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Priscilla Roberts has been a key figure in linking Chinese and Western scholars together in common investigations of China’s international past. During her time at the University of Hong Kong – which she has helped make one of the main institutions in promoting collaborative research among Chinese and foreigners – Roberts has been an indefatigable organizer of conferences, workshops, and joint projects. The chapters in the three volumes reviewed in this round-table come out of some of her activities, and are edited by Roberts, with Mei Renyi, Yan Xunhua, and He Peiqun.

The volumes under review concentrate on three different aspects of China’s foreign affairs. *Bridging the Sino-American Divide: American Studies with Chinese Characteristics*, edited by Roberts, deals with the development of studies of the United States in China since the 1970s. It features chapters by some of China’s most important U.S.-watchers (and chapters on these U.S.-watchers by foreigners who have been watching them, so to speak). The volume provides an extraordinary overview of how the Chinese understanding of America has developed over the past generation.

Both reviewers see the volume as exceptionally useful and as a starting point for further comprehensive research on the individuals and institutions who are shaping the study of the United States in China. There is little doubt that China’s U.S.-watchers – whether they work on foreign affairs, literature, or U.S. society – will be of major significance in shaping the relationship between the two countries in the future. Mao Sihui recommends the book for the unique insight it provides, while being uncertain about the degree of ‘self-censorship’ that some Chinese scholars practice when they present their views. John Haddad is taken by the vigor of American Studies as a field in China, and wonders if the new foci for the study of the United States will be overseas, for instance in China or elsewhere in Asia.

*China Views Nine Eleven: Essays in Transnational American Studies*, edited by Roberts, Mei Renyi, and Yan Xunhua, shows how key Chinese scholars have interpreted developments in the United States – both political and cultural – since the terrorist attacks of 2001. Many of the contributors to the volume point to the considerable amount of spontaneous sympathy that the United States was viewed with in China in the aftermath of the attacks. But most Chinese contributors conclude that Washington squandered the opportunities it had to build on this sympathy with its attack on Iraq. The invasion and occupation of that country led many Chinese to conclude that the United States was an international ‘trouble-maker’, whose aggressive international behavior would be a threat to China (and to the United States itself as well, in the longer term).

In his review, Lynn White still concludes on an optimistic note. “The 9/11 tragedy,” he finds, “if it has any lasting effect, may be beneficial to the long-term stability of Sino-American relations.” China learnt more about how the United States behaves when its leaders see the country as coming under threat. The United States learnt that China was not its only (or maybe not even its biggest) international problem, and that more can be
achieved through cooperation than confrontation. Gray Kochhar-Lindgren is less optimistic. Praising the book for its reflective approach across national and cultural boundaries, his conclusion is that “we are living in a state of permanent emergency”, which scholars world-wide need to take into consideration when they analyse politics and culture in the United States.

*Bonds Across Borders: Women, China, and International Relations in the Modern World*, edited by Roberts with He Peiqun, discusses the role of women in forming international affairs, both as practitioners and as analysts. It is one of the first volumes I have seen that has such a dual purpose, and it provides a very good overview of its topic. Dealing both with Chinese and foreign women who have played key roles in international affairs, the volume stands out as an innovative and skillful introduction to gender issues in diplomacy.

In her review, Wei Peh T'i (Betty Wei) stresses the importance of the collection as a first step in such investigations. She calls for further attention to be paid to the role of women in ‘informal’ international affairs, and points out how diverse the study of gender and diplomacy now has become. Catherine Forslund sees the book as a necessary step in re-integrating the history of women into the history of international relations (IR), not only in China, but also beyond, writing that “until there is no more need to distinguish the study of women in IR compared to IR studies generally, such work as these authors—both men and women—put forward will be needed, appreciated, and welcome additions to the field.”

Overall, the reviewers are very positive to the kind of international and transnational investigations of several important topics that Priscilla Roberts and her co-editors have put forward in these volumes. It is particularly noted that integrating scholars from China, who often do not have many opportunities to travel, into broader discussions where there often is an extensive U.S. or European literature, may bring great rewards. It is to be hoped that such explorations will be even more a part of our future agenda in all the different fields covered in these stimulating volumes.

**Participants:**

**Priscilla Roberts** is an Associate Professor of History and Honorary Director of the Centre of American Studies at the University of Hong Kong. She read history at King’s College, Cambridge, where she also earned her doctorate in history. She has published numerous books and articles, among them *Window on the Forbidden City: The Beijing Diaries of David Bruce, 1973–1974* (2001), *Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the World beyond Asia* (2007), and *Lord Lothian and Anglo-American Relations, 1900–1940* (2010).

**O.A. Westad** is Professor of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Professor Westad has published twelve books on international history and contemporary international affairs. His 2006 book *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge University Press) won the Bancroft Prize, the Akira Iriye International History Book Award, and the Michael Harrington Award from the American Political Science Association. He is co-editor with
Melvyn Leffler of the three-volume *Cambridge History of the Cold War*. His most recent book is *Restless Empire: China and the World since 1750*. He is now working on an international history of the Cold War in the 20th century.

**Catherine Forslund** is Professor of History and Chair of the History Department at Rockford College, where she teaches U.S., Latin American, and Asian history. Her publications include *Anna Chennault: Informal Diplomacy and Asian Relations* (2002), “‘Off for the Ditch’: Theodore and Edith Visit Panama in 1906” in *White House History* (Fall 2010), and “Worth a Thousand Words...: Editorial Cartoons of the Korean War” in *Journal of Conflict Studies* (Spring 2002). She teaches United States, U.S. diplomatic, modern Chinese, and Latin American history. Recent research interests include Edith Kermit Roosevelt.

**John Haddad** is Associate Professor of American Studies and Popular Culture at Penn State Harrisburg where he teaches courses on pop culture, American literature, and Asian American Studies. He received his Ph.D. in American Studies from the University of Texas at Austin in 2002. His first book, *The Romance of China: Excursions to China in U.S. Culture, 1776-1876* (Columbia University Press, 2008), explored the many ways that ordinary Americans learned about China in the period covered. He has recently completed a Fulbright at Hong Kong, where he taught in the American Studies Program.

**Mao Sihui** received his second M.A. in Contemporary Literary & Cultural Studies from University of Lancaster, UK and his PhD in Comparative Literature (Film Culture) from the University of Hong Kong. He is Professor of Comparative Cultural Studies and Director of MPI-Bell Centre of English, Macao Polytechnic Institute. His major publications include *Technologising the Male Body: British Cinema 1957-1987* (1999), *New Perspectives: Contemporary Literary and Cultural Studies* (2000), *Decoding Contemporary Britain* (2003), *Literature, Culture and Postmodern Transformations: 8 Case Studies from William Shakespeare to James Bond* (2009). He is General Editor of the *New Topics in Contemporary Cultural Studies Series* (6 vols, Sun Yat-sen University Press, 2007-2009), and he co-edited with Doreen Wu a special issue for the journal of *Critical Arts, Media Discourses and Cultural Globalisation: A Chinese Perspective* (Routledge & UNISA, 2011). He is currently working on *Representations of Macao in Contemporary Cinema* and *Trans-cultural Competence in ELT & Communication*.


**Wei Peh T'i (Betty Wei)** – AB (Political Science) Bryn Mawr, MA (International Relations) New York University, PhD (Modern Chinese History) University of Hong Kong – is
Honorary Institute Fellow, Institute of the Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Hong Kong; Honorary Professor, Institute of Qing History, National People’s University (国立人民大学清史研究所), Beijing. She is a U.S. citizen living in Hong Kong. Her research is principally on 19th century pre-Opium War China, including foreigners in China. Her most recent paper is “A Re-examination of the Men in the Middle: The Hong Merchants as Quasi-Foreign Service Personnel in Early Nineteenth Century Canton”, Proceedings of the Macau Ricci Institute 2011 Workshop, 2-3 March 2011. Her full-length academic publications are Shanghai: Crucible of Modern China (Oxford University Press, 1987) and Ruan Yuan 阮元, 1764-1849: The Life and Work of a Major Scholar-Official in Nineteenth Century China before the Opium War (Hong Kong University Press, 2006). Currently she is working on the biography of her father, tentatively entitled “Remembering My Father, WEI HSIOH-REN (1899-1987): Scientist, Educator, Pioneer Documentary Film Maker, Diplomat, and His Contributions to Modern China.”
Reading this collection of essays and remembrances will transport readers to an international-relations Wonderland. As with Alice, some of the language might sound foreign and off-putting at first, but the sequence of chapters, layering analysis upon narrative upon analysis, shortly gets one oriented to the International Relations (IR) jargon and creates a comfortable place in which to expand one’s perspective on this timely and compelling subject.

Any reader totally versed in the arguments of Cynthia Enloe, Joan Hoff, Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, Edward Crapol and others who have been exploring women in U.S. foreign policy and international relations for the last twenty-plus years might skip some portions of the first few chapters. As is sometimes the case with conference compilation volumes, there is some repetition of the basics, but for readers newer to the subject—even those who have explored women in diplomatic history—the groundwork presented is extensive and accessible. Starting with Priscilla Roberts’s introduction and Rosemary Foot’s overview, and concluding with Linda Yarr’s view of the future, this volume is in many ways a primer for the history, place, and prospects for women in international relations, especially with respect to China. In between the opening and closing summaries and explanations are an impressive collection of narratives and memoirs of women who have been living in the fairly rarified and certainly stratified world of diplomacy and international relations—both broadly defined.

Roberts’s well-crafted and concise summary of women engaged in diplomatic activities of all sorts sets the stage for the wealth of information that follows. She reviews female figures who have played a part in diplomatic history—even though most of them are not known for those roles. The likes of Cleopatra, Elizabeth I, and Empress Dowager Cixi were precursors for less notable figures like Louisa Catherine Adams (wife of the diplomat, and later president, John Quincy Adams) or Lydia Maria Child (an American nineteenth century abolitionist) are highlighted; all of these women—well-known and unknown—are role models for women active today in all aspects of international work. Indeed, the careers of contributing authors Qui Fang (editor for China’s Xinhua News Agency), Julia Chang Bloch (first Asian-American ambassador), Chinese Foreign Ministry research expert Song Yimin, and Foreign Affairs officer Xia Yongfang enlighten their analyses of the topic. In addition, the stories of former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, former U.S. National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the Song sisters (Qingling married to Sun Yatsen and Meiling wife of Chiang Kaishek), Englishwoman Clara Haslewood who fought against the mui tsai system of Chinese child slavery, Canadian missionary wife Jessie Boyd, and American missionary Marguerite Elizabeth Goodner Owen expand the frame of reference for what constitutes women’s roles in diplomacy and international relations.

Joan Hoff’s comparative analysis of Albright and Rice’s backgrounds and roles is limited by Rice’s short term as Secretary of State at the time of her writing, but she argues that the shadow of September 11, 2001 colors Albright’s legacy (due to questions of “who knew what about terrorism [and] Osama bin Laden”) and will play a large part in defining Rice’s
long-term reputation as well. The humanitarian policies of Albright and the Bill Clinton administration in Bosnia, Kosovo and Rwanda will be judged by the longer term consequences of each. Hoff contends that Rice’s choice to avoid the “iron-fisted femme fatale” role chosen by Albright helped her avoid the “woman question” that focused on Albright, but Rice faces her own problem of avoiding the legacy of George W. Bush’s chosen foreign policies (130).

Qingling and Meiling Song, while not official government representatives, in their own ways were as influential in Chinese foreign policy as were Albright and Rice who served decades later. Professor Chan Lau Kit-Ching explains that Qingling’s role as Sun Yatsen’s “pupil…secretary, translator, and public relations officer” was followed by her early quiet contacts with both Chinese and Soviet communists in the 1920s.2 Her influence, subtle as it was, gave her little credibility with British authorities of the time; her sister Meiling, however, carried far more weight in Chinese diplomatic activities and in the annals of history generally. During World War II, Meiling’s husband Chiang Kaishek led China in the war against Japan and Meiling, with her American education and close ties with prominent Americans, was viewed negatively by the British who considered her family (which also included brother financier T.V. Song) to be “wreaking great harm on China [and thus] on the Allied cause [in the war]” (186). The sisters’ use of the traditional method of female “access to diplomatic power and influence” through family and marriage allowed them to play a major role in their nation’s affairs (190).

The by-now accepted wisdom that requires exploring women’s full range of activities—from the highly visible prime ministers or secretaries of state, through the ambassadorial and foreign service ranks, down to diplomatic spouses, businesswomen, and missionaries—is necessary to get a complete picture of the vast and varied ways in which women have made their mark on international relations. The examples of both American and Chinese women in this volume continue this strong scholarly tradition.

The first section provides a very strong background on the role of women and gender in international relations. While often confused by the general public with diplomacy or diplomatic history, IR has its own lens for examining the place of women in the field. Explorations of feminist theory, gender, power, security, war, economics, sovereignty, and more are part of its focus. These concepts can be defined and applied in different ways to the fields of IR and diplomacy and each author clearly explains the appropriate context and usage applicable to their argument. For example, Rosemary Foot points out that IR has shifted its focus “away from the concentration on the state” which has consequently “opened up space for the consideration of women/gender,” as part of her larger discussion of the introduction of gender into the IR field.3 She concludes that “IR is...a highly

1 “Madeleine Albright and Condoleezza Rice: The Woman Question and U.S. Foreign Policy,” 129.
3 “Women/Gender and International Relations: An Overview,” 38.
gendered activity” and that “central concepts” need further analysis including how women “make the activities of males possible,” how gender “fix[es] our political identities which the state then uses for its own power,” what female roles have been “overlooked,” or how international activities affect women generally compared to the consequences for men (45-46). These questions are not the usual stuff of diplomatic examinations, but, as this book makes consistently clear, they ought to be.

Qui Fang expands the exploration of gender and feminism by placing them both in the context of sovereignty, pointing out that “in diverse cultures, the precise meaning of masculinity and femininity is quietly different” which makes for variations in how gender fits into notions of state sovereignty and state-to-state relations. Her psychological examination of gender in the larger contexts of “autonomy and exclusiveness” in sovereignty provides an insightful view that bounces between Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke while explaining how states need each other because “self-sufficiency and isolation [are] impossible in this closely interlinked world” (57). Qui’s examination begins a series of five chapters authored by a variety of Chinese authors exploring multiple aspects of women in IR.

These women present compelling chapters on the United Nations and other international organizations in IR, a gendered analysis of war and peace, American women peace activists, and security studies. Exploration of all these arenas of women’s activities is necessary to gauge the important place women play in IR. As victims, rescuers, leaders, reporters, warriors, and protesters, women define and shape the international policies of their countries.

A comparison of the official roles of women in IR reveals that the future prospects for women active in foreign-service roles is very positive. For example, in Bloch’s “Women and Diplomacy,” she points out that the first U.S female ambassador was appointed in 1949 and there have been 199 since then (135). By comparison, in “Women, Marriage, and International Relations,” Li Yingtao explains that China appointed its first woman ambassador in 1979 and has had 55 total, including numbers up to 2006 (168 and 169-171). The averages are not too far apart (3.49 vs. 2.03) and China got started with women ambassadors much more quickly in its national history than did the U.S. and other western nations. While Bloch argues that the United States can report 51% women among junior Foreign Service officer entry level positions (in 2006) and 37.4% female Foreign Service officers (in early 2007) plus 58.3% of State Department Civil Service employees, in “Women in a Changing World,” Song Yimin compares China’s 28.8% female Foreign Ministry Civil Servants in early 2006 of whom 48.6% were divisional chiefs or held higher ranks (137 and 148). These sorts of figures paint a positive image of women’s prospects in IR in both nations as female numbers continue to increase. The diversity among women diplomats is something China is not wrestling with at all. However, some have investigated the number of Asian, Latina, black, and other minority group females active in American

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4 “Man, the State, and Sovereignty: The Construction, Practice, and Remaking of Sovereignty from a Feminist Standpoint,” 49.
diplomacy, and found much smaller numbers, but even that percentage is slowly improving. And the U.S. record for appointing women to the nation’s top diplomatic roles—Secretary of State and United Nations Ambassador—exceeds that of China by far. The glass ceiling has been broken, but the hole is not yet very large.

Outside formal diplomatic roles, American women have a stronger record in terms of women operating as missionaries, businesswomen, journalists, activists, and spouses. Yet the careers of several authors and those they discuss show that Chinese women continue to make great inroads in other venues of diplomatic activity. The existence of so many Chinese scholars contributing to this volume provides optimism for the field as well as good prospects for the training of more Chinese women in IR along with analysis and recognition of their work. Certainly, the very example of the conference itself, the efforts of its organizers, the multiple contributors to this volume, their students, and others indicate the rising tide of women’s activities in Chinese IR. The Chinese authors’ work is scholarly, analytical, and very promising for both what it tells about the future of women in Chinese diplomacy and for illustrating a high level of academic skill and dedication to the field. Collectively, the Chinese scholars contribute incisive examination of their country’s record in IR. For example Song Yimin’s explanation of China’s desire for an “independent and peaceful foreign policy” or Xia Yongfang’s emphatic call for China’s government to act so “more capable women can participate in diplomacy at higher levels and take on greater responsibilities” are encouraging signs that women can speak out and are increasingly doing so (152 and 157).

There is no doubt that continued exploration of women in Chinese international relations shows great promise as it has and still does in the United States other nations. Until there is no more need to distinguish the study of women in IR compared to IR studies generally, such work as these authors—both men and women—put forward will be needed, appreciated, and welcome additions to the field.
Upon first picking up *Bridging the Sino-American Divide*, I was initially struck by the optimism conveyed by the title’s metaphor. Of course, the word “divide” implies, and quite accurately so, that a not-so-insignificant distance has historically separated Americans and Chinese. Though I will not list all the cultural, political, and economic differences that, when taken together, comprise this distance, it suffices to say that this distance has long prevented each side from accessing the other’s values, heart, and mind. Though the divide has presented a very real obstacle to mutual understanding, the word choice of the editor (Priscilla Roberts, Professor of History at Hong Kong University) implies a current situation that is both dynamic and ameliorative. Most saliently, she did not use a word like “chasm” or “gulf,” which, by suggesting a gap too wide to cross, would have infused the title with pessimism. The word “bridging” adds to the hopeful tone. Hypothetically, had she opted for an infinitive (“To Bridge the Sino-American”), she would have implied that the ambitious project rests on the drawing-board. Conversely, had she chosen the past tense (“The Sino-American Divide Bridged”), readers would infer that the great work is done. As it is, the editor indicates with the participle “bridging” that a construction project is well-underway but that the infrastructure is not yet finished. This volume, then, amounts to a progress report.

One look at the institutional affiliations of the contributors makes another point clear. The project shares a couple commonalities with the Transcontinental Railroad, which we might imagine as its nineteenth-century antecedent. First of all, the current project aims to connect the East and West. Second, it is, like its iron and wood predecessor, actually composed of two smaller projects going on simultaneously. On the one side, we have the bridging that progresses in a westerly direction and that consists mainly of American academics trying to understand China and Sino-U.S. relations. On the other side, we find the west-to-east line that, much like the earlier Central Pacific Railroad, heavily involves the Chinese – in this case students, professors, and researchers. Their mutual goal is to meet and connect.

Though *Bridging the Sino-American Divide* updates us capably on both ongoing projects, it is much stronger on the Chinese side. A tally of the contributors’ affiliations reveals that three-quarters hail from Chinese universities, an imbalance that is perhaps owing to the volume’s origins and the location of the editor. The book’s genesis was a conference at Hong Kong University organized by Priscilla Roberts and cosponsored by that institution’s Centre of American Studies and the US-China Education Trust. Though the event attracted scholars from the U.S. and Europe, the majority of presenters predictably came from China. The resulting volume of essays is dominated by the contributions of this latter group.

That the volume is weighted towards the Chinese perspective does not constitute a drawback. Though I am revealing a bias that readers may or may not share, I am – given the historical moment in which we live – more interested in the recent developments at Chinese universities. This preference should not be interpreted as a slight to American universities (indeed, I teach American Studies at one). It is just that, at present, higher
education is undergoing a rapid expansion in China. I, like many others, am naturally curious to see how America is studied in the new college programs and research centers that have been mushrooming in China as of late. I want to know how American Studies is taught, which works of American literature are assigned, what sorts of research projects are undertaken by faculty, and how Chinese students view the United States. This book’s most valuable contribution is that it supplies this information not in a general way but in a specific way. The volume is unlike any I have seen in that it takes the reader inside American Studies programs and classrooms in China.

What do we learn about the state of American Studies in China? First of all, readers discover that the current crisis in American Studies that some see in U.S. institutions does not trouble programs in China. In this review, I will not go into a lengthy history of the field as a way to explain this crisis (Bridging the Sino-American Divide provides a thorough overview of the field’s evolution). Briefly though, the field was born in the first part of the twentieth century in response to pressing political needs: the United States needed to define and present a unique American identity – one composed of specific beliefs, values, and myths – in answer to competing ideologies in Russia and Europe. If early practitioners described a single American identity and unified American culture, the field underwent a dramatic change during and after the social movements that roiled the nation in the 1960s. The revelation that America was, above all else, diverse and that there was no single identity prompted a shift in the field. Simply put, it moved away from unity and consensus and toward fragmentation and conflict. Though some trauma accompanied the transition, American Studies held itself together – even thrived – by maintaining its commitment to interdisciplinarity. So while the overarching objective of the field had changed, the field itself endured because it could demonstrate continuity of method during this period of social disruption. The crisis referred to above began later in the century when rival fields like English and History embraced interdisciplinarity themselves. Once several fields could claim interdisciplinary status, American Studies lost that single attribute that had set it apart in the academic cosmos. It entered into identity crisis.

In China, American Studies seems to enjoy immunity to this crisis. Bridging the Sino-American Divide not only offers evidence of that fact, it also helps us understand why this is the case. Since American Studies in China meets needs that are practical and local, the field is liberated from the burden of justifying its existence on intellectual or ideological grounds. The same point made more concretely sounds like this: if in China there is funding for American Studies centers, research projects, academic programs, and faculty hires, and if students express demand for classes on American themes because these serve their needs, then the field does not need to argue its own legitimacy.

Multiple essays in this volume describe both the field’s practicality in China and the local needs it fills. Recognizing the global influence of the U.S., various government ministries have recognized the wisdom of training future policy experts, intellectuals, and diplomats who understand and can work with America. These ministries have sponsored numerous centers and university programs that use funding to perform research, host conferences,
and teach classes on American themes.¹ Students flock to American Studies courses, seeing the field as a gateway to careers in foreign relations or international finance and business. They also see an American Studies major as an excellent way to improve their English skills. Indeed, for this reason, Chinese universities (unlike their American counterparts) tend to house American Studies in English or linguistics programs.²

What areas of American Studies attract Chinese students, teachers, and researchers? In each case, the choice of topic tends to reflect a local or practical need. For example, several Chinese contributors to Bridging the Sino-American Divide chose to analyze literature (the volume includes essays on Edgar Alan Poe, William Faulkner, and Gish Jen).³ This literary focus should not surprise us, given that American Studies is so often taught out of English programs. Other essays consider Sino-American relations, intercultural communications, soft power, or global business. There are two essays on McDonalds in China, one that explores the democratic principle conveyed by the chain’s de-centralized structure in China and another that evaluates its ability to assimilate into local culture.⁴ In addition, Sibing He reviews America’s nineteenth-century commerce in Macau, and Mei Renyi and Chen Juebin concentrate on the importance of Hong Kong in U.S. trade in their essay.⁵ These topics are also to be expected since they serve the interests of both the Chinese government and the students who seek careers in foreign relations and international business.

Interestingly, these are not the sorts of topics one tends to find discussed at American Studies conferences in the U.S. – at least not until recently. There the focus has traditionally been on social problems within the U.S. In a superb introductory essay to Bridging the Sino-American Divide, Priscilla Roberts explains that the incongruity had, at one time, caused a minor foreign-domestic divide within the discipline. While foreign practitioners (including the Chinese) have typically been more interested in the international relations of the U.S. and its ability to project its power globally, their American counterparts have been preoccupied with gender disparities, multiculturalism, and the experiences of “alienated or marginalized minorities.”


Sometimes, U.S. scholars have – at least from the perspective of non-Americans – operated under the assumption that they own the privilege of setting the agenda for the larger field. Not surprisingly, scholars and students in China and elsewhere have found such U.S.-centrism off-putting. “Non-Americans...found unpersuasive and even smacking of cultural imperialism,” Roberts writes, “the insistence of US specialists in American Studies that the disciplinary approaches then prevailing in their own country represented the only ‘correct’ methodology for pursuing American Studies.”

U.S.-based practitioners, in other words, perhaps demonstrated a tendency to treat their interests and methods as ensconced at the center of the American Studies universe, shunting foreign scholars off to the periphery.

More recently, the dynamic has changed. During her term as American Studies Association (ASA) President (2004-2005), Shelley Fisher Fishkin of Stanford University called for the field to reorient itself towards transnational themes. In response, conferences, scholarly journals, and academic courses devoted to the international rim of the field have sprung up recently. Thanks to this shift, Americans and non-Americans in the field are much closer together now than they were even ten years ago. In fact, we see evidence of this reduced distance in Bridging the Sino-American Divide. Though the contributions by Americans are not numerous, they are so strong as to suggest the fertility of this area. Staci Ford contributes an excellent essay on American women who have straddled the “Sino-American divide.” On the pedagogical front, Gordon Slethaug offers an account and assessment of a teaching-American-Studies project that he directed at Sun Yat-Sen University in Guangzhou.

The freshness and excitement conveyed by the thirty-five selections in Bridging the Sino-American Divide (regardless of whether an author is Chinese, American, or European) almost beg a question: if American Studies is flourishing in China, and if American Studies continues to search for an identity in the United States, might this be a sign that the center of gravity itself is shifting? Might the one-time periphery become the new center?

This question leads to my only criticism of Bridging the Sino-American Divide. In 1958, Harold Isaacs described the view from the U.S. side of the Sino-American divide in his work, Scratches on Our Minds: American Views of China and India. Progressing from one historical period to the next, he reviewed two hundred years of American perceptions (or misperceptions) of China. Now that the bridge-building is well underway, it might be time to forecast the future. What will it mean to China, the United States, and the world when the divide that Isaacs described – which has defined Sino-American discourse since the sailing of The Empress of China (1784) – vanishes? What will happen when all the bridging forces described in this book – overseas graduate students, research projects, think tanks, college

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courses, international conferences, fast-food restaurants, popular culture – succeed in de-mystifying the formerly alien culture across the Pacific? Perhaps at that time, Priscilla Roberts will coordinate the effort to publish a sequel.
On September 11, 2001, I came out of a faculty meeting to find my colleagues gathered around a small television set in the departmental office watching smoke pour from the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center. I thought it must be a joke. It wasn’t. In *China Views Nine-Eleven*, American Studies scholars from China, the U.S., Australia, and Europe examine various aspects of life in the United States since the catastrophe of that clear September day. Air traffic and pilot training, ideologies of a violently contested modernity, the New York skyline as an image of American economic power, the history of technology and religion, and a globalized media event were all simultaneously enmeshed in an act of televised and constantly mediated terror. ‘It was,’ so many commented, ‘just like a movie.’

A different period of history had ‘begun,’ although beginnings and their aftermaths are always complex and overdetermined. (When, exactly, did 9/11 begin?) It is this event and its aftermath, along with reflections on the historical antecedents, which this volume of essays addresses from multiple disciplinary perspectives. Since I am neither a China expert, a historian, nor a social scientist, my own reading of these texts is shaped by my marginalized status on the disciplinary front—although it is not particularly difficult to read across these academic lines—and by my own experience, from within the U.S., of the events of 911. The chance encounter that led to my exposure to this set of essays was a year spent in Hong Kong in 2009-10 as I worked with colleagues to assist in the transition from three to four year degrees in the public higher education sector that begins in the fall of 2012. It is from within and alongside these multiple intersections that I view these examinations, all very thoroughly explicated, of post-9/11 America.

Rather than attempting to exhaustively review the entire volume, which is quite ably presented by Priscilla Roberts in the introduction, I have chosen one text from each section of the volume—which is divided into *The International Setting, The American Scene: Domestic Politics*, and *The Cultural Impact*—on which to focus. The first is Xiao Huan’s “Fluctuations and Adjustments in American Soft Power After September 11, 2001”; the second is Xie Tao’s “Party Polarization in Congress: Change and Continuity After 9/11”; and the third is Teng Jimeng’s “No Direction Home: Protest Music at a Crossroads since 9/11.”

Xiao Huan focuses on three aspects of the decline of American ‘soft power,’ the term created by Joseph Nye but made so popular by Hillary Clinton, and one about which I am quite ambivalent. A simple binary of hard/soft can only go so far and a differentiated use of the term ‘culture’ still seems to be more useful when talking about the powers of attraction of the United States in some sectors. But public and privileged usage is itself powerful, so we are, for the time being, stuck with ‘soft power.’ First, the U.S. lost ground around the “value of democracy” (128) as it became more unilateral, and, in particular, after the disastrous invasion of Iraq. Secondly, again following the unilateralist tendencies of George W. Bush’s administration, the U.S. began to distance itself from international institutions and agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol, the Antiбаллистic Missile Treaty, and even the UN Commission on Human Rights. Finally, the number and range of cultural exchanges
decreased dramatically as it became more difficult to enter the U.S. and the budgets for organizations such as the U.S. Information Agency were slashed. (As a tangent, it will be extremely interesting to watch how the current influx of Chinese students into U.S. universities in ever-increasing numbers develops and what it comes to signify in terms of soft power.)

Huan argues that this weakening of soft power impacted the global image, the credibility, the foreign policy, and the national security of the U.S., and that although attempts were made to reverse this trend, they have not to date been very successful. Huan concludes that “Although the US government made great efforts to strengthen public diplomacy after 9/11, its soft power remained weak and fragile, especially in Islamic countries. The main reason for this was that Americans were still wedded to hegemonic and unilateralist foreign policies” (131). In the final section of the article, Huan compares the rising appeal of China’s soft power to the declining power of the U.S. in the cultural arena. She notes that “in some regions of the world, particularly in the developing countries of Southeast Asia and Africa, the contrasts between Chinese and American soft power are experiencing subtle changes, with Chinese soft power beginning to outdo that of the United States in terms of its unique attractiveness” (132). I suppose we would need to ask the countries in question about the appeal of soft power and its relation to the naval build-up by the Chinese and a redeploying of U.S. forces toward the Pacific region, but, in any case, Huan offers an explanation for this shift by claiming that the “Chinese people cherish moral and ethical values, advocating peace and harmony and objecting to violence and wars” (132) and because of China’s “active acceptance of multilateralism” (133).

Things are not, of course, so simple and need an ongoing diplomatic and scholarly dialogue, both of which are occurring at a number of sites, about particular case studies supporting these claims. As Huan notes, for China, “building up its hard power capabilities will be the foundation for the rise of its soft power and an efficient development strategy will furnish the institutional guarantee for this” (133). Much more work across the academic spectrum needs to be done on the networks that mediate between the ‘hard’ and the ‘soft’ in order to more clearly show the many ways in which the two are profoundly intertwined.

As a citizen of the U.S., I chose Xie Tao’s “Party Polarization in Congress: Change and Continuity After 9/11” with the wild hope that someone from outside the country could explain, and hopefully suggest a way beyond, the political impasses within the Washington Beltway. Tao’s article, through a detailed analysis of congressional votes along and across party lines, does an excellent job of laying out the data, but, alas, does not cure the political ills of the Republicans and Democrats for whom the ’aisle’ so often seems an uncrossable moat instead of a shared space of national conversation.

As Tao recounts, on 9/11 and during the succeeding days, the members of Congress spoke with an almost unanimous voice concerning the attack and the resolution to stand together. As Trent Lott (R-MI), then the Minority Leader, said: “There are moments in history when in the past the people of this country have set aside their prejudices and passions and have come together. We will do it. We have already done it” (cited on 244). The past, however, is itself always vexed and contested and never leads to a predictably certain future. And if
“prejudices and passions”—the powerful emotions of politics—must be set aside during a national crisis to be replaced by a more univocal reason, then once the immediacy of the crisis has passed the “prejudices and passions” can be predicted to return. (And Lott’s political fate is an interesting case of how this can play out.) Polarization, in other words, is never far away.

Tao first sets the context for his analysis by running through American history and its moments of (near) fracture: the Federalist and Anti-Federalist debate (still going strong, as we have seen with the recent Supreme Court decision about the Affordable Care Act); the history of slavery and the Civil War (and the shift from an agrarian to an industrial economy); from the New Deal of the 1930s up to the late 1960s (I would tend to subdivide this period); and, finally, from the 1970s until the present. Throughout this history there have, of course, been ferocious disagreements between the parties—which have themselves changed identities a number of times—about the essential issues of a given period, but, as Tao concludes, “since the 1970s both parties have become increasingly polarized. On the one hand, inter-party heterogeneity has grown dramatically. On the other, intra-party homogeneity has increased substantially” (252). Each party, in other words, is voting along much more homogenous lines than in the past and the parties are moving rapidly apart in terms of their positions on a range of diplomatic and domestic issues.

Even though there was a moment of unanimity around the events of 9/11, the Bush presidency as a whole—with questions of the legitimacy of the 2000 election, tax cuts for the wealthy, Kyoto, energy, judicial nominees, and Iraq all swirling about—deepened the polarization of the parties in Congress. The right and the left, pulling apart and withdrawing into their own homogenous position, have eroded the center, which, in fact, couldn’t quite hold. Indeed, Tao concludes, it was only after the 2000 election that polarization finally created media events and a “major stir” (263). As E.J. Dionne, a columnist for the Washington Post put it: “The red states got redder, the blue states got bluer, and the political map of the United States takes on the coloration of the Civil War” (cited on 264). Tao concludes his chapter with the morose observation that “as inter-party relations altered in the aftermath of 9/11, the two parties would become still more polarized, continuing a trend that dated back to the 1970s” (267).

9/11, then, was but a blip on the radar screen that was tracking a much longer trajectory of polarization—emerging from the Vietnam War and the cultural changes of the 60s—that has divided much of the nation against itself. With the financial crash of 2007-2008, which might have given the U.S. another pivotal chance to reconstruct the center, the polarization has, instead, deepened. And, yet, Barack Obama won the 2008 election with a combination of traditionally red and blue states, and the 2012 victor will need to do the same. And the current ‘do-nothing Congress’ has also, if very rarely, worked together to create some compromises. We will see what the near future brings.

Teng Jimeng’s “No Direction Home: Protest Music at the Crossroads since 9/11,” springs directly out of the author’s interest in the impact of the American music of the 1960s on Chinese intellectuals. As he notes
for an American Studies scholar based in China, the central meaning of the 1960s was the visionary collective project of Civil Rights, black power, the New Left, and anti-war movements, and their composition program of political and cultural liberations—the Counter Culture: participatory democracy, personalized politics, racial equality, folk-rock music, the women’s liberation movement, and respect for non-Anglo-American cultures. (471)

And it is protest music—and its multiple translations into the Chinese cultural idiom—that best encapsulates all of the historical complexity of the 1960s. Given this immensely powerful cultural movement, why hasn’t such music played a similar role in post-9/11 America?

Jimeng sets the stage for his argument by reminding readers that “music practice” is a complex discursive practice that includes many different social actors and cuts across the categories of both representation and action, as well as a “complex dialectics where music protest is as fluid as the audiences to which it appeals” (473). Like the other authors, he offers a brief historical overview before moving into the present, claiming that protest music can be read as a “shadow history of the complex political struggles” (475) of the U.S. and that, through a “mobilization of tradition” best exemplified by Bob Dylan, music becomes a force for the convergence of political reflection and action.

And now? There is no effective protest music—just as there was not a very effective anti-war movement in the U.S. around Iraq—although some artists have attempted that feat. As Jimeng notes, scholars have suggested a new mood of censorship, media conglomerate ownership of music outlets, more apolitical artists, and fragmented audiences created via the internet as possible contributory reasons for the failure of protest to arise within the musical community. (479). If people can get all the music they could ever want through their ear-buds on their iPods, why form communities of listeners with links to the broader political world? In sum, “Youth music as such is no longer the vanguard of the Counter Culture, but rather an expression of the dominant commercial culture, hijacked and packaged for easy digestion in malls across the United States” (484). But no culture is completely hegemonic and there are always fault lines in a reigning ideology through which creative renewal might emerge. Jimeng mentions Public Enemy, Chuck D, the Beastie Boys, Rage Against the Machine, Conor Oberst, Bruce Springsteen, and the Dixie Chicks as points of generative resistance within the generally commercial and privatized context of contemporary music; and, one never knows what comes next and music might once again join with a new politics.

In the U.S., 911 is the number to call for a response to an emergency and 9/11 created a traumatic ripple around that world that will create impacts and implications for a very long time to come. We are, as it were, living in a state of permanent emergency. Scholars and artists will need to continue to create powerful responses to understanding the event of
9/11, to considering how such events relate to history, politics, and cultural transformations, and to articulating what we might mean by the term ‘event.’ This volume creates one such moment and opens the way for further reflection across national and cultural boundaries.
Bridging the Sino-American Divide: American Studies with Chinese Characteristics is one of the most significant additions in recent years to the already impressive body of scholarship on American Studies in China. As a critic of comparative cultural studies and contemporary American culture and society, reading through the 500 plus pages has been a fascinating process of learning and reflection. In this short review, I will offer some very personal views on some of the great strengths of the book and also address a couple of issues that challenge scholars of American Studies in China as well as in the U.S.

It is exciting to notice that when the world is undergoing an unprecedented process of glocalisation, the dual process of globalisation (of the economy, images and discourses, risks and problems) and localisation (of various forms of reaction and resistance to the global trend of Westernisation/Americanisation in both the public and private socio-cultural spaces), there arises an urgent need for the Chinese to cross geographical, national, political, cultural and even psychological boundaries (sometimes barriers) between China and the United States. The powerful emergence of regional studies in the last three decades in China’s research and educational institutions seems to reconfirm the great possibility of re-reading, re-thinking or even deconstructing the greatest cultural construct in human history -- the East-West Divide. And here I am not only talking about traditional forms of regional/national studies such as Asian Studies, European Studies, British Studies or Japanese studies, but also and mainly about American Studies which, I firmly believe, helps Chinese scholars in opening up their minds and promotes cross-cultural awareness in the post-socialist era. In critical discourse studies of the complex politics of the world today, who could really afford to omit China and/or the United States? Indeed, ‘China’ has nowadays become such a sexy term loaded with a thousand and one meanings that nothing could have been more appealing and welcome than a book with the title Bridging the Sino-American Divide: American Studies with Chinese Characteristics.

Neatly divided into three parts -- “China and American Studies” (with eleven papers), “Informal Sino-US Bridges: Literature, Popular Culture, and the Personal” (with twelve papers), “Sino-US Diplomatic Relations: Past, Present, and Future” (with twelve papers), the thirty-five chapters truly reflect the great diversity of topics, concerns, and preoccupations of Chinese and American scholars as well as their different approaches to American Studies in China in a glocalised setting. Many of the papers provide informative and insightful analysis of these aspects of American Studies in China. Asking “How Far along the Road to Mutual Understanding Have We Come?”, Zi Zhongyun reflects critically on the roles, objectives and development of American Studies in China since the 1980s, rightly pointing out not only some conspicuous weaknesses of Chinese scholarship in American Studies but also a contradiction in American Studies in China between the general trend towards globalization and the desire to fulfil national aspirations (47).

What has really impressed me is that the book features a very detailed and scholarly introduction (39 pages) by the editor Priscilla Roberts (who was also one of the main organisers of the 2006 conference with the same name, “Bridging the Sino-American Divide: American Studies with Chinese Characteristics.”

The three commentaries function as summaries of, and personal reflections on, the major ideas, issues and perspectives of the papers in the three parts of the book. After a discussion of the current situation, goals, purposes, roles and approaches of American Studies in China, Mei Renyi alerts the readers to one of the most pressing problems that American Studies programmes in China face: the lack of qualified teachers and the absence of necessary resources. Much more work therefore needs to be done in order to boost real confidence and optimism in Chinese scholars doing American Studies (168). The second commentary by Wang Jianping on “Informal Sino-US Bridges” focuses on the literary and cultural dimensions of American Studies. Making insightful comments on those twelve papers, Wang observes that these scholars possess the “ability to employ the hermeneutics of cultural texts to offer shared insights into the interactions among gender, ethnicity, and race” (329).

The third commentary by Lynn T. White III on “Sino-US Diplomatic Relations: Past, Present, and Future” is a fair-minded critical assessment of the twelve papers (all except one of which are written by Chinese scholars). He is pleased to see the considerable differences among Chinese scholars on Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations and “a plurality of views that they can and do express at international conferences” (500). Looking at these “extremely interesting” chapters, White points out that some of the papers are “too diplomatic” to mention the “widest Sino-American divide that needs to be bridged, which is obviously Taiwan” (503). His observations of China’s peaceful rise as the product of a grand strategy, the development of democracy in Taiwan, the different political systems and foreign policies of and the intricate relations among PRC, the U.S. and Taiwan are very insightful and forward-looking. Putting Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations in the wider international context, White points out that “time and change will continue to shape the Sino-American relationship, and paying attention to these factors adds realism to political statements that are meaningless, if divorced from a sense of the effects of time” (501).

**American Studies in China as a Multi-disciplinary Subject**

As a dynamic, enabling, and multi-disciplinary subject, American Studies has now become a rapidly growing area of interest in many parts of the world, not only in Europe, but also in some Asian countries/regions such as China, Japan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Macao, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand. Academics in these regions have set up projects and educational programmes in a variety of tertiary institutions. In China, many universities have been offering since the early 1950s ‘English Studies’ courses which include British and
American literature, history, and international relations. In the late 1980s, some Chinese universities of international/foreign studies such as Beijing Foreign Studies University, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies (GUFS), and Shanghai International Studies University established British and American Studies programmes within their existing MA programmes and also set up centres for American Studies. In the last two decades in China, the education authorities at the national and municipal/provincial levels have funded many projects in the arts, humanities and social sciences focusing on different dimensions of American Studies, although the majority of these projects and programmes tend to concentrate on American literary and cultural studies.  

Having read the thirty-five chapters together with the introduction and three commentaries, I strongly feel that scholars in American Studies and comparative cultural studies in China have fully embraced American Studies as a dynamic and multidisciplinary subject. In “Localizing the Global: Shifting Centers, Chinese Ideology, and American Studies”, Wang Jianping observes that since “American Studies has proliferated to the point where it now embraces behavioural studies, minority studies, women’s studies, popular culture, and so forth …, the opportunities to develop the current interest are virtually unlimited” (54). The growing attention to local responses to the global changes indicates a new trend that broadens the scope of American Studies to include studies of the diversity of histories, cultures, realities and peoples that are both non-American as well as American. In “Assimilating the American Alien in Localizing McDonald’s”, Jiang Ningkang presents a well-researched and persuasive case study (with statistical analyses and interviews) of the McDonald’s restaurant in the city of Nanjing in terms of its management practices and operational interactions with local preferences and biases. What the author has offered is a perfect model of scholarship in studies of popular culture such as ‘fast food’ when one goes beyond the confines of traditional preferences for texts of ‘Grand Narratives’ in history, literature and diplomacy. Indeed, after reading papers such as “Macao in the making of Sino-US Relations: From the Empress of China to the Treaty of Wangxia, 1784-1844” by He Sibing [a well-documented paper on the intricate relations between trade, politics and foreign relations and Macao’s “pivotal role in the evolution of early Sino-US relations” (357)], and “Hong Kong’s Role in US-China Trade Relations During the 1970s” by Mei Renyi and Chen Juebin (a pioneering paper on the rural industries and Hpng Kong’s role in Sino-American trade relations as well as ‘dealings’ between China and the West in the 1970s), I feel enlightened and encouraged by the fact that American Studies has been immensely enriched when new perspectives and channels such as these that are relatively ‘free’ of political biases are newly discovered and fruitfully explored.

In short, by going beyond the ideological constraints of the more traditional approaches to American Studies which had been predominantly literary studies in China from 1950s to mid-1980s, the papers in this collection have adopted a more transnational vision in their historical explorations and comparative studies of literature, popular culture, history,

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feminism, immigration, race and ethnicity, trade, politics, foreign relations, and value
systems.

The second part of the book title *American Studies with Chinese Characteristics* has a
number of very interesting implications.

First, “Chinese Characteristics” has been closely associated with the rather nationalistic
discourse of the Chinese dominant ideology for the “Socialist Market Economy with
Chinese Characteristics” which in fact has been interpreted as “Chinese State Capitalism
with Outdated Socialist Rhetoric” by critics from both China and the West.\(^2\) When one finds
it hard to understand or explain something in/from China, one can simply resort to calling
it “Chinese Characteristics.”

Second, if we look at the collection of papers in terms of authorship, the overwhelming
majority of the contributors (twenty-seven out of thirty five) are from institutions on
China’s mainland. This also fits the title given that most of the papers present rather
typically mainstream Chinese perspectives. Since the volume is a collection of papers
selected from a big conference held in Hong Kong, this is not surprising because Hong Kong
is just a few hours away from the Mainland. In other words, American scholars present at
the conference or in this collection become almost ‘ethnic’ -- another factor that transforms
this book into one with conspicuous “Chinese Characteristics.”

Third, precisely because of the huge imbalance in the number of authors from the PRC and
the U.S., there emerges a conspicuous lack of genuine diversity of voices and perspectives
among the authors from the Mainland. Although there are a number of papers that
compare certain aspects of American culture, society and foreign policy with those of the
Chinese with sound insights (for example,. Pan Weijuan’s “American Studies and Chinese
Nation Studies Compared,”, Li Jian’s “The Development of Native American and Guizhou
Strategy: Two Perspectives and Two Roads”) Chinese authors, for various understandable
reasons, seem to play it safe when they approach topics such as race and ethnicity, gender
politics, human rights, freedom of speech, democracy, social justice and political systems. In
other words, there is still a huge gap between what they say and what they can and should
say as independent scholars. Perhaps, ‘self-censorship’ may help to explain part of the
reason behind this gap.

When looking at the future of American Studies in China, Zi Zhongyun points out that “we
should conduct multidisciplinary studies of all aspects of the United States, historically and
synchronically. What are the basic factors that make American society viable? ... In a rapidly
changing world, how long will American supremacy last, and what strategies will the United

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\(^2\) See *Adjusting to Capitalism: Chinese Workers and the State*, ed. by Greg O’Leary, 1998; Yasheng Huang,
*Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Enterpreneurship and the State*, Cambridge University Press, 2008,
and Mao Sihui’s “Translating the Other: Discursive Contradictions and New Orientalism in Contemporary
States adopt to defend its status or cope with new realities?” (47, emphasis mine). Indeed, because of the major changes in the global economy, politics, culture and information technology in the last three decades, there has emerged, for Chinese scholars, a radically changed global context for regional, national and transnational studies such as American Studies, a distinctive feature of which is the crossing of the geopolitical, socio-cultural and psychological boundaries between the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other,’ and also the building of bridges between China and the U.S. From a more American perspective, Lynn T. White III observes, “[t]he Chinese elite might, for its own reasons, decide to open up, to include a greater variety of leaders. Especially if this occurs, the Sino-American divide can be bridged peacefully throughout the future…. America will then be a better partner to China and these nations will become reliable mutual friends” (510).

Of course, not all that is happening or will happen in the near future is as easy and rosy as one may wish it to be. With America’s ‘return’ to the Asia-Pacific and China’s ‘rise’ in the global economy and international politics, for instance, both Chinese and American scholars in American Studies will meet with new challenges as well as opportunities. It will not just be a matter of mere national interest or individual cultural identity but also a real testing ground for American Studies as a dynamic and multidisciplinary subject and for scholars to approach the subject with a true global vision.

Julia Chang Bloch (U.S. ambassador to Nepal from 1989-1993 and founder and current president of the U.S.-China Education Trust) writes in the Preface to the book, “We hope the chapters in this volume will contribute to the mutual understanding that is critical to US-China relations and the future of both countries.” (xiii) Indeed, this is a book that has true ‘Chinese characteristics,’ a book that adds a number of new dimensions to our understanding of American Studies in China. Despite its imbalance in scholarship, the book provides a panoramic window onto the historical, socio-economic, political as well as literary and cultural changes and challenges facing Chinese academics who have been labouring in the less-than-idyllic spaces of American Studies in China with various kinds of research agendas, social pressures, institutional demands and ideological dictates. And for this very reason, I would salute Priscilla Roberts for her great efforts regarding and renewed contribution to the development of American Studies in China, and I hereby warmly recommend this substantial collection of papers for scholars, teachers and students of American Studies not only in ‘Greater China’ (the Mainland, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) but also in the United States and the rest of the international community.
Bonds Across Borders: Women, China, and International Relations in the Modern World, comprises an introduction by Priscilla Roberts of Hong Kong University and nineteen chapters (300 pages) with individual bibliographies at the end of each chapter and a simple and helpful index at the end of the book. The chapters were first presented as papers at a two-day conference at Fudan University (October 2003), “the first ever

1 The nineteen chapters, some in the nature of “discussant remarks” rather than research papers, are presented in four parts. The names of the authors, their institutional affiliation and titles of their works are as follows:

Part I: Gender, Wars and Peace in International Relations.


3. “Women's International Organizations, the United Nations, and International Relations”, by He Peiqun (Fudan), 67-81.

4. “War and Peace from a Gender Perspective”, by Hu Chuanrong (Shanghai International Studies Universities), 82-91.

5. “The American Women's Peace Party and Its Heritage” by He Hui (South China Normal University), 92-100.


Part II: Women as Diplomats: The Public Sphere


11. “Women, Marriage, and International Relations”, by Li Yingtao (Beijing Foreign Studies University), 160-175

Part III: Women and Informal Diplomacy
international conference focusing on the role of women in international affairs ... held in China” (Preface and Acknowledgement, ix), reflecting an ever-widening academic “interest in women and international relations, or, as it is often termed, gender and international relations” (Foot, 34). The conference was sponsored by Fudan University’s Department of Politics and the Center for American Studies and the Department of History of HKU. Both institutions boast bi-lingual capacities. It is disappointing that the editors have not provided Chinese characters alongside the pinyin for Chinese names and terms.

The twenty participants of the conference – academics, journalists, and diplomats, whose after-conference-modified contributions appear in this volume, are from institutions in China (8); the United States (U.S.) (3); the United Kingdom (1); and Hong Kong (7), including one who is also affiliated with the Sun Yatsen University (Zhongshan University 中山大学) in Guangzhou. All of the Hong Kong contributors are from the Hong Kong University History Department, but only Chan Kit-ching is a Hong Kong native; the others are American, British and Australian nationals. Fifteen of the participants are women (281-285).

In the “Introduction” Roberts provides a history of international relations as a background for the non-specialist (gender studies or diplomatic history). This somewhat lengthy essay (thirty-two pages including a seven-page bibliography of cited works, 1-32) traces the course of western civilizations from ancient to modern times, showing how the rulers, and later governments, dealt with each other, especially in modern Europe where the concepts of nation and international relations first developed. Roberts brings in almost all – but not all – the notable women rulers in the context of their times.


16. "'This One thing I Do': A Single-Minded American in China”, by Norman G. Owen (HKU), 230-38.

Part IV: Looking Forward: Future Directions

17. "Little Cause(s) for Celebration: American Women, ‘Domestic Policy’, and International Relations, by Gordon E. Slethaug (HKU and Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou), 240-256.


The “Introduction” is comprehensive and useful in linking the chapters together by adopting the gender perspective. Do not skip it.

The subject of this volume is women in international relations. The heterogeneity of the background of the contributors and the diversity of the materials they used should make the contents more appealing to readers whose specializations and interests do not focus on matters relating to gender studies.

The chapters in Part I explore the theoretical approaches to women handling international relations and how their innate understanding and feelings on certain perennial issues which influence the execution of international relations – in other words, the perspective of gender. As a sociological concept, gender refers to the collective characteristics and ways of behavior that developed in cultures and are considered appropriate to men or women. (Qiu, 49) Meanwhile, Foot presents “a broad overview of the field of women/gender and international relations,” (34) and concludes that international relations is a “highly gendered activity” (45) on which the women’s impact is beginning to be examined by scholars. On the issue of war and peace, for instance, citing ancient Sparta as an example, men favored “conquest” while women were more concerned with the “household”, although they supported their men, in times of peace and war.2 (Hu, 82-92) Women in the modern era, during the nineteenth century, began to demand organizations for their gender (He, 92-103), and, when the United Nations was being organized in 1945, as a result of pressure by “some determined women” (He, 71), “women’s issues” appeared on the UN agenda officially. (He, 72)

Part II and Part III focus on the historical or practical side of the question, with the chapters on the institutions and individuals handling international relations at head offices or in the field. The term ‘international relations’ is interpreted differently by the authors of the chapters in Part II and the authors of Part III.

Most of the chapters are based on serious and time-consuming scholarly research on actual persons who had served as diplomats, including the first two women U.S. secretaries of state Madeleine Albright and Condolezza Rice (Hoff). One chapter examines the two U.S.-educated Song (Soong) sisters, who were not officials but were involved in international relations because of their excellent command of English, and because they were married to heads of government. (Chan, 178-192) Soong Meiling, more widely known as Mme Chiang Kai-shek, in particular, was perhaps the most important woman in the conduct of Sino-U.S. and Sino-UK relations during the World War II period. In her study on women in international relations, from pre-World War I royal marriages to women serving as ambassadors, Li Yingtao has compiled a table of all the women ambassadors of the People’s

2 The contributor has not mentioned the women in the Greek comedy Lysistrata (410 B. C.) by Aristophanes (c. 456-c. 386 B. C.) on how women of Sparta protested against the Peloponnesian War.
Republic of China. (169-171) These data may be composed of dry statistics, but they can be extremely helpful to future research, especially when Chinese characters are provided in the next edition of the book under review.

Julia Chang Block, Ambassador to Nepal (1989-1003), the first Asian woman to represent the U.S. as envoy plenipotentiary, on the other hand, shares her experience and observations from her memory, including the circumstances under which she received her appointment as a woman and as an Asian. (Block, 136-146). This chapter is a rare treat.

The sources used by the contributors in Part III are exciting. They make use of recent publications (Chan), or unpublished primary sources from personal diaries to publications by women missionaries (Cunich, Stanley, Owen) in private collections.

In Part IV, the journals of what would be called today expat wives who lived in a country not their own, as private individuals as distinct from accredited diplomats in overseas posts, are examined. (Ford)

The final chapter in Part IV, “Gender and International Relations: Future Directions”, calls up visions of women, with right arms raised, shouting slogans for women to expand further their role in international relations. (Yarr, 275)

As the record of the first academic conference on women in formal and informal international relations in China, Bonds Across Borders can serve as an instigator to further research in the directions that the contributors’ in this volume have moved.

My personal interest is in biographical studies of individuals. I would start with research on women in both the formal and informal conduct of international relations, examining the relevant primary material (correspondence, diaries, poetry, gossip, ... which are also great fun to peruse.) In addition to highlighting the life and work of individual women, as Professor Arthur F. Wright writes in “Values, Roles, and Personalities” in Confucian Personalities edited by Wright and Denis Twitchett (1962), such research can enlighten the history of the entire era.

A single biographical study may bring forth into focus the critical problems and the atmosphere of an age, and thus help bridge a wide gap in our understanding of the history of the era. (11)

Among the officials, Hilary Clinton comes first to mind. Her tenure as Secretary of State started too late for the conference, and it is still current and therefore not ready for a historical study. Then there are all the Chinese diplomats already named in this volume. It will take considerable digging into the archives as well as private papers in existence to

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3 Albeit none served in what is traditionally considered to be politically significant, prestigious or glamorous posts such as Washington, London, Paris, New Delhi and Tokyo.
accrue sufficient information for such undertaking. (Do Chinese diplomats still keep diaries?)

On American women ambassadors, two names come instantly to mind: Clare Booth Luce, U.S. Ambassador to Italy (1953-1956), and Pamela Harriman, U.S. Ambassador to France (1993-1997), served in high-profile posts. Both were well-known in their private capacities, and, at least in the case of Luce, her official papers are available to researchers. Then there is the significant figure among ‘earlier’ U.S. diplomats, formal representative of the U.S. Government, whose official achievements have yet to receive proper scrutiny. Eleanor Roosevelt, the role model for my generation, which was in secondary school during and immediately after World War II, was officially appointed in 1946 by President Truman as a representative to the UN where she made valuable contributions to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

There is also the distinguished Chinese-American woman, Ambassador Linda Tsao Yang, although she is not accredited under the State Department. Yang, educated at St. John’s University in Shanghai and Columbia University in New York, was the U.S. Executive Director of the Board of Directors of the Asian Development Bank from 1993 to 1999. Under her aegis a loan scheme was developed which enabled women to run small businesses that helped many women in developing countries to work themselves out of poverty, using loans as low as U.S. $300. Every single loan under this scheme has been repaid, Ambassador Yang assured me when I spoke with her several years ago.

Despite its sub-title: *Women, China and International Relations*, there is at least as much materials and discussions on American women.

Reading *Bonds Across Borders* is an enlightening experience. It is also an enjoyable enterprise. I recommend it to serious students of gender studies, as well as to readers who like to delve into international relations without having to consider issues of gender.
Did the 9/11 tragedy speed a global ‘power transition,’ in which China is likely over a long period - during which its regime type might also change- to join or replace the United States as a hegemon? Or instead, have pundits in many nations, for their own domestic reasons, somewhat overestimated the long-term effect of this event from nearly a dozen years ago?

Answers to this question are many, and they probably show as much about the situations of the answerers as about the 9/11 moment and historical change. A great strength of this edited volume is that the respondents in the book are diverse. They are two Americans, four other Westerners, and seventeen Chinese (one is from Taiwan). Readers will be struck by the considerable variance of views concerning 9/11 among the Chinese scholars. Professor Roberts and her co-editors have assembled a very fine group of contributors. Not only do the writers from China partly disagree with each other; their views overlap extensively with those from the non-Chinese authors in this mix. Any generalization about an overall argument of the book would require many notes about exceptions. This review is too short to deal with all the chapters (in particular, it must leave to other critics the last five, concerning 9/11’s cultural impacts). The tome as a whole testifies to healthy political debate about its topic both outside China and inside that country.

The chapters of this book emerge from a Beijing conference that was held in 2007, while George W. Bush was still U.S. president. Many people in other countries (like many Americans, who soon thereafter elected a radically different successor) had at that time a very low opinion of Bush’s policies. The 9/11 moment still affects airport security and a good deal of rhetoric in the U.S. and elsewhere. Its independent effects on U.S. foreign policy are arguably fading, however, in part because 9/11 became Bush’s main – now disproven and discredited - rationale for invading Iraq.

Strong countries are seldom popular among the citizens (especially intellectuals) of other large nations. This was famously the experience of Britain in the nineteenth century, of France under its Sun King, of the Hapsburgs when they ruled half of Europe and Spanish America, of the Mongols during their brief burst of violence, of Rome, or the Assyrians, or the Japanese at their primes. Now and recently, the United States has been an imperial power, as perhaps all of this book’s authors note. So is China, although its empire is less far-flung from its center and much older. George W. Bush and many of his advisors took imperialist actions and expressed clearly imperialist attitudes. Barack Obama receives domestic U.S. criticism from some conservatives for being less forward, withdrawing from Iraq on schedule, arguing against quick attacks on the Iranian theocracy or the Syrian regime that turns its army against half its people, and occasionally admitting in public that foreign countries have patriots too.

Mei Renyi offers very extensive proof of the global “decline in the American image” (38) during Bush’s presidency, and he offers a useful analysis of five kinds of anti-Americanism (50-53). This reviewer thinks the fifth, based on policy, is far more important than the
others, which are respectively based on differences of history and culture, regime types, politically engineered distractions from domestic problems, or predisposed bias. Policies, at least, are what Americans can change. If others dislike the U.S. on further grounds, that is a complaint without a ready remedy.

What China Views Nine-Eleven could not cover, because it postdates the 2007 conference, is the rejection by Obama’s administration of the influence of neoconservatives on later U.S. policy - and thus subsequent savings of American resources such as had been squandered by Bush and his advisors. (The countereffectiveness, especially in Iraq, of various Bush advisors’ policies for their own personally held ends is a separate complex matter.) Li Zhidong nonetheless accurately predicted the neoconservatives’ decline and fall (170-205). Shi Hongshen and Wang Enming analyze the neoconservative animus against ‘nation building,’ (206-22). Not all of Bush’s neoconservative advisors were Jews – just as few Jews are neoconservatives. There have been important changes among U.S. Jewish leaders that are more evident now than they were in 2007.¹ America is now somewhat distrusted by practically all parties in (and interested in) the Middle East whence the 9/11 tragedy came – and that may be progress, if it is based on new U.S. policies that can sustain U.S. interests. Peace and prosperity, not popularity, are the main aims of serious diplomats.

Mei Renyi, after citing many surveys, rightly warned that, “unless American elites and the American people can pinpoint the root cause of the decline in the American image and begin to seek alternatives to the current approach, the situation will not change for the better” (71). That was correct - and by the 2008 election, Americans began to take such advice – not mainly to be better liked around the globe, but to create more sustainable policy.

The U.S. is not the only country some of whose citizens are chauvinistic. Zhao Baomin claims that, “China ran the Celestial Empire with restraint, abstaining from pursuing elusive imperial aims. The rulers of the ‘Middle Kingdom’ rested content with their imperial power by obtaining the submission of neighboring states, leaving them to themselves and refraining from interference in their way of life” (139). This rhetoric strongly resembles that of a mandarin presenting a memorial to his emperor; it should really be translated into wenyan (classical Chinese). But a considerable variety of barbarians would contest its content. It may also underestimate the military accomplishments of generals such as Zuo Zongtang who confirmed Chinese power in Xinjiang, or those who led the PLA into Tibet, or many earlier on other borders. Chinese ‘soft power’ has indeed long been important in the creation of this glorious state – but violence had a role too. At the 2007 conference, “Zhao’s presentation gave rise to heated discussion among other Chinese scholars” (21). It is true that China’s empire has been more compact than most Western ones (except Russia’s), but it was surely an empire – and still is, when those whom it wants to ‘submit’ refuse to do so.

Ian Tyrrell rues “the inability of the United States to transcend the ties of history” (106). He does not stress that every country faces this problem, and every country is compelled to change by alterations of its context. All empires (American, British, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, Chinese...) try to foster pride among their core populations. Yet no empire lasts forever. It is not unusual for imperial countries to be narcissistic or parochial, defining outsiders as ‘the Other,’ philistines, brutes, Untermenschen. The British once justified a great deal in the name of a “white man’s burden,” the French had their mission civilisatrice, Chinese mandarins for many centuries have felt that barbarians in each of the four directions should naturally obey the central king. Even toward Koreans and Vietnamese, some Han Chinese still documentably have not shed this attitude of superiority. Many Americans evince a comparable attitude that they tend to express in terms of ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom.’ But that issue is very complex, for non-ideological reasons to be explained below. Above all, leaders and policies make a difference, adjusting imperial self-images to realities. Bush did a documentably worse job of that than Obama has done. Some of the 2007 jeremiads in this book about 9/11 were correct for their time but are at least overblown from the perspective of 2012. The U.S. empire is in slow decline, relative to others including China. But humanity will not suffer from this change, if leaders in both America and China ‘seek truth from facts’ and match their hopes with their resources.

China is still rising, and Obama’s “pivot to Asia” could not stop that process even if he wanted it to do so – as he clearly knows and explicitly says he cannot. His policy might nonetheless succeed in deterring war during an eventual “power transition.” If relations between China and America continue to remain non-violent during a period of Chinese socioeconomic progress that has clearly begun (and they will probably do so if leaders in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington remain careful), comparative political and international relations research suggests these countries could thereafter remain at peace permanently. There is a specific link between this prediction and U.S. attitudes toward Chinese elite decisions about China’s future regime type.

Many of this book’s writers (e.g., Mei Renyi, Ian Tyrrell, Alfred Hornung) note that, “The United States has long labeled itself the ‘light house’ or ‘beacon’ of democracy, human rights, and liberty” (to use Huan Xiao’s words, 128). This mindset can rightly be criticized

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2 The Chinese attempt to teach Vietnam a “lesson” in 1979 suggested some persistence of a notion that “little brother” (đội) countries should obey their elders. More recently, an overly hasty internet poll in China indicated that South Korea (not Japan whose army killed many Chinese from 1937 to 1945) is the least-liked of China’s neighbors. This finding can be doubted, but the South Korean government has serious differences with China’s policies, especially those toward North Korea, and some Chinese take great umbrage at those differences.


as neoimperialist, as it is expressed by some Americans. It is not just that, however, if it is regarded in terms of objective U.S. state material (not ideological or cultural) interests. Such interests arise from the finding that should accurately be called the “liberal non-violence conjecture,” although it is usually given a far less precise label: the ‘democratic peace hypothesis.’ This is the research finding that major modern counterevidence is scarce (perhaps non-existent) against the proposition that liberal states do not attack each other. This finding does not refer to democracies as electoral systems. It is about non-violence between states, peace only in the sense of lack of war, even between states that have severe disagreements through which they muddle in contentious negotiations. And it is not a theory; it is just a conjecture (a proposal lacking empirical disproof). Perhaps nobody is sure why the relevant empirical facts appear as they actually do. Their validity does not depend on whether anybody can give an uncontested explanation of them; so the datum that illiberal elites tend to reject such explanations a priori is irrelevant.

As such, the liberal non-violence conjecture is nonetheless relevant to U.S. foreign policy, especially as applied to large non-liberal states, of which China is currently the globe’s most important. It suggests that America can prospectively save military lives and costs if China’s elites decide – as only they could do, if they later wish - to make their polity liberal. Perhaps they will never do this. As comparative politics literature shows, elites are crucial in choosing regime types. Various studies also suggest that states are particularly aggressive during any period of liberalizing change. Others show that increases of per-capita income create societies in which elites for their own reasons may decide to liberalize. In any case, it is reasonable for American leaders to hope the Chinese (Party) leaders someday choose to allow more separations of powers and individual rights than they have yet allowed. A change in that direction would bode to save future concrete U.S. resources. Framing policy toward such savings is a legitimate state interest. Many American leaders’ rhetoric is neoimperialist, but the U.S. preference for a future liberal China is not. When legitimate, it is about the U.S. rather than about China. It is material, not ideal.

Of course, not all Americans agree that policy should be partly framed by such policy. They disbelieve that the state elite in China will ever give up serious power to a greater variety of citizens. Americans’ views of politics, including politics toward China, are deeply divided. As Xie Tao notes, “Party polarization is nothing new in American politics” (246). Splits are

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5 Elections can return nationalist demagogues, as leaders as various as Adolf Hitler, Ferdinand Marcos, and Thaksin Shinawatra have shown – and as mass elections of a national leadership in China might well show, if they predated the end of Leninist organization there. (This slightly corrects Li Zhidong, 205, where Li refers to Michael Doyle’s interest in ‘democracies’ rather than liberal states, i.e., regimes that allow separations of power within the state and also legitimate powers of speech for others, notably journalists, lawyers, and academics.) Doyle revived an idea in “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12:3-4 (Summer and Fall, 1983), 205-35 and 323-52. He stressed that liberal states are particularly aggressive toward non-liberal ones. The literature supporting and criticizing Doyle’s notion is far too extensive to cite here (works by Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Joanne Gowa, and arguably comparativists such as Robert Dahl or Carles Boix are particularly relevant), but some of the critical literature becomes moot if the idea is conceived precisely, as a liberal non-violence conjecture. (For the definition of a ‘conjecture,’ see references to the Goldbach conjecture in mathematics.)
more obvious in liberal countries than in Leninist ones, if only because an obstreperous press trumpets them.

Zhang Liping suggests (in editor Roberts's words) that 9/11's "short-term impact was significant... inasmuch as the Republicans made gains at all political levels in 2002" (23). Paranoia after 9/11 was sufficient to sustain conservatives for a few years more. But then, flaws in Republican policies of tax cuts and expensive foreign wars combined with a failure to regulate housing and assets markets. This allowed a Democratic sweep of both houses of Congress in 2008 – and the presidency too, occupied for the first time in history by a non-caucasian.

Many authors in the book stress the “bitter polarization of the United States between conservatives and liberals” (33), and that emphasis is accurate. This is politics! Other democratic countries also show sharp divisions between parties too. Nondemocratic states such as China or Myanmar (which may change) have elites that usually suppress publicity about their policy or factional splits. The 9/11 disaster lessened conservatives' concentration on the anti-China 'blue team.' For some conservatives, such as Richard N. Haass who worried that America would weaken “in a world without a mortal enemy like the Soviet Union against which to rally in public” (175), finding a devil in the Near East was as good as finding one in the Far East. That gambit was also better for China – and probably for Chinese-American relations eventually.

The 9/11 tragedy, if it has any lasting effect, may be beneficial to the long-term stability of Sino-American relations. The idiosyncratic overreactions by G.W. Bush and his advisors, which the 9/11 trauma rationalized, eventually highlighted a need for more restraint in the use of American power. Vietnam had much earlier taught this same lesson too - and reactionaries in the U.S. elite consciously and publicly wanted to unlearn it. But education is partly repetition. China might even thank the Islamic terrorists, not for their bloodthirstiness but for turning American attention to the Near East from the Far East, at least temporarily, during a healthy period of coming to terms with the limits of U.S. influence. By the millennium's second decade, U.S. behavior was less unilateral and more efficient in terms of its still-considerable resources. Nobody can be sure whether it will remain so.

Hindsight, even from so early a date as 2012, allows vision closer to '20-20' clarity on 2001 than anyone had in 2007. Obama has reversed many of the policies for which Chinese and other authors in the 9/11/01 book rightly chastise Bush. The current president uses drone and seal attacks against non-state terrorists, but Obama has lessened the extent to which American resources will go into trying to control states in the Middle East where the 9/11 attack was planned. In the case where he might have been more forward using force against a state (Libya), he participated only after the main regional institution (the Arab League) and the main international institution (the UN Security Council) signaled some approval – and not in the lead role, which was taken by European allies. The current administration is explicit about planning a pullback even from Afghanistan and a shift of resources into the Far East, to stabilize American relations with China, not to try to prevent
China’s relative “rise.” Chapters drafted in 2007 naturally reported a quite different set of U.S. policies.

Editor Priscilla Roberts wisely quotes Zhou Enlai’s response, when he was asked for his verdict on the French Revolution: “It is still too early to tell.” Zhou spoke almost two centuries after the event; yet 9/11 is barely a dozen years ago. Historians of the future are likely to pay less attention to the 9/11 event than to broader changes in the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and America that are ongoing and will, if state leaders make policies that are careful of each other’s interests, allow international change without major war. In particular, future specific actions by leaders in America and China (and Taiwan) are likely to shape their mutual politics more than attitudes among them or in their populations.
The three books reviewed here are all the product of a lengthy engagement on my part with mainland Chinese academics across the multi-faceted field of American Studies. Since my first visit to China in 1988, I have watched with fascination as Chinese scholarship dealing with the United States re-emerged and developed, with older academics whose expertise in the field often dated back to the 1950s—their careers usually drastically interrupted by the political campaigns of Mao Zedong’s quarter-century in power—nurturing and encouraging younger students and scholars and establishing new American Studies programs across China. Over more than two decades, I was able to meet many of these scholars. Thanks to generous grants from the C. V. Starr Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the United Board for Christian Higher Education in Asia, well over a hundred mainland scholars and postgraduate students drawn from institutions around China were able to pay lengthy research visits of several months to the University of Hong Kong, a program that helped to produce dozens of books, articles, and Ph.D. theses.

These interests also put me in touch with the remarkable Julia Chang Bloch, the first Asian-American Ambassador (of either sex) ever appointed by the U. S. government, a woman who moved from China to the United States as a child. After an accomplished career in business and government, Ambassador Bloch chose not to spend her later years in comfortable retirement, but instead to establish the U.S.-China Education Trust. Founded in 2000, this organization seeks to “help China’s next-generation leaders understand American society in the context of the political, cultural and economic forces that have given rise to America and its values.” American Studies—with Media Studies—has been a particular focus of USCET’s attention. Early in the twenty-first century, USCET organized an American Studies Network of Chinese academic institutions with American Studies programs of some kind, to encourage academic interchange among China’s scholars in this broad field. Today, over fifty Chinese universities and policy institutes belong to this network. Every year since 2004, in partnership with USCET, a Chinese institution has hosted an annual themed American Studies Network conference, an event that gives Chinese scholars ranging across the wide variety of academic fields subsumed under the broad umbrella of “American Studies” an opportunity not simply to present their research, but also to assess the state of the field in China and plan future initiatives. USCET has also encouraged official recognition of American Studies as a discipline by the Chinese government.

Each of the three volumes in this collection resulted from a conference of which USCET was a co-sponsor: an early conference on women and international relations, held at Fudan University in Shanghai in October 2003, co-sponsored by Fudan University and the University of Hong Kong; the third American Studies Network conference, held at the University of Hong Kong in November 2006, on the broad theme of “Bridging the Sino-American Divide,” which sought to assess the state of American Studies in China; and the fourth American Studies Network conference, held at Beijing Foreign Studies University in September 2007, which scrutinized the impact upon the United States and beyond of the events of September 11, 2001. At each meeting, the majority of participants were mainland
Chinese, with an appreciable leavening of speakers—in some cases academics, in others distinguished former diplomats and government officials—drawn from elsewhere, not just the United States but also Hong Kong, Taiwan, Britain, Australia, and Germany. At each gathering, it was more than apparent that by the early twenty-first century, Chinese scholars have become deeply engaged with the United States not just in terms of understanding Sino-American relations, or the need of Chinese policymakers to develop an informed cohort of “America-watchers,” but also in terms of using the United States as a prism through which to approach issues that are often highly salient to China’s own development.

While China is a rising power, possibly even the next superpower-in-waiting in the apostolic succession running from Britain to the United States to China—a status that the medal counts at the recent London Olympics rather neatly encapsulated—it is sad but true that in the international academic world the lingua franca (if that is not itself a contradiction in terms) is still English. The three volumes gathered here are all products of a conscious effort to make Chinese scholarship on the United States accessible to a wider international audience. In international and Cold War history, the remarkably successful Cold War International History Project in Washington, DC, has done much to bring Chinese scholarship into the academic mainstream.1 Chinese Cold War scholars who have based themselves in the West, even while retaining strong ties to their native country, have also published extensively.2 Chinese academics in other areas of what is broadly termed

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2 See, e.g., Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Zhai Qiang, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-75 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Zhai Qiang, The Dragon, the Lion & the Eagle: Chinese-British-
American Studies have rather less visibility beyond their own country. China has translated numerous significant volumes on the United States, written by American and other Western scholars, from English into Chinese, but far fewer Chinese books make the reverse journey.3 The three volumes reviewed here—soon to be supplemented by a fourth volume on Soft Power, to be published in 2014—are the outcome of a conscious effort to fill this gap, and allow Western scholars to hear Chinese voices on the United States. Arguably these are even, in some instances, historical documents that cross the boundary between primary and secondary sources. Fifty years from now, when I will be either an exceptionally old lady or most regrettably no longer with us, and most of those reading this review will probably—advances in medical science allowing—no longer be in their first youth, some future historian will, I suspect, be scrutinizing these words, the better to appreciate one aspect of early twenty-first century transnational Sino-American relations.

I am most grateful to all six readers, for the careful attention with which they have read and thought about these various volumes. All bring their own perspectives to bear on the various collections. John Haddad, an American who has spent time at the University of Hong Kong as a Fulbright professor, and Mao Sihui, a mainland scholar teaching in Macau, both address Bridging the Sino-American Divide, a volume in which over thirty scholars focus upon the state of American Studies in China. Some do so directly, discussing the current situation of the American Studies project there; others more indirectly, by providing concrete examples of current scholarship, ranging across a variety of topics and fields. The authors include several of China’s most senior specialists in American Studies, as well as mid-career and junior scholars, quite a number of whom have earned doctorates from American institutions before returning to China to teach. The range, vitality, and freshness of much of this work are impressive. Interestingly, Haddad and Mao have rather different takes upon the state of American Studies in China. Haddad, coming to this collection with a deep understanding of the history of American Studies in the United States, admires how, at a time when the Chinese higher education system is experiencing rapid expansion, American Studies in China seems to be flourishing, meeting very “practical and local” needs in China. These include official demands at all levels of the Chinese government for “training future policy experts, intellectuals, and diplomats who understand and can work with America,” and the desire of students to further their own


careers and also to understand the United States, a country that exercises a deep fascination upon many young Chinese, even those who often deplore and resent the policies of its government and dislike the behavior of many Americans. Haddad also highlights how the subjects that attract Chinese scholars “are not the sorts of topics that one tends to find discussed at American Studies conference in the U.S.—at least not until recently.” Haddad points out that the past decade has seen decided efforts to internationalize the field of American Studies and break away from paradigms that largely reflected the needs and preoccupations of U.S.-based scholars and their concerns about their own country, which had tended to “shunt . . . foreign scholars off to the periphery.” Haddad goes so far as to ask: “if American Studies is flourishing in China, and if American Studies continues to search for an identity in the United States, might this be a sign that the center of gravity itself is shifting? Might the one-time periphery become the new center?”

Mao Sihui, who has been able to observe at first hand the development of American Studies and area studies generally within China over the past two to three decades, also sees the present as a great opportunity, positing that: “The powerful emergence of regional studies in the last three decades in China's research and educational institutions seems to reconfirm the great possibility of re-reading, re-thinking or even deconstructing the greatest cultural construct in human history—the East-West Divide.” He views American Studies in particular as a venture that “helps Chinese scholars in opening up their minds and promotes cross-cultural awareness in the post-socialist era.” Mao joins Haddad in hailing the rapid expansion of American Studies in China and the degree to which it is an interdisciplinary and transnational venture. He, too, points out how in this volume—as with the others discussed in this forum—and at the conferences to which it gave rise, American scholars were in a minority, with American perspectives at the margins rather than the center of discussions. Yet Mao is less optimistic than Haddad about the current state of Chinese scholarship on the United States. He warns of the “conspicuous lack of genuine diversity of voices and perspectives among the authors from the Mainland.” In Mao's view: “Chinese authors, for various understandable reasons, seem to play it safe when they approach topics such as race and ethnicity, gender politics, human rights, freedom of speech, democracy, social justice and political systems. In other words, there is still a huge gap between what they say and what they can and should say as independent scholars.” Cautious “self-censorship” on sensitive topics, or the deliberate avoidance of potentially controversial issues, could easily prove a real brake on “Chinese academics who have been laboring in the less-than-idyllic spaces of American Studies in China with various kinds of research agendas, social pressures, institutional demands and ideological dictates.” Yet, if Mao’s appreciation of the state of American Studies in China is perhaps more nuanced than Haddad’s, he too perceives great future opportunities—as well as major challenges—for Chinese scholars in this area. The conjunction of the rising economic and international power of China and the “return” of the United States to the Asia-Pacific are likely to create conditions that will prove “a real testing ground for American Studies as a dynamic and multidisciplinary subject” within and outside China.

Chinese scholars have a long tradition of using analogy and indirect approaches to reflect on subjects that may be too sensitive to address directly. At academic meetings in China, I have chaired sessions where young female academics used American and British literary
works to raise issues of the status of women and social equality that might prove otherwise to have been considered too disturbing to discuss. China’s various revolutions ostensibly brought sexual equality to China. In practice, despite the presence of a few high-profile women in public life, the reality has been less than rosy. A few years ago, I visited a Chinese university campus where, in a student debate, all the male students had voted in favor of the proposition that “Women should go back to the kitchen” and cease competing with men for jobs. And today’s newspaper has an article on how Chinese women need higher scores than men to enter university and face unofficial quotas favoring men. These practices, in breach of laws that forbid discrimination on the basis of gender, have provoked protests by female activists. Not all Chinese academics seek to discriminate against women, however. The conference on Women and International Relations, of which the volume Bonds Across Borders is the outcome, grew from an initiative suggested to me by Professor Zhu Mingquan of the Department of International Politics at Fudan University. Four of his younger colleagues at that time were women, and he felt that China should do more in terms of studies of women and international relations.

The very act of holding this conference was, for some of the younger male scholars who attended it, somewhat provocative and disturbing. It is worth noting that, while several Western men delivered papers at this conference, no male Chinese scholar did so. At times, too, I felt that some of the Chinese scholars present were reprising essentialist arguments used by Western women several decades earlier, that women’s childbearing role and care for their families’ well-being mean that women are inherently more peaceable, and they should therefore have more input into the making of international policies. If many Western feminists today consider such advocacy rather dated, it was nonetheless one indication how women in widely differing cultures may nonetheless employ very similar strategies when seeking inclusion in the existing power structure. Both Catherine Forslund and Wei Peh T’i, commenting on this volume, note that it brought together Chinese and Western academics studying the role of women in international relations with actual practitioners, including several distinguished Chinese and U.S. female diplomats. There was also a strong comparative element, as the experiences of Western and Asian women were juxtaposed with each other. Discussion was intense, ranging widely over the theory, history, and practice of international relations, the different roles of women, gender discrimination, how far women have specific concerns in the foreign policy arena that differ from those of men, and whether women have special contributions to make to international relations. Forslund in particular highlights those chapters dealing with the numbers of women in the U.S. and Chinese diplomatic services, suggesting that the two are not that far apart in terms of the proportion of women who have served as ambassadors. To date, however, no Chinese woman has had the type of top-level, high-profile diplomatic position that Jeane Kirkpatrick, Madeleine Albright, Condoleezza Rice, and most recently Hillary Clinton and Susan Rice have held. It is perhaps not too fanciful to say that at present, in China and the United States alike women face determined and persistent efforts by social—and in the United States, at least, religious—conservatives to roll back the gains

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they have made in the past, to restrict their educational and career opportunities, to subordinate them to men, and to relegate them to subsidiary or ancillary political and social roles. It would not be particularly surprising if American Studies in China became at least one channel through which Chinese women might articulate their opposition to moves to downgrade them. If so, the discipline would be playing its own part in transnational relations and the story of international diplomacy.

The third and most recent of these volumes resulted from a conference on the United States and 9/11 held in Beijing several years ago. A Chinese version was published in 2009, but various other commitments by the editor meant that the English version only appeared in 2011, just after the tenth anniversary of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. By that time, Chinese officials were inclined to regard these events as something of a bonus for their country, in that they diverted the attention of the George W. Bush administration away from the difficulties in Sino-American relations that dominated the first few months of Bush’s presidency and forced the U.S. government to focus upon the Middle East. Despite Chinese opposition to the American and British invasion of Iraq in 2003, paradoxically enough, even that proved beneficial, as the continuing difficulties that war and the concurrent conflict in Afghanistan presented to the United States left China free to concentrate on enhancing its economic and political power in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere. The thoughtful review by Lynn T. White III skillfully and provocatively places this volume in the context not just of U.S. and Chinese imperialism, the current pervasive sense that on the international scene the United States is a power in at least relative decline, while China’s star is rising rapidly and may soon overtake the United States. White goes further, suggesting that—despite rhetoric by each power suggesting its empire is unique, or even not really an empire—most imperial states indulge in comparable special pleading to justify their supposed special mission and position. White argues that skillful political leadership on both the U.S. and Chinese sides will be crucial in managing the gradual growth of Chinese and the “slow decline” of American power. He also argues that both China and the United States share a strong interest in ensuring that this transition is peaceful. Citing the hypothesis “that liberal states do not attack each other”—though “liberal states are often particularly aggressive toward non-liberal ones”—White therefore contends that the United States has genuine justification for a “preference for a future liberal China.” Whether Chinese elites will choose such a developmental path is still unclear.

White’s analysis of the prospects for Sino-U.S. relations is notably unsentimental. Seeking to draw out particular themes, Gray Kochhar-Lindgren focuses upon one chapter by a Chinese academic from each of the three sections of China Views Nine-Eleven: a comparative study of U.S. and Chinese “soft power”; an insightful essay on the impact of 9/11 on political polarization in the United States; and a stimulating discussion by a Beijing academic as to why 9/11 and the Iraq War did not generate a wave of protest music similar to that produced in the 1960s by the Vietnam War. “Soft power,” the ability of states to

5 Mei Renyi and Fu Meirong, eds., Change and Continuity: America After 9-11 (Beijing, World Knowledge Press, 2009).
influence other states and their citizens, at both formal and informal levels, though the prestige and attractions exerted by their culture and mores, has attracted growing interest in recent years—not least because it can seem an inexpensive and relatively painless method of conducting diplomacy on the cheap. While expressing some reservations as to the validity of the concept of “soft power,” a term first popularized by the Harvard academic Joseph S. Nye, Kochhar-Lindgren points out the important inter-relationship between “soft” and “hard” power.6 White too makes this point, further warning: “It is not unusual for imperial countries to be narcissistic or parochial, defining outsiders as ‘the Other,’ philistines, brutes, *Untermenschen*.” Current U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton seeks to use the allurements of “soft power” to attain American objectives at a comparatively modest price-tag. International prestige and respect for a nation’s values and culture do constitute intangible assets that may conceivably tip the balance in some situations, persuading rather than compelling states to wish to follow another’s lead. But it is difficult to divorce economic and military power from “soft” power. For the United States and China alike, economic growth and rising wealth have underpinned both the capacity to project martial strength and their ability to attract and win loyalty from other states and approval and admiration from non-Americans. Adept leaders may prove more skilled than more clumsy competitors at managing “soft” power and massaging a country’s image. But the deployment even of “soft power” demands economic resources that, while less costly than military hardware, may still be substantial. At American embassies and consulates around the world, Public Affairs Officers look back wistfully to several decades ago, when funding to promote U.S. culture and education overseas was far more generous than it is today.

Such programs, moreover, whose beneficiaries tend to be non-Americans, are often those most easily cut or eliminated in times of budgetary stringency. They are even more likely to become victims, given the deep political polarization afflicting and dividing the United States, something Kochhar-Lindgren clearly regrets, a phenomenon that may or may not dissipate in the not too distant future. At present, however, it seems to have reached historic highs, a pattern that even so sensational an event as 9/11 modified only temporarily. Nor has popular music responded to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan with

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the outpouring of protest songs that characterized the 1960s, especially the anti-war and
civil rights movements. Protests against the Iraq War, though large, proved notably
ineffective in the United States and, indeed, in Europe. Americans still seem notably
ambivalent as to just what the most effective reaction to Nine-Eleven and the two conflicts
that followed might have been. While approaching these issues and events from a position
of greater detachment, Chinese scholars may well find it equally difficult to assess the long-
term significance of Nine-Eleven to the United States—and, indeed, to their own country.
This volume made it clear that, among Chinese Americanists, as yet no consensus exists
over the impact of September 11, 2001, upon the United States.

There can be little doubt, however, that within China the discipline of American Studies will
continue to grow and flourish, as China’s growing cohort of “America-watchers” wrestles
with the puzzle of understanding the United States in all its complex diversity. The three
volumes reviewed here, taken together, convey something of the variety of Chinese
scholarly interest in the United States, and the ways in which American Studies has
developed in China since Deng Xiaoping launched his reforms. Exercises in transnational
studies, by their existence they also form part of the non-official diplomatic record of early
twenty-first century Sino-U.S. relations.