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Introduction by Matt Schumann, Eastern Michigan University

In his companion volume to Franz Szabo’s *The Seven Years’ War in Europe* (2007), the maritime historian Daniel Baugh completes Longman’s two-part series on the conflict, adding new dimensions to the existing historiography. Throughout, Baugh reminds us that the Seven Years’ War took place on and across the sea as much as it did in continental Europe, and that command of the oceans for both commerce and colonial supply played as vital a role in the war as did victories on European battlefields. Among many outstanding attributes, then, Baugh’s work does indeed stand as a complement to Szabo’s, inviting us to recall the global dimensions of a war that engulfed all of Europe’s major powers.

In many respects, Baugh’s work is a complement and successor to its two-volume forebear of a century ago, Julian Corbett’s *England in the Seven Years War*. It also fits alongside Jonathan Dull’s recent work on the French Marine, and smaller-scale studies of the Georgian navy by Stephen F. Gradish and Nicholas A.M. Rodger. For the opening stages of the war, it also provides a global context for British power struggles detailed by J.C.D. Clark, and at the end, for the peace negotiations treated at length by Zenab Esmat Rashed and more recently by Karl Schweizer. Baugh also treats in detail the various theatres beyond the water’s edge, from battlefields in Germany to the backwoods of North America, and from amphibious campaigns in the Caribbean to the muddled politics of the Indian subcontinent.

Baugh’s history is neatly organized into sixteen more-or-less chronological chapters, all of which are then subdivided to cover major themes, such as the leading political actors, decisive battles or key negotiations. A comprehensive introduction warns us to expect a mostly conventional diplomatic and military history, with outlying treatments of trade and domestic politics. In these respects, all four reviewers agree that Baugh largely excels, commending especially his focus on shipping lanes (Elena Schneider) and commerce raiding (Thomas Truxes). The work does have a few weaknesses, however, whether in archival materials that seem not to have made it into Baugh’s notes (Truxes, Karl Schweizer), or in non-European voices that seem to have remained silent (Schneider, Fred Anderson).


3 There is a huge amount of scholarship particularly on Europe and North America, prominent among which are Reginald Savory, *His Britannic Majesty’s Army in Germany during the Seven Years War* (Oxford, 1966); Guy Frégault, *Canada: The War of the Conquest* (Oxford, 1969); Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years War in North America and the Fate of Empire in British North America* (London, 2000).
Overall, Baugh presents a cogent summary of the Seven Years’ War with copious detail—again, especially on the naval themes that are his strong suit. To a one, the reviewers were impressed with Baugh’s range of knowledge on non-European theatres, including “Acadia, Nova Scotia and Ohio” (Schweizer), “the Carnatic Sea and the Coromandel Coast,” (Schneider) and “Fort William Henry and Chandernagore” (Anderson) to sample just a few. To these, Truxes adds the better part of a paragraph commending Baugh’s treatment of a landmark piece of British maritime legislation on the subject of neutral trade: the Rule of the War of 1756. The reviewers also justly remark on the thorough treatments of Braddock’s expedition, the siege of Minorca and the trial of Admiral John Byng, and the Battle of Quiberon Bay—which Schneider and particularly Anderson both identify as “the book’s dramatic climax.”

The shortcomings of the book are best described—at some length—in the reviews by Schweizer and Anderson. While Truxes laments that Longman seems to have put a cap on footnotes and the bibliography as a whole, Schweizer draws on his own experience in European and North American archives to distinguish between his own and Baugh’s research styles. While the reviewers agree in general that Baugh succeeded remarkably in his drawing mostly from published scholarship, it may indeed be worth revisiting at least Longman’s policy for citations—if not a few more archives—if Baugh is invited to write a second edition. Anderson’s critiques follow in the same vein, concerning specifically the Native Americans about whom there has been a wealth of scholarship in recent years. While the breadth of Baugh’s reading comes out very well in his bibliographical essay, Anderson may as well be speaking to future scholars on the North American war as to Baugh himself about the value of wading deeper into the sources used, for example, by Stephen Brumwell, Matthew Ward, Eric Hinderaker and Ian Steele, among many others. Sound and wide-ranging as Baugh’s work is—and as the reviewers acknowledge—a history of the Seven Years’ War still has yet to be written that gives equal or even proportionate voice to actors outside of what Hamish Scott has called Europe’s “Great Power System.”

In sum, I would concur with the reviewers’ general conclusion that Daniel Baugh has written an excellent global survey of the Seven Years’ War—particularly between Britain, France and Spain—and one that exhibits moments of brilliance when covering the naval expansion in New England and the southern Mississippi Valley.

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topics that are closest to Baugh’s heart and research specialty. While it may be asking a bit too much of a book that is already over 700 pages to incorporate the archival sources and non-European voices that Schweizer and Anderson respectively desire, they do point ways forward for the historiography of the Seven Years’ War, and demonstrate that while Baugh has made an excellent contribution, this is an area of research and historical reflection for which the last chapter is quite far from having been written just yet.

Participants:


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This is a long review of an important book, and so best begun by laying my cards on the table. In my view *The Global Seven Years’ War* is the best one-volume treatment yet published of what Sir Winston Churchill characterized as “a world war – the first in history.”\(^1\) It complements excellent recent syntheses by Matt Schumann and Karl Schweizer and by Franz Szabo.\(^2\) While it cannot, for reasons I will try to explain below, be considered a definitive narrative, it is nonetheless a superb, comprehensive diplomatic and military history of the great Anglo-French war in the tradition of Julian Corbett and Richard Waddington, whose early twentieth-century works established a standard of scholarly excellence that this volume more than equals.\(^3\) Like those sweeping narratives, Baugh’s story is thoroughly grounded in British and French archives; his long immersion in the relevant primary sources is evident on every page. Unlike Corbett and Waddington, who worked up their narratives mainly from the archives, Baugh has had the benefit of a great many excellent monographic studies of the war and its contexts, most of which have appeared in the last four decades.\(^4\) These have both enriched and complicated his task. His careful, critical integration of the findings of these works is nothing short of masterful; indeed, reading the “Notes on Sources” (pp. 667-720), in which he describes how his reading of these works has informed each chapter of the book, is an experience that any serious student of historian’s craft will relish. And Baugh’s book is, finally, a distinguished example of history as literary art. He tells his complex, multi-layered story in prose as lucid and graceful as any writer who has ever taken on the Seven Years’ War.

Given these manifest merits, the single stricture I have to offer is that the venerable publisher Longman, now an imprint of the Pearson Education publishing empire, has priced the U.S. paperback at $53.20 and the British edition at an only slightly less-


\(^3\) Julian S. Corbett, *England in the Seven Years’ War: A Study in Combined Strategy*, 2 vols. (London: Longmans and Green, 1907); Richard Waddington, *La Guerre de Sept Ans: Histoire diplomatique et militaire*, 5 vols. (Paris: Firmin-Didot et cie, 1899-1914). Baugh does not treat the war in Eastern Europe – the conflict that pitted Prussia against Russia and Austria – in any substantial depth, except insofar as Britain’s heavy annual subsidies to Frederick II bore on its ability to carry its global fight against France and eventually Spain. In fact no scholar to date has managed to integrate all the theaters of the war into a single, balanced, and unified narrative; thanks to Baugh’s book it may be possible to do so now.

oppressive £26.99. These prices will discourage most interested non-specialists from buying the book and will virtually exclude it from consideration for course adoption. As paperbacks go, this is a well-made volume, with sewn signatures of what seem to be acid-free paper; professional scholars who buy copies for their personal collections can be confident that they are investing not only in a work of scholarship that will stand the test of time, but physical artifact durable enough to stand up to repeated use. Such purchasers, alas, number in the low thousands. Even with public and academic library sales counted in, this excellent work will circulate far less-widely than it should. Whoever was responsible for setting Longman’s price point did this book and its author a grave disservice.

Like most other general accounts of the Seven Years' War, Baugh’s narrative centers on the actions of states, as framed by diplomatic, political, and economic factors. Military and naval operations – as driven, inflected, and constrained by geography, finance, logistics, intelligence, communications, technology, strategy and tactics, chance, commanders’ personalities, and related variables – give the story its forward momentum. Dramatic confrontations and climactic moments (especially diplomatic events, battles, and sieges) help define the story’s trajectory through five phases. The first of these begins with Anglo-French tensions building in Europe and on the disputed borderlands of empire in North America in the aftermath of the War of the Austrian Succession; it ends with the outbreak of fighting in western Pennsylvania in the summer of 1754. The second phase, a brutal, undeclared frontier war that raged in 1755-56, was marked by attacks on civilian populations both by the Anglo-Americans (whose expulsion of the entire Francophone population of Nova Scotia was a singular act of ethnic cleansing) and by the French and their Indian allies, whose attacks on settlements from Maine to North Carolina spread panic along the whole of the Anglo-American frontier and turned much of central Pennsylvania and western Virginia into an abattoir. The third period begins in mid-1756 as the various European powers, of whose alignment as British and French allies Baugh offers a lucid account, formally declared war on one another. France and its allies remained dominant until mid-1758, when the tide of what had become an increasingly global war began to turn in favor of Great Britain and its allies. This was largely a consequence of a new policy by which Parliament, at the urging of the great war leader, William Pitt, began to offer colonial governments subsidies that enabled them to mobilize manpower and other resources as never before. Britain’s seizure of French colonial holdings in North America and the Caribbean, beginning in 1758, continued in the fourth phase with the British military and naval triumphs of the *annus mirabilis*, 1759, climaxing with the surrender of the last French forces in Canada (late 1760) and India (early 1761). The final phase, a long tailing-off of the war from 1761 onward, was marked by Britain’s mastery of amphibious warfare in the Caribbean and the seizure of every French sugar island except Saint-Domingue. These conquests, and Spain’s belated entry as a belligerent in 1762 (followed straightaway by the spectacular British victory at Havana), proceeded against a backdrop of diplomatic negotiations that finally produced peace in early 1763, and produced sequelæ that took until at least 1765 to work themselves out within North America and throughout the Atlantic world.

Baugh relates this complex tale with full attention to simultaneity, surprise, chance, and contingency. Although his predominant concerns rest with monarchs, ministers, financiers,
and military commanders at war, he does not ignore those who served and suffered in the ranks, civilians who paid the price of war in taxes and the losses of loved ones, or native peoples who went to war alongside the subjects of the imperial states. Baugh’s narrative hinges on decisive battles, especially the 1759 engagements at Minden, the Plains of Abraham, and Quiberon Bay. The latter, fought in a November gale on the coast of Brittany (vividly described on pp. 431-443), functions as the dramatic climax of the book; Baugh, however, takes care not to privilege it (or any single engagement) unduly, or to minimize the significance of less-dramatic developments and events. He pays scrupulous attention to the impact of critical sieges on the course of the conflict (especially Fort William Henry and Chandernagore in 1757; Louisbourg, Ticonderoga, and Fort Frontenac in 1758; Quebec, Fort Niagara, and Madras in 1759; Pondicherry, 1761; and Havana, 1762), analyzing both their direct strategic effects and their less-tangible indirect consequences. His accounts of the war’s diplomacy – from the revolution in European defensive alignments in 1755-56 which produced the alliance system that sustained the war, to the negotiations that failed to end hostilities in 1760-61, to the talks that finally did achieve peace in 1762-63 – provide some of the most masterfully developed, even gripping, passages in the book.

Operations in North America comprise only a part of what is truly a global story, but in the end they mattered most of all to its outcome. Three crucial events in 1758 turned the tide of war in Britain’s favor. The taking of Louisbourg effectively closed the St. Lawrence to French shipping; the destruction of Fort Frontenac at the head of Lake Ontario inhibited the ability of New France’s defenders to resupply their far-flung western forts; and General John Forbes’s successful completion of a fortified road across Pennsylvania – the only American campaign that did not depend on movement along waterways – compelled the French to abandon Fort Duquesne and to cease attacks along the Pennsylvania-Virginia-Carolina frontier. All three events depended on the ability of the Pitt-Newcastle ministry to mobilize colonial American resources and manpower by reimbursing provincial governments in proportion to their participation, a policy that opened the floodgates of Anglo-American enthusiasm for the conquest of New France in 1759-60. Meanwhile France’s ability to defend its colonies and trading factories eroded in the face of the Royal Navy’s growing ability to blockade French seaports, destroy maritime commerce, cooperate with the army in amphibious operations, and defeat French naval squadrons on the high seas.

Thus the decisiveness of the Battle of Quiberon Bay derived not merely from Admiral Hawke’s destruction of a powerful French squadron, but rather from that event in light of an increasingly effective blockade of French ports and a series of bruising defeats – in the Bay of Lagos on the Portuguese coast, on Guadeloupe in the Caribbean, at Quebec and Niagara in North America, at Minden in western Germany – that had damaged French commerce and morale as much as they punished French military and naval forces. In the end what weighed most in the balance was not just the lives lost, matériel destroyed, and supply lines disrupted, but the influence of those losses on the morale and credit of the French government. British and Anglo-American successes crushed French commerce and destroyed the ability of the French Treasury to continue borrowing at even usurious interest rates; the price of shares on the London exchange meanwhile climbed to new heights and British investors continued to lend the crown every shilling the Pitt-Newcastle
ministry requested. All this – not just the overwhelming difficulty of sending supplies and reinforcements to New France – convinced Versailles that defending Canada was a game no longer worth a candle, dooming New France to conquest in 1760.

Baugh’s focus on state actors and decisive moments creates a coherent, readable, sophisticated narrative entirely in keeping with the ways that scholars have described war and international relations from the beginning of professional history-writing down to the end of the twentieth century. To ask for more than that would be to fault Baugh for failing to write a book he never intended to write, a sin against the spirit of justice in reviewing. Nonetheless, because this Roundtable invites reviewers not only to offer critiques but to raise broader issues for discussion, it may be worthwhile to consider what the consequences would be if we were to consider non-state actors – native peoples – also as having exerted significant autonomous influence on the causes, course, and consequences of the Seven Years’ War.

Baugh by no means ignores the indigenous peoples who took part in the conflict. He tends, however, to treat them principally as auxiliaries of the French or British forces, playing roles equivalent, in narrative terms, to those enacted by European colonists and their governments. My own reading of the evidence convinces me that while the actions of colonists can indeed be accurately characterized as dependent variables in the equations of power that define Baugh’s narrative, the actions and policies of Indian nations (for they did pursue their own policies) deserve separate consideration. In the remainder of this essay I will argue that, no matter what ministers at Westminster and Versailles may have thought, native peoples were indeed independent actors on the stage of eighteenth-century diplomacy and war.

For a full half-century before fighting broke out between France and Britain in the mid-1750s, native peoples had minimized the chance that any one of the three major European powers with interests in North America would be able to gain preeminence over the others by playing representatives of the three empires off against one another. Not all Indian nations participated in this system; those who did had gained their places in it painfully, as a consequence of the almost unimaginable losses inflicted by epidemic diseases and wars during the seventeenth century. In the course of that first century of European colonization north of the Gulf of Mexico, whole peoples – Hurons, Neutrals, Monongahelas, Eries, and Susquehannocks, to name just a few – had vanished. New native groups formed out of the fragments of shattered nations, forging alliances with each another and with colonizing Europeans, adopting new weapons and new modes of war-making in response to catastrophic demographic losses. The pitched battles that had once characterized wars among the indigenes of the eastern woodlands were abandoned in favor of raids in which warriors sought to take captives – either women and children who could be adopted to sustain community populations continually eroded by epidemics and war, or enemy men who could be tortured to death in rituals aimed at recovering the spiritual power of dead warriors and salving the grief of their surviving kin. Above all the experience of the catastrophic seventeenth-century wars convinced the leaders of native communities to beware of forming exclusive alliances with any colonizing European group, lest they be drawn into dependency and cultural annihilation.
The first half of the eighteenth century was thus a period of recovery in which the leaders of the largest surviving Indian nations of eastern North America became expert in playing European empires – or even different colonies within a single empire – off against one another. Such diplomatic maneuvering maximized their peoples’ access to trade goods and weapons, and hence maintained their freedom of action. By the 1740s a half-dozen Indian groups – the Abenakis, Cherokees, Creeks, Chickasaws, Choctaws, and the Six Nations of the Iroquois – had become proficient practitioners of balance-of-power diplomacy. The group whose actions were key to moderating the effects of the Anglo-French imperial competition was of course the New York-based confederacy known as the Six Nations of the Iroquois. By cooperating with their Catholic kin, the Caughnawaga Mohawks of Canada, the Six Nations took advantage of their geographical position between New France and the northern British colonies by refusing to act exclusively on the behalf of either European power. Under the leadership of chiefs skilled in diplomatic negotiations, the Iroquois League extracted subsidies and favorable terms of trade from the French and the British alike, even as they managed the flow and interpretation of intelligence between the adversary empires in such a way as to prevent either from gaining the upper hand.

This diplomatic system, however, was not especially favorable to the native peoples who were subject to one or another of the groups that dominated it. In particular three Indian groups subordinated to the Six Nations – the Delawares, Shawnees, and Mingo Senecas of the upper Ohio drainage – chafed under Iroquois claims of dominion. In the 1730s Iroquois chiefs had acted in collusion with the sons of William Penn to dispossess the Delaware people of lands north of Philadelphia. The Delawares subsequently moved to area around the Forks of Ohio (the vicinity of modern Pittsburgh) in search of autonomy, perhaps even independence.

The Delawares’ migration to the Ohio Country suited Iroquois purposes very well at first, because the presence of a subordinated ally at the Forks strengthened Iroquois claims to ownership of the region. But the Delawares were unwilling to have their land sold from under them again, and once they resettled in the Ohio Country alongside the Shawnees and the separatist Mingo Senecas who arrived at about the same time, they began to dream of freeing themselves from Iroquois hegemony and participating in the play-off system in their own right. The drift toward war on the upper Ohio in years after the War of the Austrian Succession, in other words, should be understood not only in terms of the clash between two European powers over which would dominate an inter-imperial borderland region, but also as a consequence of the Six Nations’ overestimation of their influence over supposedly dependent groups who were entertaining very different ideas about the nature of their relationship to the Iroquois League.

By 1754 Tanaghrisson, the Seneca headman charged with representing the interests of the League among the Delawares and Mingos of the upper Ohio Valley, tried (desperately, and with unforeseeably fatal consequences) to forge an unbreakable alliance with Virginia. This he did by inducing Lieutenant Colonel George Washington to lead a small force of Virginia provincial troops in an attack on an even smaller French detachment, which was in fact seeking to deliver a diplomatic message warning Washington to leave the area, or
suffer the consequences. Washington’s ill-advised attack, and the revenge that French forces soon took on his troops at the Battle of Fort Necessity (3 July 1754), played a large part in sparking the Anglo-French clash over the control of the upper Ohio Valley. But even Tanaghrisson’s intervention, crucial as it was in starting the war, was only half the story of native influence on the war’s origins, for the region’s Shawnee warriors were taking the warpath against the southern British colonies at exactly the same time, for reasons unrelated to the aspirations of the independence-minded Delawares and Mingos. The Shawnees’ attacks against British colonists on the Virginia-Carolina frontier proceeded principally from a desire to regain the honor they had lost in 1753 when six of their warriors, on a captive-taking raid against the Catawbas, had been arrested by order of South Carolina’s governor, James Glen, and imprisoned at Charleston. This act would have been outrageous to the Shawnee in any case, but the death in prison of the war party’s chief, Itawachcomequa (The Pride), made the insult casus belli. The resulting conflict between Shawnees and white southerners continued, on and off, until 1813.5

The different reasons that Delaware, Mingo, and Shawnee warriors undertook raids against Anglo-American communities in western Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North Carolina reveal the degree to which each native group acted independently, in parallel campaigns that corresponded to their own plans and goals. They conducted these raids with French support, but with only incidental reference to French desires and with little or no notice of the direction that officers of the French troupes de La Marine tried to offer. Given the behavior of European belligerents at the outset of the larger conflict, Native American independence of motive and action is scarcely surprising. The Prussian King Frederick II’s invasion of the Austrian province of Saxony arose from his own desire for territory and glory; that it was utterly at odds with the foreign policy goals and interests of his British ally concerned him scarcely at all. Austria’s decision to declare war on Prussia reflected the necessity of responding to Frederick’s aggression, was surely taken with the barest of consideration for its possible impact on Austria’s new ally, France. The other French-allied belligerents – Russia, Sweden, and especially Spain – similarly went to war in pursuit of their own interests, not out of an overriding concern for the desires of the French King Louis XV and his ministers.6


6 This was particularly true of Spain, whose early neutrality gave Britain a crucial naval advantage over France and the timing of whose final declaration of war in 1762 has until lately been all but impossible to explain. The book that does make brilliantly clear both the causes of Spain’s reluctance to renew the Bourbon Family Compact and the consequences of its belated decision to declare war – Paul Mapp, *The Elusive West and the Contest for Empire, 1713-1763* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, 2011) – unfortunately appeared too late to be incorporated in Baugh’s synthesis.
Indian actions and initiatives determined the early development of the war. The defeat of British General Edward Braddock’s force at the Monongahela on 9 July 1755 can be attributed entirely to Indian agency: negatively in the sense that Braddock had driven off potential native allies at the campaign’s outset by his astonishing arrogance, thus depriving himself of scouts, without whom he was effectively blind in the woods; positively in the sense that the 700 or so warriors who destroyed his force at the Battle of the Monongahela operated throughout the engagement without French direction or control. Subsequent attacks by Delawares and Mingos on the Pennsylvania frontier and raids by Shawnee warriors in western Virginia and North Carolina were primarily self-directed and created a state of chaos that put the central colonies on the defensive for the next three years. Meanwhile, in the north, the Mohawks withdrew from their initial alliance with New York and the New England colonies following the Battle of Lake George (7 September 1755), when to their horror British-allied Mohawks from New York and French-allied Mohawks from Caughnawaga found themselves exchanging gunfire and even killing one another. The Mohawks’ shift to neutrality stymied the ability of the Anglo-Americans to invade Canada via the Lake George—Lake Champlain—Richelieu River corridor for the next three years.

While the lack of Iroquois cooperation doomed Anglo-American operations on the New York frontier to frustration and failure, the alliance between New France and its enormous network of native allies brought warriors from as far away as Minnesota and Iowa to join in attacks on the northern British colonies. The Marquis de Montcalm’s attempts to turn those allies into irregular auxiliaries who would fight under his direction and in accordance with the ‘civilized’ values he associated with European warfare, however, undermined this highly successful system. Its breakdown in the aftermath of the Fort William Henry ‘massacre’ of 1757 all but destroyed the willingness of warriors from interior Indian groups to fight alongside the French in 1758. This shift can be seen quite clearly in the disparity between the 1,800 warriors who took part in the siege of Fort William Henry in 1757 and the 15 warriors who turned out to help Montcalm defend Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga) in 1758. More warriors returned to aid the French in the defense of Quebec the following year, but the diminished enthusiasm that native people showed, for helping the French in 1758 would prove a critical factor in the direction of the war thereafter. The year 1758 did indeed mark a turning point, a moment when factors internal to Britain’s relations with its colonies – particularly Pitt’s promises of reimbursement for expenses incurred by active participation – contributed to a shift in the direction and momentum of the war. That was an immensely important development, as Baugh notes, but it was not in fact decisive in itself, for Indian groups continued to hold the balance of power on the frontiers. This was nowhere clearer than in Pennsylvania, the critical theater of operations in 1758.

The commander of Anglo-American forces in Pennsylvania, Brigadier General John Forbes, was determined not to repeat Braddock’s mistakes in mounting his campaign against Fort Duquesne. In Forbes’s mind Braddock erred twice: first by dismissing Indians as savages, which had deprived him of intelligence and allies; second by hastening to come to grips with the French, which allowed the advance element of his force to outrun its support column and left him with no secure base to fall back on following the Battle of the
Monongahela. In operational terms the way to avoid the latter problem was simple, though vastly expensive – to make a “protected advance” against Fort Duquesne by building a road with major forts as bases of supply at 40-miles intervals, with blockhouses interspersed between them. The problem of obtaining Indian support was more complex and uncertain, requiring Forbes to regain connections with native people on a frontier that had been wholly in chaos for three years.

Forbes’s first answer, to import Cherokee warriors from South Carolina, made excellent strategic sense, but failed spectacularly in the execution. This was not because the Cherokees lacked enthusiasm for fighting Delawares and Shawnees – they were in fact eager to do so – but rather because Forbes (like Montcalm) tried to direct their actions as auxiliaries rather than treating them as allies free to operate on their own terms. In frustration the Cherokees simply went home in late summer, leaving his expedition at the point of ruin. At that moment Forbes turned to a couple of highly unlikely of allies – the Quaker leaders Israel and John Pemberton – for help.

The Pembertons were among the most notable members of the Quaker merchant elite that had controlled the Pennsylvania Assembly until 1756. When the war compelled legislators who were also members of the Society of Friends to choose between their pacifist principles and political power, Israel Pemberton had led most of them in resigning from the Assembly. He and his brother John then founded the Friendly Association for Regaining and Preserving Peace with the Indians by Pacific Measures, an organization dedicated to opening informal diplomatic channels to negotiate peace with hostile Indian groups. In 1757 the Friendly Association had persuaded Teedyuscung, the chief of a band of eastern Delawares living in the Susquehanna Valley, to leave the war path. By exploiting this connection, and using yet another pacifist go-between (Christian Frederick Post, a Moravian missionary who had married into the Delaware people), Forbes managed to extend an offer of peace to the Delawares on the Ohio. Through Teedyuscung, Pemberton, and Post, the western Delawares indicated their willingness to negotiate in return for British promises to open a trade on favorable terms in the Ohio country, to deal with them as diplomatic equals (i.e., no longer as Iroquois dependents), and to prohibit white farmers from settling beyond the Alleghenies after the war. Thus Forbes continued to build his fortified road, advancing slowly across Pennsylvania while he trusted a handful of pacifists and Indians to conduct the preliminary negotiations for peace.

Forbes’s gamble paid off at the Treaty of Easton (24 October 1758) when the Ohio Delawares agreed to withdraw from the French alliance. When Forbes finally completed his road, the French, bereft of native support, had no choice but to blow up Fort Duquesne and withdraw from the Forks of the Ohio. In the end Forbes took possession of the spot he named Pittsburgh without firing a shot.

Forbes’s refusal to hasten into battle with his enemy, together with his remarkable ability to see Indians who had made a charnel house of the Pennsylvania frontier not as savages but as human beings capable of responding to diplomatic overtures, brought peace to the long frontier from New York to North Carolina. Equally importantly, the Treaty of Easton also altered the balance of power in ways that compelled the Iroquois League to respond. By late 1758 it was clear to the chiefs of the Great Council at Onondaga that the Iroquois...
Confederacy would have to abandon its neutral stance in favor of an active alliance with the British. For the previous four years the alliance of the Ohio peoples with the French had nullified Iroquois claims to suzerainty over the Ohio Country; if the Six Nations now hoped to reassert control over the region and its peoples they needed the British to recognize them as the rightful overlords of the Delawares and others in the region. Not to act immediately to reassert control over the Ohio peoples would have been to recognize their de facto independence and to allow them to become competitors in the post-war era. And that was an outcome that the chiefs of the Iroquois League could not tolerate.

Thus the Six Nations took the warpath alongside Anglo-American forces in 1759 for reasons of Realpolitik that would have been instantly recognizable to any European foreign minister of the day – had any been able to understand Indian ‘savages’ as capable of reaching so reasoned a position. More than 900 Iroquois warriors – fully four-fifths of the League’s fighting force – accompanied the British expedition against Fort Niagara in June; when the fort surrendered on July 25, the defenders of New France no longer had the ability to communicate with Indians allies from the upper Great Lakes basin. This was the case not just by virtue of British seizure of the fort and the portage it guarded, but because Iroquois diplomats traveled the upper Lakes basin and the upper St. Lawrence Valley after the fort’s surrender, offering English trade goods and subsidies to peace chiefs willing to abandon the French alliance. The following year, 1760, when General William Amherst’s three-pronged campaign closed in on Montréal and the last defenders of Canada from the east, the west, and the south, the invaders met no effective resistance from the erstwhile Indian allies of New France because Iroquois diplomats had preceded them, negotiating the terms of peace. In the end, Amherst, like Forbes, won his greatest victory without firing a shot in anger, or losing a single soldier in battle.

So it might be argued that Indians were largely responsible for precipitating the clash of empires on the Ohio in 1754-55; that Indian agency contributed decisively to shift in the balance of power that changed the war’s course in 1758; and that Indian diplomacy decided the war’s outcome in 1760. Significantly, in both 1758 and 1760 Indian actors created decisive outcomes by avoiding battle. But so what? How does that change things in the way we understand the Seven Years’ War and its larger significance?

Indians have long been relegated to the margins of the story of the Seven Years’ War not merely because historians have been racists or apologists for imperialism, but because the historians’ prevailing assumption that battles decide the outcomes of wars has led them to discount the influence of participants who fought according to a value system that placed immense importance on avoiding battle, and the fantastic waste of lives that battles entail. Entertaining the proposition that native peoples, independently pursuing their own policies, could be influential – even decisive – in determining the outcome of a great imperial conflict may help us to begin understanding war in a way that de-centers the privileged claim of states to controlling influence over cause, course, and outcome.

Such a realization deepens the irony of this particular war’s decisive outcome for the native peoples whose decisions and actions mattered so deeply in bringing it about. When the terms of the Peace of Paris reduced the number of competing empires in North America
from three to two and created an unambiguous boundary between them, it upended the balance of power that had made it possible for Indian groups to play empires off against one another. The Indians’ loss of ability to control the terms on which they interacted with Anglo-Americans would prove to be the most tragic long-run result of the Seven Years’ War. At the same time, the unexampled decisiveness in the war’s outcome destabilized the victorious British Empire, which collapsed into civil war and revolution just twelve years after the ratification of the Peace. Tragic though the results were for the Indians who found themselves in the path of a relentlessly expanding American republic, their actions had significantly inflected the events that led to the American Revolution. Far from being the marginal figures they typically seem in state-centered narratives of the coming of Independence, native people played a central causal role in the creation of the United States of America.

Re-thinking the history of the Seven Years’ War in the way suggested above may even help us examine more critically certain assumptions we are apt to make about history generally. We tend to assume, almost automatically, that great events must have comparably great causes, and that the actions of larger, institutionally organized groups were necessarily more significant in determining historical outcomes than those of smaller, less apparently complex groups. Yet this account suggests that under the right circumstances Indian peoples – non-state actors – critically shaped North American history in the late colonial period, and indeed beyond.7 Although it may seem extravagant to move from this proposition to the conclusion that the history of international relations should expand to incorporate the diplomacy of native nations into a common frame with that of European empires and states, I believe that until historians of the Seven Years’ War do so, the definitive account of that great upheaval will remain unwritten.

Until that apparently still-distant day comes, however, The Global Seven Years’ War will stand as the indispensable scholarly narrative. Even if in closing the book I did not conclude that Daniel Baugh had uttered the last word on a topic that we both have studied for longer than either of us might wish to admit, there was no mistaking the quality of his work. It is a magnificent achievement.

7 For a similar argument regarding the influence of Comanches and other native peoples of the borderlands between Texas and northern Mexico on the coming of the Mexican-American War, see Brian DeLay, The War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2009).
Contributing to a newly burgeoning literature on the Seven Years’ War, Daniel Baugh has written a sweeping, nearly 700-page history of the conflict. Global in scope, it blends diplomatic history with a narrative of strategic military and economic aspects of the war. At the center of his account are the tactical decisions made in the waging of war and the material challenges of mobilizing sea and manpower. Top-down by design, the study draws primarily from the papers of British and French officials and a vast body of secondary literature dealing with the political, military, and operational history of the war on its many fronts, from Europe to West Africa, from North America to the West Indies, and from India to the Philippines.

British-French diplomatic relations take center stage in this account. The author attributes the outbreak of this global war to French diplomatic failure and discusses at length the diplomatic play-by-play of negotiations bookending its beginning and end. Given this narrative priority, the official war does not actually begin until the seventh of sixteen chapters, and the final chapters devote almost as much space to negotiations over the war’s end between London, Paris, and Madrid, as to the ongoing story of military engagements overseas. While there is coverage of the land war in Europe, Baugh privileges Atlantic and South Asian over European fronts. Despite these self-acknowledged limitations, the expansive scope of the project and the epic labor of weaving all these battlefronts together and embedding them in the diplomatic narrative occurring in European capitals have made for a final product that will be a valuable resource for quite some time.

In concept and execution, *The Global Seven Years’ War* is unapologetically ‘great man history.’ The men in question are the Earl of Chatham William Pitt, the Duke of Newcastle Thomas Pelham-Holles, the Earl of Hardwicke Philip Yorke, and Étienne François, the Duc de Choiseul. The only thematic chapter, at the beginning, offers a biography and overall assessment of the character and talents of each of these individuals. Pitt, Newcastle, and Hardwicke are “the great men responsible for the higher direction of the war on the British side” (28). Although Baugh criticizes Choiseul for not being “a competent war minister,” he does entertain “arguments for his greatness,” based on the diplomatic skill with which he maintained France’s alliances with Austria and Spain (32). Baugh does considerable work rescuing Pitt from recent revisionist critiques, although he is careful not to echo the traditional view that attributed to the man an almost omnipotent role in every aspect of battle planning.

The overarching argument of the book is that the war must be understood as the victory of British political and military leadership over its French counterpart. Not once does Baugh refer to 1759 as an “annus mirabilis,” characterized by miraculous British victories across the globe. Rather, British success was hard-earned, set up by careful management of material resources and highly skilled diplomatic and strategic gamesmanship. According to Baugh, France’s diplomatic recklessness precipitated the outbreak of the war (109), and despite political turmoil and a change of personnel, “the quality of British governmental
leadership conferred a decisive advantage” and contributed importantly to its ultimate results seven years later (17).

The book’s greatest strength and source of innovation may well derive from the author’s expertise in eighteenth-century British naval history. This publication represents the capstone to a distinguished career in that field, and its account of the war reflects this expertise and habit of mind.1 Baugh argues compellingly that the Seven Years’ War was “a war on water,” in which attacks on the water and the supply of campaigns by water routes were often crucial determinants of outcomes (13). Britain’s dominance of sea lanes and its utter incapacitation of the French navy by 1758 were thus critical in every front of the war. Seemingly in order to emphasize this interpretation, Baugh opens his narrative not with the official outbreak of war in the Ohio River Valley, but closer to the Atlantic, with prior contestation between Britain and France in Nova Scotia. In so doing, his account highlights both this maritime theme and the contingency of war formally breaking out in the former, as opposed to the latter, locale.

In Baugh’s version of events, battles were waged as much along seas and coastlines as over towns—in India, for example, as much over the Carnatic Sea and along the Coromandel Coast as over Madras and Pondicherry. The sieges of Menorca, Louisbourg, and Belle-Isle thus receive much more attention than in other accounts of the Seven Years’ War, particularly those more focused on land battles in Europe or North America. Baugh does not necessarily consider the siege of Quebec decisive, but rather the Battle of Quiberon Bay, along the French coast (443). Similarly, the French capture of Menorca from Britain in 1756 receives fascinating and extensive treatment, more coverage than the Battle of Minden, which is widely considered a key turning point in the European front of the war in 1759.

Highlighting the war on the water and the role of water in the war gives a certain unity to the story and ties together accounts of actions in the English Channel, along the coast of West Africa, in the Caribbean, India, and the Philippines. It also provides for moments of memorable narrative panache. Baugh describes naval engagements and operational logistics with unique and dramatic detail: ships are sometimes even identified by name, British seamen risk losing their hands to frostbite during the siege of Quebec, sails are frozen and thus rendered useless, and night raids by boat occur under cover of moonlight. In Bayonne in 1761, French residents cheer when boatloads of timber arrive in port to help redouble their shipbuilding efforts.

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Narrative brio aside, this focus on the war as a contest over oceans, not continents, and the vital importance of sea lanes is an important contribution to the scholarship. Baugh sees irony in the fact that the war began and had its largest impacts on “a wilderness region of the interior beyond the mountains about which statesmen in London and Paris knew almost nothing and had hitherto cared less” (2). Interestingly, a recent publication by Paul Mapp, which came out after Baugh’s book, traces the backstory to this European geographic misunderstanding of the far western North American continent. Among other points, he suggests that that western wilderness may have come to be seen more in terms of strategic sea lanes than had been initially thought—based, in particular, on a confused European geographic sensibility about a Northwest Passage.2

In what is also a welcome departure from prior literature on the war, Baugh’s diplomatic approach leads him to give a greater place to the role of Spain, both before and after its entry into the war in 1761. The Spanish play an important part in his narrative during the beginning of the war, when the French tried to induce their participation with the offer of the newly conquered Menorca as a gift in 1756. They also came to the fore in the final two years, during the protracted peace negotiations and after the Spanish king Charles III’s fateful decision to join the French Bourbon monarch’s side in the conflict (97-101).

While Spain’s entry into the war, as well as the threat of it before it actually occurred, is given more weight than in traditional accounts, Charles III and his realm still emerge looking somewhat like France’s—in particular, Choiseul’s—dupe, without any clear war plans or strategy of its own. This may in fact be (almost) a fair characterization, but one perhaps arrived at largely because that is how Choiseul described the situation in his correspondence. Indeed, if it had been possible, consultation with more secondary literature about Spain’s involvement in the war and/or Spanish sources beyond diplomatic correspondence with Britain and France would have added a good deal to this admittedly already sprawling tome.3 In addition, the accounts of the Spanish invasion of Portugal and the defense of Havana, though already more expansive than in histories that pay less attention to Spain, would have benefitted from more engagement with Spanish points-of-view, or at least as much as was shown in analogous accounts of battles between French and British subjects.

While Baugh’s book is an important step, to better tie the Spanish story in would also require more context from the War of Austrian Succession. For both the French and the Spanish, but particularly the Spanish, the War of Austrian Succession may well have been WWI to the Seven Years’ War’s WWII, in that one cannot understand the latter without engaging with the causes and consequences of the former. Before even entering the war, Spain had assembled a sharply articulated list of grievances derived from a sense of the

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3 The classic monograph on the Spanish in the Seven Years’ War is Vicente Palacio Atard, *El tercer pacto de familia* (Madrid: Talleres Gráficos, 1945)
injustice of the peace treaty that had ended the previous conflict, as well as the War of Spanish Succession and its Treaty of Utrecht of 1713. More context from prior conflicts and more discussion of the role of the British public—its attitudes and pressures on Parliament and decision makers in Britain—might have added to the author’s assessment of the British-Spanish war within the broader French-British one. Indeed it seems a pity to devote so many pages to such a richly nuanced narrative of diplomatic, military, and economic aspects of the war without either more discussion of the role of the British public or broader analysis of the various conflicts’ deeper causes and consequences across the eighteenth century.

The only other critique I will offer involves the role of non-Europeans in the accounts of military engagements in North America, West Africa, the Caribbean, and Asia. Peering at events through the writings of European military commanders and (often somewhat dated) historians’ monographs about these respective battles, the narrative renders Native Americans, Africans, people of African descent, and indigenous populations of India and the Philippines as shadowy presences, more part of the backdrop to Britain and France’s global great power contest than as actors capable of influencing the modes and outcomes of the war. In reading Baugh’s account of the war in Bengal, one can’t help but wonder about an individual referred to as “the nawab,” Siraj-ud-daula, on 16 June 1756 capable of marshaling an army of 30,000 men (284). A force of that size would have proved decisive in battles on any other war front, Europe included. Regarding India, West Africa, North America, and the Caribbean, in particular, this reader found herself wishing for more local context. Too often Native Americans are not identified beyond the general term “Indians,” as though they presented a monolithic type. People of African descent in the Caribbean, both enslaved and free, are not given much discussion either, even when they formed part of attacking British armies and the majority or at least half of populations under siege in Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Cuba. On this question, Baugh no doubt faced the limitations of what is possible in what is already a massive project. His narrative may also be understood as one shaped by the accounts of military commanders, who chose to describe their own protagonism in events rather than those of their allies, as well as by the work of historians who did not until recently pay considerable attention to these groups.

By its sheer range and scope, however, as well as by its own carefully chosen emphases, Baugh’s important new synthesis has moved the conversation forward in exciting, gratifying ways.

4 A recent military historical account that seeks to do so is Jeremy Black, *European Warfare in a Global Context, 1660-1815* (New York: Routledge, 2007).
For long a historiographical step-child, the Seven Years’ War has attracted a notable resurgence of scholarly interest in recent years, with works by Fred Anderson, Franz Szabo, Daniel Marston, Jonathan Dull, Karl W. Schweizer, and Matt Schumann. The volume under review (with certain qualifications) represents a highly readable, and so welcome addition to this literature both for its in-depth coverage of expeditions, combat and campaigns on a global scale, and its penetrating exploration of the complex factors shaping strategic and operational planning on all sides. A prominent maritime historian noted for his innovative writings on Grand strategy, geopolitics and comparative eighteenth-century naval systems, Baugh has here offered a judicious blend of narrative and incisive argument that avoids the traditional limitations of a purely chronological approach, achieving perspective and depth as well as range, by going beyond the external characteristics and manifestations of war within the Great Power System and subtly clarifying the processes by which its conflictual scenarios evolved and ultimately were resolved. As such, he achieves a certain degree of concision despite the huge breadth of his topic. If less attention is given to the personalities of leading statesmen, generals, and other decision makers—the human, psychological aspects of war and diplomacy are virtually ignored—the contemporary “high political” motives for actions and policies are usually identified and explained though subject sometimes to dispute.

The book opens with a broad survey of events, European and overseas, forming the prelude to imperial war. (chapters. 1-7). While the general outline will be familiar to specialist readers, Baugh’s taut narrative throws new light on specific topics such as the interface between geography and politics, the critical role of Acadia, Nova Scotia, and Ohio for both Britain and France, Francois –Joseph Dupleix’s projects in India and Major General Edward Braddock’s expedition. In the remaining and central parts of the book, Baugh presents vivid and authoritative chronicles, remarkable for their scope and integration, of all the major engagements ranging from Europe to North America, India, the Caribbean, the West African coast, and the Pacific Rim. It is in situating these within the shaping Euro-Atlantic


context of mid-eighteenth century communications, finance, bureaucracy and logistics, that the author probably makes his greatest contribution and as such, it would not be fulsome to suggest that his book stands as a worthy companion to the still fundamental navalist work by Sir Julian Corbett, *England in the Seven Years’ War*, published so long ago as 1907.

The final chapters dealing with the negotiations (1759-1763) culminating in the Peace of Paris are, unfortunately, among the weakest in the book, being largely derivative, based on outdated secondary sources to the neglect of in-depth archival research—a defect which, to a greater or lesser degree, tends to impact the handling of diplomatic issues in Baugh’s volume as a whole. Admittedly, Baugh has consulted manuscript material but only selectively and to a minimal extent. His coverage of British policy formulation, for instance, draws on *some* of the public records in the National Archives (formerly PRO) and the Newcastle and Hardwicke manuscripts deposited in the British Library—to the neglect of many other vital collections there (i.e. the Liverpool, Fox, Holderness, Martin and Mitchell papers, among others), not to mention the equally (if not often more) important private papers of leading statesmen which invariably offer rewarding insights into the motives and personalities shaping official decision making.

Much the same applies to his omission of Anglo-Hanoverian primary sources notable the Electoral Chancery Files and Prince Ferdinand’s official correspondence at Hanover and closer to home, the Germain, Gage and Shelburne papers in the Clements Library, Ann Arbor. Immersion in any or all these archives might have refined Baugh’s account of diplomatic/military maneuvers 1757-1762, both in detail and at times, on matters of interpretation.

French grand strategy is discussed in terms of the sources in the Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (Paris) to the neglect of equally vital documents in the *Archives Nationales, Archives de Colonies* and the *Bibliothèque Nationale*. Also, any authoritative evaluation of the domestic court politics determining government policy in a “Global War” necessitates consultation of the documentation generated by the major participating power centers (other than London and Paris)—specifically, Berlin, Vienna, Stockholm, and

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4 To cite only one relevant example: Zeneb Rashed, *The Peace of Paris* (Liverpool, 1951), which Baugh describes as “indispensable,” is hardly a work of “thorough scholarship” or “thoughtful interpretation,” but barely readable, confused in argumentation, repetitive, and thinly based on archival sources—especially with regard to Spain, a central focus of the book: only one ephemeral document from Simancas was consulted. It is badly in need of a modern replacement. Until this is available, a full understanding of the underlying issues and negotiating techniques leading to the Peace of Paris, is necessarily dependent on primary sources.

St. Petersburg none of which features in the book under review, an inexplicable shortcoming in my estimation. If good narrative history rests on analysis, reconstruction and placing events in context, such context must be based on manuscript research, for otherwise we get mere accretions; static narratives, sustained by successive traditions or highly contingent assertions altogether unsupported by fresh documentary evidence. Here archival work acts as a control, giving the historian a clearer perspective on the internal development of scholarship in any particular area while also compelling him/her to traverse once more the evidential path along which interpretations have evolved. Moreover, an understanding of diplomacy—integral to the decision making process of the state—requires that the official records (documents not only in the major British or French but also other foreign government collections)—be supplemented by private papers whenever possible. Too narrow a concentration on official manuscript material—and here overly selective at that—makes it impossible to satisfactorily unravel the tangled complexities of prewar and wartime multilateral diplomatic schemes. To offer only a few, representative examples: first, there is the critical issue of what triggered the escalation to war in the contested regions of North America, specifically, why the French chose to occupy the upper Ohio region, an area close to the colonies of Virginia and Pennsylvania and thus likely to provoke a militant British response (57) once the joint Boundary Commission had proved to be a failure. Baugh acknowledges that Britain’s reaction originated in London, not among colonial governors as is sometimes maintained (82)—but was rooted in the aggressive proposals of the Duke of Cumberland and Henry Fox, which Newcastle proved unable to contain. Here the author relies largely on the Newcastle manuscripts but, again, incorporation of the Cumberland Papers (Windsor Castle) and those of Fox would have put the picture into clearer focus and provided fresh corroborative details. Similarly, had Baugh consulted the Mildmay Papers, he would have appreciated more clearly the contributory role of Massachusetts’ Governor Shirley in fostering a diplomatic climate of impending hostility throughout the early 1750’s. As for France, Baugh argues that it was the ministry at Versailles, “captivated by some potent illusions” (74) which authorized and so was solely responsible for the aggressive diplomatic sequences that produced war over the Ohio question. Closer examination of the Archives des Colonies reveals, however, that

6 Although this city was then the center of rule, some of the relevant archival deposits were subsequently relocated to Moscow, most importantly: Tsentra’nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Aktow (TsGAGA)—[Central State Archives of Ancient Acts] which contains indispensable documents relevant to Russian military activity—and that of Russia’s allies—during the period 1756-1762, with commensurate diplomatic implications.


8 Jeremy Black, British Diplomats and Diplomacy, 1688-1800 (Exeter, 2001).

9 Esp. B.L. Add. MSS 51375,51376.

10 Mildmay Papers, Esex Record Office, Chelmsford, UK.

11 Archives Nationales (Paris) Série C; Serie V (Sécrétaires du Roi) cf Bibliothèque Nationale, Joly de Fleury Collections, vols. 283, 284).
France’s hard line approach was heavily influenced by the self-interested advice of François Bigot, Intendant for Canada from 1748-1760, whose commercial consortium stood to benefit handsomely from an expansion of territory and supplying the materials of war. Thus despite the overbearing ways of the Marquis Duquesne, Governor of New France from 1752, it was not he who summoned the militia “and planned to mount a large military expedition to the Ohio” (55); this provocative action had already been engineered by Bigot before Duquesne ever crossed the Atlantic to take up his post.12

Baugh also draws a distinction between ‘settlement’ and ‘trading’ with the implication that the two activities were somehow separate and distinct, whereas, in fact ‘penetration’ by traders was an inevitable prelude to, if not synonymous by eighteenth-century conceptions, British and French alike. Hence a military response to one problem inevitably impacted the other in a broader sense, as manuscript immersion reveals. Competition between state-operated companies (whether in Africa, the Caribbean, India or North America) was bound to create tension between the mother governments that would need to be defused first; after that, the settlement of territorial disputes would follow commensurately.

Baugh further expresses surprise at France’s reluctance to enter the Netherlands in 1755, as this territory, “poorly defended and garrisoned could have been conquered with ease” (149). This misconceives the entire thrust of French continental diplomacy at this time: namely, to construct a collective security arrangement made up of defensive alliances, foremost among them a reconstituted rapprochement with Frederick the Great, King of Prussia, who, hoping for neutrality in Central Europe, would have vetoed any aggressive designs against either the Netherlands or Hanover, at least prior to the Renversement. Baugh’s judgment (180) that France did not necessarily have to choose between Austria and Prussia on the eve of war ignores the impact of the Anglo Prussian Westminster Convention which confronted the French with the alternative of isolation or an Austrian alliance. The resultant dilemma for France is clearly illustrated in the informative dispatches of Baron von Knyphausen, Prussian envoy to Paris (1755-1756)13 and those of the special French minister to Berlin (1755-1756), the Duke of Nivernois,14 none of which were consulted by Baugh.

On a final historiographical note, although the author does make brief mention in his preface of The Seven Years’ War: A Transatlantic History which I published with Matt Schumann in 2008, he claims it appeared too late to be of benefit.15 This seems odd, because he does incorporate the finding of Franz Szabo’s The Seven Years’ War in Europe

12 Schweizer and Schumann, The Seven Years’ War, p. 15.


14 Archives du Ministerè des Affaires Étrangères (Paris): Correspondance Politique (Prusse), vol. 166.

15 Baugh, The Global Seven Years’ War, p. xiv.
1756-1763, which appeared the same year,\textsuperscript{16} and several articles published after 2008 are also cited. The massive archival research deployed in \textit{The Seven Years’ War} might have refined, clarified, or augmented his narrative—and conclusions—in more than one critical instance.

In sum, despite unfortunate flaws, Baugh’s work is still a significant scholarly contribution and should be read by all those interested in the first truly global war—the dynamics of conflict across the world—and the connection between empire and the drive to increase security, power, and influence within the European continent.

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 672, 692, 693.
Daniel Baugh has written a comprehensive—and highly readable—history of the Seven Years’ War, the first true world war. Although the book situates the great contest for empire on a global stage, the author never loses sight of the war’s human face. Baugh’s presentation has been carefully structured to make the multi-layered unfolding of events accessible to readers unfamiliar with the Seven Years’ War—or, for that matter, mid-eighteenth century military and maritime history. For that reason, and much more, *The Global Seven Years’ War* will be comfortable on a bookshelf that includes the work of Robert Beatson, Francis Parkman, Julian Corbett, Lawrence Henry Gipson, and Fred Anderson.¹ Baugh, Professor Emeritus of History at Cornell University and the author of *British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole*,² is regarded as one of the world’s leading authorities on eighteenth-century naval history.

*The Global Seven Years’ War* is divided into sixteen chapters that broadly follow the chronology of the war from the peace of Aix-la-Chappelle (1748) through Britain’s reform of its colonial system in the mid-1760s that precipitated the American Revolution. In his first four chapters, Baugh sets the stage for his story, introduces central characters, and lets us observe at close hand the blunders and missteps (on both sides) that made war for dominance in North America and the West Indies seem inevitable by 1755. Chapters five through eight comprise a catalog of British failures, lost opportunities, and self-inflicted wounds. Although Great Britain entered the fight with multiple advantages—most notably, the Royal Navy’s dominance at sea—ineffectual leadership, politicians working at cross-purposes, and bad luck presaged defeat and ruin. Beginning in Chapter nine —“The Tide Turns, 1758”—Baugh retells the dramatic story of British resurgence. There are scenes in chapters nine through thirteen that will clarify that great eighteenth-century toast: “To the eye of a Hawke and the heart of a Wolfe.” In Chapter thirteen, dark political clouds gather that foretell the mixed consequences of victory, the peace settlement, and the post war realignments described in Baugh’s final four chapters.

There is much to talk about regarding this book, but I will confine my remarks here to the role of colonial trade in bringing about—and prolonging—the Seven Years’ War. On his first page, Professor Baugh tells us that by the middle decades of the eighteenth century, Great Britain and France, “the two most advanced monarchies of Europe, were both inclined to measure power in terms not only of armies and European territory, but also of

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seaborne commerce, naval prowess and financial stamina” (1). The author has done a good job laying out the basic structure of British and French commerce in the Atlantic and beyond. And he underscores how the zero-sum mentality of drawing-room mercantilists on both sides helped to establish conditions that led to open warfare in 1755. Each side saw its rival’s expanding commerce as an existential threat. Speaking before Louis XV and the court at Versailles, the Comte de la Galissonière, an admiral and former Acting Governor General at Quebec, convincingly portrayed expansion of the British North American colonies as “a dire threat to the French West Indies” and argued that “the growth of American trade was augmenting British maritime power to a degree threatening to France’s superior standing in Europe” (5).

The mercantilist paranoia was not confined to Versailles. Following the close of the War of the Austrian Succession in 1748, the British had become obsessed by the dramatic expansion of the French fishery off Cape Breton and the surge in French West Indian sugar production. As Baugh tells us, “the British public viewed commerce and maritime superiority as essential to national survival and prosperity,” believing that the French had gained the upper hand in the contest (101-2). To these prisoners of mercantilist ideology, French commercial expansion was a dagger aimed at the heart of the nation. And in France “the belief was that because Britain was bent on acquiring a monopoly of world trade France could not afford to ignore a chance to limit British colonial expansion” (108).

In *The Global Seven Years’ War*, Baugh gives more than passing attention to the interconnections between military success, sea power, and wartime trade. In this global war, the nation’s capacity to fight—as well as state finances—depended upon access to the sea and the protection of long-distance commerce. It is the author’s assessment that both the French Navy and merchant marine enjoyed greater success crossing the Atlantic—given the prowess of the Royal Navy—than is generally allowed by historians. “French warships and merchant vessels often reached open sea by waiting for a strong wind from an easterly quarter. Ordinarily it was that simple,” he says. “If, however, a large merchant convoy was involved, the odds changed” (320). Among French merchantmen, the most serious damage was suffered by vessels returning from Canada and the Caribbean. Fully loaded French West Indiamen made appealing targets for both North American privateers (much of whose prize sugar was marketed on the European continent) and British privateers operating in the approaches to the French coast.

Baugh’s treatment of neutral carriers—the Dutch, Danes, and Spanish—is presented from a diplomatic and administrative perspective. From the beginning of the contest, French military planners compensated (through diplomatic channels) for their lack of naval capacity in the Atlantic. In 1756, Machault, the Naval Minister—“knowing how dependent the French West Indies were on food and wine [and supplies of all kinds] from France, and seeing the reluctance of the merchants to undertake voyages without naval escort” (323)—opened the trade of France to neutral shipping. For the British, this presented serious problems of enforcement and diplomacy. The most promising solution came in the form of the “Rule of 1756,” the British assertion that a trade that had been prohibited in peacetime (in this case by the French) could not be tolerated in a time of war. Although interdictions of Dutch and Danish merchantmen predated articulation of this principle, promulgation of
the “Rule of 1756” gave quasi-legal cover to high-handed British interference in the commerce of non-belligerent maritime powers. London was more cautious with Spain. Although William Pitt, the de facto British Prime Minister, warned against interference with Spanish shipping—and was generally obeyed by the Royal Navy—there were seizures of Spanish merchantmen by North American privateers, the most egregious requiring ministerial attention in London and Madrid. These insults to the Spanish flag were among the causes of Spain’s entry into the war in January 1762.

Given the prominence of colonial trade among the root causes of the conflict, readers will not be surprised at the scale and voracity—as well as strategic significance—of commerce raiding during the Seven Years’ War. Baugh pays close attention to the Royal Navy’s operations against French merchant shipping in the late summer and autumn of 1755, months before the formal declaration of war in May 1756. Detaining hundreds of French merchantmen in peacetime led to widespread criticism of the British Ministry and the Royal Navy. In the midst of preparations for war, however, the London government’s policy deprived the French Treasury of revenue and the French Navy of manpower, deficiencies that hobbled the fighting capacity of France and contributed to its eventual defeat (144-46). Even so, the stingy effectiveness of the French privateers is only lightly touched upon in Baugh’s treatment of the war at sea. The audacious French privateers, operating out of bases on both sides of the Atlantic, became the true nemesis of British trade and remained a problem until the end of the war.

The book’s emphasis on the French Navy’s deficiencies in manpower and financial resources masks other problems that contributed to its overall ineffectiveness. One example (not mentioned by the author) was French toleration of pacotilles, ventures in European goods carried by naval officers aboard the warships of France. This sometimes led to French warships crossing the Atlantic to the West Indies en flute, that is with their lowest level of guns made unworkable because of ladings of provisions and other goods destined for the islands. Even more money was made by naval officers carrying West Indian produce back home. There were, of course, military consequences for mingling trade and naval operations. One occurred in the late summer and early autumn of 1759 when a powerful French squadron commanded by [Commodore] Maxim, comte de Bompar, loaded sugar, indigo, and coffee at Cape François at the very moment the North American coast had been stripped of protection by British warships concentrating in the St. Lawrence River to support Wolfe at Quebec. Dozens of North American trading vessels were then anchored at Cape François doing business with the enemy under the cover of ‘flag of truce’ commissions meant to facilitate the exchange of prisoners of war. So there was no lack of military intelligence. Even a feint by Bompar’s squadron in the direction of North America would have disrupted the British campaign in Canada.

The role of colonial trade in the great war for empire is just one of the many topics raised in Daniel Baugh’s The Global Seven Years’ War. Baugh has written an engaging and accessible history, one driven by powerful themes, compelling characters, and a thorough grounding in eighteenth-century military and maritime history. There is, however, one shortcoming that must be mentioned—the paucity of notes. Students of the period will want to know more about the book’s scholarly substructure and how the author reached conclusions on
points that are still works in progress. His comments on the scale and effectiveness of privateering during the Seven Years’ War, for example, are provocative, but there is no comprehensive treatment of the subject in print, and the author provides no guidance as to how he used archival sources. One suspects that responsibility for this shortcoming lies at the feet of the publisher, not the author. Mentioning this point is not intended to diminish the significance of Professor Baugh's brilliant accomplishment. *The Global Seven Years’ War* is a book that abounds in insight and that will stimulate debate well into the future.
I shall respond first to Karl Schweizer’s review because his comments require an explanation of my aims and methods. My assignment – which accorded perfectly with my wishes – was to write a new history of the Seven Years’ War encompassing the whole world except central and eastern Europe. (Franz Szabo’s volume in the same series titled *The Seven Years’ War in Europe* was published in 2008.) I determined at the outset that I would try to look closely at both sides. One-sided histories of this war are commonplace: France is treated, to borrow a term from professional boxing circles, as ‘an opponent’ – an ill-defined figure expected to lose. Studies focusing on North America have been the important exception to this pattern because American and Canadian colonial historians have generally undertaken to explore both sides. Since, as I emphasize, the French undertook to win the war in northwestern Europe, I could not exclude this aspect of continental European warfare.

I knew that I could draw on the great scholarly work of Richard Waddington; his six volumes, published over a century ago, certainly pay close attention to transactions at Versailles. Nevertheless it seemed obvious that I would need to spend a good deal of time in Paris archives, and in an early visit I did manage to find a couple of interesting items (58, 106). Subsequently I learned of Jon Dull’s project based on archival as well as published sources; he generously allowed me to have a photocopy of his typescript well before the book was published. If there had been in Paris a collection of letters similar to the collections one finds abundantly in London that expose high-level policymaking, I would certainly have returned to Paris, but, as scholars specializing in eighteenth-century France well know, no such collection is available.

Karl Schweizer claims that my closing “chapters dealing with the negotiations (1759-1763) ... are, unfortunately, among the weakest in the book, being largely derivative, based on outdated secondary sources to the neglect of in-depth archival research,” an example being Zenab Esmat Rashed’s book published in 1951. I must respond forcefully because I consider my discussions of those negotiations, which form a considerable portion of the book’s closing chapters, to be among its strongest features. Chapter 13 begins with a

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3 Zenab Esmat Rashed, *The Peace of Paris* (Liverpool: University Press, 1951). The book, which stemmed from her dissertation, pays close attention to the French as well as British side and was a truly remarkable scholarly achievement in its time. Although its narrative is not easy to trace through, it remains a valuable guide for serious students of the 1759-1763 negotiations. I deplore Schweizer’s characterization of it, which I find amazing considering how frequently it is cited in the endnotes of Matt Schumann and Karl Schweizer, *The Seven Years’ War: A Transatlantic History* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008).
section titled “Choiseul’s approach to peace, 1759-60.” In the latter days of 1759 the French Minister judged that the colonial-maritime war with Britain was lost and opted for Spanish mediation, which Britain answered by an Anglo-Prussian Declaration calling for a general peace congress. Frustrated by the king of Spain’s growing reluctance to serve as mediator, the duc de Choiseul, who would be France’s leading Minister for twelve years, allowed his Minister at the Hague, Louis-Auguste-Augustin, comte d’Affry, to open private talks with Joseph Yorke, the British Minister there. These talks did not progress because Choiseul, bowing to pressure from Vienna, refused to allow the French to discuss the interests of Britain’s ally, Prussia. (The Austrians were sure they would soon defeat Prussia.) Choiseul turned his attention to pressing Charles III to commence hostilities against Britain, but his armed forces were far from being ready. None of this appears in Schumann and Schweizer’s recent book.4 Perhaps they were under publisher’s constraints, but at the relevant moment they devoted three pages (179-83) to discussions of Sardinian and Turkish neutrality.

From the end of March to the end of July 1761 a much noted Anglo-French peace negotiation was carried on. (Negotiations continued after the end of July, but, unknown to the British, the French were no longer seeking peace.) On almost every point, including some controversial points, Schweizer and I are in agreement, even though some of what we have written differs in important ways from previous historical accounts. We arrived at our conclusions independently except insofar as I was informed by his published essays.5 My chapter, however, offers a narrative showing how, between March and June 1761, Choiseul committed France to including Spanish grievances in its negotiation with Britain in return for a future military alliance, a pledge he hid from the Council of State (525-6). The details are found in an article by Didier Ozaman.6 These grievances, when Choiseul under pressure from the Spanish ambassador announced their inclusion in late July, enraged the British ministers, threatening the continuation of the negotiation.

With respect to the negotiations of 1762 my conclusions do not differ significantly from those in Schumann and Schweizer. “Concessions before Conquests” appears in the title of Chapter 15 of my book because this was essentially what British negotiations with France, guided by Lord Bute, amounted to during a year in which British arms captured every remaining French possession in the Caribbean except Saint-Domingue. Perhaps Schweizer fails to make allowance for a difference in emphasis. My book is concerned with the war between Britain and France, and I make it clear that what Englishmen called the ‘German war’ was the lengthy armed struggle in which British-paid forces under Ferdinand of Brunswick fought against French armies in northwestern Germany. Schweizer tends to

4 Rashed’s book devotes twenty-two pages to this in a chapter titled “The Hague Conversations.” My account of it is based largely on other sources, but she provides a useful introduction.


embed this struggle within the Anglo-Prussian alliance, a subject in which over the years he has developed scholarly expertise. To be sure, the alliance was a validating diplomatic connection, and Ferdinand of Brunswick, whom Pitt considered – from a British viewpoint, of course – “the saviour of Europe” (565), was a career general of the Prussian army, but after 1758 French and Prussian soldiers rarely faced one another in combat. It may be that Schweizer’s tendency to focus on diplomatic concerns in the heart of Europe rather than the British and French contest in Westphalia, Hesse, and Hanover has shaped his criticism of my history of the peace negotiations. But I can only guess.

I feel sure, however, that a difference in focus and approach accounts for our disagreement about the diplomatic situation on the eve of the war, and it is beneficial that he has introduced the issue in this forum. I do not dispute that the “entire thrust of French continental diplomacy” prior to 1755 was aimed at constructing a European “collective security arrangement” which would have included Prussia. My point is geopolitical. It hinges on a two-sided problem: France rather suddenly faced in 1755 the strong possibility of a naval war with Britain that it was almost certain to lose; Britain faced the strong possibility that a French army would seek to occupy either the Austrian Netherlands or Hanover. Almost every statesman in London thought that France, once at war, would choose to occupy the Netherlands, a long-standing objective. (Military occupation of that territory had an enormous effect on the outcome of the preceding war, and it was relatively easy for a French army to conquer and hold.) The Duke of Newcastle, Britain’s leading Minister during the war, was an exception. He shared George II’s fear of an attack on Hanover by Prussia. As it happened, Newcastle was right, except it was not Frederick of Prussia who attacked Hanover but, in due course, Louis of France. Schweizer maintains that Frederick “would have vetoed” aggression against the Netherlands, but in summer 1755 he urged Versailles to attack the territory. He wanted to see his ally, France, become engaged militarily on the continent.

Since Schweizer criticizes me for insufficient use of manuscript sources, a response regarding methodology seems necessary. A pioneering study in an unplowed field must be based on manuscripts – my first book is an example – but for a comprehensive survey of a worldwide war I judged this to be impractical and in many respects unnecessary. Inevitably my history is to some extent a synthesis, as Elena Schneider has termed it, but if synthesis implies merely melding and adapting other historians’ conclusions, I did all I could to avoid that. I relied heavily on printed primary sources such as the Devonshire Diary, of which Schweizer was a co-editor, and when consulting existing histories I preferred those offering numerous and lengthy quotations from original documents, such as Waddington’s volumes and the books by Alfred Bourguet. All this should be evident to anyone who reads my Notes on Sources and observes throughout the book my preference for quotation over paraphrasing.

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Aside from practicality, it may be pointed out that the use of printed sources has three distinct advantages. First, nearly all editors of documents wish to be meticulous and are likely to achieve greater accuracy than a researcher hurriedly copying. Second, readers may rather easily check the author’s footnotes in a good research library. Third – this is obvious but often taken for granted – a scholarly work provides guidance, context and collateral information. If my purpose, for example, is to learn about Anglo-Hanoverian policy, I prefer to read Uriel Dann’s admirable book rather than attempt to find things out in the Hanoverian archives for myself (even if I could do it). Although we need not be bound by conclusions of other scholars, we should welcome, though with a critical eye, what they can tell us, especially in fields where we have not developed prior expertise. Undoubtedly archival research “acts as a control” and is needed to correct inherited errors of interpretation. I have generally employed it for this purpose in articles, as Schweizer has, but the kind of control for which I felt the greatest need when writing this book was a check on omissions. The editor of a body of documents or author of a work that prints extensive quotations might fail to realize the importance of certain topics or might be motivated by prejudice to exclude them. To cite an instance of the latter, sometimes Lord Hardwicke told Newcastle that he firmly agreed with Pitt’s ideas and actions in letters that P. C. Yorke chose to leave out of his The Life and Correspondence of Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain. My extensive reading of the Hardwicke and Newcastle papers in the British Library enabled me to discover this. I have no doubt that I would find that there are regrettable omissions in many printed sources I used, but how can a historian’s work on a large subject ever be complete?

Before moving on I should clarify the situation Schweizer mentions in a closing historiographical note. Cornell’s library was slow to acquire the book he wrote with Matt Schumann and I bought a copy in September 2009. My computer files show that I had finished writing Chapter 15 (which brought the narrative of the war to an end) in March of that year. Franz Szabo’s book, which is in the same series as mine, was sent to me by our publisher a year earlier. Finally, I wish to say that during the final years of the long labor to complete my book (2005-10) I was anxious to uncover studies that would fill in what I hoped yet to learn about the conduct of the French, always the most difficult challenge. I neglected during that time to keep up with what was being published about the war in North America and missed some good new books in that field. The neglect was deliberate. I was beginning to feel that the progress of my research in fields less well covered than North America had become too slow.

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8 Uriel Dann, Hanover and Great Britain 1740-1760: Diplomacy and Survival (Leicester and London: Leicester University Press, 1991). I believe that Schumann and Schweizer’s book would have benefitted from consulting this book which as far as I can tell they do not cite.

9 See my Notes on Sources (711). Philip C. Yorke, The Life and Correspondence of Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain 3 vols. (Cambridge University Press, 1913), is replete with printed letters and extracts, an indispensable work. But the author seems to have shared Hardwicke’s eldest son’s dislike of Pitt.

10 Cited in note 3 above.
Reading Elena Schneider’s review I was gratified to see how many of the things that I tried to convey and emphasize she perceived and appreciated, among them: my discussions of peace negotiations at both the beginning and end; the placing of Hardwicke alongside Pitt and Newcastle as principal directors of the war; the superiority of British political and military leadership over French; the effectiveness of timely British logistical preparation, which was so difficult when dealing with chancy sea communications over long distances; the crucial role of waterways in all theaters, worldwide; and my case for deeming Quiberon Bay as more decisive than Quebec. Not least, Schneider seems to have enjoyed reading what I had to say about ships and the sea, which, as my friends know, makes me very happy.

I am not sure how to answer her suggestion that I should have provided a “broader analysis” and more discussion of “deeper causes and consequences across the eighteenth century.” I have published many essays (two of which she mentions in her first footnote) probing this broad arena. Admittedly, what is offered (2-8) in my introductory chapter is perhaps too narrowly focused on the immediate background of the Seven Years’ War, but it should be observed that conditions left over from the 1739-48 war in North America and India are introduced in Chapter 3. How Britain’s eagerness to quit the war in 1748 impacted its alliance with Austria, particularly with regard to the Barrier (91-7) is, I think, adequately probed. If Schneider is thinking, however, of Anglo-Spanish relations during the first half of the century, I must agree. Although I have addressed aspects of the subject in various writings elsewhere, I now think that what is provided in this book (4, 98-100) should have been amplified, especially with regard to the long history of the grievances that Spain insisted on bringing into the peace negotiation of 1761.

I take Schneider’s point about insufficient “discussion of the role of the British public” if she means that readers should have been given more background. Nevertheless, my narrative emphasizes how important it was that Newcastle dared not yield to the French during the North American disputes in 1755 because he feared public opinion, a situation that Mirepoix tried in vain to get his Foreign Minister, Rouillé (who ridiculed the idea of a government being influenced by public opinion), to understand (102-5). I state categorically that the Newcastle administration was forced out of office in late 1756 because Henry Fox was afraid to face a parliamentary onslaught which the Minorca debacle was going to bring down upon him, but I probably should have said more about the role of popular opinion in generating the fearful situation. The public’s loathing of the Hanover connection is a continuing theme, and I argue that one reason why Pitt was willing to think of peace in 1760 was his awareness that the public was beginning to detest the German war (495, 498-9). On the French side I gained a sense of popular attitudes from Edmond Dziembowski’s valuable book.11 I wish his research had managed to include popular reactions to France’s war in Germany.

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Undoubtedly Schneider is correct in pointing out that my perceptions of Spanish conduct have been distorted by French lenses. Choiseul’s letters to his ambassador at Madrid, d’Ossun, often convey a tone of dismissive contempt for the Spanish court. Studies by Ozanam, Louis Blart, and Vera Lee Brown (Holmes) strongly suggested to me that I needed to consult Spanish sources, and I had the same thought when researching the invasion of Portugal. Cornell’s library has a copy of Palacio Atard’s book. Unfortunately, I can scarcely read Spanish and my wife’s ability to do so in her younger days no longer operates. And I ran out of time.

I agree that my treatment of indigenous populations in various parts of the world leaves them as “shadowy presences.” But to have given them close attention in a way that I could feel reasonably confident of the facts would have required a very wide reading and in many cases some in-depth research, and the book would have grown even longer. Yet insofar as such people were counted on as allies to fight or provide logistical support, or recruited to serve under or alongside European commanders, I wanted to take notice of them, and I think that to some extent it shows.

Schneider mentions that 30,000 men marshaled by the Nawab of Bengal constituted a large fighting force by any standard in that day. But could they be counted on to fight? Europeans in India rightly judged that native cavalry could not be counted upon in combat. The time of the well-trained, well-disciplined sepoys in Europe had not yet arrived. In America, as Fred Anderson points out, French officers could not order their Indian allies – even those nations that were habitually aligned – to fight when and where those officers wished. On the other hand, Hessians were generally reliable mercenaries. And Pitt was right, Hardwicke wrong, in thinking that Highlanders could be trusted to serve the British Crown when deployed overseas. In each case there was a different correct answer to the question of how effective cooperation or command was to be achieved. One thing we know about American provincial forces from the work of a number of historians is that provincials generally hated regular officers from Britain. If a study exists that brings to life the ways in which slaves and freemen of color helped the French defend their Caribbean islands, I wish I had discovered it. All in all, this subject in its worldwide aspects certainly deserves the attention of military historians.

The agreeable comments of Fred Anderson I much appreciate because they come from someone who has written a marvelous book on the Seven Years’ War and also because they reflect an accurate perception of what I tried to do. I especially value what he says.

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13 Vicente Palacio Atard, El tercer pacto de familia (Madrid: Talleres Gráficos, 1945).

about my Notes on Sources; he sees that my work was essentially based on original documents, some manuscript, most printed.

Regarding his scheme for phases of the war, my own preference is to end his fourth phase in late 1759. The ‘dramatic climax’ at Quiberon Bay, swiftly following the loss of Quebec and the crisis in French finances, created a situation wherein the Bourbon monarchy had almost no chance to avoid losing the war. After 1759 it devoted nearly all its resources to the ‘German war’ and at length came close to succeeding in it, but an occupation of Hanover could not have compensated for the extreme naval and financial debility and resulting loss of the French colonial empire. Choiseul knew this; it is the reason why he was so anxious to involve Spain. In 1760 Pitt was anxious to continue supporting Ferdinand of Brunswick and his army while positioning Frederick of Prussia’s alliance expectations as secondary. This brings to mind what Anderson says about sovereign nations acting independently and “in pursuit of their own interests.” Much more conspicuously, Lord Bute in 1762, in a hurry to terminate British participation on the continent, was all too ready to end the Anglo-Prussian alliance, even after the death of the Russian Empress Elizabeth opened up some advantages for both Britain and Prussia. Frederick II, for his part, flatly refused to accept Bute’s suggestion that he open negotiations with Vienna.

Most of Anderson’s review presents an argument for regarding Indian nations and groups in North America as, if I may use the phrase, ‘a third force.’ I am sure he is right. I was fortunate to have Jon Parmenter as a Cornell colleague and thus to be able to read a draft of his article inquiring into Iroquois diplomatic capabilities and strategies. Historical progress continues to be made in this very active field, and is likely to bolster Anderson’s contention that independent decision-making, rather than subordination to European influences, was the dominant mode of Indian conduct. I grant that my approach emphasizes British and French concerns. Searching for ways to hold down the length of the book, I did not, for example, take notice of the Cherokee warriors who fought against British troops on the South Carolina frontier; my excuse was that no evidence exists, so far as I could learn, that they were acting under the influence of, or assisted by, the French.

A comparison of alliance politics in Europe and interior North America during the 1750s might well include an additional factor. Central and eastern European nations badly needed money from Britain and France to help fight their wars, while Indian nations and groups in North America badly needed firearms and ammunition, not only for carrying on hostilities with colonial interlopers but also with each other. Practically every British alliance with a European country involved subsidies. In Europe the receiver of a subsidy naturally tried to retain a power of policymaking that was independent of the payer’s control or even guidance. The British government learned to write specific military requirements into its

15 My view of Pitt’s attitude towards Ferdinand and Frederick in 1760 accords with that of O. A. Sherrard in Lord Chatham: Pitt and the Seven Years’ War (London: The Bodley Head, 1955), 354-6.

16 Published as Jon Parmenter, “After the Mourning Wars: The Iroquois as Allies in Colonial North American Campaigns, 1676-1760” William and Mary Quarterly ser.3, 64 (2007).
subsidy treaties. In North America, Indian groups badly needed firearms, but, as Anderson points out, were careful to avoid if at all possible firm commitments (and pitched battles).

I agree with Anderson about this, and I wish to point out that my narrative of the prewar period unequivocally puts the hard choices faced by Indian groups in the Ohio region at the center of the causes of the war’s outbreak. In the early 1750s French Canadian authorities realized that in the Ohio territory they could not match the competitive value of British trade goods, particularly firearms, and asked Paris to adopt means to prevent British Americans from trading there. The contest at that time was not about settlement but about Indian allegiance (46-59). It may be, as Karl Schweizer states, that “by eighteenth-century conceptions” penetration by traders was seen as an “inevitable prelude” to settlement, but the facts on the ground in the early 1750s did not match such a conception. The French wanted to monopolize trade in the Ohio territory, but they clearly had no plans for establishing settlements there. Indian allegiance was crucial for the sake of commerce (the fur trade) and strategy (protection of routes to the Mississippi), perhaps also for the spread of Catholic faith. Although the French did not envision settlement in the Ohio territory, they knew that Indians had reason to fear British settlement and understandably played on that fear. To be sure, the Ohio Company hoped to profit by developing frontier settlements, but that lay in the future; the reason the French built forts on the upper Ohio River was to bar English (usually German) traders from entering the region. Local Indians were in their own way as apprehensive as the British were about the French forts on the Ohio. When Versailles learned about Governor-General Duquesne’s establishment of these forts, it was initially more concerned about local Indian than colonial British reactions (58).17

General John Forbes was wise enough to employ diplomatic means to cultivate Indian allegiance when he undertook his offensive to capture Fort Duquesne (370-5). In due course British colonial America betrayed those Indians. As Anderson observes, the war’s outcome greatly reduced their power to act effectively to maintain independence.18 One last point: regarding the campaign of 1760 which produced the surrender of all Canada, my account emphasizes the value of warships in the St Lawrence River (where they were practically untouchable), not local Indians, for facilitating the attack on Montreal from the east. I wonder whether there is strong evidence that the British thrust from the south (via Lake Champlain) was significantly aided by Indian allies, as Anderson states. It may have

17 In his comment Schweizer says that the thrust of French forces into the upper Ohio region was “heavily influenced by the self-interested advice of François Bigot,” the intendant in Canada and that the “provocative action had already been engineered by Bigot before Duquesne ever crossed the Atlantic.” This information, based on archival evidence in Paris, is extremely interesting, not least because it tends to undermine the claim that Roland-Michel Barrin, comte de La Galissonière and other French admirals who had served in New France were the principal advisers of the plan. It would be useful to know whether Bigot had initiated his preparations before he received the letter from Paris of 9 July 1752 (55). I hope Schweizer plans to publish a paper giving details of his findings on this matter.

18 Maybe from the outset. Observe the discrepancy between Colonel Henry Bouquet’s report of what he told the Indians in a meeting near Fort Duquesne after the dying Forbes departed and what a Delaware chief later told the French at Fort Machault (375).
been. But Amherst’s decision to take his own army to Montreal by the long, circuitous route of the Mohawk River and Lake Ontario was undoubtedly influenced by expectation of Iroquois diplomatic assistance along the way (489-90).

Thomas M. Truxes’s comments on the maritime-commercial aspect are welcome. I am happy to see that he noticed my emphasis on the point that before 1759 there was no effective blockade of French ports while, nevertheless, French commerce based on these metropolitan ports was ruined anyway by the plethora of British privateers and naval cruisers which captured vessels while across the Atlantic or when trying to return to France. As for the “stinging effectiveness of French privateers,” I can only say that there is broad and rather strong evidence that British losses were less severe in the Seven Years’ War than in other eighteenth-century wars, though certainly French privateers were highly effective in the Caribbean. Yet he is right about privateering. My book does not give it the detailed attention it deserves; I wish it did.19

On the eve of war, as Truxes points out, both sides viewed overseas trade expansion as a kind of arms race. Particularly for Britain, seaborne commerce (commercial fishing should be included in this category) was seen as essential to the defense of the realm; it provided shipping and trained seamen, and enhanced financial capabilities. Since involvement in the North American interior entailed costs without appreciable commercial benefits, it is interesting – perhaps a bit puzzling – that the British public rather suddenly became excited about it on the eve of the war. A generalized fear of growing French profits and power overseas seems to have been the cause. May it not be said that France’s decisions both before the war, in respect to Canada, and towards the end, by yielding wilderness territory rather than sugar islands in peace negotiations, directed British attention to the North American interior?

Yet certainly not exclusively: George Grenville’s postwar measures in America were motivated by revenue collection and establishing British governmental authority (658-60), but they also had a mercantilistic aim in trying to prevent American colonial trade from being carried on with foreigners, particularly with the French in the West Indies. On this matter it appears that most of the British public agreed with him. People were outraged by reports that during the war Americans were trading with the enemy, particularly with the rapidly growing colony of Saint-Domingue. As Truxes has shown – he has unearthed extensive and incontrovertible evidence – the illegal traffic with Saint-Domingue was huge.20 The British Admiralty when allocating naval resources considered Saint-Domingue, far to leeward, to be of much lesser importance than the French colonies of the eastern

19 Regarding Truxes’s question about archival sources concerning privateering and shipping losses, I should make clear that I did not use archival sources but consulted studies that examined losses on the French side, particularly by Crouzet, Bosher, and Maupassant (see my footnotes 321-30 and Notes on Sources 697-8). I think he would agree that research on the subject of shipping and privateering is not easy.

Caribbean, but Truxes’s discovery that illegally traded American provisions and naval stores had enabled squadron commander Bompar, to refit his squadron there changes the picture. One wonders whether this fact became known in London. Truxes points out that Bompar sailed home with his warships laden with trade goods for personal profit, which reminds me to remark that when writing my book I wondered why Bompar, whose active service involved a number of derelictions of duty, got away without being punished when so many other French admirals suffered. It is likely that a study of his career and connections would provide a paradigm case for what ailed the French naval officer corps under Louis XV.

In closing I would like to thank the reviewers for reading so carefully this long book and offering so many useful and well informed comments. I believe I should address two matters of general interest.

First, Elena Schneider has commented that my history of the war is “top-down by design.” By this I think she means that it describes a great power contest, as the subtitle states. If this is what is meant, I unapologetically acknowledge the fact. The related question, “Which side won and why?” is never far from people’s minds, and I attempt to answer it. In addition I insist on asking a question that applies to most wars occurring before the nineteenth century: Who managed to get the war stopped and how? Readers will note that my book is critical of both Lord Bute and the duc de Choiseul, negotiators of the peace in 1762-3. Bute gave away too much, too eagerly, but he deserves credit for stopping the war. Choiseul cleverly and wisely managed to salvage a great deal for France by delaying peace, adding an ally, and generally making difficulties, but he may be judged to have done France a disservice by prolonging a war that the Bourbon monarchy could not afford to maintain without seriously undermining its financial credibility. (I wonder what Waddington, living in another era, would have said about this; death claimed him before he could write a volume on 1762-3.)

I suspect that Schneider is alluding to many other questions that should come to mind. What conditions invited or compelled powers to go to war? Who bore its burdens? Who carried on bravely? Who did not? Who suffered horribly? Who was betrayed? Who, if anyone, profited? By taking up these and similar questions, historians, especially in recent years, have opened up ‘the human side of war’ in ways that are not ‘top-down.’ It is a good thing that serious work is being done on questions like these, but the question of ‘which side won and why’ continues to be of central importance in today’s international affairs as well as historically.

Many years spent studying the history of state power and warfare have convinced me of the wisdom of Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond’s conclusion: “In the long run errors of policy have far more far-reaching effects than errors” of strategy, tactics, and development of weaponry and its use (14). To be sure, development of weaponry has become enormously important since he wrote this in the late 1930s and has become a key element in policymaking. Since the making of policy in the eighteenth century took place (as it does today) at the center of state power, my history of the war focuses primarily on what was decided in London and Paris. But it is not, I think, ‘great man history,’ at least not in
accordance with the phrase as I heard it used when I was young. In fact, I deplore the way in which the biographical approach to history, plainly the most accessible avenue for most people, tends to encourage such notions and to discourage (in many but not all instances) the roles of circumstance (geographical and cultural) and contingency, as well as the capacity of key participants at many levels to see opportunities while avoiding plunges into impossibilities. My answer to why the British won is accurately detected by Schneider: “The overarching argument of the book is that the war must be understood as the victory of British political and military leadership over its French counterpart.” I think I have managed to convey that this leadership was made possible by Britain’s political institutions, and that the failures of Bourbon France’s leadership were also deeply rooted.

Second, I cannot avoid talking a bit about the market for the book. H-Diplo invites criticism from professional and academic perspectives, and I wrote it as a historian must, and gladly, with this sort of criticism in mind, but I also wanted the book to be, as Thomas Truxes writes, “accessible to readers unfamiliar with the Seven Years’ War.” In fact, since the history of warfare can claim a considerable non-academic readership, I had non-academic readers also in mind. This is one reason that I preferred Notes on Sources, which mention for each chapter subheading only the works actually and identifiable used, to dense endnotes and a long bibliography. (But I insisted that quotations, which I believe are essential for keeping a historian honest, should have same-page footnotes.) One might think the length of the book stood in the way of marketing success, but it is notable that in recent years long books have been widely purchased and read. What hurts, as Fred Anderson points out, is the price: $53.00. Even $40.00, a price possibly available from some vendors, is high. Yet I wish to make clear that editorially Pearson/Longman were very good to me and to the book. It was way over the contracted length but they published it, and with good maps (though these contain a few glitches I failed to catch), and – certainly not least – the copyeditor they assigned was the best I have ever worked with.
Since Professor Daniel Baugh responded to my critique first and, indeed,—at least by appearances—chose to let his counter arguments frame his comments to the other reviewers, I have taken the liberty to offer a few further follow-up reflections in hope of keeping alive productive exchanges (ideally on H-Diplo) among eighteenth-century diplomatic historians, on the continuing problems posed by the “First War for Empire,” in both its continental and overseas dimensions. But more than that, since Roundtables not only solicit critiques but also encourage wider dialogue, I intend this follow-up to elicit broader discussion of the divergent research styles exemplified by Professor Baugh and myself, in relation to certain transitions in the study and writing of diplomatic history that appear to be gaining ground—most notably, the shifting priority from archival research, as indispensible for authoritative analysis, to greater dependence on printed sources, whether primary or monographic. Ultimately, I suggest, this disjunction involves more than a mere difference in technique, or procedure: at bottom rests a variant vision of the evidential taxonomy conducive to historical reflections of a higher order provided, as Herbert Butterfield repeatedly stressed, research methodology is combined “with genuine creativeness and imagination.”

In defense of his methodology—copious reliance on published scholarship over archival material—Dr. Baugh notes that in the case of France (one example), there are no manuscript collections in Paris illuminating “high-level policy-making” beyond the standard files in the Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, and the Archives Nationales (Ministère de la Marine) which he utilized only selectively. For the rest, he relied substantially on the multi-volume, now partly outdated, history of the war by Richard Waddington, the equally superannuated writings of Lawrence Henry Gipson and Sir Julian Corbett supplemented by the more recent study of French naval politics, 1755-

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2 Ibid., 29-32.


1763 by Jonathan Dull. In the case of the latter, he replicates Dull’s archival oversights; namely, his neglect of key collections in the Bibliothèque Nationale, including (in Fonds Français) the Beliardi MSS (except for one volume) and an important policy paper by de Galisonnière (vol. 11340) with wide implications for French perceptions of English intentions on the eve of war. Further, papers in Nouvelle Acquisitions, vol. 5214 (letters, 1756) and the Collection Joly de Fleury, (vols. 2453, 2454)—again seemingly not consulted by Dull and Baugh—contain precisely some of those key policy documents which Baugh claims the Paris repositories do not offer. Consequently, it makes questionable Prof. Fred Anderson’s statement in his Roundtable review that Baugh’s book is “thoroughly grounded in . . . French archives.” Concerning the pivotal Renversement (Reversal of Alliances) which changed the future direction of European History, Baugh again relies largely on Waddington who, he tells us, “made considerable use of Frederick II’s letters to [Heinrich Dodo von] Knyphausen” (the Prussian envoy at Versailles). Granted, these are important, but Waddington cited only the limited selection printed in Frederick’s political correspondence, while much of significance, especially relating to the pro Prussian faction at Versailles (including Comte d’Argenson and Charles Louis Marshall Belleisle) emerges from Knyphausen’s complete diplomatic files, manuscripts on deposit in the Secret State Archive in Berlin.

This collection incidentally, also throws light on the mission of the Duc de Nivernois to Berlin in early 1756, which is revealing on the political and strategic priorities at the French Court on the eve of war.

Part of Baugh’s rebuttal of my review includes my low estimate of the book by Zeneb Rashed, The Peace of Paris, which he “considers a remarkable scholarly achievement” (p. 7). He replicates Dull’s archival oversights; namely, his neglect of key collections in the Bibliothèque Nationale, including (in Fonds Français) the Beliardi MSS (except for one volume) and an important policy paper by de Galisonnière (vol. 11340) with wide implications for French perceptions of English intentions on the eve of war. Further, papers in Nouvelle Acquisitions, vol. 5214 (letters, 1756) and the Collection Joly de Fleury, (vols. 2453, 2454)—again seemingly not consulted by Dull and Baugh—contain precisely some of those key policy documents which Baugh claims the Paris repositories do not offer. Consequently, it makes questionable Prof. Fred Anderson’s statement in his Roundtable review that Baugh’s book is “thoroughly grounded in . . . French archives.” Concerning the pivotal Renversement (Reversal of Alliances) which changed the future direction of European History, Baugh again relies largely on Waddington who, he tells us, “made considerable use of Frederick II’s letters to [Heinrich Dodo von] Knyphausen” (the Prussian envoy at Versailles). Granted, these are important, but Waddington cited only the limited selection printed in Frederick’s political correspondence, while much of significance, especially relating to the pro Prussian faction at Versailles (including Comte d’Argenson and Charles Louis Marshall Belleisle) emerges from Knyphausen’s complete diplomatic files, manuscripts on deposit in the Secret State Archive in Berlin.

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7 J. Dull, The French Navy and the Seven Years War (Lincoln, NE, 2005).
8 Ibid, 288. The subsequent volumes reveal important additional insights into policy making which would have benefitted both Dull and Baugh.
10 Roundtable, 6.
11 Baugh, The Global Seven Years War, 686.
12 J.G. Droyson, et.al; Politische Correspondenz Friedrichs des Grossen (Berlin, 1879-1939), 46 vols.
13 Geheimes Staufs-Archiv (Preussischer Kulturbesitz), Berlin, Rep 11.89, vols. 195-197 Korrespondenz, Heinrich Dodo von Knyphausen 1754-1756. These documents were located in the: Deutsches-Zentral Archiv (D.Z.A.), Mersburg (Dentsche Democratische Republik)/DDR Merseburg when I first consulted them in 1972.
14 Still important here is the all but forgotten monograph by: Alfred Heusel, Friedrichs des Grossen Annäherung im Jahre 1755 und die Sendung des Herzog’s von Nivernois nach Berlin (Giessen, 1897).
29)—despite its myriad flaws—and claims that it was cited frequently in my recent co-authored book on the Seven Years War. A closer scrutiny of the end notes, however, shows that it was not mentioned once until the 1761 peace negotiations and then only with regard to the developing France-Spanish alliance (noted more frequently are the vital French manuscripts relating to Spain). The second mention concerns Rashed’s complete misunderstanding of Choiseul’s tortuous dealings with Austria regarding the captured Prussian lands due partly to her misreading of Waddington and more critically, failure to consult the Austrian archives. After that, the book is cited only eight times—on side issues, out of a chapter total of 363 notes; far from “frequent citations” as Baugh avers.

He claims, furthermore, that using largely printed sources has one preeminent advantage: editors of documents are allegedly meticulous by nature “and are likely to achieve greater accuracy than a researcher hurriedly copying (p. 32). Here, based on extensive experience as editor and writer I must firmly disagree: editors are all too often selective, make errors in transcription; and frequently it is precisely what has been deleted or paraphrased that can be pivotal and can completely realign the accepted interpretation and produce drastic revisions. Immersed in archives—working at the “coalseam” so to speak, one may see light where a distracted editor saw no issue at all. Moreover, volumes of selected documents published by governments are frequently little more than bowdlerized ‘official history’.

But enough lest I appear unduly captious about Baugh’s book which I praised as “a significant scholarly contribution” and still do. Its many merits as an excellent one-volume global survey of the great Anglo French war stand undisputed.

For the rest, what I wish to discuss, as mentioned at the outset, is our disparate mode of historical thought, reflected in approach and manifested here paradigmatically, within the domain of diplomatic history. A brief retrospect: this subject, in its fundamentals, goes back to Renaissance humanism—deriving from ‘diplomatic’—the classification of

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17 Haus-Hof und Staats Archiv (Vienna) Frankreich (Berichte) 1761; cf Korrespondenz Kaunitz Kar 405-406.


documents according to form, physical format, script and means of authentication.\textsuperscript{20} Scholars engaged in these disciplines drew heavily on historical examples; developed new critical methods, initiated the serious study of archival sources and placed politics alongside philosophy and theology as enduring themes worthy of serious reflection. Thus Niccolo Machiavelli, in his \textit{Istorie Fiorente} (1532), established the nation as a key unit of historical analysis, Flavio Biondo composed a work \textit{History Since the Decline of the Roman Empire},\textsuperscript{21} while Francesco Guicciardini's \textit{Storia d'Italia} (1561)\textsuperscript{22} —a milestone in historiography—provided a model for the treatment of the nation in its foreign relations. These writings, both in method and conception, were to inspire emulation during the seventeenth century: Christian Chemnitz in Sweden, the political theorist Samuel Pufendorf in Brandenburg and in England, Thomas Rymer who published the \textit{Foedera}, a vast collection of medieval documents: primarily treaties and diplomatic conventions.\textsuperscript{23}

Common to all these works was an emerging distinction between original and secondary sources, the elaboration of techniques for handling primary texts, a propensity for secular explanation of causation and an appreciation of diversity and change in time. These tendencies marked the beginning of modern ‘scientific history,’ and constitute a significant departure from traditional humanist chronicles. They were further refined during the Enlightenment, both in England and abroad, by such writers as David Hume, Adam Smith, William Robertson, Voltaire and Paul de Rapin Thoyras.

But only in the nineteenth century, with its stress on historical explanation by direct analogy to contemporary experience, did the distinctive principles of diplomatic history come to be formulated,\textsuperscript{24} and the subject transmuted into a field of major academic interest. The political and philosophical atmosphere of Europe experienced transformative change following the American and French Revolutionary Wars as archives became more accessible and as an increasingly literate and politically active public demanded more formal contact with their national histories.\textsuperscript{25} Some scholars saw the past as a vehicle for the exposition of ideas, or the inculcation of moral/philosophical principles;\textsuperscript{26} others


\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Ibid.}, vol. I, 92. Published in 1483, its original title was: \textit{Historiarum ab Inclinatione romani Imperii Decades}. Here Biondi essentially fashioned the modern periodization of European historical time.

\textsuperscript{22} David Woolf, op. cit., 387; Denys Hay, \textit{Annalists and Historians} (NY, 1977) 111-117


conversely—Leopold von Ranke foremost among them—began to theorize that history should be studied and understood on the basis of a critical analysis of primary (i.e. archival) sources free from judgment or normative strictures. In this sense, Ranke advocated a new kind of history—one that offered social, political, and military insights on the basis of extensive documentary evidence. Based both on their availability and applicability, state records on international relations lent themselves readily to this new historical vision. These records — usually well indexed, easily accessible and ultimately value-neutral -- encouraged historians to regard them as keys not only to a state’s external politics but also domestic affairs as well; its government structure, its people, its culture, and its self-perception. Probably the most famous exemplar of this trend was Ranke himself, in his use of the Venetian relazione—or relations—a unique class of papers comprised not simply of conventional diplomatic dispatches, but also of full-length descriptive accounts of the countries to which Venice’s ambassadors had been accredited. Hence Ranke glimpsed in these the possibility of writing history—both diplomatic and domestic—entirely from manuscript sources. Though Ranke had many followers, one particular strain of these included Lord Acton, Sir Adolphus Ward, Harold Temperley, and his pupil Sir Herbert Butterfield—who between them built a Cambridge-rooted intellectual tradition, a mode of historical understanding that with inevitable modification steadily radiated outwards (especially after World War II). But under pressure from abstract, theory-based social science disciplines, not to mention the activist driven concerns of ethno history, this tradition now appears increasingly on the defensive. In its early days, the Cambridge approach was animated by the emergent “professionalization of the discipline of history.” Throughout the United Kingdom, though, it proved slow to bear on the dominant historiography, one that still relied on the traditional use of printed sources alone, a system designed for “amateurs and dilettantes”, not research oriented scholars. Though Ward, Temperley and Butterfield brought diplomatic history to the fore, during the interwar period, they were not, ironically, true innovators in archival research. After all,


Temperley’s Life of Canning was based (almost exclusively) on British printed documents (a point noted negatively at the time), his Foreign Policy of Canning (1925) was similarly weak in its use of archival material, while Frederick the Great and Kaiser Joseph, unbelievably, did not use one unprinted Austrian manuscript nor did it utilize the Prussian State Archives, causing Temperley to miss some very vital clues to the complex diplomatic machinations of that era. Consequently, Butterfield’s own The Peace Tactics of Napoleon (1929), written under Temperley’s direction—and the only substantial book on pure diplomatic history he was ever to write—likewise relies meagerly on selected published letters and dispatches—and the documents in the Public Record Office (now National Archives) and British Museum (now British Library). Abroad, he visited only Paris, where he worked in the Archive des Affaires Étrangères. He did not go to Vienna, Berlin, Brussels, or Turin, where there was much additional material useful to his topic.

It was not until his appointment as Professor of History at Cambridge (1944) that Butterfield moved beyond what he learned from Temperley—began to meditate seriously on the wider ramifications of archive-based study and its place in the larger scheme of historical scholarship. Any mature, developed narrative, he realized, must be reconstructed from its center: laid out in its proper bearings—in the case of diplomatic history especially—with hard-core archival data as the generative substratum; that which gives structure to knowledge and refines the intellect. Manuscripts contained an intrinsic essence that could be identified and extracted forensically, an essence that does not transmute over time though it may serve diverse purposes. From this arises the potential for elevating precision work—the microscopic treatment of sources—to historical thinking of a higher order, insight transposed into the realm of enduring ideas. Those pursuing archival work must “carry their reflections higher and higher until they grapple with the great issues of human destiny—just as the modern physicist, while studying things that are microscopically small is, ipso facto, transforming our larger views about the nature of matter.” Distance from the manuscripts, according to Butterfield, all too easily prompts scholars to write history of a conventional, one-dimensional shape, provide routine compilations of secondary accounts, and so move away from fresh discovery; that is strengthened by creative imagination and integrative levels of analysis—all so vital for enabling historians to transcend contemporary/ideological assumptions and

32 Ibid., 78-167.

33 McIntire, op.cit., 42; Conversations with Prof. Butterfield in June 1977 and May 1978. (The Russian archives, as he reminded me, not surprisingly, were closed to non-Soviet scholars at that time).


34 Butterfield Papers, Cambridge University Library, File 304 (Misc. Drafts and Notes); File 132, (the Nature of Political History).

hence contribute enduringly to human understanding. As such, archival research provides a sensitivity to events, personalities, and ideas conducive to any conception of general history, regardless of its 'topical' focus. Sustained immersion in the archives—beyond showing purpose and application—is the key to scholarly maturity, depth, and requisite insight. Until this happens, narrative in diplomatic history—however virtuous stylistically—is not sufficiently comprehensive or evolved to qualify as definitive.

These convictions shaped Butterfield’s writings in diverse areas for the remainder of his life and became almost canonical for generations of the students he supervised for the Ph.D. degree (myself included). Baugh also received his doctoral training at Cambridge, yet somehow we reflect a divergence of research approaches. Still, there are wider disciplinary implications to his minimalist stance on the issue of manuscript evidence; he seems to align with the generation of younger scholars who for varied reasons—not the least of which involves the cost of foreign travel, as well as the role of cyberspace technology with its focus on ‘practicality’ (i.e. convenience) function as major counter forces to the pursuit of archival sources, especially those in remote or uncongenial locations.

The previous pages demonstrate why I strongly dissent from Professor Anderson’s view in the original Round Table that Baugh's narrative is “entirely in keeping with the ways that scholars have described war and international relations from the beginning of professional history writing done to the end of the twentieth century.” Given this arguably erroneous conclusion, perhaps it is time for diplomatic history per se to rediscover its archival roots and exploit the epistemological potential of these by integrating them into wider areas of historical study, thus subtly illuminating the complex matrix of human activity, past and present.

In closing, it is my earnest hope that the Editor will sponsor a special discussion forum devoted to some of the issues (or related ones) raised above.

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37 McIntire, op.cit., 275-280, 345-359, 387-389; K.W. Schweizer, “Humanities, Technology and the Modern University,” Technology Studies, no. 6 (1988-89), 1-5, as reflected in the subsequent careers and publications of most of these research students.

38 His thesis, supervised by Prof. J. Plumb, examined “Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole.” Also, Plumb and Butterfield were personally, professionally and academically seriously at variance, Conversations with Prof. Butterfield, Spring 1971, Fall 1972 and May 1977 (among other discussions).
