
The best-known episodes in U.S.-Japanese relations involve conflict, from Commodore Perry’s 1853 ‘opening’ of Japan to Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima. Michael R. Auslin’s book offers an alternative approach. Equally at home in U.S. and Japanese history, Auslin weaves a narrative of cultural exchange covering over 150 years. As Robert G. Kane notes in his review, Auslin’s emphasis on positive exchanges reveals “an underappreciated common thread” in U.S.-Japanese relations. Although the reviewers call attention to limits in Auslin’s analysis, they also support John Gripentrog’s assessment of *Pacific Cosmopolitans* as “the best account of the numerous professional organizations and institutions that emerged to promote transpacific engagement between America and Japan.”

Auslin begins in the second half of the nineteenth century with the informal Pacific crossings of travelers, writers, collectors, and other “noble adventurers” (36, 84). By the early twentieth century, individual adventurers ceded pride of place to exchange organizations and philanthropies. After a brief lull during World War II, these formal exchange organizations expanded and helped account for the success of the post 1945 alliance of the two countries. In a sense, Auslin offers a bilateral version of Akira Iriye’s 2002 book, *Global Community*, a study that he cites in his notes.¹ Like Iriye, Auslin takes an organizational approach to the history of cross-cultural exchange and identity. And where Iriye boldly downplayed the importance of the Cold War to twentieth-century international history, Auslin’s narrative makes it possible to frame the broad sweep of U.S.-Japanese relations with relatively little attention to World War II.

Each reviewer finds specific topics worthy of special praise. For Naoko Shibusawa, Auslin’s treatment of higher education stands out. Gripentrog finds particular value in *Pacific Cosmopolitans*’ coverage of official cultural exchange in the 1930s, especially the Japanese government’s Society for the Promotion of International Culture. For Kane, Auslin’s broadest contribution is his invitation to think of U.S.-Japanese relations from a vantage point of cooperation rather than of conflict.

While Auslin’s book earns praise for its broad recasting of U.S.-Japanese affairs, the reviewers also point to limits in its approach to cultural relations. Gripentrog calls attention to the many informal cultural transfers that get lost given Auslin’s focus on established exchange organizations. Describing Auslin’s coverage of recent pop culture as “half-hearted,” Gripentrog lists numerous forms of unorganized cultural relations that are worthy of more attention, from the expatriate writings of Lafcadio Hearn at the turn of the twentieth century to the popularity of sushi and “J-Pop” at century’s end. Greater attention to informal exchange, Gripentrog suggests, might have led Auslin to give more emphasis to how consumerism (e.g. radios, cars, and Jazz-Age fashion) proved central to Japan’s engagement with modernity.

Kane’s review questions Auslin’s “self-imposed analytical restrictions.” To Kane, Auslin’s attempt to create categories such as “state” and “private” exchange programs underestimates how closely government and private actors interacted. Moreover, Kane argues, Auslin’s decision to divide his non-state actors into three groups—cosmopolitans, internationalists, and nationalists—results in interpretive confusion. Auslin’s own evidence frequently leads him to abandon this framework, especially when so many actors and organizations exhibited elements of cosmopolitanism, nationalism, and internationalism at the same time.

Lastly, Shibusawa raises a significant question about Auslin’s conception of cosmopolitanism. Her review prods us to consider what underlying ideologies have driven organized cultural exchange. Shibusawa offers an answer: “the shared embrace of liberalism that continues among the internationally-minded in both countries today.” In broad terms, Shibusawa questions Auslin’s analytical separation between the realm of culture and the realms of politics and economics, and she challenges Auslin’s sense of cosmopolitanism as a “nonpolitical” outlook. Shibusawa instead suggests that the cosmopolitan culture sponsored by U.S. and Japanese exchange organizations represented “an investment in a liberal world order.”

In his introduction, Auslin writes that the Pacific cosmopolitans “helped ... to create the modern world” (1). Our three roundtable reviewers might add a wider range of characters to this world-making story, or they might insist that we are talking about a modern liberal world, but they all agree that there is an important and neglected story in Auslin’s book. Those interested in learning more about the world created by Pacific cosmopolitans will do well to study the three appreciative and critical reviews that follow in this roundtable.

Participants:

Christopher Endy is Professor of History at California State University, Los Angeles, and is the author of Cold War Holidays: American Tourism in France (Chapel Hill, 2004). He is now writing a book on the global politics of multinational corporations and business ethics since the late nineteenth century.

John Gripentrog is Associate Professor at Mars Hill College near Asheville, NC. He received his Ph.D. at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 2006. He teaches courses in both U.S. foreign relations and Modern Japan. In addition to “The Transnational Pastime: Baseball and American Perceptions of Japan in the 1930s,” which appears in Diplomatic History, Vol. 34, No.2 (April 2010), he is the author of a commemorative essay on the 70th anniversary of Pearl Harbor, forthcoming at SHAFR.org. He is currently working on an interwar history of U.S.-Japan relations.

2 For references to cosmopolitanism as “nonpolitical,” see pages 103, 123, 134, and 168 in Auslin’s book.
Robert G. Kane is Associate Professor of History at Niagara University in Lewiston, New York, where he teaches courses on the histories of Japan, China, and the United States. He received his Ph.D. in History from the University of Pennsylvania (2002) and worked in corporate Japan from 1988 to 1991. He is the author most recently of “Race and Representation: Japan and the Limits of a Wilsonian Democratic Peace,” White House Studies 10:4 (December 2010) and has written reviews for Pacific Affairs, Business History Review, H-Diplo, Orbis, and Japan Focus. He is currently writing a book-length manuscript about democracy and race in Japan-U.S. relations from 1905-1921.

Naoko Shibusawa is Associate Professor of History and American Studies at Brown University. She is the author of America’s Geisha Ally: Reimagining the Japanese (Harvard University Press, 2006, pbk, 2010). Her forthcoming book, Seduced by the East: The Treason Trial of John David Provoo, will be published by the University of North Carolina Press.
Clichés abound regarding the dubious significance of cultural exchange between nations. Despite lofty ideals, exchange has proven susceptible to sentimentalism as well as manipulation by governments, bringing into question the authenticity of interactions. The history of cultural exchange between Japan and the United States is no exception. And yet, as Michael Auslin makes clear in Pacific Cosmopolitans, the U.S.-Japan relationship stands out as one of the most unique and enduring examples of international contact, one that more often than not surmounted superficiality. In the process, argues Auslin, Japan and America “changed each other” and helped “to create the modern world” (1). The evidence for both of those assertions is compelling; however, Auslin’s particular focus on professional transpacific organizations (and the ‘cosmopolitans’ involved with those groups), tends to diminish the most fascinating and arguably the most influential cultural elements of that transformation—commodified exchange and popular culture—thereby raising questions about what actually comprises cultural exchange and cultural relations. The result is an erudite treatment that fills a niche but nonetheless leaves this reviewer desiring an account that more fully distills the cultural richness and complexity of America and Japan’s 150-year relationship.

Auslin begins with a wonderfully textured exploration of cultural exchange in the era preceding formal Japanese and American contact, shedding light in particular on Tokugawa Japan’s encounter with the world. Auslin aptly draws upon prevailing scholarship to describe how the shogunate, through the sanctioned trade with the Chinese and Dutch at Nagasaki, remained eminently apprised of both the material and intellectual developments in Asia and the West, including early impressions about an upstart country across the Pacific. Auslin then turns his historical gaze westward and chronicles the growing American presence in the Pacific in the years before Commodore Matthew Perry’s ‘opening’ of Japan—a world of whaling ships, a nascent China trade, and a skeletal U.S. Navy sniffing out coaling stations. For readers unfamiliar with the period, the first section is a good overview; but it is far too lengthy. Expanded accounts of interesting but unimportant individuals like the adventurer Ranald MacDonald encumber the narrative; indeed, not until page 45 does Auslin introduce the groundbreaking cultural encounter between Perry and the shogunate.

Auslin’s analysis of significant cultural interactions in the latter half of the nineteenth century, framed by Japan’s retreat from Tokugawa seclusion and the parallel emergence of the U.S. and Japan as Pacific powers, rightly emphasizes Meiji Japan’s frenetic and far-reaching modernization program, and the attendant massive cultural borrowing from the West. As the author colorfully notes, the “dizzying kaleidoscope of importation and adaptation”—not only of technology and institutions, but also of clothing, hairstyles, diets, architecture, and sports—so transformed urban areas that life in Meiji Japan seemed like “a fast-forwarded film” (55-56). To his credit, Auslin is cautious not to overstate America’s role in this transformation, “given the importance of Europe.” At the same time, he effectively identifies an early Japanese impulse to associate America with technical
innovation, which, he says, solidified “the image of America as the pacesetter of modernity” (57).

Auslin’s treatment of Japan’s cultural penetration of America during the Meiji Era, however, is less compelling. Despite a fine rendering of William Elliot Griffis and his influential 1876 book, _The Mikado’s Empire_, Auslin’s coverage of important cultural ‘interpreters’ like Okakura Tenshin and Lafcadio Hearn is negligible. Moreover, he makes only passing references to Ernest Fenollosa, William Sturgis Bigelow, and Edward Morse, whose books, lectures, and art collections made some of the first cultural imprints on American elites. Another puzzling omission is the _Japonisme_ phenomena and the influence of woodblock prints on nineteenth century American artists such as James McNeill Whistler and Mary Cassatt.

The thrust of Auslin’s book essentially comes to light in the third chapter with his fluent discussion of what he refers to as the “birth of exchange”—the emergence of professional U.S.-Japan exchange societies and organizations at the turn of the twentieth century. Here, the author convincingly links technological development and embryonic globalization to the desire to have more rationalized contact between nations; hence the burgeoning of private groups such as the American Friends’ Association in Tokyo and the American Asiatic Association (both founded in 1898), and most significantly, the Japan Society of New York (founded in 1907) and the America-Japan Society of Tokyo (founded in 1917). Filling the various groups’ membership rolls, notes the author, was a large circle of “transpacific cosmopolitans”—true believers in the value of cultural exchange to promote peace and understanding between the U.S. and Japan. The result was an explosion of lectures, exhibitions, publications, and tours, which, Auslin claims, “altered the atmosphere of U.S-Japan relations” (107). Considering the cloud of ‘yellow peril’ propaganda, war scares, and anti-immigration legislation that enveloped American discourse at the same time (some of which Auslin touches upon), that may be overstating things; nonetheless, what cannot be denied is the seemingly simultaneous formalization of social networks among a number of well-educated and well-to-do Japanese and Americans, like Tokugawa Iesato, Shibusawa Eiichi, Lindsay Russell, and Henry W. Taft, who held each other’s cultures in high regard.

Auslin correctly states that this burst of cultural exchange in the early twentieth century was not a one-way street (109); and yet, his evidence seems to suggest otherwise. Indeed, the narrative tends toward the efforts of a select group of Americans deeply impressed by Japan’s aesthetics and ‘civilized’ proclivities. This raises a salient question regarding the focus of the author’s study and what exactly ought to be subsumed under the term ‘cultural exchange.’ For if we are to grasp more fully the Japanese side of exchange in the first half of the twentieth century, then a broadening of the term and a different emphasis is required, one rooted in what Auslin describes earlier in the book as Japan’s fascination with America as the “pacesetter of modernity” (57). As numerous Japan scholars have documented, this fascination not only survived the Meiji era, but intensified in the 1920s and early 1930s, culminating in the widespread dissemination and adoption of modern American culture.

Although certain Japanese intellectuals at the time may have lamented the gravitational attraction of American modernity—as seen in books like Jun’ichiro Tanizaki’s _Some Prefer_
Nettles (1929)—clearly much of Japan did not. A bigger question thus remains: how do we incorporate this significant aspect of cultural relations into the more circumscribed narrative of ‘cultural exchange?’ After all, one can hardly ignore descriptions of the pervasive influence of American modernity, such as the following 1932 account by the New York Times’ longtime Tokyo correspondent Hugh Byas:

> American cars [in Japan] roll over roadways made by American cement-mixers. American soda fountains have sprung up in every Japanese city. The best of them are quite like those in America. Their frozen treats have the same remarkable names. Tokyo lunch-hour restaurants announce American dishes in the American language, “Home cooking, same as mother’s”….The Japanese drug store has copied the unique American institution complete with radio parts, gramophone records, cosmetics, sundaes and the rest. Radio receiving sets are numbered by the million. The phonograph is never silent….The new office buildings in Tokyo are copied in detail from those of America and the appliances found inside are all American. ¹

Byas’ panoramic view of modern Japan speaks directly to Auslin’s point on what was singular about the U.S.-Japan relationship: its power to shape the other and help create the modern world. To this end, a bustling Japan brimming with the unmistakable stamp of American modernity deserved greater attention in Auslin’s analysis.

Auslin astutely comments that cultural exchange deepened during the troubled decade of the 1930s. References to baseball and garden tours, student conferences, and a highly active Japan Society of New York lend credence to this assertion. One of the best contributions of the book is the author’s account of government-sponsored cultural exchange at this time, particularly the Tokyo government’s Society for the Promotion of International Culture (Kokusai Bunka Shinkōkai, or KBS). Auslin brings to the light the complexities, contradictions, and blurred lines between propaganda and compelling cultural production. It’s a fascinating insight into a mostly ignored institution.

The postwar section of the book, however, accentuates the shortcomings of the author’s narrow focus on professional exchange groups. After a succinct telling of the American occupation’s ‘revolution from above,’ Auslin spends much of the final two chapters detailing the goals and activities of a steady stream of private and public exchange and philanthropic organizations that impacted U.S.-Japan relations, including the Ford Foundation, Fulbright scholarships, USIA’s ‘American centers,’ Japan’s International House (I-House), the Japan Foundation, the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission, the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE), and the United States-Japan Foundation (USJF). This “silver age of international

exchange,” (187) as Auslin labels it, also included the reinvigoration of older groups, like the American-Japan Society of Tokyo and the Japan Society of New York. Despite the importance of these groups in facilitating cross-cultural exchange and academic research, the emphasis comes at the expense of a much broader and more absorbing story of cultural relations. To be sure, the author concludes with a discussion of America’s fascination with Japanese pop culture in the late 1980s and 1990s; but it seems half-hearted.

My point is not that a study of this nature ought to go out of its way to privilege more informal cultural interactions in the U.S.-Japan relationship. I am aware that Auslin’s main focus is on professional exchange groups, and he carries out this task with great expertise (owing doubtless to his own experience as a Fulbright fellow, Japan Foundation fellow, and author of an updated version of Edwin O. Reischauer’s historical pamphlet on the Japan Society of New York). However, his intermittent allusions to the more informal aspects of exchange complicate the meaning of ‘exchange’ and suggest neglect of a multifaceted encounter. It almost seems as if the narrative claims to be one thing (professional exchange) but aims to be another thing (diverse exchange). The book’s inside flap and the author’s introduction reinforce this impression, both of which allude to the variegated depth of cultural ties.

Places in the narrative that could have been bolstered by a broader interpretation of exchange include 1920’s American modernity (clothing, hairstyles, jazz, Hollywood films, cafes, taxi dance clubs, and the corresponding emergence of ‘modern girl’ (moga) and ‘modern boy’ (mobo); the Japanese presence at the 1932 Olympics in Los Angeles; the Japanese exhibit at the 1933 Chicago World’s Fair (especially the intriguing Manchukuo exhibit); expansion of major league baseball tours of Japan in the 1930s, and coverage of the Tokyo Giants’ unprecedented barnstorming tour of the U.S. in 1935; various Japanese golfers on the PGA tour in the 1930s; American rock n’ roll and youth culture in the 1950s; the Sixties counterculture; an expanded account of Kurosawa Akira’s prodigious influence on American filmmakers; the intercultural attraction of various artists like filmmakers David Lynch and Jim Jarmusch, and writer Murakami Haruki; Tokyo Disneyland; the vibrancy of ‘Little Tokyos’ in major American cities; the emergent sushi craze in the U.S. in the late 1980s; and a more thorough examination of Japanese pop culture in the 1990s, including J-pop. More also could have been said of F.W. Gookin and the Art Institute of Chicago’s celebration of Japanese woodblock prints as well as Frank Lloyd Wright’s lifelong fascination with Japanese aesthetics and the profound impact it had on his own creations.

I agree with Auslin that an exhaustive history of U.S.-Japan cultural relations “is impossible” (2); at the same time, as the above laundry list of cultural agents and events suggests, a primary focus on professional exchange tends to dull the vibrancy, richness, and diversity of the American-Japanese encounter. It also raises a curious question: is exchange only genuine when it is intended to be exchange (eg., an event sponsored by the Japan Society of New York)? Or can it also simply be
meaningful consequence of informal exchange (such as American readers appreciating Murakami’s novels)? Whatever the answer, it is clear that the latter has proven to comprise some of the more compelling and enduring aspects of this fascinating relationship. Assessing just how compelling and enduring informal exchange has been (and continues to be) would, of course, require a more thorough examination of primary sources, especially mass media, in order to see who and what is being discussed in each country. (On a related note, I was disappointed by the absence of a bibliography and more substantial paper trail beyond the various endnotes).²

Another question of interest involves Auslin’s assertion that, in the process of exchange, Japan and America “changed each other” (1). The evidence leaves little doubt that this was the case. Still, one does wonder about the respective degrees of influence in the relationship, and who shaped whom the most. On this point, it seems the U.S. exerted asymmetrical influence for nearly 100 years, from the 1870s up through the 1970s, with unique moments occurring during the 1920s, and again in the paternalistic occupation years (1945-1952). What the deeper significance of this seemingly lopsided influence amounted to, or how it shaped the historical trajectory of each nation is a valid area of debate, and it would have been an engaging topic for Auslin to address.

Despite these questions, Pacific Cosmopolitans capably illuminates the extent of formalized cultural exchange in the unique history of U.S.-Japan relations. Indeed, it is the best account of the numerous professional organizations and institutions that emerged to promote transpacific engagement between America and Japan. Therefore, Auslin’s book is a welcome addition to the evolving ‘cultural turn’ in the study of foreign relations.

---

² On a second (unrelated) point, I noticed only two factual errors: 1) It would have been impossible for the 1860 samurai embassy to have traveled to the east coast by train since the transcontinental rail was not built until 1869. Instead, the envoys crossed by rail at the Isthmus of Panama and continued by ship; 2) Connie Mack only joined the 1934 major league tour.
In *Pacific Cosmopolitans*, Michael Auslin offers a clear and compelling case for appreciating cultural exchange as being central to U.S.-Japan relations over the past century and a half. While he concedes that political, economic, and strategic concerns have been and will remain the priority of elites in each capital, Auslin argues that Americans and Japanese have over time far more typically experienced the cultural side of one another’s country. He defines these cultural encounters broadly, casting an analytical net that includes American consumption of Japanese art, food, technology, martial arts, and animation, for example, and the Japanese embrace of American fast food, music, sport, and film. To be sure, there were naysayers as well, such as those Japanese who feared Western encroachment against Japanese tradition and Americans who stridently opposed Japanese immigration in the 1910s and 1920s and Japanese economic competition during the 1980s and 1990s. There was also, of course, the catastrophic break of Pacific War. Despite the ups and downs, however, their “transpacific engagement” has continued to impact both societies, and U.S.-Japan cultural relations have steadily grown more formalized since the initial interactions (3). Auslin acknowledges that in each country the state has often been the principal promoter of cultural outreach, largely in order to serve its own ends. But the prime movers of cultural exchange in his narrative are private subjects and citizens, from the earliest adventurers of the nineteenth century to today’s transpacific consumers of popular culture. He is especially interested in the tension between what he sees as the three main groups of private organizers of cultural exchange. These include “cosmopolitans,” who dreamed of greater intercultural understanding, and “internationalists,” who envisioned the formation of “supranational global governance that would end conflict.” (4-5). Nationalists, meanwhile, saw culture as a “tool” of the interests of the state, which in turn influenced all three groups. Still, state influence, Auslin insists, by no means diminishes the fact that much of the “astonishing vibrancy of U.S.-Japan cultural exchange over the decades … was due to individuals acting with little thought of high-level diplomacy or economic profit” (5).

The principal strength of *Pacific Cosmopolitans* is that its cultural focus underscores the positive ties that bound Japanese and Americans together, particularly before the Pacific War. Generally speaking, Auslin does for cultural exchange what Mark Metzler has done for international finance, in that he adds an essential layer of analysis to our understanding of the complex, global matrix of human interactions in which U.S.-Japan relations operated during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.¹ This period witnessed not only “economic and technological internationalization” (87). As Auslin describes in meticulous detail, it also saw the proliferation of private alumni associations, friendship societies, academic organizations, and philanthropic foundations across the Pacific (and the globe) as knowledge became more internationalized. In short, the U.S.-Japan experience exemplified how international relations were “being knit closer together through nongovernmental groups,” even in times of diplomatic, political, and economic tensions (97). Indeed, despite

the deepening crises of the 1930s and 1940s, cultural exchange between Japanese and Americans, through student trips, baseball games, and shared popular culture, for example, continued almost to the eve of Pearl Harbor. In his accounts of numerous individuals and organizations, Auslin reveals that the proponents of cultural exchange on both sides of the Pacific believed in the innate similarities between the United States and Japan. This is an important corrective to the standard narrative of the prewar period, in which the two nations repeatedly ‘clashed’ due to their fundamental differences. The cultural framework can demonstrate, in other words, how the excesses of the Pacific War were an anomaly in bilateral relations, not what defined them over time. Auslin is equally convincing in his argument that it is “the longstanding ties and cosmopolitan feelings that had driven both countries together since the nineteenth century” that explain how rapidly the relationship returned to normal in the postwar period (169).

Ironically, despite its innovative framework, Auslin’s alternate narrative at times succumbs to the same sort of determinism that characterizes the more traditional diplomatic, political and economic accounts of the prewar era. This is exemplified in his treatment in Chapter 4 of the period from 1924 to 1941, where the buzz of approaching Japanese dive bombers nearly drowns out the cheers of intercultural amity that make up the bulk of his examples of contemporary bilateral exchange. His analysis of the 1924 National Origins Act (U.S. legislation that in effect barred Japanese immigration to the United States), which Auslin sees as the major turning point in U.S.-Japan relations on the road to the Pacific War, is particularly overwrought. While the act brought strong Japanese rebukes of the United States, it did little at the time to undermine political party government in Japan, especially in comparison to the global economic dislocations of the early 1930s. His claims of increasing international tensions in the 1920s are not supported by his examples, which rightly refer to the 1931 Manchurian Incident as the defining moment of Japanese militarism. His contention that a “very aggressive unilateralism” had characterized Japanese diplomacy from the 1890s to the early 1930s, moreover, is incorrect (153). Imperial Japan was in fact fully integrated into and adhered to the rules of great power politics at that time. What is more, as Tom Burkman shows, international accommodationism remained alive among Japanese diplomats even after Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in 1933. The value of the story that Auslin tells is that it


3 For studies that rightly describes Japan as an essential part of the European great power system, see John Albert White, Transition to Global Rivalry: Alliance Diplomacy and the Quadruple Entente, 1895-1907 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995) and Frederick Dickinson, War and National Reinvention: Japan and the Great War, 1914-1919 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).

underscores from the vantage point of cultural exchange the numerous avenues of interaction that remained open in bilateral relations into the early 1940s. Intercultural activities stayed in place not because of a “sense of foreboding” among their organizers, but because of an enduring faith in their effectiveness (142). Auslin could have reinforced that point by adhering more closely to his evidence, rather than highlighting a turning point of decline that is even earlier than what past studies have accepted.

Auslin also overanalyses the differences in intent and approach among his main categories of intercultural organizers. For example, the fact that the Japan Society of New York in the 1910s “consciously straddled the worlds of cosmopolitanism and internationalism” points to the artificiality of the hard division between the two (103). More problematic is the near solid line he draws between private and state cultural initiatives. This conceptualization is not surprising, given his stated emphasis on non-governmental cultural exchange. But his evidence consistently shows how blurry that line in fact was, and by separating what he sees as two distinct strands, the ‘pure’ and the politicized, he misses how intimately they interacted. The self-imposed analytical restrictions, moreover, limit the innovativeness of the story Auslin tells, if not the utility of his framework. A key example of a link that could be explored is between the various Japanese ‘education campaigns’ of the early twentieth century. Historians of modern Japan are now well familiar with the cooperative efforts of the Home Ministry and local leaders to ‘mold Japanese minds,’ or to educate subjects about their proper roles in society.5 Scholars of U.S.-Japan relations might also be aware of the efforts of the Foreign Ministry to instill a correct image of Japan in American and European minds, especially during the Russo-Japanese War and after the latest flare-up of bilateral friction over Japanese immigration to the United States in 1913.913 immigration episode.6 Auslin adds another layer to the mix, noting that private cultural exchange organizations, such as the Japan Society of New York, also initiated “campaigns of education” to counter a rising anti-Japanese immigration movement in the 1910s (125). It would be productive to gauge what, if any, contact the private U.S. initiatives had with the official Japanese ones, not in order to expose these efforts as propaganda, but to appreciate the multiple levels on which individuals interacted within and across societies at the time. Of equal importance, as Asada Sadao notes, is that a bitter irony of the education campaigns of the Japanese Foreign Ministry was that although they were meant to stress bilateral cultural affinity, they instead tended to accentuate Japanese uniqueness, and thus incompatibility with the United States.7 This does not seem to have been the case with the private campaigns, and it


would be fruitful to compare the two sets of initiatives in order to determine why that was. The most plausible answer is that the organizations about which Auslin writes dealt primarily with elites and high culture, not low-skilled Japanese laborers. This allows him to largely skirt analyzing racism in U.S.-Japan relations, but this is nonetheless a major omission, especially given his earlier equation of cultural exchange and interpersonal contact (49-50).

A final concern is with the cohesiveness of the narrative. Auslin has accomplished no small feat in finding an underappreciated common thread that winds its way through a hundred and fifty years of U.S.-Japan relations. The three chapters on the period from 1853 to 1945 are, despite some missing linkages, persuasive and add a new layer to our understanding of the prewar narrative. The problem is that the final two chapters on the postwar era read more like an encyclopedia of intercultural organizations, academic programs, and popular culture – albeit with polished synopses of key diplomatic and political events interspersed between the entries – than an integrated analysis. Perhaps this is because the post-1945 era has no collision akin to the Pacific War on which to build dramatic tension. Like other scholars, Auslin seeks to fill this void by drawing parallels between the 1930s and the so-called “trade wars” of the 1980s and early 1990s, but this analogy only works if one ignores the radically different political and economic contexts of the two eras (244). He also points to the more plausible comparison between the 1990s and 1910s, at least in terms of the rhetorical acrimony that afflicted bilateral relations at each time (250). Such similarities raise the question as to what has led some Japanese and Americans over time to consistently imagine themselves in conflict regardless of the level of political and economic engagement between their countries. To his credit, Auslin offers a more convincing argument than most by seeing bilateral strife in the 1980s and early 1990s as a product of “negative cultural images,” rather than as evidence of a fracture in the strategic relationship (242). This point and the larger question it illustrates both go largely unexplored, however, as Auslin turns his focus to detailing seemingly every recent instance of cultural exchange. The approach effectively undercuts his contention that bilateral relations are now “anchored by cultural connections,” since we do not see how these connections interact with other essential ones (273). In the end, Auslin reminds us that culture matters, but analysis of it must be tied to the larger political, diplomatic, and economic contexts of the times for its significance to be fully appreciated.

---

Michael R. Auslin’s *Pacific Cosmopolitans* charts a binational history of Americans and Japanese who participated in ‘cultural exchange’ from the late Tokugawa to the current Heisei era. I use the Japanese dating because this story, though a transnational one, focuses a bit more heavily on the Japanese side of the story. This approach is quite reasonable given that the impact of the United States on Japan has been far greater than vice versa. *Pacific Cosmopolitans*, moreover, is less a cultural history of U.S.-Japan relations with analyses of culture and ideas over time than a history of U.S.-Japanese cultural exchanges. It excels in the examination of people-to-people relations and the conveyers of culture or ideas. The author, a Japan scholar, has written a lively and eloquent account of these exchanges and interactions between the two nations in what appears to be a follow-up to his first book about the development of Japanese diplomacy after the 1854 Kanagawa Treaty, which established diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States.¹ Auslin, however, extends the chronological narrative much further and animates it with an emphasis on the role of cultural diplomacy and the exertion of “soft power.” Auslin doesn’t make much use of political scientist Joseph Nye’s term as it would be anachronistic to do so, but the uses of what we now recognize as “soft power” are a major thrust of his study.²

As a reviewer noted of Auslin’s first monograph, in this book also the author expertly weaves together familiar stories with unusual ones.³ And though he focuses on elites—as revealed in using “cosmopolitans” in his title—he does not wholly neglect non-elites and includes in his story the role of the *Nikkei*, the Japanese emigrants, and the reaction of the African American press to Japan and things Japanese.⁴ Auslin is also to be commended for the nuances in this story. Not everyone who enjoyed the other’s culture saw themselves as informal diplomats or as making any political commentary about the two states. Americans who have enjoyed Japanese culture—manga, anime, or sushi today, or fans, dolls, and trinkets a hundred years ago—do so without any particular attention to the bilateral

---


⁴ That said, it appears he could have benefited from more recent scholarship on Japanese America, particularly by Eiichiro Azuma, so that Auslin could have nuanced his assertion that the emigrants “played almost no role in mediating between the two cultures” (67). Azuma, Eiichiro, *Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japanese America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). Another related question is why Auslin calls the early visitors “noble adventurers.” I understand the “adventurers,” but am slightly at a loss as to why they are depicted as “noble.” Brave or intrepid, perhaps, but noble?
Auslin does not discuss this at great length, but it appears that these consumer choices reveal more about American tastes or desires that in turn tell us more about the domestic context than the bilateral one.

All in all, *Pacific Cosmopolitans* is about the binational production of knowledge via government agencies and private individuals and groups, many with close associations with their respective states. A highlight of the book is the discussion of the establishment of higher education in Japan. Almost all of Japan’s most prestigious universities today—Keio, Hitotsubashi, Tsuda, and so on—were founded and shaped by people who had been profoundly influenced by Americans. Many of the leaders got their training at U.S. universities. The imperial universities (now Tokyo University, Kyoto University, etc.) eventually shaped themselves to the German model of research universities rather than the liberal arts model, but they, too, were under the leadership of those educated in the United States. Underlying this production of shared knowledge was a liberal faith that mutual understanding would ensure mutual respect and cooperation in commercial and political matters. Or, as Auslin says in his conclusion, “good-faith efforts to promote mutual understanding have their own intrinsic value as well as the potential to bring about better political relations between states [have] been a hallmark of the U.S.-Japan relationship since its beginning” (276).

Yet, as Auslin shows, cultural diplomacy or these cultural exchanges have failed when they were most needed. They did not prevent the passage in the United States of the racist 1924 Immigration Act, or the outbreak of war at the end of 1941. Conceivably, they mitigated the worst of the ‘Japan-bashing’ that peaked during the 1980s, but Auslin doesn’t argue this, either, which was probably a wise choice since this would be hard to prove. On the other hand, not much space is devoted in the book to addressing the more straightforward question of why cultural diplomacy failed. Answers are provided indirectly. For instance, we learn that in the wake of the 1924 Act, the Japanese learned that they had to appeal to a broader American public, rather than focusing on American elites (131). It could be that the reasons for the failure of cultural diplomacy were so obvious that Auslin did not consider them worthy of deeper analysis. No public lectures, exhibits of ukiyoe, or gifts of cherry trees could smooth over the fact of the 1915 Japanese ‘Twenty-One Demands’ to China—or, more importantly, the two countries’ divergent interests in China. Auslin stresses at the outset that cultural exchange “always has and always will play a subordinate role to more traditional economic and political concerns of leaders in both countries” (2).

Still, a question remains why cultural diplomacy persisted—why has there been such faith in the “potential to bring about better relations between states”? Auslin writes that “the

---

5 For the latter period, see Andrew McKevitt, “Consuming Japan: Cultural relations and the globalizing of America, 1973-1993” (Ph.D. diss, Temple University, 2009).

6 I also have to confess special interest in Auslin’s discussions of Shibusawa Eiichi, my great-great grandfather, and of Yamamoto Tadashi, founder and director of Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE). Yamamoto is my uncle; he married my mother’s sister. I worked at JCIE for about a year after graduating from college.
pull of cultural engagement" was so strong that it required a bloody war to stop it. Yet
“once the guns fell silent, the sprouts of a new era of exchange pushed up through the ashes
of war” (168). Again, perhaps this seems too self-evident to have explored. On one level, we
can say that gestures and exchanges to humanize former enemies came through cultural
and people-to-people contact. But on another, perhaps it speaks to the shared embrace of
liberalism that continues among the internationally-minded in both countries today—
including, of course, scholars who write on the subject who themselves have an investment
in a liberal world order.

And finally, a note about which Auslin probably had little control: the lack of a bibliography
and a bare-bones notes section. As the aforementioned reviewer of his first book noted, it is
a disservice to scholars not to know the extent of the author's readings and base of
knowledge. It makes it harder to assess a scholarly work and, for others doing research in
similar areas, to profit from it. No doubt, Auslin kept a bibliography and much more
extensive endnotes that he was forced to delete on the publisher’s demand that he keep his
word count down. This is unfortunate because we could have learned much more from
Auslin’s book than his publisher allowed.

Copyright © 2013 H-Net: Humanities and Social Sciences Online. H-Net permits the
redistribution and reprinting of this work for nonprofit, educational purposes, with full and
accurate attribution to the author, web location, date of publication, H-Diplo, and H-Net:
Humanities & Social Sciences Online. For any other proposed use, contact the H-Diplo
Editors at h-diplo@h-net.msu.edu.

7 For an example of postwar rapprochement in Europe, see Petra Goedde, GIs and Germans: Culture,