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Introduction by Marilyn Young, New York University

There may still be some historians who persist in thinking about the Cold War as a long peace, whose faux battlefield was European. Most, however, have long recognized that it was more hot than cold and fought for real in Asia, Africa and Latin America. *The End of the Cold War and the Third World*, like Odd Arne Westad’s *Global Cold War*, addresses this reality in a collection of essays that include consideration of Chinese and Soviet policy, Afghanistan, India, Latin America, Southern Africa and, for good measure, Israel and Palestine.

Collections of essays are notoriously difficult to review. Most reviewers praise some contributions, disparage others and conclude on a note of moderate pleasure that the book exists. According to Jamie Miller, however, Kalinovsky and Radachenko’s volume breaks the mold, fulfilling its claim to have gone “further than anything published so far in systematically explaining, from both the perspectives of the superpowers and those of Third World countries, what the end of bipolarity meant not only for the underdeveloped periphery, so long enmeshed in ideological, socio-political and military conflicts sponsored by Washington, Moscow, or Beijing, but also for the broader patterns of international relations.”

Before discussing the book itself, Miller reflects on the consequences of Cold War rivalry – often absurdist and frequently devastating -- which allied the Soviet Union and the U.S. to rival regimes in the Third World “which not only had no hope of replicating the desired model society, but also did a huge disservice to the values the superpower espoused.” He is full of praise for the extraordinary range of archival research the contributors bring to bear on their subjects as well as for the organization of the book itself, which begins with an account of Soviet and American Third World policies and proceeds to examine the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union not only on specific countries but on regional conflicts as well. Miller finds particularly valuable two sets of articles whose conclusions are sharply at odds: Vladimir Shubin’s and Chris Saunders’ on Southern Africa and Svetaana Savranskaya’s and Mark Kramer’s on the reasons for the Soviet draw down in the Third World. For all the book’s riches, Miller was disappointed by several absences: of an economic historian’s account of changes in patterns of aid world-wide; and, in particular, by the lack of an essay dedicated to changes in U.S. policies in the Third World (the latter acknowledged by the authors in their introduction).

Jeremy Friedman too would have liked to have seen more attention paid to economic aspects of post-Cold War policies in the Third World, though, like Miller, he was impressed by the sheer range of countries and topics that were included. After duly praising the contributions, his review goes on to raise a number of fundamental questions, among them: what happened to the Third World project in the waning days of the Cold War? Was it

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simply a product of the Cold War and thus disappeared when the latter ended? Did the Cold War in fact create the Third World and, if so, in what sense does it continue to exist? The End of the Cold War and the Third World, Friedman suggests, is an excellent starting point for a range of questions that move beyond those raised by the book itself.

Michael Latham’s review outlines the main themes the book raises, beginning with the centrality of the economic development of the Third World and the threat, to the American system at any rate, of independent paths towards development taken by several states in Latin America, including Nicaragua and Chile. A second theme concerns the impact of the end of the Cold War on countries like South Africa, where the alleged threat of communism had played a role in U.S. support for the apartheid regime as opposed to the Arab-Israeli conflict which has long outlasted the Cold War. Like Miller, Latham regrets the lack of an essay devoted to the U.S. itself and adds that one on Cuba would also have been welcome. In future, he suggests, other topics might be included in a consideration of the impact of the end of the Cold War on the non-European world, as for example migration and agricultural and food policies, among others. Finally, and most intriguingly, Latham suggests the possibility of a reverse optic: how did events in the Third World contribute to an end to the Cold War?

Vijay Prashad starts where Latham concludes arguing that although attention to Asia, Africa and Latin America would seem to distinguish the volume from standard Cold War accounts, it treats the Third World as a battleground rather than itself an actor. Had the editors begun where Prashad believes they should have, the “neutering” of the Non-Aligned Movement and the disappearance of the Third World Project would have been central considerations. Prashad goes on to outline the ways in which “the demise of the old order was actually premised on the emergence of a new one, and that this new one was a lever for the destruction of the older.” While Prashad’s approach would broaden the context and introduce new processes, like the other reviewers he finds much to praise in the volume as it exists.

For his part, Heonik Kwon was glad to see that Kalinovsky and Radchenko asked the very questions about time, space and meaning he had urged on historians in his own book, The Other Cold War. The editors, like Kwon himself, reject the notion that there was ever “such a thing as the Cold War.” Instead, the “polarizing, polarized world community...experienced bipolar global politics in radically different ways across different regions.....” The collected essays enable an understanding of the plurality of experience represented by the oxymoronic notion of a Cold War and go far towards realizing a genuinely global history “that is attentive to locally variant historical realities.”

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3 Heonik Kwon, The Other Cold War (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 2010).
Participants:

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Jeremy Friedman is currently a Chauncey Post-Doctoral Fellow in Grand Strategy in International Security Studies at Yale University. He received his Ph.D. from Princeton University for his dissertation entitled "Reviving Revolution: the Sino-Soviet Split, the 'Third World,' and the Fate of the Left." He published an article in Cold War History in May 2010 entitled "Soviet Policy in the Developing World and the Chinese Challenge in the 1960s" and he is currently working on producing a monograph based on his dissertation, among other projects.

Heonik Kwon is a professorial senior research fellow of social anthropology at Trinity College, University of Cambridge. Author of several prizewinning books including Ghosts of War in Vietnam (2008) and The Other Cold War (2010), he is currently directing an international project, "Beyond the Korean War," which explores the history and memory of the Korean War in local and global contexts. His new co-authored book is North Korea Beyond Charismatic Politics (2012). He may be contacted at hik21@cam.ac.uk.


Jamie Miller is a doctoral student in the Faculty of History at the University of Cambridge. His research focuses on South Africa’s foreign policy strategies in the context of the Cold War, 1974-1980. He recently won the Saki Ruth Dockrill Memorial Prize at the
International Graduate Conference on the Cold War; the winning paper is forthcoming in *Cold War History*. He has also been published in the *New Critic* and has written several book reviews for the *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*.

**Vijay Prashad** is the George and Martha Kellner Chair of South Asian History, and Professor and Director of International Studies, Trinity College, Hartford, CT. He is the author of *The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World* (New York: New Press, 2008), which won the 2009 Muzaffar Ahmad Book Award. In 2012, Verso Press will publish his *The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South*, which will carry forward the events of the Global South from 1973 to the present.
When the Cold War ended in the “Third World,” what really changed? After all, communist regimes fell in Warsaw, Prague, Berlin, Budapest, etc. but not in Beijing, Pyongyang, or Hanoi. The Leninist parties of Southern Africa managed to consolidate their single-party systems. While Germany re-united, China and Korea remained divided, and while peace came to Southeast Asia and parts of Central America, it did not come to the Middle East, Angola, or Afghanistan, among others. Latin American regimes were still faced with their perpetual dilemma of how to develop and assert themselves in a hemisphere dominated by the United States. Consequently, the tasks set before the editors and authors of a volume entitled The End of the Cold War and the Third World are quite intimidating. This book is an extremely useful collection of works by the top scholars in the field, using new archival materials, and the scope of the book and choices of topics are original and interesting. An attempt to discuss the end of the Cold War and the Third World, though, must begin, and perhaps end as well, with the attempt to define the two key terms of the title, namely “Cold War” and “Third World.” Though the editors, in their introduction, disavow any desire to discuss the term “Third World” in depth with the quite reasonable explanation that such a discussion would require its own volume, a number of the chapters bear directly upon these questions of definition. In the end, the importance of the book, and the way forward for scholarship in this field, depends greatly on what we mean by “Cold War” and “Third World” and how those two terms do, or do not, relate to each other.

Kalinovsky and Radchenko, in their choice of topics to be covered in the book, have already implicitly made some statements in this regard. They have admirably gone beyond the usual list of Cold War “hotspots” to include chapters on Brazil, India, and the Latin American debt crisis, thereby presenting a view of the Cold War in which the term must mean more than merely a direct competition for influence between the United States and the Soviet Union. Instead, the term “Cold War” signifies a geopolitical framework which affected every country in the world both in terms of its domestic and international politics. However, for some of the authors, it seems that the Cold War nevertheless had its limits and that some topics can be seen as beyond its purview. Duccio Basosi, in his provocative piece on the Latin American debt crisis, writes that “While the growth of poverty and social disparities registered in the continent after such shock therapy were subject to multiple critiques, what is relevant here is the fact that the debt crisis (and the US recipes to confront it) did not engender a new cycle of North-South confrontation, nor did it become a field of competition for the superpowers.” In other words, Basosi seems to be saying that what is relevant to the topic at hand is the fact that the neoliberal transformation of Latin American economies, achieved under some measure of duress, did not become part of the “Cold War.” This can perhaps be seen as being in tension with Chen Jian’s fascinating piece on China’s withdrawal from the Cold War in the 1970s and 1980s, since Chen’s main argument is that China’s rejection of the socialist model of development was a signal moment in the demise of socialism as a world system with pretensions to future predominance. Chen’s argument implies that the Cold War was first and foremost a contest between models of economic development, one with special relevance for the “Third
World,” where rapid development was most sorely needed. However, if at bottom the Cold War was about economics and development, then this book actually says relatively little about the outcome of the Cold War in the Third World. Perhaps future scholarship will devote more attention to the question of the economic significance of the end of the Cold War, particularly as it relates to the issue of development in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

In terms of the political aspects of the latter part of the Cold War in the Third World, this book does a very good job of providing some interesting perspectives on the ways in which the post-Cold War world was, or was not, affected by the end of the Cold War. Sergey Radchenko’s piece shows how India, despite being an early and vocal opponent of the division of the world into two opposing camps, turned out to be one of the biggest losers in terms of geopolitical influence once that bipolar structure began to break down. Matias Spektor’s chapter on Brazil, on the other hand, details the case of a country where the end of the Cold War was met with a significant amount of anxiety regarding the advent of a world of unipolar American dominance. Brazil, unlike India, managed to turn this situation to its advantage and the debates surrounding the future course of Brasilia’s foreign policy starting in the late 1980s ultimately allowed it to strengthen its geopolitical position by consolidating a South American regional identity. These chapters, along with Dima Adamsky’s on Israel and Balazs Szalontai’s on Indochina, pose the deeper question of the significance of the Cold War for the trajectory of the Third World, and geopolitics in general in the post-Cold War world. Did the fall of a bipolar world create the space for an emerging multipolar world order or was that multipolar order not only inevitable, but, in fact, already emerging in the latter stages of the Cold War? Is the contemporary diminishing of American geopolitical influence a result of the failure of the United States to pursue an optimal policy in the era of unipolarity or was it rather, as Spektor implies, a logical outcome of the very specter of unipolarity? Perhaps the question can be put as follows: did the end of the Cold War create room for the political ambitions of the Third World, or was the Third World already outgrowing the Cold War?

This question relates to another, which the book’s collection of chapters combines to illuminate in a fascinating, multi-faceted way: How does an empire, in this case, the Soviet Union, retreat from the world in such a short time? Artemy Kalinovsky’s piece on Afghanistan, Vladimir Shubin’s on Southern Africa, and Szalontai’s as well portray an empire facing the dilemma of the Nixon administration on Vietnam – how to achieve “peace with honor” – on a global scale. The KGB remained loyal to its erstwhile clients in Afghanistan and many in the International Department maintained its commitment to the ANC, SWAPO, and others whom they had supported in the decades-long struggle against racism and imperialism in Southern Africa. The interests at the top, as Svetlana Savranskaya and Mark Kramer point out, though they disagree with each other to some degree, were focused on the economic needs of the USSR itself and rapprochement with the West. In some cases, such as in the Soviet disengagement from Indochina, a solution was found which ultimately redounded to all parties’ benefit, but in Southern Africa the Soviets essentially renounced the victory they had achieved while, in Afghanistan, the ambivalence surrounding Soviet policy after the withdrawal may have prevented the implementation of a more stable long-term solution. In the Middle East, the withdrawal of the USSR may even have ultimately made the region more unstable and undermined Israeli security because
certain Arab countries were forced to abandon the aspiration for conventional military parity in favor of asymmetrical tactics. In comparison, perhaps, with the retreat of the British and the French from their overseas empires in the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet withdrawal seems relatively successful from the perspective of the total amount of conflict and bloodshed that resulted, but the absence of continued Russian influence in many of these places in the immediate post-Cold War world contrasts sharply with the continuing importance of ties with London and Paris for many in the Third World. Consequently, if the United States is obliged to undertake a similar process of retrenchment in the near future, albeit likely not as rapid or complete, the lessons of the Soviet case should loom large.

Should that come to pass, however, the world from which the United States will be retreating will be a much different one from the one covered in this volume. It is not clear anymore that the “Third World” is even a useful or meaningful term in the post-Cold War world and this raises the question which the editors treat briefly and somewhat obliquely in the introduction: was the “Third World” merely a product of the Cold War, and if so, of what did it consist? Was it simply the absence of wealth, power, and influence or was it a positive ideological or geopolitical construct? Given the seeming failure of the various attempts to create different forms of “Third World” solidarity in the Non-Aligned Movement, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement, the Group of 77, and others, did the “Third World” even emerge from the Cold War at all or was it another casualty of the collapse of the USSR? Maybe the title could imply the simultaneous ends of both the Cold War and Third World. The lack of any discussion of what became of the “Third World” project in the latter days of the Cold War is an interesting and revealing lacuna in the book. Is this because it was dead long before the days of perestroika or because the authors see its connection to the Cold War as too tenuous? And, more importantly, what does this ultimately say for the place of the regions once known as the “Third World” in a post-Cold War context? This book provides a good overview of the current state of field on the chronological frontier of Cold War scholarship, and excellent starting point for those who will push beyond it.
Artemy M. Kalinovsky and Sergey Radchenko have assembled a valuable and insightful collection of essays. As they note in a well-framed and thoughtful introduction, the end of the Cold War has produced a great deal of historical and popular political analysis. Yet the vast majority of that work has centered on the dynamics of Soviet-American détente, the collapse of state socialism across Eastern Europe, and the diplomatic twists and turns linking Gorbachev, Reagan, and George H.W. Bush. If one sticks with a vision of the Cold War as a “long peace” between Soviet and American adversaries, that result might not be surprising. But as Kalinovsky and Radchenko correctly argue, the Cold War was fundamentally fought out in a Third World powerfully shaped by decolonization, nationalism, revolution, and aspirations for rapid economic development. By providing a volume seeking to explore the impact of the Cold War’s end across a broad range of Third World cases, the editors have taken an important step toward deepening our understanding of the period’s lasting significance and continuing effects. With two essays on Soviet policy, three on Latin America, three on Southern Africa, and one each on China, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Afghanistan, Indochina, and India, the book is also remarkably broad in its scope.

While time and space prevent me from discussing each of the book’s thirteen chapters individually, I would like to reflect on several themes that they collectively raise. First and foremost, the essays point toward the overwhelming salience of economic development as a pivotal force in the Cold War’s trajectory in the Third World. In one of the book’s strongest contributions, Chen Jian identifies the 1970s as a key period in the Cold War’s evolution. As he explains, Mao Zedong’s declaration of a new “three worlds” thesis in 1973-1974 constituted an important shift in Chinese strategic thinking. Rather than defining the clash between competing political ideologies and the divisions between communism and capitalism as the central lines organizing the world, Mao instead stressed economic development as the crucial index. The superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union, he stated, together constituted a “first world.” Relatively developed states like those in Western Europe, along with Canada, Japan, and Australia made up the second. China, finally, joined the much larger number of developing nations in Africa, Latin America, and Asia in the Third World. As Chen argues, this radical departure from the Cold War’s orthodoxy set the scene for China’s own domestic pursuit of economic liberalization under Deng Xiaoping as well as its growing detachment from anti-capitalist revolutionary movements elsewhere. Moving to open diplomatic relations with Thailand, Malaysia, and even the Philippines, all formerly considered “lackeys of US imperialism,” (110) and concluding that the Soviets were far more dangerous rivals than the Americans, China effectively departed from the Cold War fifteen years before its ultimate end. For China’s leadership, the turn toward economic liberalization, or “reform and opening,” ultimately trumped the older, Maoist ambitions of “continuous revolution.” That conclusion in itself is not new to historians. But it does certainly suggest the merits of focusing on the way that for policymakers in China, and much of the Third World, the imperatives of economic development ultimately led to choices that cut against the grain of the Cold War’s established ideological divisions.
Victor Figueroa Clark’s insightful essay on the end of the Cold War in Latin America presents a complementary perspective. While the Reagan administration protested against campaigns of Soviet subversion and political direction throughout Latin America, Clark demonstrates the extent to which the Chilean Left as well as the Nicaraguan Sandinistas were committed to their own programs of socialist economic development. It was their challenge to patterns of landholding, investment, trade, and ongoing economic ties between established Latin American elites and United States, moreover, that helped build a formidable anti-revolutionary opposition. The fact that U.S. hostility to Left-leaning governments in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Bolivia continues even today, he writes, is evidence that such economic forces have continued to transcend the Cold War’s conclusion. As he explains, the real source of anxiety in Washington during the Cold War and into the present was that Latin American governments would “be able to carry our modernization together with broad socio-economic development that would encourage country after country to abandon the inter-American system that formed the basis of US global economic and political power” (205).

Matias Spektor’s discussion of Brazil’s assessments of the end of the Cold War stresses economic development as a central variable as well. While Brazil experienced tremendous economic growth, moving from a rural, undeveloped economy in the 1940s to a rapidly industrializing, urban, “top ten, economy in the world at the end of the Cold War,” (230), it did so in ways that did not always square with Washington’s prescriptions. High tariffs, domestic subsidies, and foreign investment restrictions promoted domestic capitalist enterprises and shielded them from competition. Industrial policies largely served internal instead of export markets and state-owned enterprises played prominent roles in the national economy. For a comparatively strong state like Brazil, the Cold War structure remained relatively permissive, and the United States tolerated deviations from its prescribed orthodoxy. After 1989, however, Brazilians had good reason to fear that the United States would drive home a much more intrusive and restrictive neoliberal approach.

Beyond highlighting the extent to which issues of economic development drove and ultimately transcended the experience of Third World countries during the Cold War, this volume’s essays also illustrate the diverse impact of the Cold War’s end on in a wide range of settings. In some cases, most notably in South Africa, the end of the Cold War helped promote a resolution of devastating conflicts, setting the stage for new, democratic solutions. As Chris Saunders explains in a clearly argued chapter, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States could hardly continue to shore up Pretoria’s apartheid regime in the name of opposing the spread of communism across southern Africa. Gorbachev’s desire to improve Soviet relations with the United States and his encouragement of the African National Congress to pursue a negotiated solution played a significant role as well. Saunders is careful to acknowledge the significance of Cuba’s successful military action in achieving a solution in Namibia, and he clearly states that the end of apartheid itself was ultimately the result of sustained, internal resistance by the South African people. Yet his argument that the end of the Cold War was a crucial “secondary factor” (273) in the achievement of a settlement and an eventual democratic transition is very persuasive as well.
In other cases, however, the book's essays make it clear that fundamental political tensions that were rooted outside the Cold War were largely unaffected by its end. As Dima Adamsky explains, Israeli policymakers understood the Cold War as a force that clearly “conditioned” but did not “determine” the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict (131). While the Soviet Union certainly sought to influence the behavior of clients like Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, those states frequently pressed their own agendas and initiatives in direct opposition to Moscow's preferences. In a similar fashion, Israel also refused to toe the United States line, most notably in the Six Day War and its aftermath. The Cold War's end did facilitate the turn toward the Oslo peace process by leading key Israeli policymakers to expect that in a world in which the United States stood as the sole superpower, Israel would hold a consistent military edge over Arab states and its regional security would be preserved. Yet Israeli defense officials also watched with anxiety as their radical adversaries forged new alliances with Iran and Syria, and turned toward new means of unconventional warfare as well, including missiles and terrorism. As the fundamental sources of the Arab-Israeli conflict were rooted far outside the dynamics of U.S.-Soviet rivalry, they clearly continued to transcend the Cold War's end as well.

As compelling as many of the book's chapters are, the volume would have been stronger if the editors had considered a few possible changes. First, as Kalinovsky and Radchenko note in their introduction, the book lacks a comprehensive chapter dealing with the impact of the Cold War's end on United States policy toward the Third World. While U.S. actions and responses are discussed to some degree in several of the essays, the absence of a broad-gauge chapter on American policies, while there are two on the USSR and one on China, leaves the work unbalanced. Given the extent to which Havana played a pivotal role in several of the Latin American and South African cases discussed, a chapter on Cuban policy would have been a welcome addition too.

More broadly, most of the chapters focus on diplomatic policymaking at the highest levels, leaving aside questions of the impact of the end of the Cold War on the social, intellectual, and cultural history of the Global South. One chapter by Sue Onslow and Simon Bright takes steps in a more innovative direction by analyzing the struggle to control media representations of the war in Angola, but far more might be done to widen the focus of inquiry beyond elite policymaking to encompass a broader range of questions about the way that the end of the Cold War affected other international and transnational forces as well. Kalinovsky, Radchenko, and their contributors have accomplished a great deal, and many of these questions are clearly beyond the scope of the work. But perhaps future researchers might consider the way that the end of the Cold War affected such topics as the migration of labor within and out of the Global South, agricultural and food policy in diverse parts of the Third World, transnational discussions of the future of Third World socialism, or the role of the United Nations in peacekeeping across the Global South.

Finally, most of the book's essays deal with the impact of the end of the Cold War on the Third World, examining the way that the conclusion of that global ideological struggle affected particular geographic cases. But what if one were to reverse that framing, and ask questions about the way that the dynamics of Third World conflicts ultimately contributed
to the end of the Cold War itself? How did superpower engagement across the Global South, and the frustrations of Washington and Moscow in seeking to direct national movements, policies, and economic development there, help to expose the limits of great power ambitions, promote détente, and ultimately contribute to the Cold War’s resolution? Artemy Kalinovsky’s essay addresses the pivotal impact of the Soviet failure in Afghanistan in that light, and one wonders if other examples might be worth considering here as well.

On the whole, however, this is an outstanding work, and one that will be of great use to historians and students. Kalinovsky and Radchenko have accomplished a great deal by pushing our interest in the end of the Cold War beyond its typical Euro-American boundaries. Further research should help us to build productively upon their work.
When the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall arrived in 2009, it heralded a deluge of books on the legacy of the end of the Cold War. Most of these, culminating in Mary Elise Sarotte’s outstanding _1989_, centred on its reformulative impact on the political and economic structures of Europe. Artemy M. Kalinovsky, a specialist on the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and Sergey Radchenko, an expert on Soviet policy in the Far East, have instead presented a fascinating edited volume focused squarely on the impact of the end of the Cold War on the developing world. _The End of the Cold War and the Third World_, the editors vaunt, “goes further than anything published so far in systematically explaining, from both the perspectives of the superpowers and those of Third World countries, what the end of bipolarity meant not only for the underdeveloped periphery, so long enmeshed in ideological, socio-political and military conflicts sponsored by Washington, Moscow, or Beijing, but also for the broader patterns of international relations.” It is a bold claim, but one that is hard to dispute. _The End of the Cold War and the Third World_ provides a wealth of stimulating insights, all presented within a conception of the subject matter that in its scope, depth, and nuance will serve as a beacon for other scholars.

The end of the Cold War was an event of profound significance for the Third World. Superpowers had long corrupted developing countries’ desire for modernisation in the name of military, strategic, or ideological goals whose value derived from the Cold War paradigm. Much-needed development assistance, whether in the form of funds, technical experts, arms, or military advisors, was granted not in order to help Third World countries develop to a state of prosperity and higher living standards on their own terms, but usually to help them validate a given programme of modernisation, be it capitalist or communist. Of course, seen from the perspective of the donor superpowers, these _ipso facto_ meant the same thing: successful development and human progress could only come by following the path they themselves had followed (or believed they had followed), while any diversion could risk descent into the chaos that was the inevitable consequence of the other camp’s heretical creed.

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3 For the leading work on the Cold War and the Third World as a whole, see Odd Arne Westad, _The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
But the reality was somewhat different. Actually finding (often) pre-industrial Third World societies capable of being catapulted into modernity without tearing apart at the seams was difficult. The intensity of the superpower rivalry and the desire for short-term gains further militated against long-term investment in Third World societies. With a certain inevitability, therefore, superpower support was often handed to leaders who could sing from the right ideological hymn sheet, rather than deliver tangible social or economic progress for their peoples. The result was a vassal system, where loyalty to the superpower was paramount and the nature of the society a distant secondary concern.

This arrangement would have been bad enough if it were reasonably stable, yet it was anything but. Seeking fealty over long-term progress, both superpowers tended to forge alliances with individual leaders as much as “states”, and certainly more than “peoples” or “societies”. After all, the latter could not be trusted to follow the superpower’s lead rather than call their own tune. So both developed a preference for strong leaders who could use a paid-for security apparatus to simply contain the explosive by-products unleashed by the collision of nationalism, ethnic conflict, decolonisation, and modernisation, rather than respond to them. In this way, the system of competition, as much as the nature of any ideology involved, inherently favoured the production of despots over democrats. But the pressures of modernity made for an explosive cocktail that individual vassals did well to survive. Both Washington (most notably in Iran and Cuba) and Moscow (in Ghana, Indonesia, and Afghanistan, among others) found themselves burned by coups that removed their allies from power and installed a rival on the throne. At best, policymakers awoke the next morning to find their influence negligible in country x (and often it was seen as little more than “country x”). But more often they found that their support for the previous regime made them persona non grata with the new one. The fealty that they sought and bought was inherently fleeting and shallow.

Exacerbating the instability of the system was that both superpowers arrogated to themselves the right to undermine the other’s vassal regimes. Such was the universalist merit of their blueprint for humanity (and the apocalyptic consequences if the other triumphed) that such actions were readily rationalised and justified. The result was that Third World states trying against daunting odds to build stable and prosperous societies were forced to do so in a state of systemic and permanent insecurity. For every Third World country, it seemed, there was its counterpoint across the border or operating in the countryside, funded and armed by the other superpower and trying to corrode its rule. This state of affairs created a spiralling need for security assistance at the expense of development aid. Guerrilla leaders and despotic Presidents alike came cap in hand to the Kremlin or the White House, returning with promises of shipments of AK-47s or substantial Military Assistance Programme packages. Few strings regarding the precise nature of their political programme were attached. Consequently, both superpowers ended up allied to Third World regimes which not only had no hope of replicating the desired model society, but also did a huge disservice to the values the superpower espoused. This phenomenon reached its bizarre apex in the Horn of Africa in 1977-8. Moscow decided to abandon its Somalian clients in favour of supporting the sworn enemy across the border, Ethiopia, where it saw in Haile-Mariam Mengistu’s agrarian Ethiopian Revolution some semblance of communist potential. The Carter Administration, disavowed by its old allies...
in Addis Ababa, responded by throwing its support squarely behind Somalia, where Siad Barre’s ruthless and oppressive regime had nothing to commend itself other than its opposition to the Ethiopians. (The Cold War has long lent itself to satire and whimsy – from Dr Strangelove to Goodbye Lenin! – but perhaps the sheer absurdity of superpower competition in the Third World has been less attractive, save for The Quiet American, simply because the consequences, such as Somalia and Ethiopia’s futures for the next three decades, are just too ghastly for the satire to succeed.) Sometimes military support alone was insufficient and the superpowers launched direct military interventions to keep Third World countries in their camp. The results of these were often unpredictable and sometimes disastrous, which only further strengthened the metropoles’ inclination towards outsourcing the maintenance of security to whatever unsavoury character could do so to the further marginalisation of concerns about the type of society they were building.

This system came to an end in the late 1980s. The Soviet Union was declining rapidly. Its economy, sluggish since the late 1970s, had ground to a halt. Its model for modernisation was fast losing currency both at home and abroad. Even so, Moscow’s decision to disengage from the Third World was taken neither lightly nor unanimously; the Soviet Union’s superpower status owed much to its heft on the international stage. But the overall effect was that as Mikhail Gorbachev began reducing Soviet assistance to the Third World, the United States followed suit. The effects on the Third World were dramatic. In some instances, as Artemy M. Kalinovsky points out in his chapter on the endgame of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, superpower disengagement left only a power vacuum ideal for the flourishing of dangerous forces. In others, as Balázs Szalontai writes in his analysis of the transition of Indochina away from ideological national identities and towards the marketplace and as Victor Figueroa Clark points out in his piece on Latin America, regimes found their lifeblood ideologies losing credibility with alarming speed, resulting in profound changes in national outlook and political norms. And in regional conflict situations, the abdication of Cold War sponsors often changed the dynamics drastically. In some instances, as Vladimir Shubin and Chris Saunders point out in their chapters on South West Africa/Namibia and South Africa, this resulted in the de-escalation and resolution of long-running conflicts. But elsewhere, as in Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, Central America, and Ethiopia, the wars continued, often along the same battle lines left by the Cold War but with a once prominent ideological dimension receding into the background.

The End of the Cold War and the Third World endeavours to track the impact of these momentous geopolitical developments on two sets of actors: the Third World states themselves, usually through the prism of regional conflict situations; and (to a lesser extent) the superpowers who were forced to recalibrate their Third World policies in the light of new geopolitical environments and changed national priorities. Edited volumes by their very nature often feel disjointed or uneven, a risk amplified in this instance by the geographically diverse subject matter. However, Kalinovsky and Radchenko have done well to minimise this risk by ensuring both that the calibre of the individual contributions (and the scholarly pedigree of the contributors) remains high throughout and that the contributors evince a consistent scholarly approach. In the tradition of the LSE Ideas School associated with this Routledge series, the volume consciously eschews more traditional US-
centric or bipolar approaches to Cold War history and focuses instead on neglected actors, including both communist and Third World states. Chapters cover the impact of the end of the Cold War on: Soviet Third World policies during the Gorbachev era (a particular if unsurprising strength, given the background of the editors); Chinese policies during the same period; the Arab-Israeli conflict; the failure to establish stability in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal; the transition “from battlefield to marketplace” of Indochina; the end of non-alignment in India; various issues concerning Latin America; and white minority rule in Southern Africa. The result is a cohesive volume that utilises “nitty-gritty work with evidence in archives the world over”\(^4\) to explore a Cold War conceived of as more than just synonymous with military or strategic superpower competition, but instead intersecting with other historical forces such as decolonisation, economic development, industrialisation, or pre-existing local national or ethnic conflicts. Third World countries are no longer presented as merely an object of superpower desire – a paradigm as inaccurate in history today as it was destructive in geopolitics then - or a sideshow to the real Cold War in Europe, but are accorded agency within a complex and multi-faceted conception of international relations. The volume features exceptionally impressive original research from Soviet archives, as well as substantial material from Vietnamese, Hungarian, Mongolian, Bulgarian, Nicaraguan, Brazilian, and American repositories, to name only the most salient, in addition to a wealth of information gleaned from interviews and manuscripts sources. Consequently, the volume provides both a mass of original primary research for regional specialists interested in just one or two chapters, and a complex, diverse, and rich conception of the end of the Cold War that will attract scholars from a number of fields interested in the subject as a whole. For both reasons, The End of the Cold War and the Third World, though priced at a hefty £85, will doubtless become an enduring staple of Cold War libraries.

The first part of this volume deals with superpower policies towards the Third World; the (larger) second part their impact on various regional conflicts and Third World actors. Bridging the two is Chen Jian’s aptly positioned chapter on China, which looks both at Beijing’s policies towards the Third World in its capacity as a superpower as well as its repudiation of the Soviet path to modernisation as a Third World country in its own right. Space considerations do not permit a thorough dissection of all of the chapters; one is to be found in any case in Kalinovsky and Radchenko’s introduction. But the most prominent thread throughout the volume – and characteristic of the stimulating insights that it offers – is comprised of five contributions on Moscow’s disengagement from the Third World, two centred on its origin, and two on its effects in Southern Africa.

The first of these chapters focuses on the reasons for Soviet disengagement from the Third World from 1988 onwards. Svetlana Savranskaya, in a piece of outstanding scholarship, argues that close advisors long associated with Moscow’s Third World policies had become disillusioned with the traditional pattern of support to client regimes that “proclaimed themselves to be socialist-oriented but were mainly economically underdeveloped

dictatorships” at much the same time that Gorbachev realised that those policies constituted a serious obstacle to co-operation with the West on arms control and other issues, his central foreign policy priority. The result of this dovetailing was a sudden and stark shift towards a “new thinking” that combined Soviet disengagement with the resolution of long-running Third World conflicts. Moscow would now endeavour to use the resolution of wars in the Third World that it had fuelled to the benefit of its negotiating position with the West. “Soviet analysis and rhetoric,” Savranskaya explains, “now emphasised the local roots of every conflict and rejected class-based or even superpower interest-based descriptions of conflicts. Instead of class interests, Soviet leaders now spoke of broader interests – building new cooperative international security in close interaction with the US.”

This persuasive case is challenged in part by a brilliant argument from Mark Kramer, equally well-grounded in newly uncovered Soviet archival material. While agreeing with Savranskaya’s identification of Gorbachev’s “new thinking” and his prioritisation of better relations with the West over continued Soviet assistance to the Third World, Kramer argues that the perceived decline in Soviet arms sales to the Third World, a key element of its overall aid contributions, was not due to this “new thinking”. Instead, Kramer argues, with Moscow finding itself in increasingly dire financial straits, it sought to increase arms sales to its clients as a potential source of much-needed hard currency. However, it found demand for arms severely limited due to the saturation of the arms market by Western arms manufacturers (who were receiving fewer contracts from Western governments themselves disengaging from the Third World, but were more efficient and advanced than their Soviet counterparts) and the financial troubles experienced by their old clients. Further, Kramer argues that even while Gorbachev’s foreign policy advisors may have been arguing in favour of disengagement from the Third World, the military was strongly advocating a renewed push for arms sales in an endeavour to stymie Gorbachev’s plans to redirect its resources towards the consumer sector. This chapter, alongside Sue Onslow’s analysis of the media dimension of the Cold War through the lens of the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale, remains the most original and provocative of the volume.

A second pair of chapters focuses on the impact of Soviet disengagement on the decline of white minority rule in South Africa and South West Africa/Namibia. In a thoughtful piece, Chris Saunders argues that the Soviet Union’s disengagement from Southern Africa both enabled Pretoria to perceive the African National Congress as a nationalist body rather than a proxy for Moscow’s expansionist designs, a crucial precondition of the peaceful transfer of power in South Africa, and removed Washington’s rationale for supporting

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Pretoria as a bulwark against communism in the region. In this way, Cold War developments strongly militated in favour of a transition to majority rule in both South Africa and South West Africa/Namibia. Given the salient yet under-explored role anti-communist doctrines long played in Pretoria's security concerns, particularly after the transition of power in Angola and Mozambique to Marxist regimes in 1975-6, this is prima facie a persuasive thesis. However, it should be noted that it is also a thesis popular with former officials of the apartheid regime, as it inherently shifts responsibility for the failure to move towards universal franchise away from their own race-based political structures and norms and towards the communist doctrine of their adversaries.

Vladimir Shubin, formerly a key figure in the execution of Soviet policy on Southern Africa, takes a different stance, distinguishing between the transfers of power in South West Africa/Namibia and South Africa. On South West Africa/Namibia, Shubin suggests that it was Moscow’s focus on the resolution of long-running Third World conflicts (as part of the “new thinking”) that was pivotal to the 1988 New York agreements with South Africa. In this analysis, Moscow constituted a “pillar of support” for Angola and Cuba, rather than “twisting the arms” of their leaders. In this way, the key precondition for progress out of the impasse on the South West Africa/Namibian question was not Soviet disengagement, as Saunders suggests, but Soviet involvement in a context of relaxed international tensions. On South Africa, Shubin argues that after the settlement on South West Africa/Namibia, Moscow indeed began to disengage from the region - and to the detriment of the ANC. 9

Shubin’s chapter remains problematic in precisely its areas of conflict with Saunders’. First, his characterisation of Moscow’s continued support for Luanda and Havana – to the extent that it is made out as an argument rather than as a series of recollections - relies heavily on his own personal experience. It is not verified using objective archival evidence and ultimately not challengeable by Saunders. Second, Shubin’s argument that Moscow’s disengagement weakened the ANC’s hand in negotiations with Pretoria is simply not proven in this chapter (nor in his recent The Hot “Cold War”: The USSR in Southern Africa). It is a significant and contentious point, yet neither Shubin nor Saunders makes any use of archival material here to bolster their case. Of course, the point is not that the disagreement between Shubin and Saunders or the Savranskaya-Kramer juxtaposition in any way weakens the volume, but rather the inverse. The end of the Cold War and the Third World remains a diverse, complex, and fascinating topic involving issues of real historical significance; differing interpretations are inevitable, even welcome. One can only hope that more fruitful research will follow the trail blazed by Kalinovsky and Radchenko’s volume.


9 Shubin, "Were the Soviets ‘Selling out’?,” p. 245.

The End of the Cold War and the Third World is both professional and insightful, but inevitably not exhaustive. A chapter on how the end of the Cold War influenced Cuba, both domestically in the context of the evaporation of its Soviet support, and abroad as the self-proclaimed vanguard of anti-colonial struggle in Africa, would have been fascinating. Another, perhaps by an economic historian, on how the end of the Cold War affected global aid patterns to Third World countries into the 1990s would also have been worthwhile. But it is the (acknowledged) absence of any chapter dealing specifically with the change in American Third World policies brought about by the end of the Cold War that constitutes a serious omission. The authors attempt to compensate by offering a brief overview of U.S. policy in the Introduction. But a couple of pages do not suffice for a crucial dimension of the topic; the removal of the raison d’être for U.S. involvement in Third World conflicts was nothing short of pivotal to their resolution or evolution into the 1990s. This reviewer applauds a long overdue focus on non-U.S. sources, perspectives, and issues. But they should be pursued in tandem with the American dimension, and certainly not to its exclusion. This is not a question of whether Cold War history as a discipline is a broad enough church to encompass both the more traditional approaches and the Westadian new wave (though plainly it is). It is simply a recognition that if the Cold War as a system of international relations was more interconnected than previously envisaged, then surely Washington played a central role in the network of interests, issues, developments, and conflicts that concern Cold War historians. Here, the absence of even one chapter outlining how U.S. engagement in the Third World was altered by the end of the Cold War only weakens the volume, and quite unnecessarily.

A further point is that while Kalinovsky and Radchenko do well to provide a methodological consistency to the volume, in the form of a multi-archival and conceptually broad approach, the contributions are never brought together to buttress any real conclusions about the end of the Cold War and the Third World generally. As the editors note, the volume only provides an account of “what happened and why” and leaves to political scientists any sense of “overarching theoretical framework”.11 The only conclusive message seems to be that the impact of the end of the Cold War on the Third World was varied, complex, and diverse (which it was). At times, traditionalist Cold War historians might be forgiven for feeling that at its most basic this thesis amounts to a Cold War of limitless conceptual and geographical breadth that was ‘different in nature in different places’. Such reductio ad absurdum aside, there is a need for more overarching approaches to provide some cohesion to this new conception of the Cold War. The dominant thesis in this field is that of Odd Arne Westad, which clearly positions itself as a renegade challenge to the old conceptions: “The Cold War is still generally assumed to have been a context between two superpowers over military power and strategic control, mostly centred on Europe. This book, on the contrary, claims that the most important aspects of the Cold War were neither military nor strategic, nor Europe-centred, but connected to political and social development in the Third World.”12 This provocative encapsulation, particularly its


12 Westad, The Global Cold War, p. 396.
claim to exclude other approaches, will not be accepted by many Cold War historians. But the more enduring message, and one only underlined by this volume, is that there is a clear opening for comprehensive studies of what is meant by the Cold War in the Third World and that such studies will have to try hard not to be stimulating and challenging.
The term “Third World” was much used during the forty-odd year period of the Cold War. Indeed, the aspirations and frustrations of the nations and communities that made up this “World” were very much part of the way in which the bipolar global political order took shape and evolved at that time. Conventional Cold War historiography, however, tends to treat these voices as a relatively marginal element in the constitution of its dyadic structure, concentrating instead on the power struggles between the dominating state entities in the First and the Second Worlds. This was hardly surprising given that the very reference of the Third World was as child to the Cold War’s organization of a worldwide political duality, as was that of the other two worlds from whose chronic relationship it was created. In recent years, however, students of Cold War history have begun to pay more focused attention to the voices and agencies of the decolonizing world in the making of the Cold War’s political structure—although these voices are still less than authentic. Much of the existing Cold War history literature discusses the Third World in terms of what this world meant for the power politics in and between the First and the Second Worlds. Little space exists in these premises for efforts to unravel what the Cold War meant for the Third World, or how decolonization helped to shape the process of political bipolarization. Those who claim to represent an authentic voice, on the other hand—such as scholars of contemporary postcolonial historical scholarship, writing primarily after the end of the Cold War geopolitical order in the early 1990s—tend to be oblivious to the various roles of the Third World in the Cold War, not to mention the Cold War’s impact on the Third World, being intent instead on highlighting the decolonizing world’s arguably uninterrupted struggle for self-determination and self-respect stretching from the time of institutionalized colonialism to the postcolonial era during and after the Cold War. In this somewhat impoverished state of contemporary historical scholarship of the Cold War and the Third World, therefore, there is either a failure to appreciate the conceptual relationship between the Third World and the Cold War—even though it was precisely when the Cold War ended that the Third World became the “developing world”, “the South”, and variations thereof; or, if a relationship is recognized, it is one of dependence—the experience of the Third World being understood and narrated merely through the prism of the politics of the First and Second Worlds (as defined, that is, through the bipolarity).

In this context, therefore, Artemy Kalinovsky and Sergey Radchenko’s *The End of the Cold War and the Third World* comes as a timely, insightful volume that takes a major step in recognizing and correcting the problematic analytical relationship between the Cold War and the Third World. Its contribution to modern world history is especially valuable insofar as it aims to be as much a work of contemporary history as about the past century. As the title indicates, this work concentrates on the meanings of the end of the Cold War, and thus may be regarded as a companion volume to Michael Hogan’s important earlier (1992, edited) volume, *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications*.\(^1\) Kalinovsky and

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Radchenko’s volume puts the Third World’s experience of the end of the Cold War on equal terms to that of the First and Second Worlds. This was not the case with Hogan, notwithstanding its essays, particularly those written by Walter LaFeber and Bruce Cumings, which called for a reasoned pluralist perspective to the experience of the Cold War, drawing attention to the experiential disparities of the global conflict between the world powers and the decolonizing nations. These voices remain relatively marginal in *The End of the Cold War*, whereas similar voices are raised throughout *The End of the Cold War and the Third World*. Many of the key issues mentioned by LaFeber and/or Cumings in understanding the Cold War as a globally shared yet regionally divergent historical experience are richly elaborated by Kalinovsky and Radchenko in their superb introductory essay.

The issues raised by Kalinovsky and Radchenko include the question of temporality as regards the end of the Cold War: namely, “Did the Cold War end at the same time (and in the same way) in each of the three Worlds?” This question of time is conceptually inseparable from that of spatiality: “Did all communities and peoples everywhere experience the Cold War (in the same way)?”—and from that of signification: Did the Cold War have identical meanings for the decolonizing nations in Asia and Africa, and the former colonial powers in Europe and elsewhere?” In short, was there actually a single entity, “the Cold War”, its passage and ending similarly experienced across the world? Kalinovsky and Radchenko’s answers to these big, important questions take a form that I would endorse strongly: No, indeed, there never was such a thing as the Cold War. The polarizing, polarized world community of the past century experienced bipolar global politics in radically different ways across different regions, and we may not force their divergent experiences into a convenient, yet misleadingly homogenous concept.

In conventional knowledge, the term “Cold War” refers to the prevailing condition of the world in the second half of the twentieth century, divided into two separate conceptions of political modernity and paths of economic development. In a narrower sense, it also means the contest of power and will between the two dominant states—the USA and USSR—that set out to rule the world and thereby, neither being able to overcome the other, divided it between them in an undeclared state of war. As such, the Cold War was a highly unconventional war, having no clear distinction between war and peace. Its ending was similarly unusual, failing to benefit from any ceremonial cessation of violence. The Cold War was neither a real war nor a genuine peace, an ambiguity that explains why some consider it an imaginary (c.f. “phony”) war whereas others associate it with what in modern history was an exceptionally long period of peace. It is probably fair to say that—in the first two Worlds at least, and certainly in the West—the dominant image (recollection, cultural impression) of the Cold War is of its having been fought mainly with political, economic, ideological, and polemical means; of the nations that waged this war as being engaged in building and stockpiling arsenals of weapons of mass destruction in the belief that they would never have to use them; and of the threats of mutually assured total destruction as assuring a prolonged duration of international peace. These strange features that constitute our collective memory of the Cold War make it difficult to come to terms with its history according to the conventional antinomy of war and peace (hence the oxymoronic nomenclature).
As LaFeber notes, however, this view of the Cold War speaks a half-truth of bipolar history. The view represents the dominant Western (and also the Soviet) experience of the cold war primarily as an imaginary war, referring to the politics of competitively preparing for war in the hope of avoiding an actual outbreak of war. In fact, of course, this identification of the second half of the twentieth century as an exceptionally long period of international peace would be hardly intelligible to most of the rest of the world. The Cold War era resulted in forty million human casualties of war in different parts of the world, as LaFeber mentions; the major “proxy” (sic)—i.e. Third World—conflicts of Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan between them spanned almost the entire duration of the period. (In fact, “proxy war” here actually translates as—operates as a euphemism for—“war in a Third World country,” because had it occurred in a First or Second World country, it would have been the real thing!) How to reconcile this exceptionally violent historical reality with the predominant Western perception of an exceptionally long peace is crucial when it comes to grasping the meaning of the global Cold War. According to Cumings, it is necessary to balance the dominant “balance of power” conception of the cold war, on which the idea of the long peace view is based, with the reality of the “balance of terror” experienced in the wider (read “Third”) world.

If the various territories of the world did not experience the Cold War in the same way, it is reasonable to think that today they do not all remember the bipolar political era in the same way either, and that the end of this era did not mean the same to all peoples in all regions. This simple yet important recognition is what brings the essays together in Kalinovsky and Radchenko’s The End of the Cold War and the Third World. These essays ask many other questions of diversity and plurality in Cold War historical experience, both in spatial and temporal senses. Some contributions focus on questions of disparity existing within the First or Second World, including the Sino-Soviet split and its impact on revolutionary movements in decolonizing societies. Other essays consider the fusion and fission between the idea of the Third World and the horizon of Asian-African solidarity, or the idea of non-alignment. Others again look at South and Latin American cases, or at issue-related contexts including debt crisis, arms trading and the media.

These questions ought to be taken seriously—not least because they have much to offer for a better understanding of contemporary global realities—and they should bring about further innovative questions related to the deep plurality of Cold War historical experience. One hopes, however, that the diversification of Cold War history is not to be mistaken for a fragmentation of Cold War global history and a denial of its basic unity. A global history is a

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history that is attentive to locally variant historical realities and to the fundamental diversity of human existence. It follows that the more we become familiar with the Cold War's diverse realities, the closer we will be to an understanding of the Cold War as a genuinely global history. *The Cold War and the Third World* makes an important step in this hopeful direction.
When I went to graduate school at the University of Chicago in the late 1980s, diplomatic history was, in intellectual terms, a sleepy, conservative backwater. The historians themselves still seemed to command attention in the intellectual journals of the Atlantic world, and their wisdom still seemed to attract the ears of Washington. Congressional hearings were not complete without one or another of these historians, whose statements were in harmony with their audiences. The emblematic figures were the old friends John Lewis Gaddis and Paul Kennedy, whose presence at Yale assured that the train running from Boston to Washington would always pause to pick them up from New Haven.

Things are quite different in this field now. Kennedy and Gaddis were Atlanticists, whose framework to understand the world took them to the archives of the North Atlantic, but no further. Their students and those who are now emergent in the field have other ambitions. Having learned languages such as Arabic and Chinese, they now scour the archives of Beijing and Cairo to elaborate upon the multivalent interests of the peoples of the planet. For them, there is no requirement to assume that the main players in the world system live in one of five cities, and nor is there the moral blindness to seek out the views of others who might not be powerful but who are nonetheless important. Over the course of the past five years, I have visited a number of conferences organized by this emergent generation and remain very impressed by their high quality of archival work, their facility with languages, and their dedication to tracing the complexity of diplomatic deliberations.

I read the essays in the volume edited by Artemy Kalinovsky and Sergey Radchenko with my mind on this new generation of diplomatic historians largely trained in the United States. Of course, Kalinovsky and Radchenko’s book is not peopled with those historians, and nor by historians or scholars trained in the confines of the Kennedy-Gaddis continent. Nor are the contributors all recent scholars (some are retired, and some have already established careers). The essays have more of the feel of the *Journal of Cold War Studies*, edited by Mark Kramer who runs MIT’s Cold War Studies Program (and has an essay in the book). Nonetheless, what reminds me of the new generation of scholars is that this book would be welcome on their reading lists, since it is very much along the grain of becoming the mainstream in diplomatic history: to take seriously the views of every participant in an interchange, and to develop an argument that allows the reader to see these multivalent views as serious in themselves.

*The End of the Cold War* teaches us a great deal, particularly about how the proxy wars functioned in the 1980s and how these slowly came to a close (the best book on this process is Artemy Kalinovsky’s own *A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan*). Some essays are richer than others, as one would expect, and with some parts of the world covered with a great deal of care while others receive slipshod coverage. One would have liked an essay that dealt with Cuba in this period.
The book is framed around a simple question: what was the effect on the Third World of the end of the Cold War? The actual question should have been: what was the effect on the Third World of the collapse of the Soviet Union? Certainly, the Cold War ended when the USSR fell apart but these two events are not exactly the same thing. The simpler process is of course the demise of the USSR. That is a process that began as early as the 1980s and then finally ended with the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union and the spin off of its satellites. Most of the book’s essays recount the difficulty for regimes in the Third World that had come to rely upon the USSR and the Eastern European states for military hardware, diplomatic cover, and economic aid. Conflicts in the Horn of Africa and in South-East Asia were decisively marked by the terminal withdrawal of the USSR, indeed so too has been the recent history of Afghanistan. The way the USSR collapsed set the stage for the histories of these regions in the decades that followed.

The book’s essays certainly pay attention to the fall of the USSR, although not fully in the way that I have articulated above, but apart from the essay by Duccio Basosi, there is little attention to the demise of the Third World Project. By 1973, the Non-Aligned Movement, which carried the Project, seemed to be at its zenith. The UN General Assembly passed the New International Economic Order (NIEO) resolution. With the oil revolt, the NIEO set the stage for a major challenge from the Global South. But this would not come, largely because of the debt crisis and the full-scale political assault from the West (later North). By 1983, the NAM had been neutered, and the Third World Project fell to the wayside.

Since the book pays no concomitant attention to the collapse of the NAM, it addresses the Cold War through the U.S.-USSR optic, with the rest of the world as battleground. This is the conventional reading of the Cold War, even as this book takes seriously the views of the people in Brazil or Nicaragua, Angola or Cambodia. What it lacks, to my mind, is an epistemology that sees the Third World as being a considerable actor in the Cold War and not simply the canvas on which others could play out their illusions.

The gaze of this book is on the USSR’s collapse, and Washington comes in only when it is important to see how the West adjusts itself to this monumental event. In a sense, this book is about how the world came to terms with the collapse of the old order. What we don’t see is that the demise of the old order was actually premised on the emergence of a new one, and that this new one was a lever for the destruction of the older. By this I mean that after the 1973 thrust from the NAM and the oil states, the North re-organized itself ideologically (through the category of neoliberalism), institutionally (through the creation in 1974 of the G7), and militarily (through the eventual emergence of NATO as a more aggressive world actor, spanning the period from the threat of battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe and to the threat of missile defense systems, to the Kosovo War to Libya and so on). This new architecture emerges in the 1970s, and is given buoyancy with the Volcker Shock – the Dollar-Wall Street complex was empowered by the rise in U. S. interest rates, the skyrocketing LIBOR rates, the indebtedness of the South and the economic pressure put on the USSR through the turbulence of the 1980s. None of this is in the book directly, although of course several essays pay close attention to the Soviet economic crisis which led the regime, as Mark Kramer points out, to push military exports to earn foreign exchange.
Kalinovsky and Radchenko have edited a very useful book – with essays chock full of important material; for example, Svetlana Savrankaya’s essay has new insights on Gorbachev that has not been available in English and Victor Figueroa Clark provides a remarkable story of militant internationalism that links Chile and Nicaragua around the Cuban orbit. These are essays to read and reread, to teach and discuss. My criticism is simply meant to broaden the context of the processes and events of the essays in the book.
Organizing an edited volume is a challenging task; writing a review of one is too. We are very grateful to the H-Diplo editors and to the roundtable participants for their engaged and encouraging reviews of the volume. In what follows, we will take up some of the important issues raised in the reviews.

Several participants raise the issue of the "Third World" project's death. If by Third World project we mean, as Vijay Prashad does, the achievement of a kind of unity among post-colonial nations that would free them from dependence on the European powers without binding them to the Cold War superpowers, then it is indeed clear that the project was dying the 1970s. By that point the various "isms" (such as Arab nationalism) and antagonisms (India-Pakistan, Somalia and Ethiopia, and so on) had already eroded whatever superficial unity still survived since Bandung. Soviet and American development aid was making it harder for so-called Third World countries to maintain neutrality. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (which India, despite its alleged non-alignment, tacitly supported) was probably one of the final blows.

Although not exactly in the form Prashad suggests, the question of the "death" of the Third World is indeed broached in several chapters of the volume, including in Chen Jian's insightful analysis, and studies by Duccio Basosi and Matias Spektor. In a sense, Chen Jian's chapter challenges the chronological consistency of the volume by putting emphasis on the 1970s, when China's reorientation from the revolutionary to the developmental discourse heralded - for Chen Jian at least - the beginning of end of the Cold War, and, indeed, the end of the Third World as a meaningful concept. Likewise, Basosi and Spektor highlight themes of resurgence of the West - in ideological terms - by the 1980s; their chapters thus giving additional support to Prashad's point of view. Other chapters in this volume disagree with such a premature burial of the Cold War - and of the Third World - and we, as editors, were delighted to see that there indeed was no consensus on the subject. We are quite happy with the "lacuna" Friedman notes, because we feel that the answers to Jeremy Friedman's tantalizing questions can all be found in the different interpretations offered in the book. It does sometimes require pushing beyond the conclusions the authors themselves were willing to make. This is something that each reader can do for her or himself, and it is for this reason that, as Jamie Miller points out, the volume lacks a conclusion. This was certainly an omission by design, we should add, for we were more interested in raising questions than in providing answers.

On the other hand, looking at the question from the point of view of the superpowers, the Third World project had not disappeared even in the 1980s. What we mean by this is that both superpowers continued to view themselves as the teachers of the Third World, a position which came with responsibility (or justification, depending on your point of view) to engage in the economic development, domestic politics, and foreign relations of their respective clients. The idea that less developed nations had to be helped and saved from the other side's expansionist designs did not go away. What was changing by the 1980s was
the consensus on how aid should be delivered and what the best models for the Third World were. In the U.S., the New Deal development model had already been falling apart from the mid-1960s, as disillusionment with projects undertaken in Latin America, Africa, and Asia had begun to set in.

In the USSR this process took longer, and Soviet aid in the 1980s still looked very similar to that of previous decades, although behind the scenes there was plenty of skepticism both about the kind of aid being offered and whom it was being offered to - clients like Ethiopia’s Haile Miriam Mengistu being particularly frustrating. Crucial, too, is that the infrastructure that had developed to study and engage with the Third World from the 1950s was still there in the 1980s, and still playing an influential role in policymaking. The scholars, party activists, translators, intelligence workers, and specialists who had made their careers working on the Third World still believed in their overall mission at the end of the 1980s, even if a certain amount of skepticism and even cynicism had crept in. Even as Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the USSR, for Moscow, the Cold War was as much as ever a battle for the Third World - on that much at least our authors agree. The future of the Soviet Cold War project looked bright and red from the Kremlin. Ronald Reagan, too, had a vision for the Third World, and these competing visions still influenced and even defined the choices and priorities of Third World clients as they pondered whether to embrace Marx, God or Mammon, or all three. Indeed, we only learned of the death of the Third World in retrospect. It is only now that we can say, looking back, that the Third World, alas, was long dead, and we (you, they) were battling windmills. Or were we?

Michael Latham asks an important question: to what extent did the Third World conflicts contribute to the end of the Cold War itself? The answer seems to be that the effect was real but indirect. In the late 1970s, confrontations in the Third World had helped bring détente to an end and led to one of the most tense periods in the Cold War. At the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, U.S. displeasure was considered a price worth paying to keep the country free of U.S. influence. By the mid-1980s, frustration with that conflict (as well as conflicts in the Horn of Africa and beyond), arguably helped convince Soviet leaders to prioritize the thawing relationship with the U.S. over Moscow’s clients in the Third World. But as Svetlana Savranskaya has shown, this transformation took time, and even when it did happen, the hope was that the two superpowers could now collaborate to resolve Third World issues - primarily conflicts, but developmental ones as well. That this cooperation did not ultimately develop was primarily a result of U.S. attitudes and, most importantly, Soviet disintegration.

Reviewers highlight that one clear message of the volume is that the Cold War ended differently in different parts of the Third World. This, we agree with Heonik Kwon, underscores what he calls the "deep plurality of Cold War historical experience." Kwon suggests that even as we deconstruct these various overlapping Cold War narratives, we must be mindful of the "basic unity" of the Cold War. We hope, as editors, that the diverse and geographically disparate contributions to this volume, The End of the Cold War and the Third World, do contribute to this "basic unity." We thank the reviewers for commending our effort to include these excellent, well-researched and theoretically sophisticated chapters under one roof.