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Introduction by T. Christopher Jespersen, North Georgia College & State University

In researching the American film industry in Japan before and after World War Two, Hiroshi Kitamura must have engaged in more than the usual acts of research collection and analysis; he apparently imbibed deeply of the Hollywood mantra that nothing succeeds like a sequel, since, according to two of the reviewers, Kitamura is well situated to produce a second work that follows up *Screening Enlightenment*, one that examines American movies in Japan after the occupation. That’s a nifty accomplishment, but then again, so is the original work. According to the reviewers, in this “tightly focused”, “[t]horoughly researched and carefully argued” book, one that is a “stellar contribution to the scholarship”, Kitamura employs “richly textured accounts” to bring to historical light the nature of the American film industry in Japan after the war, and the way in which Japanese, both “cultural elites and fandom participated in an emerging culture with much arder and energy.”

John Trumpbour quite rightly situates Kitamura’s work within the context of similar examinations into American film, culture, and occupied Germany, and the American cultural relationship with Europe after the war. Drawing upon works by Heide Fehrenbach, Victoria de Grazia, and Reinhold Wagnleitner, Trumpbour provides appropriate parallels between those authors and their subjects with what Kitamura tackles in his book. Mire Koikari places *Screening Enlightenment* within the context of John Dower’s magisterial work *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, as does Lary May, and both Koikari and May bring to the discussion the vast and excellent scholarship on the culture of the Cold War as it applied to the American domestic scene and how Kitamura adds to our broader understanding of the various currents swirling about and their application to Japan.

*Screening Enlightenment*, like all good books, is thus carefully placed within the existing scholarship at the same time that it makes an original contribution. Michael Barnhart indicates that the book would have been valuable as a discussion of “influence and attitudes,” but as Barnhart then points out Kitamura has done more than that: his investigation into and analysis of “the institutional dynamics of the occupation authorities, the film industries in America and Japan, and the various Japanese organizations that sprung up to enjoy, or accommodate, Hollywood’s products” make *Screening Enlightenment* “especially worthwhile.”

In addition to his significant contribution to diplomatic history and U.S. relations with Japan, Kitamura adds to our understanding of Japanese history in the critical period after the war. His work, as has been mentioned, fits nicely with John Dower’s book but also with something as seemingly far afield as Sheldon Garon’s *Molding Japanese Minds*, for what

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Kitamura details so carefully through his examination of the Central Motion Picture Exchange (CMPE) and the *Eiga no tomo*, among other organizations and entities, is how Japanese came to embrace the carefully scripted and edited manner in which American films were reintroduced to Japan during the occupation.\(^2\)

One particularly delightful example that Kitamura uncovers involved the Marunouchi Subaru-za theater. Located in central Tokyo, the Subaru-za not only became “a ‘shrine’ of Hollywood’s new releases” (122), it sought to create a new experience, one that was both special and designed to affect the way Japanese acted. The theater limited admissions to seating capacity, an idea easily taken for granted now but something entirely different from the crowding that was commonplace in Japanese theaters at the time. As Kitamura observes, this innovation “helped restore spatial order” and also “achieved temporal order” and, as a result, created a relaxed atmosphere that also raised the standards for public conduct and decorum. Patrons were prohibited from smoking, gentlemen were required to remove their hats, and the theater even boasted a dozen “romance seats” that raised the notion of “public romance” to “an acceptable and even respectable experience.” (124)

In the end, Kitamura expertly blends his archival work on the film industry within the broader account of Japan’s recovery. And in the best tradition of Hollywood, he leaves us with a teaser of potential coming attractions – of a resurgent Japanese film industry that ends up creating some of the truly great works in film history to the changing Japanese popular acceptance of American films as an economically prosperous nation and its people come to grips with their new international status in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. In Hiroshi Kitamura’s capable hands all the reviewers agree, that would be a sequel well worth viewing.

**Participants:**


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was a recipient of the Organization of American Historians-Japan Association for American Studies Short-term Residency in Japan Award to teach at Kyoritsu Women’s University (2005).

**Michael A. Barnhart** is Distinguished Teaching Professor at SUNY-Stony Brook. His work includes *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941* and *Japan and the World Since 1868*. His current project is a multi-volume survey tentatively titled, *E Pluribus: A Political History of American Foreign Relations*.

**Mire Koikari** is associate professor and director of Women's Studies at the University of Hawai’i at Manoa. Her recent publications include *Pedagogy of Democracy: Feminism and the Cold War in the United States Occupation of Japan, 1945 – 1972* (Temple University Press, 2008). She is currently working on a project where she explores connections among Cold War technical and cultural interchanges, transnational proliferation of “scientific domesticity,” and US military expansionism in postwar Okinawa.


What was the purpose of showing American movies in Occupation Japan? Were they to demonstrate the virtues of democracy? The superior values of America in general? Or were they meant to simply draw Japan under American influence while providing healthy profits for an American film industry overwhelmingly centered in Hollywood during these years? As this compact, well-organized and well-researched study makes clear, the right answer is all of the above. Yet, as it also makes clear, quite often these goals were not complementary, especially in the confused and conflicting cultural administration of the early Occupation period. The result is a tightly focused study that tells its story well, but one that may seem almost too tightly focused and even too shy in drawing more general conclusions from that well-told story.

It should come as no surprise that the Occupation authorities were concerned, almost obsessed, with destroying the spirit of militarism in Japan and saw film, especially film censorship, as a key way to achieve this objective. That was bad news for the samurai movies, but the Americans were nearly as strict against Hollywood’s westerns. The authorities did not want the atomic holocaust much publicized. Yet release of “The Bells of Nagasaki” was only delayed, not forbidden, while American-made pulp films containing references to powerful explosive devices were banned or censored. In fact, American films depicting any anti-social behavior had a hard time making past the censors, including “Double Indemnity” (too much crime) and “The Great Gatsby” (too much dissolution).

Kitamura’s study also forces a new look at easy models of American proselytizing during the Occupation. While it was true that the authorities wanted to portray American lifestyle favorably, this aim led to interesting decisions. Biographies of admirable and intrepid Americans were particularly favored, such as Lou Gehrig’s story in “Pride of the Yankees.” But the Occupation deliberately tried to portray women as men’s equals, giving “The Farmer’s Daughter” and “Little Women” strong support. Films depicting racism were discouraged: bad news for Tarzan.

If Kitamura only discussed influence and attitudes, his study would be valuable. But its analysis of the institutional dynamics of the occupation authorities, the film industries in America and Japan, and the various Japanese organizations that sprung up to enjoy, or accommodate, Hollywood’s products make it especially worthwhile. The U.S. Army’s Civil Affairs Division (CAD), with global authority over occupation affairs, was far less accommodating (or sensitive, or possibly even intelligent) in its very strict censorship policies than General Douglas MacArthur in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) in Japan, leading to occasional friction. It is something of a missed opportunity that Kitamura does not explore why this was so. It might be particularly interesting to have a better sense of where CAD’s officers came from, and how they got to their positions, to explain their hardline and quite inflexible stance. CAD’s finance officers provoked a first-class film crisis by refusing to allow Hollywood to repatriate its films’ profits made in Japan. The refusal made eminent sense. Occupation Japan’s critical shortage of foreign exchange is well known. But the American film-makers had a devastating
response, refusing to ship new movies for release in Japan until their profits were released
to them. CAD not only lost this fight; it also hastened, it lifted its iron hand of censorship
afterwards. Here too, though, Kitamura’s close focus on his main story leads to a missed
opportunity. He refers to a similar fight after the Occupation, this time between Hollywood
and a now sovereign Japan’s Ministry of Finance. Alas, he does not tell us who won this
veritable clash of the titans.

Kitamura’s study also includes a fascinating analysis of Hollywood’s impact on the
distribution of films in Japan. Spearheaded by an imperious Charles Mayer, who ran the
Central Motion Picture Exchange for much of the Occupation, the Americans virtually
remade how movies were distributed and shown in Japan. Mayer’s organization provided
powerful incentives for even destitute Japan to develop luxury cinema emporiums. Mayer
ensured that these bright houses, often with reserved seating, received the top of the line
movies. By contrast, dingy local theaters would not be permitted to show American films at
all unless minimal standards of hygiene and comfort were met. Even then, they were
allotted only the pulp films: good news for Tarzan once CAD’s heavy hand was lifted. Any
student of the emergence of the mass movie industry within the United States a generation
earlier will recognize much here, and it seems a little regrettable that Kitamura does not
note some of the parallels.

The largest missed chance, at least from this reviewer’s perspective, is a more thoughtful
examination of just why American films were so popular in Occupation Japan—and after.
Kitamura is too good an historian to miss that popularity, and his conclusion notes as much,
from “West Side Story” to “Top Gun.” Surely the factors that converged during the
Occupation explain some of this endurance. But how much? My first research trip to Japan
landed me in a group of Japanese graduate students my age. To someone who prided
himself on a certain degree of intellectual sophistication (well, so it seemed at the time),
those students seemed obsessed with American movies, even adopting English names for
themselves, names invariably drawn from the products of Hollywood. The Occupation was
long over. Mayer was long gone. Yet the cultural reconstruction was ongoing. A few words,
even speculations, from such a careful scholar as Kitamura would have made this
admirable study even better.
Hiroshi Kitamura’s *Screening Enlightenment: Hollywood and the Cultural Reconstruction of Defeated Japan* is an invaluable addition to an expanding body of scholarship on the U.S. occupation of Japan. Since the 1950s, occupation studies have examined a wide range of topics concerning the postwar U.S.-Japan encounter, including, among others, constitutional and civil code revisions, educational reform, economic restructuring, labor and women’s movements. While earlier debates have more often focused on political and economic dimensions, recent studies have taken culture as an equally or even more important window into the occupation.¹ As John Dower reveals in *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, the occupation involved more than political or economic restructuring of Japan; it spawned a diverse array of cultural discourses and practices, compelling the victors and the vanquished to engage with each other in complex and often amorphous terms.² Kitamura takes a close look at one arena of occupation-time cultural dynamics, i.e., the film industry. Tapping into the occupiers’ censorship records, Hollywood film studios’ memorandas and newsletters, and Japanese film magazines and fan letters, he skillfully reconstructs Hollywood’s incursion into occupied Japan, American and Japanese film studios’ negotiations with General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), occupiers’ censorship and its outcomes, and Japanese responses and reactions. Far from a case of the victor’s cultural imposition on the vanquished, Kitamura’s book illuminates how Japanese cultural elites and fandom participated in an emerging culture with much ardor and energy, turning the postwar film industry into a "contact zone" between the two former enemies.

Kitamura’s book provides richly textured accounts. After carefully setting up the historical background of the American film industry and its presence in prewar Japan, he goes on to identify major actors and their contributions to the postwar Japanese film world: the Motion Picture Export Association (MPEA) which promoted Hollywood’s overseas expansion in the postwar world; the Central Motion Picture Exchange (CMPE) which functioned as “East Asian outpost” of the MPEA; the Civil Information and Education Section (CI&E) and the Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD) of SCAP which mobilized films as the chief means of Japanese “reorientation” and “rehabilitation”; and Japanese “cultural elites” and fans who engaged in a multitude of film-related activities against the backdrop of a war-torn nation.


The stories Kitamura provides of film making and distribution during the occupation are truly fascinating. The films chosen by the occupiers for Japanese “rehabilitation” and “reorientation” were an eclectic mix, including “Abe Lincoln in Illinois,” “Madame Curie,” “Casablanca,” and “the Keys of the Kingdom.” While the occupiers claimed rehabilitation, reorientation, and democratization as their main agendas in postwar Japan, Kitamura’s examination illuminates other motives and intentions that informed the censors’ decisions. “The Bells of Nagasaki,” a biopic of a Japanese radiologist who survived the atomic bomb in Nagasaki, was censored, as SCAP, concerned with any depiction of the U.S. as inhumane, thought that the scene of the Nagasaki bombing would “serve no constructive purpose.”(56) As a result, the film did not get released until later, when censorship policies were finally relaxed. The occupiers’ weariness in dealing with the issue of the atomic bomb was such that SCAP suspended the release of another film, “Tarzan and the Green Goddess.” To the occupiers’ chagrin, this American film included a reference to a secret object whose explosive power would result in the destruction of the entire world (71). This was not the only trouble Tarzan faced in occupied Japan. SCAP was not at all happy with the film’s portrayal of indigenous populations in the South American jungle as primitive and powerless; nor was it indifferent to a depiction of conflicts between whites and non-whites in the film. Such depictions, SCAP argued, showed “imperialism at its worst,” creating negative impressions of the U.S. (76) SCAP’s censorship efforts sometimes looked arbitrary and even absurd. “Arabian Nights” came under SCAP’s criticism because of its depiction (and thus alleged endorsement) of violence and cruelty which would hinder Japanese rehabilitation and reorientation (72). In contrast, “Anna and the King of Siam” was SCAP’s favorite, as it emphasized harmonious relationship between West and East and emphasized the values of science, modernity, and progress (77).

Equally or more fascinating are accounts of the marketing strategies Hollywood, more specifically the CMPE, adopted in occupied Japan. Partly to appease MacArthur and SCAP but mainly to maximize its profits, the Hollywood industry framed its marketing campaigns in terms of promoting “culture” and “enlightening” Japanese. American films were to help the Japanese learn about superior American culture and develop new citizenry befitting to a postwar nation. The enlightenment campaign deployed lectures, exhibits, and other promotional materials and strategies in order to disseminate American films. "Rhapsody in Blue" was promoted as a biopic of George Gershwin but also as a chronicle of American music history (98). “Little Women” was disseminated as a morality tale for women where the meanings of love, marriage, and family would be explored in the film’s Victorian domestic setting (103). “Union Pacific” was to provide an occasion to teach the Japanese the values of technological triumph and progress (107).

The Japanese welcomed this enlightenment campaign. As Kitamura recounts, they were indeed eager, even obsessed, to interpret, understand, and devour American culture. A group of “cultural elites” emerged, organizing themselves into the American Movie Culture Association (AMCA) and spreading the gospel of American culture throughout Japan. Perceived as “influential agents” by SCAP in rehabilitating and reorienting Japanese, and treated as “business agents” by Hollywood in boosting its commerce, these “cultural elites” were important intermediaries who would provide the instructions in film appreciation and guide the Japanese along the path of enlightenment. No less earnest were Japanese film
fans at large. Japanese film fandom soon emerged, publishing a magazine, Eiga no tomo (Friends of the movies) and inaugurating a fan club, Tomo no kai (Meeting of friends), both of which quickly spread throughout Japan, with an iconic figure, Yodogawa Nagaharu, often at the center of many of their activities. In this new cultural domain, Japanese film fans came to exchange information on film stars, learn “proper” methods of spectatorship, and pursue “correct” understandings of American films and culture. In occupied Japan, the film world became a crucial space where the Japanese would articulate a new sense of self in relation to the victor’s culture.

Richly detailed and concisely written, Kitamura’s book beautifully illuminates the significance of culture in postwar Japan. Notwithstanding its excellent quality, the book also begs for further clarification and contemplation. While his accounts sheds light on the internal workings of the Japanese and American film industries as well as SCAP, one wishes to see more of the pairing of this set of information with that of the political and economic dynamics at national and international levels. Far from smooth or static, the U.S. occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1952 was a rugged process, punctuated by many events and even crises along the way. Domestically, for example, constitutional revision dramatically transformed the national polity and the status of the Emperor in the early days of the occupation, but this tenor of “progress” of the occupation was soon altered as a result of the “reverse course,” commencing an explicitly rightward turn in occupation policies. Internationally, the communist revolution in China, the Korean War, and increasing tensions between the U.S. and the USSR provided the backdrop against which the U.S. occupation of Japan took place, whose contours and content were deeply impacted by these larger geopolitical dynamics. How did these domestic and international dynamics inform decisions and pronouncements made by Japanese and American film industries, CI& E and CCD of SCAP, as well as Japanese “cultural elites” and fan clubs? Tracing the connections between the inner working of the postwar film industries and larger dynamics of national and international politics would enrich the author’s claim that culture is always already articulated in relation to historical and political dynamics.

With Kitamura’s focus on culture, the book also begs for further engagement with Cold War cultural studies. Scholars such as Elaine Tyler May, Lary May, Paul Boyer, Alan Nadel, Guy Oakes, May Dudziak, Penny Von Eschen, and Robert Dean have illuminated the complex and convoluted nature of Cold War culture. While these scholars have primarily focused on Cold War cultural formation in the US, other scholars such as Christina Klein, Robert

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Haddow, Thomas Borstelmann, and Yoshikuni Igarashi have shown how Cold War cultural dynamics did not remain within the U.S. but extended themselves to other regions and locations, including postwar Japan. Contradictory and at times even nebulous, Cold War culture in the U.S. and elsewhere articulated distinct patterns involving gender, race, sexuality, and nation. Kitamura’s study in fact shows, but does not necessarily explicitly theorize, these gendered, racialized, national, and transnational dynamics of Cold War culture. As he suggests in his discussions of “Little Women,” the film idealized women safely contained within home, a theme identified by Elaine Tyler May and others as one of the central features of Cold War culture. His analysis of “Anna and the King of Siam” highlights the occupiers’ interest in promoting East-West harmony and friendship, which constituted a central feature of the “Cold War Orientalism” proposed by Christina Klein. There are many other examples and discussions throughout the book that suggest the significance of gender, race, sexuality, etc., as important ingredients of Cold War cultural formation and transformation. Given his familiarity with Cold War cultural studies (which is evident in his endnotes and bibliography), Kitamura must already be in dialogue with the pre-existing work on Cold War culture. Thus one cannot help but wonder: would he agree with the understandings of Cold War culture generated by these studies that have preceded his own, or would he give a fresh twist, perhaps even a challenge, to any of these pre-existing understandings and analyses of Cold War culture?

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Just after the end of World War II, when it was acceptable for the Japanese to write and speak freely, the veteran film critic Hazumi Tsuneo repented, like many of his fellow critics, for his militant support of the imperial state during the long Pacific War against the United States. The defeat prompted him to regret his "shameful" support of the "imperialist" actions of the Japanese state and military. As part of his asking for forgiveness, he praised the United States and its films whose images possessed a "miraculous" power to transform. Hollywood films, he claimed in a 1947 book, carried the "frontier spirit" of America, and "the anti fascism "of its "American democracy." Hazumi encouraged Japanese youth to gain a "correct understanding "of the new occupiers. To that end, he explained, "one cannot cast one’s eyes from American movies." (IX)

Hazumi was one of many Japanese critics who saw American film as the model for a radical break from the old Imperial order. In documenting Hollywood’s place in this rupture, Screening Enlightenment: Hollywood and the Cultural Reconstruction of Defeated Japan now establishes Hiroshi Kitamura as one of the most insightful of recent historians recording the impact of the occupation on Japan after World War II. Thoroughly researched and carefully argued, this work complements John Dower’s very influential Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, a broad exploration of the political and cultural reconstruction of Japan, and Kyoko Hirano’s Mr. Smith Goes to Tokyo, a study of the impact of the American occupation on the Japanese film industry. ¹ In focusing on the place of the American film industry in postwar Japan, Kitamura provides a template for answering questions that concern students of the era. How did the short-lived occupation, and America’s rise to world power in the Cold War, serve to reshape nationalism in the two countries? Did Hollywood promote a modern cultural imperialism that stimulated demand for American consumer goods worldwide? And why were the Japanese so accepting of the defeat and the American effort to transform their social and cultural values?

Kitamura’s book explores these and other issues in three distinct phases. In the prewar era, the Japanese state restricted American imports and in World War II banned them altogether. Following the defeat, however, the occupation spurred Hollywood’s commercial expansion throughout Japan. While American officials censored the media and selected all films shown in Japan they realized that, Hollywood provided a mechanism for reorienting Japanese culture along democratic lines. One of Kitamura’s most important findings is that the Japanese critics and audiences consumed Hollywood films not because the Americans forced them to, but because the Hollywood products provided an alternative to the backward values of the old “feudal” order that many thought had created a “shameful” and horrific war. Starting at “year zero”- that period in 1945 when the old order lay in ashes- the elites, critics and young audiences consumed these images as entertainment and as models for a lifestyle to compliment the occupation’s political policies.

¹ John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1999); Kyoko Hirano, Mr. Smith Goes to Tokyo (Washington, D.C: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1992).
Though Kitamura does not emphasize it, the fate of Japan and the content of the Hollywood films depended on a vast political and cultural change operating transnationally in Japan and the United States. The Americans and the film industry that came to Japan in 1945 were still under the influence of the political and cultural upheaval of the Great Depression. In an American society that had been dominated by the Anglo Saxon middle class, the interests and the voices of the working class divided by race and ethnicity remained excluded from the public sphere. This was possible because the Anglo Saxon middle classes controlled the national print media, state, and business system. Yet the worldwide economic crisis left this older order in shambles. Amid the upheaval workers organized, and, voting by class, entered the two party system. A film industry formed by the “new” immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe provided a vernacular ethos that helped spark common bonds across divided groups. In Hollywood as in the nation, the major cinema personalities represented a new “America” arising from the bottom rather than the top of the social order. Whether it was the Cherokee Indian comic Will Rogers, the African American singer Paul Robeson, the Irish and Italian Catholic directors, John Ford and Frank Capra, or the New Englander Betty Davis, major stars dramatized on the screen a new populism that was critical of class inequality and the greed of big business, corrupt politicians, World War I and imperialism. Carrying this elan into public life, film makers and the stars made the industry one of the most unionized and pro-New Deal voting blocs in the entire nation from the thirties to World War II.²

It was this New Deal America that dominated the ideas of American officials and Hollywood in the first phase of the Japanese occupation. In the period from 1945 to 1948, the Americans all promoted policies and films associated with the New Deal and the vernacular arts. Within this agenda, the victors’ commitment to democracy in economics and culture operated as two sides of the same coin. That elan spurred American policymakers to launch politics to break up the large corporate monopolies - the Zaibatsu - in the business sector, to redistribute land in the agrarian sectors, to legitimize labor unions in heavy industry sectors, to outlaw the elite military system in the defense sector, to renounce war in foreign policy, to form a new democratic constitution that emancipated women in public life, and to insure that the emperor become a secular figurehead.

With the start of the Cold War, however, the occupation underwent what has been called the “great reversal.” As anti-communism dominated domestic and foreign affairs in America and Japan, the great project of social engineering or Japanese nation building ran on parallel tracks with the purges unfolding in the United States. In line with protecting the Free World, General Douglas MacArthur and his administrators purged the communists from labor and the film industry, restricted labor strikes, restored the Zaibatsu in industry, ended land redistribution policies in the countryside and encouraged a homeland defense establishment to maintain domestic security. At the same time as the “great reversal” unfolded in Japan, it danced to tunes of a vast change in American politics. The country now

created for the first time in an era of peace a military establishment with bases and treaties around the world. Unlike the earlier domestic “Red Scare” after World War I that affected immigrants and labor, and lasted a short time, the postwar crusade permeated all the major institution in American life and set policy for the next fifty years. Not only were militant labor unions contained and left-wing film makers blacklisted, but the state cooperated on many levels with film producers to influence private life by censoring film scripts, while the government launched a “lavender scare” against homosexuals and business and state leaders alike expected women to focus desires for freedom and sexual emancipation within a consumer-oriented, suburban home now expanding outside every major city on the national landscape.3

In politics and film making this Cold War environment unfolded on both sides of the Pacific. Where the elan of the New Deal in the arts revolved around populist and progressive values at odds with liberal capitalism and class inequality, the advent of postwar anti-Communism saw American politicians defining democracy in terms of liberal capitalism and mass consumer culture. In the realm of film production geared towards both global and domestic audiences, the values informing popular film underwent alteration. Increasingly the Hollywood producers used business and state power to purge left wing artists in Japan and the United States. The postwar exile or conversion of artists like Charlie Chaplin and John Ford erased working class heroes as a major centerpiece of American popular art, and, by implication, the political rhetoric of the two parties. Kitamura reveals that the need to police and censor film in Japan was a major stimulus for the leader of the Hollywood Producers association to tell screen writers in 1946 that in Hollywood “we’ll have no more *Grapes of Wrath* or films that treat the ‘banker as a villain’”4 and for officers of the Central Intelligence Agency to expurgate themes of racial or social conflict from films exported abroad. In this context, the occupation authorities in Japan insisted that producers shed from film populist sounds and images. Dependent on the approval of military elites and State Department officials emanating from Anglo Saxon middle class, film exhibitors in Japan censored or forbade films critical of inequality, monopoly capital, imperialism, or the decision to drop atomic bomb on Japan as a danger to national security. Kitamura shows us that the great reversal reinforced trends that had served to reorient cultural authority from the bottom to the top of the social order. In the case of musicals like *Rhapsody in Blue*, a film portraying the life of famed American composer George Gershwin, publicists portrayed the production as the story of “jazz.” Although jazz music derived from the vernacular arts of African Americans and immigrants, advertisers portrayed the music less as the art of the African Americans than the product of superior European civilization. As such the publicists claimed that Gershwin, the composer of *Porgy and Bess*, found his inspiration among composers of classic symphonies. Similarly,

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4 Lary May, pp. 176-177.
publicists portrayed the special theaters that showed American films as high class and morally superior to movie houses that showed Japanese or foreign films. Complementing what was in essence a whitening of a diverse American culture, films critical of monopoly capitalism or corrupt politicians like Mr. Smith Goes to Washington or The Grapes of Wrath faced exclusion, while those works such as The Letter and The Bengal Lancers that were critical of western imperialism, a theme very close to Japanese war propaganda, were summarily banned.

In light of these converging trends -- the great reversal in politics and culture, censorship of films, the “whitening” of exhibition practices --- Kitamura’s most remarkable finding is that the critics and many in their audiences viewed Hollywood movies as an experience that could make a new and better future. To make this argument, the author focuses on elites, critics and young viewers who wrote to magazines, created books, formed film societies and edited publications dedicated to promoting Hollywood as the agent for mass conversion. Indicative of this effort, critics such as Nakano Goro during the war had asked the Japanese to “Hate enemy America/ Hate American civilization.” Yet after the defeat Nakano repented these earlier writings. Instead he promoted American films as emblems of a “superior civilization” that audiences should not hate but emulate. He told audiences of his radio show that Hollywood “showcased democracy in action.” For the victors’ belief in social mobility and their confidence stemmed from the “air of freedom in the New World.” (143-146). Honda Akira, another critic, wrote that one saw in the new films that “America is liberated from troublesome traditions” and its population was “not blinded by flamboyance, authority or social status.” When these images appeared on the screen they revealed that Americans saw the “true disposition of mankind.” (149). Still another wrote that the “defeat of old Japan” found its counter in American movies whose “vitality” pointed the way to a “new beginning” for the Japanese people in the wake of a destructive defeat (158).

Heady stuff indeed. Hiroshi Kitamura ends his fascinating book by claiming that in Japan American films provided the foundation for a new middle class consumer culture that pervades Japan to this day. I’m not so sure that this is the whole story or that his book’s title, Screening Enlightenment adequately describes what he discovered. For one thing, the responses of critics and audiences suggest that American films performed a far more irrational, emotional and even religious function than spreading reason and order. Along these lines, one might have expected that the Japanese would respond to their trauma by demanding revenge on the occupiers, or by mobilizing to restore victory over their former enemy.5 Yet this did not happen. On the contrary the Japanese embraced defeat. Why? One reason is that the Japanese were exhausted by the long war, and the Imperial state that promised so much had delivered so little. Another is that Hollywood films provided a vehicle of atonement and even rebirth. It was not just that the films had possessed a “miraculous” power with their close ups, with their parallel editing, with their cross cutting.

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with their dramatic lightening and compositions to defy, like a god, the limits of mere mortals’ visions of time and space. Rather more to the point was an audience poll documented by Kitamura that revealed that the two most popular films of the occupation years were *Gone With the Wind* and *Casablanca*. Is it too much to suggest that here Japanese audiences saw, like them, a hero and a heroine, Scarlet O’Hara and Rick Blaine whose old values contributed to war and destruction? In response the characters enact a narrative of struggle and metamorphosis that led to rebirth - an artistic vision that provided a model for a people facing defeat and recovery after World War II.
Hiroshi Kitamura in *Screening Entertainment* has delivered a stellar contribution to the scholarship on Hollywood and the re-making of postwar nations. Prior to Kitamura’s exploration of Japan, this field of inquiry found its momentum in Mitteleuropa: Reinhold Wagnleitner in *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria* (1994) and Heide Fehrenbach in *Cinema in Democratizing Germany: Reconstructing National Identity after Hitler* (1995). Victoria de Grazia added the pan-European dimension in *Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (2005), though her work makes many forays outside the fields of cinema and popular culture.

Kitamura’s work contrasts an interwar/WWII-era Japan that clamped down on U.S. cinema with a postwar epoch exhibiting a national romance and fascination with Hollywood. Hollywood, which in the early interwar years held high hopes that Japan might blossom into one of its leading export markets instead witnessed a spectacular withering and, finally, state-enforced quarantine. In Kitamura’s account, “The volume of U.S. films, which reached as many as 235 in 1935, plummeted to 81 in 1940 and 41 the following year” (18). Draconian censorship prevented the importation of *Mutiny on the Bounty* (1935), which only gained screen time after the company chopped four of its thirteen reels; that is, those reels depicting rebellion. When a writer saw the sanitized product, he dubbed the wholesome new product “Bounty without Mutiny” (18).

*Screening Entertainment* is spiced with many Japanese reactions to Hollywood cinema, though postwar Japan seemed to respond in a far more smiling and affable way to Hollywood productions than some postwar Germans. When the U.S. Consul General in Munich James R. Wilkinson reflected in early 1947 that “the German reaction to these films has been unsatisfactory,” he included the testimony of a denizen of Eichstätt, Bavaria: “The local population is greatly dissatisfied with the type of films supplied in local theatres…. Many American films appear not to make sense, they seem stupidly conceived and are very superficial. The American film stars are pretty, beautifully groomed and dressed but are not actors and have no talent except their physical beauty.” Among the early missteps in Germany had been inundating the market with films depicting U.S. military might, as Wilkinson explained: “…. the militaristic pictures were received with disapproval by the Germans. The Germans were already sufficiently impressed with American military accomplishments and did not need to be reminded....”

The Japanese also chafed at militarism in U.S. films. But in Kitamura’s account, the U.S. representatives of the film industry in Japan put a special stress on the artistic superiority of Hollywood productions, with a regular appeal to *bunka* (culture) and *bunkasei*.

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(culturalism). This cultural turn may seem odd to those who have followed the activities of U.S. diplomats in European nations. As practiced by certain State Department officials in Europe, U.S. cultural diplomacy frequently sought to stress not the nation’s commercial cinema but what was regarded as the most elevated of “high art”: the classical music of Aaron Copland, modernist currents in art, and the literary excellence of Archibald MacLeish. But in Japan, it seems that Hollywood film received a boost as belonging to a higher art form, with Kitamura documenting how the Central Motion Picture Exchange (CMPE) sought to “transform dingy theater spaces” into what its leader Charles Mayer regularly hailed as “shrines of culture” (bunka no dendō) (113). Theater owners soon coveted the right to post marquee signs declaring a theater: “Home of American Movies.” Theaters with superior equipment and furnishings were rewarded under the CMPE’s “good movies to good theaters” policy. Meanwhile, film magazines in Japan cultivated not simply loyalty to the stars but a sensibility that Hollywood productions delivered bunka (culture) and “enlightenment.”

Europeans often derided the notion that commercial U.S. films provided “art” or “culture.” Vladimir Wengeroff of Westi Films had explained in La cinématographie française (1 October 1926) that “The Americans do not understand that if cinema is 20% art and 80% industry, we – Europe – have that 20%. That’s our strength and that’s how we will win.” After World War II, many Europeans clung to the belief that European mastery of high art and artisanal practices would help them maintain a cultural space against the industrial regime of Hollywood. In postwar Japan, however, the artisanal model of cultural production came under increasing fire as backward and outmoded. Kitamura shows how the thinking of Japanese writers and intellectuals shifted from interwar admiration of Japanese cinema to a postwar view that the country now needed to turn to Hollywood for new lessons in the cinematic arts. Late in the war, the journalist Nakano Gorō had loathed Hollywood motion pictures as a “morale-boosting stimulant and…. anesthetic drug” infused with “erotic” and “hedonistic” values (143). In the postwar aftermath, he soon dropped the talk about U.S. decadence and began to hail the productions of a “superior civilization.” He contrasted the dignity of U.S. cinema audiences from many social classes with the slacker demeanor and lumpen depravity of many Japanese venues “dominated by…. adolescents with pimples or women of the night” (145).

Kitamura provides an account of Japanese enthusiasm for a “high-end” biopic Song of Love (1947) about the classical composers Robert and Clara Schumann, the latter character played by Katherine Hepburn. In the case of this production, Japanese ardor for European-style classical music reinforced Hollywood’s bunka credibility. At a memorial conference for the British social historian V.G. Kiernan held at Cambridge University in October 2010, Eric Hobsbawm observed that European classical music has high cultural force in the major nations of East Asia, Japan, China, and Korea; but it struck him that this music is far weaker in South Asia, which remains committed to its own deeply rooted classical genres. He further suggested that the power of globalized U.S. popular culture may run into resistance

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in the face of certain tenacious cultural traditions. In India, Bollywood and domestic cinema often occupies close to 90 percent of the screen time, a figure unparalleled in the rest of the world, save for markets practicing totalitarian exclusion.

Kitamura’s work focuses on the several U.S. studios that made up the Motion Picture Export Association (MPEA). He briefly mentions the then non-MPEA Disney studio and the independents, and their ability to gain market access in Japan. But there is probably more of a story that could be told here, as Disney frequently complained to the U.S. State Department that it was growing larger than many of the MPEA companies. Disney expressed mounting disgust at what it judged to be Foggy Bottom favoritism to the MPEA. Eventually the U.S. State Department gave the MPEA direct negotiating privileges with foreign governments precisely to avoid complaints that its diplomats favored these colluding studios. This special status in conducting Hollywood foreign policy with numerous governments is how the MPEA soon became known as “The Little State Department.”

Kitamura tells a remarkable story of how the fear and loathing of Hollywood in interwar Japan gave way to love, devotion, and surrender in the postwar world. Japan is frequently Hollywood’s number one export market, a far cry from the interwar years when Britain was the preeminent destination for U.S. cinema exports. Kitamura’s work ends with a lyric upsurge about this dramatic triumph for U.S. cultural diplomacy in Japan. And yet, this finale to the book may have been a little too tidy. Japan, after all, is one of the few remaining nations in the advanced industrial world to give Hollywood serious competition in the production of films for its own domestic market. Moreover, there remain some significant pockets of resistance to the malign influence of U.S. popular culture as well as to the U.S. military presence.

Kitamura runs with the favored narrative of harmonious relations between postwar Japanese and Americans. Nevertheless, a joint poll of Gallup and Yomiuri Shimbun during November 2008 indicated that only 32 percent of Japanese believe they can “trust” the United States, a big contrast to the 67 percent of U.S. respondents who felt “trust” toward contemporary Japan. Concordia University historian Matthew Penney discussed how in 1967, “Astroboy, the Japanese animation and comic book icon, died protecting a North Vietnamese village from American bombers.”

The Japanese New Left excoriated the violence of U.S. neo-imperialism, though some of this movement’s popular culture production reminded readers that Japan too had been a stronghold of militarism and colonialist excess. Right-leaning currents seem appalled by the hedonistic excesses and absence of discipline in U.S. society, views that were on display in Shintaro Ishihara’s bestseller, The Japan That Can Say No (1989). It would be intriguing to see a Kitamura sequel to Screening Enlightenment, but one ready to take on those discordant postwar voices that still speak of Hollywood as a corrosive influence on Japanese society.

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It is a true honor for a first-time author to have his or her book scrutinized in an H-Diplo Roundtable. I would like to begin by thanking Michael Barnhart, Mire Koikari, Lary May, and John Trumpbour for taking part in this forum. I am grateful for their generous praises and sensible criticisms. I also wish to express my gratitude to Tom Maddux for assembling this roundtable, and to Chris Jespersen for framing and introducing it.

*Screening Enlightenment: Hollywood and the Cultural Reconstruction of Defeated Japan* is a book about cross-cultural influence. It looks at Hollywood to understand the growing intimacy between Japan and the United States in the aftermath of the Second World War. Part of my aim was to cast attention on a powerful business institution whose role in the occupation has largely been neglected. But I also seek to show how a U.S. media enterprise helped shape postwar U.S.-Japan relations by exploring a widespread “convergence process” that formed across the Pacific.¹ Relying on English- and Japanese-language sources, I not only study the more familiar avenues of trade policy and state regulation, but also look at the intricate processes of film distribution, promotion, exhibition, and consumption. In the broadest sense, I aim to show the power of U.S. culture (soft power) in the international arena, the role of local actors in facilitating global processes, and the ways in which this interactive dynamic helped shape a strong transpacific relationship during an era of dramatic transition in U.S.-Asian relations.

I am delighted to learn that the four reviewers have found merit in my book. It is flattering to have one’s work considered as a “fascinating book” (May), a “stellar contribution” (Trumpbour), an “admirable study” (Barnhart), and an “invaluable addition” (Koikari) to the literature. To summarize briefly, the reviewers seem to have appreciated three things: the brevity of the narrative, the primary research, and the elucidation of Japanese perspectives. Given that my intention was to study U.S.-Japan relations from the “bottom up” as well as the “top down,” I especially appreciate those who have found the discussion of Japanese film consumers to be “[o]ne of Kitamura’s most important findings” (May). Despite the growth of multi-lingual and multi-archival studies in recent years, few diplomatic historians have adequately explored the theme of cultural and popular reception abroad; for film and media experts, consumption remains a notoriously challenging field of inquiry. I could not be happier if my work in some way contributes to the study of the “popular” in internationalist and transnationalist fields.

Yet at the same time, the reviewers have also addressed some important questions and criticisms. I have identified four of them. The first issue concerns the “ordering” of the occupation era. Some appear to have felt that my reimagining of the early postwar Japan involves too much structure and orderliness. Barnhart, for example, writes that my

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¹ The idea of “convergence” is inspired by Henry Jenkins, *Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide* (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 1-23. Jenkins’s use of “convergence” largely concerns the digital and new media, but I find the concept applicable to Hollywood’s multimedia marketing and the active fan involvement in early postwar Japan.
narrative seems “almost too tightly focused” in discussing “the confused and conflicting cultural administration of the Occupation period.” He thus wishes to learn more on the frictions that separated the U.S. Army (Civil Affairs Division) from SCAP’s censors in Tokyo, for example. May raises a similar point from a different angle. Responding to my treatment of fan psychology, he speculates that American cinema in Japan appears to have performed a “far more irrational, emotional and even religious function than spreading reason and order.” These commentaries invoke the portrait of the early postwar years as a “confusion era.”

I agree that the MacArthur years did involve complex, irrational, and emotional behavior. In an era that the whole nation seemed to sink into a state of kyodatsu, the reactions of the Japanese were undoubtedly split and multiple. My goal, however, was not to end by demonstrating confusion, but to show how a new hegemonic order emerged from the disorder, and the ways in which both the Americans and the Japanese actively partook in forming that power structure. It is perhaps not surprising to see some disorientation in this new hierarchy, as hegemonic establishments, as Antonio Gramsci and others have taught us, do not completely eliminate conflict and disorder, but rather thrive through an ongoing “mediation” and “management” of such cacophonic impulses. Showcasing disorder and irrationality may nuance my narrative, but in my opinion they will not undermine my argument. In the end, I do not disagree with Barnhart and May, but rather suggest that we contextualize “confusion” in the larger matrix of power that exerted great influence on Japanese society.

The second issue is related to the first; it concerns Japanese resistance. Barnhart is curious to know how the Japanese Ministry of Finance confronted the U.S. film industry during the final two years of the occupation (and beyond). Trumpbour notes that the closure of my narrative is “a little too tidy” and alludes to “significant pockets of resistance” that stemmed from a society that later gave life to Ishihara Shintarō’s The Japan that can Say No. The point raised here is an important one. My book tries to show that Japanese filmmakers at times opposed and contested MacArthur’s censorship team, but what about the other Japanese? When I started my research, I expected to encounter a substantive amount of primary evidence on audience opposition, yet to my disappointment, I could not find much. Why? One possible explanation is that those who were unhappy with Hollywood did not bother to vent their emotions in print, as they had more pressing matters to deal with. Another explanation is the presence of SCAP’s censorship apparatus, which not only banned or edited books and articles, but also pressured writers to prevent undesirable ideas from being expressed in print. This panoptic institution undoubtedly played a powerful role in curtailing anti-Hollywood and anti-American discourse.

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However, this does not mean that anti-Hollywood resistance was absent in the postwar era or even during MacArthur’s reign. Here I point to some ways in which historians may be able to get at this. One is to look at the Japanese government. Looking at its regulation on fiscal transfers and import limits, as Barnhart suggests, should uncover a complex politics of protectionism and opposition particularly after the occupation. Evidence of resistance might also be evident if one examines labor and left-wing publications. The Gordon Prange Collection at the University of Maryland-College Park has some relevant volumes; others may be available in the archives in Japan. Furthermore, scholars might find dissenting voices by examining Japanese cinema and its broader fan culture. Studying Japanese filmmaking as well as popular discourse surrounding it (via fan magazines, newsletters, and oral interviews) may reveal a larger collective sentiment that confronted U.S. film culture, particularly during the “second golden age” of this national cinema in the mid to late 1950s. Perhaps another means is to theorize resistance by adapting the works of Dick Hebdige, Fredric Jameson, John Fiske and others. Resistance is a challenging avenue of inquiry, and I would be excited to see more works on it. Studies of this kind will undoubtedly enrich the growing literature on anti-Americanism and “America in the world.”

Third, the reviewers point to the larger international context, namely the Cold War. In critiquing my work, May points to the “great reversal” that replaced the New Dealer-driven programs of the occupation with those of hard-line anti-communists. Koikari pushes this point one step further, asking how the “reverse course” in the occupation, the rise of Mao’s China, and the Korean War specifically influenced U.S. film policy and Japanese film culture. To respond, my work does deal with the Cold War, which I also consider as significant in understanding the era. I thus show how the occupiers shifted their tone to endorse the

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4 Although I should note that my efforts to mine these periodicals only led me to sporadic remarks about U.S. cinema. My impression is that left-wing writers were more preoccupied about the exploitative tendencies of the managerial class within the Japanese studio system, and much less so about the specter of Hollywood.

5 Yet here I must point out that the relationship between Hollywood and Japanese cinema is a complex one. Although many filmmakers may have resisted Hollywood, they seem to have been fascinated with it as well. A fascinating example that captures this fascination is Nikkatsu’s “Japanese western” (wasei uesutan), starring the likes of Kobayashi Akira, Shishido Jō, and Kaneko Nobuo. This genre film integrated the conventions of the Hollywood western with that of the Japanese period story, and staged shoot-outs in rural Japan. See Hiroshi Kitamura, “Shoot-out in Hokkaido: Nikkatsu’s “Wanderer” (Wataridori) Series and the Politics of Transnationality,” Philippa Gates and Lisa Fennell, eds., Trans-National Asian Identities in Pan-Pacific Cinemas: The Reel Asian Exchange (New York: Routledge, forthcoming October 2011).


release of anti-communist narratives (such as the *The Iron Curtain*) or non-Cold War films (such as *Little Women*) that embodied Cold War implications, for example. But what I also believe is that the Cold War paradigm did not fundamentally replace the hegemonic edifice that the Americans strove to establish from the moment of their arrival. It merely reinvented and built on it. Nonetheless, I agree that it would be fascinating to learn more about how the Cold War affected Japan’s cine-culture and society during and after the occupation.

The final issue concerns globalization. What does my case study on Japan reveal about Hollywood and the United States’ global power? Trumpbour suggests that the influence of U.S. soft power may have varied by place. His review cites reports on considerable audience discontent against Hollywood cinema in Germany and the wider Europe, particularly as it “often derided the notion that commercial U.S. films provided ‘art’ or ‘culture’.” As I tried to show in my book, the case of occupied Japan points to a different structure of feeling—one in which movie-goers often celebrated Hollywood as a harbinger of “culture” (*bunka*); whereas elites in Europe often looked down on U.S. cinema as “materialistic” and “lowlbrow,” many elites in Japan regarded Hollywood as a source of entertainment and “enlightenment.” To me, this outcome certainly points to the idea that the “Hollywoodization” or “Americanization” of the world was not a monolithic or homogeneous process. Instead, it shows Hollywood’s adaptive marketing in response to diverse consumer tastes. In addition, it may be revelatory of a larger pattern of cultural consumption that transcended Japan—one that may have existed in many non-Western societies in which things American were often looked upon as “modern” and “advanced.” Further research on Hollywood’s global prowess may allow us to offer more definitive conclusions on these observations. It will enable us to understand the pervasive and uneven impact of U.S. cultural formations in the international arena.

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9 There are some useful recent works that examine the intersection between Cold War and Japan, but much more can be explored in this nexus. See, for example, Komori Yōichi, et al., *Reisen taisei to shihon no bunka: 1955nen igo 1 Iwanami kōza kindai Nihon no bunkashi* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2002); Ann Sheriff, *Japan’s Cold War: Media, Literature, and the Law* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); Tsuchiya Yuka, *Shinbei nihon no kōchiku: Amerika no tainichi jōhō, kyōiku seisaku to nihon senryō* (Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 2009), 226-272.


In closing, I wish to thank the organizers and participants in this roundtable, once again. I appreciate the opportunity to respond to the reviewers’ insightful comments and to share my thoughts with the readers of H-Diplo.