Introduction by Richard Immerman


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A review of *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume I: Origins*, published as H-Diplo Roundtable, Volume XII, No. 8 (2011), is available at:


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When historians of the cold war of the quality and stature of Melvin Leffler and Odd Arne Westad collect scores of their most accomplished colleagues to contribute essays to a history of the cold war published by Cambridge University Press, the academy, primarily but not exclusively scholars and students of international history and affairs, takes notice. Indeed, the editors of H-Diplo understandably and wisely chose to dedicate a separate roundtable to each of the three volumes of the *Cambridge History of the Cold War*. The first, focusing on Volume 1: *The Origins*, came online on March 11 of this year.¹ This second roundtable offers commentaries on the essays in Volume II.

The subtitle is apt: *Crises and Détente*. This volume begins chronologically with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, identified by many, including James Hershberg, the author of the Cuban Missile Crisis chapter, as the cold war crisis that presented the greatest risk of crossing the nuclear threshold (in comparison, the Berlin Crisis receives short shrift). As the volume proceeds through the 1960s and 1970s, it covers, to varying degrees, the subsequent crises that punctuated and to many observers defined the cold war: in the Middle East, in Eastern Europe, in Southeast Asia, in Africa, in Latin America. More conceptually, the contributors address nuclear crises, regional crises, financial crises, even cultural, ideological, and identity crises.

The volume pairs “Crises” with “Détente,” however, and if anything this latter theme is more pervasive. Not unlike what has become the conventional narrative of the cold war, the contributors collectively, by design or circumstance, link the sobering effect of the Cuban Missile Crisis with a steady if hardly linear “progress” toward détente. Marc Trachtenberg’s essay on the “Structure of Great Power Politics, 1963-1965,” is perhaps the most explicit explication of this dynamic, but it emerges in multiple other chapters as well. Yet it is also Trachtenberg who most explicitly calls this trajectory into question (again, his assessment is congruent with that of the other contributors). As is manifest by the resurgence of crises in Central America, Iran, and Afghanistan after 1975 and 1976 (effectively the endpoint of this volume even though some chapters extend to the end of the Carter administration), détente was “something of a charade.” It masked rather than resolved the underlying tensions that drove the cold war.

The volume receives high marks from each of the four reviewers. Sandra Scanlon is the most positive; she portrays *Crises and Détente* as virtually without blemish. Scanlon labels the history presented by the essays in toto as “sophisticated and lucid.” She applauds the editors for not imposing a synthesis, thereby allowing the essays to underscore the key yet distinct issues and shine a light on opportunities for further research. The closest Scanlon comes to a criticism is in her conclusion. “No volume could hope to offer voice to all those affected by the international politics of this era,” she concedes. But “the editors have

ensured,” she quickly adds, “that no voice can afford to be silenced in our exploration of the global Cold War.”

The other reviewers are not so unequivocal, although they are uniformly favorable in their assessments, “The events of this period are carefully analyzed by a group of authors, utilizing the very latest scholarly findings from different countries,” writes Ilya Gaiduk. He concurs with Scanlon’s praise for the volume’s eclecticism: “The attention devoted to the entire spectrum of forces and tendencies influencing the Cold War is without doubt one of the most significant achievements of the volume.” Michael Hopkins describes the essays as “richly insightful.” In his view, “There is no better place to begin to understand this conflict. With this David Milne emphatically agrees. If he were recommending essays on the cold war to someone without any foundation in its history, he would turn to these first. Their “breadth and depth of coverage, in disciplinary and geographical terms, is unparalleled,” all “are accessible to the general reader,” and they are “awe-inspiring” in “sweep and erudition.”

While the reviewers make clear that this volume of the Cambridge History of the Cold War will occupy an important niche in the historiography, they, including Scanlon, make equally clear that this historiography has a fertile future. Both Gaiduk and Hopkins find fault with the Western-centric orientation of the volume. They lament the preponderant emphasis on the United States and Europe, whether assessed from the standpoints of chapter titles, sources, or authors selected. Gaiduk points out that the tendency of the authors to cite their own works exacerbates this “narrowness in approach and interpretation.”

Yet it is David Milne who raises the most fundamental question: What is the value added of this collection? At issue, he explains, is the extent to which the essays offer insights that are either absent from or challenge the extant literature. On this question the reviews’ assessment is ambiguous. Each of the participants highlights the contributions of John Gaddis and Robert Jervis as particularly thoughtful, perceptive, and engaging. Compliments about other essays are scattered throughout. Yet the take-away from the roundtable comments is that this volume is largely summative and foundational.

Given the cost of the volume (and set), consequently, one must wonder (and Milne does) whether those likely to benefit the most from the essays, students, especially undergraduates, and the general reader, will be the least likely to read them. In light of what appears to be a growing trend among presses to publish encyclopedias, handbooks, companions, and the like (full disclosure: I am co-editing one such volume) that are beyond the price range of most individual consumers and stretch the resources of many libraries, this contradiction is cause for concern.2

Participants:

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2 [Editor’s Note]: Paperback editions of The Cambridge History of the Cold War are forthcoming in late 2011-early 2012. Further details may be obtained at: http://www.cambridge.org/us/knowledge/series/series_display/item3937003/?site_locale=en_US.
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Dr. Michael F. Hopkins is Senior Lecturer in History at the University of Liverpool. He is the author of Oliver Franks and the Truman Administration (2003) and (with Michael Dockrill) The Cold War 1945-1991 (2006) He is currently completing a study of Dean Acheson.


Sandra Scanlon is Lecturer in American History at University College Dublin. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Cambridge and was previously a Fellow in International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science. She is the author of “The Conservative Lobby and Nixon’s ‘Peace with Honor’ in Vietnam,” Journal of American Studies (2009) and co-editor of Reform and Renewal: Transatlantic Relations during the 1960s and 1970s (Newcastle, 2009). Sandra is currently completing a monograph on the Vietnam War and its cultural and political impacts on the development of the conservative movement.
The second volume of the *Cambridge History of the Cold War* (CHCW) primarily concentrates on the period of the 1960s and 1970s, when the confrontation between the two superpowers, the USA and the USSR, reached its most dangerous peak during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Afterwards, international relations developed into détente, an attempt to defuse the most explosive issue of international relations, a potential nuclear catastrophe by way of peaceful negotiations.

The events of this period are carefully analyzed by a group of authors, utilizing the very latest scholarly findings from different countries. The well-known John Gaddis, one of the leading specialists of Cold War Studies, introduces the second volume, setting the tone and context by analyzing the strategy of the main participants. Gaddis draws parallels to the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta, calling the post-war confrontation a “strategic stalemate”, and claiming that this constituted one of the reasons for the protracted nature of the Cold War (p. 9).

Gaddis outlines this notion in the field of ideology, where the struggle between two incompatible worldviews did not leave room for compromise and reconciliation. Similarly, the competition extended into the sphere of nuclear weapons, where the threat of global destruction did not stop both sides from attempting to reach superiority in numbers and weaponry. Even concerning their allies, the confrontation often inspired the superpowers to attract as many smaller states as possible into their orbit and incorporate their ambitions and phobias. As a result, the interests of the great powers often became the victims of their satellites. In the Cold War era, there were many examples for the phenomenon of “tails wagging the dogs” and not the other way around (p. 12).

However, Gaddis belongs to the school of thought blaming the origin of the Cold War squarely on the Soviet side. In Gaddis’ opinion, Iosif V. Stalin in particular, in contrast to American President Franklin D. Roosevelt, felt that a confrontation with the West after the Second World War was inevitable (p. 5). The Soviet dictator followed a “grand strategy” of struggle with the USA, whose policy of “containment” remained only a partial answer.

Although the debate on the subject of responsibility for the Cold War remains sketchy, and is beyond the chronological and thematic scope of this volume, and therefore does not become a subject of special attention in other articles, the issue of causation literally permeates the entire volume, re-surfacing in the final article by Wilfried Loth on the Cold

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1 This review is an adapted version of a review of all three volumes of the *Cambridge History of the Cold War* that will appear in a forthcoming issue of the journal *Novaya i Noveyshaya Istoriya*. It is distributed with the permission of the author.
War in the context of social and economic history of the twentieth century. Loth’s article, like Gaddis’ contribution, somewhat defines the volume’s orientation.

In Loth’s opinion, “the link between Soviet power and an international movement that sought to topple the bourgeois-capitalist order meant that East-West tensions had social and domestic ramifications in addition to the ideological ones” (p. 506). Because the Communist movement had followers in different countries and enjoyed Moscow’s support, the danger emanating from the USSR was felt by many in the West not only as a threat to their independence but also a threat to their way of life. In this fashion, apart from geopolitical and strategic factors, which determined the Cold War confrontation, social and economic factors also played a large role, influencing the course and outcome of the confrontation.

The attention devoted to the entire spectrum of forces and tendencies influencing the Cold War is without doubt one of the most significant achievements of the volume. The authors do not restrict themselves to diplomatic and military aspects between the two blocs and their leaders. They analyze the economic relations of the period (Richard N. Cooper), the problems of propaganda and ideological competition (Nicholas Cull), and the influence of protest movements on both sides of the “Iron Curtain” on the atmosphere of the Cold War (Jeremi Suri). They also discuss issues of identity (Robert Jervis), the battle of the intelligence services (Christopher Andrew), and European integration (N. Piers Ludlow).

The geographic span of the book is particularly impressive, covering many regions and countries, including those not traditionally integrated into the narrative, for example the Mediterranean Sea as a region of confrontation between East and West, analyzed in the article by Ennio Di Nolfo. In this way, the authors combine the thematic-chronological approach with a regional context, significantly expanding our concept of the Cold War and its impact on countries and peoples.

Speaking about the deficiencies in the CHCW, it should be noted that while applauding the scope of themes and issues discussed, the authors failed to fully overcome the Western and even, more precisely, America-centric approach that continues to prevail in this publication, from the selection of authors to the referenced historiography. In the first case, the absolute majority of the authors, even if they for some reason consider themselves as representatives of non-Western historical schools, either permanently live, or live and work in the U.S. and Western Europe. With regard to the historiographical framework presented in the articles, even a cursory glance at the cited literature reveals a high prevalence of papers published in the U.S. and Western European countries. In addition, the authors prefer to mostly quote their own books and publications, while the few studies that appear to broaden their source base (incidentally, not always successfully) are rare exceptions, and again reflect the views of Western historiography. Even the bibliographic review at the end of volume, which is designed to give a broad picture of the state of Cold War historiography, does not change the overall impression much.

Of course, such a “bent” can be explained by the fact that in the United States, the study of the Cold War has advanced far ahead in comparison with other countries, including
European countries. The unprecedented openness of American archives, with which only the access to British archives can be compared to, has, along with other factors, contributed to the rapid development of American Cold War historiography and its comparative advantage over other countries. But it is still disconcerting that, even with the unconditional supremacy of the achievements of Cold War historiography in the U.S. and other Western countries, the CHCW claims to be considered the international story, although other points of view are poorly or not represented at all. This is particularly evident in the second volume.

The consequence of such one-sidedness is a certain narrowness in approach and interpretation, when most of the events are viewed primarily in terms of their impact on the U.S. and its allies. Even the Soviet Union, America’s chief rival in the postwar confrontation, is relegated to a subordinate position in the interpretation of the authors of the articles of the second volume, not to mention China, India, Japan, these active players in the international arena during the period 1960-1980.
Crisis and Detente is the middle part of the excellent The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Its three volumes comprise eighty-two chapters by different authors and nearly 2000 pages. Each book concentrates on a distinct phase of the Cold War even though they do not have exact dates. CHCW II begins with the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 and the era of nuclear fears represented in movies like Dr Strangelove (1964) and Seven Days in May (1964), captures the vigour and economic growth and challenges to conventional wisdom of the 1960s, as well as the running sore of Vietnam, explores efforts to ease East-West tensions which reached a highpoint in the early 1970s, and ends with the demise of détente in 1975-1976 - though coverage of the Middle East ends in 1979 with the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty and the Iranian revolution, while the chapter on Cuba goes up to 1980.

The editors are wise enough to realise that some themes need a larger canvas, and so they include a number of studies that range beyond 1962-1976. In the opening chapter, John Lewis Gaddis examines the grand strategies adopted by the Soviet Union and the United States over the course of the Cold War. He suggests the nuclear arms race reinforced the Cold War status quo (12), and that smaller powers manoeuvred the superpowers – “the Third World was both victim and manipulator of the ‘first’ and ‘second’” (13). The Cold War ended because Moscow failed “to respect structures that had sustained Soviet power” (19): it intervened in territories like Afghanistan that brought only troubles to both Afghans and Soviets; it opened up the Soviet bloc to western technologies and food; it allowed, through the Helsinki Accords, abuses of human rights within Soviet dominated areas to be regarded as legitimate concerns of the international community. Gaddis’s study is a compelling miniature conspectus on the Cold War – even though it sometimes blurs the distinction between the strategies of the superpowers and a strategic view of their activities. In another thoughtful analysis, Robert Jervis contends that this was a contest between two visions of national identity, namely, the “values, attributes and practices that members believe characterize the country and set it apart from others” (22). The American identity comprised democracy, individualism and voluntarism, opposition to concentrated power, belief in a supreme being, and confidence that this “way of life” would appeal to others. The Soviets focused on the Marxist vision of a country shaped by the proletariat, of the transforming effects of class conflict on individuals and societies; and they also asserted their superpower status. The conflict ended when the Soviet identity shifted: Moscow dropped its adherence to class conflict, leaving little of the Soviet identity and mission in the world (42). “American identity had a resilience that the Soviet one did not” (43). He also makes an interesting claim: “Although American society changed markedly during the Cold War, it is far from clear that it would have been much different had those years been peaceful or characterized by conflict with a different adversary” (43).

Christopher Andrew stresses the important role of intelligence, claiming that the Soviet Union only survived as long as it did because of the KGB. It is a pity, then, that this is the only chapter on the topic and so has to cover the whole of the Cold War. Nicholas Cull explores Cold War culture in literature, film and broadcasting in particular. He seeks to
understand both how the governments influenced that culture and the ways in which artists responded to the conflict. He notes how popular culture was mobilised by governments, how artists addressed great issues, sometimes offering dissenting views but others toed the official line or pandered to the prejudice of the masses (458).

Several regional studies also take a broader chronological view. Fredrik Logevall tells the sorry tale of the wars over Indochina, 1945-1975. He stresses the misgivings of many powerful figures in 1965 about committing U.S. ground forces (296); and he doubts the domino theory and the damage non-involvement would have caused to American credibility (302). Douglas Little examines the Middle East from 1956 to 1979. He charts the chequered history of U.S. attempts to compete with the Soviets for influence, to prevent the Arab-Israeli conflict from escalating, and the American failure to understand the rise of radical Islam. Piero Gleijeses’s chapter on Cuba 1959-1980 is particularly welcome, since the country rarely enjoys separate coverage. Yet, as Gleijeses argues, “Cuban foreign policy had a profound impact” (347). Cuban troops helped the Namibians win their struggle against South Africa and changed American policy to the white minority regime in Rhodesia. Here was a third World country that “changed the course of events in a distant region – humiliating one superpower and repeatedly defying the other” (348). There are also two studies of economics. Wilfried Loth places the East-West confrontation in the context of social and economic developments in the twentieth century: “The Cold War thus not only had its roots in the conflicts of modern industrial society; it was also made obsolete by the further development of that society” (523). Richard Cooper’s valuable survey of economic developments reminds us that the Soviet economy looked healthy in the 1960s and 1970s. The 1960s saw “perhaps the highest decadal growth in history” (47). For all the necessary wariness about official Soviet statistics, observers detected rapid growth amongst the U.S.S.R. and the Warsaw Pact countries. Indeed, the mid-1970s looked bleaker for the U.S. and the West as it faced “stagflation.”

All these chapters, as well others on nuclear competition and proliferation, France, Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, European integration, the Third World, and counter-cultures, deliver on the editors’ aim to explore as wide a range of aspects of the conflict as possible. Power politics are rightly at the centre of the volume, examined in the twin themes of crisis and détente. James Hershberg delivers a deft outline of the Cuban missile crisis. Sensibly wanting to avoid duplication, the chapter on Presidents Kennedy and Johnson by Frank Costigliola and the chapter on Soviet foreign policy by Svetalana Savranskaya and William Taubman do not offer detailed accounts of the crisis. Hershberg suggests that Khrushchev placed the missiles in Cuba to improve the balance of nuclear power with the United States, to defend Cuba, and to do so by a less expensive option than a large conventional force (68-69). Savranskaya and Taubman believe that Khrushchev also saw the missiles as a bargaining tool to secure a treaty on Berlin (136). Compared with the earliest accounts, when he was praised for his cool restraint during the crisis, Kennedy does not emerge very favourably from these chapters. Costigliola argues that Kennedy overrated the importance of Latin America and Castro in particular, and that this set in motion the dangerous path to the confrontation of October 1962 (121). Hershberg believes that both Kennedy and Khrushchev were irresponsible and reckless before the crisis but more impressive during it (87). Was the anti-Castro policy really on the same scale of recklessness as the installation
of nuclear missiles? There was only one other serious crisis between 1962 and 1976 – the point when Nixon and Kissinger decided, during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, to put U.S. forces on the highest state of readiness short of war – DEFCON III – in response to Brezhnev’s declaration that Moscow would intervene unilaterally, if they could not achieve a U.S.-Soviet approach. Robert Schulzinger, in his chapter on the Nixon and Ford administrations, merely mentions this in passing. Douglas Little, in his treatment of the Middle East, argues that the Americans were being needlessly alarmist.

CHCW II pays more attention to its other theme – and with good reason, for this was a period between the Cuba crisis and the renewed Cold War after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The earliest appeals for a relaxation of tensions were made by Winston Churchill in the 1950s; and the first concrete move came in the Geneva summit in 1955. But these led nowhere. For Jussi Hanhimaki the first serious initiative came from the Europeans: West German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s pursuit of Ostpolitik forced the Americans to match this initiative. Henry Kissinger admitted as much in his memoirs, saying that Nixon and he developed a détente policy in part to preclude a West German-led European détente with the Soviet Union which excluded the United States.¹ Costigliola notes the readiness of Kennedy and Johnson to pursue better relations after the scare over Cuban missiles, but, he adds, they were hidebound by their attachment to the Cold War policies enunciated under Truman and Eisenhower (132). The replacement of Khrushchev as Soviet leader in 1964 by Alexei Kosygin and Leonid Brezhnev offered the prospect of improved superpower relations. However, it was only when Brezhnev emerged as the dominant figure that détente became a more realistic possibility, for he wanted to be seen as a peacemaker. Nuclear parity gave him greater self-confidence in arms talks but he was also concerned about the vulnerability of his allies in Eastern Europe. In addition, he was under pressure to meet the needs of the Soviet population and to narrow the technological gap with the West. So he favoured expanding East-West trade. Jeremi Suri suggests a wider context for the pursuit of détente. The leaders of the superpowers were responding not just to changed international circumstances but to domestic challenges to their authority and the orthodoxies of Cold War policy: U.S.-Soviet deals and the opening to China eventually stabilised the political scene in the United States and U.S.S.R. (478-479).

Nixon and Kissinger gained plaudits at the time for their efforts to promote more peaceful relations, but the authors in CHCW II are more sceptical. The Soviets and Americans, according to Savranskaya and Taubman, had different views of détente. For Moscow the aim was to confirm its military and political parity, to provide a platform for pursuit of its ideological goals, in particular its support for national liberation movements. Washington wished to avoid an escalation of U.S.-Soviet tensions to confrontation; and hoped to enlist Soviet assistance in resolving its difficulties, especially in Vietnam (149). Marc Trachtenberg claims that it was a “charade”: Kissinger and Nixon were not trying to construct “a ‘global structure of peace’ based on cooperation with the U.S.S.R . . . [but rather] to keep the Soviets in line by making sure they had to worry about a strong China

¹ Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 410-411, 529-531; Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little Brown, 1982), 145-146.
on their Asian border” (500). So Washington was not interested in “working with the Soviets on fundamental political problems” (500). Robert Schulzinger recognises that détente helped to ease popular fears of the risk of war between the U.S. and the USSR but, he adds, the manipulative and secretive ways of Nixon and Kissinger helped undermine its foundations. Gaddis is the most positive in his verdict: détente was both a cooperative superpower attempt to regain the initiative and a competitive superpower effort to obtain advantage (14), yet it did make the Cold War safer and more predictable (20).

Nevertheless, there is a consensus among the contributors that the stress on human rights in the Helsinki Accords of 1975 “helped set in motion forces that led to the demise of Soviet-style Communism” (374).

CHCW II offers a richly insightful examination of superpower relations. Its coverage of American policy is thorough, but more space should have been devoted to the USSR and China. Savranskaya and Taubman mention Soviet efforts to improve relations with China, in the face of Washington’s efforts to open channels with Beijing (148). It would have been interesting to hear more about this. Indeed, there is too little on the Chinese perspective. There is no separate chapter on China. Sergei Radchenko’s study of the Sino-Soviet split touches on the Chinese desire for greater status, resentment at Moscow’s frequent ethnic slurs, and Sino-Soviet border disputes.

In sum, this fine volume brings together leading scholars in the field to present in clear and perceptive chapters the latest knowledge and the current state of debate on the Cold War. There is no better place to begin to understand this conflict. However, it does not entirely meet the editors’ very high goals of avoiding the overly-U.S. focus of many studies and being “comprehensive, comparative and pluralist” (xvi).
The Cambridge History of the Cold War is a challenging series to review, particularly in a roundtable format. It’s been of some comfort that I’ve been asked to review just one of the three weighty volumes. But Volume II – subtitled Crisis and Détente – still amounts to twenty-four essays in over 500 pages of text. How does one engage with such a multi-headed hydra?

It struck me as problematic to critique individual chapters as the editors can’t necessarily speak on the contributor’s behalf. This wasn’t a major issue, regardless, as the essays – while variable in quality as they always are in such an endeavour – are each well-researched and clearly presented. All are accessible to the general reader and, in fine, paint a comprehensive panorama of the middle years of the Cold War (Volume I tackles “Origins” and Volume III focuses on “Endings.”) Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad have done a marvellous job at conceiving the series, laying parameters, and keeping the contributors focused on their allocated briefs. Indeed, if could recommend just three books to a reader with no prior knowledge of the Cold War – the average undergraduate, say – it would likely be this series. The breadth and depth of coverage, in disciplinary and geographical terms, is unparalleled. But roundtables tend not to work when all that is offered is praise. So I’ll also take an opportunity to query its raison d’être.

Before that, I’d like to offer a few observations on the essays that stood out. When reviewing a collection of essays commissioned to capture the state of the art, scholars are always on the look-out for “added value,” insights that are not already present in the existing literature. To my mind, the contributors who added the most value were those afforded the latitude to speak to larger themes – grand strategy, identity, culture, intelligence – that take a narrative thread from beginning to end. John Lewis Gaddis’s essay, for example, is absorbing, reminding us of the reasons for his eminence. Gaddis has not published much since his 2005 The Cold War (aimed primarily at the general reader) focusing much of his energy on developing the Grand Strategy program at Yale. His essay showcases his talents as a synthesizer, as a scholar adept at assuming a panoptic perspective, and indeed as an historian with literary as well as philosophical sensibilities. Gaddis is particularly strong in identifying Stalin’s geopolitical modus operandi: “We do not often think of Stalin as a grand strategist but perhaps we should. He rose to the top of the Kremlin hierarchy by systematically eliminating rivals who underestimated him. He transformed the Soviet Union from an agrarian state into an industrial great power.” (2) In simple prose he explains why Moscow confronted so many enemies in the early 1980s – Deng Xiaoping, Lech Walesa, Vaclav Havel, Pope John Paul II, a range of activists inspired by the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and many others. Gaddis characterizes this as “a major failure of strategy, since an obvious standard for success in strategy is to decrease, not increase, the number of enemies one faces.” (19) Using this criterion, I wonder if Gaddis regards Barack Obama as a superior grand strategist to George W. Bush – I suspect probably not. Regardless, the essay is a welcome insight into Gaddis’ current thinking on diplomacy.
Other fine essays included Robert Jervis’s piece on identity. Jervis observes that American and Soviet identities were ideational instead of geographical. “Maintaining Soviet identity,” Jervis writes, “depended on the future unfolding according to a plan: a cooperative worker’s society was to be put in place, the Soviet Union was to modernize, class conflict would prevail until the workers prevailed. The Cold War ended only when one side’s identity did; it could not have ended peacefully otherwise.” (43) The essay builds on Jervis’s large body of previous work on the subject, distilling its essence with commendable clarity. Many other essays go well beyond the diligent recounting of narrative detail and historiographical context. There is much added value in this collection.

My main concern about the volume is one that is applicable to all the Cambridge “History of” series, awe-inspiring as they are in sweep and erudition. It is simply that they capture the academic core of a discipline – indeed, they represent their crowning achievement in many cases – but they tend not to be widely read. This is unavoidable in many respects because these handsome volumes are so expensive; university libraries will likely represent the primary market. But I also find it unlikely that student essays/dissertations, journal articles, or scholarly monographs, will cite the volume with high frequency, instead focusing on the canonical texts – single authored monographs, primarily – in Cold War history.

In this respect the volume is a lot like Denis Diderot’s Encyclopédie. Sweeping in its coverage, the Encyclopédie aimed to capture the main currents of Enlightenment thinking. Diderot’s declared intention in editing the volume was “to change the way people think,” yet it didn’t achieve that admirable aim. This instead was realized by the Enlightenment’s multiple component parts. The Encyclopédie was a magnificent scholarly edifice examined with admiration from afar. And while the collection contains an important, oft-cited introduction by D’Alembert, and carried essays by luminaries such Rousseau, Voltaire and Montesquieu, contemporary scholars don’t spend much time poring over its many volumes. Instead, students of the Enlightenment from a range of disciplines engage with the seminal single-authored books: Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws, Rousseau’s Social Contract and Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature, and many others. These books are alive, but the Encyclopédie is something of a museum piece – defining an era for posterity instead of bequeathing the ideas that shaped subsequent generations. In a similar fashion, Cold War scholars will likely continue to grapple with the path-breaking texts of our own luminaries: Odd Arne Westad’s The Global Cold War, Melvyn Leffler’s Preponderance of Power, John Lewis Gaddis’ Strategies of Containment, and many others beside.

All of which is not to say that the three volumes of the Cambridge History of the Cold War lack utility. The essays cover the field admirably, and follow a venerable scholarly tradition of synthesising the best of something, presenting a one-stop destination for those with limited time-resources. The volumes will also be useful to scholars working on textbooks of their own – the suggested further readings are comprehensive and helpful – and will be invaluable in respect to lecture-preparation. It’s simply that while the single-authored works mentioned above will be hale and hearty in subsequent generations, this volume might become something like the Encyclopédie: magnificent, imposing, and inanimate.
Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad offer a sophisticated and lucid history of the Cold War during its second phase. Their editorial line opens opportunities for further research, while offering distinct interpretations of the salient issues of debate. Bringing together divergent, if not necessarily competing, arguments, this collection of twenty-four essays avoids synthesis to the benefit of underscoring key themes relating to the nature and longer term impacts of Cold War conflict, culture, and cooperation during a period of intermittent crisis and prevailing stability. The collection’s coherence relies on collective recognition that this period marked a distinct phase in international relations, one in which the Cold War international system was stabilized on a global scale. Stabilization of this international order furthered tension and fuelled crises, and détente (or rather the varied forms of détente) is understood as a dynamic, at times reactionary process. East-West tensions therefore dominated the international system, but third parties made significant efforts to operate outside the confines of this rigid bipolar world order. New voices emerge as agents in defining the nature of the Cold War conflict and international culture. Unsurprisingly given Westad’s earlier work in particular, this is a far cry from a straightforward examination of superpower relations during the second phase of the Cold War.

Thematically, this volume can be observed to explore three defined, if broadly interpreted, issues: decolonization and the third world; the origins and impacts of détente; and questions of identity and culture. Each operated within the framework of a stabilized order, described by John Lewis Gaddis as a “grand strategic stalemate” (9). Each was the subject and progenitor of international crises.

Decolonization and the emergence of independent states in the third world coincided with the consolidation of the bipolar world order. This process exacerbated crises; the efforts of third world states to follow paths that diverged from those established by superpower rivalry resulted in the increased militarization of disputes or competitions in those areas. Furthermore, the superpowers increasingly came to define success in terms of influence in the third world. Frank Costigliola observes that Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson were particularly inclined to interpret non-aligned third world states as “malleable objects” to be won or lost (113). The Soviet Union witnessed successive states adopt the mantle of socialism with often limited Soviet intervention. “History,” Gaddis notes, “seemed to be vindicating Marx in places Marx had hardly heard of” (17). For the most part, superpower activism in the third world revealed, however, the limits to U.S. and Soviet power projection. Setbacks fostered domestic turmoil, as in the case of U.S. intervention in Vietnam, and challenged Soviet faith in the constant progress toward global socialist revolution. In the Middle East especially, as Douglas Little discusses, the Soviets learned that being anti-Western did not necessarily make third parties pro-Soviet. In terms of impact, the Soviet Union appears to have suffered more as a result of setbacks in the third world, despite the obvious public trauma of the grand U.S. failure in Southeast Asia. Liberal theorists who had professed that a democratic, capitalist United States represented the “endpoint” of the “historical scale” found their particular modernization theories under
scrutiny (262). But the ideas underpinning American exceptionalism were sustained. Americans may have been forced at this juncture to question the potential of U.S. power, but they were not faced with a fundamental challenge to their collective national identity. Conversely, Soviet identity was challenged by the limits of socialist revolution in the third world, a factor that was, according to Robert Jervis, crucial to ending the Cold War. “The Cold War,” he contends, “ended only when one side’s identity did; it could not have ended peacefully otherwise” (43).

Superpower engagement in competition in the third world thus proved problematic, but it is by no means the most important aspect of the dynamic relationship between decolonization and the Cold War. Characterized by Piero Gleijeses as “a socialist country with a Third World sensibility,” Cuba stands out for its pursuit of socialist revolutions beyond its borders, as well as its willingness to follow a path independent of Soviet guidance (342). Cuba’s position at the intersection of these two worlds reflects a broader international process, rather than an anomaly. Decolonization as a defining agent of the twentieth century international order cannot be understood simply within the confines of the Cold War. Neither the editors nor Michael Latham in his essay on the third world posit such a reductionist paradigm. But further research is required to understand the ways in which the ideologies underpinning the pursuit of independence impacted the discourse of Cold War rivalries. Similarly, analyzing the ways in which the Cold War was consumed within the cultures of newly independent states is particularly significant in furthering our understanding of the contemporary international order.

Superpower détente, as a means of formalizing the “rules” of the Cold War, failed to recognize the independence of third world actors and their abilities to offer “temptations,” which thereby extended rivalry into new areas (Gaddis, 15). This was by no means its only limitation. The authors provide distinct interpretations of détente, focusing on U.S., Soviet, and European policymakers’ goals and understandings of the international environment. Marc Trachtenberg perhaps goes furthest in denouncing the reality of the Nixon administration’s stated rationale for détente, and argues that this “charade” was designed simply to obscure the Americans’ goal of building up a strong China on Russia’s border (500). A broader consensus emerges regarding the importance of strategic parity in creating the pre-conditions for superpower détente and the priority attached to national interests and international stability. Consistently, such goals trumped any real engagement with reducing competition, at least between the superpowers. Despite the prominence of arms reduction agreements, and indeed their significance in rallying opposition to détente, they served largely symbolic purposes.

Perhaps the most compelling arguments regarding détente relate to its ambiguous and unanticipated impacts. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, a product of European détente, brought a focus on the “rights of people rather than the prerogatives of states” to the international arena (Jussi Hansimäki, 216). The Soviets made a grievous error in accepting that human rights were a matter of international concern, Gaddis contends, a position that is supported by Robert Schulzinger’s claim that the Helsinki Final Act “actually helped set in motion forces that led to the demise of Soviet-style Communism” (374). By making Western cultural products more readily available in the
East, the Act afforded popular culture a greater opportunity to become a “space in which dissenting views could be developed and disseminated” (Nicholas Cull, 458). The significance attached to European détente attests to this collection’s efforts to further internationalize the history of the Cold War. More importantly, it attests to the necessary recognition of the agency of third parties in defining the Cold War order and in determining its course during this period. While European détente rallied critics and contributed to the political reemergence of hard-line Cold War ideologies, it also altered the context of the Cold War in Eastern Europe and contributed to its ending.

The significance of culture permeates this collection of essays, offering skillful interpretations of leaders’ motivations, individual understandings of international relations, domestic political considerations and ideologies. Drawing on sources from international archives, the authors reveal the complexities of individual and collective consumptions of Cold War orthodoxies. Challenges to the pervasive cultures of the Cold War were exemplified by individual leaders, for instance France’s Charles de Gaulle and Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, and by transnational movements, as represented by the emergence of the counter-culture. As such, social and identity crises reveal themselves as comparable to military tensions in furthering the process of détente and characterizing this era. In this respect, the editors ably further the process of clarifying “what mattered to the greatest number of people during the Cold War” (Leffler and Westad, xv). It was an ambitious endeavour. The editors and contributors deserve high praise for their success in elucidating the significance of cultural matters in determining the trajectory of the Cold War.

No volume could hope to offer voice to all those affected by the international politics of this era. The editors have ensured, however, that no voice can afford to be silenced in our exploration of the global Cold War.

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