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The current controversy over the U.S. response to the deadly attacks on the American compound in Benghazi last September centers on talking points -- talking points constructed by the Obama administration to manage public perception of the crisis. While critics charge cover-up and the President dismisses the criticism as a 'sideshow,' the ongoing circus in Washington features some familiar acts: heated partisan politics, power struggles between the executive and the legislature, and disputes over what sort of image the United States should be projecting around the world. Justin Hart’s timely *Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy* considers the roots of the controversy over the presentation of the international image of the United States at home and abroad. *Empire of Ideas*, which contributes to the growing collection of scholarship regarding public diplomacy, examines why and how the United States embraced public diplomacy in the first place. As noted by the reviewers in this roundtable, Hart’s study provides answers and raises questions of great interest.

To begin, *Empire of Ideas* provokes a discussion about definitions of public diplomacy as a subject and as a field of research. Michael L. Krenn and Allan M. Winkler approve of the distinctions Hart makes regarding the terms diplomacy, foreign policy, and foreign relations. Andrew Johnstone welcomes Hart’s analysis of the contested roles of education, propaganda, information, and truth in the construction of public diplomacy. One of Hart’s significant contributions, according to Johnstone, is showing how public diplomacy blurs the line between foreign and domestic policy. For Johnstone, Hart’s investigation describes the dilemma for policymakers over what to include in the projected image of the United States. Do diplomats present an image that is largely positive or one that acknowledges flaws and injustices? Winkler credits Hart with raising basic questions about the role of propaganda and public diplomacy in a democratic society, about the importance of image, and how the desired message is crafted. Krenn asks whether, in their analysis of public diplomacy, historians must consider everything from high culture to popular culture and from public efforts to private enterprises. If so, he wonders, “what is not part of this new diplomacy”?

Hart’s location of the origins of U.S. public diplomacy in the 1930s inspires a varied response. Krenn observes that historians including Tom Zeiler, Frank Ninkovich, and Jessica Gienow-Hecht have analyzed cultural interactions in the nineteenth century. Winkler notes that Hart depicts World War II rather than the Cold War as the key period influencing the creation of public diplomacy. Johnstone approves of Hart’s emphasis on the continuity between prewar and postwar efforts at public diplomacy. Scott Lucas contends that Hart should take his investigation of public diplomacy in the Cold War era beyond the State Department to include the military, the CIA, and the National Security Council. Of course, as Krenn points out, the determination of the origins of public diplomacy depends upon how public diplomacy is defined.

The reviewers address Hart’s argument that the adoption of public diplomacy led to the transformation of U.S. foreign policy. Lucas argues that Hart needs to recognize the role of
strategy in the relationship between public diplomacy and foreign policymaking. Johnstone writes that Hart focuses on the philosophical level to show widespread agreement with the idea that America’s image had become an important foreign relations tool. These comments lead to the much-debated question about just what is to be transformed—the image or the policy. Is it the purpose of public diplomacy to improve the perception of the policy or to change the policy to improve the image of the United States or a combination of the two? Another key question is who has the power to carry out this transformation? Both Lucas and Krenn point to Hart’s observation that policymakers who wanted to shape the image of the United States did not have much control over cultural portrayals of that image.

Assessing the impact of public diplomacy on domestic and foreign audiences has been a challenge for the U.S. officials who implement it and for the historians who analyze it. Winkler notes that Hart recognizes the many difficulties confronting public diplomats who tried to construct an acceptable and persuasive image of the United States for diverse global audiences. Johnstone and Krenn wish for more analysis of public participation in the making of public diplomacy as well as more evaluation of the influence of public diplomacy on the American public. In addition, Krenn points out that Empire of Ideas does not provide much on the reaction of audiences overseas to U.S. public diplomacy. Although it is hard to know if the intended audiences buy what public diplomacy is selling, this question remains a crucial one. As the Benghazi talking-points controversy illustrates, sometimes it can be easier to tell when certain audiences do not buy what public diplomacy is selling. No doubt debates will continue about the practice and study of public diplomacy as explored in Justin Hart’s thought-provoking Empire of Ideas.

Participants:

Justin Hart is Associate Professor of History at Texas Tech University. He is the author of Empire of Ideas (Oxford University Press, 2013) and several articles and book chapters, including “Making Democracy Safe for the World: Race, Propaganda, and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy during World War II” (Pacific Historical Review, February 2004), which received the James Madison Prize of the Society for the History of the Federal Government and the W. Turrentine Jackson Prize of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association. He completed his Ph.D. in History at Rutgers University under the direction of Lloyd Gardner.

Susan A. Brewer is a professor of history at the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point. She is the author of Why America Fights: Patriotism and War Propaganda from the Philippines to Iraq (Oxford, 2009) and To Win the Peace: British Propaganda in the United States during World War II (Cornell, 1997).

Andrew Johnstone is a Lecturer in American History at the University of Leicester. He received his PhD from the University of Birmingham in 2006 and is the author of Dilemmas of Internationalism: The American Association for the United Nations and US Foreign Policy, 1941-1948, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009). He is also the co-editor (with Helen Laville) of The US Public and American Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 2010), and his articles have
appeared in Diplomatic History, the Journal of American Studies, and the Journal of Transatlantic Studies. His current project is on internationalism, ideology, and U.S. entry into World War II.

**Michael L. Krenn** is Professor of History and Faculty Coordinator for First Year Seminar at Appalachian State University. He received his Ph.D. in 1985 from Rutgers University, where he studied under the guidance of Lloyd C. Gardner. He is the author of five books, the most recent of which are Fall-Out Shelters for the Human Spirit: American Art and Cold War (2005) and The Color of Empire: Race and American Foreign Relations (2006). He is currently at work on a comprehensive history of U.S. cultural diplomacy.

**Scott Lucas** is Professor of American Studies at the University of Birmingham and editor of EA WorldView. His recent publications include Trials of Engagement: The Future of US Public Diplomacy and Challenging US Foreign Policy: America and the World in the Long 20th Century.

**Allan M. Winkler** is University Distinguished Professor of History at Miami University in Ohio. He is author of The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942-1945 (1978), Life Under a Cloud: American Anxiety about the Atom (1993), and most recently “To Everything There Is a Season”: Pete Seeger and the Power of Song (2009). He is currently working on a book about the song “We Shall Overcome.”
In *Empire of Ideas*, Justin Hart examines the development of public diplomacy in the United States. This deeply researched book investigates what Hart calls the “first phase” of public diplomacy which ran from 1936 to 1953 (2). Starting with the Buenos Aires Conference in 1936, where educational exchanges were proposed with Latin American nations, the story runs through World War II and into the early years of the Cold War, culminating in the establishment of the United States Information Agency in 1953. The book outlines the numerous different bureaucratic efforts to develop a public diplomacy program, yet providing a bureaucratic history is not Hart’s primary concern. Instead, Hart sets out to explore “the philosophical assumptions about foreign relations that led to the creation of these initiatives in the first place” (5). The concern here is not so much recounting what was done, but looking at why it was it done in the first place.¹

One consequence of this approach is that Hart is not primarily concerned with the role that public diplomacy played in the decision-making process. Rather, he asks why the government felt it necessary to create a public diplomacy apparatus in the first place, and why that apparatus caused such controversy. By asking this question, we get to the heart of the matter and the book’s real significance: “the way the American Century redefined the nature of U.S. Foreign Relations and, in turn, reconfigured its domestic affairs as well” (13).

The story is one of frequent tension and conflict as American policy makers struggled to come to terms not only with the potential but also the pitfalls of public diplomacy. While it was recognized that the U.S. government needed to pay greater attention to how it was perceived overseas, there was endless disagreement over how to go about altering those perceptions. The definitions of education, information, propaganda, and truth were contested, as was the definition of the United States itself. The tensions were never resolved, and Hart offers no definitive answers, but the questions that policy makers grappled with remain today. Should U.S. public diplomacy emphasize the positive aspects of American life? Should it ignore the more negative aspects, especially those likely to play badly overseas? Should those negative aspects be explained or justified? Yet while answers were rarely found, the questions remained as “the consequence of the style of empire that U.S. officials had worked so hard to promote for so many years, the undeniable by-product of their determination to spread the American dream” (201).

In addition to its impressive recounting of this story, perhaps the book’s greatest strength is in highlighting “the permeability of boundaries between domestic and foreign” (197). A 1945 quote from the first Assistant Secretary of State for Public and Cultural Affairs Archibald MacLeish appears on a number of occasions to hammer the point home: “electric communications has made foreign relations domestic affairs” (10, 109, 200). For public

diplomats, this called for subtlety and nuance, and the implication was that the United States needed to pay “much more attention to the image it projected to the world” (197). For domestic critics of public diplomacy, however, it meant the nation had to be wary of foreign ideologies, and required a more forceful propaganda machinery to face up to the nation’s totalitarian foes. Either way, there was no denying that domestic affairs were now foreign relations, as the rest of the world was looking more closely than ever at the internal and external activity of the United States. Similarly, domestic political debate was increasingly affected by the conduct of a more active foreign policy.

The book also serves to emphasize the continuity between pre-war and post-war foreign policy in the development of public diplomacy considerations. While this may not be entirely original, it’s certainly a point worth making again. By outlining the pre-war origins and wartime tribulations of early public diplomats, Hart reminds readers that such activity was not simply an outgrowth of the Cold War, that World War II was not just the origin of the Cold War, and that history did not begin in 1945. The fact that the State Department’s own records on international information activity consider the origins of that activity to be in 1938 deserves more than a footnote on page 204 (even if it does slightly undercut Hart’s argument that 1936 is the true starting point here).

In what is an otherwise impressive book, my main concern relates to its consideration of the American public. In the introduction Hart writes that “the theoretical foundation of public diplomacy reflected a growing awareness of public participation in U.S. foreign relations” (10 – emphasis in original). Hart again uses MacLeish’s comment about how foreign relations were now domestic affairs. Yet it is perhaps more accurate to say that the book examines how foreign relations became domestic politics, rather than domestic affairs. This is because despite this initial reference to public participation, there’s little consideration of public participation in the rest of the book. What there is suggests a definition of “public participation” that includes the “full range of domestic activities that shaped perceptions of the United States abroad” (116). While it is true that policymakers were concerned about how domestic matters were perceived overseas (questions such as race relations in the South, for example), this is an extremely broad definition of “public participation.” Hart concedes in a footnote that the term was originally used by the State Department’s H. Schuyler Foster in a slightly different context, though it is not clear what that was (227). Even if this broad definition is accepted, the role of the public, such as there is one here, is largely passive: the public was not aware that it was contributing to U.S. foreign relations in this context.

This is all the more odd considering that the State Department did in fact create a Division specifically for actual public participation. The Division of Public Liaison, located within the Office of Public Affairs, was created in 1944 with the intention of developing a two-way relationship with the American public. Yet this public participation in U.S. foreign policy is not detailed here. The author acknowledges that the State Department “developed an extensive apparatus for interacting with domestic audiences” through units such as the
Office of Public Opinion Studies (109). Yet these units were more about monitoring the public and its attitudes than interacting with it.2

A related issue is that within its own bureaucratic structures, the Department of State drew a distinction between international and domestic information matters. Some of what Hart considers as outward facing public diplomacy was seen by the State Department as inward facing domestic public affairs. The Office of Public Affairs, for example, was set up to deal primarily with the American public, rather than foreign publics, which were left to units such as the Office of International Information and the Office of Educational Exchange (even while they were overseen by the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs). The same applies to the Office of Public Opinion Studies. While the lines between domestic and foreign were frequently blurred during this period, it is a distinction that more often than not had a difference, and one that could have been made more clearly here.

Beyond this, the book only left me wanting further information, as there were issues that could perhaps have been covered in greater depth. The focus is on debates about spreading ideas, rather than a detailed consideration of what the ideas were - and how ‘America’ was defined - or how those ideas were spread. Then again, I acknowledge that these debates are not really Hart’s main focus. Similarly, while the book does not try to provide a comprehensive survey, the domestic battles over public diplomacy in the early 1950s are glossed over rather quickly. The strict focus of chapter six on Joseph McCarthy means that other Congressional critics (eg. Senator Pat McCarran) are overlooked, and the book moves from Wheeling in February 1950 to Dwight Eisenhower’s inauguration in January 1953 in less than seven pages. Still, these issues have been covered elsewhere, and as they say, always leave them wanting more.3

On the whole, this is an impressive addition to an ever-growing literature on U.S. public diplomacy and American cultural activity. Ultimately, it successfully explains why American policymakers have struggled to define America in their own terms, while at the same time showing why they have little choice but to continue with their efforts.


It is not often that I find a book that tells me so little that I consider to be ‘new’ information, yet nevertheless manages to spur me to so many new ways of thinking about what I thought I knew about the subject. Such is the case with Justin Hart’s new book, *Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy*. At first glance the book appears to cover much the same ground as so many other works before it. And, in fact, it does—at least in terms of much of the empirical evidence discussed in the book. Appropriate to a book about an empire of ideas, however, Hart is tilling some familiar soil in order to raise some intriguing questions not only about the subject of U.S. public diplomacy but also about how historians are dealing with this subtopic of American diplomatic history.

Hart argues that the ‘origins’ of U.S. public diplomacy lay in the mid-1930s, climaxing with the true birth of this new form of diplomacy at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace in Buenos Aires in 1936. He spends much of the first part of the book detailing the institutional and bureaucratic debates, meetings, and programs that eventually sprang from that humble beginning. But this has all been covered many times before, as in J. Manuel Espinosa’s *Inter-American Beginnings of U.S. Cultural Diplomacy, 1936-1948*, 1976, Frank Ninkovich’s *The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950*, 1981, and Gary E. Kraske’s *Missionaries of the Book: The American Library Profession and the Origins of United States Cultural Diplomacy*, 1985, who all identified the birth of this ‘new’ approach to American foreign relations as occurring during the 1930s. As for the bureaucratic history of these early years, Espinosa’s book is nearly encyclopedic in this regard.1

The last chapters of the book, covering the post-World War II period up to the establishment of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1953, are similarly unsurprising in terms of their coverage of the both the bureaucratic and programmatic structures of America’s Cold War public/cultural diplomacy. It is hardly necessary to

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recount the dozens and dozens of books that have appeared in the last fifteen to twenty
years describing in great detail the post-1945 cultural offensives launched by the
Department of State and, later, the USIA. To recognize that any attempt to find something
that has lain remarkably untouched in the archives is likely to be a frustrating endeavor.

And so, why does Hart’s book continue to run through my mind as I ponder my past (and
future) work in the field of U.S. cultural/public diplomacy? Basically, it comes down to the
fact that Hart is raising all of the right questions that need to be more fully addressed if we
are to move ahead as scholars of this particular subfield of U.S. diplomatic history. This
brief review cannot hope to touch on all of them and so I will focus on what seems to me to
be Hart’s attempt to construct what my friend and colleague Jessica Gienow-Hecht referred
to in a recent e-mail exchange as ‘an architecture of cultural diplomacy.’ In short, he is
trying to better define our field from the foundations up. He begins at the beginning,
arguing that a better understanding of cultural diplomacy “requires thinking carefully
about the distinctions between diplomacy, foreign policy, and foreign relations,” and
concludes that the latter, by signifying “the sum total of a nation’s contacts with
governments and peoples of other nations” is the proper framework within which to place
cultural diplomacy (12). From this point he moves to expand the parameters of
cultural/public diplomacy both chronologically and in terms of what constitutes this
relatively new field of study. In examining the growth of cultural/public diplomacy in the
post-World War II period Hart claims that “the focus on America’s image in the world
would have existed with or without the Cold War” (108). Although the author is simply
trying to make the point that American policymakers’ concern with international
perceptions of their nation was not merely the result of a desire to blunt fascist or
communist propaganda attacks, Hart’s conclusion nevertheless suggests that U.S.
cultural/public diplomacy might well have existed long before the 1930s (as the recent
works by Gienow-Hecht, Zeiler, and Ninkovich discussed in footnote 1 argue). In addition,
it strongly hints that the current ‘war of ideas’ being waged by the Department of State is
not entirely a reaction to the war on terror.

However, the issue of when the nation’s cultural diplomacy began (or ended, or evolved)
begs the question of what, exactly, constitutes cultural/public diplomacy? Hart makes
some significant progress toward better defining precisely what that form of diplomacy
entails. He starts small, by addressing the “high culture” versus “popular culture” (add
“debate” to the end of this sentence.) (27). High culture—fine art, theater, opera, etc.—has
been the dominant focus of much of the recent historical literature, but Hart makes a
compelling case that not only should historians begin to more seriously consider the
impact of popular culture but also points out that U.S. officials as far back as the 1930s
were cognizant of the power of Hollywood movies, popular music, and pulp novels.

Hart is after bigger game, however, and in his introduction he makes one of his most
important arguments: that cultural/public diplomacy (particularly the pushing of
American ideology out into a wider world) should be viewed as neither simply an ‘add-on’
part of the “normal” foreign relations of the United States, nor as an after-the-fact excuse
for actions the nation would have taken in any case. Instead, “during the 1940s, that sense
of ideological mission became not only the rationale for a predetermined set of foreign
policies but an actual component of foreign policy itself, as image became a crucial tool of empire” (9). And in that regard, the entire nature of U.S. foreign policy needed to be understood in a dramatically different way: “For public diplomats and policymakers more broadly, the proliferation of mass communications and the heightened mobility of individuals and ideas had effectively made ‘people’—at home and abroad—not just an external influence upon the formation of policy, but an organic component of a broadened conception of what constituted foreign relations” (10).

To be sure, this more expansive (but terribly exciting) vision of what constitutes U.S. cultural/public diplomacy can prove problematic. When Hart argues that American officials also considered technical and economic aid part of the package (48-51), this is an interesting but potentially confounding definition of this new form of diplomacy. After all, if both high and popular culture are included; if the actions of officials and non-governmental individuals and organizations are considered; and even economic and technical assistance fall under the purview of cultural/public diplomacy, this raises the natural question: what is not part of this new diplomacy? If it encompasses all aspects of American foreign relations, then is the field of cultural/public diplomacy a unique or discernible field at all?

On one central question, however, Hart makes little progress: What is the impact of American cultural/public diplomacy? In short, what does this new form of diplomacy actually do? There is not much in the way of analysis of the impact on the foreign audiences. He does better when discussing the domestic audience. In two interesting sections, Hart examines the efforts of the Department of State to ‘sell’ the Truman Doctrine (120-123) and the Marshall Plan (123-128) through a program of public diplomacy. When all is said and done, however, the author is forced to admit that “As with the propaganda surrounding the Truman Doctrine, it is difficult to measure the net impact of this highly coordinated campaign [regarding the Marshall Plan]” (128). Just as race was the Achilles heel of U.S. propaganda during the Cold War, the inability to precisely document the impact of America’s cultural and public diplomacy is a consistent weakness for the field.

Hart does miss some opportunities for further exploration. He begins his analysis early in the book by arguing that a “paradox of the American Century” was contained in the fact that, “The same phenomenon that awarded such extraordinary power to the policymakers who presided over the creation of the national security state simultaneously precipitated an astonishing dispersal of authority over U.S. foreign relations more generally. In contrast to their vast accumulation of power in the political, economic, and military realms, U.S. officials exercised comparatively little control over the cultural realm despite their realization that perceptions of America mattered more than ever before” (12). Yet there is surprisingly little in the book about the areas to which that “authority” was “dispersed.” Non-governmental organizations are certainly mentioned, but their often crucial roles in both the creation and implementation of many programs in the cultural and/or public diplomacy fields are pushed into the background. For example, the issue of civil rights in America is touched on at several points in the book but there is nothing approaching a fuller analysis of the single most vexing issue for U.S. diplomats in terms of creating a pleasing American image around the world. In particular, the pressures
exerted by American civil rights activists, the media, and organizations are not clearly addressed. In discussing America’s international cultural exchange programs, Hart concludes that in the debate between the “cultural purists, who believed in the importance of exchange for its own sake, and the pragmatists, who viewed the exchanges as a starting point for a much broader agenda,” the “vision of the latter group came to dominate, as the voices of the former receded in the face of American globalism” (59). That was hardly the case in the post-World War II debates about American cultural diplomacy where firefights between the “purists” (the artists, art organizations, museums, dance companies, performers, etc.) and the “pragmatists” in the State Department and USIA continued to dog those cultural efforts right into the late-1960s and early-1970s.²

Regardless of the criticisms, make no mistake about it: this is an important book in the evolution of the field of U.S. cultural/public diplomacy. If it does not overwhelm with the amount of new information it offers, it certainly impresses with its understanding of some of the most important issues and questions facing the field and with its subtle suggestions that we have a long way to go in terms of defining exactly what our field is.

² Some examples of the continued battles between non-governmental organizations (and individuals) and the more propaganda oriented officials in State and USIA include Margaret Lynne Ausfeld and Virginia M. Mecklenburg, Advancing American Art: Politics and Aesthetics in the State Department Exhibition, 1946-1948 (Montgomery, AL: Montgomery Museum of Fine Arts, 1984), and my book on the U.S. art program after World War II, Fall-Out Shelters for the Human Spirit: American Art and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), which deal with the world of painting and fine art; Penny M. von Eschen, Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), and Lisa E. Davenport, Jazz Diplomacy: Promoting America in the Cold War Era (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 2009), which look at the role of jazz; and Naima Prevots, Dance for Export: Cultural Diplomacy and the Cold War (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1998), examines the role of dance.
U.S. public diplomacy --- in its own right or as part of wider concepts such as cultural diplomacy, psychological strategy, and political warfare --- has received increasing attention among historians as well as political scientists in the last decade. Fuelled both by the rise of 1990s scholarship on “State-private networks” as part of a total conception of the Cold War, and by more contemporary developments such as the 2003 Iraq invasion, scholarship on U.S. public diplomacy has opened up the interaction between projection, ideology, and interaction in American foreign policy.

On the surface, Justin Hart’s *Empire of Ideas* offers a vital contribution to this documentation and analysis by taking the story back to 1936, which he situates as the start of U.S. Government attention to cultural diplomacy via the case of Latin America, “stress[ing] the continuities between the pre-1945 and post-1945 period” (5). The book’s subtitle, “The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of US Foreign Policy,” promises an interrogation that goes beyond a simple narration of American operations. In his most provocative sentence Hart declares that, rather than shaping public diplomacy as part of their implementation of foreign policy, officials were overtaken by it: “In contrast to their vast accumulation of power in the political, economic, and military realms, US officials exercised comparatively little control over the cultural realm despite their realization that perceptions of America mattered more than even before” (12).

The problem is that Hart, for all his collection of material, does not have the analytical framework to properly interrogate the relationship between public diplomacy and foreign policy.

Instead, the author puts out a narrative dotted with sweeping declarations:

“The debate [from the 1930s]...pitted purists, who viewed intellectual exchanges as an almost post-national exercise in reducing strife through a meeting of minds, against policymakers, who sought to deploy “culture” as a tool of US foreign policy” (24).

“The blunt truth was that the U.S. officials who embraced the methods of public diplomacy during the late 1930s did so because they began to care about the image the nation projected to the world” (38).

“Top officials in the U.S. government sought a postcolonial imperial strategy for extending the political and cultural influence of the United States throughout the world” (63).

Those declarations might be a starting point for investigation and discussion. For Hart, however, they are periodic endpoints because --- despite his rhetoric --- there is little consideration of policy in the book, at least at high levels. Secretaries of State pop up in his narrative of events, but in the context of specific programmes and bureaucratic re-
alignments. Presidents and the post-1947 National Security Council rarely show; the military and CIA are close to absent.

Hart’s pronouncements cannot substitute for this absence, as he struggles to put across his grasp of policy. At one point, he opines on an “obvious” distinction “between a nation’s foreign policies and its foreign relations” (63). Less than ten pages later, he has forgotten that distinction: “By the end of the war, the OWI [Office of War Information] had made it clear that propaganda not only mattered to U.S. foreign policy --- but that it was a foreign policy” (72).

A starting point for interrogation --- and thus for a productive analysis beyond Hart’s narrative --- is the recognition of ‘strategy,’ as opposed to tactics, in the relationship between public diplomacy and foreign policy.

The U.S. Government did not pursue a strategic approach in the 1930s --- in contrast to that taken by its European counterparts --- and instead merely developed individual initiatives. World War II prompted an expansion of tactics, overt and covert, in the support of military and political campaigns.

Arguably, however, the question of strategy was only posed by George Kennan’s Policy Planning Staff in spring 1948 with a memorandum on “The Inauguration of Political Warfare against the Soviet Union.” That effort was connected with programmes, such as the Marshall Plan and covert intervention in France and Italy, and with organisation of and between the State Department, the military, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). More importantly, it was an attempt to link public diplomacy and political warfare to a strategy incorporating “containment” and “liberation”.1

Tensions both in tactics and strategy were never resolved, up to and beyond the failed Hungarian Revolution of 1956, but there is no doubt that policymakers, up to the President, were seized with the issue. New agencies were created, such as the Psychological Strategy Board, as were positions like the President’s Special Assistant for Psychological Operations. There were crisis cases, such as the death of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in 1953 and the East German uprising. There were highest-level strategic reviews, such as President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s “Operation Solarium” leading to his “New Look” foreign policy.

Hart, whose post-World War II narrative is weaker than its pre-1945 counterpart, misses all this. He cites notable scholarship such as that of Kenneth Osgood and Giles Scott-Smith, but draws little of significance from it: other academics, such as Hugh Wilford, are ignored.2

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So the outcome is not a weak conclusion. It is no conclusion at all, while Hart’s “Epilogue” stagggers around a few tangential points.

That is a shame, because Hart offers raw material with potential and the promotional blurb accompanying it - “Empire of Ideas remains relevant today, when U.S. officials have launched full-scale propaganda to combat negative perceptions in the Arab world and elsewhere” --- is not out of place.

However, to offer ideas of historical value, and which have contemporary salience, an author has to get to grips with the animating strategic issues that have occupied policy-makers, then and now. To do otherwise leaves no more than the platitude: “This development goes a long way toward explaining why it has been so difficult to build and sustain an active and vibrant program in public diplomacy” (14).
Public diplomacy has become an important part of foreign relations in the past fifty years. In the aftermath of the Al-Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001, Americans have become increasingly aware of misunderstandings with the Muslim world and the need both to appreciate patterns of life in the Middle East and to craft a more sympathetic image of American life for people abroad. In Empire of Ideas, Justin Hart describes thoughtfully the origins of public diplomacy as part of an effort to address such concerns, particularly in the period from 1936, when, at a conference in Buenos Aires, the United States proposed a series of educational and technological exchanges with the nations of Latin America, and 1953, when the American government established the United States Information Agency (USIA). He observes that public diplomacy was more the result of developments during World War II than of events during the Cold War and seeks to understand why this effort has often posed problems with a variety of government officials. His book, in short, is a penetrating account of the first and formative phase of public diplomacy in America.

At the outset, Hart makes an important distinction between diplomacy, foreign policy, and foreign relations. By diplomacy, he means high-level contacts between representatives of various nations. Foreign policy refers to a government’s formal approach to the outside world, in diplomatic, military, economic, legal, and cultural terms. The term ‘foreign relations’ refers to a nation’s full range of contacts with other governments and peoples. Public diplomacy in the modern world, Hart suggests, is a necessary part of foreign relations in this sense, though it clearly has a bearing on political and policy issues as well.

In an earlier era, Hart observes, there was less concern with image. Propaganda became important during World War I, when the journalist George Creel’s Committee on Public Information stirred up a hatred of all things German while trying to convey some sense of what Americans thought the war was all about. Creel wanted to share President Woodrow Wilson’s vision of a war to end all wars and a League of Nations to preserve peace with the rest of the world. But the shrill message created a backlash that reverberated throughout 1920s and 1930s, as the United States sought to distance itself from struggles taking place elsewhere in the world.

Hart sees World War II as instrumental in underscoring for the United States the need for public diplomacy. He begins a chapter on “The Drift of History: War, Culture, and Hegemony” by declaring, “If 1941 did not change everything about the U.S. posture toward the outside world, the events of that year certainly came very close” (41). And he continues in the next paragraph by suggesting that these events “provided the essential backdrop for the complete reconceptualization of cultural diplomacy that took place during 1941” (41). He highlights a number of important figures who played a role in this process. Vice President Henry A. Wallace, participating in meetings of the General Advisory Committee for the State Department’s Division of Cultural Relations, created after the Buenos Aires convention, asked that culture be viewed broadly. It was not just the province of the upper
classes but included all the people. Interested in improving worldwide economic conditions, he argued that “there is no sharp line of division between...the economic action programs and the Cultural Relations Program.... one must supplement the other” (48). Though his approach was different from that of the publisher Henry Luce, who outlined his own vision of the American Century, Wallace shared a sense of the need to reach out to others around the world.

Hart notes rightly that the creation of the Office of War Information (OWI), the nation’s World War II propaganda agency, established the parameters of cultural diplomacy. “History has not been kind to the World War II propaganda initiatives of the U.S. government,” he observes wryly at the start of a chapter on OWI (71). But the actions of Pulitzer Prize-winning playwright Robert E. Sherwood, poet and Librarian of Congress Archibald MacLeish, and newscaster Elmer Davis were instrumental in committing the nation to what they called a “strategy of truth,” in contrast to what Nazi propaganda did, and their actions helped create a sense of importance of telling the American story as successfully as they could. Their preeminent effort was to help win the war, but as Hart notes astutely, they understood that “image would be the key to the ability of the United States to extend its influence in the postwar period while avoiding the costs of territorial colonialism” (95).

Hart’s engaging story continues as World War II came to an end. The appointment of MacLeish as Assistant Secretary of State for Public and Cultural Relations was a “major milestone” (70). Though he only remained in that position for a few months, other influential figures, notably the advertising man and later politician William Benton, followed him and continued the process of crafting an information program. At the war’s end, the administration dismantled OWI and moved information functions into the State Department, where they remained for the next eight years. The onset of the Cold War made the need for propaganda more evident, particularly with the effort to make people around the world – and in the United States – understand the value of such programs as the Marshall Plan. The Smith-Mundt Act (the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act) of 1948 finally endorsed the need for public diplomacy. And then, in 1953, after Senator Joe McCarthy’s vicious attacks on the Voice of America, Congress created the United States Information Agency (USIA) as an independent organization to deal with the various elements of information policy in a more coordinated way.

Hart has done a masterful job of examining all relevant materials, ranging from agency files to personal and presidential papers. He has also mastered the voluminous secondary literature and draws on it gracefully but unobtrusively in telling his own story. On a personal note, I dealt with many of the issues he considers in my study of the Office of War Information thirty-five years ago, but never carried the story beyond the end of the war. It is gratifying to see Hart draw on this start in a crisp and thoughtful way and to examine the most important questions with even greater sophistication. He has also used well other

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materials that have appeared in the past several decades and that give his own account a solid grounding.²

Hart profiles the major figures in his story nicely. His portrait of Henry Wallace when he first appears is but one example. Wallace, he notes, was often considered many things: “a mystic, a zealot, a tireless advocate of ‘globaloney,’ and – especially during his 1948 run for President on the Progressive Party ticket – a communist. The ‘New Dealingist of New Dealers,’ as one newspaper profile put it” (47). In describing Archibald MacLeish, Hart touches on everything from his Yale background, when he played football and was part of the famous secret society Skull & Bones, to his work as a lawyer and his subsequent decision to devote his life to poetry, all before he became a journalist for Henry Luce and then Librarian of Congress.

But the most important parts of the book deal with the fundamental question of the role of public diplomacy in a democracy. Who is responsible for crafting a message? How important is image in pursuing one’s own ends? Just how essential a role should public diplomacy play? At the very outset, Hart notes “the challenge of shaping the global image of a pluralistic democracy” (4). He highlights the slow evolution of attitudes, pointing out how in the late 1930s, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, in naming Ben Cherrington first director of the department’s Cultural Division, assured him that “his work would not involve propaganda” (58). By the end of World War II, there was agreement on “the role of image in U.S. foreign policy making” (59). But there were still important issues that had to be resolved.

A key issue was the question of just who spoke for the government. The issue surfaced vividly at the time OWI began operation. Hull wrote that he assumed that war information activities did “not include information relating to the foreign policy of the United States, over which this Department…has exclusive jurisdiction.” That view, OWI Director Elmer Davis responded, “would be tenable only on the hypothesis that our foreign policy has no relation to the war.”³ Relationships improved both during the war and in the decades that followed, but fundamental questions remained. And to this day there are concerns about the role of public diplomacy in the foreign policy process.

“The job of synchronizing the many ‘voices’ of the U.S. government was just the beginning,” Hart notes about the early 1950s. “The real quandaries came in trying to decide which psychological strategies to deploy and what effect they would have upon America’s image in different parts of the world” (163). And, he suggests, definitive answers were sometimes hard to find. At the very end of his account, he points to debates about “the very existence


³ Winkler, 47.
of government propaganda in an open society,” and the shape it should take. “Public diplomats,” he concludes in this brief but lively book, “faced the unenviable task of navigating these concerns to develop an approach to the image question that was both viable and palatable. In the end, they failed more often than they succeeded – sometimes because of their own missteps, but more often because of the difficulty of the task they confronted” (201).
It is a rare privilege to get the chance to respond in print to the reviews of one’s book, so many thanks to Tom Maddux and the team at H-Diplo for that opportunity. Thanks as well to Andrew Johnstone, Michael Krenn, Scott Lucas, and Allan Winkler for taking the time to offer their thoughts. I have utilized—sometimes quite heavily—the scholarship that each one of them has produced and it is an honor to participate with them in a conversation on the place of public diplomacy within mid-twentieth century U.S. foreign relations. I have decided to respond to their reviews one by one since there is very little overlap between them. Indeed, I am quite struck by the way that each reviewer chose to emphasize different aspects of Empire of Ideas. Apparently, the book means very different things to different people, which I take as a positive sign, generally speaking.

Allan Winkler’s praise for the book is especially flattering to me. As many readers undoubtedly know, thirty-five years ago Winkler wrote what is still the best general treatment of the Office of War Information, which is the subject of Chapter 3 of Empire of Ideas.¹ Winkler has moved on to other topics over the years, but his first book remains a seminal piece of the literature on U.S. propaganda during World War II. There are only a handful of books that I turned to as often as his The Politics of Propaganda, so I am very pleased indeed that he found Empire of Ideas to be a valuable elaboration on many of the issues he introduced some time ago.

Michael Krenn raises many provocative questions in his review, but I want to focus in particular on his interest (borrowing from Jessica Gienow-Hecht) in constructing “an architecture” of public/cultural diplomacy.² I think Krenn is right that the primary contribution of Empire of Ideas is in providing a framework for future studies. Although there are places where the book draws on seldom-utilized sources to introduce new evidence—such as with the minutes of the Advisory Committee for the State Department’s Division of Cultural Relations in Chapters One and Two, the records of the Psychological Strategy Board in Chapter Five, or the various newspaper sources I draw on throughout—in general I was more interested in providing an original interpretation of subjects first mined by others. In the long process of turning my dissertation into a book I realized that what I really wanted to do was to write an essay about how and why the U.S. government decided to develop an apparatus for conducting public diplomacy in the first place, and how that decision stemmed from and symbolized a broader transformation in the nature of


U.S. foreign relations. Many others have already offered discrete studies of particular programs and broad surveys that cover a long span of time, and fascinating new studies in these veins continue to appear almost monthly, so for better or worse I made no attempt to offer a comprehensive account of any of the initiatives I covered.

In terms of the architecture that Krenn is seeking, he introduces a key question regarding how we define what does and does not fall under the rubric of public/cultural diplomacy:

If both high and popular culture are included; if the actions of officials and non-governmental individuals and organizations are considered; and even economic and technical assistance fall under the purview of cultural/public diplomacy, this raises the natural question: what is not part of this new diplomacy? If it encompasses all aspects of American foreign relations, then is the field of cultural/public diplomacy a unique or discernible field at all?

There is no doubt that public diplomacy as an entity grew out of the blurring of boundaries in modern U.S. foreign relations—culture vs. economics; public vs. private; domestic vs. foreign—so it makes sense that one might wonder where the boundaries of public diplomacy itself begin and end. The answer to that question is that public diplomacy, as I argue in the introduction, was concerned first and foremost with the project of image management; the reason why it seemed to encompass everything was because everything affected image. I would suggest, then, that in writing the history of public diplomacy one need not write the history of everything; just the history of the nation’s image in the world and government efforts to influence that image.

Andrew Johnstone also raises a number of important issues that need to be addressed if we are to begin to construct an architecture of public diplomacy. For example, he questions my use of the term “public participation” (in contrast to “public opinion”) to describe the way that the domestic public interacts with the foreign policymaking process in the context of mid-twentieth-century U.S. foreign relations:

In what is an otherwise impressive book, my main concern relates to its consideration of the American public. In the introduction Hart writes that “the theoretical foundation of public diplomacy reflected a growing awareness of public participation in U.S. foreign relations” (10 – emphasis in original)...Yet it is perhaps more accurate to say that the book examines how foreign relations became domestic politics, rather than domestic affairs. This is because despite this initial reference to public participation, there’s little consideration of public participation in the rest of the book. What there is suggests a definition of “public participation” that includes the “full range of domestic activities that shaped perceptions of the United States abroad” (116). While it is true that policymakers were concerned about how domestic matters were perceived overseas (questions such as race relations in the South, for example), this is an extremely broad definition of “public participation”...Even if this broad definition is accepted, the role of the public, such as there is one here, is largely passive: the public was not aware that it was contributing to U.S. foreign relations in this context.
This is another area where the book primarily strives to provide a framework for other scholars to develop further. There are places where *Empire of Ideas* describes “public participation” and not just “domestic politics”—the material from Chapters 2 and 3 on American pluralism, for example—but I was primarily interested in documenting the ways that policymakers worried about how domestic events outside their control complicated their jobs in shaping foreign perceptions of American culture and the American people. The comment by the poet and propagandist Archibald MacLeish that “electric communications has made foreign relations domestic affairs” fits into this framework (10, 109, 200). So does the speech by political scientist and policymaker Schuyler Foster in which he actually used the phrase “public participation” (227).

On a broader level, though, there was the constant concern of public diplomats about the perceptions foreigners would draw about the United States based on American newspapers, Hollywood films, and so forth. In my view, there can be no doubt that in the professional judgment of mid-twentieth-century U.S. public diplomats, the public not only ‘participated’ in crafting the image the United States projected to the world; it perhaps played the predominant role in that process. More importantly, contrary to Johnstone’s conclusion, it is clearly not true that “the role of the public...[was] largely passive: the public was not aware that it was contributing to U.S. foreign relations in this context.” Particularly in the case of civil rights leaders trying to embarrass the U.S. government into action, many U.S. citizens knew exactly what they were doing in engaging the global conversation on the meaning of ‘America.’ (So did Hollywood filmmakers, for that matter.) I am quite confident that there are many other, yet-to-be discovered examples as well, and I hope that *Empire of Ideas* offers a way of understanding and interpreting the foreign policy significance of those activities, when other scholars provide the empirical evidence for them.

Johnstone also expresses concern about the way that I blur the boundaries between government efforts to communicate with the domestic versus foreign publics:

Within its own bureaucratic structures, the Department of State drew a distinction between international and domestic information matters. Some of what Hart considers as outward facing public diplomacy was seen by the State Department as inward facing domestic public affairs. The Office of Public Affairs, for example, was set up to deal primarily with the American public, rather than foreign publics, which were left to units such as the Office of International Information and the Office of Educational Exchange (even while they were overseen by the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs). The same applies to the Office of Public Opinion Studies. While the lines between domestic and foreign were frequently blurred during this period, it is a distinction that more often than not had a difference, and one that could have been made more clearly here.

Johnstone makes an interesting point in delineating public affairs from public diplomacy. I must admit I struggled with whether to include interactions with the domestic public in a book on ‘public diplomacy,’ since ‘diplomacy’ is typically restricted to interactions with a
foreign entity. Ultimately, I decided to do so because I find it incredibly revealing that the State Department created an operation for disseminating information to the domestic public at exactly the same time (1944-1945) as it incorporated the Office of War Information’s (OWI) operations for disseminating information to foreign publics. Moreover, as I detail in Chapter Two, the State Department located both of these functions in one Office of Public Information, overseen by one Assistant Secretary of State for Public and Cultural Relations (initially MacLeish). In short, one can certainly distinguish between inward-facing and outward-facing programs, and perhaps Johnstone is right that I should have been more precise in doing so, but my primary point was that the State Department, based on its own bureaucratic structures, saw the two as inextricably intertwined. Whatever position one takes, though, the relationship of domestic public affairs to the story of public diplomacy is a subject that warrants much more discussion.

Finally, let me address Scott Lucas’s criticisms, which strike me as based either on a serious misunderstanding of the purpose of the book or a fairly superficial reading of it. His review presents two principal objections: that I frequently offer “sweeping declarations” without elaborating; and that I concentrate on “tactics” rather than “strategy” or, put differently, that I do not focus on the people he thinks really matter in the grand scheme of things. In support of his point about “sweeping declarations” he offers three quotations from the book, which are taken completely out of context. All three are summary statements designed to bring together pages and pages of evidence—in the case of the first one, evidence that follows the statement; in the case of the latter two, evidence that has just been discussed. At the risk of stating the obvious, every single book that contains any analysis and interpretation whatsoever contains statements such as these. The question is not whether they exist; the question is whether there is any evidence to support them. Lucas’s review does not comment on the evidence surrounding these quotations; it simply implies that they appear out of the blue.

His more substantive critique is the one about tactics versus strategy. The crux of the complaint seems to be that, because Empire of Ideas tells the stories of people Lucas considers marginal figures in the policymaking process, I am not dealing with the ‘real’ issues that animated U.S. foreign policy, instead highlighting minor disagreements here and there: “There is little consideration of policy in the book, at least at high levels,” he asserts. “Secretaries of State pop up in [Hart’s] narrative of events, but in the context of specific programmes and bureaucratic re-alignments. Presidents and the post-1947 National Security Council rarely show; the military and CIA are close to absent.”

I really am not quite sure what to make of these charges. To be blunt, I find them both specious and untrue. In terms of high policy, Empire of Ideas includes extended meditations on the Open Door policy, the Good Neighbor policy, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Cold War in Asia, and decolonization, to name several just off the top of my head. Consulting my index, I note that Franklin Roosevelt warrants fifteen separate sub-entries; Harry Truman generates fourteen. Secretary of State Cordell Hull appears on seventeen separate pages; Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles (arguably of even greater importance than Hull in Roosevelt-era foreign policy) appears on nine pages and plays the critical role in the effort to create the Division of Cultural Relations within the
State Department. Nelson Rockefeller’s work during World War II takes up eleven pages of Chapter 1; Vice President Henry Wallace is the indispensible character in Chapter 2; Secretary of State Dean Acheson appears on fifteen pages. I could go on.

I will acknowledge that these familiar stories and well-known characters sometimes take a back seat to the work of the primary architects of U.S. public diplomacy—Archibald MacLeish, Robert Sherwood, William Benton, and others—but that is because Empire of Ideas is a book about how, when, and why the U.S. government decided to develop programs in public diplomacy. To tell this story requires one to actually examine the people who worked in the trenches, not just their more recognizable superiors. To criticize the book for doing that is akin to criticizing a social history of the American Revolution for failing to focus enough on George Washington.

Part of Lucas’s confusion here stems from the fact that he conflates public diplomacy with political warfare. They are not the same thing, as Lucas seems to acknowledge in his first sentence, but then forgets for the rest of his review. The reason the Policy Planning Staff, the National Security Council, the military and the CIA appear infrequently is because they were not primarily concerned with public diplomacy; when they ventured into the realm of ideas, they focused on political warfare. At numerous points throughout the narrative, starting on page six when I explain why I largely exclude the military and the CIA from the story, and continuing frequently thereafter in my efforts to distinguish between white (overt) and black (covert) propaganda, I explain that one of the greatest difficulties public diplomats faced over the years was in trying to insulate their efforts from those who wanted to use ideas as weapons to defeat the enemy, in much the same way as one would use a bomb or a bullet. The principal focus throughout Empire of Ideas is on efforts to manage the image of the United States in the world—the singular purpose that united the many disparate initiatives of public diplomacy. Even though the lines could certainly be blurry at times, political warfare was not primarily concerned with the image the nation projected to the world. If it was, it would not have relied so much on black propaganda, the long-term effect of which was (and is) devastating to the nation’s image.

As for whether public diplomacy constituted a strategic—rather than a tactical—approach to U.S. foreign policy, I cannot imagine how one could read Empire of Ideas and reach the conclusion that it does not deal with strategy. I argue on page three that the U.S. government embraced the methods of public diplomacy during the 1930s “as part and parcel of a postcolonial, imperial strategy to extend the influence of the United States while avoiding the costs of acquiring a large territorial empire.” On page 8, I spell out the theoretical foundation for the book:

U.S. officials stood at the crossroads of four intersecting phenomena that came together to fundamentally reconfigure the global environment and the place of the United States therein. The first was the arrival of the United States as the world’s dominant power by every conceivable measure; the second was the emergence of geopolitical and ideological threats to American dominance, first from Germany and Japan and, later, from the Soviet Union; the third was the continuing proliferation of access to the
technologies of mass communications; and the fourth was the disintegration of European empires (particularly the British Empire) and the concomitant explosion of newly autonomous actors onto the international stage. All of these forces combined to render the image of “America” relevant to foreign policy in a way that it never had been before.

The argument I make is that this is the necessary context for understanding why the United States turned to public diplomacy when it did. The dominant theme of the book—indeed, the title of it—emphasizes the ways that U.S. officials sought to use ideas to build an empire. There is an entire book’s worth of evidence that they thought in these terms. It would be difficult to get more strategic than that.

In closing, let me again thank the staff at H-Diplo, all of the reviewers, and especially the readers for devoting their time and energy to a discussion of Empire of Ideas and, more importantly, the issues that it addresses. It has been a pleasure to participate in this conversation.

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