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Introduction by Christopher Endy

Carol C. Chin. *Modernity and National Identity in the United States and East Asia, 1895-1919.*

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Introduction by Christopher Endy, California State University, Los Angeles

Among historians of U.S. international relations, the concept of “modernity” has over the last decade become tightly connected to Cold War-era modernization theory. Mention modernity, and U.S. diplomatic historians will think of hydroelectric dams, birth control technologies, and high-yield “miracle rice.”¹ Carol C. Chin offers a different perspective. Turning to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Chin’s debut book calls attention to a wider spectrum of the ways in which world leaders and average citizens sought to make societies modern. What emerges is a Pacific-oriented prehistory of modernization ideas and a reminder of how the turn of the twentieth century was itself a dynamic moment in international history.

Like many of the best studies of modernization, Chin’s book takes an ambitious approach that combines transnational and comparative history.² She examines three countries—the United States, China, and Japan—and emphasizes how relations between the three reflected *and* influenced each society’s debates over what it meant to be a modern nation. Chin devotes special attention to visions of women’s role in society, a topic that animated many discussions over modernity. As the reviewer James Matray notes, she addresses these topics with prose that is “precise, articulate, and robust.” In fact, Chin’s ability to define slippery concepts such as modernity and national identity, along with her extensive bibliographic notes, makes the book especially valuable for graduate students.

In this roundtable, the reviewers’ praise and criticism mostly revolve around the book’s ambitious range. The reviewers especially appreciate the insights Chin provides by studying nationalist discourses within a triangular relationship. Chin’s analysis of nationalism in two rising empires (Japan and the United States) and one in decline (China) reveals interesting patterns that might otherwise have gone unnoticed. As the reviewers Joseph Henning and Hiroshi Kitamura note, Chin effectively shows how nationalists in the United States, China, and Japan each developed a vision of their country as an “exceptional” power with a unique and beneficial role to play in Asia. Chin’s attention to transnational contacts between nationalists also conveys a seeming paradox in what Kitamura calls “the larger transpacific world” during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It was an era of increased nationalism and internationalism, and Chin shows how the two trends developed hand in hand.

All four reviewers give highest praise to Chin’s chapters on women. For Matray, Chin is at her “most insightful” when exploring how a cohort of Chinese “New Women” broke from

¹ See for instance Michael E. Latham, *The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010); and David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

² On modernization’s comparative and transnational dimensions, see the special forum, “Modernization as a Global Project,” edited by David C. Engerman and Corinna R. Unger in the June 2009 issue of *Diplomatic History*.

the more conservative gender messages transmitted by U.S. missionaries. These Chinese feminists instead strategically appropriated ideas from their American counterparts and built a unique vision of how new gender roles could improve the whole of China. Like Matray, Mari Yoshihara appreciates Chin's attention to Chinese feminists' agency, along with her insightful analysis of magazine images depicting the Chinese New Women.

Chin's ambitious scope—a study of nationalism, gender, and modernity in three countries—leads, almost inevitably, to a discussion of thin spots in her coverage. In Chin's trilateral approach, China and the United States emerge as the strongest two sides. The reviews by Henning and Yoshihara both detail Japanese sources and historiography that could have bolstered Chin's third case. Kitamura also hoped to see more connections between China and Japan, to match the rich detail that Chin provides on U.S.-Chinese relations. Yoshihara and Matray wonder if a wider survey of women's history might have yielded even more diverse views on gender and modernity. They suggest the value of more attention to Japanese women activists, conservative Chinese women, and American women who were not missionaries, such as writers, artists, and businessmen's wives.

Last, several reviewers raise one of the classic questions in international relations historiography: how should historians link culture and foreign policy? Matray notes that “direct connections between the actions of the people the author discusses and actual U.S. policies in East Asia are few.” Kitamura likewise asks if “cultural formations actively feed into concrete policymaking.” In light of these critiques, the full significance of Chin's work will not be known until later, when more traditional diplomatic historians determine the extent to which foreign policymakers in each country drew on the ideas developed by her more intellectual sources. But in this regard, Chin is in fine company. Many esteemed scholars exploring the cultural foundations of foreign policy leave the same work to others.³

In her author's reply, Chin acknowledges the challenge of causality in diplomatic history, yet she also takes a strong stand in defense of intercultural history for its own sake. Not everything we study, she concludes, needs to involve state policy. On this point, Chin is absolutely right. People around the world are still enthralled by notions of the modern. As in the past, we often look across national borders to help figure out what being modern means. Today's rhetoric surrounding some U.S. research universities' new partnerships in China, for instance, provides just one example of the ongoing transpacific construction of the future.⁴ With the media full of predictions of a new 'Asian century,' Chin's study is a perfect example of why intercultural history matters, even when diplomats remain on the margins.

³ For a stimulating discussion on culture and causality, and for a work that also skirts direct evidence of ties between culture and policymaking, see Frank Ninkovich, *Global Dawn: The Cultural Foundation of American Internationalism, 1865–1890* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2009).

⁴ “Message From President Brodhead Regarding Duke Kunshan University,” 23 August 2012, <http://today.duke.edu/2012/08/rhbdku> (accessed 5 September 2012).

Participants:

Carol C. Chin is an Associate Professor in the Department of History and the International Relations Programme at the University of Toronto. She received her Ph.D. from the Ohio State University, where she studied with Michael Hogan and Peter Hahn. Her current research is on Chinese and American women's transnational networks in the first half of the twentieth century

Christopher Endy is professor of history at California State University, Los Angeles, and is the author of *Cold War Holidays: American Tourism in France* (Chapel Hill, 2004). He is now writing a book on the global politics of multinational corporations and business ethics since the late nineteenth century.

Joseph M. Henning is an associate professor of history at the Rochester Institute of Technology and taught previously at Saint Vincent College. He received his Ph.D. from American University, where he studied with Robert L. Beisner and Anna K. Nelson. Henning is the author of *Outposts of Civilization: Race, Religion, and the Formative Years of American-Japanese Relations* (2000), which has been translated into Japanese. He is currently working on a biography of William Elliot Griffis.

Hiroshi Kitamura is Associate Professor of History at the College of William and Mary. He is the author of *Screening Enlightenment: Hollywood and the Cultural Reconstruction of Defeated Japan* (Cornell University Press, 2010), which won the Shimizu Hiroshi Award from the Japanese Association for American Studies. He is currently at work on two projects: a transnational history of post-World War II Japanese cinema, and a relational study of U.S. and East Asian cinemas during the Cold War.

James I. Matray earned his doctoral degree in U.S. History at the University of Virginia in 1977, where he was lucky to study under the late and great Norman A. Graebner. In 2002, he joined the faculty of California State University, Chico as department chair and professor of history. His most recent publications are a historiographical article in *Cold War History* titled "Korea's War at Sixty: A Survey of the Literature" and "Fighting the Problem: George C. Marshall and Korea," in *George C. Marshall: Servant of the American Nation*, edited by Charles F. Brower IV, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

Mari Yoshihara is Professor of American Studies at University of Hawai'i. She has a PhD in American Civilization from Brown University and is the author of *Embracing the East: White Women and American Orientalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) and *Musicians from a Different Shore: Asians and Asian Americans in Classical Music* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2007) as well as numerous books in Japanese. She is currently working on a comparative study of cultural policy and arts patronage in the United States and Japan.

Review by Joseph M. Henning, Rochester Institute of Technology

American exceptionalism is a durable idea. In 1630, John Winthrop first pictured America as a metaphorical “city upon a hill,” describing the Puritan aspiration to build a model society for the rest of the world to emulate. In 1989, President Ronald Reagan used the phrase in his farewell address. More recently, claims about exceptionalism have gained traction in presidential politics. At the 2009 NATO summit, President Barack Obama observed, “I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I suspect that the Brits believe in British exceptionalism and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism.” And last April, former Senator Rick Santorum, a 2012 Republican candidate, attacked the president for suggesting that Americans are no different than Britons or Greeks. In a speech at the National Press Club in Washington, Santorum proclaimed that Obama “doesn’t believe America is exceptional.”¹ As Obama suggested, however, American exceptionalism is not exceptional at all. Not only Great Britain and Greece, but also China and Japan have seen themselves from a vantage point similar to the city upon a hill. Many, if not all, nations and peoples think of themselves as unique.

In this lively monograph, Carol Chin demonstrates how East Asia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries served as a proving ground for national exceptionalism. Simultaneously, the United States, China, and Japan constructed new, sometimes quite similar, national identities. Each of the three viewed itself as uniquely endowed with the mantle of civilization. Further, each identified a civilizing mission for itself in relation to its neighbors. Even the notion of manifest destiny, it seems, was not entirely exceptional.

Part of the Kent State University Press series on New Studies in U.S. Foreign Relations, Chin’s book examines the triangular set of relations among the United States, China, and Japan. It is a history of ideas in international relations, focusing on constructed discourses: modernity, national identity, culture, and internationalism. In her straightforward and jargon-free introduction, she argues that modernity was a measure to use in determining one’s place in the hierarchy of civilized nations. Although Americans, Chinese, and Japanese believed that modern progress was synonymous with civilization, they envisioned different paths toward it. Also, she writes, national identity is two-fold. It includes a people’s conception of their nation’s place in the world, as well as individuals’ conceptions of their place within the nation. Both are intertwined with the symbols and values that constitute a nation’s culture. Finally, internationalism was the process by which relations between nations, including both state and non-state actors, transfigured national identities. Each nation’s experience in the international system, and especially in this triangle, shaped its constructs of modernity and national identity.

¹ Barack Obama, “News Conference by President Obama,” 4 April 2009, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/news-conference-president-obama-4042009> (accessed 12 May 2011); John Dickerson, “Exceptionally Thin,” *Slate*, 29 April 2011, <http://www.slate.com/id/2292553/> (accessed 12 May 2011).

Chin divides the rest of the book into three parts. In Part I, she provides historical contexts up to the 1890s for each nation's identity as civilized and modern. For centuries, Chinese imperial dynasties played a self-appointed role as the pinnacle of civilization, the Middle Kingdom whose cultural influence civilized its barbarian neighbors. To Americans, civilization, Christianization, and manifest destiny were processes by which they settled a continent and began to collect overseas colonies. Japan, though late in asserting itself as an international empire, adopted for itself the task of serving as the only East Asian beacon of modern civilization. As Chin astutely observes, there were striking similarities among all three identities. All accepted for themselves a civilizing mission to convert their neighboring barbarians. All were cities upon hills.

Part II, which is narrower in focus than the other two parts, is the most engaging.² Here, Chin successfully introduces gender as a salient component of modernity and national identity. Focusing on U.S. missionary women and their Chinese coworkers and converts, she demonstrates how missionaries deliberately sought to modernize Chinese women. Opposed to footbinding and arranged marriages, they tried to turn back the tide of Chinese tradition by imparting Christianity and modernity to "heathen" women (87). Western modernity became transnational in the hands of missionary women: they deemed Western civilization as universally valid. Although they "did not participate directly in the overt exercise of U.S. military, diplomatic, or economic power," Chin points out, "they occupied a position of power in relation to the local population because of their cultural identity" (85).

While gender is the central theme of Part II, it is neglected in Parts I and III. Precisely because Chin so skillfully wields gender as an analytical instrument, its relative absence in these sections is notable. In Part I, she does not explore the historical contexts in these nations for discourses of gender. In Part III, she does not ask how gender, beyond the sphere of missionary activity, affected ideas of modernity, national identity, and internationalism.

Chin's work is based on broad, multi-archival research in the United States, China, and Taiwan. Most of her accounts of Japan, however, are based on English-language sources, primary and secondary; in these sections, her work, though insightful, is mainly synthetic. Also, Japan temporarily disappears from the scene in Part II. One-third of the book thus becomes a study of the bilateral U.S.-China relationship rather than the triangular relations of the United States, China, and Japan. Part II does not consider, for instance, whether missionaries in Japan and Japanese converts confronted the same tensions regarding modernity and women's rights as did missionary women in China. What roles did gender and religion play in American and Japanese constructions of national identity?³

² An earlier version of Chapter Three appeared as Carol Chin, "Beneficent Imperialists: American Women Missionaries in Turn-of-the-Century China," *Diplomatic History* 27 (summer 2003): 327-52.

³ For wide-ranging studies of U.S. missionary women, imperialism, and race, see Barbara Reeves Ellington, Kathryn Kish Sklar, Connie A. Shemo, eds., *Competing Kingdoms: Women, Mission, Nation, and the American Protestant Empire, 1812-1960* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).

In Part III, Japan returns when Chin directs her attention to the “rising tide of internationalism” in the early twentieth century (135). Within and among all three countries, nineteenth-century definitions of national identity conflicted and were contested. American civilization’s missionary impulse gave ground to a new focus on economics and politics: the United States took upon itself the Wilsonian task of making the international system conform to American ideals. At the same time, Chinese leaders began to argue that China’s modern nationalism now entitled it to an autonomous place in that system. And Japan continued its quest for imperial expansion. Its Twenty-One Demands, delivered to China in 1915, embodied its identification of nationalism with empire. The Treaty of Versailles, however, threatened to make Japan’s national identity obsolete. The aftermath of World War I, Chin shows, brought uncertainty and instability to East Asia. While China did not establish the international standing necessary to regain its sovereign rights, Wilsonian internationalism posed a potential obstacle to Japan’s imperial ambitions. Thus, Chin deftly opens a significant new window onto U.S.-East Asian relations.

Yet missing from the book is a thorough introduction to the nineteenth-century ‘science’ of race, a school of thought central to these discourses of national identity and modernity. Instead, Chin emphasizes the cultural and social constructs of Anglo-Saxonism. But biological constructs of race were more central to U.S. conceptions of national and cultural identity than she implies. The “American school” of anthropology, for instance, claimed to have discovered immutable, biological characteristics, and thus empirical proof of white superiority.⁴ Hierarchies of civilization and race coexisted. In the eyes of many Americans, one’s position in the former was mirrored by one’s position in the latter. The racial classification of a people determined whether or not they were capable of being civilized, not to mention modern.

Chin also mentions Herbert Spencer and social Darwinism but does not examine carefully enough the popularity of his Synthetic Philosophy. His part as the outspoken originator of the phrase “survival of the fittest” is difficult to underestimate. In his popular serialized volumes, sold by subscription, Spencer provided fuel for the fires of white superiority. Rife with discussions of ‘civilized’ and ‘semi-civilized’ nations, his works commanded broad influence among scholars in all three countries. Such voices of scientific authority helped to cement racial and cultural constructs in American exceptionalism.

Despite these empirical claims, race was indeed malleable. Chin observes that sometimes “cultural or religious attributes surmounted the perceived handicap of ‘race’” (96). For example, Chinese converts were often categorized “as Christians first and Chinese second” (37). This malleability, however, is all the more remarkable given the omnipresence and tenacity of racial science. Americans, Chinese, and Japanese exerted considerable pressure and at times reconfigured the parameters of race.

⁴ For example, see William Stanton, *The Leopard’s Spots: Scientific Attitudes toward Race in America, 1815-59* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); Stephen Jay Gould, *The Mismeasure of Man* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981).

Ultimately, Chin makes important contributions to the study of U.S. foreign relations, gender history and identity studies. Future scholars of U.S.-East Asian relations will rely on her work. As intellectual history, it complements such studies as Michael H. Hunt's *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* and Anders Stephanson's *Manifest Destiny*.⁵ Lucid and incisive, it skillfully addresses and deserves multiple audiences: graduate and undergraduate, academic and non-academic. By shedding light on how American, Chinese, and Japanese national identities changed at the turn of the twentieth century, Chin reveals the multiplicities and fluidities of exceptionalism and helps us to understand the persistence of its myths.

⁵Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); Anders Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995).

The turn of the twentieth century was a tumultuous time in U.S.-East Asian relations. In the years following the Civil War, the United States increasingly extended its 'national' influence across the Pacific, as it went on to annex Hawai'i and occupy the Philippines in the hopes of staking a claim in the fabled 'China market.' Japan was likewise pursuing a course of expansionism. Emboldened by its growing industry, technology, and military in the decades after the Meiji Restoration, it wielded unexpected strength against the Chinese and Russians in successive wars and began to reach into the Asian mainland. China struggled to hold its own against Japanese as well as Western imperialism. Yet hardly passive or submissive, it strove to overcome the difficult times by adapting, appropriating, and rejecting foreign influence.

Carol C. Chin's *Modernity and National Identity in the United States and East Asia, 1895-1919* is an attempt to dissect this complex three-way relationship. Instead of revisiting this transitional moment solely through the lens of top-level diplomacy, she casts close attention to the diverse cultural articulations of state and private actors in an attempt to show the tense interplay of the three competing societies. Relying on an assortment of archival materials collected in Beijing, Shanghai, Taipei, and a handful of repositories in the United States, Chin weaves a rich tapestry of the beliefs and representations that emerged from multiple subject positions. A "history of ideas" (2) situated in the Pacific world, this thoughtful study deepens our understanding of U.S.-East Asian relations from cultural and transnational viewpoints.

The book begins by examining the formation of national identity in the United States, China, and Japan before the 1890s. This discursive process, argues Chin, largely revolved around an "ideology of exceptionalism" (41) that each society developed in opposition to each another. In America, this practice originated from the Puritan conception of a 'City upon a Hill'—an idea directed against 'corrupt' European monarchies—but increasingly involved a dialectic with the Chinese, whom many American elites perceived as "uncivilized heathens" (29). The Chinese, by contrast, touted the cultural superiority of their Confucian civilization against American and Western "barbari[sm]" (26). The Japanese, albeit "in slightly less universalistic terms" (21) than the Americans or the Chinese, constructed a collective identity by separating their race/ethnicity (*minzoku*) from that of their Asian neighbors—including the soon-to-be-co-opted Ainu and Okinawans.

These constructions of self and other, however, were never singular or static. In the U.S., socio-economic change at home inspired many Americans to assert a stronger presence in the international arena. This gave rise to the Open Door Notes and a self-righteous desire to carry the 'white man's burden' in the Asia-Pacific, but it also prompted many intellectuals and religious leaders to deplore imperial ventures in the Philippines and elsewhere in hopes of preserving the nation's republican ideals. In the meantime, Japan's imagined community underwent change. While strengthening their industrial and military capabilities, the architects of 'modern' Japan broadened the cultural applicability of their self-proclaimed civilization, as they degraded China as "Shina" (instead of "Zhongguo" or

“Chūgoku”) and identified themselves as non-Western equivalents to the West (66). Cultural constructions in China were in flux as well. A combination of domestic and international pressures forced a new generation of intellectuals to search for a ‘modern’ Chinese selfhood that blended Confucian and Western principles—often by turning to a Spencerian hierarchy of civilizations.

At the heart of identity formation lay women and gender. In the book’s middle chapters, Chin examines the interactive but often disjointed interplays between American women missionaries and Chinese feminists over the construction of their collective identities. The discord owed in no small measure to the fact that the white American women—most of them middle-class and college-trained—were “beneficent imperialists” (83) who, in spite of their often altruistic intentions, ended up imposing their “relatively conservative” (93) values of modernity and femininity—which included sanitation, education (e.g. literacy and Bible-training), and marriage with male converts. The response of Chinese women was complex. While expressing admiration towards American women, they also drew inspiration from Europe and Japan. More important, they cultivated their own identity as “new Chinese women” (104) and engaged with modernity in their own terms. In teasing out the complex psychology of these Chinese feminists, Chin presents a brilliant analysis of the magazine covers of *Funü shibao*. Through a thickly-described study of the illustrated representations of women reading, playing tennis, or hunting with rifle in hand, Chin not only points out the discrepancies between Chinese and American conceptions of modernity, but also the fact that China’s modernity itself was unevenly inscribed.

As Chinese women refashioned their identities, the larger transpacific world accelerated its move towards internationalism. In the final chapters, Chin explores how political and cultural leaders in the three societies re-negotiated their way of thinking with the outside world during the first two decades of the twentieth century. In the U.S. context, this trend was spearheaded by William Howard Taft’s dollar diplomacy in China and Woodrow Wilson’s grand idealism. The Chinese reached outward in a variety of ways. Qing leaders tried to resolve pressing matters—such as anti-Chinese legislation in America and opium consumption at home—through the help of international organizations and transnational networks, while writers and artists generated new worldviews through the budding New Culture movement. The Japanese internationalized their identity via colonialism and aggressive diplomacy (e.g. the Twenty-One Demands). Ironically, many of these endeavors led to a clash during the Great War and thereby crippled the momentum. As a result, Japan was forced to compromise its imperial ambitions (at least for the time being), the new Republic of China failed to earn the respect of the international community, and the U.S. chose a “return to normalcy” over Wilson’s call for an “internationalist identity” (172). In the end, “[h]ow to balance national identity, internationalism, and modernity,” writes Chin, “remained as difficult as ever” (183).

Modernity and National Identity is an insightful book. Building on the works that attribute the rise of modernity—both as a condition and as a discursive formation—to urbanization, hyper-capitalism, spectacular sensations, and aesthetic experimentation, Chin adroitly

shows how international relations and diplomacy also contributed to its construction.¹ Another strength is its inclusion of both government and private actors. In weaving politicians, bureaucrats, philosophers, novelists, and missionaries into a single narrative, Chin helps broaden the framework of ‘foreign relations’ and shows how ‘national’ agendas are often formed beyond the state. The transpacific focus is also a plus. In demonstrating how many Americans, Japanese, and Chinese cultivated their own collective identities, Chin not only reveals the unevenness and multiplicity of cultural conceptions, but also debunks the idea that modernity was a purely Western creation. Together with scholars ranging from Tani Barlow, Masao Miyoshi, to Leo Ou-fan Lee, Chin urges us to look at the “multiple modernities” shaped outside the West.²

Yet Chin’s impressive research and analysis has also left me with three questions or critiques—which I present here in the hopes of generating constructive discussion. The first issue concerns the agents of cultural articulation. In the book, those who voiced nation and modernity are multinational and wide-ranging, but mostly limited to the learned elites. This leaves us wondering about the thoughts and beliefs of others outside the privileged socio-economic classes. For example, in the U.S. context, Chin chooses to primarily focus on white political, cultural, and religious leaders. While integrating the perspectives of women—a valuable contribution, no doubt—she does not interrogate other neglected voices, say, of African-Americans who were closely attuned to the happenings in East Asia.³ More broadly, one wishes to know how ‘popular’ and ‘vernacular’ constructs of modernity—to borrow the words of Miriam Hansen—shaped the transpacific world.⁴

My second critique involves the Asian sphere. While taking pains to document and analyze a three-way relationship, Chin’s study offers much less on the Chinese-Japanese connection and its influence on modernist formations within and beyond East Asia. This imbalance is

¹ See, for example, T.J. Clark, *The Painting of Modern Life: Paris in the Art of Manet and His Followers* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Miles Ogborn, *Spaces of Modernity: London’s Geographies, 1680-1780* (London: Guilford Press, 1998); Carl E. Schorske, *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture* (New York: Vintage, 1981); Vanessa R. Schwartz, *Spectacular Realities: Early Mass Culture in Fin-de-Siècle Paris* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Ben Singer, *Melodrama and Modernity: Early Sensational Cinema and Its Contexts* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).

² Tani Barlow, “Introduction: On Colonial Modernity,” in Barlow, ed., *Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), 1-20 (see the other essays in this volume as well); Leo Ou-fan Lee, *Shanghai Modern: The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China, 1930-1945* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); Masao Miyoshi, *Off Center: Power and Culture Relations between Japan and the United States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 13-14. Also see Jenny Kwok Wah Lau, ed., *Multiple Modernities: Cinemas and Popular Media in Transcultural East Asia* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003).

³ Marc Gallicchio, *The African American Encounter with Japan and China: Black Internationalism in Asia, 1895-1945* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), esp. 6-57.

⁴ Miriam Hansen, “Fallen Women, Rising Stars, New Horizons: Shanghai Silent Film as Vernacular Modernism,” *Film Quarterly*, 54:1 (Autumn 2000), 10-22. It must be clarified here that Hansen explicitly differentiates “vernacular modernism” from “popular modernism.”

most evident in the otherwise fascinating section on women and gender—a pair of chapters that concentrates on U.S.-Chinese interactions. To be sure, Chin does make note of Qiu Jin and other Chinese women who studied at Shimoda Utako’s Girls’ Practical School in Japan (105, 107, 164) and the transfer of gendered ideas from Japan to China (through such ideas as “good wives and wise mothers,” *xianqi liangmu* in Chinese, *ryōsai kenbo* in Japanese, 108-109). Yet the Japan-China nexus ultimately eludes the kind of depth and synthetic effort that Chin rewards to the other nodes of the interactive triangle. One omission that particularly stands out is the “new Japanese woman”—a prominent phenomenon that emerged alongside her Chinese and American counterparts.⁵ Although the “new woman” (*atarashii onna*)—typified in part by the trope of the Japanese “modern girl” (*modan gāru*)—is known to have flourished in the 1920s and 1930s (especially after the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923), recent scholarly works have traced her origins to earlier decades.⁶ Chin does a wonderful job of discussing Chinese women’s construction of modern national identities; one would have liked to learn more about their Japanese counterparts during the same and overlapping eras.

The final critique deals with the question of causality. How do cultural imaginaries about modernity and national identity shape world affairs—and more specifically, foreign policy? Do cultural formations actively feed into concrete policymaking or are they strictly by-products of the international system? Chin is certainly sensitive to such questions, as she carefully introduces the cultural discourses of political leaders and government bureaucrats of the three societies (see, for example, 51, 67, 68, 73, 143). But while doing so, Chin’s narrative, by and large, does not explicitly identify the power and weight of such rhetoric in relation to other causal variables such as economics and national security. Even though Chin’s work, in my opinion, successfully elucidates “the connection between intellectual history and the study of U.S.-East Asian relations at the turn of the century” (5), the book will leave some readers of this forum wondering about the hierarchy of factors and motivations in the making of official U.S.-East Asian policy.

⁵ To be fair, Chin does refer to this but does so only once and in passing (109).

⁶ See, for example, Fujiki Hideaki, *Zōshoku suru perusona: eiga sutādamu no seiritsu to Nihon kindai* (Nagoya: Nagoya University Press, 2007); Barbara Sato, *The New Japanese Woman: Modernity, Media, and Women in Interwar Japan* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003).

Carol C. Chin applies new research and interpretive techniques in order to analyze of the conduct of U.S. foreign relations in her *Modernity and National Identity in the United States and East Asia, 1895-1919*. Following the lead of Akira Iriye, Frank Costigliola, Emily Rosenberg, and Andrew Rotter, to name a few, she writes from a perspective that emphasizes the importance of culture and gender in shaping events. But, as Chin declares at the outset, her “book is first and foremost a history of ideas” (2). She argues that the United States, China, and Japan simultaneously struggled to arrive at a definition of what it meant to be a modern nation during the two decades before World War II. The Great War intensified but did not resolve the uncertainty all three continued to have about their national identity. Japan defined itself in terms of its ability to dominate China, which lacked a sense of nationhood. How the United States reacted to this shaped its self-image. Chin is right when she claims that her study deepens existing understanding of U.S.-East Asian relations.

In her introduction, Chin quotes U.S. Minister Charles Denby’s report to the State Department in December 1894 that “the ignorance and helplessness of [the Chinese] pass all comprehension. International Law is a sealed book to them. They know absolutely nothing” (1). The author nicely interprets his remark as an illustration of the four main themes of her study: how East Asia accentuated American ambivalence about the nation’s role in world; China’s struggle to adapt its worldview to the realities of modern international relations; the centrality of China in creating strained relations between the United States and Japan; and, finally, how “it demonstrates the role of international affairs in the development of modern national identities as well as the importance of identities and self-images in understanding foreign relations” (2). The next year, the Japanese military defeat of China “validated [its] modernization project” (4) without clarifying its national identity, while exposing the consequences for the Chinese of having no sense of nationhood. In 1898, Americans found that easy victory over Spain did not clarify what it meant to be a world power.

Precise, articulate, and robust prose is a notable strength of this study. Clear language and analytical precision, in my view, are especially important in cultural studies that advance innovative interpretations. Chin understands this, presenting at the outset definitions of the main terms she uses. Modernity has multiple meanings and is an “elusive, dynamic, and shifting goal” (6). Also, Chin underscores that it is not a synonym for Westernization. National identity, she explains, is a collective act of self-definition in terms of fundamental myths, symbols, and values. Disagreeing with Clifford Geertz, she argues “that culture can indeed be a form of power” (9), shaping how a people perceive and deal with the Other. The author also makes a distinction between internationalism and globalization. “In the late nineteenth century,” Chin writes, “country of origin and national identification *did* matter, not only in the economic sphere but also among the emergent international organizations” (13). Since this fine work has few flaws, this commentary will mostly summarize its main arguments.

Chin proceeds topically without regard to precise chronology, organizing her study in three parts each with a brief introduction summarizing its contents and two chapters. She consistently develops similarities in the experiences of the United States, China, and Japan from 1895 to 1919, perceptively remarking at the outset how the “three peoples rooted their national identity in a sense of exceptionalism and superiority” (10). In Part I, titled “Ideas and the Making of Identity,” her focus is on describing how Americans, Chinese, and Japanese in the late nineteenth Century defined “Civilization and National identity” in terms of differences from the Other. For example, Theodore Roosevelt insisted that the United States had to adopt a foreign policy of aggressive expansion or become a replica of China. As for China, it saw no need to change an already superior civilization, having exercised its power over barbarian neighbors through moral suasion, rather than force. Japan, after the Meiji Restoration, sought to define its national identity as modern, civilized, and prominent in international affairs.

Americans, Chinese, and Japanese redefined their nation’s identity as they began to confront modernity at the turn of the century. Making good use of gendered analysis, Chin explains how Americans judged China as heathen, backward, and uncivilized, especially in comparison with Japan, which some thought had a superior culture. Their image of China was “as weak, emotional, immature, and dependent on the strength and protection of United States,” but Japan was by contrast “strong, virile, and assertive—manly qualities that could evoke both respect and fear” (30). Because American missionaries viewed themselves as divinely chosen to convert the unenlightened, they also judged the Chinese as “promising pupils” (29) who could learn how to be civilized. Embracing Christianity was the first step, causing some Americans to see the Boxer Rebellion as a sign of progress toward modernization through violence. For Americans, Chin explains, empire raised questions about core values and “involvement in Asia . . . [and] helped to mold Americans’ self-image . . .” (76).

Competing visions of modernity and empire existed in the United States, China, and Japan as the nineteenth century neared an end. Edward Bellamy, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Josiah Strong, Chin explains, all advanced an optimistic picture of the U.S. future, the latter two issuing a “clarion call for Americans to go forth, compete, and prevail” (p. 48) over the disorientation and anxiety that was afflicting American society. Expansionism would counteract the influences of urbanization that had made Americans weak and effeminate, thus avoiding “Chinese isolation” (53). U.S. missionaries agreed, emphasizing the nation’s duty to expand and supporting the U.S. military and its use of power to acquire territories that “would become part of America’s holdings but not part of the nation itself” (55). The Open Door policy, Chin writes, “was a declaration of American identity” that signaled how the United States now projected “a strong national presence” (62), instead of being a collection of island communities.

Meiji Japan, meanwhile, had associated civilization with modernization, pursuing this objective through remaking itself from inside as a matter of moral and conscious striving. It assumed correctly, Chin writes, that a modern nation was not just Western, but universal and “accessible to all and by no means the exclusive property of the West” (65). While acknowledging its debt to China and the West, Japan proceeded in a separate sphere, as

“Imperial modernity became the core of [a] new identity” (68) that included the expectation of its transmission to neighbors. Japan’s model was a tough sell in China, not least because it rejected the reality of a multistate system. Chinese reformers read Bellamy and hoped for convergence in a shared modernity. But they believed the first priority was for the people to embrace a sense of nationhood. China’s transformation was the most far reaching, but incomplete as the women’s rights struggle, Chin explains, exemplified its uneven progress toward modernity.

Part II examines “Women and Constructions of Modernity.” Chin labels female U.S. missionaries “beneficent Imperialists” who were “quite unabashed” (83) in their intention to impose Western culture on the Chinese. But diplomats and businessmen shared their belief that China would benefit from being open, modern, and Christian. A central goal for female American missionaries was to educate Chinese women who would be “useful . . . for a new China” (91) and thus symbolic of a civilized society. They also sought to end footbinding, while ironically working to install a new form of arranged marriages. A “young bride-to-be was to receive triple schooling in religion, intellect, and housekeeping (89) in preparation to marry another Christian. American women missionaries, however, were not propagating feminist values or radical social changes, since they did not foresee careers for Chinese women in politics or business. While striving to surmount racial stereotyping, they remained less willing to abandon traditional gender roles. A cultural clash that was central to their experience in China raised questions about American modernity and “whether consciously or not, embodied the tensions between empire and national identity . . .” (103).

Most insightful in this work is Chin’s description of how Chinese women ignored the restraints of missionary teachings and constructed their own ideas of modernity. After 1905, rising numbers of them became active in reform, as they looked to the United States and Japan for ideas for remaking China into a strong and modern nation. Uncertainty and ambivalence emerged as a pattern in defining China’s ‘New Woman,’ not least because “much of the discourse . . . was in fact produced by and for men, raising questions of authenticity of voice and audience response” (108). Nevertheless, there was abundant evidence of how Chinese women connected asserting their autonomy, expanding their rights, and achieving economic independence with modernity. Chin covers this in detail by examining the content of Chinese magazine articles, although she does admit that “interpretation of . . . images remains speculative” (123). Chinese women also demanded suffrage, linking their campaign with the world movement with the expectation that success would win respect for China as modern. Chinese reformers therefore borrowed discourses, strategies, and images from West to construct their own uneven and imitative modernity. “The Chinese engagement with representations of modernity,” Chin documents in impressive analytical fashion, “was in turn translated back under the Western gaze of American writers and illustrators whose reactions ranged from amused condescension to exaggerated admiration to genuine respect” (132).

Chin begins Part III, titled “Modernity and Identity in the Global Arena,” with an explanation of how internationalism early in the twentieth century disguised the persistence of nationalism. Many new organizations lobbied for peace but each, she keenly

observes, sought to regulate behavior between nations rather than among nations. In the United States, Japan, and China, “reexamination of national identity was ongoing in the political realm as well as the intellectual as they confronted the implementation of modernity in an ever more international context” (137). For all three, Chin contends, 1912 was a watershed year. In the United States, the New Nationalism had transformed the nation into a truly national one that President William Howard Taft sought to project to the world with the first stop in China. After the revolution, Republican China resorted to international action to regain its sovereignty with treaty revision to gain equality on immigration and end economic exploitation, notably with the anti-American 1905 boycott. Japan saw itself as a nation, but leaders debated the next step. Party politicians challenged the power of the oligarchs, posing as defenders of the people’s will as Meiji ideology required. But by then, expansionism defined Japan’s identity. Once “China had chosen a path of modernization that denied Japan’s power to direct the course of the revolution” (164), choosing instead to emulate the U.S. model, Tokyo and Washington were on a collision course.

During World War I, rising tensions within and between the three nations reached a climax because the conflict “exposed many of the shortcomings and contradictions in their projected role in the world and their [differing] respective approaches to modernity” (168). Woodrow Wilson believed U.S. “principles and traditions” (171) required assuming new global responsibilities, but the American people did not want to remake the world. China also disagreed on its national identity and definition of modernity, with the New Culture movement rejecting pursuit of a hybrid culture. But Chinese leaders had accepted fully an internationalist approach, favoring mediation and declaring war on Germany for “not merely short-term advantage but the larger goal of securing China’s status in the world” (179). Chin disagrees with the historian Xu Guoqi, writing that “China gained little in international respect during the war” (174).¹ Japan’s uncertainty about its imperial essence and modern identity added urgency to the pursuit of expansion on the mainland. But internationalism was replacing “imperialism as the basis of the new international order” (163), leaving Japan disgruntled after the war because this contradicted its national identity. Not only did Wilson’s rhetoric threaten its colonies, but rejection of the racial equality clause showed that the West was unwilling to accept it as an equal in the new international order.

Chin deserves praise for her careful presentation and prudent analysis. Another positive feature is her parenthetical placement after key terms of both Chinese and Japanese translations. The author also has a sense of humor, bringing a smile to my face when I read how China attended a conference in the early twentieth Century as “one of the banquet guests rather than part of the menu” (67). Ten images provide strong visual elaboration for a number of interpretive points, including a reproduction of John Gast’s famous painting *American Progress*. Half are covers from issues of the journal *Funu Shibao* (*Women’s Times*) in 1918 and 1919 that depicted Chinese women in modern contexts and attire. Chin

¹ Xu Guoqi, *China and the Great War. China’s Pursuit of a New National Identity and Internationalization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3, 14.

insightfully describes in the text how these images support her arguments, noting how “sex appeal is not overtly on display, but a kind of titillating curiosity is” (119). But in one figure presenting two views of marriage, she observes that the Western “bride happens to be taller than the groom” (115) when in fact she is standing a step higher on a flight of stairs.

References to interesting anecdotal information nicely support principal arguments. Describing the professionalization of the U.S. diplomatic service in the late nineteenth Century, Chin points to the establishment of the Far Eastern division as the first bureau in a new geographic organizational structure as indicative of a U.S. priority on East Asian interests. At times, the author is repetitious, such as stating several times that women’s rights were most advanced in the United States and least in China. Some important issues need further development. For example, Chin mentions only briefly how American missionaries intended the Chinese women they were educating to be “mirror images of the American settlement house workers and progressive reformers” (91). Similarly, she refers to U.S. missionaries as “pioneers in religion not social activism” (93).

A more substantive criticism of this study relates to the weak connection between evidence and interpretation on two critical issues. First, Chin presents an enormous amount of information describing Chinese attitudes and opinions about national identity and modernization. She relies heavily on the contents of several periodicals. What remains unclear is which and how many Chinese read these publications. Moreover, Chin acknowledges that “the message is ambiguous” (114) in these periodicals because they presented conflicting information about the desired role for women. On a related point, she devotes praiseworthy attention to Mary Stone (Shi Meiyu) and Ida Kahn (Kang Aide), two Chinese physicians, but how typical were they? Chin in fact admits that “it is much harder to find the voices of Chinese Christian women” (99) because they left no papers or letters. These limitations compel the author to conclude imprecisely that “some process of cultural transformation was at work” (100).

Secondly, Chin shows how American “women missionaries did not participate directly in the . . . exercise of U.S. military, diplomatic, or economic power, [but] they occupied a position of power in relation to the local population because of their cultural identity” (85). Indeed, direct connections between the actions of the people the author discusses and actual U.S. policies in East Asia are few. Oddly, Sarah Pike Conger, wife of the American minister to Beijing, makes only a cameo appearance. If traditional works on U.S. foreign relations have been a mere recounting of what “one clerk wrote to another,” this study provides a reason to ask whether it presents more than a recitation of what one Chinese intellectual like Wang Tao, one U.S. missionary like Reverend Henry van Dyke, and one American female educator like Mary Porter Gamewell said to their associates and followers. Chin notes this disconnect between activism and policy when she notes how Christianity had no influence on Yuan Shikai.

Chin relies on an abundance of primary and secondary sources to show that “national identity could indeed be transformed by the international context” (172). In her conclusion, she briefly describes how the United States, China, and Japan entered the postwar era still struggling to balance national identity, internationalism, and modernity.

In 1900, all three nations had determined that the conception each had of its place in the world community was insufficient to meet the demands of the modern age. Two decades later, none had clarified its global role. While Americans retreated into isolationism, for the Chinese, “collapse of the republic dealt a serious setback to the quest for modernity and fractured China’s national identity” (189). Sadly, the Chinese watched at the Washington Conference as outside powers again decided their nation’s fate. By 1920, “Japan was on a path to separate itself from the Western system and intensify its focus on Asia” (187). Thereafter, the clash between these three divergent national identities set the stage for a return to conflict. Chin’s study demonstrates conclusively that “the intellectual trajectories of the three nations were closely intertwined, in complex and sometimes surprising ways” (5).

This work of intellectual and diplomatic history examines how the concepts of modernity and national identity developed in the United States, Japan, and China at the turn of the twentieth century, both within the respective national discourses as well as in the context of changing global dynamics. In tracing this, the author makes several points.

First, in all three nations under discussion, the understanding of modernity and national identity shaped and was shaped by the nations' place in the new world order and the nations' view of each other. As the United States, Japan, and China each sought to define and assert its identity and role in the changing global geopolitics, each faced ambivalence and opposition both domestically and from other nations. In the wake of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and the subsequent Washington Conference of 1922, none of the three nations had fully achieved its purported goals in advancing its national interest.

Second, in understanding modernity and national identity in the context of international relations, it is important to pay attention to not only the discourses of and between the governments but also the non-state actors and the realm of culture. The author illustrates this point by examining the role of women in each nation's modernizing project. Furthermore, through a study of American missionaries in China, the author also delineates the international and cross-cultural dynamics of women's politics, showing the liberating as well as conventional gender politics and ideological barriers of the American women's Christian mission in China.

Third, the emerging internationalism did not transcend nation-based identifications but rather went hand in hand with nationalism. On both sides of the Pacific, internationalism—whether of Progressive women activists such as Jane Addams or of Wilsonian vision of international order—was often a vehicle for voicing a more advanced national identity.

This study is not the type of scholarship that uncovers new archives or offers new interpretations of historical events or documents. Many of the sources, both primary and secondary, used in the study are well known to scholars in the field, and the historical development the author narrates is not particularly novel. Thus, the contribution of this work lies not in its originality but rather in its comparison of national histories and synthesis of ideas. I find the work's particular strength in the two chapters in Part II, where the author examines the roles and identities of American women missionaries in China and Chinese responses to the emerging 'New Woman.' In contrast to the other chapters that are painted with broad strokes, here the author zooms in for a much more detailed look at the lives, work, and identities of American missionaries and the New Women of China. The author thereby illustrates the ideological and attitudinal limitations of the American missionaries who saw themselves as beneficent carriers of the civilizing mission, much in

line with Jane Hunter's earlier scholarship.¹ She also demonstrates the agency of Chinese women who appropriated the vision of modernity in their own terms rather than blindly absorbing Western models of civilization and progress. Furthermore, in her close analysis of visual representations of the New Women in Chinese women's magazines, the author convincingly illustrates the uneven, ambivalent meanings assigned to New Women as the embodiment of modernity.

In this discussion of women and constructions of modernity, a look at American women who engaged East Asia during this period other than as missionaries—travelers, writers, artists, art patronesses, wives of diplomats and businessmen, and so forth—would have added further complexity and nuance to the author's argument about "beneficent imperialists," (Chapter 3) as women from different subject positions and with different motivations—and hence different ideas about modernity despite their shared gender—engaged Asia differently. While it is certainly true that such American women still maintained their position of superiority vis-à-vis Asian women and men by virtue of their racial and national identities, for many women, their engagement with Asia indeed allowed them to step beyond conventional gender norms, and their international outlook did broaden their notion of national identity.² This would have expanded and strengthened the author's argument about women as agents of modernity and national identity.

Additionally, while the book addresses the tripartite dynamics of the United States, Japan, and China, and convincingly argues that each of the three nations defined its national identity in relation to the others, the author's main interest is clearly in U.S-China relations in the context where Japan was rapidly asserting its nationalist and imperialist ambitions in Asia. In other words, in much of the study, Japan is a foil or backdrop. This is no doubt partly due to the author's perfectly understandable use of Chinese and English, but not Japanese, language sources. However, even with only English-language secondary sources, a comparably close look at the 'modern girl' in Japan and ambivalent responses to them, as well as Japanese women activists' relationship to American and Chinese women respectively, would have greatly enriched the author's study.³

¹ Jane Hunter, *Gospel of Gentility: American Women Missionaries in Turn-of-the-Century China* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).

² Mari Yoshihara, *Embracing the East: White Women and American Orientalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Kristin L. Hoganson, *Consumers' Imperium: The Global Production of American Domesticity, 1865-1920* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).

³ For instance, see Mari Yoshihara, "The Flight of the Japanese Butterfly: Orientalism, Nationalism, and Performances of Japanese Womanhood," *American Quarterly* 56:4 (2004): 975-1001; Manako Ogawa, "American Women's Destiny, Asian Women's Dignity: Trans-Pacific Activism of the Women's Christian Temperance Union, 1886-1945," (PhD Dissertation, University of Hawai'i, 2004); Rumi Yasutake, *Transnational Women's Activism: The United States, Japan, and Japanese Immigrant Communities in California, 1859-1920* (New York: New York University Press, 2004); Ayako Kano, *Acting Like a Woman in Modern Japan: Theater, Gender, and Nationalism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001); Sharon A. Minichiello, "Greater Taisho: Japan 1900-1930," in *Taisho Chic: Japanese Modernity, Nostalgia, and Deco* (Honolulu: Honolulu Academy of Arts, 2001), 9-15; Kendall H. Brown, "Flowers of Taisho: Images of Women in Japanese Society and Art, 1915-1935," in *Ibid.*, 17-28; Sharon H. Nolte and Sally Ann Hastings, "The Meiji State's Policy toward

Despite these minor quibbles, this book is an ambitious study that brings together intellectual history, cultural history, diplomatic history, and women's history and addresses the amorphous concepts of modernity and national identity with precision and complexity.

Women, 1890-1910," in *Recreating Japanese Women, 1600-1945*, ed. Gail Lee Bernstein (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 151-174; Miriam Silverberg, "The Modern Girl as Militant," in *Ibid.*, 239-266.

Author's Response by Carol C. Chin, University of Toronto

Let me begin by thanking Tom Maddux for arranging this forum and the reviewers for their thoughtful and gracious comments on my book. It is indeed a treat to have such well-respected colleagues in the field pay close and well-informed attention to one's work. Given that the topic is a bit amorphous, it is especially gratifying to see that the reviewers grasped what I was trying to accomplish and—for the most part—what I did not claim to be doing.

Each of the commentators has highlighted one or more of the specific themes of the book and pointed out other themes that I could have explored further. James Matray has nicely summarized the whole book, thus saving me the trouble of recapping my argument here. Joe Henning frames his remarks around the theme of exceptionalism, or rather, unexceptionalism.¹ He points out, quite rightly, that I could or should have done more with the developments of race science, following a theme laid out in his own splendid monograph.² Mari Yoshihara focuses on the gender aspect and suggests that the analysis would have been stronger if I had included the views of other categories of American women and the influence of Japanese women, both activists and the “modern girl.” On the first point, I can only say that attempting a thorough study of American women travelers, writers, art patronesses, and the like would have turned it into a different book, one that others, including Yoshihara herself, are probably better positioned than I to write. Nearly all of the reviewers remarked on the thinness of analysis on the Japanese side, which Yoshihara attributes to the thinness of my Japanese-language ability. That conclusion is partly true, though the lack of emphasis on Japan is also a function of my overall primary focus on the United States and China. Hiroshi Kitamura, among other things, underscores the ways in which the book is a “history of ideas.” He also queries (as does Matray) the missing link between the cultural and intellectual trends and actual foreign policy, and that is the point that I would like to take up in more detail.

Causality—the “so what?” question— is the perennial issue for anyone attempting to use culture, gender, or race to illuminate aspects of U.S. foreign relations. I can think of two answers to this question. The first is that cultural and intellectual interactions create the environment in which policymakers operate, whether consciously or unconsciously. Diplomats and politicians, like everyone else, are products of their time and place; rarely are they able to escape the beliefs and assumptions of their cultural milieu in responding to situations or making policy choices. To take a simple example, although it is difficult to draw a direct line from Denby's disdain for China's diplomatic capacity to any specific action of the State Department or the legation in Beijing, it surely adds to our overall understanding of the development of national identity to explore the prevalence of certain

¹ Following the logic of Henning's introductory examples, I come to the rather pleasing conclusion that Rick Santorum would probably hate my book, were he ever to know of its existence.

² Joseph M. Henning, *Outposts of Civilization: Race, Religion, and the Formative Years of American-Japanese Relations* (New York: New York University Press, 2000).

American attitudes toward the Chinese and Japanese with whom Denby and others were dealing. Matray's version of "so what" is to suggest that, instead of "what one clerk said to another," I could be simply substituting what a few intellectuals or missionaries said to each other. Perhaps—but in most of my examples these were not individual exchanges but contributions to a particular intellectual atmosphere that other parties picked up on in interesting and sometimes unforeseen ways. That Chinese intellectuals read Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward*, or that Chinese women commented on American and British suffragists, and that each used that information or cultural messages for their own purposes—these strike me as interesting and noteworthy phenomena that tell us something about interactions between people (and ideas), though not necessarily between governments.

This brings me to my second response to the causality question, which is simply: No, I haven't proven that any of these cultural influences or ideas of modernity or national identity had any effect on the *diplomatic* history. I happened to find these things fascinating in and of themselves. In my own way I am trying to contribute to the development of our field to the point where those of us interested in these topics no longer have to justify the importance or worthiness of cultural approaches. For a worthy look at how nontraditional factors can influence the making of foreign policy, see Frank Costigliola's new book, *Roosevelt's Lost Alliances*, in which he charts the influence of emotional beliefs on key officials.³

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³ Frank Costigliola, *Roosevelt's Lost Alliances: How Personal Politics Helped Start the Cold War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012).