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A number of scholars\(^1\) have recently written favorable reviews of Neil Silver's skillful translation into English of Chinese Professor Shen Zhihua's groundbreaking study of the interplay between Chinese leader Mao Zedong and his Soviet and North Korean counterparts, Joseph Stalin and Kim Il-sung in the months and years leading up to the Korea War. The book deserves the attention it is getting. For decades the considerations that led to the outbreak of the Korean War have been cloaked in obscurity. This was the product both of the absence of first-hand sources and of the false accounts of the origins of the war perpetrated by all of the communist countries that participated in the war directly or indirectly. One of the book's great strengths is the insight it provides into the intense debate among Chinese leaders during the decision-making process leading up to the crossing of the Yalu by the Chinese People's Volunteers in October 1950.

As these reviewers make clear, satisfactory answers are now available to the lion's share of the questions concerning the Korean War that have puzzled historians for many years. This is because of the access to Russian and Chinese archival materials that has been possible in recent years.\(^2\) Whereas the debate in the past centered on fundamental questions regarding the decisions leading up to the war, the remaining issues in contention, while important, have more to do with nuances than core elements. Professor Shen's research deserves an important share of the credit for this development. Long available to readers of Chinese, Professor Shen's book is now available to a wider English speaking audience.\(^3\) Hopefully, this will contribute to even richer scholarly attention to unresolved points, which include Stalin's exact motives in backing the North Korean attack on the South.

As a fifteen year old American teenager who was in Nanjing at the outbreak of the Korean War, who remembers vividly the dramatic arrival of the first Soviet MIG-15 that was sent across the city at roof top level, and who went on to major in East Asian history in college, I have long been fascinated with these questions. I would add two points to the comments of the reviewers. First, the breaking of the U.S. monopoly of atomic bombs through the successful testing of a Soviet atomic bomb in August 1949 was undoubtedly a factor in

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\(^1\) In addition to the three reviews in this roundtable, please see Masuda Hajimu review in the *Journal of American-East Asian Relations*, 19 (2012) 3-4.

\(^2\) As pointed out by the translator, during the early 1990s, President Yeltsin shared a major selection from the Russian Presidential archives with South Korea (and the world), and Russia also granted some access to Soviet-era Foreign Ministry and former CPSU Central Committee archives. All of these sources were used by Shen Zhihua. On the Chinese side, Shen drew on official, albeit selected collections of telegrams, letters and meeting minutes; official military histories; biographies; memoirs; oral histories; interviews; and provincial archives.

Stalin’s shift to a more forward leaning posture in East Asia in early 1950, although by no means a principal reason.

Second, while President Truman was successfully adopting a harder line against Soviet expansion in Europe through the Marshall Plan, the Berlin air lift, the application of the Truman Doctrine in Greece, and the formation of NATO, the “loss of China” in East Asia was a devastating setback for the U.S. position there that had extensive political reverberations in the United States and in the region. While Stalin may have had mixed views about the Chinese Communist victory, and only gradually decided wholeheartedly to embrace it, for the Americans it was an unmitigated disaster that put the United States into a defensive crouch that may have contributed to Stalin’s misreading of its reaction to the aggression against South Korea.

Participants:


Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy is the Director of the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States. He retired from the Foreign Service in January 2001 after a career spanning 45 years with the U.S. Department of State. A fluent Chinese speaker, Mr. Roy spent much of his career in East Asia, where his assignments included Bangkok (twice), Hong Kong, Taipei, Beijing (twice), Singapore and Jakarta. Ambassador Roy also specialized in Soviet affairs and served in Moscow at the height of the Cold War. Before taking up Russian studies, he was one of the first two Foreign Service Officers to study Mongolian. Mr. Roy rose to become a three-time ambassador, serving as the top U.S. envoy in Singapore (1984-86), the People’s Republic of China (1991-95) and Indonesia (1996-99). In 1996 he was promoted to the rank of Career Ambassador, the highest rank in the Foreign Service. Ambassador’s Roy’s final post with the State Department was as Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research. In 2001 he received Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson Award for Distinguished Public Service. Ambassador Roy was born in Nanjing, China of American missionary parents. In 1956, he graduated magna cum laude from Princeton University, where he majored in history and was elected to Phi Beta Kappa.
Neil Silver retired from the U.S. Foreign Service in 2005 after a 33-year career, which included postings in Beijing (twice), Tokyo (twice), Hong Kong and Moscow. He also worked on Asian affairs (China, Japan, Korea and Southeast Asia) in several postings to the State Department. After serving as Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs in Beijing (1992-95) and Tokyo (1995-98), he returned to the State Department, where his last position was as Director of the Office of Strategic, Proliferation and Military Issues in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (2002-05). Educated at Columbia, Harvard, the National War College and a number of language schools, his paid retirement pursuits include translating 1950s and 60s-era Chinese documents for the Wilson Center’s Cold War International History Project and declassifying documents of more recent years for the State Department’s Office of Freedom of Information.


Kathryn Weathersby is Professorial Lecturer in Korean Studies at The School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, and Visiting Professor at Sungshin Women’s University in Seoul, Korea. She was previously Coordinator of the Korea Initiative of the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. The first Western scholar to gain access to Russian archival documents on North Korea, she has published and lectured widely on the Soviet role in the Korean War, the Cold War in Asia, and the history of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
Historians have gained access over the past two decades to documents and other primary sources in Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that have allowed them to answer previously unresolved questions surrounding the origins of the Korean War. Disagreement continues, however, in describing the leading factors motivating the central actors, especially on the Communist side. The Chinese scholar Shen Zhihua’s main purpose in this book is to explain why Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin approved North Korean leader Kim Il Sung’s plan to attack the Republic of Korea (ROK) on 25 June 1950. “In a nutshell,” he argues persuasively, “the starting point in Stalin’s strategy toward war in Korea was to guarantee Soviet political and economic interests in the Far East, while avoiding any direct, armed clash with the United States in the region” (132). Shen supports his clear and careful analysis with extensive research. He has read all of the Communist primary sources that are currently available, along with referencing a solid collection of the leading secondary works examining the reasons for the outbreak of the Korean War. First published in Chinese in 2003, the book now appears in a good English translation, thanks to Neil Silver. He includes as an introduction the Chinese scholar Yang Kuisong’s 2004 review of this study in a Chinese journal, where he wrote that Shen’s “step-by-step explanation of the process by which the Chinese decided to join the war . . . is convincing, logical, dramatic, and on target” (16).

Shen begins with a perceptive examination of Stalin’s assessment of the international situation that the Soviet Union faced in East Asia as World War II came to an end. “Soviet policies toward both China and Korea aimed to foster regional stability within the Yalta system,” he asserts, because this was “vital, in Moscow’s view, to promoting Soviet economic interests and security goals in the Far East” (17). According to Shen, Stalin followed a postwar approach of “opportunistic cooperation” (p. 21) to achieve three essential objectives. First, he sought peaceful coexistence, copying the traditional Russian strategy “of using space to buy time” (19) to build a buffer zone around his nation. Second, Stalin fostered world revolution, but with the crucial qualification that doing so had to serve the third goal of defending Soviet national security. “Whether and when the people of a country should rise in revolution, and whether or not the Soviet Union should support a given national liberation movement, depended,” Shen emphasizes, “on whether or not a revolutionary movement was helpful in promoting Soviet national interests” (21). Stalin’s decision to form an alliance with the new Communist government in China in February 1950 and to approve the North Korean attack the following April represented sharp departures from his previously cautious strategy. Shen identifies and discusses several critical developments after 1945 that motivated Stalin’s shift to toughness and confrontation.

Shen insists that Stalin wanted to maintain his wartime partnership with the United States and Britain after 1945. He thought conflict with his former allies was unlikely so long as he followed a cooperative policy to preserve the Yalta system of spheres of influence. “Stalin’s intent was to build a new world order based on shared Soviet-American world dominion,” Shen concludes, but President Franklin D. “Roosevelt’s death arguably darkened prospects
for great power cooperation” (22). Given his assumptions, Stalin thought he was acting to advance national interests in the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence when Moscow demanded postwar strategic concessions from Turkey. Significantly, “when faced with a stiff attitude from the United States and Britain, the Soviet Union retreated and compromised” (24). Furthermore, Stalin demonstrated the limits of Soviet expansionism when he ordered military withdrawal from Iran, China, and later northern Korea. But his actions in the Near East strengthened unity between the United States and Western Europe in confronting the Soviet Union, leading to the formation antagonistic blocs. The U.S. proposal of the Marshall Plan in June 1947 was what “really brought about a fundamental change in Soviet postwar foreign policy” (25). Abandoning cooperation, Stalin acted to tighten Soviet control over Eastern Europe with the signing of six bilateral trade agreements and the creation of the Cominform, an agency to exert Soviet control over the Communist party in each of these nations. But while concentrating “power in Europe to confront the United States and the West, in Asia, the Soviet Union maintained a relatively moderate and conservative policy, albeit one based principally on expediency” (28).

Challenging traditional opinion, Shen argues that as late as June 1945, Moscow "had no firm policy for postwar Korea" (32) and Stalin did not want to enter the nation. After covering familiar ground in describing Korea’s division and Soviet-American military occupation, he further contends that the Soviets had no fixed plan for resolving the dispute over Korea. “Under the premise of controlling some militarily important positions,” Shen boldly argues, Stalin’s “strategy called for balancing Soviet and American interests and influence on the Korean peninsula” (34). Once again rejecting conventional wisdom, Shen maintains that rather than planning for a long-term occupation of Korea, Stalin instead expected implementation of the four-power trusteeship plan adopted at the Moscow Conference in late 1945. The Soviets allegedly had no involvement with the activities of the Communists in southern Korea and repeatedly denied their requests for help. After Soviet-American Joint Commission negotiations deadlocked, Moscow “began to assist in the political and economic development of North Korea, aiming to bolster the North with the goal of . . . establishing a unified Korean government friendly to the Soviet Union through national, peninsula-wide elections” (37). In August 1947, a “new point of departure for Soviet policy toward Korea” (40) arrived when Moscow ceased its economic exploitation and began building North Korea into “a protective security screen for the Soviet Union” (41). Stalin never considered creating an East European-style satellite in Korea because this risked provoking a conflict with the United States when tensions were high in Europe because of the Berlin Blockade, which lasted from 24 June 1948 to 12 May 1949.

Perhaps the most fascinating chapters in this study reexamine Stalin’s interaction with both Jiang Jieshi, president of the Republic of China, and Mao Zedong, chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), near the end of World War II and early in the postwar Chinese Civil War. Shen identifies Moscow’s goals as affirming Mongolia’s separation from China and restoring Soviet economic rights in Northeast China, to include acquiring an ice-free port. That Stalin’s prewar relationship with Mao was “fraught with mutual distrust and discord” (47) is well known, but Shen adds that “whether the Soviet Red Army would ‘leave alone’ or provide ‘sympathy to’ Chinese Communist forces in Northeast China would be decided solely on the basis of Soviets’ needs as related to the Nationalist government in
China and the United States internationally” (51). At first, Stalin thought he could work with Jiang and the United States to achieve his aims in China, infuriating Mao and causing him to consider briefly aligning with Washington and fighting the Guomindang without Stalin’s help. But after Stalin removed Soviet forces from Manchuria in 1946 to curry favor with Jiang, the United States replaced them. Moscow “once again revised its policy,” Shen writes, “seeking now to gain its objectives by assisting the Chinese Communist Party in Northeast China” (59). However, the CCP and its “military forces were then only a bargaining chip in Stalin’s negotiations with the Nationalist government, and not a very important bargaining chip at that” (62). A complex and subtle Sino-Soviet relationship ended with CCP victories on the battlefield, causing Stalin to recalibrate and prepare to provide aid in May 1948.

“At the end of 1948,” Shen reports, “both Stalin and Mao knew they had to reach out and draw closer, though differences and contradictions remained between the two” (69) “that led over time to increasing tension and discord in the alliance” (70). Mao wanted Soviet help to seize Taiwan and rebuild China, while Stalin sought Chinese support to check the United States, but avoidance of involvement in a Sino-American conflict. Soviet intentions were ambiguous, as Stalin continued to seek a deal with Jiang early in 1949. According to Shen, his “calculations were more complicated and nuanced than Mao thought” (78); he argues that the Soviet leader’s main fear was that the CCP would initiate an extreme military action and provide a pretext for U.S. intervention in Chinese Civil War. Advancing yet another provocative opinion, Shen claims that Stalin would have accepted China’s division between Mao and Jiang at the Yangtze. But by July 1949, CCP military victories caused him to be solicitous when he met with Liu Shaoqi, Vice Chairman of the CCP and Mao’s second in command, in Moscow. Stalin apologized for urging the CCP to compromise with Jiang, which “was the first sign of Soviet respect for the [CCP] in the history of Sino-Soviet inter-party relations” (81). These discussions made it clear that “at the heart of the clashing interests” (84) was the Soviet desire to retain its rights in Manchuria versus the CCP’s determination to end all unequal arrangements. Shen then covers in detail Mao’s trip to Moscow in December and his extended discussions with Stalin. In describing their previously documented exchanges, the significance of the author’s contribution is not factual, but analytical.

Stated simply, Shen contends that the Korean War began because Stalin, submitting to Mao’s demand, forfeited the right he had gained under the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty to an ice-free port in Manchuria. Korea now “found its way onto . . . Stalin’s map” because it provided “a compensatory measure to foster this Russian traditional strategic aspiration.” If Kim Il Sung conquered South Korea, Stalin would secure his ice-free Pacific port. According to Shen, “Moscow turned abruptly then from its long-maintained defensive posture in the Far East to a strategic offensive” (p. 105). In support of his argument, the author references the well-known Soviet documents that show how Stalin consistently refused in 1949 to approve Kim Il Sung’s persistent requests to authorize an attack on the ROK. As for Soviet delivery of large amounts of military aid, this “was intended to strengthen the North’s defensive capability, not to encourage the North to go on the attack” (110). During the fall of 1949, Stalin remained adamant in his insistence that Kim Il Sung could pursue reunification through partisan action alone and not an overt military assault.
By early 1950, he had begun to reconsider his position, partially because he did not expect a military response from the United States. But from a tactical perspective, Shen asserts, “logically speaking, Stalin would not decide to sanction starting a war in Korea merely because the U.S. would not intervene” (114).

Stalin’s strategic assessment of the situation in East Asia, Shen insists, was the decisive factor in changing his policy toward Korea. “On January 30, less than two weeks after Stalin had been forced to accept the Chinese draft agreement on the Changchun Railway, Lushun and Dalian” (116), he informed Kim Il Sung of his readiness to help with his planned invasion. After sending more arms, Stalin gave his final approval in April. But Shen challenges the conclusion of other scholars that “since the Soviet Union felt its position in the Far East was now stronger, it follows that Moscow was more confident it could confront and defeat U.S. power on the Korean peninsula.” Rather, Mao’s new “regime in China and the signing of the new Sino-Soviet treaty made [the Soviet leader] wonder if Soviet interests in the Far East were threatened or, possibly, even lost.” Stalin therefore changed “his policies to guarantee enduring Soviet strategic goals in the Far East” (117). He had been interested in Korea’s ports since 1945, and North Korea’s reunification of the peninsula would provide him with access to them. But if North Korea lost the war, the PRC would face a united Korea under U.S. domination, forcing Beijing “to ask Soviet forces to stay on in Lushun and Dalian” (118). Shen dismisses as a motive Stalin’s desire to reunite Korea preparatory to an attack on Japan because this would ignite a war with the United States. Citing flimsy evidence, he reports that Stalin moved gradually toward the conclusion that the Americans would not “intervene, or at least would not do so before it was too late” (123).

Stalin’s consistent opposition to Mao’s plans to invade Taiwan helps to explain why he did not inform China’s leader of preparations for war in Korea. Shen rejects the argument that the PRC’s return of North Korean troops who had fought in the Chinese Civil War in April 1950 proved it was assisting the upcoming invasion, explaining that redeployment occurred “continually” (127) after July 1949 because the Koreans wanted to return home and the war was nearing an end. During Stalin’s three official meetings with Mao in Moscow, he emphasizes, “none . . . touched on military action by North Korea against the South” (129). Nor did he inform Mao of his decision to help with the invasion or invite Kim Il Sung to meet with him in April. If Mao had this information, he would not have interrupted his meeting with Kim in May to confirm Moscow’s decision. “Stalin’s basic intent was to fob off all responsibility on China should the U.S. unexpectedly intervene” (123), Shen explains. Immediate U.S. military intervention therefore surprised and greatly concerned Stalin. Determined to hide Moscow’s involvement, he prohibited Soviet advisors from accompanying North Korean troops and concealed Soviet aid. Unaware of war preparations, China’s “leaders lacked sufficient mental and military preparation, and were therefore “slow to adjust their own domestic agenda in reaction to the outbreak of war” (138). Beijing did not change its plans to seize Taiwan or enact land reform even after the United States deployed its 7th Fleet in the Taiwan Strait.

Shen recaps the record of events and discussions contained in available Communist sources describing the reasons for Chinese military intervention in the Korean War. He
demonstrates convincingly that Stalin at first did not want Beijing to enter the conflict. After explaining how the Inchon landing changed his mind, Shen provides detailed coverage of Mao’s famous unsent telegram informing Stalin of the PRC’s decision to intervene and his subsequent demand for Soviet air support as a condition for its entry. Mao, Shen argues, already had decided to intervene when he sent Zhou Enlai to the Soviet Union to clarify the extent of military aid and air support the PRC could expect. He rejects the claim that Zhou was making a last-ditch effort to shift the burden of saving Kim Il Sung’s regime to Stalin. Both national security and revolutionary nationalism, Shen argues, were “compelling” (175) motives behind Chinese intervention, but a precondition was that U.S. forces crossed the 38th parallel. A more important calculation therefore caused Mao and his associates to defend North Korea:

If the war spread to China, and the Soviet Union again sent troops into the Northeast, this region would either be occupied by the United States or controlled by the Soviet Union. That is to say, whether the war resulted in victory or defeat, China would not be able to prevent the compromise of its sovereignty in the Northeast. The only way to prevent this eventuality was to stop the war outside of China’s borders (176).

Stalin never pledged air assistance to China in Korea, just limited protection of its rear area. “This ability to walk a fine line,” Shen claims, “illustrated Stalin’s brilliant diplomatic tactic and slick and sly diplomatic language” (174).

Contrary to the title, this study does not examine *Trilateral Communist Relations in the 1950s*. Shen’s last chapter discusses the second six months of the Korean War in abbreviated fashion, faulting Mao for not accepting the UN proposal for a cease-fire in January 1951. With renewed confidence in his ally, a less cautious Stalin ordered Soviet air protection for Chinese transportation lines. Shen states without providing any examples that during the armistice talks, “Mao sought and respected Stalin’s advice” (184) and the Soviet leader “approved every concrete measure adopted and every plan decided” (201). “In sum,” he concludes in his only comment on the last two years of the war, “from the entrance of Chinese troops into Korea until Stalin’s death in March 1953, Chinese and Soviet leaders, especially Mao and Stalin, closely coordinated their steps and views on all the important issues regarding the war in Korea” (203). Other weaknesses, however, are few. One factual error misdates the arrival of U.S. occupation forces in southern Korea as 6 September (30). Another credits Stalin with taking the initiative to start the truce talks, ignoring George F. Kennan’s key indirect efforts to achieve this result. Shen makes two mistakes when he claims that “the U.S. Congress authorized full-scale intervention in the Korean War” (135) on 29 June 1950. Also, he misspells Matthew B. “Ridgeway” regularly. Finally, this book would be very expensive even at half its currently outrageous list price.

Korean War scholars will find much in this study worthy of debate and disagreement. Shen signals his expectation of criticism as being inevitable. “Even when authentic [Soviet] documents are available,” he advises importantly, “it is hard to say that the words recorded reflect the true intentions of the leaders of such a political system” (p. 227). For example,
some readers may question his claim that in 1945 “Moscow still considered Japan to be a threat, so it wanted to prevent Japan from again turning Korea into a springboard for expansion on the Asian continent” (33). Many others will doubt that Stalin opposed Beijing’s seizure of Taiwan because he feared that a reunited “China might constitute a future potential threat to Soviet Union” (124). Less substantively, Shen relies on the recollection of a Soviet bureaucrat to endorse the claim that Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson’s exclusion of the ROK from the U.S. “defensive perimeter” in his National Press Club speech “had a major impact” in persuading Stalin that the United States would not enter the war (122). How this myth persists without a single document to prove its veracity remains a mystery. Shen stands on firmer ground when he argues that the Korean War strengthened the Sino-Soviet alliance, as Stalin “supplied virtually everything China requested” (186) during the war and “indeed carried out [his] duty” (185). However, Soviet “political and economic strength, Stalin’s prestige in the international communist movement and within the [CCP] itself, and Stalin’s rapier-like diplomatic skills—put Mao in a passive, subordinate position” (203), accelerating the steady decline in Sino-Soviet relations.
A number of years ago this reviewer attended an interesting roundtable discussion at the annual convention of the American Historical Association. One of the presenters, a Western scholar, lamented the one-sided nature of the East-West scholarly exchange: whereas Western historians were well known and well cited in China, the same did not hold true for Western scholarship that – for a host of more or less convincing reasons – by and large ignored the work of Chinese historians. Cold War history is not immune to some of these handicaps. There is still something of a gap between the Chinese and the Western communities of Cold War historians, though in recent years this gap has narrowed perceptibly as mainland scholars like Li Danhui, Niu Jun, Yang Kuisong, among others, have seen publication of their work in leading Western periodicals, reshaping and enriching global scholarship on the Cold War. Shen Zhuhua's rise to international prominence has been a part of this general process.

Shen Zhuhua enjoys a legendary standing in China. The ups and downs of his career warrant a separate book; suffice it to say here that it entailed enough pain and suffering – much of it at the hands of the State – to fill ten lifespans, but also unexpected entrepreneurial detours that toughened Shen for the organizational feats that many armchair historians would find daunting if not altogether impossible. For, to a large extent, Shen Zhuhua has become a dean of Cold War studies in China. As the founder and the director of the Cold War center at East China Normal University, he has spearheaded efforts to advance and internationalize Cold War scholarship in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), to increase interaction between Chinese and Western historians, and to promote archival openness in a country where people still can go to jail for leaking ‘sensitive’ documents on subjects like the Korean War.

The Korean War is the subject of the book under review here. Neil Silver has done an excellent job as a translator. Fluid and engaging in style, this volume is also densely packed with facts and figures that will be of interest to any scholar of the Korean War and of Sino-Soviet relations. Silver also accurately conveys Shen’s analytical clarity, especially in the first few chapters that deal with Soviet and Chinese decision-making in the months leading to the outbreak of the conflict. Although Shen’s original research that went into this book was completed more than ten years ago, unresolved impediments in the access to the Russian and the Chinese archives (not to mention those of North Korea) mean that no one has yet been able to better the book’s documentary base or to clarify some of its key points of contention. For these reasons, the book retains its value – years after its publication in Chinese – as an introductory primer on the Sino-Soviet side of the Korean conflict, and as a first port of call for researchers interested in the key Chinese and Russian evidence we now have on the origins of the Cold War in East Asia.

In this review I will content myself merely with highlighting some of the big questions posed by the book. One of Shen’s most important arguments concerns the reason for Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s change of heart, at some point in late January 1950, with regard to North Korean leader Kim Il-sung’s repeated entreaties to launch the invasion of South Korea. Stalin, unwilling until then to endorse such a reckless enterprise, appeared to give
in, at last, inviting Kim to Moscow to discuss the details. In Shen Zhihua’s view, this volte face was caused primarily by the Soviet leader’s realization that the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance would undermine his geopolitical gains in Northeast China. Stalin needed to compensate for the projected loss of the warm water ports (Dalian and Lushun) to his Chinese ally. A unified Korea subservient to Moscow would in part make up for what Stalin now had no choice but to give away to an impatient Chairman Mao Zedong who was just then in Moscow pleading for friendship in subtly threatening ways.

Western scholars first encountered this argument in an article Shen Zhihua published in the Journal of Cold War Studies more than a decade ago.¹ The book goes a little further in exploring the circumstantial evidence. There are no “smoking guns” here, just logic and inference, and Shen does not close the debate but he does make a strong case for one possible rationale for Stalin’s action, one that is grounded on a view of Stalin, which prioritizes geopolitical (and one might add, nineteenth-century) conceptions of national interest above considerations of an ideological nature (spreading world revolution) or even the imperative of maintaining peaceful co-existence with the United States. “Soviet national security always occupied the highest place [for Stalin],” writes Shen Zhihua (21), and this assumption (which will claim ready adherents as well as vicious opponents in the ranks of Cold War historians) underpins much of the author’s analysis.

Shen spends at least as much time on Sino-Soviet relations as he does on Korea. His analysis of the making of the Sino-Soviet alliance – and the author is one of the world’s foremost authorities on the subject – is insightful and quite detailed. I found especially useful the part that dealt with Stalin’s China strategy between the end of the Second World War and the establishment of the PRC in 1949. The views of Chinese and Russian historians have tended to diverge sharply as to what extent Stalin actually supported the Chinese Communist Party, and Shen Zhihua’s balanced approach – highlighting the Soviet leader’s foremost concern with the maintenance of the Yalta system and with keeping the Americans out of Northeast China – adds much-needed clarity to this somewhat politicized question. With the same characteristic clarity Shen shows the extent of Stalin’s military aid to China during the Korean War. He reveals that although the Chinese paid for the weapons the Soviet Union supplied during the Korean War, many of these weapons were used to re-equip the Chinese army, and that Stalin was in fact more generous with those weapons than the Chinese and much of Western historiography has allowed.

Returning to the origins of the Sino-Soviet alliance, another of Shen Zhihua’s key arguments is, to quote Silver’s translation, that “Communist China and the Soviet Union built their alliance principally to manage the perceived American threat” (88). In making such an unequivocal statement, Shen puts himself at odds with some of the new Cold War historiography of China’s foreign relations, and of the Sino-Soviet alliance.² Readers will

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² Most prominently, Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: UNC Press, 2001).
judge for themselves whether this ‘realist’ interpretation is sufficiently convincing; I certainly find it so. Shen explores the reasons for Stalin’s agreement to renegotiate the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty (after initially torpedoing the idea), laying emphasis, it appears, on Mao’s resilience in Moscow: “Stalin,” writes Shen Zhihua, “had to make a choice” (96). To clarify the record, though, I have to disagree with Shen’s treatment of Mao’s January 2, 1950 TASS interview, which, he argues “was designed to pressure Stalin into discussing a new treaty” (96). In my understanding, this interview – including Mao’s answers to the questions of a TASS correspondent – was written by Stalin. Shen presents the fruits of Mao’s visit to Moscow as being essentially favorable for China: Stalin had to make the most concessions, including his hard-won gains in Manchuria. This is a strong claim that challenges some of the prevailing historiography on the making of the alliance.3

Finally, Shen goes into some depth regarding the Chinese and Soviet decision-making surrounding Beijing’s agreement to dispatch military forces to North Korea. The author recounts the mystery of the two telegrams from Mao to Stalin, dated October 2, 1950, which differ sharply in their response to Stalin’s plea to send troops. Shen Zhihua was personally involved in the resolution of this multi-archival mystery, and those readers who missed the fascinating discussion in the Cold War International History Project Bulletin (Issues 6-7)4 will find Shen’s account of shaming the Chinese archives to open documents very interesting. Unfortunately, this feat has not been repeated for many years so that we are still short on evidence when attempting to analyze China’s decision-making in October 1950. As for Shen’s position on the question, in addition to well-known arguments concerning the national interests and ideological predispositions of the Chinese leadership, he cites Mao’s fear of Soviet reoccupation of the Northeast as one reason for choosing war, even in the face of opposition on the part of the Chairman’s reluctant colleagues. According to this theory (elaborated on 176) Mao feared that if the Chinese failed to intervene in the war, either the Americans or the Russians would eventually end up in Manchuria as the war widened to China’s proper, challenging the PRC’s sovereignty there. This interesting interpretation must for the time-being remain in the realm of speculation, pending new archival discoveries.

All in all, this is one of the analytically strongest and most-well researched books on the Soviet Union’s and China’s roads to the Korean War in existence. I highly commend Neil Silver for the tremendous effort that went into translating and editing this volume, which included the challenge of avoiding double translations (from Russian to Chinese to English), and finding appropriate transliterations for personal names. Silver’s valuable


contribution to the internationalization of such outstanding scholarship will certainly win appreciation in the wide circles of historians of China’s foreign relations and the global Cold War.
The publication of Shen Zhizhao’s *Mao, Stalin and the Korean War* marks a significant advance in English language literature on the Korean War. A Russia specialist, Shen has long been China’s leading historian of the Korean War, tirelessly pioneering research into Chinese archival documents and making the abundant declassified Russian documents available in Chinese translation. The original 2003 version of this book was a sensation in China as the first non-propagandistic, scholarly account of this pivotal event in the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Former State Department officer Neil Silver has done a great service to English-speaking readers by painstakingly translating and adapting this important work.

Shen investigates two central questions about the war: why Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin decided to support a North Korean attack on South Korea in 1950 and why the Chinese leadership decided to enter the war in October 1950. Unlike most English language accounts of the war, which examine its outbreak in terms of the Soviet/American conflict, Shen places Stalin’s decisions regarding Korea in the context of his rapidly changing relations with the Chinese Communist leadership. Drawing on both Chinese and Russian sources, Shen charts Stalin’s ambivalent approach to the Chinese party from 1945 to the end of 1949. He argues that the Soviet leader was determined to maintain the territorial gains in the Far East he had secured through the Yalta system, which were contingent on his conclusion of a treaty with Nationalist government. He therefore supported his Chinese comrades only sporadically. For the same reason, throughout this period he maintained a defensive position in regard to divided Korea. The decision to establish an alliance with the PRC, made in early January 1950, fundamentally changed the equation. In negotiating the terms of the alliance treaty, the Chinese leadership held firm to their demand that the Soviet Union relinquish control of its important assets in Manchuria, the Russian-built Changchun railroad and the ports of Lushun and Dalian at its terminus that provided Moscow its only ice-free access to the Pacific. To compensate for the loss of these strategically essential holdings, Stalin backed North Korean leader Kim Il Sung’s assault on South Korea, since control of the entire peninsula by the much more tractable North Koreans would assure Moscow access to the ports of Pusan and Inchon.

Shen’s analysis of the impact of the Sino-Soviet alliance on Soviet policy toward Korea enriches our understanding of the reasons Stalin took the risky step of invading the Republic of Korea. However, Shen surprisingly omits discussion of NSC-48, the American strategic strategy for East Asia adopted in late December 1949 in response to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In this new policy, the U.S. prioritized its goals in the region given the limited military resources it retained after postwar demobilization. Thus, it committed itself to the defense of Japan, the Philippines and the small islands to the East that had been taken from Japan at the end of the war.

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1 A slightly different version of this review was published by H-Net Reviews in April 2013, at https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=37597. That review was commissioned by Dr. Seth Offenbach for H-Diplo.
Territories to the West, including Korea and Taiwan, lay outside the new defense perimeter.

I have argued that Stalin learned immediately of the substance of NSC-48, most likely from Donald McLean, his highly-placed British spy in Washington, and that knowledge of this policy change led him to conclude that the United States would not intervene to protect South Korea.\(^2\) A record of Stalin's conversations with Kim II Sung in April 1950 quoted by Russian scholars Evgenii Bazhanov and Natalia Bazhanova, but not included in Shen’s account, reveals that the Soviet leader explained to his Korean protégé that it was now possible to assist him in his military campaign against the South because of the victory of the Chinese Communists and the disinclination of the Americans to intervene in Korea.\(^3\) Nonetheless, Stalin cautioned that they must proceed carefully because the danger of American intervention remained. He thus informed the North Korean leader that if the Korean People’s Army needed reinforcements, he would have to turn to China; Soviet troops would not be sent to Korea.\(^4\) Shen’s analysis broadens our understanding of the impact of the establishment of the PRC on Stalin’s policy toward Korea, but it does not fully explain the decision for war. However much Stalin may have desired new ports on the Pacific, he would not have authorized the attack on South Korea unless he calculated that it would not lead to conflict with the United States. Shen’s careful examination of his second question, which is based on newly available Chinese sources as well as the Russian documents released in the 1990s, provides a much fuller picture of Beijing’s decision to intervene than scholars have previously been able to construct. Departing from the interpretation of the Chinese-American historian Chen Jian, who argues that Chairman Mao Zedong’s decision to intervene was primarily driven by a desire to maintain revolutionary momentum within the PRC, Shen concludes that security concerns were paramount.\(^5\)

Since China had barely begun to build an air force, it needed Soviet air cover to protect both its troops entering Korea and its rear areas in Manchuria from devastating American air attacks. Shen documents in detail Beijing’s intense negotiations with Stalin over this issue. In the end, fearing that Soviet air involvement in Korea would lead to all-out war with the United States, the Soviet leader stalled for time, claiming that it would take two to two and a half months for any of the numerous Soviet air assets deployed in the Far East to transfer to Manchuria (165). Since this timetable would be too late to prevent a North Korean


\(^4\) Kathryn Weathersby, “Should We Fear This? Stalin and the Danger of War with America,” Working Paper No. 39 Cold War International History Project.

defeat, the Chinese leadership agreed with Stalin’s instructions to Kim Il Sung to evacuate his remaining forces to Manchuria and the Soviet Far East.

At this point, however, Mao Zedong feared that a North Korean defeat would transfer the war to Northeast China. Although the Sino/Soviet alliance would force the Soviet Union to support China in this war, the outcome would be the loss of Northeast China either to Moscow or the Americans. Shen notes that after Stalin sent the Red Army into Manchuria in 1945 to defeat Japanese troops, he was able to force Chiang Kai-shek to sign a treaty that harmed China’s interests. Moreover, the PRC had secured the return of the Changchun Railway, Lushun and Dalian only through very tough negotiations, like “taking meat out of a tiger’s mouth” (176). Thus, to forestall loss of sovereignty to either great power, Mao decided to send troops to Korea even without Soviet air cover.

In a final twist, once Chinese forces successfully engaged the far better equipped American troops on 25 October 1950, Stalin at last decided that he could trust his Chinese allies. As is well-known, the Soviet leader had long doubted that Mao was a real Communist and feared that he would follow the path of the independent Yugoslav leader, Marshall Josip Broz Tito. But just one week after the Chinese ‘Volunteers’ proved their mettle against the Americans, the Soviet Air Force entered the war, albeit only in the rear area. As Shen documents, both Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai attributed Stalin’s changed view of the Chinese Communist Party to China’s entry into the Korean War.

As the newly harmonious allies saved North Korea from extinction, they also began a period of unprecedented cooperation. The Chinese understood that Soviet air units must limit their zone of operation to rear areas in order to avoid escalating the war. Soviet planes thus could not provide cover for Chinese ground troops, as Beijing had initially requested, but Mao did not again ask for such assistance. Shen concludes that while the allies disagreed on various tactical issues, for the remainder of the war Stalin and Mao “were able to exchange opinions candidly, fostering the resolution of issues between them” (182). Shen emphasizes that the Soviet Union met nearly all of China’s requests for weapons and supplies, materiel which it could not obtain anywhere else. Moscow sent torpedo boats, floating mines, armored ships, small patrol boats, mine-sweeping equipment and coastal artillery, in the process creating the PRC’s navy. The Soviet Union also provided air combat advisers to train Chinese pilots, as well as donating its new jet-powered fighters, MiG-15s. The month before armistice negotiations began in June 1951, Mao requested that the Soviet Union supply sixty divisions of ground forces, an amount that exceeded Moscow’s immediate capacities. In the end, the Soviet Union agreed to supply sixteen divisions during 1951 and the remaining forty-four by 1954. By the end of the war, fifty-six divisions had been reequipped with Soviet arms. Moscow also provided anti-aircraft artillery for 101 battalions as well as artillery for two rocket divisions, fourteen howitzer divisions, two anti-tank divisions, four searchlight regiments, one radar regiment and eight independent radar battalions. Twenty-eight engineering regiments were supplied with Soviet construction equipment, as well as ten railroad divisions (185-191).
The cooperation from Moscow that flowed from China’s performance in the Korean War extended to economic development as well. Shen writes that the volume of Sino-Soviet trade increased nine-fold in the first year of the war, from $26,300,000 in 1949 to $241,900,000 in 1950 (191). The Soviet Union sold China at discounted prices equipment for mining, transportation, energy production, metal rolling and milling, as well as oil and finished steel. Moscow also sent a large number of technicians to China and welcomed large numbers of Chinese as students in Soviet institutions. This close cooperation ended abruptly with the Sino-Soviet split in 1960, but as Shen emphasizes, while it lasted it “played a major role in China’s economic revival” (191).

Neil Silver’s highly readable translation of Shen Zhihua’s book includes a useful introductory essay by Yang Kuisong of Beijing University, who takes issue with some of Shen’s conclusions regarding Stalin’s motives for starting the war. With regard to China’s decision to intervene, however, Yang concludes that Shen’s account is “convincing, logical, dramatic, and on target” (16). Indeed, this path-breaking book is both fascinating and essential reading for all scholars interested in the recent history of Northeast Asia.
Translator’s Comments by Neil Silver, U.S. Foreign Service (retired)

I’ve read someplace that only rank amateurs and college professors translate books. I’m definitely in the former category, though, in fact, there is another category as well: fools.

Shen Zhihua’s book on the intra-Communist diplomatic history of the Korean War was one of four notable Chinese books I read just after my late 2005 retirement from the Foreign Service. The others were a complex and tragic novel of remembrance, a “Gulag Archipelago” with Chinese characteristics, exploring the betrayal of China’s intellectuals by the Chinese Communist revolution; a Chinese journalist’s attempt to understand why pre-1949 Beijing was essentially demolished and mummified under orders and pressure from Mao Zedong; and the memoir of former Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, which, if one knows where to look, can be quite illuminating on more recent Chinese diplomatic history. These books intersected with several strong personal interests: modern history in and among China, Japan and the Koreas; the narrower field of diplomatic history; and publishing, intellectual trends, and censorship in today’s China.

Among my reasons for translating Shen’s book (it was certainly easier to translate than the Chinese novel, which I attempted, but abandoned over fears that I lacked a proper ‘literary voice’) was my conviction that it represented a new kind of historical writing in China. Though I have subsequently come to appreciate the large amount of useful and relatively unfettered “mainland Chinese” historical scholarship that is published outside China, including in the United States, often in cooperation with Chinese-born scholars living abroad, I felt consistently throughout my translation of Shen’s book that it was important

1 You Fengwei, Zhongguo 1957 (China 1957), Shenyang: Chunfeng wenyi chubanshe, 2004. Based on scores of interviews with anti-rightist campaign prison camp survivors, the female protagonist ultimately goes mad after promising never again to speak unless the Communist Party apologizes for violating her right to privacy, and the male narrator devises ingenious stratagems to remember what has happened and what he has seen before and during his imprisonment.

2 Wang Jun, Chengji (City Record), Beijing: Shenghuo, dushu, xinzhi sanlian shudian, 2003. For an expanded English edition, see Jun Wang, Beijing Record: a physical and political history of planning modern Beijing, Singapore and Hackensack, NY, World Scientific, 2011. As the advertisement for this edition states, “Beijing Record [conveys] the inside story on the key decisions that led to Beijing’s present urban fragmentation and its loss of memory and history in the form of bulldozing its architectural heritage.”

3 Qian Qichen, Waijiao shiji (Ten Diplomatic Episodes), Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2003. For an English edition, see Qian Qichen, Ten Episodes in China’s diplomacy, New York: HarperCollins, 2005. One of the more memorable episodes described by Qian is the extremely cool treatment he received when he was sent to tell Kim Il-sung that China was about to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea. See Waijiao shiji, 157-160.

that Western readers should be able to gauge the state of scholarship as it is in China, not as filtered through overseas 'hybrid' scholarship. I thus strove to keep my translation as close as possible to Shen's original. In common with some other Chinese writers, Shen's tendency toward sentences that wind on like the Great Wall of China posed some difficulties, and I felt the book's appeal would be enhanced by a different chapter organization and the addition of numerous descriptive chapter 'sub-titles,' essentially an outline as presented in my table of contents. Last, faced with the need to avoid double and even triple translation difficulties, I decided to research, redesign and even redo Shen's endnotes so that non-Chinese readers could more easily access his sources, figuring that Chinese-literate students and researchers can always refer to Shen's original endnotes in Chinese, should they wish to do so.

One of the emerging trends in China, perhaps only over the past decade, has been the appearance of occasional frank references to censorship (and self-censorship). For instance, in his review (which I used as an introduction to my translation of Shen's book), Chinese historian Yang Kuisong notes up front that, "For some time, Chinese scholars have not been shy in voicing their opinions, but it has, in fact, been very hard for them to publish the results of their research openly in China."5 And, as the Chinese-American Cold War scholar Yafeng Xia has pointed out, there also remains a large gap between the facts and interpretations presented in Chinese academic studies on Cold War history and the same history as presented in Chinese school textbooks.6 But, though certainly different in degree, Chinese authorities are not unique in shaping instructional material for youth to fit the mold of politically-correct, orthodox historiography.

Though Shen's scholarship relates to events that occurred two generations and six decades ago, together with Chinese authors of books on other important topics, he is among a cohort of Chinese writers and readers who are trying to understand China's past so that they may better understand its present. As is clear from his response to reviewers in this roundtable, although he remains convinced of the plausibility of his realpolitik analysis of Stalin's likely motivation for agreeing to the Korean War, with the passage of time and his attention to other aspects of the decision to go to war on the Chinese side, Shen's analysis of Mao's likely motivations is now more complex, more nuanced, and more inclusive of both realpolitik and ideological factors.

Shen's book, together with his more recent analysis, opens up many other fruitful avenues for future Korean War and Cold War scholarship. "Although more than 25,000 books and articles have been written" on World War One,7 historians can still be excited by the latest scholarship on that war. Shen has combed officially published selections from China's

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6 Xia, "The Study of Cold War International History in China, 111-113.

central archives, oral histories, memoirs, provincial archives, and Russian archival material, among other sources. Thus, despite restrictions on access to Chinese Foreign Ministry archives, which are only selectively open, and then only up through 1965 on issues related to Communist China’s early history, there are still reserves of largely untapped material, with, hopefully, more to be discovered.

Finally, although the Korean War has had a major and lasting impact on the concepts of deterrence and strategic signaling as broadly understood in the United States, great, abiding political cultural differences between China and other countries, including the United States and Japan, hint at the likelihood of large, lurking, and perhaps dangerous gaps between Chinese and foreign concepts and practices regarding what constitutes effective deterrence, effective strategic signaling, and effective ‘international regimes’ and institutions.8

I am very grateful to H-Diplo for organizing this discussion of *Mao, Stalin and the Korean War*, the English-language translation of the 2007 edition of my *Mao Zedong, Sidalin yu Chaoxian Zhanzheng* (Mao Zedong, Stalin and the Korean War). And I am also extremely grateful for the comments and criticisms offered by James Matray, Kathryn Weathersby, and Sergey Radchenko, as well as the introduction by Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy. These three academics are all noted experts in this field, and their views have undoubtedly had a major impact on my research. Here I have to express my special thanks to Neil Silver. When, with the introduction of an American academic, he first phoned me in 2006 while he was visiting China (we were then unable to meet) and said that he valued my book and was considering translating it, my initial reaction was that he was merely being polite. Since we then spoke only casually, I was surprised a year later when he visited me in Shanghai to discuss further his translation plan. In retirement, altogether he spent six or seven years, on his own, translating, editing and then publishing his English-language version of my Chinese work. If it were not for his efforts, it would be hard for Western scholars to appreciate the fruits of the research of Chinese scholars, and I would not be able to profit from the valuable comments here.

Below, I will offer a general response to the comments of these specialists and will then go on to discuss some points at issue concerning the Korean War.

First, I should state that my original Chinese work, *Mao Zedong, Sidalin yu Chaoxian Zhanzheng*, was published in Hong Kong in 1998; when it went through censorship for publication on the mainland in 2003, under time pressure, only several appendices were added; and, when it was revised and republished in 2007, there were only a few changes in the main body of the text and, several new passages were added. Although my basic points of view were reflected in the book, through this iterative process, it was difficult to avoid some infelicitous turns of phrase and redundancies. Therefore, in my discussions with Neil Silver, I expressed the hope that, in the translation process, he would directly edit the book and put its contents into English in accord with my train of thought. At the same time, I combed through the issues discussed in the text once again, added some new material, and a new Chinese edition (the third edition) was published in January 2013. To avoid the inconvenience of having to resubmit the text for censorship (and because it might not have been approved), I had no choice but to use the original title.

The two main issues I discuss in the book, why Stalin would suddenly change his view in January 1950, and agree with Kim Il-sung to launch a war on the South, and why Mao Zedong, in spite of all the difficulties, would consistently desire to send troops to Korea to join in this war, really involve deductions or inferences regarding Stalin’s and Mao’s motivations for policy decisions. Here there is an especially noteworthy issue, one that differs from the study of the policy motivations of the United States and other Western countries. With respect to the policy motivations of communist states, owing to the secrecy and the arbitrariness of their policy processes, and their far from ideal archival declassification systems, researchers, who can never see documents like the records of the
U.S. National Security Council, can only make deductions based on indirect historical material of which they are aware. Therefore, as I see it, here, with respect to viewpoints on Stalin’s and Mao’s policy motivations (that is to say, deductions) there is no question of correctness or incorrectness, but rather only questions of whether or not deductions are reasonable. As long as these deductions are logical, and there are no conflicts with historical material already in hand, then they are plausible and reasonable, although they may not necessarily be correct.

Motivations for Stalin’s policy decision:

Up to the present, the historical narrative provides two premises for addressing the question of Stalin’s motivations: first, Stalin fundamentally changed his Korea policy in January 1950; and second, when Stalin agreed with Kim Il-sung to take military action, the Soviet Union had its own needs. Accordingly, the question becomes: in less than a month’s time, what did Stalin lose to cause him to believe that he could compensate for it through military action in Korea? Here there are some time nodes that are especially worthy of attention: on 26 January, the Chinese side presented a draft agreement concerning the Lushun naval base, Dalian port, and the Chinese Changchun Railway, requesting the return to China of complete sovereignty in the Northeast within two years; on 28 January, the Soviet side returned, with changes, the original document presented by China, basically agreeing to China’s demands; and, on 30 January, Stalin sent a telegram to Kim Il-sung indicating that he agreed with his military plan and was willing to provide assistance. From this, one can deduce that, with the signing of the Chinese-Soviet treaty of alliance, the Soviet Union would lose its only ice-free outlet and port on the Pacific Ocean, that this undoubtedly was a major loss with respect to its strategic interests, and that the result would lead to the loss of a Soviet strategic pillar in the Far East. Stalin’s agreement with Kim Il-sung’s military attack on South Korea, then, was conceived to rebuild or guarantee through this military action the Soviet Union’s traditional strategic strong position in the Far East. A Czarist Foreign Minister and the Soviet Foreign Ministry had both pointed out the geographical significance of the Korean peninsula as an ocean outlet, and Nationalist-era diplomat Wellington Koo had also voiced his hope that the Soviet Union would give up the Lushun [naval] base and find an ocean outlet and ice-free port on the Korean peninsula. Therefore, it would be very easy for Stalin to consider this point. On the other hand, there was a stipulation in the agreement presented by the Chinese side: should a situation of war occur, “China and the Soviet Union may jointly use Lushun naval base, in order to jointly fight the enemy.”

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2 AVPRF, fond 7, opis 23a, papka 18, delo 234, listy 17-22, 29-34.
version, it proposed another article in the agreement text: “Soviet military forces and military cargo shall freely move back and forth from the Manzhouli station to the Suifenhe station and along the Chinese Changchun Railway, with transportation costs calculated according to charges for Chinese military forces.”

In this way, even if the military action in Korea did not turn out as it wished, the Soviet Union could continue to control the Liaodong peninsula, and thereby guarantee its strategic interests in the Northeast region.

The factor constraining Stalin’s policy decision was whether or not the United States would intervene after the Korean War broke out. In 1949, when Moscow rebuffed North Korea and criticized the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang, its major reason for doing so was that it feared military action by Kim Il-sung would invite an American intervention. Stalin, of course, would not be easily swayed by Kim Il-sung’s braggadocio, so his agreement to have Kim Il-sung come to Moscow for talks really indicates that he had already thought through this issue. President Harry Truman’s 5 January 1950 statement and Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s 12 January National Press Club speech made Stalin feel that the United States would likely adopt an evasive attitude toward the Korean issue, but Stalin, who would not lightly believe American public statements, needed more reliable evidence, and the Soviets, in fact, had this kind of evidence. In September 1956, Soviet Communist Party Politburo member Anastas Mikoyan told Mao that, “Before the Korean War started, our intelligence service decoded an enemy telegram according to which General Douglas MacArthur had reported to Washington that, should military clashes break out between North and South Korea, he advocated that the United States not intervene.”

In this way, the risk brought on by starting a war was greatly reduced. Despite this, Stalin still required that Mao’s approval be sought, so that, in the event of an unfavorable outcome, this would allow for China’s coming forward to assist North Korea.

Motivations for Mao Zedong’s policy decisions:

Between August and September 1950, when the issue of sending troops was raised on Mao’s initiative, through October when Stalin’s request to dispatch troops was accepted by Mao, then owing to the changed battlefield situation, China’s motivations for dispatching troops to fight in Korea were quite different. Based on Mao’s statements and actions on the issue of sending troops to Korea, here below are several possible Chinese motivations:

First, the stationing of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait stirred up anti-U.S. revolutionary passion. To defeat the United States and to finish the revolution, whether

3 Ibid.

4 Memorandum of Mao Zedong’s discussion with Mikoyan, 23 September 1956, author’s personal collection.

5 For more discussion of Mao Zedong’s motivations, see: Shen Zhihua, Mao Zedong, Sidalin yu Chaoxian zhanzheng (Mao Zedong, Stalin and the Korean War)(Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe, 2013), Chapter 4, section 3.
contending with imperialism abroad or solidifying the socialist regime at home, Mao’s August and September impulses and decisions all reflect this kind of revolutionary fervor.

Second, based on the international division of labor between the Soviet Communist Party and the Chinese Communist Party, China assumed a dominant role on the Korean issue. From this, we can see what the historian Chen Jian speaks of as the “Central Kingdom” impulse existing in the inner recesses of Mao’s thoughts. In Mao’s lexicon, the “Eastern Cominform” and the Asian socialist camp to a large degree were other manifestations of this impulse in contemporary society and the revolutionary period. These factors also influenced Mao’s August and September policy decisions.

Third, there was concern about the threat to China’s border security and overall sovereignty. In a situation in which there had been a turn for the worse on the battlefield, any thought of achieving complete military victory was likely quite thin. On the contrary, at this time, China’s own security had become a prominent concern. Besides worrying about border security from a geopolitical standpoint, Mao most likely also had a much deeper level of concern, regarding the integrity of China’s sovereignty. The issue was, if North Korea established a government-in-exile in Northeast China in accord with the plans made at the Black Sea meeting between Stalin and Zhou Enlai, and had its surviving military units retreated to the Northeast for rest and reorganization, should the flames of war be brought onto Chinese territory, according to the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance, there would be a strong probability that Stalin would then dispatch 100,000 Soviet Far East troops into the Northeast to assist China in the fight. Actually, Stalin’s 5 October telegram to Mao had already conveyed this idea. No matter what, this was not the kind of outcome that Mao wanted to see. Mao’s concerns over China’s security and sovereignty were reflected in his 13 October decision.

Fourth, the strategic posture of the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance was upheld in order to strengthen the Chinese Communist regime. After Stalin clearly expressed his view that the Soviet air force would not be able to coordinate with the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) in battle, a guarantee [or premise] for fighting the U.S. forces militarily disappeared, and the prospects for deploying troops abroad darkened. On the contrary, if the war went badly at the outset, and the Chinese force was beaten back by the Americans, Mao would draw criticism on himself, and this would create a situation that would be even more disadvantageous. At this point in time, Mao’s argument was, “Even if we can’t beat the

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7 The idea of an Eastern Cominform, an intended counterpart to the Soviet-created, Euro-centric Cominform, mesmerized Mao, but was never actually created. However, beginning in 1950, the Chinese Communist Party started classes and other revolutionary activities for a number of Asian communist parties, all led by the newly created Chinese Communist Party International Liaison Department. For more on this topic, see Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia, “Leadership Transfer in the Asian Revolution: Mao Zedong and the Asian Cominform,” Cold War History, accepted and forthcoming.
Americans, we still have to fight.” Obviously, the main consideration was not to push the “national boundary” toward the south. That is to say, besides guaranteeing border security and Chinese sovereignty, Mao should have had a deeper consideration. The Chinese Communist Party’s newly established state was a poor, backward country that had gone through many years of the chaos and pillage of war. Internally, it was a country devastated, awaiting reconstruction, and containing a society in turmoil. Externally, there was imperialist hostility and pressure, along with the menacing stance of Kuomintang (KMT or Nationalist) leader Chiang Kai-shek, watching for a chance to retake the mainland. In this situation, if China sent troops into battle and the outcome was unfavorable, this would undoubtedly threaten the new regime’s existence. The “new China” had to draw on the strength of the socialist Soviet Union, and had to draw on the political deterrence of the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance in order to guarantee Chinese security and consolidate the newly-born regime. But the signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance had diminished Stalin’s confidence in Mao Zedong. Only by deploying troops to North Korea could China demonstrate that it was still a member of the socialist camp led by the Soviet Union, and, through this means, gain Stalin’s trust. This was the final factor in Mao’s 18 October decision.

Newly Added Content in the Third (January 2013) Chinese Edition:9

1. The issue concerning Lin Biao’s illness and unwillingness to take command and to go into battle. Lin Biao was the CCP’s most talented general and was then commander of the Fourth Field Army. Perhaps this is an issue that has not attracted much interest among Western readers, but in Chinese society this has been a longstanding rumor that has led to much tongue wagging. After detailed research in Chinese historical sources, what I’d like to say is that since Lin Biao was seriously ill, Mao really never considered asking him to take command; the person Mao first considered to lead the Volunteers’ Army was Su Yu, a deputy commander of the Third Field Army, but Su Yu felt that it was inappropriate to command Lin Biao’s military units (the Fourth Field Army) and pleaded sickness in order not to go. Although Lin Biao did not advocate going to war, he nevertheless actively participated in planning the troop deployment to North Korea, and, moreover, Mao relied on Lin and valued his service.

2. Contradictions and differences between the leaders of China and North Korea. In the three years of the war, there were a series of important differences between China and North Korea. This was manifested on many important issues, such as military command, whether to continue marching south after (the Chinese and North Korean Force) occupied Seoul, the right to manage the Korean railway, and whether or not to accept the American

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8 Wang Yan et al., ed., Peng Dehuai zhuan (Biography of Peng Dehua) (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1993, p. 47; A discussion with Peng Dehuai concerning the problem of Gao Gang. 8 February 1955, notes by Wang Yan, the Director of Peng’s office, author’s personal collection.

9 For more on the new content in the 2013 edition, see Shen, Mao Zedong, Sidalin yu Chaoxian zhanzheng, Chapter 4, section 2 and Chapter 5, section 3.
ceasefire conditions. What is important to note is that, with respect to all the contradictions that emerged between China and North Korea, in the end, Stalin always stood with the Chinese. This makes it clear that after China deployed its troops to North Korea, Stalin changed his attitude toward Mao, Sino-Soviet alliance relations were strengthened, and, moreover, demonstrates that the so-called “friendship forged in blood” between China and North Korea is actually a historical myth.

3. Mao Zedong’s major policy decision error during the Korean War: In January 1951, the United Nations put forward a ceasefire proposal that was favorable to China in every aspect. The U.S. government, finding itself in an awkward predicament, was forced to indicate its acceptance, gambling that China would not accept the proposal. Chinese leaders, their heads dizzy with thoughts of victory, incorrectly assessing the situation, and lacking diplomatic experience on the international stage, rashly rejected the United Nations ceasefire proposal. The result of this decision was that China lost its favorable position on the Korean battlefield and on the international stage, and, from that point on, it found itself bogged down in a completely passive situation, politically, diplomatically and militarily. With respect to the skeptical view in Chinese society as to whether or not Mao’s decision to send troops to Korea was wise, my personal view is that, since the war was prolonged for two years, with great cost to China, the harm was done not by the October 1950 decision to send troops, but rather by the January 1951 decision not to (accept the ceasefire and) end the war.
非常感谢美国人文社会科学在线外交及国际关系史专栏（H-Diplo）组织的这次对拙著《毛泽东、斯大林与朝鲜战争》一书翻译和编辑后的英文本的评论，非常感谢马特雷（James Matray）、威瑟斯比（Kathryn Weathersby）、拉琴科（Sergey Radchenko）的评论和指正，以及芮效俭（Stapleton Roy）大使的介绍。他们都是这个领域的知名专家，他们的意见对于我的研究无疑具有很大的促进作用。在此，我还要特别表示对苏礼文（Neil Silver）先生的感谢。经一位美国学者的介绍，苏礼文在一次来中国旅行时打电话与我联系（当时我们没能见面），他说我这本书很有价值，提出了准备译成英文出版的想法。我最初以为他只是出于客气，随口说说，不想第二年他就来到上海，与我商谈翻译计划。苏礼文先生在古稀之年，花费6-7年的时间，以一己之力翻译和编辑了我的这本中文著作。如果没有他的努力，西方学者难以了解中国学者的研究成果，我也无法听到这些珍贵的意见。

下面，我对几位专家的评论做一点综合性回应，并进一步讨论有关朝鲜战争的几个热点问题。

首先需要说明的是，我的中文专著《毛泽东、斯大林与朝鲜战争》最早是1998年在香港出版的；2003年在大陆通过审查出版时，因为时间紧迫，只是作为余论增加了几篇论文；2007年修订再版，对正文做了少量修改，又增加了几篇新论文。尽管我的基本看法在书中都已有反应，但以这种形式叙事，难免有些叙述不畅和内容重复。因此，我与苏礼文先生商量，希望他在翻译的过程中，按照我的思路对内容直接用英文进行重新编辑。与此同时，我本人也对书中讨论的问题做了重新梳理，并增加了一些新的篇章。新的中文书（珍藏版或第三版）于2013年1月出版，只是为了避免再次送审的麻烦（可能不被批准），不得不使用了原来的书名。

我在书中讨论的两个主要问题，即斯大林为什么会突然改变主意，同意金日成发动对南方的战争；毛泽东为什么不顾一切困难，坚持要出兵朝鲜参与这场战争，实际上都是对决策动机的推断。这里有一个特别值得注意的问题，与对美国和西方国家决策动机的研究不同，关于共产党国家的决策动机，由于其决策程序的隐秘性和独断性，加上档案解密制度的不完善，研究者往往看不到像美国国家安全委员会讨论记录那样的文件，所以只能依据已知的间接史料进行推断。因此，在我看来，这里关于决策动机的看法（即推断）不是正确与否的问题，而是合理与否的问题。只要这个推断合乎逻辑，且与人们已经掌握的事实没有抵触，就是可能的、合理的，尽管它未必是真实的。

关于斯大林的决策动机。
到目前为止的历史叙事可以为回答这个问题提供两个前提：第一，斯大林根本改变对朝鲜半岛政策的时间就在1950年1月；第二，斯大林同意金日成采取军事行动有苏联自己的需要。于是，问题就变成：在这不到一个月的时间里，斯大林究竟失去了什么东西使他感到必须要通过在朝鲜采取军事行动来进行补偿？这里有一个时间节点特别值得注意：1月26日，中方提出了关于旅顺口、大连港和中长路的协定草案，要求在两年内收回中国在东北的全部主权；1月28日，苏联退回经修改的中方文本，基本上接受了中国的要求；1月30日，斯大林给金日成发电报，表示同意他的军事计划并愿意提供帮助。由此可以推断，中苏同盟条约的签订将使苏联失去通向太平洋的唯一的出海口和不冻港，这无疑是一种战略利益的重大损失，其结果将导致苏联在亚洲失去战略依托。斯大林同意金日成对朝鲜南方发动进攻，就是想通过这次军事行动来重建或保障苏联在远东地区的这一传统战略的支撑点。朝鲜半岛作为出海口在地理上的重要性，沙皇的外交大臣和苏联外交部都曾经提到，顾维钧也曾提出希望苏联放弃旅顺港而在朝鲜半岛寻求出海口和不冻港。所以，斯大林很容易想到这一点。另一方面，中方提交的协定中有一条规定：一旦出现战争局面，“中苏两国可共同使用旅顺口海军基地，以利共同对敌作战”。苏联在接受这个文本的同时，提出在议定书中再加一条：“苏联的军队和军用物资将自由地从满洲里车站到绥芬河车站以及沿中国长春铁路往返调运，其运费按中国军队调运的现行价格计算。”这样，无论在朝鲜的军事行动结果如何，苏联都可以继续掌控辽东半岛，以保证其在东北亚地区的战略利益。

制约斯大林决策的条件就是战争爆发后美国是否会进行干预。1949年莫斯科拒绝朝鲜和批评苏联驻朝使馆的主要出发点，就是担心金日成的军事行动会招来美国的干涉。斯大林当然不会简单地被金日成的豪言壮语所忽悠，实际上，同意金日成来莫斯科进行商谈就表明他对这个问题已经有所判断。杜鲁门1月5日的声明和艾奇逊1月12日的演说使斯大林感觉到美国对朝鲜问题可能会采取回避态度，但斯大林不会轻易相信美国人的公开声明，他需要更可靠的证据，而苏联人确实掌握了这样的证据。1956年9月米高扬告诉毛泽东：“朝鲜战争开始前，我们情报机关破译的敌人的电报说，麦克阿瑟向华盛顿报告，他主张朝鲜南北双方发生军事冲突时美国不要进行干涉。”这样，发动战争所带来的风险就大大降低了。尽管如此，斯大林在与金日成会谈时还是要求他必须征得毛泽东的同意，以便在不利的情况下让中国出面援助朝鲜。


2АВПРФ，ф.07，оп.23а，п.18，д.234，л.17-22，29-34。

3毛泽东与米高扬谈话记录，1956年9月23日，私人收藏。
关于毛泽东的决策动机。

从1950年8月、9月主动提出出兵，到10月接受斯大林的要求出兵，由于战场局势的变化，中国派兵入朝作战的动机是有所不同的，根据毛泽东在出兵朝鲜问题上的言行，中国的决策动机有以下几种可能：

第一，由于第七舰队进驻台湾海峡而引发的对抗美国的革命激情。打败美国，完成革命，无论是对外与帝国主义抗衡还是对内巩固社会主义政权，毛泽东此时的冲动都可以归结为一种革命情结。（8-9月决策）

第二，根据苏共与中共的国际分工为社会主义阵营承担责任和义务，并以此取得对朝鲜问题的主导权。从中也可以看出陈兼所说的存在于毛泽东内心深处的“中央王朝”的理念。在毛泽东的意识和话语中，东方情报局和亚洲的社会主义阵营，在很大程度上就是这一理念在现代社会和革命时代的另一种表达方式。（8-9月决策）

第三，对中国边境安全和主权完整受到威胁的忧虑。当战场形势已经发生逆转的情况下，想要在军事上取得全胜的考虑大概应该淡薄了。相反，此时中国自身的问题已经凸显出来。除了从地缘政治角度对边境安全的担心外，毛泽东很可能还有对中国主权完整受到威胁的更深层的忧虑。问题在于，如果按照黑海会议的安排，让金日成在东北建立流亡政府，并将其残余部队撤到东北休整，那么，万一因此而将战火引致中国境内，斯大林便极有可能根据中苏同盟条约，派几十万苏联远东军进入东北，援助中国作战。实际上，斯大林10月5日给毛泽东的电报已经表达出这种意向。这种结果是毛泽东无论如何也不愿意看到的。（10月13日决策）

第四，维护中苏同盟的战略态势以保障中共政权的巩固。当斯大林明确表示苏联空军不能协同志愿军作战的意见后，在军事上与美军抗衡的保障条件已经消失，出国作战的前景自然十分暗淡。相反，如果初战不利，被美军打回，还可能引火烧身，造成更不利于边境安全的局面。这时毛泽东的说法是：“即使打不过美国也要打”。显然，向南推进“国境线”在这里已经不是主要考虑了。这就是说，在保障边境安全和中国主权之外，毛泽东应该还有更深层的考虑。中国共产党刚刚建立的是一个经过多年战乱洗劫的贫穷落后的国家，国内是满目疮痍、百废待兴、社会动荡，国外是帝国主义的敌视和压迫，再加上蒋介石虎视眈眈，伺机反攻大陆，在这种情况下，如果中国出兵作战不利，无疑会给新政权的生存带来威胁。新中国必须借助社会主义苏联的力量，借助中苏同盟的政治威慑，来保证中

4 以下内容参见沈志华：《毛泽东、斯大林与朝鲜战争》（珍藏本），广州：广东人民出版社，2013年，第四章第三节。

5 参见沈志华：《毛泽东与东方情报局——亚洲革命主导权的转移》，《华东师范大学学报》2011年第6期，第27-37页。

6 王焰等编：《彭德怀传》，北京：当代中国出版社，1993年，第47页；彭德怀关于高岗问题的一次谈话，1955年2月8日，彭办主任王焰抄记，私人收藏。
国的安全和新生政权的巩固。然而，中苏同盟条约的签订已使斯大林对毛泽东的信任荡然无存，中国只能以出兵朝鲜的方式表明自己还是以苏联为首的社会主义阵营的成员，从而取得斯大林的信任。（10月18日决策）

中文第三版新增加的主要内容。7

1、关于林彪称病，不愿挂帅出征的问题。这个问题在西方读者中或许并没有引起关注，但在中国却是社会上一直津津乐道的一段传闻。通过对中国史料的详细考证，我想说明的是，由于林彪重病在身，毛泽东并未考虑请他挂帅；毛泽东最初考虑的志愿军领导人是粟裕，而粟裕因感到不便指挥林彪的部队而称病不出；林彪虽不主张出战，但仍积极参与了出兵朝鲜的谋划，并受到毛泽东的信任和倚重。

2、中朝两国领导人之间的矛盾和分歧。在三年战争中，中国与朝鲜之间存在着一系列严重的分歧，这表现在军队指挥权、占领汉城是否继续南下、朝鲜铁路管理权、是否接受美国的停战条件等许多重大问题上。值得注意的是，在所有中朝之间发生矛盾的问题上，斯大林最后都是站在了中国的立场上。这一方面反映出，在中国派兵入朝后斯大林改变了对毛泽东的看法，中苏同盟关系得到了巩固和加强，另一方面也表明所谓中朝之间“用鲜血凝成的友谊”实际上是一个历史神话。

3、毛泽东在朝鲜战争中的重大决策失误。1951年1月联合国提出在各方面都对中国十分有利的停火议案，美国政府左右为难，只得表示同意，而把赌注压在中国不会接受这个议案之上。中国领导人被胜利冲昏了头脑，错误估计形势，且缺乏在国际舞台上的外交经验，轻易地拒绝了联合国的停火议案。这一决策的后果是，中国彻底失去了在朝鲜战场及国际舞台上的有利地位，从此在政治、外交、军事等各方面都陷了完全被动的局面。针对中国社会上对毛泽东出兵决策是否明智表示怀疑的看法，本书认为：实际上，由于战争延长两年而使中国付出的重大代价，并不是1950年10月出兵决策造成的，而是1951年1月的收兵决策造成的。

7以下内容参见沈志华：《毛泽东、斯大林与朝鲜战争》（珍藏本），第四章第二节、第五章第三节、余论。