined positions and embrace the more complicated realities that prevailed in Korea during the Cold War.