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Both Sarah Snyder’s book, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War*, and the four unanimously and deservedly favorable reviews suggest that an important historiographic moment has arrived. The reviewers praise Snyder’s use of a large amount of published and unpublished material in Russian and other European, as well U.S., archives, appreciate the book’s coverage of non-state actors in addition to governmental leaders, and congratulate the author on persuasively establishing a clear connection between human rights activism and the end of the Cold War.

As all the reviewers note, the book brings the history of the Cold War and that of human rights closer together. This is of momentous significance, for it implies that these histories are of equal importance for our understanding of the recent past. Rather than being treated as a mere footnote to the high drama of great-power relations, activities by human rights organizations must be taken seriously in their own right. It is ironical, in a way, that the history of the Cold War ended when the history of human rights, at least in their contemporary implications, was just beginning. The first was a geopolitical drama, which always has a beginning and an end, whereas the second is a never-ending story.

In addition to recognizing the contribution of human rights activism to shaping the Cold War, therefore, one could also ask how the ending of the Cold War affected human rights activism. What implications did the geopolitical drama have for the history of human rights? How were the promoters of human rights affected by ways in which the U.S.-USSR high drama approached its dénouement? We must remember that there were many other human rights abuses in the world outside the Soviet bloc: South Africa, Iran, Pakistan, South Korea, Cambodia, and many others. During the 1970s, moreover, human rights activities covered much wider territory than international relations, extending themselves to such areas as the rights of women, homosexuals, and the physically and mentally handicapped. An interesting question, therefore, might be how these various agendas were related to one another. Did the human rights activists’ successful efforts in influencing Soviet policy and ultimately bringing about an end to the Cold War affect other endeavors to combat injustice? Or did race prejudices, discrimination against women, and other instances of human rights abuse remain? If so, why did the success of the “Helsinki network” not duplicate itself in these other areas?

Such questions suggest that human rights history has its own chronology, different from and much longer than the history of the Cold War, different indeed from the history of international relations. The latter has tended to determine the way we periodize the past. For instance, we are still apt to understand the history of the twentieth century in terms of the First World War, the Second World War, the Cold War, and the period after the Cold War. But the story of human rights cannot be neatly fitted into such a geopolitically determined chronology, any more than can the histories of other non-geopolitical movements such as the efforts to cope with diseases, environmental disasters, and drug abuses. There are, in other words, multiple chronologies, and one important contribution of
this book may well be to make us aware of this fact and to compel us to get away from geopolitical determinism.

None of the four reviewers, however, goes that far. They write their reviews mostly within the traditional frameworks of great-power rivalries and governmental decision-making processes. Thus Gregory Domber refers to the insights the book presents into “American, West European, East European, and Soviet decision making.” N. Piers Ludlow writes that Snyder’s account shows that the USSR’s acceptance of the human rights agenda must be “considered one of the most damaging of self-inflicted wounds of the whole Cold War.” Michael Cotey Morgan says the book helps us “broaden the way we think about the period between 1989 and 1991 and to see the end of the Cold War not as a single abrupt event but rather as a gradual process.” Andrew Preston agrees with Snyder that “ideas and culture can have direct causal force in international history, because they can influence policymakers themselves as well as shape the world system in which they operate.”

These are all appropriate observations, but the reviewers also acknowledge that what Snyder’s book offers is as much transnational as international history. Thus Domber writes, “the book truly is a transnational history.” How would such an observation square with his above-quoted stress on decision-making? In a sense, the book shows how international history and transnational history relate to one another. All four reviewers seem aware of this problématique. Preston acknowledges that “the cultural turn and, more recently, the transnational turn have revolutionalized the practice of diplomatic and international history.” The latter is clearly making an impact on the former. Ludlow’s review aptly concludes, “the collective challenge to all international historians working on contemporary history is to ask themselves whether their subjects too might not benefit from the broadening of the cast list that Snyder’s exemplary book brings about.” As Morgan notes at the end of his review, the book “serves as a reminder that the fates of the mightiest powers depend on the actions of individual men and women.” Transnational historians might argue that not just the mightiest powers but everything depends on the actions of individuals and their organizations. The mighty powers come and go, but humanity lives on. The Cold War was a transient phase in humanity’s long history, and this book is a powerful reminder that we lose sight of contemporary history when we focus our scholarly efforts on national and international affairs and neglect transnational connections.

Participants:

Sarah B. Snyder, Lecturer in International History at University College London, specializes in the Cold War, human rights activism, and United States human rights policy. She is the author of Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network (Cambridge University Press), which won the 2012 Stuart L. Bernath Prize and the 2012 Myrna F. Bernath Book Award from the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, as well as articles in Cold War History, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Journal of American Studies, and Journal of Transatlantic Studies. She received her Ph.D. from Georgetown University.

Gregory F. Domber is assistant professor of history at the University of North Florida. He has published numerous pieces on U.S.-Polish relations and the Western role in Poland’s democratic transformation in the 1980s, most recently in the *Journal of Cold War Studies*. His Ph.D. dissertation at George Washington University, *Supporting the Revolution: America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989*, won the 2009 Betty M. Unterberger Dissertation Prize. He is currently rewriting and revising it for publication.

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In *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network*, Sarah Snyder presents an original and provocative perspective on the end of the Cold War. The work is laudable, first, because Snyder fully historicizes the revolutionary events of 1989-1991 by initiating her study in global trends that began in the 1970s. Second, she breaks out of the limitations of writing about individual administrations or leaders—either Soviet, European, or American—by focusing on a group of dissidents, activists, and their international network of non-governmental organizations that worked between and among various governments to shape the East-West dialogue. Most notably, she transcends more theoretical discussions of ‘norm transference’ that have dominated discussions of the Helsinki effect, to argue in favor of the power of human rights advocacy. Snyder argues that hard work by this transnational network of activists “cataloguing repeated violations of the Helsinki Final Act and humanizing those who suffered from abuses” (245) forced concerns about human rights to become a regular part of high-level diplomacy. For Snyder, the Helsinki Final Act was effective not just as a statement of principles, but because it initiated a regular process for follow-up meetings that allowed the West “to use public embarrassment to pressure Eastern states to live up to the Helsinki Final Act more faithfully.” (110) By the time Gorbachev came to power, human rights had become a central part of Soviet national security.

Chronologically, Snyder covers the development of human rights activism over what might be called the long-1980s, from the slow death of détente to the rapid dissolution of the Soviet Union, roughly 1976-1991. Ostensibly this is a study of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process from the writing of the Final Act in 1975 through regular summit meetings in Belgrade (1977), Madrid (1980-1983), Vienna (1986-1989), and Paris (1990). She does not simply explore the meetings’ proceedings, but instead sustains her analytical gaze on the loosely knit mesh of Eastern dissidents, Western politicians, journalists, activists and organizations that existed outside of the CSCE, but used the follow-up meetings to focus world attention on human rights abuses in the Communist world. In particular, Snyder focuses on the creation and policies of the U.S. Congress’s Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki Watch, and the International Helsinki Foundation for Human rights. By exchanging and translating *samizdat* texts or keeping media attention on the plight of individual dissidents by publishing regular reports, for example, these larger institutions “strengthened and formalized diffuse Helsinki monitoring activities, heightening their effectiveness.” (3) Snyder also spends significant time writing about the formation of the Moscow Helsinki Group and efforts by activists such as Yuri Orlov and Anatoly Shcharansky to defend and invoke the rights of well-known dissident scientists, Jewish *refuseniks*, and Evangelicals. While the coordinated efforts of activists on both sides of the Iron Curtain had little effect on Soviet or bloc policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Snyder argues convincingly that sustained Western pressure caused Gorbachev to recognize “that the Soviet failure to implement the Helsinki Final Act was an obstacle to his policy priorities” and that human rights abuses “prevented constructive East-West relations.” (247) Buttressed by political pressure from human rights activists inside and outside of government, the CSCE process
proved to the Soviets that human rights had become entrenched in Western foreign policy and that the Final Act secured “greater respect for human rights in foreign countries [than] the agreement’s trade or security aspects.” (248) In the late 1980s, the CSCE process shifted the tenor and direction of the East-West dialogue from the era of détente and opened the door, in part, for the revolutionary events of 1989.

As the blurb on the back of the book from Akira Iriye notes, this is a methodologically innovative study, a fact that becomes clear in the extensive footnotes. Snyder’s work combines records from traditional diplomatic sources, like governmental archives and significant new oral history interviews, with exhaustive work into the private papers of community leaders, activists, and dissidents, as well as non-governmental archives, including various ethnic associations in the United States, Human Rights Watch, the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and records from Radio Free Europe at both the Hoover Institution and the Open Society Institute. Snyder’s exhaustive research agenda and travel schedule, reveal just how time consuming research on transnational history can become, but the rewards are strong, providing insights into American, West European, East European, and Soviet decision making.

Although Snyder has utilized both English and Russian materials, her analysis is strongest when writing about decisions and organizations centered in the United States, like Helsinki Watch and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Human Rights Activism adds significant nuanced analysis on Jimmy Carter’s initial embrace of human rights as a national security priority. The book also makes a very strong case that Carter’s selection of former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, and Goldberg’s choice to break with diplomatic precedent at the Belgrade meeting in 1977 to take a confrontational tone with the Soviets—actually naming names, humanizing the human rights abuses, and utilizing public humiliation in an international forum—transformed the follow-up meetings into a forum for action rather than just another place for idle talk. The U.S. Congress also plays a significant role in the argument, led by Representative Millicent Fenwick’s work to create the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which proved such an essential lynchpin to empowering the wider Helsinki system. Snyder’s book also provides an in-depth analysis of Ronald Reagan’s unexpected decision to prioritize CSCE and human rights in the Communist bloc, nicely illustrating one of the continuities between Carter and Reagan that can be lost in studies focused on individual administrations. Because American policy makers and human rights activists were often most interested in the other superpower, Snyder’s narrative focuses most heavily on the CSCE network in the Soviet Union. Her analysis as well is dominated by U.S.-Soviet relations, providing a picture of a web, not with one center but two opposing points of focus.

Nonetheless, the book truly is a transnational history. The Worker’s Defense Committee (KOR) in Poland, Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, activists linked with both, as well as human rights and CSCE advocates in Western Europe make numerous appearances in the book. These references, however, are more often evocative than informative, more suggestive than conclusive. Human Rights Activism does prove that there was an effective transnational system at work, but it leaves room for future work. Was intra-bloc
coordination between dissidents facilitated by the CSCE network or did it predate it? What kind of communication was there between the East and independent West European groups in, for example, the Scandinavian countries like Sweden, which was a major conduit for aid to the Solidarity Trade Union during these years? How did West European groups influence their own governments’ postures and statements at the various CSCE summits? Did human rights activism and West European integration overlap in any meaningful way? More fundamentally, how did the Eastern countries coordinate their action within the Warsaw Pact and in bi-lateral relations with Moscow? There is very little sense in this book of how the Soviets or their bloc partners prepared for the meetings or discussed human rights strategies in their wake. As Snyder notes in her introduction, it may be impossible to find the documents necessary to answers some of these questions given the clandestine nature of these Eastern groups; however, from my own superficial work in dissident and security service archives in Poland, it seems that national or regional specialists with the necessary language skills could make a close inspection of these sources and the Communist Party records in each individual state to illuminate some of the unexplored areas of Snyder's book.

Overall, Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War is a grand first step in understanding how institutions and individuals outside of government shaped human rights politics and facilitated the end of the Cold War. Perhaps most importantly, Snyder has moved discussions of the Helsinki effect away from the realm of political science and placed it solidly into a historical framework. People, not just norms, made the Helsinki Final Act an important factor in the end of the Cold War. Overall, Snyder’s thoroughly researched and meticulously documented work deserves a spot at the top of the recent spate of literature on the end of the Cold War. It also provides substantial insight into the work of non-governmental rights organizations to shape the nature of interstate relations. It should become essential reading for anyone interested in the development of global human rights institutions and the transformation of U.S.-Soviet relations in the long 1980s. This is a first book worthy of adding to upper-level syllabi and reading lists.
Sarah Snyder’s book adds real scholarly weight to an often discussed, but at times alarmingly nebulous assertion, about the role of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process in bringing about the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the end of the Cold War. In Europe in particular, discomfort with overly triumphalist U.S. readings of the end of the Cold War that emphasise the roles of Ronald Reagan and of the US military build-up has led many analysts to suggest that the slow corrosive effect of human rights norms and the dissident activity within Eastern Europe that they encouraged were more important than any ‘hard-power’ notions. In other words it was soft-power and liberalism that triumphed, not military might and confrontational U.S. foreign policy. And yet while superficially appealing, this thesis always suffered from a serious lack of evidence, not least because of the long time lag between the much-studied CSCE process itself and the ending of the Cold War a decade and a half later.

Snyder’s book goes a long way to redressing our lack of knowledge about what happened in the period between the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. It also transforms the cast list and locations of CSCE historiography. Hitherto this historiography has tended to be focused primarily on those diplomats and statesmen who populated the international conferences in Dipoli, Helsinki and Geneva – and to a certain extent on their back up teams in each of the national capitals of the main countries involved. Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War concentrates instead on the courageous dissidents within the Eastern Bloc itself who sought to monitor their governments’ records in adhering to the principles of human rights that they had signed on to in Helsinki, and on the extensive network of Western activists which sprung up to support them and to ensure that the question of Soviet bloc compliance with its human rights obligations was never allowed to slip from the West’s collective gaze. The stage meanwhile becomes the Moscow apartments where the dissidents gathered, the Russian labour camps where many ended up, and the Congressional and other committee rooms where Western activists publicised the sufferings of Eastern Bloc political prisoners and urged their governments to continue supporting their cause.

There is also an interesting transatlantic shift in levels of activism. One of the main themes of much of the recent writing about the CSCE process itself has been the contrast drawn between the comparative lack of interest in the conference of the U.S. government in general and Henry Kissinger in particular, and the much more enthusiastic approach of many Western European participants. The U.S. did not appear to believe that multilateral diplomacy of the type practiced in the CSCE could genuinely alter Cold War realities; many Western Europeans were adamant that it could. And these different levels of belief fed into different levels of commitment within the conference discussions themselves. Snyder’s continuation of the CSCE story after 1975, however, suggests that this contrast soon ceased to apply. On the contrary, by the time of the Belgrade follow-up conference of 1977-78 it was Jimmy Carter’s government which was the most energetic critic of the Soviet Union’s failure to implement the Helsinki norms in its bloc, whereas many European governments seemed anxious that too forceful a championing of the human rights’ cause might undo that
European détente which had been both cause and effect of the Helsinki process. Later follow-up conferences too, in Madrid, Vienna and Paris, were notable for high levels of U.S. government activism, despite the Ronald Reagan’s previous criticism of the CSCE process. But this westerly transatlantic shift in dynamism seems also, from Snyder’s analysis, to have been true at the level of NGO activities. For it was U.S.-based groups, in particular Helsinki Watch, that seem to have thrown themselves into the task of keeping the Helsinki flame burning most energetically, with Western European counterparts developing rather more slowly and cautiously. Explaining these contrasting levels of U.S. and Western European engagement with the cause of human rights activism will be an interesting task for future research, potentially revealing much about diverging attitudes not just to the Cold War but also about the division of labour between governmental actors and NGOs, and the place of public denunciation of foreign governments as opposed to quiet behind-the-scenes advocacy.

Another fascinating question raised, but perhaps not fully answered by this excellent book, is why the Soviet Union chose to remain involved in a process that opened it up to so much criticism, from within as much as from without. During the main CSCE negotiations themselves the Soviet calculations were fairly clear: in return for an international recognition of the European status quo and as such a *de facto* acceptance of the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, Moscow was prepared to take the risk of accepting Western wording on human contacts and human rights. This trade-off was made all the easier by the mistaken belief of many within the Soviet regime that such liberal notions would have little practical effect. But once it became clear – as it quickly did – that basket III (that portion of the CSCE Final Act that dealt with ’human contacts’) and the rest of the human rights dimension of the CSCE treaty were not just empty rhetoric, but were instead something that would inspire dissident activity within the Eastern Bloc and lead to the Soviet Union being publicly criticised in Belgrade and then Madrid, why did the Soviets go on putting up with the follow-up process? After all, the main Soviet gains through the CSCE process had been made and were unlikely to weakened by a lack of ongoing dialogue. Plausibly enough Snyder suggests that Soviet hopes of a conference on European disarmament, at which they would be able to exploit the serious divisions within the Western bloc on the issues of arms build-up, was one important factor, while the prestige that Brezhnev had invested in the CSCE process was another. But I still found myself wondering whether a more comprehensive explanation is not necessary, for what, if Snyder’s overall thesis is correct, has to be considered one of the most damaging of self-inflicted wounds of the whole Cold War.

Finally Snyder deserves enormous praise for demonstrating how much can be achieved by research that stretches well beyond intergovernmental contacts and instead probes the work of activists and non-governmental bodies across the East-West divide. It is true of course that this inclusion of non-governmental actors is potentially daunting for all future historians. It is hard enough trying to study a multilateral process like the CSCE from the point of view of multiple governments, let alone having to bring in a much wider cross section of civil society also. Quite apart from anything else, the range of archives and other sources involved rises significantly. But such is the wealth of Snyder’s findings that her methodology must not be set aside by others unwilling to explore the plethora of sources...
she employs. Instead the collective challenge to all international historians working on contemporary history is to ask themselves whether their subjects too might not benefit from the broadening of the cast list that Snyder's exemplary book brings about.
Over the last decade, the history of human rights has attracted increasing attention from scholars. Historians now debate how our contemporary understanding of human rights emerged, and whether its origins date to the late eighteenth century, the early twentieth century, or even the 1970s. They are also exploring the ways in which grandiose claims about human rights made—or failed to make—a difference in the lives of ordinary people. Sarah B. Snyder's new book, which is part of this new wave of scholarship, considers how the growth of international human rights activism in the 1970s and 1980s contributed to the most important geopolitical change of the last generation: the collapse of communism in Europe. Anyone looking for a test case of the power of human rights ideas would have a hard time finding a better example.

Snyder does not go so far as to claim that human rights activism was solely responsible for the fall of the Berlin Wall or the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Rather, it was one factor in a complicated process. In particular, she examines the ways in which a “transnational network” of politicians, activists, and dissidents shaped the superpowers’ policies in the decade-and-a-half that followed the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. By pressing the American government to put more weight on human rights in its relations with Moscow, and by persuading Kremlin officials to change the way they treated Soviet citizens, Snyder argues, the Helsinki network helped to bring the Cold War to a peaceful conclusion. The book is not strictly a history of the Helsinki process, nor of Western human rights NGOs, nor of communist bloc dissident movements. Instead, with admirable brevity, Snyder focuses on the interaction of these themes in order to tell the story of how the network of Helsinki activists came into being and the ways in which it affected superpower relations.

The Helsinki Final Act was the product of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), a massive diplomatic undertaking involving every country in Europe and North America (with the exception of recalcitrant Albania). Worried about the security and legitimacy of the Soviet bloc, Leonid Brezhnev made the CSCE the centerpiece of his foreign policy in the late 1960s and into the 1970s. He wanted a bold East-West agreement to confirm Europe’s postwar frontiers and promote East-West trade. The Western Europeans and North Americans agreed to participate because they were confident that they could expand the conference’s agenda to include items that might undermine Soviet power over the long run. Respect for human rights and the freer movement of people and information were the most important of these measures, which Brezhnev and his international counterparts endorsed when they signed the Final Act in 1975. In the years that followed, these principles spawned the transnational network that is the focus of Snyder’s story.

This network included three main groups. First, American members of Congress, notably Representative Millicent Fenwick (R-NJ) and Representative Dante Fascell (D-FL), spearheaded the creation of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, a joint legislative-executive body with a mandate to investigate whether the Final Act’s signatories were living up to their promises. The second group comprised North American and Western European NGOs such as Helsinki Watch and the International Helsinki Federation.
(IHF), which gathered and disseminated information about human rights violations in the Soviet bloc. Last, and perhaps most importantly, dissidents in the USSR and Eastern Europe, such as Yuri Orlov, Anatoly Shcharansky, and Vaclav Havel, established organizations of their own, including the Moscow Helsinki Group and Charter 77, to draft reports on human rights violations and spread word to the West. By means of letters, phone calls, and smuggled documents, individuals throughout the network supported each other's efforts and pressured communist governments from within and without.

Today the prevalence of the internet and tools like Twitter makes it hard to imagine how international politics could function in the absence of such networks. Millions of people around the world now intuitively understand the power of transnational networks, but this was not the case during the Cold War, even as the second age of globalization took hold in the 1970s. But in the Helsinki network, government officials and private citizens collaborated across national frontiers. By focusing on activists as well as politicians and examining the relationship between diplomatic negotiations and civil society, Snyder presents a new way of doing international history—all the more impressive because her subjects had no main organizing authority, functioned without clear chains of command, and left no central archive. Snyder therefore pieced her account together from a wide range of archival collections, largely in the United States. The list of the members of Congress whose papers she consulted is particularly impressive.

Setting aside the subject's inherent methodological challenges, the book's success hangs on Snyder’s ability not just to reconstruct the development of the Helsinki network but also to prove that it actually changed government policy in the United States and Soviet Union. The network's main elements were already in place by the time that Ronald Reagan became president. Because Reagan had previously criticized the CSCE, observers expected him to back away from Jimmy Carter's policy of using the Helsinki process to excoriate the Soviets for their human rights violations. Instead, Reagan continued Carter’s policy and left the energetic Max Kampelman—Carter’s appointee—in place to lead the U.S. delegation at the Madrid follow-up meeting (135-7).

As time went on, the Reagan administration made clear to Moscow that it would be impossible to make progress on arms control and trade without simultaneous improvements on human rights. As Snyder explains, American officials valued the information about Soviet abuses that they received from Helsinki Watch and the IHF. One of the administration’s notable human rights success stories—persuading the Kremlin to release Yuri Orlov and Anatoly Shcharansky from prison in 1986—illustrated “the close, working relationship between Helsinki Watch and Reagan administration officials,” Snyder writes (168-9). In her view, the case demonstrated the power of the Helsinki network. It is undeniable that the most senior American decision-makers supported the network, but it is harder to establish whether American human rights policy in the 1980s would have been substantially different had the network never been created. It is impossible to answer this sort of counterfactual definitively, but the question requires an evaluation of all of the factors that informed Reagan's views on human rights. In order to determine the Helsinki network's impact, one needs to examine it within this broader political context.
The Soviet side of the story is even more complex. When Mikhail Gorbachev took office in 1985, he showed little interest in international human rights norms. Like his predecessors, he refused to make concessions to foreign demands on the subject, regardless of whether they came from the American government or European NGOs. Within three years, however, he concluded that perestroika could not succeed if the Soviet government did not respect citizens’ fundamental freedoms (191-93). Soon thereafter, Eastern European governments began working with Helsinki Watch and the USSR invited the IHF to tour the country and investigate its human rights record (195-99).

What caused this dramatic turnaround? At least part of the change, Snyder suggests, was due to Gorbachev's own thinking and the influence of his top officials, especially foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze (158-72). The Reagan administration also deserves some credit for making human rights a central subject of bilateral negotiations alongside traditional concerns like arms control and trade. Snyder explains that the Helsinki network's relentless campaigning secured the release of numerous political prisoners, but to what extent did these activists and NGOs contribute to the fundamental shift in Gorbachev's and Shevardnadze's views? To be sure, the two men concluded that the USSR had to prove its commitment to East-West cooperation, and there was no better forum for doing so than the CSCE. There is a fine but important distinction, however, between assessing the influence of the Helsinki process as a whole and that of the Helsinki network in particular, which was only part of the broader process. One cannot expect explicit evidence documenting the precise ways that Helsinki Watch altered Kremlin officials' views. As in the American case, however, one must weigh the network's clout against the other factors that shaped Soviet policy.

The Helsinki network, in Snyder's estimation, demonstrates that individuals operating outside of conventional government channels can influence the direction of international politics. She contrasts her approach with that of such scholars as Daniel Thomas, who in writing about the consequences of the Final Act emphasize the power of human rights norms rather than human rights activism (244-45). The contrast is important. Snyder's work, which highlights the efforts of private citizens, represents a sustained attempt to reconstruct the precise mechanisms by which ideas translate into action. At the same time, however, it is important to remember the environment in which activists and policymakers operated. The state of the Soviet economy in the 1970s and 1980s, for instance, did not preordain the course of events, but it did constrain the options available to the members of the IHF and the occupants of the Kremlin alike.

In passing, Snyder makes the interesting claim that the Cold War ended not with the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 or the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 but, more prosaically, with the conclusion of the CSCE’s Vienna review meeting in January 1989. When they wrapped up their meeting, the assembled diplomats agreed to hold, at the USSR’s request, a human rights conference in Moscow. In order to secure Western support for this proposal, the Soviets had made a number of major concessions, including ending the jamming of Western radio broadcasts, releasing hundreds of political prisoners, and loosening restrictions on emigration. This was a far cry from the status quo even five years previously. Whether one accepts that this moment
marked the end of the Cold War depends on how one defines the Cold War in the first place. But even if one does not share Snyder’s assessment, it is nevertheless fruitful to broaden the way we think about the period between 1989 and 1991 and to see the end of the Cold War not as a single abrupt event but rather as a gradual process.

This process depended on the actions of citizens and politicians alike. In documenting the history of the Helsinki network from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, Snyder makes the case that the Cold War’s peaceful conclusion was the result not just of American military strength or Soviet economic weakness, but of the energy and courage of committed activists. The book breaks new ground in dissecting the ways in which ideas can drive statecraft, and in which the abstract phrases of a diplomatic agreement can become reality. It serves as a reminder that the fates of the mightiest powers depend on the actions of individual men and women.
As many others have already observed, writing the history of human rights is a fairly recent phenomenon. Perhaps, as Samuel Moyn contends, this is because the global human rights discourse is itself a recent phenomenon, dating back only to the late 1970s. With our habitual zeal to grapple with anything maturing after 30 or 40 years or so, historians have thus stumbled across the story of human rights in its natural gestation phase. Or perhaps it is because a generation of historians came of age during the human rights moment of the 1990s and is now seeking to provide human rights with a useable past that stretches back to the American and French Revolutions and the abolitionist crusade against the overseas slave trade. Whatever the reason, human rights history is now one of the leading subjects in all fields of historical inquiry. It is certainly a leader within Sarah Snyder’s field of international history.

Diplomatic and international historians used to focus almost exclusively on military, economic, and strategic considerations at the expense of cultural and religious factors. Race, gender, and other ‘intangible’ phenomena were deemed insufficiently rigorous to have had any impact on foreign policymaking. But the cultural turn and, more recently, the transnational turn have revolutionized the practice of diplomatic and international history—decidedly for the better—and examinations of middle class consumers, civil rights activists, and women’s rights campaigners are now assumed to be as legitimate as those of nuclear strategists and foreign service officers.

Still, there is a sense that while these two approaches—the top-down political and bottom-up cultural, for lack of better terms—are both full members of the same club, they rarely share the same conversations or outlook. Practitioners of the political approach sniff at the culturalists’ supposed lack of empiricism, inattention to the importance of cause-and-effect, and neglect of power. Practitioners of the cultural approach, on the other hand, continue to deride the supposed political/diplomatic obsession with power-wielding elites, usually dead white men. The two sides are undoubtedly closer to each other than ever before, but they still remain two sides.

But there are ways to bridge them, and studies of human rights, such as Snyder’s, can lead the way. As Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War brilliantly demonstrates, ideas and culture can have direct causal force in international history, because they can influence policymakers themselves as well as shape the world system in which they operate. Snyder’s examination of human rights activists, and not simply international legal norms and diplomatic accords, illustrates the impact of their ideas and values despite the fact that the activists themselves lacked any kind of policymaking authority. Instead, they worked through political channels and the popular media to broadcast their message and

highlight the ways in which the Soviet Union and its client states in Eastern Europe were ignoring their human rights commitments under the Helsinki Accords.

Though she doesn’t frame it in these terms explicitly, Snyder’s use of religion is highly effective in linking the top-down and bottom-up approaches. In the study of international history, and even within the more capacious methodological boundaries of the field’s cultural and transnational turns, religion stands on its own. By many standards it is a traditional field of scholarly inquiry—after all, the discipline of history was originally church history, its most pressing questions revolving around the lives of the saints. Yet religion’s long neglect by diplomatic and international historians, and its reliance on unconventional methods and non-elite figures, places it squarely within the cultural and transnational turns.

However, despite its obvious relevance, religion has been mostly ignored in the burgeoning field of human rights history, even though faith is among the most important sources of human rights traditions and activism.2 As the originator of natural law doctrine and the inspiration for the concept of the dignity of the individual, Christianity is one of the wellsprings of modern human rights. But more specific to Snyder’s timeframe of the 1970s and ’80s, religion was instrumental in three ways: as a source of ideas, as a source of flashpoint controversies, and as a source of people (victims as well as activists).

First, in terms of ideas, religion promoted the concept of the sanctity of individual rights based on personal religious liberty entirely free from the dictates of the state. Religion in this sense was akin to, even a source of, the human conscience and imagination, and if the state could violate the inner recesses of the mind to suppress them then there was no stopping the power of the state and thus no chance for individual human rights. As long as religious liberty existed, people retained at least a semblance of individual autonomy and freedom; from there, all other freedoms were possible. This aspect of political thought was believed particularly strongly by Americans, who, from the First Amendment and FDR’s Four Freedoms to more recent invocations such as George W. Bush’s post-9/11 addresses and Barack Obama’s 2009 Cairo speech, have seen religious pluralism as a source of peace and religious liberty as one of the foundational and most important of all human rights.

In this spirit, Americans in the Cold War, from George Kennan to Ronald Reagan, used the absence of religious liberty as a diagnosis for totalitarianism. As William Inboden has shown regarding the early Cold War, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations perceived religion as both a diagnosis and a cure to tyranny abroad.3 Or as Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski put it in 1966, “the Christian churches have shown themselves to

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2 Along with Moyn’s Last Utopia, an important exception that takes religion seriously and integrates it into the politics of human rights as a whole is Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

be a real bulwark against the claim to total power of the totalitarian dictatorship, perhaps more real than any others. Whether Protestant or Catholic, the genuine Christian cannot accept totalitarianism. For Christianity claims the whole man and the last word with regard to man’s values and man’s destiny. This claim the totalitarians cannot accept.”4 And in the long run, the religious spirit would prevail over political control: “the islands of separateness represented by the Christian churches, as guardians of the individual conscience and its religious freedom,” Friedrich and Brzezinski concluded, “are likely to outlast even a long-term totalitarian dictatorship.”5 For their part, Jews, Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, and Protestants throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe argued that religion was the very basis of their humanity, and that state efforts to repress it were among the most invasive violations of their human rights.

Second, this basic dynamic—of religious people seething under official state repression of their faith—led to flashpoint controversies. Jewish refuseniks seeking to emigrate to Israel are probably the best known example, and they were certainly the most influential. But they were not alone. All over Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Christians from various denominations chafed under government regulation and punishment. When they protested such conditions, they provided the controversial flashpoints that moved emotions in the West and spurred the cause of human rights. Without their concrete examples, human rights would likely have remained mere abstractions buried in a treaty.

Third, their plight received widespread attention thanks to the efforts of allies and sympathizers in the West, many of whom were either personally religious or had ties to religious communities and institutions. In the United States, where much of Snyder’s gripping drama unfolds, such figures included Father Robert F. Drinan, a Massachusetts congressman who in 1971 became the first-ever Catholic priest to be elected to Congress. Others, such as Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson, are famous for their support of human rights and opposition to detente, but we rarely remember that they often couched their human rights campaigns explicitly as a struggle for religious freedom. Human rights historians need to do a much better job of paying attention to unjustly neglected figures, like Drinan, and of paying attention to unjustly forgotten elements of well-known figures, such as Jackson’s crusades for religious freedom. The Jackson-Vanik bill, which linked the bestowal of Most favored Nation trading status upon the Soviets with the relaxation of immigration restrictions on Soviet Jews, is a familiar episode in the narratives of detente and human rights, but the fact that its prime motivation was religious freedom is usually left unsaid and almost always left unexplored.

Snyder appreciates these religious influences, unusually for a historian of human rights, and integrates it into her analysis. Her most notable case (141-146) is the so-called Siberian Seven, a family of Pentecostals from Chernogorsk, a small city in southern Siberian


5 Friedrich Brzezinski, 315.
not far from the Mongolian border. In 1978, after an unsuccessful attempt fifteen years before, the Vashchenko family barged their way into the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and sought political asylum. They refused to leave the embassy and, as awkward as their presence was, U.S. diplomats refused to hand them over. But their cause was as much religious as it was political; or, more accurately, it was political only because controlling religion was one of the Kremlin’s main tools of internal repression and control, and the Vashchenkos protested infringements on their freedom of worship. Their cause became the priority of several members of the U.S. Congress, both Democrat and Republican, and they pressured the Carter and Reagan administrations incessantly. Unlike Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan paid close attention to the Siberian Seven, and when he had his first private meeting with the Soviet Ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, the only topic he wanted to discuss was the plight of the Vashchenkos. To Reagan, their suffering was a basic issue of fundamental human rights, and he asked the Soviets what it would take to get them exit visas. Crucially, he promised Dobrynin and the Kremlin that the United States wouldn’t score any political points if the Vashchenkos were allowed to leave the Soviet Union. Everyone involved later agreed that the Vashchenkos’ successful emigration to the United States in 1983—via Israel, and thanks in no small part to the negotiating skills of Dobrynin, Secretary of State George Shultz, State Department Soviet expert Jack Matlock, and the U.S. representative to the CSCE meetings in Madrid, Max Kampelman—marked the first important step towards the detente that would bring the Cold War to an end six years later.

To be sure, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War* is mostly not about religion; nonetheless, Snyder deftly makes use of it where warranted. In doing so, she points the way to how scholars can effectively blend religion within a more secular framework. Such a development is long overdue. As Drinan himself noted in 2001, in “fifty years of the international human rights movement, religion has not attained the level of importance that some secular ideals...have reached.” According to Drinan, most human rights groups deliberately ignored or resisted religion because of their “persistent and understandable feeling...that religious institutions have had a checkered record of defining and legitimating the human rights of the children of God.” Though Snyder’s book marks an important step in the right direction, it is just a first step—much more work needs to be done, for example on religion and the Helsinki groups. Yet it provides a worthy model for the scholars who will undoubtedly follow in her footsteps. And it is but one example of the overall success of her wonderful book, as utterly persuasive in its thesis as it is impressive in its research, which sheds a significant amount of new light and original insight in explaining the end of the Cold War.

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I was delighted by H-Diplo’s decision to organize a roundtable on my book, which emphasizes the influence of human rights activists on superpower politics and highlights the benefits of transnational approaches to international history. I am honored by the reviews of Andrew Preston, Gregory Domber, Piers Ludlow, and Michael Morgan, whose respective work engages with these questions in diverse ways.

Up until this point, much of the scholarship on the Cold War has not focused sufficiently on the intersection of human rights concerns and the formulation of foreign policy. One important consequence of increasing attention to transnational dimensions of the Cold War and international history more broadly has been the recognition that nonstate actors influenced state actors and international relations. Thus in my work, as political scientist G. John Ikenberry has written, “it was not containment that won the Cold War but the relentless efforts of activists, journalists, lawyers, minority-rights advocates, and diplomats who worked across borders to set the stage for the political earthquakes that followed.”

So far scholars have considered a range of factors in explaining the end of the Cold War, including economic stagnation, the military arms race, overextension abroad, and the personal contributions of political leaders such as Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Mikhail Gorbachev, Margaret Thatcher, and Pope John Paul II. My intention is to challenge these narratives by offering a more complex account that moves beyond focusing solely on political leaders and structural factors. Instead, my book emphasizes the significance of collective and individual human rights advocacy, arguing that Helsinki activism was one factor that ultimately influenced movements for reform, both those from below in Eastern Europe and from above in the Soviet Union.

Succinctly, I argue that the Helsinki Final Act spurred the development of a transnational network that contributed to the peaceful end of the Cold War. My book addresses the puzzling question of how the Helsinki Final Act, which was a voluntary agreement quickly dismissed by many international participants and commentators, came to play such an influential role in the end of the Cold War. In my view, the individuals on both sides of the East-West divide who made up the transnational Helsinki network were the critical, and unanticipated, actors to this transformation. The transnational Helsinki network that emerged after 1975 played an important role in convincing Western leaders to make human rights an essential part of their diplomacy and later to induce, at least indirectly, Eastern European and Soviet policymakers to undertake reform.

My hope is that the book will convince readers not only that human rights activism needs to be taken more seriously in explanations of the end of the Cold War, but also that scholars

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should pay greater attention to the salience of human rights concerns throughout the Cold War and beyond.

I would like to respond to what I see as the three most important issues raised in these reviews: questions of time, space, and method. Both Domber and Morgan comment on the book’s periodization. For Domber, my book examines “what might be called the long-1980s, from the slow death of détente to the rapid dissolution of the Soviet Union.” This formulation is a useful way of thinking about the end of the Cold War, particularly from an American perspective, as it links the Carter years to those that followed. Moving away from a periodization that sharply divides Carter and détente from Reagan and the new Cold War enables us to see the end of the Cold War as a longer, more evolutionary process. On a related note, Morgan points out that I argue for a relatively early end to the Cold War – 17 January 1989, when the CSCE review meeting in Vienna closed. Indeed, I contend that the commitments in the Vienna Concluding Document and the progress on freedom of information, emigration, and political prisoners made during the course of the Vienna meeting together signaled a profoundly new framework for East-West relations. It is my hope that the book will spur further reevaluations of the periodization of the late Cold War and its end.

In terms of space, I particularly appreciate Ludlow’s observation that I have introduced new “stages” on which we must see the Cold War as playing. I hope the book demonstrates the importance of moving examinations of the CSCE, and East-West diplomacy more broadly, out of the international convention halls in Finland, Austria, and Yugoslavia familiar to specialists on these conferences. What went on behind the scenes in Moscow kitchens, cluttered New York City offices, and congressional hearings rooms was as important in paving the way for the high-level diplomacy that followed. My examination of these different “stages” leads inevitably to the new cast I have presented. As Ludlow suggests, the key members of the transnational Helsinki network – Millicent Fenwick, Arthur Goldberg, Max Kampelman, Yuri Orlov, Anatoly Shcharansky, Jeri Laber, Ludmilla Alekseeva, and others – are relatively understudied in the history of the Cold War but warrant close historical examination. I have tried to evaluate their contributions objectively while avoiding temptations to sensationalize their suffering.

In terms of method, I appreciate the reviewers’ support for my efforts to write lower-level and nonstate actors more prominently into the history of the end of the Cold War. Morgan rightly points out that my greatest methodological challenge was not just uncovering the transnational connections that made up Helsinki activism but demonstrating the network’s influence on international relations, or in his words, to show how “ideas translate into action.” The reviews, and particularly Preston’s comment that the book shows that “ideas

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2 Robert Gates makes this point in his memoirs as well: “I believe historians and political observers alike have failed to appreciate the importance of Jimmy Carter’s contribution to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.” Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 177.
and culture can have direct causal force in international history,” suggest I have been at least partially successful. Nonetheless, important work remains.

Ludlow, Preston, and Domber’s reviews usefully highlight further avenues for related research at the state and nonstate levels, all of which I encourage. I agree with Ludlow’s suggestion that we need more work on Soviet policy toward the CSCE. A deeper understanding of Soviet objectives and the significance to which Soviet leaders attached continued participation in the Helsinki process are necessary, particularly to assessing the CSCE as a multilateral framework and suggestions to replicate the CSCE in other troublesome areas of the world.3 Given the limited access to the relevant Soviet archival sources, future scholars with different language skills could examine Soviet CSCE policy by mining the archives of the USSR’s Warsaw Pact allies. I second Preston’s call for further research into the intersection between religion and Helsinki groups. Beyond that, religious groups themselves, such as the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, and their attention to human rights violations, particularly regarding freedom of religion, deserve closer study. Similarly, much work remains to be done on ethnic interest groups’ Helsinki activism as well as the involvement of less specialized human rights organizations.4 I focused my analysis on groups whose mandate was Helsinki monitoring, but the broader “Helsinki lobby,” as groups interested in the CSCE in the United States were termed, merits study as well.5 In addition, as Domber suggests, our understanding of the dynamics of human rights activism in this period would benefit from new research that studies not only Eastern European dissidents, but also their supporters in Western and neutral countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands.

This project began as inquiry into how United States policy toward the Helsinki Final Act was transformed in the short period between August 1975 and the opening of the first follow-up meeting in November 1977. The answer is not simply the change in administrations, as during the 1976 campaign, Carter had characterized the accords as a “mistake” and declared that there was “no reason for us to participate in the Helsinki conference.”6 The United States adopted a new approach to participation in the CSCE under the influence of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the activism of Eastern European dissidents. Andrei Sakharov’s correspondence, Charter 77’s manifesto,


Moscow Helsinki Group reports on violations of the Helsinki Final Act, and hearings held by
the Commission all focused American attention on the ways in which the CSCE could be
used to advance the rights of those living in the Soviet bloc and, perhaps more cynically, to
wage the Cold War. The United States’ allies did not convert to this point of view so
readily.7 Much remains to be done to fill in the national perspectives of the thirty-five CSCE
member states as well as the nonstate actors who sought to influence them. I urge those
working on the CSCE to look increasingly beyond 1975 because as Ludlow suggests,
examining differences among American and Western European approaches to human
rights advocacy raises important questions not only about the efficacy of different types of
human rights activism but also changing conceptions of the roles of the United States and
Western European powers in the world.

Perhaps even more interesting for me is the evolution of Reagan’s stance of the CSCE. This
addresses to some degree Morgan’s counterfactual question about how different United
States human rights policy would have been had the Helsinki network never developed.
Whereas earlier Reagan had charged that the agreement had “put the American seal of
approval on the Red Army’s Second World War conquests,” during his presidency, the
United States actively and constructively participated in the Helsinki process.8 How can
such a shift be explained? Certainly the Carter administration, and particularly its
ambassador to the Belgrade meeting, Arthur Goldberg, demonstrated that the CSCE was an
additional forum in which Cold War propaganda points could be scored. But, during the
1980 campaign, Reagan questioned whether the United States should participate in the
CSCE review meeting in Madrid given the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: “Frankly, I have
an uneasy feeling that going to Madrid is negating what we thought we could accomplish by
boycotting the Olympics. If the athletes can’t go, why should the diplomats go?” (136)
Furthermore, the new Reagan administration sought to diminish American attention to
human rights, exemplified by the nominations of Jeane Kirkpatrick to serve as United States
Ambassador to the United Nations and Ernest W. Lefever to head the State Department’s
Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Both were vocal critics of Carter’s
human rights policy. Helsinki activists were key members in the campaign to defeat
Lefever’s nomination, which led the administration to shift its approach to human rights.9
This discrete achievement cannot begin to answer what is, after all, an impossible question.
But, all of the evidence available to me suggests United States policy would have taken a
considerably different course without congressional and nongovernmental activism in
support of compliance with the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent CSCE agreements.

7 See for example the conference papers published in Vladimir Bilandzic and Milan Kosanovic, ed.
From Helsinki to Belgrade - The First CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Belgrade 1977/78. Belgrade: Fond Mihaila
Zikica, 2008.

8 Leo P. Ribuffo, “Is Poland a Soviet Satellite?: Gerald Ford, the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine, and the Election

9 For further discussion see Sarah B. Snyder, “The Defeat of Ernest Lefever’s Nomination: Keeping
Human Rights on the United States Foreign Policy Agenda,” in Bevan Sewell and Scott Lucas, ed. Challenging