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Introduction by Dustin Walcher, Southern Oregon University

Since I started teaching specialized courses on the history of U.S. foreign relations and inter-American history at least two students per year have stayed late after class or stopped by my office to chat about the 1973 coup that removed Salvador Allende from power in Chile. Moreover, in the three years I have taught my department’s capstone research seminar, I have supervised four separate papers centering on the topic. It is unlikely that my students have simply responded to, and subsequently tapped into, my own interests. Typically the conversations my students initiated took place well before we covered Salvador Allende’s rise and demise in class, and my capstones are organized around broad topics such as “The Global Cold War” that offer countless possibilities for research topics.\(^1\) Besides, while the history of U.S. policy toward Chile during the 1960s and 1970s certainly interests me, it is not my particular bailiwick. In this light, the high level of interest expressed by my students is remarkable. Fortunately for them, the subject lends itself to detailed examination without having to leave the confines of Oregon’s Rogue Valley. Since the 1970s, the response of Richard Nixon’s administration to Allende’s rise, and its role in hastening his fall, has generated a substantial secondary literature, including books and articles by journalists, political scientists, and historians. Additionally, two congressional investigations produced reports, each of which detail the U.S. role in destabilizing Allende’s democratic government, and the National Security Archive at George Washington University has posted relevant, formerly classified documents.\(^2\)

Indeed, the sheer quantity of books and articles analyzing the Nixon administration’s policies toward Chile, much of which rehash familiar ground while adopting a prosecutorial tone, has been enough to fatigue some specialists.\(^3\) “The thought of having to read yet another account of the U.S. role in the Schneider assassination,” Jeffrey Taffet exclaims, “makes me want to cringe.” Fortunately for him, Tanya Harmer’s *Allende’s Chile & the Inter-American Cold War* is a different kind of book. “The international history of Allende’s overthrow is a far more complex story than a simple case of ‘who did it?’,” she writes (252).

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\(^1\) The incarnation of the course alluded to was anchored by Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).


\(^3\) Although not limited to the Nixon administration’s approach toward Chile, the most popular prosecutorial treatment is Christopher Hitchens, *The Trial of Henry Kissinger* (New York: Verso, 2001).
While most existing studies have concentrated on the Nixon administration’s actions, and are framed as studies of U.S. diplomacy, Harmer consciously set out to write an international history of Allende’s Chile that would not “add one more voice to the historiography of blame” (256). While the Nixon administration, appropriately, continues to figure prominently, she grounds her analysis on archival sources from seven countries and interviews with some thirty historical actors. Although her conclusions are critical of both the Nixon administration and, even more notably, the Emílio Garrastazu Médici government of Brazil, she does not assign herself the role of prosecutor. Instead, Harmer primarily seeks to understand and explain the motivations and actions of each of the principle actors in the events of 11 September 1973.

The reviewers are highly complementary. Stephen Rabe lauds *Allende’s Chile* as “an outstanding piece of scholarship” and “international history at its finest.” Taffet finds “Harmer’s work is so much better than anything extant on the Cold War in Chile in the early 1970s that scholars will have to follow in her footsteps.” Michael Schmidli calls the book “a powerful and convincing international history of Salvador Allende’s fraught presidency,” with “much to offer Cold War historians and Latin Americanists alike.” For Aldo Marchesí, it is simply “brilliant.” Indeed, Harmer’s work is nothing short of impressive; she has produced a model of international history, and in the process posits an inter-American framework for understanding the region’s Cold War.

At the heart of *Allende’s Chile*, Harmer argues that the struggles over *la vía chilena* were not just a product of Chilean history, or even of the history of U.S.-Chilean relations narrowly, but rather contributed to the trajectory of the inter-American Cold War. She highlights both the impact of international actors on Chile during the Allende period and the significance of events in Chile to the larger inter-American system. Although Harmer explores the U.S. role at great length, she breaks new ground through her examination of Brazilian and Cuban actors. Brazil’s rightest military regime, having concluded that an elected socialist government in Chile constituted what we might term today an existential threat, made opposing Allende a priority. Indeed, in meetings with Nixon, Médici emerged as the most forceful advocate of a hard line toward Allende. Meanwhile, Fidel Castro offered significant support to the Allende government, and directly to the *Unidad Popular*’s (UP) left wing. That Allende did not follow all of the advice proffered – particularly Castro’s suggestions to arm the working class and, in the regime’s final days, to make a last stand at a defensible position rather than sit comparatively helplessly within the presidential palace, *la Moneda* – highlights the tactical disagreement between the two, but does not minimize their shared goal of nurturing a viable socialist state. While Chileans were nobody’s puppets, and while Chileans of all ideological stripes acted in what they perceived to be the best interest of their country, they nonetheless found themselves living in a critical battleground in the inter-American Cold War. Brazil, the United States, and Cuba each partnered with their own local ideological allies in pursuit of their own strategic objectives.4

4 On existing trends in the literature highlighting Latin American agency, see Max Paul Friedman, “Retiring the Puppets, Bringing Latin America Back In: Recent Scholarship on United States-Latin American Relations,” *Diplomatic History* 27:5 (November 2003): 621-636.
While Harmer’s most significant contributions emerge in the realm of international history, she also contributes to our understanding the Nixon administration’s policymaking process. A secondary theme of Allende’s Chile centers on the often intense policy disputes between the White House and the State Department. Differences were especially stark in the wake of Allende’s election. State Department officials were more cautious, and less eager, to intervene against Allende, fearing the potential negative ramifications for the U.S. image, and U.S. policy objectives, throughout the region. The White House, by contrast, was much more eager to remove Allende by all available means. Nixon and Henry Kissinger took a personal interest in the Chilean question, and ensured that the administration would follow the hard line.

The reviewers find that by framing of her narrative within the context of the inter-American Cold War, and analyzing events from the perspective of the larger inter-American system, Harmer makes a significant contribution to the historiography. The contrast between great power détente and the acceleration of violence and conflict in Chile was palpable. While the Nixon administration adopted a more cooperative stance toward the Soviet Union and China, it was inflexible toward Chile. The inter-American Cold War, Harmer finds, continued along a different trajectory and with different rules from its global incarnation. In light of this line of analysis, Taffet asks whether the phrase “Cold War,” however modified, should be jettisoned completely with reference to the inter-American system. “Empire” or “hegemony,” he suggests, could provide a more useful analytic framework.

Meanwhile, in response to Harmer’s emphasis on Latin American agency, Schmidli poses two questions. First, “if Chile was ultimately unable to escape dependency, how much agency should we attribute to other Latin American nations?” He highlights the position of Brazil. While the Médici government intervened in Chile and had interests compatible to those of Washington, its existence stemmed in part from U.S. support for the 1964 Brazilian coup d’état. In that light, “[l]ike Chile’s inability to escape a system of dependency,” Schmidli asks, “should we understand Brazilian actions as illuminating a system of U.S. Cold War hemispheric hegemony?” Schmidli’s is similar to Taffet’s question, highlighted earlier, asking whether a different vocabulary is necessary to analyze inter-American relations.

Second, Schmidli questions whether Harmer underemphasizes the significance of “foreign intervention in fueling domestic Chilean opposition to Allende.” Harmer does not emphasize the CIA’s efforts to promote and help finance domestic opposition to Allende. However, she does highlight that opposition as part of the Chilean political process. Schmidli would like Harmer to “extend her analysis of U.S. and regional opposition to Allende to assess more fully its impact on Chilean domestic political activism.” Indeed, the reviewers would like to see more extensive treatment of the domestic Chilean context more broadly.

Finally, Harmer de-emphasizes the significance of economic motivations to U.S. policymakers. While the participants in this roundtable do not engage the question of Washington’s motivations to a significant degree, it occupies a central place in the larger
literature. Harmer finds that the Nixon administration did not choose to destabilize the Allende government in response to prompting from U.S. copper and utility executives. Instead, Washington determined that the existence of an additional Marxist government in the hemisphere – even one that was democratically constituted – represented a national security threat. In that sense, the Nixon administration’s initial efforts to prevent Allende from assuming power can be seen as an extension of the containment doctrine. Having failed in that effort, the administration subsequently sought to remove Allende from power utilizing limited covert means, again citing the perceived demands of national security. In arguing against the centrality of business interests to policy formulation, Harmer relies upon a relatively narrow interpretive standard. She would need to see a direct link demonstrating that the lobbying of a specific business resulted in a particular policy outcome to conclude that commercial motivations were determinative.

Ultimately, despite avoiding a prosecutorial approach, Harmer’s narrative retains the feeling of a tragedy. It is not that Allende emerges from this account unscathed; to the contrary, Harmer finds his management of the Chilean economy to have been extraordinarily wanting. While it may have been an impossible task for anybody, he nonetheless proved unable to hold together the fractious UP as a coherent governing coalition. But in the end, Allende’s opponents, supported by international allies in Brasilia and Washington, trampled over constitutional processes. Their claims that Allende was subverting democracy and planning to transform Chile into a dictatorship do not withstand serious scrutiny. Those conclusions in and of themselves are not new, but by integrating a wider variety of international actors into the narrative, and situating the story in the context of the inter-American Cold War, Harmer makes a substantial contribution to the literature. Indeed, she makes clear that the coup did not occur simply because “Nixon ordered [it] to happen.” (272) Allende’s Chile & the Inter-American Cold War will be essential reading for both historians of U.S. foreign relations and of modern Latin America.

Participants:

Tanya Harmer is a lecturer in international history at the London School of Economics and Political Science. She is now working on a biography of Salvador Allende’s daughter, Beatriz, and a longer monograph on the Cold War in Latin America. She will be a visiting Assistant Professor at Columbia University in 2012-13.

Dustin Walcher is Associate Professor of History and Strategic Studies at Southern Oregon University, and a review editor for H-Diplo. He received his Ph.D. in 2007 from the Ohio State University. A specialist in the history of U.S. foreign relations, he is currently completing a manuscript that examines the failure of U.S.-led development initiatives and the rise of political violence in Argentina during the 1950s and 1960s.

William Michael Schmidli is an Assistant Professor of History at Bucknell University. He completed a Ph.D. in the Department of History at Cornell University in February 2010. He

5 On economic themes in Harmer, see especially 9-10, 49-50, 119-121, 195, 218, 259, and 264.
specializes in the history of United States foreign relations, the Cold War, modern Latin America, and human rights. He is currently working on a book-length project entitled From Counterinsurgency to Human Rights: the United States, Argentina and the Cold War.

**Stephen G. Rabe** is the Ashbel Smith Professor at the University of Texas at Dallas, where he has taught for thirty-five years. He has taught or lectured in nineteen countries, including leading seminars in Argentina, Brazil, and Ecuador. He has written or edited ten books, including The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America (Oxford University Press, 2012).

**Aldo Marchesi** is Professor at the University of the Republic, Uruguay. His topics of research are related to the recent history of the Southern Cone. His current project, Geographies of Armed Protest, examines a particular new left transnational political culture related to a network of militants who embraced political violence as a way to pursue social change in the Southern Cone during the late 1960s and early 1970s.

**Jeffrey Taffet** is an Associate Professor of History in the Department of Humanities at the United States Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point. He is the author of Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America (Routledge, 2007).
One of the final images of Salvador Allende in la Moneda is representative of the dramatic dilemmas that faced the Unidad Popular (UP) coalition during its short existence. In the picture, Allende is standing alongside militants from his security team and looking up towards the sky as warplanes begin to shoot at the palace. The leader of Chile’s pacific path towards socialism is not in uniform, though he has donned a helmet and is holding an AKA 47, a gift from Fidel Castro. The planes that bombed la Moneda belonged to the Chilean Air Force and they had come to “save” Chile from “international Marxism”.¹ This military mission of the Chilean armed forces was supported by the Brazilian military and by U.S. agents. Shortly after the bombing, Allende went back in la Moneda, which now lay in ruins, and committed suicide with the weapon that Castro had given him to defend the revolution. For many years, it was thought that the planes had been piloted by Americans. This myth, in fact, was perpetuated by the Chilean military itself in an attempt to reduce its responsibility for the eighteen rockets that were fired on the presidential palace.

The people and objects in the photograph are indicative of the great variety of actors involved in this process along with the complex relationship between local actors and international process, and finally, the Allende’s ambiguity to face dramatic choices. These are all questions addressed by Tanya Harmer in her brilliant and well-documented Allende’s Chile and The Inter-American Cold War. Harmer’s work is a detailed historical reconstruction of the different international actors who were involved in a key episode of the Cold War south of the equator –, that is, the time in which the Unidad Popular (UP) was in power (1970-1973). The work focuses on the involvement of Americans, Brazilians, Cubans, Soviets, and Chileans in the episode.

Harmer’s main methodological innovation in comparison to previous works on the UP from the perspective of international history is providing a multidimensional, comprehensive, and decentralized perspective. As Harmer herself suggests, she seeks to avoid the “historiography of blame” that has mainly focused on the role that the United States played in bringing down Allende (pp. 256). Going beyond this focus does not mean exonerating any of the actors; instead, Harmer abandons this accusatory focus in lieu of one that seeks to understand “who the main protagonist of that conflict were, what they believed in and fought over, how the ideological struggles they engaged in evolved, and with what consequences” (pp. 256). By choosing to examine the episode in this way, Harmer does more than merely analyze U.S.-Chilean relations; she integrates other international actors who were relevant to this conflict but have been largely overlooked until now. In this regard, Cuba and Brazil take on an important role in Harmer’s narrative, which represents a significant contribution with respect to the existing historiography on this topic.

¹ Manuel A. Garreton et al., Por la fuerza sin la razón. Análisis y textos de los bandos de la dictadura militar (LoM Ed.: Santiago, 1998) 58.
Although Cuba’s involvement has been mentioned in previous works, the nature and scope of its intervention were highly difficult to determine due to the lack of primary sources. Harmer uses works published in Chile by militants with ties to the president’s security group along with interviews done by the author with Cuban officials who were active in Chile at the time, creating a much clearer view of the alliance forged by Castro and Allende. With these sources, Harmer delves deeper into issues that have been particularly sensitive in the public debate in Chile as to the scope of Cuba’s military support for the Allende administration. Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War provides information on the quantity of Cuban armaments available to protect the president in the case of a threat to the government, in addition to the Cuban presence in government security tasks related to presidential security. Cuba’s involvement as presented here does not justify the opposition’s clamor regarding the risk of foreign intervention; it was, however, sizeable, in spite of the attempts of the left to minimize its importance. The text also shows how Castro and Allende disagreed on the path that the Chilean process should take. Despite their differences, Harmer is clear about one thing: Cuba made no attempt to undermine the process, and despite disagreeing with Allende, the Cubans were profoundly loyal and respectful of Allende’s leadership.

By including Brazil in her research, Harmer makes a truly original contribution, as I am unaware of any other work that has pointed out Brazil’s role in this process. Harmer expounds on the difficult relationship between Allende and the Brazilian dictatorship. From the beginning, the leading role that the Brazilian dictatorship played in fighting the Marxist left in South America made it the most outspoken opponent to Marxism in the region. At the same time, this also made Brazil the main ally of the United States since its position was in line with the Nixon administration’s objectives in South America. In addition, by operating with Brazil, U.S. exposure in the region could be reduced. With this alliance, the United States and Brazil were able to exchange information and develop activities to support the opposition within Chile, and the Chilean armed forces.

Harmer provides a detailed analysis of the different U.S. actors involved in the process that ended with the downfall of Allende. In her argument, there are few contradictions at the state level in terms of the ultimate objective of the United States: again, Allende’s downfall. However, for a time there was little consensus among Americans as to the specific form U.S. intervention should take. While some defended the idea of direct participation in ousting the leader, others with connections to the State Department proposed undermining the Chilean economy (well-aware of the Chilean economy’s dependence on the United States) and thus avoiding a direct confrontation with Chile. The State Department was concerned about the U.S. public image and the risk of attracting criticism to its foreign policies, both within the country and throughout the Third World.

This was the context in which Allende attempted to develop a foreign policy that was defined as ideological pluralism. The goal of this policy was to strengthen national sovereignty and economic and political independence while promoting Latin Americanism and Third Worldism. Based on these principles, Chile sought to reposition itself in the global context while attempting to get along with the United States, promote good relations with its Latin American neighbors, and move towards both the Eastern Block and the
movement of non-aligned states. However, the country was unable to achieve the majority of its goals. Although some members of the Chilean government hoped to seek some sort of agreement with the United States after implementing a policy of nationalizations, the Americans used their diplomatic negotiations as a political tool that prolonged the economic suffering of the UP administration. The support from the Eastern Block turned out to be much more limited than initially expected; the Chilean industrial system was in fact more compatible with the productive processes of Western capitalism. Although Cuba was one of the UP’s most important allies, the economic support that it could provide was limited. Finally, the non-aligned countries did not provide Chile with much support, in spite of Chile’s role in the movement. Among the Latin American countries, the good relationship was short-lived since the dispute within the Inter-American system led the country to be increasingly isolated, even from nationalist governments which had initially enjoyed good relations with Allende.

Beyond the historic reconstruction of the role of these international actors in the Chilean episode, the principal merit of Harmer’s work lies in conceptualizing their participation within an uncommon category: that is, within the framework of the Inter-American system. Harmer points out a noteworthy difference between the context of the global Cold War and that of the Inter-American system at the start of the 1970s. While the conflict between the superpowers was marked by détente, a search for agreements and rapprochement, that dynamic was not evident in the Inter-American system. This system was distinguished by an intense and violent ideological conflict between the left and right that was clearly evidenced in the Chilean episode. The U.S. concerns in the region can be better attributed to its historic role in the region than to the climate of the détente. In Harmer’s words:

For a superpower with global aspirations, Latin America’s position was therefore pivotal. And in spite of superpower détente, U.S. policy makers’ frames of reference vis-à-vis Latin America consequently remained wedded to the concept of a “mortal struggle” against communism and regional examples set by the likes of Castro and Allende (259).

Although some previous works have already pointed out that the chronology of the dynamics of revolution and counter-revolution in Latin America was different from that of the traditional Cold War, the concept of the Inter-American system involves acknowledging the active role that certain Latin American elites played in developing the Inter-American Cold War. As was also seen in the Brazilian example, in this case the Inter-American Cold War was fought at all levels, and certain elites embraced the cause even more radically at times than the superpower to the north. In addition, the notion of a system goes against a binary scheme of the United States vs. Latin America. This focus involves a closer examination of multilateral relations as opposed to bilateral ones. In this way, it is clear that several different aspects of the bilateral relations between the United States and Mexico, Brazil, and Peru were strongly influenced by the policies Washington implemented for Allende’s Chile.

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I believe that Harmer’s placement of the Chilean episode within the logic of the Inter-American Cold War is the most important contribution of her work. She shares points in common with previous works by Ariel Armory, Daniela Spenser, Gilbert Joseph, and Piero Gleijeses. 3 In terms of methodology, however, Harmer’s work takes a step forward from previous scholarship. The broad scope of analysis, whereby Harmer integrates sources from different countries and offers a more systematic, specific description of relations between countries in the Inter-American system during the Cold War, makes this book a model for further research.

It is important to mention that a work of this kind always has certain gaps due to the fact that its scope is impossible to summarize in a single investigation. Harmer mainly focuses on the roles played by groups specializing in foreign relations, thus overlooking the importance of other non-state actors had in the process. Although the Chilean political parties (opponents, party members, and leftist critics) and their relations with U.S. and Cuban state actors are included in the investigation, the role of non-state actors from other countries is overlooked. For example, although Harmer insists on the concern with U.S. public image in the context of elections, she makes almost no mention of the political and social actors who questioned foreign policy within the United States or of the relations that such actors may have had with UP members who were in Washington at the time. This omission, however, does not take away from Harmer’s work; instead, it creates an opportunity for future research along the lines she established.

Finally, there are two specific questions that came up while I was reading Harmer’s work. In her interesting analysis of the role that the Cubans played in the president’s security and in military preparation, Harmer uses a story by Luis Fernandez Oña to suggest that the severity of the bombing of la Moneda could be related to filtered information which led the Chilean military to overestimate the Cuban armaments. This hypothesis is an interesting one, and it has also been suggested by those who studied the effects of the apocryphal Z Plan, which propagated the idea of massive killing of members of Allende’s opposition in the Chilean army.4 However, the extreme violence of the first months of the coup was not only reserved for Cubans and foreigners. Most of the forced disappearances and executions took place in the first few months of the dictatorship. This leads me to think that although some military officers may have overestimated the Cuban influence, the repression was also aimed at containing a popular movement that evoked just as much fear (or perhaps more fear) as “international subversion.”

Last, although it is not her main purpose, Harmer’s work reveals the close relationship between ideas and international relations. Though this was obvious to anyone in the field

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3 As example of these works see the compilation: Gilbert Joseph and Daniela Spenser, In from the cold: Latin America’s new encounter with the Cold War (Durham: Duke Press, 2008)

of international relations during the Cold War, it takes on singular features here due to the novel, challenging aspects of Allende’s experience in ideological terms. For several reasons, Allende was a stone guest for enemies and allies alike. Everyone felt challenged to some degree by this experience, which sought to bring together the best of both worlds (liberal democracy and socialism). In this regard, the dissatisfaction of the United States and the lack of interest of the Soviet Union in the Chilean experience were not only related to the struggle for global hegemony but also to their inability to understand what was happening in Chile. For the United States, it was impossible to reach an agreement with a government that questioned U.S. notions of democracy, in which liberalism and capitalism were two inseparable parts of a single system. When the Soviets expressed doubts regarding the stability of the process and wanted more guarantees of the transition to socialism, they did so for reasons related to political realism, but also because they did not believe that a transition to socialism could be made without the principles of fierce state authoritarianism. Even the Cubans, Chile’s main allies, viewed Allende as unreal - much closer to the imagined Cuban revolution than to the Chilean political experience. The Cubans hoped that Allende would be a leader like Castro, capable of leading the military in its resistance to the conservative backlash, a notion that Allende explicitly rejected on several occasions including his public speeches in Havana. To what extent does this original feature of the Chilean experience help explain the difficulties the country had in terms of joining a global order that could not tolerate such innovation?
Tanya Harmer has produced an outstanding piece of scholarship. *Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War* merits a book prize from some professional organization. This is international history at its finest. Harmer has demonstrated how Allende’s Chile became the cockpit for an inter-American struggle over ideas of revolution, socialism, and a new international economic order. Her story is supported by impressive multi-archival, multi-national research. She has worked in archives in Brazil, Chile, Eastern Europe, the United Kingdom, and the United States and interviewed Cubans, including Luis Fernández Oña, Fidel Castro’s emissary to Chile. Oña was also the husband of Beatriz Allende, Salvador Allende Gossen’s daughter. I am not on a book prize committee this year, so I could not trumpet *Allende’s Chile*. But I did recommend to the editors of *Diplomatic History* that they assign a feature review to this book.

Good history never really provides definitive answers. Good history raises new questions, provoking debate and new scholarship. It moves the conversation along into novel and fruitful topics. In that spirit of scholarly exchange, I am going to raise the critical thoughts that Harmer’s work put in my head. I am also going to challenge some of her methodological approaches. I reiterate, however that I accept Harmer’s central premise that Allende’s Chile became a theatre in the Cold War struggle between the East and West in ways that we had not imagined.

In a peculiar way, Harmer’s analysis of what happened in Chile between Salvador Allende’s election in 1970 and his tragic overthrow and death on 11 September 1973 has renewed my confidence in my approach, both in teaching and writing, to the U.S. role in Latin America during the Cold War. Since 1977, I have been teaching courses on Latin America, U.S. foreign relations, and inter-American relations at the University of Texas at Dallas. I have often dedicated two or three undergraduate class periods, or an entire three-hour graduate seminar, to Chile. I begin with the concept of *La Vía Chilena* or “the Chilean way.” The Chilean integrative myth is that, since the time of Diego Portales (1833), Chileans have been different from other Latin Americans. Chileans judge themselves as an urbane, literate people who have resolved their political and socioeconomic problems in a reasoned way. They take history, art, literature, and political philosophy seriously. Like other national stories, there is a fair element of fiction in this Chilean self-perception. Everyday life in Santiago does strike a visitor as being quite different from life in, say, Buenos Aires. But Chileans did not avoid violent political and social confrontations in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I continue the narrative by noting that in the first half of the twentieth century Chileans created a modern social welfare state and extended the franchise to adult Chileans. The problem was that this European-like state was built on the foundations of a traditional, even feudal, social order with a grossly unequal distribution of wealth and income, skewed land tenure patterns, and an overreliance for tax revenues on the export of copper by foreign (U.S.) companies. By the 1950s, Chile was heading toward crisis. It was not producing enough food to feed its rapidly growing population, and it was borrowing too much international capital to sustain its social welfare state. The price that copper commanded on international markets was also falling in relation to the prices of...
imported finished goods. Perhaps 25 percent of Chile’s burgeoning population lived in absolute poverty. In such a socioeconomic milieu, political life had become polarized. The Chilean polity roughly broke down into thirds. One third of the population, the Radicals, voted to trust in the traditional ways, one third, the Christian Democrats, favored evolutionary reform, and one-third, the Allende adherents, called for thoroughgoing change, even revolution. To the surprise of international observers, especially the United States, Salvador Allende almost won the 1958 election, garnering 28 percent of the vote. The president-elect, Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez (1958-64), won only 31.6 percent of the vote.

My palpable teaching point is that Allende’s policies and governing tactics, the political hysteria that gripped Chile between 1970 and 1973, and the aftermath, with seventeen years of grisly dictatorship under General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte (1973-90), cannot be understood without reference to Chile’s history and its mystical faith in *La Vía Chilena*. Quite obviously, historians cannot predict the future. Counterfactual accounts are interesting but untestable. Nonetheless, a scholar can imagine Chile heading toward the political abyss, without foreign actors—Brazil, Cuba, the United States—encouraging violent responses. Tanya Harmer’s international history approach is wonderful. But this book essentially devotes 275 pages to the events between 1970 and 1973. Sustained analysis about Chile’s past or the evolution in Allende’s thinking before 1970 is missing. Yes, Allende admired the Cuban Revolution and became friends with Castro in 1967. Mark T. Hove has demonstrated, however, that a turning point in Allende’s thinking was the U.S. intervention in Guatemala in 1954.1 It would also be important to dwell on Allende’s denunciation of the Soviet Union’s invasion of Budapest in 1956 and Prague in 1968. It is unfair to ask another historian to write a different book. And there can never be a definitive book. But the international history approach will not tell you that Allende’s Chile was as much a victim of Chilean history, as it was a casualty of the Cold War.

In class or seminar, having explored the Chilean past, we look at Chile’s history in depth from 1958 to 1973, giving special attention to the reforms that the Christian Democratic leader, Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964-70), enacted. President Frei had some success in alleviating poverty in Chile, building 400,000 low-cost homes and resettling 27,000 families on their own farms. By 1970, the majority of Chileans favored continued socioeconomic reform and the nationalization of the U.S. copper companies. Chilean conservatives were, however, horrified by President Frei’s accomplishments. In 1964, Frei had won a big victory, because conservatives, fearful of Allende, had tacitly supported the Christian Democrats. The 1964 election, in which the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) spent massively on behalf of the Christian Democrats, had the unfortunate effect of further polarizing the Chilean electorate, as Margaret Power has shown.2 Political opponents

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became mortal enemies. In 1970, the critical decision by conservatives to run their own candidate provided Allende and his Unidad Popular alliance with their electoral opening. Allende, with 36.6 percent, garnered a plurality of the votes. As it had in 1958, the Chilean legislature, true to La Vía Chilena, ratified as president the man who had won a plurality. The shock of the assassination of General René Schneider, a defender of the constitution and civilian rule, by military rightists provided further incentive to Chileans to do the right thing. Allende took office in November 1970 with a limited electoral mandate. On the other hand, Radomiro Tomic, the Christian Democratic standard bearer, won 28 percent of the vote. Tomic had pushed the Christian Democrats to the political left, promising extensive land and labor reforms. It could be therefore said that a substantial number of Chileans favored far-reaching change.

President Allende stayed true to the Chilean constitution and parliamentary procedures. Basic freedoms were preserved and honored. Everyone in Chile, from the extreme right to the extreme left on the political spectrum, was free to speak, shout, or write about their manic version of events. Allende’s policies measurably improved the lives of the Chilean poor. His political coalition did well in the municipal elections in April 1971 and won 43 percent of the vote in the legislative elections in March 1973. But, as Jonathan Haslam has detailed, Allende destroyed the Chilean economy, rapidly increasing consumption without a concomitant increase in productivity. Chile’s indebtedness grew by $800,000 a day for each day Allende was president. To be sure, the Richard M. Nixon administration pressured international agencies to cut off loans to Chile. But sympathetic European socialists were befuddled by Chile’s economic choices. And, as Harmer demonstrates with her multi-archival research, the leaders of the Soviet Union could not comprehend Unidad Popular’s “chaotic management of the economy” and declined to waste Soviet foreign aid on Chile (198-202). Allende also could not control the radical elements of his coalition, like the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), that engaged in illegal land and business seizures that further dislocated the Chilean economy. As a final piece of my presentation of Allende’s Chile, I have shown students the contemporary documentary film, Campamento Nueva La Habana, which presents the viewpoints of Chilean radicals. In one scene, the leaders of the shantytown community demand that the local school teachers stop teaching the history of Western civilization and focus instead on the lives of revolutionaries like Ernesto “Che” Guevara. Perhaps reflecting their own middle-class sensibilities, my students looked askance at this revolutionary zeal and grasped how panicky Christian Democrats rationalized their support for a military golpe de estado.

Neither I nor the students are required to speculate on what would have happened in Allende’s Chile if there had not been international meddlers. The United States had intensified Chile’s political polarization between 1958 and 1970, destabilized Chile during the Allende years, and aided and abetted the terrorists of 11 September 1973, who bombed and strafed the presidential palace, la Moneda. As Harmer concludes, the long-term policy goal of the Nixon administration remained constant: “to bring down Allende” (65). I have

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always told students that the Chilean military masterminded the 11 September 1973 coup d’état. But there is a “fine line” between monitoring a golpe, as the CIA did, and directing an intervention. Harmer seconds that point in the last appropriately titled chapter, “Cataclysm” (221, 252-54). Since the 1970s, historians have been able to speak knowledgeably about the U.S. role in Chile, because we had access to two extraordinary congressional reports: Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders and Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973.4 In the past decade or so, our documentary knowledge of the U.S. role in Chile has increased exponentially. In 1999-2000, President Bill Clinton ordered the declassification of 20,000 documents pertaining to Chile. The National Security Archive, spearheaded by Peter Kornbluh, pressed for the declassification of documents.5 The Historical Office of the State Department released records on the Nixon administration, revealing that the administration worked closely with Brazil’s military rulers in undermining Allende. With her assiduous archival work, Harmer has further expanded our resource base. This new evidence has led me to conclude that the Nixon administration was more intimately involved with General Pinochet and his minions than I had previously thought. U.S. military officers told Pinochet, when he was in the Panama Canal Zone to purchase tanks, that “U.S. will support coup against Allende ‘with whatever means necessary’ when time comes.”6 Haslam, citing unidentified sources, has alleged that General Vernon Walters, the deputy director of the CIA, set up shop in offices behind the Hotel Carrera and near La Moneda in the days before the golpe. The ubiquitous Walters served as the U.S. point man in Brasília in April 1964, facilitating the “quiet intervention” that led to military overthrow of President João Goulart (1961-64) of Brazil.7 Haslam’s allegation could not be submitted as evidence in a court of law. Harmer disputes Haslam’s contention, noting that Walters’s diary entry has him in Florida on 11 September. But Harmer concedes that she had not actually seen the diary (285, fn. #14). Harmer’s testimony also would not pass legal muster.

In my classroom presentations over the years, I had not addressed President Nixon and Henry Kissinger’s actions in the aftermath of the overthrow of Allende. But in examining the new documentary evidence for my book, The Killing Zone, it became apparent to me that this too was an important story. The United States helped Pinochet consolidate his dictatorship, showering him with economic and military support. In 1974, Chile—which accounted for 3 percent of Latin America’s population—received 48 percent of U.S. “Food


7 Phyllis R. Parker, Brazil and the Quiet Intervention (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979).
for Peace” (PL 480) grants to the region. Chile emerged as the fifth largest customer in the world for U.S. military hardware. In 1974-1975, nearly nine hundred Chilean military personnel trained at the School of Americas in Panama.\(^8\) Although not carrying her story much beyond 1973, Harmer notes that General Walters advised the notorious Manuel Contreras, the head of Chile’s new secret police agency (the DINA), on the craft of intelligence (248-50). Pinochet and Contreras authorized assassinations, murder, and international terrorism in the form of “Operation Condor.”\(^9\) As notable scholars like Steve J. Stern and Thomas C. Wright have documented, the Pinochet regime murdered over 3,000 Chileans, imprisoned 200,000 and tortured about 100,000 of these political prisoners. Another 200,000 Chileans, two percent of the population, fled into exile.\(^10\) Scholars should never forget that appalling toll when they assess the U.S. role in Chile.

The other big issue that we have always addressed in class is the role of Fidel Castro’s Cuba in Allende’s Chile. My standard account on this issue is that Allende predictably established warm, friendly relations with Cuba. Castro came and stayed (overstayed) in Chile for a month in late 1971. But Allende kept his pledge to U.S. officials that he would not permit Chile to be a base for revolution or Soviet weaponry. President Allende also ignored Castro’s unsolicited advice to arm Chilean workers and prepare for the inevitable military golpe. The findings presented in *Allende’s Chile* will cause me to modify but not change my classroom presentation.

The heart of Harmer’s study probes the depth of Cuban involvement in Chile. The jacket cover (also on page 201) is a 1972 photograph of Allende in Cuba in a white shirt, with the taller, dark-uniformed Castro standing behind Allende. To me, the jacket cover projected the impression that Allende was a protégé, even puppet, of Castro. Nothing could be further from the truth, as Harmer repeatedly reveals throughout the text. Allende forced the arrogant Castro to accept that “Allende would be in charge and Cuba would respect his sovereign authority” (55). Allende did not want Cubans fighting in Chile, and, in the climatic showdown, Allende did not ask for Cuban help. The Chilean leader also denounced Cuban freelancing with the MIR, demanding that the Cubans cease arming the radicals (135-6, 155). Allende, after all, believed in *La Vía Chilena*. What is new and significant to me, however, is Harmer’s major point that the visible Cuban presence in Chile infuriated the Chilean right and frightened political moderates. Allende’s enemies undoubtedly exaggerated the Cuban role. Estimates of Cuban arms transfers vary widely, ranging from about 300 to 3,000 weapons (233). Nonetheless, fear and loathing of the Cuban Revolution fueled the savagery of the Chilean military and its right-wing supporters in September

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\(^8\) Rabe, *Killing Zone*, 137-42.


1973 and thereafter. As did the United States, Cuba had fomented “the internationalization of Chilean politics” (71).

In sum, Tanya Harmer deserves congratulations for her hard work and painstaking study. *Allende’s Chile* represents a major contribution to the study of inter-American relations, U.S. foreign relations, and the practice of international history.
Tanya Harmer has written a powerful and convincing international history of Salvador Allende’s fraught presidency. Reflecting an impressive feat of multi-archival and multi-lingual research, *Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War* reveals the complexity of the inter-American political landscape in the early 1970s, and situates Allende’s *Via Chilena* in the context of both the East-West divide, and, significantly, the deepening rift between the global North and South. An important contribution to New Cold War History and a step toward bringing Latin America, in Gilbert Joseph’s apt phrase, “in from the cold,” *Allende’s Chile* has much to offer Cold War historians and Latin Americanists alike.1

At the heart of Harmer’s narrative is the complex nature of the inter-American system in the early 1970s. For scholars steeped in narratives of U.S. complicity in the destabilization of Allende’s Chile and the September 1973 coup d’état, Harmer’s analysis stands out for its sophistication and balance. On one level, Harmer argues that after initially giving the green light to a series of “haphazard” covert operations, by early 1971, the Nixon Administration had set in motion a subtle and effective policy aimed at destabilizing the Chilean economy (57). Publicly describing U.S. policy toward Allende as “correct but cool,” Washington quietly turned off the tap on U.S. and U.S.-influenced multilateral aid and prolonged negotiations on Allende’s copper nationalization plan. Given the enormous impact of what Fidel Castro aptly described as the “economic asphyxia” of Chile, Harmer’s emphasis on the effectiveness of U.S. policymakers’ efforts to mislead their Chilean counterparts is striking; in particular, drawing from heretofore unseen Chilean documents, Harmer reveals that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger personally offered Chilean Ambassador Orlando Letelier assurance that the United States “was not intervening in Chile” (200, 88). As a result, throughout 1971 and 1972 the Chileans remained unsure of Nixon and Kissinger’s intentions, Harmer contends, even as the Chilean economy unraveled under the pressure of the U.S. “comprehensive destabilization campaign” (122).

On another level, Harmer emphasizes the success of the Nixon administration’s effort to bolster U.S. ties to regional allies in response to the perceived threat posed by Allende’s Chile. With a consensus that the Chilean election was “a profound regional defeat” for the United States, “and one that would have a significant impact on the global contest for influence and power,” the Nixon team actively worked to shore up relations with Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and, in particular, Brazil and Mexico. By bringing to light the broad-based scope of the administration’s efforts, Harmer offers an important corrective to studies depicting the Nixon team as predominately disengaged from Latin America.

Indeed, although at its core reactive, Harmer convincingly illustrates that Nixon’s Latin America policy was highly significant for inter-American relations: “with no satisfactory alternatives,” she argues, “countries such as Mexico and Peru ultimately opted for a special

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relationship with the United States instead of relying on collective confrontation through slow-moving international forums.” Under Nixon’s watch, Harmer concludes, “having wobbled for the past few years, the Inter-American balance of power seemed to be moving decidedly back in the United States’ favor” (175-176).

While underscoring the regional impact of the Nixon Administration’s response to Allende’s presidency, Harmer also emphasizes Latin American agency. First, drawing from Latin American sources, Harmer argues that “the United States did not act alone but worked with regional actors and was sometimes dragged into further involvement in inter-American affairs by them” (10). The Nixon Administration “joined” the Brazilian intervention in Chile, Harmer contends, rather than vice versa; “Nixon appears to have been ready to intervene unilaterally in Latin America if need be,” Harmer writes, “but Brazil’s growing role in boosting counterrevolutionary forces in South America perfectly suited U.S. attempts to share its Cold War burden with key regional allies and lessen its own exposure” (128). Moving beyond the traditional Washington-Santiago framework, Harmer’s argument that Brazil situated itself at the center of a constellation of Latin American regimes deeply hostile to Allende advances our understanding of the complexity of the inter-American system in the early 1970s.

Harmer pursues a second vector of Latin American agency in her extensive analysis of Chilean-Cuban relations during Allende’s presidency. Given the challenges of gaining access to Cuban archives, Harmer is to be commended on the extent of Cuban archival material and interviews cited in Allende’s Chile. Emphasizing the similarities in Fidel Castro and Salvador Allende’s worldviews, Harmer argues that both leaders, “shared a belief that they faced similar challenges of dependency and underdevelopment in an unequal capitalist world and that they were circumscribed in their efforts to redress this system by the overbearing power of the United States in Latin America” (33). Underscoring this ideological harmony, Allende’s decision to reestablish diplomatic relations with Castro in late 1970, Harmer contends, marked “the beginning of Cuba’s formal reintegration into the inter-American system” after being sanctioned by the Organization of American States six years earlier (2). Harmer also tracks the close ties that quickly developed between Chile and Cuba after Allende’s election, ranging from expanded trade to Cuban training of the presidential bodyguard. Yet while documenting the Cuban-Chilean special relationship, Harmer is careful to emphasize the limits of Castro’s impact on the Via Chilena; hewing a middle path between competing interpretations of Cuba’s role in Chile—one arguing that Cuba subverted Chilean democracy, the other that the Cubans abandoned Allende to the Chilean coup d’état—Harmer asserts that notwithstanding their growing frustration with the Chilean leader, “the Cubans ultimately accepted that Allende was in charge” (11).

If Harmer’s analysis of inter-American relations during the Allende era convincingly illustrates Latin American agency, by situating Allende’s Via Chilena within the “growing North-South divide in global politics,” Harmer ultimately underscores the constraints the Chilean president confronted in his effort to chart an independent course in the international arena. By the early 1970s, she argues, the cumulative effect of decolonization and the emergence of the Third World, the Cuban Revolution, the Vietnam War, and increasing tension between the Soviet Union and China resulted in a Cold War that was
“more diffuse, fragmented, and global” and pursued by a “far greater array of ideologically driven warriors than it had been in the immediate aftermath of World War II” (257). While these developments contributed to an easing of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union and sparked hope in the developing world for new opportunities for coalition-building, trade expansion, and access to development aid, *Allende’s Chile* emphasizes the hard reality behind détente’s soft façade. Both the Nixon administration’s implacable hostility to Allende and the socialist bloc’s limited support for the *Via Chilena*, Harmer contends, reveal that “there was no meaningful inter-American détente” (4).

Indeed, Harmer attributes much of Allende’s failure to avoid an economic crisis to Chile’s dependence on foreign trade and economic assistance. Notwithstanding the Chilean president’s efforts to cultivate support abroad, Harmer emphasizes the limits to Chilean agency; by the end of 1972, she writes, Chile “found itself precariously drifting between East and West, powerless to influence systemic change, and losing face among those who had earlier shown Allende sympathy” (217). Although also reflecting deep divisions within Allende’s Popular Unity (UP) party, as Harmer argues, this dire situation was more broadly an indication of Chilean dependency. “Despite efforts to rejuggle Chile’s international relations, Santiago was ultimately still dependent on the vertical North-South relationships that the UP had hoped to set to one side in favor of South-South ties and ideological pluralism,” Harmer writes. “Even if Washington had extended détente to the global South (rather than merely attempting to limit the USSR’s involvement in the Third World) and even if the Soviet Union had not backed away from risking its relations with the United States to help sustain a revolutionary process it increasingly believed would fail, this essential dilemma would not have been solved” (264).

Taken as a whole, Harmer’s emphasis on both Latin American agency and the constraints Allende faced deftly illuminates Chile’s evolving position in a variety of contexts—inter-American, East-West, and North-South—during the early 1970s, without losing sight of the disproportionate power wielded by the United States throughout Cold War era. Her analysis raises, however, a pair of interesting questions. First, if Chile was ultimately unable to escape dependency, how much agency should we attribute to other Latin American nations? Take, for example, Brazil, which Harmer argues led the United States in intervening against Allende. How should we understand the relationship between a) Brazilian agency and autonomy in foreign policy, and b) the significant U.S. support for the Brazilian coup d’État in 1964, and the subsequent extension of economic assistance, military and police training, and aid? Like Chile’s inability to escape a system of dependency, should we understand Brazilian actions as illuminating a system of U.S. Cold War hemispheric hegemony?

A second question deals with the relationship between international pressure and domestic unrest. *Allende’s Chile* focuses primarily on top-level policymakers and state-to-state relations. Yet, domestic developments are nonetheless critical to the narrative. Harmer contends, for example, that divisions within the UP “basically paralyzed Chile’s U.S. policy from the mid-1972 onward” (13). Moreover, domestic unrest fomented by Allende’s opponents, culminating in the three-week truckers’ strike in October 1972, revealed “how intertwined the UP’s economic, political, and military challenges were becoming.”
Allende’s decision to end the strike by bringing military leaders into the Chilean government, Harmer writes, “ended the Chilean road to socialism and began the road to militarism” (183-184). This is a striking assertion. But how important was foreign intervention in fueling domestic Chilean opposition to Allende? Harmer deemphasizes, for example, the significance of U.S. on-the-ground covert destabilization efforts in Chile and involvement in plotting the September 1973 coup d’état (183, 253). Taken as a whole, and at the risk of asking too much of a single monograph, Harmer could extend her analysis of U.S. and regional opposition to Allende to assess more fully its impact on Chilean domestic political activism.
The historiography on U.S. involvement in Chile in the 1970s has focused broadly on what could be called moral questions and culpability questions. There is not much meaningful disagreement to be had about what actually happened, about the role of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or about how much President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger were involved in the making of policy. While there certainly are still questions to be answered about the activities of U.S. officials involved, the basics of the narrative and the larger U.S. intent in Chile has been clear for a long time. Most recently Jonathan Haslam, Kristian Gustafson, and Lubna Qureshi, have used the story of U.S. intervention as a way of making larger judgments about the morality, or lack of morality, in Nixon and Kissinger’s foreign policy and how much they may have been responsible for the 1973 coup. ¹ This conversation has not been confined to academic circles. The late Christopher Hitchens, one of the few individuals who might be considered a ‘public intellectual’ in the contemporary era, made U.S. involvement in Chile central to his argument that Kissinger was guilty of war crimes.²

In part, because of the focus on these moral and culpability questions, the historiography on Chile and the United States has often been disappointing. In each of the recent books, the authors seem to begin with a premise, and then they proceed to explain how the evidence supports that premise. Because much of the story has been about values of U.S. policymakers and what they wanted to happen in Chile, a complete understanding of Chilean politics has not been necessary. This has led to weakly researched and occasionally glib analyses. But the problem has been even larger as Tanya Harmer demonstrates quite effectively in Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War. Looking at U.S. involvement in Chile to discover evidence about the ethics of leaders severely restrains the meaning of the narrative. It does not allow for a larger, integrated conversation about how Chile connected with the global Cold War in the early 1970s. Chile itself becomes unimportant in its own right; it can be easily swapped for some other case that also raises issues about morality and foreign policy.

The great value of Harmer’s study is her ability to explain in a much more satisfying and intellectually rigorous way why understanding the rise and fall of Salvador Allende’s government is important in a regional and, to a lesser extent, a global context. She explains that the Chilean experiment with socialism and the opposition to that experiment represented a climatic moment in the Cold War in Latin America. On one side, Allende’s victory allowed leftists in the region, most notably in Cuba, to imagine that history was on their side. On the other, right wing leaders in various Latin American countries, and their


allies in Washington, D.C., similarly understood the Chilean situation as the key moment in a regional Cold War. While the 1973 coup d’état did not end the regional conflict, it did demonstrate how right-wing militaries could be effective in stopping leftist movements. It also signaled to the Cubans that they should focus their revolutionary efforts elsewhere.

Seen in this light, the totality of U.S. policy in Latin America makes more sense. Previously, scholars have struggled with the perplexing question of why Nixon and Kissinger reacted so strongly to Allende’s election. There is ample evidence, cited by Harmer and others, that on taking office the U.S. president and his national security advisor thought Latin America was unimportant. Yet, after Allende’s victory, both pushed extreme plans to stop him from taking power. Following the failure of those plans and his inauguration, they then continuously championed policies designed to weaken his government. Only by understanding that they reacted to Chile as a regional problem, not as a specific one, can scholars understand this response. Harmer explains that it was Chile itself that forced this reassessment; changes in Chilean politics indicated that the Cold War in Latin America needed to become a priority and that the United States should move closer to reliable allies such as General Emílio Garrastazu Médici’s military regime in Brazil.

As Harmer demonstrates, the rules of the Cold War in Latin America were different than those of the larger conflict. She argues that Nixon and Kissinger compartmentalized the Cold War in Latin America and treated it quite differently than the rest of their foreign policy. At the same moment that leaders in Washington were advancing Détente and trying to relax tensions with China, they rejected the idea of working with Allende, who represented a much smaller threat to the United States. This is what Harmer means by the Inter-American Cold War, and part of what distinguishes it from the global Cold War. Indeed, it was not only the United States that saw the Cold War in Latin America differently. Harmer suggests that Soviet leaders were apprehensive too about what was happening in Chile, in part because of détente, and were reluctant to engage with Allende. Only the Cuban leader, Fidel Castro, really committed to the Chilean experiment.

Harmer’s effectiveness in explaining that the Inter-American Cold War had its own dynamic raises an issue about using a Cold War vocabulary to describe the narrative. If the rules of the conflict in this region were fundamentally different from those applied elsewhere during the Cold War, than perhaps is it reasonable to suggest that something different (i.e. not anticommunism) was driving it. There is a long history of U.S. leaders dealing with Latin America as their own backyard, and the response to Allende might be effectively connected with other efforts as diverse as President Woodrow Wilson’s involvement in the Mexican Revolution or the more contemporary work to fight narcotic trafficking and armed insurgency in Plan Colombia. What was it that drove Nixon and Kissinger to see Latin America differently than the rest of the world? One answer would be a kind of imperialism of the mind, or maybe of the guts. Harmer does not talk about imperialism of any kind as a factor behind U.S. policy, but she does indicate that Chilean leaders understood U.S. involvement in Chile (economic and other) as imperialistic. She spends much of the text explaining that among Allende’s biggest problems was the control that foreigners had over his country’s economy. While she seems to reject the notion that economic interests drove the U.S. to action (an argument Qureshi tries to make too...
simplistically in her recent text), some different kind of visceral imperialism does seem to have been at work here. Indeed, for Harmer, the key factor shaping U.S. policy seems psychological or emotional.

The role of Cuba raises more questions about empire. Harmer shows that, essentially for the first time, the United States had a real competitor from within the region. While Castro and Allende were temperamentally and ideologically quite different, Castro still assumed for himself the role of advisor and, to a limited extent, provider of arms and training. Like Nixon and Kissinger, Castro seems to have responded emotionally to the Chilean election of 1970. Cuba hardly qualifies as a superpower though, and the competition between it and the United States was not one of equals. Nevertheless, it may be possible to suggest that Castro’s efforts in Chile had some informal imperial component. In Africa it may be easier to label Cuban efforts a kind of revolutionary anti-imperialism, which in themselves represented a kind of imperialism, yet the same dynamic seems to have been at work here. It is important to note, however, that while Cuban involvement and fears about external socialist domination seem to have resonated with the Chilean military and other Latin Americans on the right, they appear not to have been a meaningful factor for the United States. U.S. decisions on Chile were not contingent on Cuban policy. Harmer demonstrates that leaders in Washington decided that Allende was a problem without any concrete evidence of Chilean-Cuban ties.

Harmer wants to use a Cold War frame for her analysis and it is obviously impossible to separate Allende’s movement from the Cold War, but there is more at work here. This is not so much a critique as it is a suggestion that Harmer’s research could have allowed her to construct a grander analysis, or a distinct vocabulary, about the ways that 1970s-style U.S. imperialism and the Cold War intersected in Latin America.

In general, Harmer’s narrative is careful and convincing and rarely moves past the evidence. She makes mature judgments and demonstrates conclusively that she understands the larger context of Chilean and global politics. In a few places she seems too reliant on her interviews or on one secondary source, but these are minor concerns. Further, in a forthright note on the sources, she makes clear that she understands the limits of her evidence.

Harmer’s work with Cuban sources sets this book apart and allows her to gain a unique perspective on the trajectory of Allende’s movement. One excellent example of this is her discussion of Cuban efforts to convince Allende to take the military more seriously, and to do a better job in preparing for an eventual coup. She notes that Allende wanted to face a coup at the Moneda (the presidential palace) as a symbolic act to make a case about the legality of his government, but she also explains that the building itself was an easy military target and distant from his power base in the industrial zones. Harmer argues that Allende’s Cuban friends suggested he should prepare a bunker in the outskirts of Santiago, and that from there he could mount a much better defense. This would have given armed leftists more time to organize themselves, and would have provided them with a better chance of standing up to the military. She notes that diplomats in the heavily fortified
Cuban embassy fared much better against the Chilean army than those in the Moneda, tantalizingly implying that Allende’s last decision may have been an avoidable mistake.

Partially because of the Cuban sources, Harmer is able to appreciate the complexity of Allende’s position far more clearly than earlier scholars. While Allende has often been portrayed simplistically as being in over his head, Harmer’s sympathetic approach explains the difficulties he faced and notes how his challenges evolved over time. While she is often critical of Allende, he is significantly less wooden in this account. For Harmer, Allende was neither a hero nor a bumbling idiot, ideologically good nor bad, right nor wrong; he was a political leader attempting to pursue a grand agenda that faced a series of significant, and potentially insurmountable, domestic and international problems.

In a way, Harmer’s maturity and her desire to elevate the discussion leads to one of the few disappointments of the book. Harmer writes for a knowledgeable audience. She notes in passing, for example, the complexity of Allende’s coalition, but expects the reader to be familiar with the structure of Chilean political life and the unique histories of its major and minor parties. Further, there is only the sparest conversation on Chile’s place in the world prior to the 1970s. Quite consciously she also omits discussion of some of the most well-known aspects of U.S. involvement on the grounds that they are a matter of public record. As a reader who has waded through most of the extant literature on Chile in the 1960s and 1970s, I found this approach refreshing. The thought of having to read yet another account of the U.S. role in the Schneider assassination makes me cringe. Yet, unfortunately, it means that this book may not be suitable for use with undergraduates, and perhaps even with some graduate students. Very few readers, for example, will understand how the Socialist Party operated, the ideological and tactical visions of the various leftist Chilean parties, or will appreciate how Eduardo Frei’s Revolution in Liberty led to Allende’s victory in the 1970 presidential election. All of these issues are important to understanding what happened in Chile during this period. This is by no means a criticism of Harmer’s scholarship or analysis; both are outstanding. It is unfortunate though, that because the work is targeted to fairly advanced readers, instructors may shy away from using it as a course reading.

That said, this issue should resolve itself over time. Harmer’s work is so much better than anything extant on the Cold War in Chile in the early 1970s that scholars will have to follow in her footsteps. No future book on this period will be credible unless it responds to Harmer’s position that Chile was central to the regional politics of the era. Her argument will face challenges from scholars who want to suggest that other national case studies are more significant to regional politics, and it will face challenges from scholars who believe that there is value in telling a story about how U.S. leaders involved themselves in Latin American politics. It may not be true that a book primarily about the approach of the Nixon administration toward Chile will fail to be illuminating about the Latin American Cold War. Harmer herself seems to recognize that her book may be closer to the “first word” than the “last word” on the period. Thus, even if Harmer’s work has trouble making it into course syllabi, it will surely inform scholars and impact what students eventually learn about the period.
I would like to thank the participants of this roundtable for their generous praise for and appreciation of the research that went into Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War. What is particularly encouraging is that they all seem to agree that the book ‘moves the conversation along’ and points in new scholarly directions. After all, the book is a new perspective on a well-known story – one that has been taught for decades in classrooms, has already filled thousands of pages and attracted public interest and debate. It was therefore always very much my intention to write this history from a new angle and with new sources rather than regurgitating what is already known. As I set off to do research I also had a different set of questions I wanted to answer that I felt were not fully addressed elsewhere.

In particular, I wanted to understand some of the broader, regional and global dimensions of Allende’s presidency. I was struck by the fact that accounts of it, and the Chilean coup on 11 September 1973, tended to ignore the region Chile belonged to as if the country had existed as some kind of isolated island in the middle of the Pacific with the only connection to other countries being the impact of U.S. intervention in it. Histories of the Nixon administration’s intervention in Chile also neglected to mention how Washington approached Latin America as a whole during these years. Moreover, historians told the story of U.S. intervention in Chile without explaining meaningfully how Allende or the left-wing Popular Unity coalition government he led responded or conducted their foreign policy, and I wanted to know more about how they planned to position Chile internationally. Having seen pictures of Fidel Castro in Chile during his epic trip there at the end of 1971, I was especially curious to know what he had said to Allende and how such apparently different leaders evaluated Chile’s peaceful democratic road to socialism, regional affairs, and world politics together.

At the same time as I was beginning to ask these questions, I was inspired by new de-centred international histories that came out in the early 2000s. In particular, Piero Gleijeses’ work on Cuba’s involvement in Africa and Matthew Connelly’s take on the Algerian FLN’s revolutionary diplomacy caught my eye.1 Here were historians telling familiar stories from different perspectives, using new archives, interviews, and published sources. The result was a fuller, interactive, and more global interpretation of the past that helped me not only understand the history of late twentieth-century Algeria and Angola or the Congo, but also how events in these countries interacted with countries further afield. These monographs told us something about the way in which different cultures, peoples, and ideas interacted with each other. And they were not merely accounts of how those in the corridors of power in Washington, Paris, London, or Moscow viewed what was happening, even if their views were also incorporated into their histories. Rather, they pushed the boundaries of what was meant by international history, internationalizing the

way in which I thought about my research options and the past. History did not need to be – nor should it necessarily always be – rooted through the corridors of superpower capitals, historians like these were saying. It was also about the Cuban volunteers who went to Algeria in the early 1960s to show solidarity with the Algerian revolution and about the FLN’s efforts to develop an international policy that would assist them in their struggle for power. In short, history could also be told from the perspective of Luanda, Havana, and Algiers, and simultaneously from different viewpoints in interwoven integrated narratives.

In *Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War* I wanted to follow these examples and explore a more multidimensional international history of Allende’s Chile, focusing in on Chile’s foreign policy goals, its position within growing North-South debates, Chileans’ relations with other countries in Latin America, and their relationship with the United States within the context of the inter-American system. The four reviewers of the book here seemed to value this approach, particularly when it came to what it revealed about previously lesser-known stories like Brazil’s intervention in Chile in the early 1970s. I will admit here that when I started research on Chile’s international history during this period I did not expect to find as much on Brazil as I did. Yes, I was curious as to whether any connection existed between 1964 and 1973, intrigued by Nathaniel Davies’ hints in his memoir and struck by the parallels between the two coups. Yet the Brazilian dimension of the story jumped off document pages in a way that I had never imagined it would. Instead of being a bit part of the story, General Emílio Garrastazu Médici’s international policies during the late 1960s and early 1970s increasingly seemed to be a key determinant in the way history unfolded in the Southern Cone. Since finishing the book, I have not stopped investigating Brazil’s Cold War in the Southern Cone, and those wishing to find out more will find my forthcoming article in *Cold War History* useful in this respect. They will also find interesting the most recent news, revealed in Brazil’s *O Globo* newspaper, that newly declassified Brazilian General Staff documents prove that Brazil provided General Pinochet’s government with weapons for repression. Indeed, my sense is that we will be finding out much more about Brazil’s relations with its neighbours and its foreign policy in the near future that does not contradict my argument in *Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War*, but adds to it.

These kinds of revelations demonstrate that although we know far more about the international dimensions of the Cold War conflict in Latin America than we once did, we still have lots to learn. As Aldo Marchesi states, the inter-American framework that I adopt in the book is a relatively “uncommon category” of analysis. I sincerely hope that this

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changes. Now that so many Latin American archives are open, historians have more scope in which to explore relations between countries in the region and the way in which their diplomats related to each other in international forums. Beyond Brazil, there is also far more to learn about international and transnational anti-communist military and right wing networks throughout Latin America during the Cold War. Similarly, as the Cuban part of my research illustrates, revolutionaries more often than not thought in regional – even global – terms rather than neatly defined national boundaries. Historians like Ariel Armony and Eric Zolov have also shown that events in one part of Latin America very often had significant impacts on how history unfolded in another part of the region.5 To put it another way, I am pleased my reviewers appreciated this approach and I look forward to learning more from international and transnational histories of the inter-American system in the future.

There are nevertheless pitfalls to be wary of when adopting this kind of broad, multidimensional approach. One is that there are inevitably going to be gaps in what is and can be covered. Stephen Rabe, Aldo Marchesi, and William Michael Schmidli suggest that Chile’s historical and domestic political context is not covered in as much depth in Allende’s *Chile and the Inter-American Cold War* as it might have been in a more narrowly framed history of Chile during these years. Overall, I think this is fair. I do spend a considerable amount of time dealing with the internal Chilean characteristics of the mounting crisis, particularly when it came to divisions within the Popular Unity coalition, the impact of growing political violence, strikes, and the military’s involvement in politics. However, it is true to say that I do not give ample space to issues like Chilean congressional debates and Allende’s domestic programmes. Marchesi is also obviously right to stress that in addition to the foreigners who were targeted after the coup in 1973, tens of thousands of Chileans suffered ruthless repression.

To some extent, what is and is not included in a book depends on where we come from as historians and what it is we are interested in understanding (as well as how many pages a publisher will allow, of course). First and foremost, I am an international and transnational historian specialising on Latin America rather than an historian of Chilean domestic politics. Even so, I totally agree with Rabe’s assertion that you cannot understand what happened in Chile after 1970 without understanding what happened in that country in the preceding decades. Where I differ slightly is that I think that Chileans and Chile were more influenced by external events and ideas than he allows for. He points to Hungary in 1956 and Mark Hove’s article on the impact that Arbenz’s overthrow in Guatemala had on Allende’s thinking, which argues that 1954 was a turning point for him before the Cuban revolution and his admiration for Castro. I would actually go much further than this and say that the 1930s were formative years for Allende - that the worldwide depression of the same decade had a profound impact on politics and society in Chile and that Chileans were

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highly attuned to what was happening in the Soviet Union, in Spain during the country’s Civil War, and in Vietnam in the 1950s and 1960s (I am currently reading an unpublished memoir of a man who would later go on to Cuba to train as a revolutionary and who vividly remembers watching the battle of Dien Bien Phu on newsreels at the cinema in Santiago as a boy). Indeed, when I reviewed Hove’s article for H-Diplo, I made a similar point about needing to read 1954 in a broader context, particularly when it came to Allende’s thinking and how the United States perceived communism in Chile. So, although I did make an effort to talk about Chile’s historical context and the evolution Allende’s thinking in chapter 1 of the book, I take Rabe’s point about the need for as much context as possible when studying Allende and Chilean events in the 1970s. I also very much look forward to Victor Figueroa Clark’s forthcoming biography on Salvador Allende which is due out next year.

Meanwhile, the other gaps that reviewers mentioned underline the kind of directions that I believe future scholarship on Chile will follow. Marchesi astutely points out that we need to know more about non-state actors. Although he emphasises those in the United States who disagreed with their government’s policies and interacted with what was happening in Chile, I would also point to gaps in our understanding of Brazilian or Argentinean academic, business, and political think tanks, and how they related to Chilean events and groups in the early 1970s. Meanwhile, Schmidli would like more information on the details of political activism in Chile and precisely how outside intervention impacted upon it, which I fully agree deserves closer examination and future research.

What was the impact of this confluence of internal and external factors when it came to Allende’s presidency and the coup that toppled him in 1973? I think that Rabe raises an interesting counterfactual question as to whether Chile would have headed towards what he calls “the political abyss” without foreign actors. My sense is that it may well have, but not in the way or to the extent that it did in the 1970s. The international context, the interconnectedness of events around the world by this decade, the foreigners involved in Chile, and the association with outsiders that many Chileans ascribed to their enemies – rightly and wrongly – profoundly shaped the way in which their disputes were conceptualised and fought. The so-called “political abyss” would have been very different without the potent mix of U.S. intervention, Allende’s association with Cuba and Cuban influence in Chile, the Communist Party’s close relations with the Soviet Union, and Brazil’s position as a model and supporter to military officials.

All of which brings me on to Jeffrey Taffet’s question as to whether this is specifically a Cold War story, one that relates to a longer history of U.S. imperialism or, as he puts it, a “grander narrative” about how these two stories “intersected” with each other in Latin America. As it turns out, I think that focussing on the notion of an “intersection” between patterns of U.S. imperialism and the Cold War is a very good idea. Arne Westad’s idea of the Global Cold War as new phase in a longer history of European imperialism is also

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particularly useful here. But I remain convinced of the idea of the inter-American system having its very own Cold War dynamics, as opposed to merely ricocheting off global developments. These dynamics, after 1959, had to do with revolutionary Cuba existing not only as an opponent of U.S. imperialism but also as a promoter of socialist revolution, thereby constituting a very real ideological challenge to U.S.-style capitalism. They are also to do with the fact that when Chilean Communist and Socialist Parties challenged imperialism – again, going back to the 1920s and 1930s – they not only offered a form of resistance to the United States’ influence in their country but also held out a socialist vision for the future that helped define what the ideological struggle in Chile was all about. Going back to Rabe’s point about the specificity of the Chilean context and Allende’s criticism of the Soviet Union, it was, at least in part, the historical strength of Chile’s Marxist Left that meant U.S. policymakers conceived of it as a Cold War threat – meaning here an ideologically driven communist threat – independent of the Soviet Union, and at precisely the same time as the gradual move towards superpower détente.

This inter-American ideological conflict certainly intersects with – and continues – a longer narrative of U.S. incursions into the region dating back to the nineteenth century. There was, as Taffet suggests, something imperial, visceral, and emotional about the way in which U.S. officials dealt with Chile that can also be seen, for example, in the way that U.S. occupation forces dealt with Cuba after 1898. What was different was how this was conceptualised, codified, explained, and justified. When it comes to the U.S. side of the story, then, you could say that the inter-American Cold War was where U.S. imperialism in Latin America was framed in terms of opposition to Latin American variants of communism and socialist revolution, both real and imagined.

This turned out to be a deeply asymmetrical contest in which those advocating socialist revolution and Marxist-inspired alternatives to the capitalist modernity promoted by the United States ultimately and decisively lost out. Schmidli therefore asks how much agency we should give to those who unsuccessfully challenged U.S. influence, the capitalist system, and their own dependency in the name of socialist revolution. My answer would be that agency does not equal power and that telling the history of how and why Latin American countries sought to advance their own goals and aspirations, the way in which they tried to do so, and also why they failed is very different from saying that they had the power to radically remake the world and their place in it. History is also not over, nor did it end in 1973. What happened in the past continues to inform the present and the future, and the experience of the 1970s was a profound learning curve for many of today’s leaders in the region. Understanding what it was they hoped to achieve then, what they learnt from their experiences and, as a result, how different sectors of Latin Americans perceive the United States today is vitally important for understanding contemporary inter-American relations.

Indeed, I do not see anything contradictory about examining, on the one hand, what it was Allende hoped to achieve, how he went about striving for his goals, the ways in which he

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tried to mitigate against outside pressure but was sometimes woefully unprepared and, on the other hand, the constraints and opposition that he ultimately faced. As I argue in the book, I actually think that Allende had considerable strengths and opportunities despite U.S. power and influence in his country, particularly at the beginning of his presidency and as a result of some outstanding foreign policy advisors. As Greg Grandin notes in a recent review of the book for the London Review of Books, Allende was also far more successful in charting a new international agenda than portrayals of him as a passive victim of U.S. intervention suggest. Indeed, overall, the story of Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War is about how Chileans responded to the external environment they faced, how they sought to change it, and the extent to which it influenced their aims and the ideals they strove for closer to home. Allende and the Popular Unity coalition had autonomy when it came to how they responded to U.S. intervention and the constraints of dependency, but they did not necessarily control the situation that they responded to.

Finally, Schmidli asks about the Brazilians and the relationship between Brazilian agency and autonomy in foreign policy, and U.S. support for the coup in 1964. The answer is that traditionally Brazilian governments were happy to accept U.S. support when it supported the course of action they wanted to take – and the same goes for coup plotters – but that successive governments have resisted U.S. support and intervention when it has threatened Brazilian sovereignty, as happened when President Carter tried to impose a human rights agenda (1977-1981). Matias Spektor has written very persuasively on this and the ways in which Brazil’s leaders managed their relationship with Washington during the Nixon and Ford administrations, and beyond. However, it must be noted that other countries were not able to manage U.S. power or ignore it as much as Brazil was. And as scholars work towards a more inclusive, regional history of Latin America, it is important not to fall back on blanket explanations for the whole region or accounts of static U.S. imperial power across the whole of the Western Hemisphere without looking at the nuances and interactions that occurred between different powers, governments, and peoples and their counterparts north of the Rio Grande.

My response to the roundtable is already far longer than I had anticipated, but this is because I was honoured by the thoughtful comments and insightful suggestions that all the reviewers offered and wanted a chance to engage with them. I am sincerely grateful to all four participants and to Dustin Walcher, who organised the roundtable, for initiating a conversation that I look forward to continuing. In the meantime, I hope that readers will find Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War a new, and even provocative, perspective. I am sorry that Taffet does not feel it can be assigned for undergraduate courses. I have personally used the conclusion and selected chapters with second year undergraduates and it has gone down well. To be sure, some concepts and details need explaining to those who are not as familiar with the story. But I hope that teachers will help

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students where needed, not least because of the broader points about the inter-American system and the way in which we understand the history of the Cold War in a Latin American context that I try to get across.