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Introduction by Akira Iriye

**Emily Rosenberg, ed. *A World Connecting, 1870-1945*.** Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013. ISBN: 9780674047211 (hardcover, \$39.95/£29.95/€36.00)

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Introduction by Akira Iriye, Harvard University

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As co-editor (with Jürgen Osterhammel) of the six-volume *History of the World*, of which *A World Connecting* is Volume Five and the first to be published, I could not be happier to read these excellent, thought-provoking reviews. Their comments make as much stimulating reading as the chapters they comment on, all of which helps us to understand how historians today grapple with the opportunities opened up by the emerging genre of world (or global) history.

Of course, there is nothing new about the idea of world history, which has been written about for several decades. But each generation of historians may write its own world history. In planning this specific multi-volume history of the world that was to be published simultaneously in the United States and in Germany, we decided to focus on themes that stress encounters, connections, and interactions among people and their communities. The titles (some of which are still tentative) of the six volumes reflect this emphasis: Volume 1 (to 600), *Making Civilizations*; Volume 2 (600 to 1350), *Mobility and Diversity*; Volume 3 (1350-1750), *Empires and Encounters*; Volume 4 (1750-1870), *An Emerging Modern World*; Volume 5 (1870-1945), *A World Connecting*; and Volume 6 (since 1945), *Global Interdependence*.

Such a scheme results in skewing the history of the world toward the present, with three out of the six volumes dealing with the period since the mid-eighteenth century. This may be criticized as being unabashedly presentist, but the volume editors, the contributors to each volume, and the publishers (Harvard University Press and C. H. Beck) are all eager to present a history of the world that is reflective of the current scholarly trends that (as Erez Manela's essay notes) stress global linkages, go beyond the usual Western-centered presentations, and provoke fruitful controversy. And the reviews here do seem to indicate that we have succeeded in this last regard. All the reviewers, themselves eminent historians grappling with global themes, offer thought-provoking essays, revealing that the study of modern world history (or global history) is still at its inception so that we can all make our contributions by exploring further the methodologies and conceptualizations involved.

This volume contains an introduction by volume editor Emily Rosenberg, and five substantive chapters (which will in due course be published as separate books), each of which is given a thorough examination by a reviewer. Rather than summarizing the five reviews, I shall discuss below some of the common themes and questions that emerge from them.

First of all, the reviewers are interested in the question of chronology. What is the justification for starting this volume in 1870 and ending it in 1945? Does this (admittedly a rather conventional) periodization inhibit a thorough understanding of the themes discussed by the chapters, ranging from modern state formation and behavior to the commodification of mass culture? Some reviewers seem particularly unhappy that the volume ends with 1945, noting that many of the themes presented in the chapters persist

beyond the end of the Second World War. This is a valid criticism, and I can only plead that the chapters in the subsequent volume will try to relate post-1945 world history to what preceded it.

Apart from the question of whether 1870 or 1945 makes a valid starting or ending date, Manela raises a fundamental question of how we may deal with the issue of “change over time...in a global history that seeks to cover so many disparate currents.” The subjects discussed in this volume (the modern state, imperialism, migrations, the world economy, and cultural trends) all have their distinctive chronologies and sub-chronologies. To force them into a periodizing scheme determined by wars among a few great powers may not quite work for all of them. This is clearly a problem that we shall continue to grapple with.

On the other hand, the editor and authors of this volume do seem justified in couching their narratives within the overall framework of growing interconnections – whether for good or for evil – among people and regions of the world. That is to say, the world before 1870 and after 1945 was interconnected in some different ways, as the preceding and the following volumes will try to discuss. One would like to hope that the reviewers of this volume will come back to comment on these other volumes when they are published.

Second, do the analyses presented in the chapters add up to what Charles Bright calls “a genuinely global narrative”? By that he seems to mean an innovative way of putting together familiar events, so that we may relate developments in various parts of the world within an overall framework. “A world connecting” obviously is a way to do so, but Bright would stress that in an increasingly interconnected world, everyone “was forced, with a new immediacy, into more continuous, inescapable, and dangerous engagement with everyone else.” It is to be hoped that the essays in this volume show that the consequences of global connectedness were often unpredictable, some more productive of human wellbeing than others. That is one fruitful way to understand the human condition in a globalizing age.

Such an observation leads to the question of power, a third question that the reviewers raise. The relationship between global interconnectedness, on one hand, and “unequal conditions of global power systems” (Bright) on the other, is a question that other volumes of this History of the World will take up, but for this particular volume, it is of obvious relevance inasmuch as globalization and imperialism, on one hand, and international interdependence and interstate warfare, on the other, occurred simultaneously.

Fourth, at the end of the spectrum from power-holders are those who live “without reference to...forces of connection,” to quote from Anne Foster’s review. The question she raises, “how power is experienced by ordinary people who live with imperialism” can be extended to embrace all ‘ordinary people’ living in an increasingly interconnected world. Some may never even ‘experience’ globalization, while others may become willing recipients of it so that, as Kristin Hoganson’s essay notes, “commodity chains” provide a “lens into transnational, if not global, economic relations.” Still, as Donna Gabaccia points out, there are many ways of mass absorption into global culture. As she puts it, “does culture travel differently when it is mediated – as books, newspapers, and images – rather

than a component of embodied, transcultural human encounter?" This is a fascinating question, which is of key importance for a volume like this where each chapter takes up a different theme. Gabaccia would like to "bring increasingly rich historiographies on trade and migration into a livelier and more extensive dialogue." To which we may add the historiographies on the modern state, on imperialism, and on global cultures.

In sum, the chapter contributors and their reviewers seem in agreement that there was, in Hoganson's words, "a certain unevenness in the overall picture of global connections" during the period under consideration. One would hope that the other five volumes in this *History of the World* will take up the challenge and contribute further to enriching our understanding of human unity and diversity.

*Editor's Note:* Each of the reviewers focused on a specific section of *A World Connecting, 1870-1945* which included an introduction by Emily S. Rosenberg and

Charles S. Maier, "Leviathan 2.0: Inventing Modern Statehood"

Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton, "Empires and the Reach of the Global"

Dirk Hoerder, "Migrations and Belongings"

Steven C. Topik and Allen Wells, "Commodity Chains in a Global Economy"

Emily S. Rosenberg, "Transnational Currents in a Shrinking World"

### Participants:

**Emily S. Rosenberg** is Professor of History at the University of California, Irvine. She is author of *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945*; *Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930*; *A Date Which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory*; and coauthor of *Liberty, Equality, Power: A History of the American People* (6th ed., 2011). She has served as president of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR); an editor of the *Oxford Companion to United States History*; a Board member of the Organization of American Historians; and co-edits the "American Encounters, Global Interactions" book series for Duke University Press.

**Akira Iriye** is Charles Warren Professor of American History, Emeritus, Harvard University. His publications include *Cultural Internationalism and World Order*, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World*, and *The Globalizing of America: American Foreign Relations, 1913-1945*.

**Charles Bright** is the Arthur J. Thurnau Professor and Professor of History at the University of Michigan. He has worked on political history (*State-making and Social Movements* with Susan Harding), prison history (*The Powers that Punish: Prison and Politics in the Era of the "Big House", 1920-1955*), oral history-theater projects on Detroit history, and a series of essays on global history (with Michael Geyer) that we're trying to work up into a book. He is currently editing a collection of letters covering his grandfather's career (1911-1949) as a missionary in China.

**Anne L. Foster** is Associate Professor of History at Indiana State University. She earned her Ph.D. at Cornell University. Her first book, *Projections of Power: The United States and Europe in Colonial Southeast Asia, 1919-1941* was published by Duke University Press in 2010. She is currently writing a book tentatively titled *The State of Opium*, an exploration of the international and transnational issues surrounding the movement to regulate and eventually prohibit opium in Southeast Asia during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

**Donna R. Gabaccia** is Professor of History and former Director of the Immigration History Research Center at the University of Minnesota. She is author of many books and articles on immigrant life in the U.S. (*Foreign Relations: Global Perspectives on American Immigration*, Princeton, 2012), food studies (*We Are what Eat: Ethnic Food and the Making of Americans*, Cambridge, 1998), on immigrant gender, class, and labor (*From the Other Side: Women, Gender and Immigrant Life in the United States, 1820-1980*, Bloomington 1994), and Italian migration around the world (*Italy's Many Diasporas*, London and Seattle, 2000). Gabaccia teaches world history, has longstanding interests in interdisciplinary methodologies, and served as president of the Social Science History Association in 2008. She is currently co-authoring a book with sociologist Katharine Donato on the so-called feminization of international migration.

**Kristin Hoganson**, a Yale Ph.D., is a Professor of History at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. She is the author of *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine American Wars* and *Consumers' Imperium: The Global Production of American Domesticity, 1865-1920*. Her current research reconsiders the heartland myth in light of nineteenth-century mobility and connections. An article drawn from this larger work, "Meat in the Middle: Converging Borderlands in the U.S. Midwest, 1835-1900" (*Journal of American History*, March 2012) recently won the Wayne D. Rasmussen Award offered by the Agricultural History Society and the Ray Allen Billington Prize offered by the Western History Association.

**Erez Manela** is Professor of History at Harvard University, where he teaches international history and the history of the United States in the world. His publications include the prize-winning book *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford, 2007) and (as co-editor) *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective* (Harvard, 2010).

Review by Charles Bright, University of Michigan

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Review of Charles Maier, "Leviathan 2.0: Inventing Modern Statehood" in Emily S. Rosenberg, ed. *A World Connecting, 1870-1945*. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012: 29-282.

Charles Maier's *Leviathan 2.0* offers a history of the "long century of modern statehood" (32-33) from 1850 to 1970. It's a fulsome elaboration of his earlier essays on the territorialization of the nation state.<sup>1</sup> Like his book on empires<sup>2</sup>, it is learned, wide-ranging, at times rambling and discursive, but always stimulating and provocative – a book-length meditation on some key themes of global development with an eye fastened on contemporary scholarly debates. A few words of review can hardly do it full justice.

Maier's main purpose is to trace the general reconstitution of states world-wide from the middle decades of the nineteenth century. Earlier dynastic states (*Leviathan 1.0* in Maier's metaphor) – annealed in warfare and insistent (in Europe at least) on absolute sovereignty, externally in relation to other sovereigns and internally in suzerainty over local privileges and rights -- gave way after 1850 to a second instantiation under new power elites who were bent on a general tightening of central administration and its organizational overhaul, a deepening permeation of society, and a more definitive territorial mobilization of resources for competition on a global terrain. This new *Leviathan* asserted claims to power over entire populations – normative coordination rather than mere domination – in order to release, in Foucault's terms, new powers and capabilities.<sup>3</sup> For Maier this state-form persisted into the middle decades of the last century, although he remains ambivalent about the precise point of closure – preferring to remain within the time-frame of the larger volume which ends in 1945, while pushing his own discussion into the 1970s and 80s, where he sees signs perhaps of a *Leviathan 3.0* rearing its head.

Maier begins at the Little Big Horn and on an elegiac note – reciting the last stand of indigenous peoples in sprawling prairie spaces, or at Isandlwana and Adwa, in the Sudan and the Rif, and across the Asian Khanates and Patagonia, as they were forcibly subjugated and their nomadism cornered in political units "organized to permeate and master

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<sup>1</sup> Charles S. Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era," *American Historical Review* 103, no. 3 (2000); ; Charles S. Maier, "Transformations of Territoriality, 1600 - 2000," in *Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien*, ed. Gunilla Budde, Sebastian Conrad, and Oliver Janz (Göttingen: Vadenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006).

<sup>2</sup> Charles S. Maier, *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and its Predecessors* (Cambridge, Mass. ; London: Harvard University Press, 2007).

<sup>3</sup> Perhaps the most evocative demonstration of how the coordinated norms of a modern disciplinary society can generate new powers and capacities is in Foucault's discussion of "Docile Bodies" in Part 3 or his *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison* (trans. by Alan Sheridan) New York: Vintage Books, 1995

territory” (32-33). This was “a genuine’ moment’ in world history” (93) with deep antecedents; Maier carefully tracks them as a dual movement across the early-modern period and through a series of comparative categories. On the one hand, there was an accumulating “institutional meltdown” of older state-forms from the mid-eighteenth century. He is cautious here – noting that while certain rhythms of development became more aligned as the world “interacted more intensely and systematically”,<sup>4</sup> much ordinary life remained untouched and different states continued to “present a persisting individuality” (78). Still, “similar pressures and similar rifts can be detected” as the effects of marketization in land and labor intersected with “ever-widening pressure from the West”, in both expanding trade and military interventions. Assembling comparative parallels from around the world, Maier sees “an epoch of coordinated transition” between the 1810s and 1840s, a pile-up of ‘er-words’ – denser, greater, fuller – that then collided with a second movement, one of blowback, in the form of religious revivals and messianic cults (Wahabism, Mormonism, Sufism, and the Great Awakening) and a series of revolts (in Europe, China, India), (216-29). These insurgencies and the violence they engendered were all, in turn, put down or contained by new elite modernizers and state rationalizers who proceeded to rebuild states from the top down, using new technologies and administrative techniques to unify territory, integrate internal markets, mobilize national resources and productive capacities, tap foreign investment, and foster national identities and solidarities. By 1880, “the world...had been transformed – not by revolution, but by strong leaders.” A “new recipe for governing” had emerged: “to develop the territory, keep power in the hands of men of science, expertise, and property, and prepare for a continuing military rivalry.” (148-9)

This recipe applied to the ‘civilized’ world – “understood as Europe with its American outliers, the British dominions, and the ambitious Japanese.” (149). Why so many of these states “underwent analogous transformations at the same time” is explained by the “pressures for transformation [that] arose within many societies simultaneously.” (93-4). Deploying a series of comparative categories (representation, party politics, secularization, segmented constitutionalism and its exclusions, controlled transformation, ethnic conflict and nationalisms – the list goes on), Maier tells the story of Leviathan 2.0 into the twentieth century as the struggle to contain, control, and organize these largely internal pressures through a mixture of repression and concession together with variably credible promises of political reform, economic wellbeing and national security. Other more systemic, transnational comparisons are passed over. Maier is implicitly aware of the important differences in the trajectories of development among ‘civilized’ modern states – as, for example, between the organization of vast territorial hinterlands by Russia and the United States, the more intense self-mobilization – even self-exploitation – of industrial newcomers like Germany and, belatedly, Japan, not to mention the crash, terror-driven ‘late’ industrialization of the Soviet Union, and the very different paths taken by Britain, as well as France, in trying to evade the pains of domestic readjustment through long-range territorial expansion and a more effective organization of colonial empires. Everywhere, as

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<sup>4</sup> Here following C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2004).

Maier contends, states were “trump” (149), but his comparative method may obscure the equally important fact that Leviathan came in many shapes and sizes and its survival depended on how viable these variations were in a global system of competitive states at particular moments and in shifting conjunctures.

Some did it better than others, and “of course there were laggards....” (150); for Maier, Russia, China, the Ottomans, and the Mexicans all faltered in the struggle for a modern politics. It was “hard to nativize” (160) a western model to accommodate Ottoman, Qing, and Romanov realities. State-led efforts at modernization destabilized institutional claims of rulership; state centralization stirred regional and ethnic opposition; change put strain on the rickety mechanisms of representation, etc., – all of which laid the less “successful” open to western “strategic rivalries and foreign investors seeking profits” which, in turn, produced the blowback of nationalist politics, even revolution, that came, in time, to frame the discourses around imperialism and underdevelopment (212-3). Maier reviews the revolutions at the beginning of the twentieth century – in Persia, Russia, Mexico, the Ottoman and Chinese empires – as examples of thwarted catch up; they failed to overcome backwardness and remained hobbled by old institutions – Russia and China dominated by reactionary women (the Tsarina and the Dowager Empress); Mexico and the Ottoman empire ruled by aging autocrats (President Porfirio Diaz and Sultan Abdülhamid II). He ends this comparative assessment with the contentiously bold conclusion that these revolts “formed a delayed and defective version of the successful national reconstitutions of the mid-nineteenth century” in which “belated decomposing states would help drag the successful national constructions of half a century earlier into the great war that overtook them all.” (213-4).

The scale of violence in the twentieth century – which of course was generated by advanced industrial, not “decomposing” states – produced full-scale state-led mobilizations. Grappling with conditions of war, revolution, civil unrest and total self-organization generated various emergency measures, presumably only for the duration. Leviathan 2.0 became an exceptional state. Here Maier engages in a long discussion of the parallels among totalitarian, fascist and communist regimes. Were these the “perverted culmination” (269) of Leviathan 2.0 – “wartime states erected on a permanent basis?” (271). On balance, Maier sees more at work: “the notion of differentiated humanity that race and war made natural when confronting others” was here turned in upon national populations and made “a project of purification within.” (271) This discussion may understate the extent to which a competitive power system forced all states to turn inward upon domestic societies, tearing them apart and reassembling their capacities in the name of survival. Viewed from this systemic angle, state-building involved very distinct projects – liberal, communist, fascist, imperial, militarist, developmental – devised at different moments in conditions that were never equal and from options that were not equally available. While Maier shows a deep and commendable distaste for state excesses and makes a convincing case for working through and understanding obedience to criminal power, his attempt to bundle Nazi and Soviet practice together into a the polar opposite of ‘normal’ state practice (embodied in the ‘renormalized’ welfare state after 1945) is not entirely persuasive and causes him to skip almost entirely over the Cold War.



This is obviously an unapologetically Euro-centric history – necessarily so when the nation state is taken as the given outcome, a found and ready vessel carrying comparable features for comparative analysis. Maier’s treatment of the gradual spread and diffusion of this specific state form to the wider world is judicious and ringed round with caveats as well as calls to “generalize extravagantly” (42), but the story – cast from its western center – inevitably brings with it the lags, gaps, short-falls, and belated bids that appear always elsewhere in comparison to a putative western norm. This is not only old-fashioned history, but it deprives Maier of a full grasp of the mutual construction of the modern state in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and of the ways in which the hierarchies and categories he uses were formed relationally and reciprocally in the process of state-making. This is not just a problem of Euro-centrism. The processional train of comparative analysis which aligns everyone in the same rat race may provide a global reach, but it lacks a genuinely global narrative. Like so many of us doing global history, Maier has trouble developing a narrative through-line that does not fall into familiar frames and stories. While he is heedful of complaints that world history is too abstract and needs agents, and he is too good a historian to ignore Chulalongkorn the Great of Siam and the Chinese Empress Dowager Cixi entirely, his account is often dismissive of the reforms and modernizing efforts of others, especially when these do not conform to western norms, and it is quite overweighted with the details of European development, becoming at times, and especially with regard to central Europe – Italy above all (138-43; 238-42) – reminiscent of older diplomatic histories in which princely families unite, statesmen maneuver, and capital cities think and act. Human agency is effaced – or doomed to failure – except among the ‘successful’ states setting the global norm. This imbalance can become tedious, and the swift treatments of the non-western world (he avoids colonial empires, presumably because the next chapter covers them) is also conducive of small errors of detail (the Liaodong Peninsula was not, at last check, in Guangdong Province – 255).

It might be helpful to suggest that greater emphasis on the simultaneity of the changes described here could open a more systemic through-line across the comparative landscape Maier lays out. The violence of the mid-nineteenth century and the vulnerabilities this exposed strained social cohesion and political legitimacy in many places, separately, but also simultaneously, and forced everyone into urgent efforts at self-renewal and reinvention. This was a systemic mandate grounded in unequal power relations; the metaphoric equality of a rat race was entirely fictitious. It was the simultaneity of crises around the world, and the fact that these ran in tandem and were coeval with the dramatic tilting of the global balance of power in favor of western-based production and destruction, that insured new and generative dynamics. Aggressive assertions of a ‘new’ imperialism encountered everywhere, a world in upheaval, fully in motion and scrambling to grapple with specific crises of social order and authority. Everybody was running faster from the middle decades of the nineteenth century – as the buffers of distance collapsed and time-lapses were foreshortened. Everyone was forced, with a new immediacy, into more continuous, inescapable, and dangerous engagement with everyone else, opening possibilities and opportunities, but also assailing all with a greater exposure and an amplification of fear. Calculations of risk and the devising of strategies for survival were on the table for everyone, and everyone knew it. How to be modern was as urgent a preoccupation in Shanghai or Buenos Aires as it was in Berlin or Paris.

We are here beyond the making of a connected world and dealing with the fact – the done deal – of connectivity, now moving in multiple directions at once. And what was true laterally across spaces was also the case vertically within regimes and hierarchies of power, as Maier describes. From the mid-nineteenth century, projects of self-strengthening and renovation entailed an elaboration of state power, the telescoping of internal distances between centers and subordinates, an increasing interference in local domains and a foreshortening of the negotiated subordinations, the layered and partial sovereignties, and the “polite fictions” that across much of the world had allowed local autonomies to co-exist with the acknowledgement of suzerainty.<sup>5</sup> It is useful to think of the dynamics of this situation as a series of choices about how to change in order to hold out against, adapt to, or appropriate from a world of continuous and inescapable interconnectivity those “tools of continuation” necessary for survival. This was a new, global situation, taking shape, not as an acceleration along a continuum of European expansionism, nor in a wild diffusion of western power and practices over the rest, but in the simultaneous and often quite febrile scramble of people around the world to secure and maintain control over their destinies by means of a greater, more sustained engagement with all others. Whether these scrambles for self-renewal succeeded, or collapsed under new overlays of western power, they began as proactive interventions, they developed in competitive synchronicity as distinct projects, and they continued within and under the constraints and unequal conditions of global power systems right through the twentieth century. Perhaps this is a way to capture the mutual labor that went into making the global condition that confronted everyone from the middle decades of the nineteenth century.<sup>6</sup>

And it was out of control. As the “great divergence”<sup>7</sup> turned into an equally powerful and inescapable convergence of peoples and power systems, it set off chain reactions of acceleration, which were mutually reinforcing and again simultaneous. The graphs of production, extraction, trade, investment, population movement and growth (topics of other chapters in the book at hand) all shot up and out the roof from the mid-nineteenth century on – relentlessly and irreversibly (despite famines and depressions), feeding and amplifying each other and turning interaction into interdependency. This was often the effect of state promotion – as dramatic in the grain exports of Russia or cotton production in India as in the industrial output of the west. And the energies released in this general acceleration fed the competitive juices of Great- Power rivalries, the intensity of which

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<sup>5</sup> The phrase is from Selim Deringil, ““They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery”: The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45, no. 2 (2003): p. 338.

<sup>6</sup> A fuller exposition of this perspective may be found in Charles Bright and Michael Geyer, “Benchmarks of Globalization: the Global Condition, 1850-2010” in Douglas Taylor Northrop, *A Companion to World History*, Wiley-Blackwell companions to history (Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012). pp. 285-300.

<sup>7</sup> In the sense used by Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: Europe, China, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).

escaped the emerging networks of transnational association and rule making (along with Norman Angel's dreams of perpetual peace<sup>8</sup>) and repeatedly challenged and destabilized hegemonic bids to impose hierarchies of order and rules of engagement, whether by Britain before 1914, Germany and a passel of rivals between the wars, or American and Soviet bids at competitive stabilization during the Cold War.

In all this, the new state form – Leviathan 2.0 – proved a key means of engaging a global condition that affected all. This new condition was the external pressure that had to be contained, controlled, and aligned with domestic pressures. States were all bound to develop (change). Everybody tried, their efforts constantly modified and adapted to changing conditions. Certainly some staggered and stalled out – their minatory failure helping to drive the anxious engines of competitive development even harder. Maier is right: the costs of not developing were great and the degrees of movement proved variable. But this should not mask the extent of change that even the most sclerotic states managed. China and the Ottoman Empire may not have been able to keep pace with a relentless global acceleration, but they did manage to stay afloat (and later transform themselves); they fielded modern armies in the twentieth century; and most importantly, they were playing in the same game albeit from different starting points. And conversely, we should not underrate the deep destabilization of the west, catching up with its own rapidly changing modern self; territorial projects of self-mobilization were never complete, and under stress they sometimes went completely off the rails, with massively horrifying consequences.

It is not clear how Maier wants to end his story. He sounds a hopeful note, as the exceptional state of wartime emergency retreated after 1945, and the “re-normalized” welfare states of the west, next to the “seemingly stable single party” (276) socialist states and the militarized developmentalist states of the global south brought some equilibrium. Competition was less in emergency mode, perhaps; but the Cold War is very much part of Maier's story – attempts by rival hegemonies to stabilize hierarchy and enforce control, while engendering precipitant escalations of production and destruction that took the planet to the edge of extinction in military MADness and ecological destruction. It may well be that Leviathan 2.0 will end with a whimper – that the wreckage of states we see all around indicates that state-centered responses to the global condition have run their course. It may also be, as Maier suggests, that states are “becoming more responsive to claims of justice and human rights” (278) and that the accumulation of the lateral disciplines of network power are gradually containing competitive national forces.<sup>9</sup> States are becoming less exclusive, more porous and territorially less absolute, and as Maier notes, many of the

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<sup>8</sup> His famous prediction that global interconnectivity rendered interstate war unlikely was published as Leviathan 2.0 was about to release its full potential for violence: Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion; a Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to their Economic and Social Advantage* (London: W. Heinemann, 1910).

<sup>9</sup> A strong argument on this is David Singh Grewal, *Network Power: the Social Dynamics of Globalization* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). For a more skeptical view, Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: the History of an Idea* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2012).

big liberation upheavals of the late twentieth century – against apartheid, military dictatorships, and socialist systems – were revolts against state authority. But they were also rebellions against the systemic terms of hegemonic order deployed by Soviet and American state power, which may suggest that we have come to the end of a particular configuration of globality in which a single power – or powers in tandem – can hope to impose hegemonically a regime of order on the global engagement of all with all.

Review by Anne L. Foster, Indiana State University

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Review of Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton, "Empires and the Reach of the Global" in Emily Rosenberg, ed. *A World Connecting, 1870-1945*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012: 285-431.

*Things Fall Apart: Imperialism in Global History, 1870-1945*

“The white man is very clever. He came quietly and peaceably with his religion. We were amused at his foolishness and allowed him to stay. Now he has won our brothers, and our clan can no longer act as one. He has put a knife on the things that held us together and we have fallen apart.”<sup>1</sup>

*Patih* (a Javanese official): “You still owe the state 90 cents.”

Saminist (Javanese peasant): “I have not borrowed anything from the state.”

*Patih*: “You have to pay taxes though?”

Saminist: “Wong Sikep (i.e., the Saminist) knows no taxes.”

*Patih*: “Are you crazy or pretending to be crazy?”

Saminist: “I am not crazy nor do I pretend to be.”

*Patih*: “You used to pay taxes; why not now?”

Saminist: “Formerly is formerly; now is now. Why doesn’t the state stop asking for money?”

*Patih*: “The state spends money too for the native population. If the state did not have enough money, it would be impossible to maintain the roads properly.”

Saminist: “If we find the state of the roads troubling us, we’ll fix them ourselves.”

*Patih*: “So you won’t pay the tax?”

Saminist: “Wong Sikep knows no tax.”<sup>2</sup>

The Samin movement, whose adherents are called Saminists, began in the late nineteenth century on Java, the heart of the Dutch empire in what is now Indonesia. Its founder, Surontiko Samin, was an illiterate peasant, as were nearly all Saminists. Saminists resisted the demands of the state, as the exchange above records, primarily by refusing to acknowledge that such demands existed. Indeed, when the Saminists persisted in not acknowledging their obligation to pay taxes, the government seized their property, sold it to pay the tax and attempted to return the excess from the sale. Saminists refused to accept this money, with one Saminist explaining: “As far as I know, I haven’t sold anything.” As readers may imagine, Dutch and Javanese officials found the Saminists perplexing, frustrating, and more than a little frightening. Histories of Indonesian nationalism often

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<sup>1</sup> Obierika to Okonkwo in *Things Fall Apart* by Chinua Achebe (New York: Norton, 2009), p. 100.

<sup>2</sup> This exchange, which took place in court as the Saminist was brought to trial for failure to pay tax, is recorded in H. Benda and L. Castles, “The Samin Movement,” *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 125, 2 (1969) 207-240, exchange on p. 225. The term “Wong Sikep” can be interpreted in several ways, one of which signifies those who are full members of a village community.

used to begin with a brief discussion of Saminism, evidence of a proto-nationalist mindset in the late nineteenth century, not least because Dutch officials feared a Saminist uprising.

But since Saminism neither connected to any external ideology or movement, nor ended with the creation of an independent Indonesia, the association with nationalism never quite fit. But if it was not an anti-Dutch, proto-nationalist movement, which it appears not to have been, then what was it? And, more importantly for this review, what might the Samin movement suggest to us about how we must look at the fact, the trajectory, the problematic, and the challenge of empire in a global history of 1870-1945? One question it raises, among several, is how power is experienced by ordinary people who live with imperialism.

The other epigraph, from the classic *Things Fall Apart*, is probably as familiar to many readers of this review as the Samin movement is unfamiliar. Many of us perhaps first encountered imperialism as an academic subject when assigned to read this book in high school or college. Indeed, the book has been assigned and recommended so often that it may have lost its ability to convey its message as powerfully as it did soon after publication. But, the quotation above encapsulates one important theme of the novel which also is critical for us to consider as we think about the relationship(s) between empire and global history. Global histories tend to focus on the many trends which bring the world and its peoples closer, to explore that which crosses and transcends borders. By its very nature, a coherent global history must explore events, trends, or developments which are common to a large number of people in diverse parts of the world, as the title of the book under review suggests: *A World Connecting*. But, as Obierika expresses in the epigraph, their experience of those trends may not be merely different, but indeed may be the occasion for the world 'falling apart' rather than coming together. I will return to the experience of 'falling apart' below, and what it means for how we think about empire and world history.

*A World Connecting* is an ambitious, thought-provoking, exciting work. A world history of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries provides a welcome antidote to those who believe globalization was invented in approximately 1989, but, more importantly, this volume focuses on five key themes of modern globalization: the modern state, empires, migrations, economics (trade and production), and social and cultural networks. The themes are well chosen, distinct yet reinforcing in their importance and effects as themes in world history. Empire, the subject of the chapter under review here, self-evidently belongs: as a political, economic, cultural, and social process, imperialism did as much as anything to bring different parts of the world into connection. Like the book, this chapter, titled "Empires and the Reach of the Global", sets large goals and prompts us to think about the 'reach' of empire, geographically of course, but also in the myriad effects of empire on how people lived, imagined their worlds, and interacted with their environments.

The reach of this chapter is impressive. Antoinette Burton and Tony Ballantyne, writing in a remarkably uniform voice, appear to have mastered diverse, extensive historiographies, and draw their examples from Africa, Asia (east, south and southeast), Australia and New Zealand, and Pacific Islands. Scholars of one imperial power, or of a particular geographical region, will learn something about another power or area on almost every page. There is

some attention, too, to what we might call the layers of empire. Our caricature of empire is of a highly bureaucratized, intrusive, and coercive state which endeavors to re-shape religious beliefs, economic structures and relations, political institutions, and cultures in a geographically delimited, colonized area. But Burton and Ballantyne draw examples from the equally numerous imperialized spaces where colonial power was incomplete, contested, or confined primarily to the economic realm. Scholars have had difficulty escaping the pull of cartography, in which maps shaded to show imperial relations through the global spread of colors emanating from Europe, Japan and the United States seem to suggest an equally smooth and even spread of power across all the 'red' or 'green' or 'yellow' dependencies. The maps convey an important truth about empire, but not the only or full truth about the ways in which power operated. Burton and Ballantyne are more sensitive than many to this complexity. They also make an admirable and often successful effort to bring together two (often) competing approaches to the study of empire: the cultural and the political/economic.

I don't envy Burton and Ballantyne's task in figuring out how to shape a chapter about the sprawling, diverse, burgeoning field of imperial studies in such a way as to convey the outlines of that field to non-experts and tie the main themes of the field to issues in global history. They have made some smart choices. The introductory section of the chapter serves both theoretical and informational purposes. This section reminds (or informs) readers of the scale and scope of empires during the period 1870-1945, and especially that not all empires were European or modern. More theoretically, they prompt us to consider the challenges of attempting to study the 'imperial,' and particularly its relation to the 'global.' It is not merely that there are such diverse experiences of imperialism, but also, and more importantly, that those experiences cannot be neatly contained. For instance, migration patterns may have been largely shaped by the realities of imperialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, but global trends in production and trade with differing relations to imperialism did as well, and migration patterns themselves worked to enable and create imperial power (and weakness). More traditional historians might have despaired at the stubborn unwillingness of imperialism to submit to a historical narrative, but Burton and Ballantyne express skepticism about the value of a traditional narrative to tell this story.

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first explores the territoriality of empire and the global; the second examines how new technologies (factories, transportation, communication) remade empire in a global frame; the third section explores the transnational connections of people and ideas which grew out of imperialism and fundamentally re-shaped ideas about global governance. These three approaches are in many ways traditional: the acquisition of territory, effects of the industrial revolution, and circumstances of the growth of independence movements. The approach within each section is far from traditional, however. In using the Bandung Conference of 1955, the meeting of twenty-nine countries, most newly independent, at which the non-aligned movement is usually said to have begun, to highlight the types of transnational connections and learning which occurred during imperial rule, for instance, they explore the ways in which Bandung revealed how participants conceived of the relationship of gender and power as much as they discuss the particular forms of anti-colonial political sentiments

expressed at the Conference (390-92). The section on space begins with familiar actors: military men who fought against indigenous peoples, and created and enforced newly drawn borders. The story then broadens to explore the how military conquest and the land that was conquered influenced each other, and how the land changed as it was put to the task of supporting the occupiers. Sexual and sometimes domestic relationships also accompanied occupation, with varying consequences for sexual and racial order (318-21). The authors' consistent and thoughtful attention to the multi-faceted functioning of imperialism is a key strength of this chapter.

A book of this size and authoritative nature, the latter indicated by the stature of the contributing authors, all of whom are leading experts in their fields, has an almost impossible task. We look to this volume for answers to many of the questions which vex us regarding how to think about the relation of 'global history' to the smaller bits of history which each of us claims some mastery over. Inevitably, no one volume can answer these questions and indeed perhaps the best such a volume can do is raise the best new questions for us to explore.

Burton and Ballantyne have pointed out some of the places where it might be useful for scholars of empire to go next: they clearly suggest that it is time to put aside debates, ultimately foolish, about the primacy of culture or politics or economics, and pay close attention to the interwoven nature of these, along with other approaches. Not merely a cultural turn or a spatial turn, but an interconnected turn, perhaps? They also call into question our desire to draw boundaries, around territories, or knowledge, or groups of people (racial, gendered, national, etc.), and suggest instead that one of the most interesting and important outcomes of imperial encounters is that of the category of 'multi' or 'between.' Imperialism prompted people to create allegiances across traditional boundaries in their societies, to build identities which had not existed previously, and to envision their communities as encompassing different geographical as well as personal terrain.

Burton and Ballantyne's examination of the global and the imperial, not by use of the definite article to imply there is one unified exemplar of either, provides us with invaluable insights into each, as well as about the ways they illumine each other. There are great benefits to the approach they have taken, as with the approach of this volume as a whole. But in the midst of these benefits, have there been losses? Are aspects of imperial, or global, history obscured or slighted by studying them in tandem?

My two opening epigraphs evoke the issues which nagged at me as I read this chapter. Imperial history, a label I am pleased to see attached to my own work, has at its heart a dilemma. It exists only because of the imperialistic activities of imperialists. The story of imperialism is the story of the at least partially successful exercise of power by one group over another group. We can and do explore imperialism as a relationship, and demonstrate the ways in which indigenous peoples resisted and shaped the imperial relationship themselves. We can, and do, demonstrate that imperialists did not achieve all they hoped, that their power was constrained, and that they were themselves changed in unforeseen



and sometimes unwanted ways by imperialism. Still, imperialism was (and is) at its base a relationship of power, chosen by one side and not chosen by the other.

Burton and Ballantyne are of course sensitive to this imbalance of power, and strive to address it in the way many of us do: by highlighting the agency and voice of the colonized, in a variety of sophisticated ways. But some voices have no place in their narrative, since it grows out of concern with imperialism and global history. The voice of Obierika, whose world has 'fallen apart,, may represent, rather than new connections, the soon-to-be-buried past, and belong in the story of imperialism and global connectedness only as an obsolete relic. The voice of the Samin, who failed to recognize the demands of any state, indigenous or imperial, may amuse us as much as it frustrated officials of their day, but in a story of imperialism and global history can only be an oddity, and therefore not significant. If these voices seem self-evidently obsolete or odd in a history of the connection of empire and the global, that suggests such a history marginalizes the voices and experiences of many ordinary people.

The essay "Empire and the Reach of the Global" has its own limits then. It cannot assess how far the reach, of empire or the global, extended into indigenous societies. Burton and Ballantyne wrestle with the "teleological interpretations of globalization" (300) and likewise with fact that "not all localities were firmly linked into the imperial or the global" (299). They suggest, therefore, that indigenous peoples did sometimes craft lives, or sections of their lives, without reference to these forces of connection. But those parts of people's lives do not fit in this story, and remain opaque. Imperial historians, like colonial officials, must live with uncertainty, not knowing how much they do, and how much they do not, understand the forces shaping their world.

Review by Donna R. Gabaccia, University of Minnesota

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Review of Dirk Hoerder, "Migrations and Belongings," 435-589 in Emily S. Rosenberg, ed. *A World Connecting, 1870-1945*. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012: 435-589.

For the general reader, Dirk Hoerder's "Migrations and Belongings" provides an excellent introduction to a field of study—once understood to be almost synonymous with U.S. immigration history—that has changed radically over the past three decades. The study of migration is now a global and interdisciplinary field that encompasses all regions of the world; historians such as Hoerder have contributed greatly to this transformation. Migration can now be brought easily, if also still incompletely, into dialogue with other transnational, international, and world history themes, including the ones that have been compiled in this volume. Hoerder's essay makes it difficult to embrace the still-too-common popular impression that human movement is a recent development and a product of the globalization of the past few decades. Even social scientists may want to re-think their claims that our own times constitute an unprecedented "Age of Migration."<sup>1</sup> However, many readers will also recognize how much remains to be done before world historians can fully integrate the histories of migrants, trade, state-making, empires and cultural exchange into a coherent narrative of globalization between 1870 and 1945.

"Migrations and Belonging" draws heavily on Hoerder's magisterial and encyclopedic *Cultures in Contact: World Migrations in the Second Millennium*.<sup>2</sup> To grasp fully the significance of Hoerder's work, it is helpful to acknowledge his place in the emerging global historiography on migration. Hoerder shares with the world historian Patrick Manning and the Dutch team of Leo and Jan Lucassen and their associates a research agenda that is focused on the long-term history of human mobility.<sup>3</sup> Their long-term histories work to normalize migration, extricating it from discourses of alarm, problem, and threat. All of these scholars reveal movement as an integral dimension of human life, at all times and in all places, rather than as an intermittently occurring or exceptional event. All also reject the notion that humans are somehow naturally or culturally sedentary. Instead, they seek to catalogue and to explain variations and patterns of human movement, to understand how migration creates linkages and relationships that structure social and cultural space over time, and to use human migrations to understand and to tell the story of what others have

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<sup>1</sup> Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (New York: Guilford Press, 2008).

<sup>2</sup> (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002). See also Dirk Hoerder and Christiane Harzig, with Donna Gabaccia, *What is Migration History?* (Malden, Mass: Polity Press, 2009).

<sup>3</sup> Patrick Manning, *Migration in World History* (New York: Routledge, 2005); Jan and Leo Lucassen, eds., *Migration, Migration History, History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives* (Bern: Peter Lang, 1997); Jan Lucassen, Leo Lucassen, and Patrick Manning, eds. *Migration History in World History: Multidisciplinary Approaches* (Leiden and Boston: Brill Publishers, 2010).

called the history of globalization. While some now define their interest as mobility or movement, rather than migration, Hoerder offers a sensible argument (442) for discussing migration, and he firmly rejects state-generated categories such as ‘immigrant’ or ‘emigrant’ along with the national narratives or interpretations -- most notably in the American mythology of the “nation of immigrants — they inevitably generate.

While sharing much with other world historians, Hoerder makes a far stronger case for the importance of the micro-level and for the significance of migrant agency as an influence on the changing web of connections that constitute globalization. His deep roots in labor and social history especially differentiate his interpretations of past migrations from those of the more economic narrative developed by the historian and Africanist Patrick Manning. Hoerder certainly recognizes the structures—of law, economic inequality, society, empire or family—that can open or foreclose options for migrant decision-makers. But he also repeatedly reminds readers that migrants pursue their own plans or ‘life projects’: they negotiate, they change, they reject some options and choose others. They are not, in other words, mere drops of water carried along by the metaphorical waves, streams, and currents that dominate popular and scholarly accounts of migration. Through his attention to agency, Hoerder manages to introduce relations of class, gender, and age in his examples of how migration was organized in different times and places and how millions of decision-making migrants, along with their emotional and social needs for connection, love, and transcendence created the migration systems he describes (and which he defines on 439), thus shaping the “macro-regions” (440) which replace nation states or continents as the main spatial units of analysis in his work. Hoerder understands himself to be studying transcultural movements (472) because he does not believe nations and states defined the main axes of human solidarities, belonging, and identification in the nineteenth century.

Telling in this regard is Hoerder’s attention to the nineteenth century as the era of the proletarian mass migrations, a label he borrows from an early-1920s study by Walter F. Willcox and Imre Ferenczi.<sup>4</sup> Hoerder provides a grounded portrait of how subsistence-oriented peasants living in almost all parts of the world became “proletarianized” during migration and how some at least used circulatory, repeated, or return migrations to escape proletarianization by selling their labor on a temporary basis, often under shocking conditions of life and work. This concern with migrants as living human beings allows Hoerder to offer a typology of migrations that ruptures the dichotomy between voluntary and involuntary movements and to reject the lure of socio-biology and evolutionary thinking that surfaces, for example, in Patrick Manning’s comparison of humans to other mobile animal species, or the Lucassens’ recent turn toward genetic modeling to trace early human migrations.<sup>5</sup> Hoerder’s analysis may provide a bird’s-eye view of a world that swarms like an ant hill or bee hive, but Hoerder remains a committed humanist; his writing

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<sup>4</sup> Walter F. Willcox and Imre Ferenczi, *International Migrations* (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1929).

<sup>5</sup> Patrick Manning, *Migration in World History* (Routledge, 2012); Jan Lucassen, Leo Lucassen, and Patrick Manning, (Brill, 2010). *Migration History in World History*.

sometimes takes abrupt turns and twists in order to force readers to see that he is, in fact, discussing fully-formed and sentient men and women who were engaged in making their own lives under the specific historical conditions they faced.

Given the fondness of migration historians for very long-term analyses on a large spatial scale, it is not surprising that Hoerder offers in “Migration and Belonging” a broader periodization than the volume in which it is embedded. His periodization is, however, more open-ended and capacious at its beginning (his detailed narrative of past migrations begins with the slave trade) than at its end, where World War II provides a somewhat abrupt marker and leaves readers to speculate about how the migrations of the immediate postwar era might be connected to the migrations of their own world. Hoerder also sees distinctive characteristics of the migrations of the century after 1840. Notably, he argues for a nineteenth century integration of disparate world macro-regions through systems of migration such as the Atlantic, the Russo-Siberian system, the Black Atlantic and Asian diasporas. Following Adam McKeown<sup>6</sup>, Hoerder thus de-centers the Atlantic migrations that have dominated most historical accounts. One of the fruits of this approach is a more nuanced typology of migration and an ability to identify patterns in sending and receiving regions on opposite sides of the world. Europe was not the only sending area of importance, nor were the Americas the only important region of destination. Hoerder offers a truly global analysis and sketches the resulting cultural encounters that occurred in each.

But states also matter. In Hoerder’s analysis, the two world wars of the twentieth century, along with the two periods of imperial devolution and state building that accompanied them, signaled the transition from the era of ‘proletarianizing’ labor migrations of the nineteenth century to the rise of the refugee as the iconic migrant of the twentieth century. On this point, Hoerder’s distinction between the national consciousness of the early nineteenth century and the chauvinism of the later nineteenth century invites comparison to the dynamics of state formation that are outlined in Charles S. Maier’s “Leviathan 2.0.” Hoerder’s focus remains resolutely on how the drawing of borders, the erection of restrictions on migratory movements, and ethnic cleansing affected people. Still, Hoerder’s analysis suggests that by the twentieth century, states expanded, at least in part, to patrol their borders and to break the challenge of migratory workers. Here again one wishes Hoerder had provided a somewhat fuller treatment of the years after 1945, since the two wars, incidences of ethnic cleansing, and the refugee generation and increased state restrictions on human mobility significantly changed migration systems, reorienting them increasingly away from the global east/west flows of the nineteenth century toward the global north/south dynamics of second half of the twentieth century, which more resembled the spatiality of nineteenth century empires.

While Hoerder succeeds brilliantly in linking his analyses of migration to the empires, states, and cultural exchanges that provide the thematic focus for the remaining essays of *A World Connecting*, his integration of trade is more cursory. Similarly, migration appears

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<sup>6</sup> “Global Migration, 1846–1940,” *Journal of World History* 15, 2 (June 2004): 155-189.

only fleetingly in Steven C. Topik and Allen Wells' essay on commodity chains. (Hoerder links trade to migration most effectively in his discussions of slavery and in a section focused on South, Southeast, and East Asia; migration is documented in Topik and Wells' essay through a marvelous Canadian promotional poster meant to lure immigrants to grain-growing regions in the west.) One wishes that Hoerder, Topik and Wells had been encouraged to collaborate in the production of a sequence of maps resembling the one on 436-437 but which would include the arrows of both systems of migration and of commodity trading. Both essays certainly make clear that the mobility of people and commodities depended upon the same infrastructures of transportation and commerce. And certainly the production and trading of the commodities that Topik and Wells describe could not have been realized without the massive labor migrations Hoerder describes. Narrower studies of particular regions and countries have sometimes revealed merchants and investors as strategizing decision-makers who sought simultaneously to capture and profit from the best combinations of the passenger trade (migrants) with commodity trade.<sup>7</sup> An important next step for world historians, then, is to bring increasingly rich historiographies on trade and migration into a livelier and more extensive dialogue.

By calling attention to how effectively Hoerder's account of migration creates bridges to the other four thematic histories in *A World Connecting*, it seems important to ask also how the authors of the essays on state, empire, and cultural exchange have absorbed the perspectives of the world historians of migration. Certainly, none of the authors in *A World Connecting* seems to assume unproblematically that people are sedentary. Still, awareness of mobility as a generator or a consequence of empire-building, state formation, trade and culture exchange also requires greater thought and perhaps also more collaborative efforts at synthesis. How, for example, would Maier assess the significance of the mass labor migrations on the state-building dynamics that are his focus? Does it matter whether culture travels with tourists and empire-builders rather than with labor migrants or refugees? Do differing cultural dynamics follow? Finally, does culture travel differently when it is mediated—as books, newspapers, and images—rather than a component of embodied, transcultural human encounter? Certainly much work remains for a new generation of world historians. And *A Connecting World* provides a good foundation and starting place for those who wish to understand better the relations among the themes treated separately, if provocatively, in this very worthwhile collection.

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<sup>7</sup> Donna R. Gabaccia, *Foreign Relations: Global Perspectives on American Immigration* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).

Review by Kristin Hoganson, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

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Review of Steven C. Topik and Allen Wells. "Commodity Chains in a Global Economy," in Emily S. Rosenberg, ed., *A World Connecting, 1870-1945*. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012: 593-812.

If *A World Connecting* is the kind of tome that puts the M in magisterial, then its section on commodity chains is a noteworthy part of the larger enterprise, one that provides an accessible yet sweeping synthesis of scholarship on production, mobility infrastructures, and trade.

At its most basic level, this book-within-a-book serves as a corrective to those who trace the start of economic globalization back to around 1989. In keeping with the larger thrust of the volume, Steven C. Topik and Allen Wells find the years between 1870 and 1945 to be a period of significantly increasing connections. The presentism that characterizes much academic (at least outside of History) and public globalization discourse is not the only misperception that Topik and Wells set out to counter. They refute the assumption of inevitability (which holds that the dynamics of capitalism have led to an unrelenting advance of globalization) and the myth of uniformity (which holds that world markets have reduced heterogeneity). They also provide a riposte to those who have celebrated global trade as a pathway to greater prosperity. Even while acknowledging some of the benefits of economic integration, Topik and Wells are careful to note that this was a period marked by colonial power relations, growing divisions in wealth, deadly wars, and environmental degradation. Labor was forced as well as free; workers impoverished as well as enriched. Topik and Wells point out that people who were not incorporated into the world market did not necessarily consider themselves losers; that indigenous people, religious movements, and leftist activists all resisted incorporation.

"Commodity Chains in a Global Economy" is divided into three parts. The first, "Transformations," considers changes in 'the world economy,' including the Great Divergence (increasing disparities in wealth), different forms of economic organization, the first and second industrial revolutions, growing economies of scale and scope in more concentrated corporate forms of production, and unprecedented levels of foreign investment. The second part, "The Sinews of Trade," moves on to legal frameworks, monetary standards, transportation technologies and infrastructures, communications advances, energy sources, boards of trade, and enabling materials (such as copper and rubber). The final part, described by the authors as the "heart of our story," considers the "various commodity chains that carried the bulk of cross-border commerce": grains, hard fibers used in packaging, and stimulants like sugar, chocolate and tobacco (594). The wide range of topic headings – ranging from "Currency" to "The Automobile" and "Petroleum" -- enhances the utility of the volume as a reference work.

Were this a stand-alone book, a reader might ask for more coverage of consumption, labor mobility, and empire, but given that other essays in the volume tackle these topics, it would overegg the pudding to call for them here as well. As it is, the scope is so ambitious that

much of the coverage has to be drawn in broad brush strokes. To take one example, the environmental consequences of commodity production, population growth, and resource extraction get about a page of coverage. The range of actors is sometimes so vast that passive voice becomes an almost necessary default: “Land, forests, and wildlife increasingly were perceived either as private property or as barriers to progress” (607). Fortunately, the wide-ranging notes provide a valuable guide to readers who might want a finer-line understanding of the many topics covered.

Although Topik and Wells’ treatment of economic issues amply supports the argument of increasing global connectedness proffered by the volume as a whole, their account also invites questions as to whether the volume’s chronological scope (1870-1945) aptly periodizes global economic history. In a reflection on periodization, Topik and Wells note the systematic application of the principles of liberal economic thought to parts of the international political economy. This guiding logic suggests the possibility of other periodizations, including one that would start with the British free trade policies of the 1840s and close with the economic ruptures of the 1930s. Topik and Wells also characterize this span of years as the time when globalization became manifest. Along with suggesting that the trade circuits of the previous century did little to prompt new forms of global consciousness, this assertion skirts questions such as ‘to whom?’ and ‘how so?’ – questions underscored by the observation that growers, processors, shippers, and marketers on different continents “did not necessarily realize that they were participating in a complex international chain” (807).

The relationship between commerce and global consciousness aside, “Commodity Chains in a Global Economy” makes a powerful case for the value of commodity chains as a lens into transnational, if not global, economic relations. By emphasizing things like minerals and grains, Topik and Wells counter Europe-centered maps of globalization, providing ample evidence for the argument that the global south was not peripheral to the world economy. Even as they draw attention to integrative chains, they also provide some comparative perspectives. One of the most telling comparisons in the book is that between coffee producing areas (generally independent national states) and tea producing areas (generally colonies). Whereas many tea plantations enriched imperialist investors, Topik and Wells point out that Latin American coffee growers were more likely to be price setters and leaders in production technology.

Although the essay relies on common keywords like ‘global economy’ and ‘world market,’ Topik and Wells are sensitive to the limits of these terms. They characterize the world market as a “theoretical fiction” with great variations and cyclical swings (594). They note that “there was not *one* world market, but myriad, often segmented, and ever-evolving markets,” and that there were significant interregional trade connections that did not register in global trade statistics (685). The inability of our standard conceptual vocabulary to fully register such rifts suggests the need for further mapping. The essay includes one arrow-filled map that illustrates patterns of transnational investment. In addition to clarifying some of the obstacles to mobility (such as protective policies and a growing attention to border patrolling), more such spatial analysis could help clarify the specific sets of relationships hidden by blanket terms like ‘global’ and ‘world.’

As it stands, the essay seems to emphasize ties between the North Atlantic and Latin America and Asia. By highlighting agricultural commodities, it positions the industrial centers of the former more as sites of consumption and the totality of the latter two more as sites of production. The selection of case studies also produces a certain unevenness in the overall picture of global connections. Among the places implicitly characterized as less globally connected than others (due to the small amount of coverage they receive) are Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Topik and Wells characterize Africa as marginal to international markets in this period, but their tendency to compare Africa to smaller aggregations, such as Bengal, the Philippines, and Vietnam underscores the potential payoffs from additional geographic analysis.<sup>1</sup>

Although H-Diplo readers might want more consideration of the changing U.S. role in global economics and deeper reflection on the implications of economic connections for power and security (perhaps along the lines of Lizzie Collingham's *The Taste of War: World War II and the Battle for Food*), this contribution to *A World Connecting* has a great deal to offer to U.S. foreign relations historians.<sup>2</sup> Its wide geographic net, clear framing, remarkable amount of synthesis, lucid analysis, and well-chosen case studies make it a go-to account for anyone who would situate U.S. economic history in a global context in this period.

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<sup>1</sup> On the utility of mapping to historical analysis, see Richard White, "What is Spatial History?" on The Spatial History Project Website, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/spatialhistory/cgi-bin/site/pub.php?id=29>, posted Feb. 1, 2010.

<sup>2</sup> Lizzie Collingham, *The Taste of War: World War II and the Battle for Food* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2012).



Review by Erez Manela, Harvard University

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Review of Emily S. Rosenberg, “Transnational Currents in a Shrinking World,” in Emily S. Rosenberg, ed. *A World Connecting, 1870-1945*. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012: 815-996.

**A**s the editor of the volume that includes this essay, Emily Rosenberg could have assigned herself the easiest task of the lot. Instead, she commendably took on the hardest. Of the five essays in this volume—they are called chapters, though, at some two hundred pages of text each, they are really short books—Rosenberg’s had the broadest and most complicated charge. The first four essays in the volume are each centered on a specific thematic core around which the authors could construct their world histories of the period from 1870 to 1945: the emergence of modern states, the rise and decline of empires, the mass migrations of people, and the global flow of commodities, respectively. Rosenberg, however, did not enjoy the advantage of such a thematic core in carrying out her assignment; in a sense, her task was to write the residual essay, the one that covered all the significant strands of world history that did not fit into the other four. Though the historical currents covered in this essay are defined at the outset as “social and cultural” (816), it proves impossible, as well it should be, to separate neatly the currents that are social and cultural from those that are political, intellectual, religious, scientific, or technological. So the task at hand was a difficult one indeed.

Rosenberg’s response to this difficulty of multiple themes—an understandable response, though not without its problems—is to slice the narrative up by topic into more manageable chunks. The essay is divided into five major sections, and each of these sections is in turn further broken up into numerous subsections, with each subsection tasked with shepherding its particular theme expeditiously through the entire period under review, more or less. Each such subsection, we learn at the outset, is designed to chart a historical ‘current’—a governing metaphor in this essay—that has flowed through global space and time. Taken together, these currents presumably join to make up substantial expanses of the ocean that is world history between 1870 and 1945. At the outset, Rosenberg also clearly lays out the essay’s central interpretive principles: an emphasis on networks rather than fixed territorial boundaries; the mutually constitutive relationship between national (or imperial) construction and the articulation of transnational networks; the interconnection of the global and the local and the importance of constructing a narrative that scales back and forth between them; the crucial role of “contact zones” in fostering not simply transmission or imposition but the coproduction of what Rosenberg calls “differentiated commonalities” (820); and the imbrication within modern life of seemingly opposing impulses, such as rationality and emotion, science and faith, rigorous taxonomy and mass spectacle.

The essay then proceeds to move briskly through its numerous themes. The first section, “Currents of Internationalism,” includes subsections on the standardization of the measurements of space and time, on the internationalization of sports, on the development of international law and arbitration, and on the emergence of permanent international

institutions centered on the League of Nations. The second section, capaciously titled “Social Networking and Entangled Attachments,” begins with a set of rather puzzling juxtapositions--language and photography, labor and anticolonialism--before moving on to discuss diasporic and then religious networks (dispatching Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, theosophy, and others in quick succession) and concluding with the transnational movement for women’s rights. The third section, “Exhibitionary Nodes,” devotes much of its space to world fairs and then moves to touch on museums, botanical gardens, and zoos as manifestations of the contemporary penchant to collect, catalog, organize, and represent the world to diverse audiences. Section Four, “Circuits of Expertise,” outlines the transnational flows of scientific and technical knowledge, beginning with engineering and moving to agricultural and forestry sciences, the social sciences, racial science, urban organization, and medicine and public health. Finally, Section Five, “Spectacular Flows,” focuses on mass culture, discussing in turn adventure narratives, popular entertainment, mass tourism, and consumer culture and advertising.

Though some readers might wish to quibble with topic selection, emphasis, or treatment, Rosenberg’s approach is clear-eyed and judicious. There is a great deal here that is fascinating, and the achievement of the essay is a significant one. In clear, compelling prose, Rosenberg summarizes reams of diverse and cutting-edge literature, and the text, along with the appended notes and bibliography, will serve as an excellent starting point for anyone preparing to write on any of the topics it covers. And yet despite the essay’s careful and largely logical organization, the overall impression it leaves is not unlike that of a Jackson Pollock painting; it is full of fascinating, vivid assemblages of diverse colors and forms that edify and entrance, but which do not seem, in the end, to convey the image of anything in particular. While this may not have been the author’s intention, the essay’s structure runs the risk of giving readers the impression that all the currents it covers were equally important, and that they were evenly distributed across global space and time. They often seem to be everywhere at once but nowhere in particular, lacking clear origins, centers, or direction; they flow across time unguided by any particular logic; and the relationships and mutual influences among them, while assumed and sometimes implied, are usually not directly explored.

This vague sense of disorientation may well be an unavoidable, perhaps even desirable, result of the sort of project that this volume has undertaken. As Rosenberg makes clear in her editor’s introduction to the volume, this project is committed to shedding the twin biases that defined much of the older writing on world history, namely its Eurocentrism (the view of Europe as the generative center of world history) and its state-centrism (the privileging of states as actors and, more significantly, their naturalization as containers of history). These commitments are not only laudable but necessary, though at this point in time they are of course hardly new. But while these methodological commitments have become indispensable points of departure for any narrative of world history, they cannot (or at least, should not) also serve as its end points.

To begin with, the necessary decentering of Europe in narratives of world history is nowhere more difficult to accomplish than for the period covered in this volume, 1870 to 1945, since it is precisely in this period that Europe (and its North American offshoots)

was, in fact, the major source and nexus of many of the currents that Rosenberg discusses. Decentering Europe in the global history of this period therefore leaves us with currents that seem to swirl and collide everywhere at once but nowhere in particular. The essay rightly urges us to move past the common ways of mapping the history of the period—maps based on national and imperial territories and centered on Europe—and calls for the “remapping” of the world in ways that shift away from the traditional historiographical frames and emphases. But while Rosenberg mentions a number of alternative mapping schemes and the essay itself includes two maps (of major communication lines in 1924 and of rubber production and distribution centers in 1928), it remains unclear what the new cartographical representations it advocates might look like or how precisely they would represent the numerous currents it traces, if indeed such a picture is amenable to mapping at all. While spatial indeterminacy might well be a necessary step in our move away from a Eurocentric global history, readers looking for an alternative spatial rendering, or remapping, of the era will not quite find it here.

In fact, to the extent that geographic patterns can be discerned in the narrative presented in this essay, they are not very surprising ones. First, it seems clear that most of the global currents discussed emanated primarily from Europe; or more precisely, from the major urban centers in Britain, Germany, and (to a lesser extent) France before World War I, with the geographic focus of generative creativity shifting perceptibly toward the United States after the war. In addition, rising “global cities” outside Europe and North America (Tokyo, Shanghai, Mumbai, Cairo, Istanbul, Buenos Aires and others) emerge across many of the currents as secondary hubs, while sub-Saharan Africa remains at the margins for much of the narrative.

A second large question that arises from this narrative is the one of temporality. As they do across global space, the currents described here also seem to flow through the temporal dimension in no particular direction or order. The question here is not one of periodization in the sense of the chronological start and end points. It should not surprise anyone that the essay traces some of the currents it covers back in time before 1870, to the mid-nineteenth century and sometimes earlier. Nor will it startle most readers to discover that many of the currents—though certainly not all, and with the notable exception of those related to popular entertainment, tourism, and consumerism, where the temporal focus is on the interwar years—seem to peter out, or at least lose their much of their power and vitality, with the outbreak of World War I. Indeed, though the essay notionally covers world history to 1945, the final decade of that period, in which much of the world was hurtling toward and then engaged in World War II, is barely mentioned. It may well be that for this particular essay, defining the time period as 1850 to 1929 would have made more sense, but this periodization would have worked less well for some of the other essays in this volume and, in any case, the start and end dates here are externally imposed by the series and are therefore, at least partly, an arbitrary parameter.

The real problem with temporality here, then, is not whether different start/end dates would have worked better. Rather, it is how one should deal with that most crucial aspect of historical narrative—change over time—in a global history that seeks to cover so many disparate currents. Readers who come to this essay seeking an explicit exploration of

specific, widely-shared inflection points for the global currents it covers will be largely disappointed, as will those readers who look for a methodical mapping of spatial differentiation, focal points, or centers and peripheries. So while readers will emerge with a sharpened sense of the numerous flows and interconnections that characterized this era, they will not find a clearly articulated sense of how precisely the world of 1870 differed from the world of 1945 in terms of these currents, nor what the major inflection points were that shaped or directed those changes. In deemphasizing the role of the world wars and global depressions, Rosenberg clearly wants us to see connections that bridge those common temporal dividing lines. Still, readers who want to know whether and which global currents abated, redirected, strengthened or continued unchanged across these divides will, in most cases, need to read between the lines and reach their own conclusions.

In short, as a reader who approached this essay with strong sympathy for both the importance and the difficulty of Rosenberg's task I remained, after reading it, still sympathetic to the task but possessed of an even more vivid sense of the difficulties it poses. Throughout the essay, and especially at the end, Rosenberg strives to impress upon readers the nearly infinite multiplicity, multifocality, and complexity of global currents in this period, as if warning us away from any facile conclusions that would fall back on the comfortable old assumptions. But a conclusion that emphasizes how "the currents that carried mass cultural products mapped, unmapped, and remapped the globe," begs the questions of what these new maps looked like; if the answer is only that they reflected "ever-changing configuration of connectivity" (993) then perhaps the metaphor of mapping is not the best one to use, since a map assumes a subject that has a certain fixity in space, however temporary such fixity may be. And while one could hardly argue with a conclusion that finds "cultural modernity" to have "almost limitless patterns" (994), one still wants to know which patterns proved particularly common, durable, and influential.

Such problems are not unique to this essay, but rather reflect the difficulties of writing the sort of world history this volume seeks to produce, at least at our current stage of historiographical development. We know we must do away with the state-centric and Euro-centric biases of the old historiography, and we also want to avoid the sort of mono-causal global history in which everything is explained by the logic of capitalism, or imperialism, or the inexorable rise of Europe. But we are still searching for the best ways to construct a narrative of world history that is multifocal and multicausal while at the same time also retaining narrative cohesion and analytical clarity; a narrative that is not beholden to Euro- or state-centrism and yet does not downplay the foundational roles that states in general, and that certain European and North American societies and states in particular, played in the global history of the period from 1870 and 1945. The present volume can serve well as a vessel to sail for a while down the treacherous rapids of this historiographical current. But there is still quite a way to go down this particular river, and it is not yet entirely clear whether it is safe harbor or a crashing waterfall that awaits us just over the horizon.

**A** *World Connecting, 1870-1945* comprises Volume Five of what will be a six-volume world history published jointly and simultaneously by Harvard University Press (English version) and Beck Publishers (German version) under the general editorship of Akira Iriye and Jürgen Osterhammel. The goal of the book was not to provide a comprehensive or encyclopedic history of the world but to present book-length, thematic essays by leading historians. We expected that the total would be more than the sum of parts; that suggestive synergies would appear without enforcing rigid interpretive guidelines.

What emerged in the five essays comprised a remarkably co-productive thematic overview of the period from about 1870 to 1945—an overview that stresses movement, connectivity, and relational meanings. Harvard University Press suggested the title *A World Connecting*. Beck Publishers, concerned about how this phrase could artfully and effectively be rendered in German, attached a different title: *Geschichte Der Welt, 1870-1945: Weltmärkte und Weltkriege*.

Although each of the reviewers concentrates on just one of the chapters, taken as a whole, the reviews generally express appreciation that our five key themes-- the modern state, empires, migrations, commodities (trade and production), and social and cultural networks—are, in the words of Anne Foster, “well chosen, distinct yet reinforcing in their importance and effects.” Some reviewers note how each essay integrates economic, social, cultural, and political history. By favoring broad themes that cut across both geography and disciplinary sub-fields, *A World Connecting* tries to avoid the kind of segmentations that have often structured world histories. The reviewers commend the global reach that the sections attain and the depth of historical scholarship invoked. They are generous in their comments, insightful in weighing the interpretive stakes in each of our chapters, and thoughtful in advancing their own perspectives on relative strengths and weaknesses.

The reviewers of each chapter also, appropriately, pose questions about choices and framings. Because the volume consists of essays with separate authorial voices, it is not surprising that the reviews raise a variety of issues. One reviewer sees traces of Eurocentrism (Charles Bright) while another finds “a counter to Europe-centered maps of globalization” (Kristin Hoganson). Donna Gabbacia wonders whether some of the essays missed opportunities to speak more directly to each other; she asks specifically whether four of the essays have sufficiently incorporated the understandings of the global scope of migrations in this period that are well laid out in Dirk Hoerder’s chapter. Because the best histories emerge from on-going conversations, such observations can be seen as important parts of the overall project of envisioning this era.

For the most part, the reviewers raise issues that earlier hovered over each author’s struggle to articulate meaningful themes while still highlighting the specifics of locality. If historians generally agree that scales of historical analysis—ranging from global to imperial, to regional, to national, to local—all interact and continually reconstitute the

other, it remains agonizing to select illustrations among the vast variations in these processes. The politics of representation is difficult, and the choice of broader-but-thinner versus narrower-but-thicker coverage haunts every conception of world history.

Foster questions the framework of “connecting.” She writes that a “coherent global history must explore events, trends, or developments which are common to a large number of people in diverse parts of the world,” but that the “experience of those trends may not be merely different, but indeed may be the occasion for the world ‘falling apart’ rather than coming together.” Our chapters, I believe, attempt to highlight precisely that dynamic. The organizing theme of “connecting” by no means signifies only commonalities, as each one of our essays readily show. “Connecting” no more connotes stabilization than it connotes destabilization; indeed the two concepts are nested opposites and exist together as parts of the same historical dynamic. As the introduction puts it: in this period of intensifying interconnectivity “things fell apart and also came together differently.” (p. 4)

Of course, there are voices—of people, groups, movements, indeed entire countries-- that do not appear in the volume. Even rather huge areas and millions of people are, it could be argued, “marginalized” through omission. These silences include both those whose “connectedness” to the rest of the world may have remained tenuous during the period from 1870 to 1945 as well as those who are densely connected in myriad ways. Foster seems to attribute exclusions to the theme of “connectedness,” but if a history of connection “marginalizes the voices and experiences of many ordinary people,” does not any other schema one could imagine—even one that would explicitly set out to “cover” every “ordinary person” in the world? The goal of this volume was not (and could not) be coverage; it was to illuminate the inclusionary *and* exclusionary dynamic of a “world connecting.” I would argue that its five-part thematic structure can help explain the *process* of exclusion and of “falling apart” far better than any (ultimately futile) attempt *not* to marginalize anything.

Erez Manela asks about the selection of social and cultural interconnections. Indeed, it may be readily conceded that there are all kinds of interactions—just as there are all kinds of people and groups—that *A World Connecting* does not discuss. He further suggests that the crisscrossing of social and cultural connections can be too “at large” in the world to produce clear historical trajectories. He writes that “we are still searching for the best ways to construct a narrative of world history that is multifocal and multicausal while at the same time also retaining narrative cohesion and analytical clarity.”

I would argue, however, that an emphasis on varied processes would provide an avenue toward, not away from, greater “analytical clarity” because in human affairs as complex as world history, “narrative cohesion” may be less important than an understanding of relational, co-productive, and nonsynchronous change. The themes highlighted in this book cannot shape a grand narrative that can be common to all or can be overlaid onto all parts of the world. As Bright writes, when connectivity is seen as “moving in multiple directions at once” then “it is useful to think of the dynamics of this situation as a series of choices about how to change in order to hold out against, adapt to, or appropriate from a world of continuous and inescapable interconnectivity those ‘tools of continuation’

necessary for survival.” Each chapter has, in its own way, avoided a conceptualization of essence and condition in favor of one stressing interactive process and movement. By emphasizing multiple valences within an interconnected world, I believe, our approach provides more of an analytical framework than a narrative—just as it deals with the dynamic of inclusion/exclusion more than with coverage of all the world’s diverse peoples.

As the volume’s editor, I will not presume to reply to the questions that the five reviewers raise about individual chapters. I will, however, speak for our author team generally in expressing gratitude for the careful readings and insights of all of the reviewers. And as editor, I can perhaps most usefully comment further on the project as a whole—a task that brings me to consider the question of the book’s two different titles.

Historians have often framed this period of world history as one of particular violence—driven by the increasingly lethal nature of weaponry and by the ways in which imperial power and competition helped construct networks within which localized conflicts could rapidly become regional and even global in scope. *Age of Extremes* and *Dark Continent* are titles that have come to announce almost iconic narratives.<sup>1</sup> And for good reason. Colonial wars, wars of national unifications, and two cataclysmic global wars certainly provide evidence for an era of escalating violence. So the German title, with its emphasis on world wars along with the global spread of markets, seems aptly descriptive. But violence itself needs further historical contextualization.

By whichever title, English or German, the era’s extremes and the darkness of its engines of destruction emerge in our history from the networked connectivities that drove distrust and exploitation just as surely as they claimed to promote new understandings and affiliations. This was a “world connecting” for bad *and* for good, for death *and* for life. It was a world in which the shrinkage of time and space came at such bewildering speed that what seemed strange could become newly familiar and what seemed familiar could become newly strange. The migrations of people, the acceleration of commerce, and the cascade of ever faster modes of information affected more and more people but in very differentiated ways. We try to highlight the varied ways through which people and groups tried to contain, guide, and live within the on-rushing networks associated with modernity. Attempts at enclosure and escape vied with pressures favoring permeability.

Foster writes that “We look to this volume for answers to many of the questions which vex us regarding how to think about the relation of ‘global history’ to the smaller bits of history which each of us claim some mastery over. Inevitably, no one volume can answer these questions.” But one volume *can* suggest the many ways in which the dynamic of connectivity rippled through political, demographic, economic, cultural, and social realms. Connectivity in this era, like the so-called “globalization” that succeeded it, neither brought the standardization that many critics frequently feared, nor did it set the world on a common path toward a common future. As people were drawn together into reconfigured

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<sup>1</sup> Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991* (New York: Pantheon, 1995); Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century* (New York: Vintage, 1998).

states, empires, markets, labor systems, and affiliations, the escalating inequalities and conflicts of the era emerged in different shapes and forms.

Our volume represents no “new interpretation” of world history – connectivity and relationality have characterized world history in most periods and figures in most historical accounts. Rather, it lays out the variety of processes and ripple effects that characterized this particular era. By probing the always moving dialectic in regimes of power—especially those expressed in terms of nationality, commercialization, gender, race, religion, and region—the book provides a setting not in which questions can be *answered* but in which the dynamics of change may be fruitfully explored.

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