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Studies of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s diplomacy during WWII have always experienced problems with the hindsight perspective. From the earliest critiques historians have been challenged by the knowledge that the Cold War emerged out of the consequences of WWII and as a result they have found it difficult to avoid excessive criticism and speculation on what Roosevelt should have done differently in order to have obtained a better strategic position versus Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union or what policies Roosevelt and his successor Harry S. Truman should have pursued in order to have prevented the Cold War from erupting.\(^1\) Warren F. Kimball’s *The Juggler: Franklin D. Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman* (1991) put many studies on the dusty shelves as a result of its impressive research and persuasive reassessment of Roosevelt’s wartime diplomacy within the context of WWII with a judicious use of hindsight.

With *Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances: How Personal Politics Helped Start the Cold War*, Frank Costigliola has successfully stepped on to the WWII field and directly aimed at the hindsight “looking glass” as indicated in the subtitle reference “Start the Cold War”. The reviewers are very enthusiastic about Costigliola’s study which applies a fresh interpretation that focuses on the Big Three, “tracing the political consequences of the relationships, personalities, emotional lives, emotional dispositions, sensibilities, and cultural assumptions” of the Big Three—Winston Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin.\(^1\) Theories about emotions, gender, and culture are part of the foundation but, as Michael Sherry, notes, they remain “largely off-stage” as Costigliola presents a very engaging story with many personal details, romantic affairs, and a nude Churchill strutting about in conversation with Roosevelt. As Sherry favorably notes, Costigliola successfully explores “how strategic and political calculations intersected towering, troubled personalities.” Katherine Sibley also applauds Costigliola’s use of “interdisciplinary insights” to “further enrich the story, from his psychological and sexual analyses of his subjects to the discursive analysis of their writing,” as “the author enjoys teasing out their full meanings and significance.” A good policy example of this is Costigliola’s development of Roosevelt’s “world policemen” concept in which the Big Four—the U.S., Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China—would keep the postwar peace under the rhetorical umbrella of the Atlantic Charter and the structure of the Security Council in the forthcoming United Nations.\(^2\) Costigliola offers more elaboration of Roosevelt’s concept and expectations than the President ever did in writing and maybe even in conversations.

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\(^1\) Many of these studies are gathering dust on library shelves or in remote storage facilities. A few exceptions that devoted more attention to available documentation, the relationship of the military situation to diplomatic negotiations during the war, and the interrelationship of the European and Asian theaters include Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945* (1979); Robert Divine, *Roosevelt and World War II* (1969) and Herbert Feis, *Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought* (1957).

\(^2\) Costigliola describes this as fitting the “square peg of the Four Policemen approach into the round hole of the Atlantic Charter” (184).
Many of the traditional military-diplomatic issues of the WWII literature are neither central nor discussed by Costigliola. The debate over the opening of a second front in Europe, the policy of unconditional surrender, the issue of invading Central Europe through the so-called “soft underbelly” of the Balkans, the colonialism question, the Pacific war and its strategic and post-war issues, the development and use of the atomic bomb and related Soviet espionage, are all secondary to Costigliola’s laser-like focus on the Big Three with Roosevelt as the most important leader holding together the Grand Alliance. Churchill, on the other hand, is the most volatile of the three, shifting from a willingness to cut spheres of influence deals in 1944 with Stalin on Greece and the Balkans to asking his military planners for a war plan against the Soviet Union in 1945, “Operation Unthinkable” (336-337). Costigliola’s depiction of Stalin reinforces other assessments that emphasize his role as the poker player who kept his cards covered and preferred to wait for other players to show their cards first. What Costigliola adds to this is the impression that Stalin was genuinely impressed by Roosevelt’s effort to treat him as an equal, to empathize with the losses and role that the Soviet Union was playing in stopping and defeating the German army, and to respond favorably to Stalin’s quest for future security vis-à-vis Germany with a security sphere in Eastern Europe, the disarmament of Germany, reparations, and possible dismemberment. Realists, however, who emphasize the centrality of power realities and leaders who focus on this condition and strive to shape it to their advantage, might question whether Stalin was moved by Roosevelt’s personality and gestures or by the realities in the European war, in particular in Eastern and Central Europe, that worked to the Soviet advantage in 1943-1945. On Roosevelt, Costigliola borrows Kimball’s “juggler” metaphor in accounting for how Roosevelt hoped to square the circle by the end of the war through working with the Big Three, defeating Germany and Japan with Soviet assistance, moving the Western powers away from colonialism, and persuading Americans to support an enhanced U.S. role in keeping the peace.

The reviewers favorably note that Costigliola is not uncritical of Roosevelt’s leadership although they don’t question the author’s support for Roosevelt’s assumption after his first meeting with Stalin at the Teheran Conference that Stalin was “get-atable” (198). Costigliola, for example, criticizes the President for failing to replace his close team of advisers and supporters, most notably Missy LeHand, the President’s personal and political partner, Sumner Welles, Undersecretary of State, and Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt’s chief

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4 It would be interesting to know if Stalin had a similar reaction to Roosevelt, i.e., that the President was “get-atable”. Whereas Roosevelt deliberately projected a friendly, concerned, and conciliatory demeanor to Stalin the latter seemed more cautious, suspicious, and restrained but made his demands clear such as recognition of the Soviet Union’s 1941 boundaries, the necessity for a security sphere in Eastern Europe, and the total destruction of Germany’s power. At the same time Stalin seemed to watch the ‘correlation of forces’ and take advantage of improvements on the Soviet side as the war progressed. As Costigliola notes, Roosevelt also kept some of his cards off the table such as postwar economic assistance and the hoped-for development of atomic weapons.
policy maker and implementer, among several other aides. (58-90), who helped maintain the President’s energy and spirits through relaxation and socializing and, most importantly, got him to take policy initiatives rather than his preferred approach of “backing into solutions” (210). As Sibley points out, without these advisers Roosevelt also failed to explain adequately his postwar peace plans and the U.S. role to the American public and left his Vice President Harry Truman in the dark with respect to the his strategy and how to deal with anticipated problems. Roosevelt realized there would be problems with both the Western colonial powers and the Soviet Union, and as Costigliola and other historians have noted, hoped to manage them with U.S. economic assistance and the sharing of the new atomic energy under development in the Manhattan Project to create atomic bombs.

The arrival of Truman points to a second major thesis of Costigliola’s study on the origins of the Cold War. In viewing conflict as inevitable but not necessarily one that had to develop into a Cold War, (4, 417) Costigliola recognizes that the Big Three conferences at Teheran and Yalta did not resolve all issues, despite eight days at Yalta where the issue of Poland challenged their relationship, and that actions by all of the Big Three contributed significantly to the breakdown of the relationship after Yalta and after the death of FDR. Costigliola takes up the old disputed issue of whether or not Truman’s arrival in the Oval Office with new advisers brought a significant break with Roosevelt’s strategy. Truman definitely had a different personality and level of experience and a much greater reliance on the advice of experienced military and diplomatic advisers including former Ambassador Joseph Davis, Ambassador Averell Harriman, and Russian specialists like Charles Bohlen and George Kennan in Moscow. Related to the question as to why U.S. policy shifted, Costigliola emphasizes the personal experience of U.S. officials in Moscow after U.S. diplomatic recognition in 1933 in which after a brief ‘honeymoon,’ the Kremlin cut off Russian contact with the embassy officials which, as Michaela Hoenicke Moore notes in her favorable assessment of the book, embittered Bohlen, Kennan and others, turning them into “spurned lovers” and reinforcing this resentment with a “more conventional racial-cultural stereotype of Russians as ‘barbarians’ and ‘uncivilized’.”

5 An issue that is not explored directly in the reviews is Costigliola’s assessment of Stalin’s policies and intentions. Costigliola has relied upon secondary assessment in English without discussing some of the differences that exist among authors such as Jonathan Haslam’s Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the War (2011); Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin’s Wars (2006); Vladimir Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War (1996); Vladimir Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (2007); and Jochen Lauffer, Pax Sovietica. Stalin, die Westmächte und die deutsche Frage 1941-1945 [Pax Sovietica. Stalin, the Western Allies and the German Question, 1941-1945] (2009). For a discussion of the differences, see the H-Diplo roundtables on most of these books at http://http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/. If Moscow ever opens up its archives beyond limited and selected areas and especially the records on Stalin, historians may gain more confidence in their assessments of Stalin’s policies and intentions. If Stalin committed as little as Roosevelt did on paper, questions may remain open and subject to different assessments.

The reviewers are not ready to endorse Costigliola’s emphasis on the spurned Russian specialists causing a Truman policy shift towards the Cold War over Poland. Sherry suggests that Costigliola “underplays how erratic Truman was regarding the Soviet Union” as his insecure tongue-lashing of visiting Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov was followed up by the President recruiting Harry Hopkins to visit Stalin and work out a Roosevelt-type deal on Poland. Truman also gave considerable amounts of his time to former Ambassador Joseph Davies who advocated a continuation of Roosevelt’s policies toward Stalin. Michael Holzman and Sibley also question Costigliola on this issue as they point to important Truman officials who had not served in Moscow, such as Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and General George Marshall, and who had substantial influence on Truman and policy. Sibley and Moore note, moreover, that the Russian specialists, even if isolated from personal contacts with Russians, observed and reported from the U.S. listening post in Riga, Latvia on the deadly impact of Stalin’s domestic policies from the collectivization of agriculture to the Moscow show trials of many of Stalin’s former rivals and colleagues, to the general purge. They also reported on Stalin’s shifting diplomacy from supporting revolution in the early 1930s, to organizing united fronts against fascism by 1935, to collaboration with Adolf Hitler in the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 and ensuing participation in the division of Poland, the reacquisition of the Baltic states and Bessarabia from Rumania, to the Winter War on Finland. The Russian specialists accepted the expediency of the Grand Alliance with Stalin after the Nazi attack on Stalin in June 1941 but they lacked FDR’s confidence that Stalin was “get-able” or that the U.S. should get close to or rely on a leader whom many considered to be more similar to Hitler in his methods than with Western leaders. “Red Fascism, Brown Bolshevism” captured this perspective very well for these officials and the American public.

Since Costigliola raises the ‘what if’ question—what if Roosevelt had lived for another year or the rest of his term or longer—to suggest a lack of inevitability in the emergence of the Cold War and the importance of the change at the top to Truman and his advisers as well as their mishandling of the disputes over Poland, the question could be pursed further. As Trachtenberg and other historians including Costigliola have noted, Truman used Harry Hopkins and Joseph Davies to negotiate a compromise on Poland and Secretary of State James Byrnes negotiated a compromise on Eastern Europe that led to U.S. recognition of

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7 On the issue of Truman abandoning Roosevelt’s approach toward Stalin and initiating the Cold War, there is continuing debate on when Truman shifted, the considerations shaping the U.S. reorientation to a Cold War stance toward the Soviet Union that reflected a changed perspective from viewing Stalin as a difficult ally, to an estranged member of the Big Three, to an enemy with increasingly perceived dangerous intentions toward the “free world”. For several different assessments, see the H-Diplo roundtables on Arnold Offner Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002); Wilson D. Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); and Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

the new regimes in these countries. These were Roosevelt-type arrangements reflecting power realities. However, how would Roosevelt have managed Stalin's efforts to obtain concessions with respect to Iran and Turkey? Would Roosevelt have been able to work out a compromise with Stalin on Germany and on European economic recovery? Costigliola recognizes the destructiveness of Stalin’s regime and his never-ending deadly purges and concludes that “even when Roosevelt was around, Stalin had undermined the alliance with merciless, obstinate, and narrow-minded policies” including a brutal occupation of Eastern Europe and efforts to extend his sphere at the end of the war in Asia and Europe (392).

Costigliola, who is familiar with the significant secondary sources on Stalin and his foreign policies, aligns himself the most with Geoffrey Roberts’ evaluation which suggests there was more opportunity for postwar cooperation with Stalin than do the assessments of Jonathan Haslam and Vladislav Zubok which emphasize the unreliability of Stalin especially if he noted opportunities to advance Soviet interests within an overall ideological perspective of “socialist imperialism”.9

As Hoenicke Moore concludes, “Costigliola’s study revises and deepens our understanding of this crucial period and intervenes decisively in the ongoing scholarly and political debates on the origins of the Cold War and the problem of diplomacy versus confrontation.” The reviews agree with this assessment for, as Sibley suggests, “by magnificently restoring human agency to history, Costigliola is able to make us wrestle deeply with how one president might have stopped that conflict from happening the way that it did.”

Participants:

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A connection between nationalism and U.S. foreign policy with special attention to the multiple legacies of World War Two.

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“Emotions are not contamination of thought, but the basis that underlies the thought process.” Joachim Radkau illustrated this point in his biography of Max Weber and Frank Costigliola breaks new ground in diplomatic history by making this scientific insight relevant for high politics. With this study the author establishes emotions as an analytical category on a par and interrelated with race, class, gender, culture and religion. He notes that seventy years ago “top leaders talked knowingly about emotions” – as did historians and other scholars who understood the significance of the affective. Isaiah Berlin, the political philosopher, who as a young man expertly analyzed the American political scene for the British Foreign Office, found that “[h]istory, as it is normally written, usually represents ‘political’ – public – events as the most important, while spiritual – ‘inner’ – events are largely forgotten; yet prima facie it is they – the ‘inner’ events – that are the most real, the most immediate experience of human beings: they, and only they, are what life, in the last analysis, is made of.” And, we may add, a good part of diplomacy, too.

Today emotions appear more often as obstacles to a clear-headed, sober analysis and pursuit of rational interests. And yet we do observe politicians harnessing powerful feelings of revenge, fear and hatred among their constituencies to garner support for previously conceived strategies and objectives. Then there is the phenomenon of old political hands grown wise, like President Jimmy Carter or Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, counseling restraint, direct talks, empathy, seeing things from the other side, in order to defuse tension and resolve international conflicts. What they advise is in current-day parlance called ‘emotional intelligence.’ Costigliola’s book makes clear how much successful diplomacy in war and peacetime depends on it.

In September 1945 Secretary of War Henry Stimson, another octogenarian drawing lessons from decades of “active service in peace and war,” advised President Truman to engage the Soviets on the issue of the atomic bomb in order to prevent an arms race: “the old custom of secrecy and nationalistic military superiority [has to give way to] saving civilization … The chief lesson I have learned in a long life is that the only way you can make a man trustworthy is to trust him, and the surest way to make him untrustworthy is to distrust him and show your distrust.” Costigliola reminds us that during the cabinet meeting that followed the majority of advisers sided with Stimson; mainly because they accepted the scientists’ estimation that the U.S. might not really have had a secret to give away or that it was better “to parlay the wispy secret into a solid agreement” (371). Still, Truman followed the minority that called for a tough stance and verbal confrontation with the


Soviets because as Navy Secretary James Forrestal put it “we tried [the alternative] once with Hitler. There are no returns on appeasement” (372). We will return to the “appeasement” issue and analogy with Nazi Germany, but for now Stimson’s formulation is noteworthy, because it suggested that, rather than passivity, there is agency and effectiveness in displaying trust. Trust requires self-control and emotional restraint; for example, reining in one’s fear and one’s desire to control the other. Finally, trust requires recognition that international politics, like life in general, involves risks and imponderables.

In *Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances* Costigliola deploys a finely tuned methodology to produce a learned and satisfying *histoire totale* of the inner workings of the Big Three wartime alliance and the reasons for its demise. He re-examines familiar material in the light of new questions and draws on previously ignored or under-utilized sources, of which the ones by women are especially important. His analysis of the human dimension of high diplomacy and, more specifically, of emotions, their cultural manifestations, and their gendered values (189, 289, 300, 329, 343) allows for a truly transnational approach (beautifully illustrated in chapters 1 and 2). This lifts some of the inevitable ethno-cultural fog from this history of international relations. Costigliola’s approach shows that the Western anti-Soviet/Russian animus, as well as Russian hostility to and suspicion of the West, had much deeper roots than political ideology (17, 34) but was, for a while, successfully managed and contained by the personal diplomacy of the Big Three (Chapters 3-6). Overall, Costigliola’s study revises and deepens our understanding of this crucial period and intervenes decisively in the ongoing scholarly and political debates on the origins of the Cold War and the problem of diplomacy versus confrontation.

The critical and volatile 1940s, encompassing World War Two and the early Cold War, shaped the postwar world for decades to come. The costs of the Cold War – in blood, treasure and damage to political culture - were tremendous, for the two main antagonists and, as Arne Westad has shown, for peoples in the global South. That is why the question of the origins of the Cold War still preoccupies us even as book shelves have already been filled on the subject. Costigliola offers a couple of distinct arguments on this issue: FDR’s personal diplomacy, which was based on confidence, emotional self-control and faith in America’s national destiny, motivated by pragmatism and realism, and allowed for differences, tolerating compromises and ambiguity, was successful. The sharp turn towards confrontation with the Soviets was based on ethno-cultural differences and emotional reactions rather than careful analysis of the international context and Soviet behavior (288). Still, whether a continuation of Roosevelt’s approach would have yielded a “better world” remains an entirely open question in Costigliola’s estimation: much depended on Stalin and the Soviets who, within the framework of the skillful management of emotions,

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4 Kathleen Harriman, Eleanor Roosevelt, Anna Roosevelt Boettiger, FBI records of taped phone conversations by Harry Hopkins’ wife Louise, Courtney Letts de Espil among others; unfortunately, two key figures, Missy LeHand (68) and Pamela Churchill (118) – for different reasons – did not leave a paper trail to document their significant roles.

not to mention actual policies, made a number of egregious mistakes. And much remained outside the control of any of these leaders and their policies. Costigliola thus reinserts a sense of precariousness and contingency into this narrative of international relations.

Moreover, throughout his study the author adds instructive nuances to his key theses; more important than interpretive unity is precise analysis. For example, the argument regarding Roosevelt’s skillful strategy of personal diplomacy and of overcoming cultural prejudice, is balanced by a thorough account of the president’s flaws and shortcomings (e.g. 59, 68, 75, 229) as well as his hubris, captured in the title of chapter 6: “I’ve Worked It Out: Roosevelt’s Plan to Win the Peace and Defy Death, 1944-45.” Roosevelt’s personal conceit contrasts with the more familiar display of national, collective arrogance (exceptionalism) of which American foreign policy is often accused.(374). Similarly, Costigliola’s in-depth and contextualized interpretation of George F. Kennan’s complex and influential “long telegram” (together with Stalin’s February 1946 election speech and Churchill’s Fulton speech) shows that the diplomat wrote one thing but meant another (408-412).

Other examples include the meticulous presentation of the different positions within the British camp, plus Winston Churchill’s considerable emotional range. Thus we find the British on several occasions contemplating war against the Soviet Union - with the help of the Germans. (180, 336) And yet, at the same time, Churchill – often yo-yo-like – and British diplomats, more consistently, pursued the alliance with the Soviets (286ff. for different approaches in Foreign Office versus Post-Hostilities Planning Staff). Then again, while some of the U.S. diplomatic staff began laying the groundwork for the early cold-war rhetoric of the Russians as uncivilized, raping and pillaging savages, the British ambassador in Moscow, Clark Kerr, shaped a different narrative in his cables to the home office: “Displaying his flair for instructive metaphors, he aimed at making Soviet behavior appear more acceptable by drawing analogies to the behavior of nonthreatening inferiors familiar to the British elite. [On their touchiness he characterized the] Soviets as being ‘as sensitive of their reputation as is a prostitute who has married into the peerage...[regarding their awkwardness he compared them to] a wet retriever puppy in somebody else’s drawing room’” (297, 293). And yet with regard to the turn towards a showdown with the Soviets, it was “the skilled civil servants and private secretaries staffing the prime minister’s office [who] outclassed the shoestring, increasingly truncated operation of the White House” (90) and its isolated president. And thus, London, anxious about decline, defensive about empire, and feeling superior in “great power skills” vis-à-vis the Soviets but also the “backward,” “almost tribal” Americans (151) would increasingly, together with the State Department, prevail in matters of postwar planning from 1944 on (244).

In contrast to the author’s finely tuned portrait of the Anglo-Americans, the Russians receive less attention, with the notable exception of Stalin and his Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov. In a fascinating episode Costigliola contrasts the testimony of one of the American diplomats’ Russian lovers – who had been deported - with the deliberate misunderstanding of her words by another American diplomat. (272) This revealing incident underscores how the American interpretations in the end eclipse the Russian voices. The author’s greater attention to the British and Americans is undoubtedly due, among other things, to the availability of sources, (presumably) the author’s linguistic
expertise, and a legitimate focus on the “linchpin” Roosevelt and his successor. Still, Costigliola’s approach, applied more extensively to the Russian side, would be most fruitful.

On the one hand, Costigliola pushes back against a self-satisfied and triumphalist understanding of how the United States defended the West against Soviet aggression and Communist take-overs; and how, consequently, the Cold War was unavoidable due to Soviet behavior. Instead Costigliola argues “[d]espite the egregiousness of Soviet actions, these actions ... did not justify the Cold War.” (427) The basis for this judgment is Costigliola’s evidence throughout the book that the shift away from effective personal diplomacy and high-level talks to costly confrontation was caused by intense emotions of a handful of individuals (288). In other words, it was neither geopolitical exigency nor “realism,” which is to say objective, rational calculation, but resentment, grievances, prejudices, and insecurity that accounted for the shift.

The author allows that “[p]ostwar political and ideological rivalries with the Kremlin were probably inevitable. A militarized confrontation, however, was not” (417). He further notes a somewhat tragic paradox: Stalin’s vision and hope for “a general bargain” at the end of the war in which the West accepted “the Soviet Union’s preinvasion borders, its predominance in Eastern Europe, and the restoration of its pre-1905 position in the Far East [while m]ost of the globe would fall into the British or the American spheres ... ironically” was maintained in large parts during the Cold War. “Regulating this international system, however, would not be the cautious collaboration envisioned by the Big Three, but rather an all-out militarized competition checked only by the threat of nuclear annihilation” (420, see also 352).

On the other hand, Costigliola writes history within the post-1980s framework of international relations: it takes (at least) two to tangle; focusing on one side alone will only distort our analysis. This makes room for agency and errors on all sides. Even though FDR clearly was the “fulcrum” and “linchpin” of Big Three cooperation (2, 57, 419), not everything depended on the Americans. Costigliola maintains that “[t]he Cold War was not inevitable” (4) but in contrast to John Lewis Gaddis’ We Now Know,6 the author repeatedly finds that “we shall never know” (291, 417): for example, whether FDR’s vision of Big Three (Four) postwar cooperation would have worked, whether the easing up of the Kremlin in 1943 could have lasted, whether Stimson’s atomic diplomacy would have averted an arms race, whether Secretary of State James Byrnes’ last negotiation effort could have borne fruits.

Several sections of Costigliola’s book, especially in the second half, speak to the problem as to why – even in the light of a full revelation of German warfare, genocide, and atrocities – American and British diplomats singled out their Soviet ally for distrust, contempt and suspicion. Two different strands come together here and feed into what is more conventionally reduced to anti-communist ideological hostility. On the one hand,

6 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know. Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998)
Costigliola lays out the evidence for the – understandably - intense and emotional responses of American diplomats on the scene (Kennan, William Bullitt, Charles Bohlen, Averell Harriman, John Deane among others) to the purges and deportations, the character of Soviet policies in Poland and Ukraine and, most importantly, to the complete isolation into which the Kremlin forced the Westerners stationed in Moscow (chapter 7) by undercutting all contacts to ordinary Russians or in-official sources on which diplomats depend. This more recent, personal and experience-based hostility – which the author convincingly compares to the resentment of a spurned lover (263) given the “immensely exciting days” of the Soviet-American honeymoon phase of the early 1930s (266f, 289) – merged with a more conventional racial-cultural stereotype of Russians as “barbarians” and “uncivilized” (244, 273, 276, 286f, 308f, 361).

The “ill-judged” and “dangerous” (334, 405f) argument, or rather prediction, that developed out of this line of thinking was that Russians only understood one language – that of force. The author makes clear that the Cold War anti-appeasement lesson owed much more to long-standing cultural-racial perceptions of Russians and later to feelings of personal revenge than to historical analogy. The argument that the Russians, like “all primitive peoples’ lacked ‘ethical or moral considerations,’” that consequently, the Russian “psychology recognizes only firmness, power and force’” and that therefore “efforts at ‘friendly cooperation’ would be misunderstood as ‘evidence of weakness’” was already advanced in 1939 by U.S. Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt (121f). Similarly, the U.S. military attaché in Moscow, Joseph A. Michela, advised in 1941 that the “Asiatic” character of the Russians required that one showed a certain degree of “forceful, decisive, blunt and almost rude, and in appropriate cases even contemptuous personal demeanor. Any other approach will be interpreted as a weakness.” (276)

Cultural difference between Russia and America and the civilizational status of Russia and Germany, however, could be thought of in a variety of ways. Roosevelt, who as a deeply revered head-of-state did not have to suffer Soviet crudeness and disrespect, had hoped that the “semi-Oriental” status of Russia, possibly together with China as a “fourth policeman,” could help stave off a racial war or “clash of civilizations” in the future. (200). The president was apparently also the only one in high office who agreed with Stalin’s description of the German invasion of Russia as barbarous: “It was the Germans, not the Russians, who stood on the wrong side of the gulf between civilization and barbarism” (351, see also 124, 199, 244). On the other hand, U.S. diplomat Elbridge Durbrow who was stationed in Moscow “recalled that officials from the U.S. embassies in Moscow and Berlin ‘used to get in awful arguments … whether Hitler was the worse dictator or Stalin. The Moscow boys always won’” (273). Even though Costigliola offers ample of evidence as to why that was so, the related argument on which British and Americans, and soon Poles and Ukrainians agreed, namely that the Germans were more “civilized” than the Russians (306, 361) has to be probed a bit further in its stunning moral blindness or selectivity.\footnote{This is a problem I address in my own work and which did not escape contemporary attention: George Gallup noted in 1942 that it seemed as if “German ideas of racial superiority find their counterpart in our own theories of racial and cultural superiority.” George Gallup, “An Analysis of American Public Opinion}
after all the Germans who perpetrated the massacre in Babi Yar, Ukraine, and crushed the Warsaw Uprising – which Costigliola describes as a “crucible [forging] proto-Cold War attitudes, [when] moralized judgments fused political issues into an intractable lump” (219).

So why did Americans (and the British) on crucial occasions show more empathy for the Germans than with the Nazi victims, including the Russians? In addition to the ethno-cultural identification, there is the issue of personal experiences underlying these strong emotional responses and eventually the resulting “emotional beliefs.” These experiences include Bullitt learning that many of his Russian friends became victims of the purges (269) just as other embassy staff found their lovers deported; Kennan, Harriman and their colleagues suffering from a significant loss of control in the wake of the strictly enforced isolation, resulting in disorientation, breakdowns and depression; and Harriman taking the brutality of Soviet policies in Poland (but again where are the Germans?!) personally, indeed conflating the United States with Poland (220, similarly for Deane, 307). And – to underscore differences in personal experiences - while “Harriman and Deane read wrenching testimony from repatriated POWs and airmen ... the president remained focused on the big picture of postwar collaboration” (309). With regard to the Soviet policy of isolating the American diplomats, Costigliola explains that “[t]he more enjoyment ‘the new boys in town,’ as Bohlen put it, had in 1933/34, the more they would feel assaulted – personally, professionally, and politically – when Stalin shut down contact with foreigners and denied Americans the privileges they had so intensely enjoyed. They regarded Stalin's efforts to isolate the Soviet people as a kind of aggression against them, and this sentiment contributes to what became their visceral anticommunism” (268). Yet, as the author relates in the same chapter, the U.S. diplomatic staff also suffered from an American homophobic, anti-promiscuity backlash instigated by the FBI (270ff). The connection between what was soon seen as illicit sexual conduct and political depravity was propagandized more publicly during the McCarthy era. But even though many of the participants in the “fun” (289f) at the U.S. embassy in Moscow in the early 1930s were not sympathetic to red-baiting, they soon became outspokenly hostile to “any dangerous intimacy” with Cold War enemies. Thus Bohlen warned in 1952 against “the spectacle of American and Soviet diplomats with arms around each other in whoopee parties” – clearly recalling his personal experiences. Costigliola concludes: “The Cold War drastically narrowed what was acceptable personal or political behavior” (290).

Finally, especially insidious and disastrous for American postwar foreign policy discourse was Harriman’s explanation to President Truman that Roosevelt’s policy of negotiating with Stalin had been based on fear (322). This argument both appealed to the newly-minted president’s mental disposition and helped solidify the American anti-Soviet hardliners’ story that the Russians only responded to toughness. It also fed into the myth that the paralyzed President at Yalta had not been able to stand up to the Soviets and that

Regarding the War,” p. 10, 10 September 1942, President’s Personal File 4721, FDR-Papers, FDR Library, Hyde Park.
more virile elements in the United States now had to step forth and save the honor of the nation (289).

I thoroughly enjoyed reading this absorbing book and, while following current day international news, thought that it might serve as a manual for diplomats interested in confidence building measures (97). At other times this academic study reminded me of Leo Tolstoy’s War and Peace. Since the index does not include all the actors, it is advisable, as my mother taught me in reading big Russian novels, to keep a list of the cast with brief identifications. And there are no minor characters on this stage. Or minor episodes, for that matter; everything is significant. Most importantly, the author’s interpretive subtleties contribute to the novelistic impression. In applying a new line of inquiry to the age-old problem of war and peace, Costigliola shows a keen sense of human agency, historical contingency, ironic and tragic twists, as well as an appreciation of his protagonists’ ‘flawed’ characters. Along the way he accomplishes the highest aim of a historian: to tell the story of ‘what really happened.’ Which is why I would also recommend this book for classroom assignment: if your students read only one book about this critical period, let it be this one.

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8 Yet, it is shorter and offers excellent summaries at the end of each chapter.

9 Take, for example, the brief explanation on page 238 based on Harriman’s account that at Yalta “Stalin and Churchill ‘were talking at the same time and not always on the same subject.’ In ‘attempting to translate what was being said,’ the interpreters only added to the din.” In other words, “Faulty hearing, mistranslation, and cognitive dissonance all undercut the veracity of official transcripts of conversations.”

10 Albert Camus, another expert on totalitarianism, wrote “Only the novel is faithful to the specific: it does not offer conclusions about life but instead reveals its unfolding.” Cited in Robert Zaretsky, Albert Camus. Elements of a Life (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 76.
On May 31, 1967, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., among the most eminent American historians of his generation, author of quintessential American Cold War document, *The Vital Center*, advisor to presidents, convened an ‘off-the-record seminar’ with two elderly grey eminences who had been ‘present at the creation’ of the American national security state: John J. McCloy and W. Averell Harriman. Schlesinger asked Harriman: “When do you think Stalin became irrational?” Harriman did not answer directly, responding instead that Stalin “was the ablest man that I’ve ever known.”

Taken aback, Schlesinger pressed: “Even abler than [Winston] Churchill, even than Roosevelt?” “Yes. Very definitely.” The questioner tried again: When did Stalin begin “to lose—to go around mad”? Harriman explained that although the dictator’s mental stability had indeed failed, that slippage had occurred only a few years before his death in 1953 . . . Undaunted, Schlesinger a few months later published in *Foreign Affairs* a widely read essay blaming the Cold War principally on “the intransigence of Leninist ideology, the sinister dynamics of a totalitarian society, and the madness of Stalin” (9).

The madness of foreign rulers has an ancient pedigree. It was a favorite trope of Suetonius, whose mad emperors entertain us to this day. Aside from Caligula and his fellows, the ancients associated madness with barbarism and were particularly pleased to join the two in the figure of the mad oriental monarch: Xerxes lashing the Hellespont and the like. The cruelty of ‘orientals’ was proverbial and particularly potent—if that is the word—when associated with women or men who engaged in sexual activities associated with women. Madness, barbarism, cruelty, the violation of sex roles all being signs by which we recognize them. Schlesinger, knowing Harriman to have been crucial to the reversal of alliances that took place after the death of Franklin Roosevelt, and assuming that when asked he would designate the ruthless, cruel, absolute Asiatic ruler as mad, was caught off guard when Harriman not only did not do so, but said he thought Stalin “the ablest man” he had ever known. Best to draw a veil over an old man’s indiscretions.

How many years must pass before clashes of nations and ideologies have sufficiently cooled for historians to produce stories that depict their actors in an even-handed manner? More, no doubt, than the scant quarter century since the end of the Cold War during which time we have had history in the Schlesinger vein, revisionism, post-revision, etc. Now comes Frank Costigliola’s *Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances*. The book operates on two levels. The more conventional is a “revisionist” Cold War narrative, pivoting on the death of Franklin Roosevelt, and assuming that when asked he would designate the ruthless, cruel, absolute Asiatic ruler as mad, was caught off guard when Harriman not only did not do so, but said he thought Stalin “the ablest man” he had ever known. Best to draw a veil over an old man’s indiscretions.

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essentially defensive, consumed with mingled fear and admiration of Germany, seeking safety in a barrier of ‘friendly’ nations on its western border—a border, it insisted, that must be identical to that enjoyed by the Tsar in 1914. (Stalin once remarked to his mother that he was "something like the Tsar.") Churchill and the British Empire are described least sympathetically, as Costigliola adopts Roosevelt’s anti-colonialist attitudes.

Costigliola’s view of these matters is interestingly similar to that of the British Washington Embassy as the Grand Alliance soured into the Cold War: “The late President Roosevelt dreamed of, and strove for the ideal of one world in which the Big Three partnership, forged during the war, would be merged in the United Nations Organisation … The present [Harry S. Truman] Administration lacks the inspired leadership which marked the regime of Mr. Roosevelt.”2 Costigliola’s story of the Grand Alliance is a tale about Roosevelt’s personalization of the relationship between the three allied nations, his keeping a dynamic balance, like a juggler on a balance bar, and how everything fell apart under Truman, about whom Costigliola finds little to admire. Fair enough, even if this ventures out a bit far onto the thin ice of criticism of the now-beatified man from Missouri and praise of Rooseveltian people and policies later to be characterized as ‘dupes’ and ‘fellow-travelling,’ if not worse.3

Costigliola has a fine ear for the unconscious language of diplomats and politicians. The association of the word “penetration” with fears of the Soviet Union catches and holds his attention and leads to what will be the second, more controversial level of his analysis. This story is one of young love and middle-age bitterness, the longing for Soviet ballerinas and the intimacy of diplomatic intercourse, anger at not being allowed to see behind the boudoir curtain and fear of the barbarous, savage customs of the other. It goes like this: in 1934 the first American ambassador to the Soviet Union, William C. Bullitt, had assembled a brilliant staff of young, Russian-speaking diplomats: Charles Bohlen, George Kennan, and Charles Thayer. They enjoyed good relations with members of the Soviet government, who attended parties at Spaso House, and they conducted love affairs, as young men will. The rose glow of the love affairs at first colored their views of the Soviet Union itself. Then, the story goes, Stalin, like an evil wizard, arrested the ballerinas and stopped the parties. It was these men, embittered by their unrequited passion for Russia (and some Russians), who, with Harriman and Churchill, were instrumental in assisting Truman at the beginning of the Cold War.

It is an interesting story. One so very rarely hears about the sexual aspect of diplomatic decision-making. Perhaps if there were more stories of this sort Costigliola’s account would not seem quite so overstated. He seems most on solid ground in relation to Bohlen and Thayer and, in a cooler way, in regard to that unusually complex personality, George Kennan (whose diaries he is editing). On the other hand, President Truman is not known to

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have had love affairs in pre-war Moscow, nor did Secretary of Defense Forrestal, and yet they were at least as anti-Soviet (and fearful of Communist penetration) as Bohlen, Bullitt, and Kennan.

The reversal of alliances in 1945 was abrupt and, as far as is presently known, one-sided. Churchill contemplated mobilizing the Wehrmacht divisions under Allied control in the West for an offensive against the Red Army early in that year (if not before). Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union (as well as that to Britain) was cut off abruptly and without consultation. The use of the atomic bomb on Japan was planned as much as a warning to Moscow as a demonstration to Tokyo. British diplomats were devising an arrangement of subject and client states all along the Soviet Union’s southern border against the renewal of the Great Game and American planners were compiling lists of targets within the Soviet Union suitable for atomic bombs. Roosevelt had imagined he could create a new world in which the Big Four would keep the peace. Truman had no such dreams.

The ideology of the Cold War, from Arthur Koestler’s hysterical cries to a Berlin crowd appreciative of hysterical orators to Ronald Reagan’s speeches about an “Evil Empire” was intended to create a certain reality. It was, for fifty years, highly successful. Even those who had helped create it were convinced—or particularly they. Stalin was a mad man, an evil emperor, ruling a population of slaves eager to penetrate the West. Perhaps this fascinating, deeply researched book will contribute to a historical narrative of the period between the death of Roosevelt and that of the Soviet Union without fables about evil wizards and barbarian hordes.
The essence of Frank Costigliola’s latest tome, Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances, is revealed – as it should be of course – in the work’s subtitle “How Personal Politics Helped Start the Cold War”. The volume is an engaging and detailed account of the personalities involved as the end of the Second World War became the foundation for the Cold War. Costigliola adopts such an approach because “[t]he functioning of the wartime alliance and the future of the post-war world pivoted on diplomacy inextricably personal and political” (3). The book admirably fulfils its goal of examining “wartime diplomacy in the context of each leader’s family and cultural heritage, formative experiences, and emotional dispositions and sensibilities” (3). In doing so, Costigliola makes an outstanding contribution to the scholarship of the Second World War. Three necessarily brief insights illustrate its contribution.

The cast of characters whose personalities are covered is remarkable both in breadth and depth, but central to the Costigliola’s argument are Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin and Franklin Roosevelt: the Grand Alliance’s ‘Big Three’. Of the three, Costigliola considers the American president to be the most important: “As the fulcrum of the Grand Alliance, Roosevelt merits primary, but not exclusive, attention” (2). So while the childhood and formative years of all three central characters are examined, because their “background, personality, and culture conditioned their emotional beliefs and their interactions with each other” (2-3), it is the American President who receives the most detailed scrutiny. In drawing upon his past work on the thirty-second President, Costigliola paints a fascinating picture of Roosevelt and those in his ‘Intimate Circle’, which was made up of Missy LeHand, a secretary who became an adviser and confidante of FDR; Louis Howe, a pre-1936 advisor, Thomas G. Corcoran, who designed and lobbied for New Deal legislation; Harry Hopkins, who turned FDR’s ideas into programs and served as the President’s contact with Churchill, Stalin; the Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall; and Sumner Welles as the diplomat with uncanny intuition for interpreting and formulating FDR’s foreign policy aims. These characters were ultimately worn out and worn down by Roosevelt’s “demanding behaviour,” but as they fell from the President’s favour, they were never “effectively replaced” (61). Crucially, as Costigliola explains throughout the text, this left Roosevelt isolated to face the concurrent challenges of wartime and post-war planning, which involved the considerable man-management tasks of dealing with Churchill and Stalin. The impact of his isolation from the influence of the coterie with whom he mixed work and play was to prevent the moments of levity which lightened the burdens of office. The author suggests this had policy relevance during the latter part of the war: “[f]or the crucial last sixteen months of Roosevelt’s presidency, the circle remained broken” (84). However, Costigliola adds, the president “continued his struggle to win the war, keep the alliance together, and guide it into the postwar world” (84). That it was such a struggle indicates how much Roosevelt, along with Churchill and Stalin, devoted themselves to the task of continuing the alliance into the post-war period. Costigliola argues convincingly that because the Big Three shared a “mutual interest in a stable and peaceful world that would ensure their collective predominance” (4), they “sought, respectively, to broker, finesse or impose a Three Policeman solution” (218). Such belief was implicit to their working
relationship and leads Costigliola to state plainly that the “Cold War was not inevitable” (4). In short, and much to the author’s credit, throughout the book the unfolding tale of post-war planning melding into post-war policy is done with craft and clarity.

Importantly, in emphasising the role of Roosevelt and his compadres in the Big Three, Costigliola strikes a delicate balance between an emphasis on ‘Big Man’ history and those in the supporting cast. The Big Three have had their fair share of attention in this narrative. Jonathon Fenby’s Alliance: The Inside Story of How Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill Won One War and Began Another argued that “personalities at the top of the wartime alliance had always been vital, their relationships crucial” (417), but Costigliola goes further. In establishing the balance between the Big Three and their entourages, the author acknowledges a growing body of work that investigates those who occupy a second tier of political and diplomatic positions. These characters may have a transitory influence, but an influence nonetheless in interpreting, and importantly, recording the interactions of the Grand Alliance. To that end we learn about W. Averell Harriman, Roosevelt’s wartime Ambassador to Moscow, and a cohort of Russia experts who served in Moscow and Washington in the likes of George F. Kennan, Charles E. Bohlen, and William C. Bullitt, who was the first U.S. ambassador to Moscow in 1934 and who all went on to exert an influence on President Harry Truman’s policy toward Stalin and the Soviet Union. We also learn about the woman who would ultimately become Harriman’s third wife (1971), but was at the time Winston Churchill’s daughter-in-law. Pamela Digby Churchill’s various transatlantic relations which went beyond Harriman at the time to include the American reporter Edward R. Murrow, flirtations at least with Harry Hopkins when on his mission to London in early 1941, and Royal Air Force Chief of Air Staff Viscount Charles Portal. In explaining Digby Churchill’s role Costigliola avoids any temptation to titillate. Instead, and as is evident throughout, the author carefully matches the influence of personality to the political outcome that followed. By focusing upon individuals beyond Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, Costigliola distinguishes this book from past scholarship further by exploring the Big Three away from the wartime summits. A richer and more nuanced understanding is the result.

A further notable aspect of Costigliola’s detailed account of the Grand Alliance centres on the health of the main protagonists. Both Churchill and Stalin saw their health suffer under the stresses and strains of the war, but given that Roosevelt was not to see the war’s conclusion and the counterfactual debates that fact opens up, Costigliola focuses upon Roosevelt. Rather than recount a tale of steady decline in the President toward his death in April 1945, the author argues, based upon his thorough research, that Roosevelt’s health was essentially changeable; benefitting as much from relaxation and rest as appropriate medical care. In this account, Costigliola counters the oft-drawn conclusion from the less-than-flattering pictures of Roosevelt at Yalta in early 1945. The author makes a convincing case that the President’s intellect and his enthusiasm for the task ahead, despite a chequered health record, were not bound to fail when they did. The cerebral haemorrhage that killed Roosevelt could have happened years later or, indeed, years before.

This volume charts the end of one conflict and the beginning of another as the Second World War gave way to the Cold War. It is tinged with tragedy as the book shows the
critical importance of the transition from war to Cold War, and not the peace that Roosevelt envisioned based on the world's great power's policing what all acknowledged would be a challenging period. The logic of Costigliola's argument is that the Cold War did not stem “solely from political disputes and the ideological clash between capitalism and communism” (4) but it was also about individuals and all of their foibles. Michaela Hoenicke Moore’s 2010 Know Your Enemy has been rightly lauded as a model of a multifaceted analysis of how American society influenced foreign policy making during the Roosevelt era. Costigliola’s account of the Grand Alliance joins Hoenicke-Moore’s work by providing a comprehensive account of the personal and psychological influences upon both the winning of the Second World War and the onset of the Cold War.
Review by David F. Schmitz, Whitman College

The Cultural U-Turn

Frank Costigliola’s *Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances* is an important and innovative analysis of the Big Three and the origins of the Cold War. Based on prodigious research, Costigliola’s examination of the personal lives and interpersonal dynamics of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin, and Winston Churchill, along with Harry S. Truman and key advisors, demonstrates that Roosevelt was the key to the Grand Alliance and that his death was a central event in the origins of the Cold War. Costigliola’s well-written, provocative study is full of new insights and perspectives that demand the attention of all scholars of American foreign relations.

Costigliola’s methodology is new for the study of the origins of the Cold War and a model in terms of showing how gender, class, and culture influence politics and policymaking. The book examines “wartime diplomacy in the context of each leader’s family and cultural heritage, formative experiences, and emotional dispositions and sensibilities” (3). As Costigliola notes, while there are numerous works on the origins of the Cold War, he sought “to go beyond earlier studies by tracing the political consequences of the relationships, personalities, emotional lives, emotional dispositions, sensibilities, and cultural assumptions of Roosevelt and other key figures” through a close examination of the personal lives of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin that he believes is “critical to understanding how they interacted to create and sustain Allied unity” while also “investigating the inner qualities of Truman, Harriman, and Kennan” to understand why “they opposed the compromises and ambiguity that were essential to sustaining the Grand Alliance” (12). Costigliola’s questions and concerns are, however, as old as the origins of the Cold War. Using cultural analysis, he has gone back to the question of whether or not Roosevelt’s death was significant in the development of the Cold War. In doing so, he brilliantly links the cultural turn to questions of power, ideology, individuals, and institutions.

Costigliola begins by quoting a long classified interview by Robert Sherwood of Anthony Eden in 1946 conducted for Sherwood’s book *Roosevelt and Hopkins*.1 Discussing Roosevelt’s approach to the Russians, the greater subtlety the president exhibited in contrast to Churchill and Truman, and the breakdown of the wartime alliance, Eden declared that “had Roosevelt lived and retained his health he would never have permitted the present situation to develop.” According to Eden, Roosevelt’s “death, therefore, was a calamity of immeasurable proportions” (2).

As he notes, Costigliola “reaches a similar conclusion” (2). He argues that “Roosevelt’s death weakened, perhaps fatally, the prospects for avoiding or at least mitigating the Cold War. FDR was critical to the founding of the Grand Alliance and to keeping it together. He

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intended the coalition to continue into the postwar era, as did Joseph Stalin” (2). For Costigliola, tensions among the Big Three were to be expected after World War II, but conflict was not inevitable. Understanding how the Grand Alliance worked and then fell apart is vital for examining how the Cold War emerged: “[t]he alliance cohered and then collapsed for reasons more contingent, emotional, and cultural than historians have heretofore recognized. If Roosevelt had lived a while longer ... he might have succeeded in bringing about the transition to a postwar world managed by the Big Three” (4).

The central, and what some might find the most controversial, concept that Costigliola uses to explain this is “emotional belief” or how the wartime leaders “extrapolated—that is, made the leap in logic—from what they knew, to what they wanted to believe. Emotional beliefs entail arranging the evidence to support a conviction that goes beyond that evidence. Examining the assumptions in a statesman’s leap in logic can yield evidence of that official’s overall perspective and objectives” (12-13; emphasis in original). Costigliola finds that “Roosevelt’s personal background predisposed him to an emotional belief that postwar cooperation was necessary and worth the risk” (13). Due to this, “Roosevelt remained the linchpin of the Grand Alliance. He was the most committed to trying postwar cooperation. In terms of personality and politics, the Big Three most depended on him” (57).

Costigliola does not suggest that tension and conflict would not have existed in the postwar period had Roosevelt been able to serve out his fourth term. Soviet actions in Eastern Europe, Great Britain’s empire and needs, and growing American power along with the atomic bomb provided more than enough bases for difficulties. Still, these issues did not necessitate a breakup of the Grand Alliance and the emergence of the Cold War. Costigliola acknowledges the difficulties that faced the victorious powers after the war. Even if Roosevelt lived, the end of the fighting and lack of agreement on many issues guaranteed there would be stresses on the alliance. Yet, the difference in American leadership shifted the focus in Washington from efforts at cooperation and a peace based on Big Three cooperation to demands for Soviet concessions. As Costigliola argues, “[w]ith Truman, however, came changed personalities and perceptions that further aggravated those tensions and, in turn, exacerbated suspicions in Moscow” (313). Costigliola notes that “FDR expected a long postwar transition during which Americans would have to tolerate spheres of influence in Eastern Europe and other departures from the Wilsonian principles of the Atlantic Charter. Tragically uninstructed by Roosevelt, Truman was neither temperamentally nor intellectually inclined toward such patience” (316).

Roosevelt understood the Soviet perspective on many issues, and in particular the fear of Germany and the desire for security. The president knew that the Soviet Union would dominate, at a minimum, postwar Poland and Romania, and that there was very little the western allies could do to change this. Yet, he believed that once the West demonstrated that Russia had no need to fear a revived Germany after the war, and that Soviet security needs could be met through collective security and cooperation of the Big Three, Moscow would slowly ease its domination and become more receptive to the views of Washington and London on European matters. Costigliola’s analysis of Yalta and the creation of the
United Nations show the subtlety of Roosevelt’s diplomacy that was so dependent on his personality.

The pivot of *Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances* are chapters 6 and 7 where, after carefully building his analysis of the outlooks and relationships of Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill, Costigliola sets out FDR’s vision for postwar great power relations and then examines the people and factors responsible for undercutting and changing Roosevelt’s policy. Costigliola’s examination of Ambassador Averill Harriman and diplomat George Kennan, and what he terms the “diplomacy of trauma” (259), is one the most innovative and impressive parts of this work. Building off their time in the Soviet Union and their dealings with Russian leaders in Moscow, these diplomats came to very different conclusions about the motivations and goals of Stalin than Roosevelt, and concluded that peace and American interests were best secured through confrontation. From his first contacts with the new president, Harriman put forth his interpretation that Roosevelt’s policy had been based on fear and a lack of understanding that the Soviets postwar ambitions had no limits. The United States, Harriman asserted, had to act to gain Soviet respect. If Washington stood firm, Moscow would back down from its demands and become cooperative in negotiations. Harriman’s position was supported by Kennan, and Costigliola’s analysis of Kennan’s thinking, and the Long Telegram in particular, is reward enough for reading *Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances*.

As Costigliola concludes, “In the weeks after Roosevelt died, U.S. policy pivoted from trying to get along with the Soviets to emphasizing differences with them. Embittered by his disappointments and frustrations in Moscow, Harriman, bolstered by Kennan, [Charles] Bohlen, and [Elbridge] Durbrow, helped shift policy and opinion toward denigrating the Soviet Union and Big Three cooperation.” (358) The Grand Alliance soured over Poland and Truman’s efforts to undo the Yalta agreements, and while the issues regarding the Polish government were eventually resolved by the Big Three, the differences that now guided the American and Soviet approaches could not be repaired when Germany and the atomic bomb were the issues for discussion at Potsdam and after.

Given the importance of the April 23, 1945 meeting of Truman with his advisors prior to his talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, and their caution against any break with the Soviet Union, it is surprising that Costigliola does not provide more background and explanation for why Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall backed Roosevelt’s approach at this critical juncture. Stimson, as Costigliola shows, continued to resist the abandonment of the Grand Alliance until he left office in September 1945, but was unable to turn his stature into an effective counter to the advisors Truman was listening to about the postwar world. Since his study is based so heavily on biography and personality, it would have been useful to learn more about why Costigliola thinks these two staunch conservatives saw matters at the end of the war much the same way that Roosevelt did.

Moreover, Costigliola could have spent some time explaining the policy directions by Roosevelt that were not consistent with postwar cooperation. For much of the war, Roosevelt conducted his diplomacy on two tracks, one guided by the needs of the Grand
Alliance and its continuation after the war that Costigliola so effectively analyzes, and another based on an American unilateral approach to postwar foreign policy. Two examples of this are the development of the atomic bomb and postwar economic planning—both of which proceeded without the inclusion of the Soviet Union. Costigliola provides an extensive analysis of the decisions concerning the bomb and the political implications of Roosevelt’s and Truman’s actions. American economic planning and the Bretton Woods agreements, however, are not discussed. Postwar economic assistance to the Soviet Union for its recovery was a crucial component of Roosevelt’s hope for a continuation of the Grand Alliance and the moderation of Soviet control in Eastern Europe, and it is unfortunate that Costigliola does not explain how he sees the international economic institutions established by the United States or the use of postwar aid as serving Roosevelt’s goals.

These, however, are minor concerns. *Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances* is a major achievement. Frank Costigliola has taken well known topics—Roosevelt, World War II diplomacy, and the origins of the Cold War—and provided a new understanding of the president and his policies. In a bookend to Eden’s remarks at the beginning of the work, Costigliola gives Harriman the last word. The veteran diplomat told Arthur Schlesinger Jr. in the 1960s that “FDR was basically right in thinking he could make progress by personal relations with Stalin…. The Russians were utterly convinced that the change came as a result of the shift from Roosevelt to Truman.” Doing a U-turn of his own views, Harriman continued: “If Roosevelt had lived with full vigor, it’s very hard to say what could happen because—Roosevelt could lead the world” (428). Costigliola brilliantly shows how FDR intended to do just that.
Review by Michael Sherry, Northwestern University

Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances stands apart from many books in the field. Instead of heavy scholarly prose, Frank Costigliola offers fleet narrative, despite the occasional anachronism (President Harry Truman “manned up,”363). Against much theory-driven work, Costigliola’s approach is archive-driven (the theory, about emotions, gender, and culture, is there but largely off-stage). Amid many searches for the big, foundational structures of history, Costigliola offers personalities, making them foundational. While many scholars have left behind the hoary causes-of-the-Cold War quest, Costigliola pursues it successfully as he examines “the political consequences of the relationships, personalities, emotional lives, emotional dispositions, sensibilities, and cultural assumptions of [Franklin D.] Roosevelt and other key figures”(12). Among its pleasures for me was experiencing long-familiar stories anew because of Costigliola’s fresh context for them—for example, Truman’s “straight one-two to the jaw” to Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, as “Truman bragged” about his tough talk to the Russians on 23 April 1945 (326).

Given his focus on the intimate lives and emotions of Roosevelt, Josef Stalin, Winston Churchill, and those around them, Costigliola’s book perhaps has a gossipy feel to it, for all that he resists a gossipy style. Readers are peeping toms, looking over Costigliola’s shoulder as he looks into those leaders’ difficult bodies and personalities. Adding to the book’s gossipy feel is its subjects’ own rapacious fondness for gossip, a fondness intensified by wartime urgency, liquor, rivalry, and frenzy. The result is often eye-opening and sometimes jaw-dropping, as Costigliola, for example, traces the relationship between Franklin Roosevelt and Maurgerite “Missy” LeHand, his secretary, but also his muse, handler, and spur. In doing so, he also elevates the role of women in what is usually an all-guy story (Eleanor Roosevelt excepted) and the role of gender, doing so without overplaying his hand. Costigliola is hardly oblivious to John Lewis Gaddis’s strategic chessboard or Warren Kimball’s idea of Roosevelt as a “juggler.”1 He deftly weaves in what many scholars have offered (he can hardly do justice to all, there are so many). But he is on to something different: how strategic and political calculations intersected towering, troubled personalities.

“The coalition might well have survived if Roosevelt had lived longer,” Costigliola speculates (358). Is he right? And if he is, so what? It may be true that Roosevelt’s death turned the U.S. toward the Cold War, but what do we make of that fact? We can imagine a longer-lived Roosevelt, and Costigliola makes a good case that what killed Roosevelt was not a terminal condition (he was trying to take better care of his health) but a rogue event, a cerebral aneurysm that “could have occurred years earlier, years later, or not at all” (258). But what other counter-factuals might we pose? What if Stalin had been killed during the war, or Churchill had been voted out of office earlier, or indeed Roosevelt had

died “years earlier”? If nothing else, Costigliola’s approach underlines how personality-dependent the Grand Alliance was, and hence how shaky its foundations were. If it only took the death of one man to pull it apart, what enduring strength or appeal did it really have? This book only goes so far toward answering that question.

But it also oversimplifies Costigliola’s argument to see it as hinging only on Roosevelt’s death, for he sets that death within the broad, volatile interplay of personalities, emotions, and cultures. His death mattered because it, and his flagging leadership before it, opened the way for a surge of “emotional thinking” among all parties: for anti-Soviet sentiments and “cultural and ethnic sympathies for the Germans” among Anglo-Americans, and for tone-deaf comments and brutal actions on Stalin’s part (307, 417).”Contingencies of personality, health, feelings, and cultural assumptions propelled massive events with dangerous, or positive, momentum” (422). It was dangerous, as Costigliola sees it, when American diplomat Averell Harriman, Truman and others became convinced that if they “manned up,” Stalin would back down (363). By the time that conviction was proven wrong—Stalin was cautious and flexible but did not back down—the Cold War’s momentum was established, turning “postwar political and ideological rivalries with the Kremlin” that were “probably inevitable” into a lasting “militarized confrontation” that was far from inevitable (417). If I am not entirely convinced by that argument, I am very convinced that no one else has made the case better than Costigliola does. This is superb history—closely tied to his prodigious sources, smart and scrupulous in using them, fair-minded in its judgment—that builds powerfully to its 1945-46 climax.

What comes across is how complicated, fragile, and sometimes weird these people were. Repeatedly they collapsed in physical or psychic distress, withdrawing not only from public view but from the key people running the war machinery. Men often felt their manhood had been impugned by the disasters their nation faced (“How did they catch us with our pants down?” Senator Tom Connally asked Roosevelt on December 7, 141). Women often felt betrayed and discarded after doing so much to make the men function. Courageous in his way, Roosevelt still feared flying—his arduous trip to Casablanca in January 1943 was his first airplane flight since 1932. Does this warts-and-all portrayal of these people thereby diminish them? Not for me. Instead, Costigliola suggests how a terrifying war galvanized and troubled the minds, souls, and bodies of leaders. There is hardly a dull one in the whole lot.

There is hardly a steady one either. If Costigliola had extended his gaze, he might have captured steadier hands. But on Big Three relations late in the war, the steady hands of General George C. Marshall, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower had little influence. Instead, the big power game was played by jilted Soviet “experts” like Harriman and George Kennan (whose famous “long telegram” Costigliola shrewdly analyzes), by the mercurial advisor and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, and by a new president determined to disprove his deeply-felt insecurity and convinced that he ran a tidier White House (while “budget director Harold Smith marveled at finding ‘Truman more disorganized than Roosevelt,’”371). That Truman believed that America’s atomic “know-how” could be kept secret—one aspect of “his unquestioning faith in America’s
exceptionalism”—added to the anti-Soviet shift as he rejected Stimson’s warning, "We do not have a secret to give away—the secret will give itself away" (14, 371).

Costigliola writes about his subjects in a tone more of regret than condemnation. He is careful not to cast their weaknesses and eccentricities as willful misbehavior and to balance them with their strengths. He is likewise careful to explain how individual idiosyncracies mattered less in themselves than when they amplified the cultural and political dispositions of institutions and countries. He is least charitable to Harriman, Kennan, and the other U.S. officials, each of whom left the Moscow embassy as a “‘disappointed lover’” (sometimes literally) of Soviet people and culture when the Kremlin isolated them, and who were inclined to remark, as Harriman did, “Anything unknown to us is sinister” (263, 7). He explains their alienation from all things Soviet but shows little sympathy for it. In one of his few jabs at others’ scholarship, Costigliola adds that “Cold War orthodoxy would keep coming back to the Russian experts’ judgments, especially Kennan’s. But that was like relying on the participants in a series of bad marriages to be the best judge of why those relationships failed” (288).

His sharpest criticism of the Big Three concerns Roosevelt and his “saddest, most dangerous failing as wartime leader” (236). As trusted aides like Harry Hopkins and Missy LeHand fell apart or got cast aside, Roosevelt failed to assemble a new team to help him project his public voice, leaving his dreams of Big Three cooperation and his grasp of imperialism’s evils poorly understood by Americans (and others) and by the administration that replaced his. If Stalin and Churchill come off a bit better, it is not because Costigliola is less harsh on them (“Stalin had undermined the alliance with his merciless, obstinate, and narrow-minded policies,” 392), but because he knows them less well and because Roosevelt, not Churchill or Stalin, was “the linchpin of the Grand Alliance” (57). And after all, he is writing as a disappointed American, not a disappointed Russian or Englishman.

His portrayal of Roosevelt is nuanced, acute, sustained. He captures Roosevelt’s style of leadership superbly, as when he examines Roosevelt’s habit of backing into things. Regarding racial integration of the armed forces, “‘We sort of back into’ progress, Roosevelt explained. Years earlier, the polio victim had ‘backed into’ rooms by crawling backward while diverting onlookers with banter. Faced with the anti-interventionist sentiment of 1940-41, he had backed into the conflict while talking about aid to the Allies and defense of the hemisphere. Now, in 1944-45, he was trying to back into Big Three governance,” but without the “transformational, Pearl Harbor-like event... to provide the wind at his back as he navigated,” and without a smart staff to aid him (210).

Though Costigliola does not speculate along these lines, one can imagine that a longer-lived Roosevelt might have reconstructed wartime moral clarity by tapping the revelations that emerged after his death. He could have exploited Nazi genocide to challenge the renewed sense of racial kinship with Germans that many British and American officials expressed, reasserting that Germany, not the Soviet Union, was the great threat to western values and postwar harmony. It is indeed astonishing how little notice many officials (at least civilians like Harriman and Kennan) took of German genocide and how quickly they figured Soviets
as the more barbaric people. And Roosevelt might have waved the atomic threat to humankind to marshal support for Big Three cooperation.

Among this book’s contributions is its embedding of the Cold War in World War II. It is hardly the first to do so. Yet there has long been a tendency—or just a default option—to explain the Cold War by focusing on the 1945-48 period, when the obvious sparks we call the Cold War started flying (how many titles related to the Cold War make 1945 their starting point?). My students struggle to connect the Cold War to World War II, as if history began all over in 1945. Costigliola encourages us not to amputate the backstory—the giant, awful experience of World War II that shaped all the players.

By the same token, he pushes the start of the Cold War to an earlier point than many historians date it. All scholars recognize the bitterness that arose over Poland in 1944 and the change in American tone with Roosevelt’s death. But rather than seeing such changes as ominous preludes to a Cold War yet to erupt, Costigliola sees in them a decisive emotional shift that “persisted even when political relations warmed, as they did on and off for the remainder of 1945” (344). That was the moment when “it became more customary [for American officials] to refer to the Soviets not as fellow world policemen as Roosevelt had often depicted them, but rather as international criminals”—a big shift indeed (344). Churchill’s “monologue berating the Russians’ reminded [Ambassador Joseph] Davies of listening to Goebbels, Goering, and Hitler” (348). The Cold War had started, even if the label was not yet attached to it. Emphasizing the abruptness of the shift, Costigliola underplays how erratic Truman was regarding the Soviet Union (and much else). But his point is that being erratic was not the same as being ambiguous and open-ended in the Roosevelt style. It instead involved abrupt jerks and ill-considered decisions.

To play the reviewer’s game of imagining the book the author did not write, I wish that Costigliola had opened up his story more to show how the volatile interplay he describes came across to the various publics involved. The book is about what went on behind the screen, not what popped out in front of it. When, for example, we learn that in spring 1945 “war talk” from inside the Truman Administration was “roiling the public,” we learn almost nothing about that “roiling” (346). But attending to it would have made a long book much longer. The flip side of my wish is my recognition that Costigliola kept his boundaries under control—still another reason that this is an outstanding book.
Frank Costigliola’s most recent book has arrived, and it was well worth the wait. Eminently readable and deeply researched, it is full of anecdotal highlights and unforgettable images, both in photographs and in the author’s masterful prose. The work presents a provocative and largely persuasive (and also counterfactual) thesis on the development of the Grand Alliance and the emergence of the Cold War, drawing on a careful study of the relationships of Franklin Roosevelt, Josef Stalin, and Winston Churchill that is enriched by the author’s understanding of culture, psychology, language, and gender. Its use of hitherto untapped sources from the United States, Britain, and Russia add further nuance and complexity to the story.

Costigliola is not alone in arguing that the demise of the Roosevelt administration was responsible for the Cold War; just a decade ago, in a study of the next occupant of the Oval Office, Arnold Offner strongly implicated Harry S. Truman’s narrow thinking and provincial outlook as a key contributor to that long conflict.¹ Costigliola’s focus here, though, is chiefly on Roosevelt, and his potential to have prevented this outcome—had he lived. The author shows how Roosevelt’s cultural background and personality could well have made the difference in 1945 and after. His personal sense of security and self-confidence as the squire of Hyde Park, as well as his (related) ease with ambiguous situations and outcomes, had already allowed him to assuage the insecurities of the Soviets, and to accept less-than-perfect solutions where the less sure Truman could not. Thus Roosevelt went to Yalta in 1945, despite his physical frailty, rather than insist the dictator come to him, and this made a powerful impression on his hosts. There he also made a problematic compromise over Poland—but it was no worse than the arrangement which continued for the next four decades, and was effected without the bristling arsenals.

But Roosevelt had his limits too, as Costigliola’s own portrait makes clear. Not only would he have had to have been vigorously alive, continuing to transcend his health problems, in order to prevent the Cold War, he also would have needed to do something he did not do well—put his ideas into practice. Earlier, as the author well details, he had a cozy circle of excellent advisors and supporters, from Missy Le Hand, his private secretary and administrator, to Harry Hopkins, his confidant and right-hand man, to carry out his goals. When they each withdrew, however, either from illness, marriage, or both, he did not replace them. Certainly he never consulted Truman, which is further evidence of a blind spot and a lack of planning. Who would have ensured that his post-war vision, led by his “Four Policemen,” was properly executed?

But Costigliola suggests that there was another reason why the Cold War happened sans Roosevelt, one that had less to do with the lack of his skillful hand, and more to do with

¹ Arnold Offner, Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2002), 18, 23.
William C. Bullitt’s broken-hearted boys. Costigliola has told this story before, but now he ties it much more closely to the demise of the Grand Alliance. When Bullitt became Ambassador to the Soviet Union in late 1933, he invited along a cohort of young and frolicsome men to assist him. As Costigliola tells it, this “honeymoon” class—including George F. Kennan, Chip Bohlen, Charles Thayer, and Elbridge Durbrow—lived in a blissful Boheme of boozy bashes and ballerinas (260). But all too soon, it came crashing down when the Soviet government reaffirmed its customary practice of isolating Russians from foreigners. Indeed, Bullitt somberly declared that the “honeymoon atmosphere had evaporated completely” in mid-April 1934—barely three months after Kennan had arrived on January 3. Costigliola asserts that the group of spurned specialists, deprived of their petting and partying, nursed a fierce fury which glowed hotly in 1945-46 absent the more conciliatory tone set by Roosevelt. Was the mourned loss of such a brief window into Soviet society a more important factor in creating anti-Soviet animosity than Stalin’s own actions at the end of the war—his detached (actually, devious) treatment of the Warsaw uprising and other savage tactics in Eastern Europe, not to mention his too-long tolerance of the numerous rapes and other ravages carried out by his troops, for example (all of which Costigliola fully notes)? These depredations seem absolutely crucial in fueling the new anger in Washington.

All the same, the “spurned lover” sobriquet seems fitting for W. Averell Harriman, who arrived as American ambassador during another cozy moment, in 1943. Harriman treated Vyacheslav Molotov to a personal tour of his airplane, but he too was soon frustrated in his attempts at further “intimacy” with the foreign minister (301). By 1944, Harriman condemned the Russians as “barbarians” and was actively undermining Roosevelt’s efforts to engage with their leadership. As in other cases detailed here, the “personal became political” (361, 262). This was not the first time things had gone wrong for Harriman in Russia; Costigliola doesn’t mention his failed manganese mine in Chiaturi, Georgia, in the 1920s. Harriman got over that bonanza lost to the Bolsheviks, and he would eventually get over his wartime disappointment too, and be one of the voices of reason in the Vietnam War. Of course, he never got over Pamela Digby Churchill—another wartime honeymoon story vividly conveyed here.

But neither the disappointed Russian experts, nor Stalin’s appalling behavior, would have necessitated the Cold War if Roosevelt had been there, Costigliola contends. Indeed, “So much depended on Roosevelt,” (421) for the president was aware of what Soviet Assistant Minister Ivan Maisky described as the Russian “sense of inferiority” and “touchiness,” and Roosevelt, too, had the unusual “emotional intelligence” to accommodate these sensitivities.

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2 Frank Costigliola, “‘Unceasing Pressure for Penetration’: Gender, Pathology, and Emotion in George Kennan’s Formation of the Cold War,” *Journal of American History* 83 (March 1997): 1328.


Churchill could get along with Stalin, especially when alcohol-assisted, but he never tried to gain the same understanding, as he found it difficult to stray far from his animating enmity to communism, which was forged during the Russian Revolution. Roosevelt was thus the essential partner for the execution of the Grand Alliance’s follow-on, a joint plan for the postwar condominium of the Four Policemen: the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and China. Without him, as well, the issue of Poland became a “deal-breaker” (349).

The view of Stalin that emerges here—a man who was vitally interested in a postwar relationship, and who even as he “undermined the alliance he wanted to preserve” in order to keep the spoils of war, nevertheless showed “restraint” as a mass murderer –will no doubt encounter some resistance in the reading public (54, 12). And not just among laymen and women; scholars like John Lewis Gaddis too adhere to the Stalin-as-paranoid persona.5 Perhaps, as the literary scholar Karen Ryan suggests, Stalin’s paranoia was “functional.”6 Whether the Soviet leader was restrained, functioning, paranoid, or all three, Costigliola is probably right that it was not only dangerous but ineffectual to insist on the freedom of one country (e.g., Poland) as the sine qua non for a modus vivendi with him. It was inconsistent too, since the peoples of the United States’ closest ally were hardly liberated at the time, including a large portion of the British Empire.

In any case, with Roosevelt’s body just days in the tomb, Ambassador Harriman dropped the “fear-bomb” with the next president, employing, as Costigliola perceptively notes, a “discursive break” with previous rhetoric (322, 336). Harriman persuaded Truman that it was Roosevelt’s “fear” of the Soviets, not his flexibility, that had allowed for the arrangement over Poland at Yalta (344). The timid Truman then overreacted to prove his manly mettle. Costigliola contends that the man from Independence frequently made “snap judgments” based on questionable assumptions, like his decision to keep the bomb a secret, even when he knew Soviet spies were all over it (316, 325). Truman’s propensity to rush to judgment does seem evident in other contexts, as with his peevish response to music critic Paul Hume’s assessment of daughter Margaret’s vocal talents, but one must also consider that when confronted with red baiting, Truman was not necessarily knee-jerk in his reactions.7 Famously, and mistakenly, he thought the Hiss case was a “red herring,” and stalwartly and correctly, he stood by Dean Acheson when Republicans called for his ouster in 1950.8

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5 Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 21, 52, 62.


7 The story is well summed up in an obituary of this critic (who later became friends with Truman), “Paul Hume, 85; Washington Post Music Critic Drew President Truman’s Wrath,” Los Angeles Times, November 28, 2001.

8 The “red herring” comment may be found in Rick Perlstein, Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008), 30.
One of Costigliola’s chief contributions is to include interdisciplinary insights that further enrich the story, from his psychological and sexual analyses of his subjects to the discursive analysis of their writings. Rather than simply letting quotations, and situations, speak for themselves, the author enjoys teasing out their full meanings and significance. The “wedding” of Roosevelt and Churchill at the Atlantic Conference (complete with the agnostic Churchill dutifully mouthing sacred hymns and scriptures for his “bride”) is a good example. And as the nuptials suggest, there is a physicality in this book that makes it even more vital. Here are Roosevelt’s “limp and flaccid,” “wasted” legs, but “great will” in the set of his jaw (182, 136, 27); Churchill’s “pair of crinkled, creamy buttocks” as manifest during his nude conferencing after hours (177); Stalin’s “damaged” body (32), and Hopkins’s simultaneously “frail and vibrant” one (107). The drinking parties, sexual passions, and other bodily excrescences all provide a full sense of the corporeal here. In such passages, this work continuously engages, entertains, and illuminates. Whatever one’s quibble may be with Costigliola’s individual assessments of Truman, Stalin, Roosevelt, or Churchill for that matter, the book effectively overturns the view of the Cold War as a sort of natural disaster, the unstoppable result of “massive, geopolitical, ideological and political pressures” that would be hard for any president to have “defied.”

Instead, by magnificently restoring human agency to history, Costigliola is able to make us wrestle deeply with how one president might have stopped that conflict from happening the way that it did.

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9 Colin Dueck, review of Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War by Arnold Offner, in Presidential Studies Quarterly 34 (December 2004): 904.
I deeply appreciate the careful reading of my book by the esteemed historians chosen by H-Diplo. And while I am gratified at the reviewers’ testimony that the book brings a fresh perspective and new sources to a seemingly worn-out topic, I am also mindful that I have done nothing more, as many other historians have done, than tap into the almost inexhaustible well of creativity that is our discipline.

As several of the reviewers remark, counterfactual history can only take us so far, and I agree. Nevertheless, it is only by venturing a bit down the paths not taken by historical actors that we can put into context the avenue that was pursued. Michael Sherry asks, “how shaky [were] the foundations” of the World War II alliance “if it only took the death of one man to pull it apart?” The months following FDR’s death are best understood as a critical juncture in history, much as the summer of 1914, the fall of 1989, and the fall of 2001 are. During such upheavals, otherwise rigid parameters of geography, politics, and economics become more plastic, and the emotional intelligence of a Franklin Roosevelt or the insecure bluster of a Harry Truman can have enormous consequences. As Roosevelt repeatedly said, the immediate postwar period would be a time of uncertainty and transition, when international relationships could develop in very different directions. The period 1945-46 proved especially pivotal because, once Washington and Moscow dropped the premise that the Big Three (or Four) would for the most part cooperate in the postwar world, an accretion of strength of one side was interpreted as an absolute loss to the other. Zero-sum politics undermined, for instance, the pledges of Roosevelt and of Churchill at Tehran and at Yalta that they would support enhanced Soviet power vis-à-vis Turkey in the Dardanelles.

J. Simon Rofe and other reviewers refer to the pivot, in chapters 7 and 8, to what Michael Holzman calls the second level of analysis in the book, that of the “love affairs” of diplomats in Moscow. (Chapters 9 and 10, to be sure, again pick up the story of the interactions of leaders in Washington, London, and Moscow.) Katherine Sibley writes of ambassador “William C. Bullitt’s broken-hearted boys” – “George F. Kennan, Chip Bohlen, Charles Thayer, and Elbridge Durbrow”—who had in 1933-34 lived “in a blissful Boheme of boozy bashes and ballerinas.” I think it important, first, to distinguish between Kennan, on the one hand, and Bohlen, Thayer, and Durbrow, on the other. The latter three wrote explicitly about their sexual affairs in Moscow; Kennan in his diary and letters alluded to the temptations without specifying whether he indulged. Of far greater significance for the future, moreover, was not the indulging or abstaining from sexual activity, but rather the emotional valence and impact of living in Russia. While Bullitt’s full-flush enthusiasm (fired by Stalin’s initial warmth and the ambassador’s presumption that the Soviets would approve a grandiose Monticello-in-Moscow of an embassy) waned by April 1934, Kennan’s passion did not.

On a July 1934 vacation, he found in Norway a “paradise of cleanliness, order, and well-fed respectability” – by which contrast, “Moscow seems highly incredible. Nevertheless, I think
of it often,” he wrote Bullitt, and “I shall be very glad to get back.” The ambassador replied: “Do not hurry back. The work . . . is much less important than your health.” Kenneth, however, in deciding to cut short his vacation, explained: “I am really homesick for Moscow.” After a physical and mental breakdown in December 1934, he recuperated in Vienna, where he found himself longing to “rub elbows with [the Russians] in the streets, to smell the earthy, almost touching smells which characterize them, – to look into faces still so close to the stark realities of life and death.” Upon his return to Moscow in July 1944 after a seven-year absence, such intense emotions enveloped him again. Mingling with ordinary Russians, soaking in “their tremendous, pulsating warmth and vitality” infused Kennan with “an indescribable sort of satisfaction.” He mused, “I would rather be sent to Siberia among” Russians “than to live in Park Avenue among our own stuffy folk.” Such longing made it “harder than ever to swallow . . . . that I must always remain a distrusted outsider.” This frustration meant that “the peak of [my] life . . . was definitely passed.”

The key point here is that Kennan’s fierce resentment of the Kremlin-imposed isolation that prohibited him and other resident foreigners from having contact with the Russian people would in 1945-46 sharpen his insistence that the Soviet government itself should be isolated through a policy of containment.

As Michael Holzman remarks, neither Truman nor Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal had “love affairs in pre-war Moscow” and yet they, too, were anti-Soviet. The last thing I would want is for someone to read my book as an argument for some kind of emotional or, worse, sexual determinism. Causation is complex, including the reasons for the development of anti-Soviet feelings. Roosevelt was one of the relatively few elite Americans not strongly affected by the Red Scare after World War I. Truman distrusted foreign ideologies and most foreigners. Forrestal regarded the Soviets as treacherous ‘orientals’ and as ideological clones of the Nazis. And, we must not forget, the Soviets did do terrible things in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. The impact of the emotional thinking of Harriman and Kennan – expressed in the former’s briefings to Truman and others in April-May 1945 and in the latter’s long telegram and Mr. X article – was to add the authority of the on-the-scene ‘expert’ to the anti-Soviet predilections of others.

David Schmitz rightly points to my relative neglect of Henry L. Stimson and General George C. Marshall. What motivated their resistance to Truman’s move, impelled by Harriman, away from Roosevelt’s policies? In 1940-41, Stimson and Marshall had agonized over how

1. Kennan to Bullitt, July 6, 1934, box 44, William C. Bullitt papers, Sterling Library, Yale University, New Haven, CT.

2. Bullitt to Kennan, July 20, 1934, box 44, Bullitt papers.


4. Kennan to Jeanette Hotchkiss, September 11, 1935, box 24, George F. Kennan papers, Mudd Library, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.

5. Kennan to Hotchkiss, October 8, 1944, box 24, Kennan papers.
Adolf Hitler might be stopped. Neither the American people nor Roosevelt wanted U.S. forces to bear the brunt of that burden. Then the German invasion of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent terrible blood sacrifice of the Red Army, blasted open a partial path to victory. Moreover, Stimson – a protégé not of Woodrow Wilson but rather of Theodore Roosevelt – viewed international relations in terms of history and realpolitik. Just decades earlier, he reminded Truman, much of Poland had belonged to Russia. Schmitz’s other point, about the absence in the book of much discussion about postwar aid to Moscow or about the World Bank and the IMF, reflects the puzzling absence of these undeniably important factors in at least the official versions of Roosevelt's discussions at Tehran or at Yalta. One can only surmise that Franklin Roosevelt intended to use economic aid, and probably also control over the atomic bomb, as leverage in some grand deal with Stalin. Roosevelt would not, however, have endeavored to negotiate such a bargain at an open conference, such as the late-April 1945 San Francisco meeting, which he conceptualized as something quite different: a public-relations event to rally support for the big powers from smaller nations and from the American people. He instead anticipated a series of exclusive, cozy summits, far from reporters, where he could deploy his charm, backed by the awesome power of the United States.

As Michaela Hoenicke Moore observes, this book examines the inner lives of American, British, and Soviet leaders – and in that order of emphasis. There is ample room and, I hope, evidence for a historian to develop more fully the Russian side of the story. Similarly, as Michael Sherry points out, the emotional and cultural attitudes of the public during the critical juncture of 1945-46 await a fuller treatment. For colleagues who might, as Hoenicke Moore suggests, assign Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances to students, I can report that the paperback edition will be available as of February 1 and that it will include, as she advised, a list of the cast with brief identifications.