Elizabeth Schmidt. *Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. ISBN: 9780521882385 (hardback, $80.00); 9780521709033 (paperback, $27.99); 9781107302228 (Adobe eBook Reader, $22.00).


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A common refrain from those who teach African history is how difficult it is to find suitable textbooks for classroom use. Finding a text which succinctly covers the diverse continent with the appropriate mix of broad and specific themes is nearly impossible. Especially difficult is finding a book for course adoption which adequately covers foreign policy and foreign interventions in Africa. Most books discuss colonialism, but only superficially touch upon post-colonial interventions in favor of focusing more on the continent's social and economic history. The reviewers in this Roundtable agree that Elizabeth Schmidt's *Foreign Intervention in Africa: From Cold War to the War on Terror* makes a significant contribution to filling this void.

David Newbury, Thomas Noer, and Timothy Scarnecchia all applaud Schmidt for the clarity and insightfulness of her prose and praise the work as well suited for classroom use. Noer and Scarnecchia commend Schmidt for arguing that “the most consequential foreign intervention during this period was intracontinental.” African leaders, often assisted by their American or European allies, “supported warlords, dictators, and dissent movements in neighboring countries and fought for control of their neighbors’ resources” (3). Noer praises Schmidt for illustrating “that many Africans welcomed and even encouraged intrusion by non-African states for their own political and economic gain.” Similarly, Scarnecchia notes that the greatest challenge of teaching African history is to “balance the local, regional, and international forces that all must be considered in order to understand the history of Africa during colonization and the Cold War before the question of ‘blame’ can be confronted in an informed manner” and concludes that Schmidt’s book “goes a very long way to sorting out questions of international and regional causation.” Newbury, meanwhile, views the “central intellectual contribution” of the book as its highlighting “an important dimension of Africa’s current crisis” and envisions it making a “major contribution to courses on Africa.” The reviewers also see *Foreign Intervention in Africa* as being applicable to courses on global politics, the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy, and development.

In contrast, Alex Thomson, while praising the book for being “eminently readable,” is unsure of its purpose. According to Thomson, Schmidt could have used the project to summarize recent literature on foreign intervention in Africa; to introduce original research or new conceptual or theoretical conclusions about the topic; or to offer a textbook. In Thomson’s view, Schmidt’s book “although partially playing each of these roles, falls short of satisfactorily fulfilling any of them.” Thomson is left unconvinced by Schmidt’s principal arguments, and regrets that each is only discussed in a paragraph or two in the conclusion and not adequately elaborated upon within the case studies.

While Thomson characterizes the entire book as an “opportunity lost”, the other reviewers also highlight missed opportunities of pertinent topics left uncovered in *Foreign Intervention in Africa*. Newbury wishes that Schmidt had discussed how interventions in Africa impacted, both domestically as well as in their wider foreign policies, states such as the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Portugal, and Cuba. On a related plane, I
would have liked to have seen more discussion of the motivations these non-African states had for their interventions. Noer agrees, noting that during the Cold War Cuba sent troops to intervene in several conflicts in Africa while neither the United States nor the Soviet Union did, leaving him wishing that Schmidt had explored the Castro regime’s motivations for its African interventions more closely. Noer also laments that Schmidt did not include a case study on the Biafra crisis which he believes “would serve as a clear illustration to students of the human costs of political rivalry, cultural conflict, and the ultimate tragedy that characterizes much of the history of post-colonial Africa.” Personally, I wish that in her conclusion Schmidt had more implicitly analyzed the similarities and differences in foreign interventions in Africa during the Cold-War and War on Terror eras.

Three of the reviewers see this book as a valuable tool to help students understand the complexity of Africa’s wars and political system. Tim Scarnecchia, who already assigned the book to students this past summer, testifies that the “real test of the book’s efficacy is the vastly improved coherence and, more importantly, solid arguments of [his] students’ essays and exams after they have read this book.” Alex Thomson dissents from this viewpoint, criticizing what he perceives as a lack of “original theoretical or conceptual interpretations” offered by Schmidt. Thomson instead suggests Peter Schraeder’s *United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change* as a superior alternative to *Foreign Intervention in Africa*. I strongly disagree with this assessment. Schraeder’s book is outdated, based on case studies less applicable to contemporary politics than the ones used by Schmidt, and provides readers with political science theories weakly supported by a thin layer of primary source research. Given the choice to assign students a book with perhaps too little analysis or one with flawed analysis, I intend to use Schmidt’s *Foreign Intervention in Africa* the next time I teach a course in recent African history.

**Participants:**

**Elizabeth Schmidt** is a professor of history at Loyola University Maryland. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Her books include: *Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror* (Cambridge University Press, 2013); *Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea, 1946-1958* (Ohio University Press, 2007); *Mobilizing the Masses: Gender, Ethnicity, and Class in the Nationalist Movement in Guinea, 1939-1958* (Heinemann, 2005); *Peasants, Traders, and Wives: Shona Women in the History of Zimbabwe, 1870-1939* (Heinemann; James Currey; Baobab, 1992); and *Decoding Corporate Camouflage: U.S. Business Support for Apartheid* (Institute for Policy Studies, 1980). Her next book, *From State Collapse to the War on Terror: Foreign Intervention in Africa after the Cold War*, will be published by Ohio University Press.

**Philip E. Muehlenbeck**, a professorial lecturer in history at George Washington University, is the author of *Betting on the Africans: John F. Kennedy’s Courting of African Nationalist*

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**David Newbury** is emeritus professor of History and African Studies at Smith College in Northampton, MA. His latest publications include *The Land Beyond the Mists* (Ohio University Press) and, as editor, Alison Des Forges’s *Defeat is the Only Bad News: Rwanda Under Musinga, 1896-1931* (University of Wisconsin Press). His current research is on the effects, at many levels, of a devastating famine in eastern Rwanda in 1927.

**Thomas Noer** is Valor Distinguished Professor of the Humanities at Carthage College. He is the author of *Briton, Boer, and Yankee: The United States and South Africa, 1870-1914, Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948-1968*, and *Soapy: A Biography of G. Mennen Williams*. He is currently working on the politics of Frank Lloyd Wright.


This book is about ‘hidden histories.’ But these are ‘histories hidden in plain sight,’ for they are known well to those in Africa and those who lived through the period of the book’s focus, primarily 1960-2010, the first fifty years of postcolonial Africa. While known to some, however, these histories are largely ignored, for just as Africa itself is considered ‘remote’ (and therefore unimportant), its history too is seen as remote from the concerns of most outsiders. In the welter of evanescent facts that bombard western observers, and in a world saturated with instantaneous communication, the slow unfolding of foreign involvement in far-away lands is neglected, almost instantaneously relegated to archival irrelevance and quickly marginalized by our constant obsession with ephemeral events and narrow fields of focus.

In such a context Elizabeth Schmidt’s welcome work both broadens our field of vision and deepens our historical engagement. Her analysis makes it very clear that events in Africa today do not occur on a blank slate and that current conditions in Africa can be fully understood only within their broader and deeper contexts. But the work is distinguished not only by its comprehensive approach but also by its accessibility, which derives both from the book’s organizational clarity and from Schmidt’s unencumbered prose. To be sure, much is omitted, as is inevitable in dealing with a continent of such vast proportions and such diverse histories. Nonetheless, what is examined is representative, important, and presented in a straightforward, clear, no-nonsense fashion. Such a work should serve as a major contribution to courses on Africa, on global politics in the postwar period, and on development issues.

Two principal themes dominate Schmidt’s presentation. Together, these themes do not represent an original argument, but in today’s world the histories so apparent a generation ago need to be rediscovered and restated if we are to make sense of current African political structures. The first theme explores the overarching effects of Cold War strategic concerns in guiding western involvement in Africa in the thirty years following decolonization. The second illustrates the more general struggle of western states to project aspects of colonial power into postcolonial contexts. And these two themes overlap, as western powers claimed the need to preserve a colonial presence in Africa to confront a presumed Soviet threat.

Despite western paranoia—imagining Soviet presence where it did not exist or exaggerating Soviet influence where it did—in most cases (Ethiopia being the obvious exception) Soviet presence in Africa after 1960 was both modest and ineffectual. In the struggle for Independence, nationalist leaders in Africa were often more concerned with the struggle against poverty, ignorance, and disease than with international Cold War alignments. But as an alternative to the rapacious capitalism that marked some colonial regimes, African leaders often referred to some vague ‘African Socialism’ as a pathway to put economics in the service of society. Consequently, western policy makers, often consumed with Cold-War objectives and concerned about claims to ‘socialism’ of any kind,
frequently obstructed the efforts of African governments from focusing on these social
goals. Socialism of any genre had to be opposed.

But these internal dynamics go largely unexplored here, as does the frequent western
support for coercive, corrupt, and sometimes venal political cultures as a means of assuring
stable allies in Africa. Instead, Schmidt’s work is clearly focused on the title topic: foreign
intervention in Africa. To be sure, there have been many forms of engagement by
westerners in Africa over the past fifty years—and some have been helpful to Africans. But
as this book makes clear, state intervention by western powers was predominantly
oriented to achieving goals defined by western objectives; state-supported economic,
humanitarian, or individual forms of engagement were expected to operate within that
larger political framework. These strategic interventions were so frequent and pervasive
that they largely became accepted and treated as ‘normal’ by outsiders; consequently, they
have remained largely unnoticed and unexamined, not only from the perspective of the
present but also by the actors of the day. In this sense, too, they have become invisible:
they are hidden histories, taken for granted and supposedly self-explanatory. Yet as
Schmidt notes, France alone conducted more than three dozen military engagements in
sixteen different countries over the first thirty years after ‘decolonization’—and that
number accounts only for the known, admitted, overtly military interventions for these
particular countries, which comprise less than a third of African states. Furthermore, after
the French disasters in Vietnam and Algeria, and the British ordeal in Kenya—all part of the
decolonization process—postcolonial military engagement invariably took the form of
short-term ‘surgical’ interventions, avoiding the appearance of a pervasive military
presence. For many countries such intervention became the subliminal economic and
political framework within which state-level political culture operated in Africa.

Schmidt’s major contribution is in so effectively lifting the veil, revealing and exposing the
persistence of such actions. In doing so, she poses a whole host of new questions, opens
new themes to pursue, and provides new depths of understanding to unfold within this
field of constant intervention. One of the most frequent characteristics of such foreign
presence—and for some, one of the most insidious—is how these histories have become
indigenized, simply absorbed within the cultures of state politics in Africa, often with
malevolent effects on the local populations. Events in Africa are often assumed by
westerners to be exclusively a product of local circumstances; but power, like ecology, does
not respect the arbitrary units of national boundaries. Schmidt’s work provides an
essential foundation for understanding the broader world of globalized power
relationships; her book makes it resoundingly clear that in African political cultures, even
more than elsewhere, understanding such supposedly ‘national’ characteristics cannot be
separated from understanding the international context within which power operates. The
total effect is to alter our perception of what is ‘Africa’ in this era of such pervasive global
interactions, broad economic reach, and pernicious inequalities among states. This work
shows how a focus on the discrete contours of Africa tends to ignore the extraneous factors
that stem from outside those geographical limits; without that broad lens we cannot
effectively understand the events on the ground.
The structure of Schmidt’s presentation is simple: a chapter on the context of nationalism and decolonization and a discussion of western political concerns during the decolonization process in Africa is followed by subsequent chapters that provide the empirical foundations for the book’s principal themes. Case studies are drawn from North Africa, Central Africa, Southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, and West Africa (as the primary focus to French intervention). East Africa has a less prominent place in this presentation, for after the costly ‘Emergency’ in Kenya during the 1950s and the British support for all three East African governments in the face of army mutinies immediately after Independence, direct military intervention in the region was limited; in this region intervention took other forms. Still this work is not intended as a complete catalogue of intervention; its comprehensive character is shown not in the work’s geographic inclusiveness but in its analytic depth.

Specific case studies include a chapter on the now largely forgotten western political presence in the crises of Egypt and Algeria in the 1950s, both of which are relevant to current transformations in North Africa. The next chapter provides a brilliant summary of the complex trajectory of political machinations in the Congo—by outsiders as well as by competing Congolese personalities—during the Congo Crisis of 1960-65. It clearly contextualizes these histories within wider global confrontations and properly notes the lack of any meaningful national vision on the part of politicians to follow Patrice Lumumba and Pierre Mulele: “As would be true throughout the Congo’s troubled future, the rebels . . . promoted their own interests and settled personal scores” (73). But amidst all the strengths of this chapter there may have been a missed opportunity here, for an exploration of the distinctions between the goals of the national elites and the attitudes of the rural peasantries in the period after Lumumba’s assassination could have highlighted the connection of foreign intervention with internal repression. While all people in the Congo suffered under colonial rule, different class and regional fractions suffered differently. On Independence in 1960, the middle classes became tied to the system which remained largely unchanged from the colonial administrative matrix. But in a system that provided precious few rural benefits, the concerns of the peasant classes focused more on the structural demands placed on them, in a phenomenon that Herbert Weiss convincingly refers to as “rural radicalism,” arguing that the rural populations, often peremptorily dismissed as ‘the peasant masses,’ were more visionary and insightful than the elites, who saw themselves as simply filling the roles of the departing Belgians.¹ These confrontational differences created massive class tensions within the new state—tensions that were devastating to the politics of the Congo at the time, leading eventually to Mobutu’s accession to power in 1965. A deeper comprehension of the catastrophic processes now unfolding in the Congo might have emerged had the chapter made more apparent the radical division between elite concern for accumulation and rural grievances over the scale of extraction at the heart of the system, for these realities form the historical dimension to the way that outside interventions (including from African countries) have played and

continue to play on those divisions. And they were a direct result of foreign intervention in the country immediately following ‘decolonization.’

There follows an equally important chapter on the continental Portuguese colonial territories, where Independence was achieved only in 1975, after years of political mobilization and military action by the African nationalist movements. In this case, one of the major lessons to emerge is the direct link between African intervention and its effects on the European power. For in the end the refusal of the Portuguese military to continue fighting such destructive campaigns for the glory of the state alone led to the 1974 coup in Portugal that overthrew decades of decrepit autocracy—both in Portugal and in its colonies. Though the chapter is rich in detail and insight—and especially noteworthy for its exploration of U.S. support for Portugal during this time—there was nonetheless an opportunity to have pointed out how such intervention can have significant effects in the ‘metropolitan’ power as well as on the ‘target states’ in Africa. (Similarly, France’s war in Algeria led directly to the coup that brought Charles de Gaulle to power, and Britain’s disastrous invasion of Suez led to a fundamental reorientation in British foreign policy and its internal imperial expectations.) In many cases, African resistance had global effects that were often unrecognized by westerners.

A chapter on southern Africa provides a useful consideration of western engagement with the white regimes in South Africa, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, and Namibia, and a reminder of the destructive destabilization campaigns waged by South Africa—with western acquiescence, and sometimes direct support—against other southern African states in the 1970s. This chapter offers a good example of a broader theme: that intervention between states in Africa, frequently supported by powerful external patrons, can have powerful effects. However, much of this history of South African military action in southern Africa has been swept out of western historical consciousness in the wake of the celebration of South Africa’s vaunted transition out of the unconscionable system of apartheid, put in place by whites in South Africa and reinforced by external alliances with western powers, notably by active support (termed ‘constructive engagement’) from the U.S. The pathway to a posited ‘nonracial nirvana’ in South Africa was not predestined, as many outside observers have come to assume two decades later. Schmidt’s detailed reminder of the struggles involved—at least those that took place on the external plane—is salutary, for these forgotten histories are no less important and no less instructive of the nature of historical process in Africa just because they been neglected.

The complicated nature of foreign involvement is shown by the experience of foreign presence in the area of the Horn of Africa. Following his resistance to the Axis Powers during World War II, Haile Selassie, the ruler of Ethiopia, retained a strong alliance with the U.S. in the postwar era—an alliance that provided the U.S. with an important monitoring station and port access on the Red Sea. In turn, Selassie received strong support for his internal autocracy and his annexation of Eritrea—the area where the U.S. military assets were concentrated. With his overthrow in 1974 (resulting in large part from the Eritrean resistance movement) the new rulers, collectively known as ‘the Derg,’ spurned alliance with Selassie’s former mentors and turned instead to the Soviet Union. In a parallel movement, Ethiopia’s south-eastern neighbor Somalia ‘flipped’ from being a Soviet ally to
become a U.S. ally—in part because of Somali enmity toward Ethiopia and Ethiopian claims, supported by the US, for a vast region inhabited by ethnic Somali. In setting out these complex histories so clearly, Schmidt’s chapter addresses the continuing western misunderstandings that coagulate around both the supposed ‘implosion’ of the state in Somalia and the adulation of the post-Derg state in Ethiopia. Once again, she provides us with a valuable reminder that the chaos we see in Africa today is part of a larger history in which the west often played an integral role.

There follow two chapters which adopt different approaches. One is on the sad story of French intrusion and manipulation in West and Central Africa. The second provides a lucid account of the restructured interactions since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent dissolution of western Cold War pretexts for the political manipulation of the vulnerable, weak regimes of many African states—states often lacking in legitimacy and probity, and therefore poorly rooted in the confidence and loyalties of their populations. In many instances these states could not provide even the most basic state services for their populations—the hope of an impartial judicial system, an effective police system guaranteeing domestic order, a reliable monetary system, a functioning educational system, a basic road system, and at least minimal health care structures. Nor could these states adequately represent the needs of their populations at the international level in a globalized world of such radical inequalities in terms of power and wealth. Yet these ‘state fictions’ were kept in place through the powerful support of foreign intervention at least in part because the current international system—as evidenced through such institutions as the UN, international financial institutions, and global trade agreements—can only function through a system of states, whether or not these units serve the interests of the people within them. We cannot conceive of a world without states; so we operate within a vision of that world, irrespective of the internal components of those basic building blocks to global structures. Schmidt doesn’t go into such ramifications, but her book provides a clear presentation of the forms of foreign intervention operating within this larger context. Furthermore, while this book does not often directly address the state interactions with civil society actors, it makes clear the limits of state autonomy even in a world where the myth of the sovereign state prevails. That is how this work is essential to understanding the structures of the African political world today.

The central intellectual contribution of this text is to highlight an important dimension of Africa’s current crisis. This generic crisis is not a result only of incoherent institutions, marked by the absence of activist political parties, outspoken labor unions, courageous journalistic cultures, energetic local business enterprises, lively university discourses, and vibrant civil societies. Instead, she argues that this crisis condition results in part from the way in which these territorial units have been situated within a global political system defined by the dominant powers of the early twentieth century state system and have seen their civil functions slowly eviscerated by western-supported policy actions or military intervention. The period following the Cold War saw major changes in the forms of western intervention in Africa, as western economic ideologies, most clearly articulated in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Structural Adjustment Programs and reinforced in many bilateral aid contracts, led to a drastic diminution in state social services throughout Africa; state aid for schools, health facilities, food and gas subsidies, even piped water
access, were all dramatically reduced. The result was the dissolution of any state support in addressing the needs of the population. Yet in the face of these deprivations the stance of the west could only be described as ‘aloof': without Cold War concerns, Africa was unimportant to the West. After two decades of intense western financial overlordship, the problems of Africa were redefined as ‘African problems.’

But as Schmidt reminds us, with renewed security fears after September 11, 2001 “the global war on terror became the new anticommunism” (213). Once again, western overtures to African states were based on global strategic concerns—both in terms of military security and in terms of the security of material resources. (Access to oil was principal among these, but increasingly land for agricultural investment and biofuels took prominence in many areas—Ethiopia, Sudan, and Tanzania, among them.) However there was also a renewed push for favorable U.S. business relations through the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which required African states to lower tariffs for U.S.-produced goods and required conformity with U.S. intellectual property laws and liberal policies on the repatriation of profits—even as the U.S. continued to provide domestic subsidies (notably in cotton and sugar) to protect its own agricultural producers. In this new context, the concern for African people—after two decades of devastating structural adjustment programs and debt repayment pressures—was not highly visible: witness the West’s response to the Rwandan and Dar Fur genocides.

Schmidt’s final chapter provides a series of useful current political sketches of Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and Zaire/Congo. Here again, she unveils the histories hidden beneath the thick accretion of several dominant western assumptions: Africa as the quintessential home of poverty and backwardness (the ‘Heart of Darkness’ theme); Africa as essential victim (of generic, not specifically political, forces); and ‘exotic Africa’—a place for whites to test their personal courage and moral virtue. The presentation of these tropes as simply perceived features of ‘essential Africa’ in the minds of westerners removed western agency from the poverty, violence, or the lack of state services that characterized Africa. Furthermore, in presenting these more recent trends, Schmidt makes clear the obvious parallels with earlier times: just as domestic insurgencies sparked by local grievances were often associated with ‘Communist aggression’ during the Cold War, so too “the vague rubric of international terrorism was used to explain a range of civil disturbances in the early twenty-first century” (214). The response to such unrest was based more on concerns for the West’s own security than on understanding the conditions in local states—which often provide a foothold for outside ideologies to gain traction. “Rather than winning hearts and minds, American intervention often rendered local populations even more susceptible to the appeals of international terrorist organizations” (215). In these ways Western responses were once again—as as in the decades immediately following decolonization—sometimes complicit in creating the West’s own worst fears. Yet the suffering was borne by Africans.

In short, the strengths of Foreign Intervention in Africa are manifest. They include the clarity of its exposition, the range of information it provides and, most of all, the importance of the topic. This book should become a staple in courses on African history, on global issues, or on social development, for it is a work that will add not only to students’
specific knowledge of Africa, but to a deeper understanding of the complex world in which they will live out their lives. For such a clear, useable resource, teachers will, no doubt, be grateful. For slightly different reasons, students should be even more grateful: not because the book simplifies a complex world but precisely because it allows them to grapple in a coherent fashion with a world far more complex than has been commonly presented. It is rare to find such complexity presented with such clarity.
Foreign intervention has been a constant part of Africa’s history. The spread of Islam in the seventh and eighth centuries, the devastating slave trade, and the impact of European colonialism were crucial in shaping the region. Elizabeth Schmidt analyzes intervention in the period from 1956 to 2010 by focusing on six examples that cover all five decades and nearly the entire continent: European actions in Egypt and Algeria in the 1950s; foreign response to the chaos following Belgium’s abandonment of the Congo in 1960; the struggle for independence of the Portuguese colonies; the long battle for majority rule in South Africa and Rhodesia; conflict in the Horn in East Africa; and French attempts to assert its influence in its former territories in West and Central Africa. The final chapter examines the global ‘war on terror’ and its impact on the region.

Each chapter considers the causes of intervention, the nature of the involvement, and its impact on Africa and Africans. Schmidt argues that “foreign intervention tended to exacerbate rather than alleviate African conflicts and to harm rather than help indigenous populations” (2). Even seemingly well-intended efforts often led to disastrous results. She also illustrates that many Africans welcomed and even encouraged intrusion by non-African states for their own political and economic gain.

The term ‘intervention’ is complex and illusive. The most obvious is direct military involvement, but the word also includes economic relations (trade, loans, investments, aid programs), political policies (propaganda, refugee programs, support of parties and candidates), and cultural exchanges. In many respects, foreign intervention in Africa occurs every hour of every day.

The author recognizes this and does not focus solely on military intervention, but also explores more subtle forms of foreign involvement ranging from direct economic and military aid to attempts to support selected leaders and political factions. She also notes that “the most consequential foreign intervention during this period was intracontinental. African governments, sometimes assisted by extracontinental powers, supported warlords, dictators, and dissent movements in neighboring countries and fought for control of their neighbors’ resources” (3).

This book is part of a series, *New Approaches to African History*, “designed to introduce students to current findings and new ideas in African history.” It meets this objective well. Each chapter provides an overview that is detailed enough to show the complexity of the issue but brief enough to avoid losing students in a mass of names, groups, and events. The writing is clear and precise and the author offers a brief annotated bibliography of significant works on the subject. As it was designed for students, there is no major new archival research or stunning new interpretations.

The first four case studies illustrate clearly how the Cold War shaped the actions of Europe, the U.S., and the Soviet Union. With the end of British, French, and Belgian colonialism, Africa became a battle ground as Europe sought to maintain its economic interests while
Washington and Moscow tried to lure or cajole independent African nations to their side in the global struggle. Although France and Britain did intervene militarily in Egypt and Algeria, and Belgium sent troops to the Congo, most of the intervention was less direct. It involved economic and political issues and the attempt of the West to ‘control’ radicalism and maintain ‘stability’ on the continent. The intransigence of Portugal and the continued power of the white minority in South Africa and Rhodesia forced America and Europe to try to both maintain good relations with independent Africa and to continue cooperation with a NATO ally and insure access to the resources of Southern Africa. This also allowed the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba to promote their opposition to colonialism and commitment to majority rule.

The final regional example, the complex and tragic conflict in the Horn of Africa, clearly shows the mental gymnastics of both sides in the Cold War as the U.S. and Soviet Union repeatedly switched their support from Ethiopia to Somalia depending on the faction in power and the ever-changing balance of the power in the region. War, famine, instability, and corruption dominated and, as the author concludes, “The militarization and destabilization of the Horn during the Cold War are at the root of the conflicts that continue to devastate the region in the twenty-first century” (144).

Schmidt’s first four ‘case studies’ cover rather familiar ground but do so in a concise and clear fashion. There are a few points that even in a book designed for undergraduates could have used a bit more analysis. Neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union ever sent troops to Africa (although Washington did provide air transport in the Congo), but Cuba did. Its soldiers and weapons were crucial in the drive for the independence of Angola. The decision by Fidel Castro to use force in Africa needs further explanation. Was Cuba motivated by an idealistic commitment to majority rule? Was it asserting its independence from its communist allies? Was it retaliating against the U.S.? A more detailed explanation of Cuba’s motivation would be helpful.

Second, the author repeatedly argues that foreign intervention did far more harm than good. She also contends that many African groups and leaders welcomed and even encouraged involvement by non-African nations. There is a need for more clarity as to which groups, individuals, and organizations benefited from European, American, Soviet, Chinese, Cuban, and United Nations’ intervention. Schmidt may be correct that foreign involvement ultimately harmed the continent, but she needs to also show also what factions benefited.

Finally, a chapter on the Biafra crisis (1967-1970) might have served as an important example, as it was one of the few issues in Africa that attracted the world’s attention. It led to military and humanitarian involvement by a number of nations and was a tragic illustration of the heritage of colonialism and the ethnic conflicts that followed. The global image of a starving Biafran child was crucial in bringing Africa’s misery to the conscience of Europeans and Americans. It would serve as a clear illustration to students of the human costs of political rivalry, cultural conflict, and the ultimate tragedy that characterizes much of the history of post-colonial Africa.
The last two chapters are the most intriguing and provocative. Both explore topics less familiar but of more interest to those concerned with African history and international relations. Schmidt's chapter on France's attempts first to block independence and later to use a complicated combination of rewards and punishments to keep it former colonies economically dependent is fascinating. She notes “Paris assumed that interference in the affairs of its former territories was its natural right” (166). Having first tried to destroy the economy of Guinea when it voted for independence in 1958, France followed by using economic and military pressure to try to retain control of other former colonies when they achieved self-rule. In the first three decades of independence, France sent troops over thirty times to sixteen African nations to maintain pro-French governments and to protect its economic interests. This chapter shows clearly the willingness and ability of former colonial powers to manipulate African states long after they were technically ‘independent.’

The final chapter offers a revealing look at the impact of the post 9/11 war on terror on Africa. With the collapse of the bi-polar Cold War perspective, the war on terror became the defining factor in American perceptions of Africa. Washington was willing to support undemocratic and brutal leaders if they endorsed, at least verbally, the campaign against international terror. The result was an escalation in violence as war lords, mercenaries, gangsters, and private organizations received American funding and encouragement while inflicting their own ‘war on terror’ against any group opposing their power. Massive military aid led to horrific violence, repression, corruption, and ethnic conflict. Schmidt uses Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and Zaire to illustrate her thesis and is convincing in showing the devastating human cost of Washington’s global battle against terrorism.

Elizabeth Schmidt’s perceptive book illustrates both the encompassing nature of ‘foreign intervention’ and its often harmful effects. Intervention involves far more than sending troops. In many ways all foreign policy is ‘intervention’ as it involves one nation trying to make another do what it wants. Making a loan, providing technical assistance, offering cultural programs, negotiating a treaty, taking in refugees, signing a commercial agreement, funding political organizations, are all forms of intervention in the affairs of a foreign state. The impact of sending troops abroad is obvious, but the repercussions of other forms of involvement are less clear. Foreign Intervention in Africa should serve as a warning that any form of intervention, no matter how well-intended, must be preceded by a sober assessment of its consequences.
As stated in the introduction to the “New Approaches to African History” series at the beginning of the book, the idea of the series is to “introduce students to current findings and new ideas in African history” and “to introduce debates on historiographical or substantive issues and may argue for a particular point of view.” (iii) Having now assigned this book in my undergraduate contemporary Africa course during summer term 2013, I believe the book lives up to these claims, and my students found it very helpful in both senses—as an introduction to the history of foreign interventions and as a presentation of a particular point of view.

This book is a great help then for anyone teaching a course on the global Cold War, American foreign policy after the Second World War, African politics, or a modern Africa history survey. This is a work with sufficient scope and breadth, as well as readability, to make the complexity of African post-World-War-Two politics understandable for undergraduate and graduate students. The real benefit of the book, what I see as the way it fills a major gap in the existing books available for teaching, is that Schmidt succeeds in writing in a very clear way about a number of overlapping influences and contingencies that are all necessary to examine in order to avoid overly determined views of causation during this period. The greatest difficulty involved in teaching African history to students in North America—beyond most students’ unfortunate lack of prior knowledge of African history—involves the need to sort out who is to ‘blame’ for many of the problems that continue to confront many African states. The difficulty in answering this question historically revolves around how to balance the local, regional, and international forces that all must be considered in order to understand the history of Africa during decolonization and the Cold War before the question of ‘blame’ can be confronted in an informed manner. Schmidt’s book goes a very long way to sorting out questions of international and regional causation.

An interesting criticism from students, and one perhaps relevant to this H-Diplo roundtable discussion of the book, had to do with what they saw as Schmidt’s more critical treatment of Republican administrations compared with those of the Democrats. It is true that Cold War dealings with African states had a particularly partisan feel, and the American historiography has always demonstrated this, starting with the John F. Kennedy administration’s attempt to ‘court’ African leaders as a contrast to Dwight Eisenhower’s Cold War interventions, as Phil Muehlenbeck’s recent book has so nicely demonstrated.1 But Schmidt’s discussion of the Kennedy administration’s anti-communist strategies in backing Sese Seko Mobutu and President Johnson’s support of Moïse Tshombe’s secessionist claims to Katanga would suggest a more balanced treatment of the various administrations in the book. The Nixon and Ford administrations do not seem to stand out

as being that different in Schmidt’s coverage, with their building an anti-Soviet and Cuban alliance with strong partnerships in Zaire, Liberia, and South Africa.

The section of the book that may give readers the impression of a ‘bias’ against Republican administrations would be Schmidt’s excellent discussion of the changing relations of different U.S. administrations with South Africa (106-110), given the human rights emphasis of the Carter years, and then the return to hardline Cold-War interventionist strategies in the early 1980s. Reagan’s Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Chester Crocker, receives particular criticism from Schmidt for the shifting of U.S. policy toward supporting apartheid South Africa at a time when the anti-apartheid movement in North America and elsewhere had made great progress. Schmidt points out how this return to support for white South Africa and its claims in Namibia, as well as U.S. support for Jonas Savimbi in Angola and Renamo (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) in Mozambique, would lead to a much greater deal of suffering and violence in a region that might otherwise have managed to avoid further conflict—especially given the optimism over a negotiated settlement in Zimbabwe and the Cold War pragmatism of Mozambique’s President Samora Machel in the early 1980s. It would be difficult for any scholar to avoid a ‘bias’ given the effects of what we used to call ‘destructive engagement’ with South Africa in the Reagan years. I first met Schmidt in Ann Arbor during the height of the anti-apartheid movement on U.S. campuses, and I have always respected the commitment and scholarly activism she demonstrated then and after with organizations such as the Association of Concerned Africa Scholars. It is also fitting that the William Minter, the writer, researcher, and activist with whom Schmidt has collaborated on many projects to help influence the United States’ Africa policy, should have been selected to write the book’s preface. As someone who is currently writing on Rhodesian and Zimbabwean diplomacy in the 1970s and 1980s, I tried to find some weaknesses in Schmidt’s summary of these complicated years of negotiations and conflict (115-121), but I was unable to find any. This in part comes from Schmidt’s own scholarly involvement earlier in her career with the question of Rhodesian Sanctions and Zimbabwe’s independence. It is also evidence of her careful and thoughtful approach to a narrative that is at the same time very comprehensive while also aware of the need to remain concise as it is primarily an undergraduate-level text.

In terms of sources and methodology, Schmidt has carefully selected the key texts many of us have been using to teach these topics. The sources are conveniently discussed in brief annotated sections at the end of each chapter, making it useful for student research papers. Some areas, such as the discussion of French and American Cold War interventions in Guinea, draw heavily from Schmidt’s earlier work.\(^2\) It would be helpful if Schmidt could produce an online bibliography similar to those done for other works in this Cambridge Series, in order to keep students and scholars up to date on the latest works. Methodologically, the book works from a very basic premise that interventions in Africa have had a significant impact on the nature of the African state and the economies of individual nations and regions. The unrelenting pace of interventions in Africa since World

War II has fundamentally shaped post-colonial and post-Cold-War Africa. Bringing together in this synthetic study the evidence from research conducted over the past fifty years, Schmidt provides scholars with a much needed and concise discussion of this process.

The real test of the book’s efficacy is the vastly improved coherence and, more importantly, solid arguments of my students’ essays and exams after they have read this book. As our attention in contemporary African history and political science courses shifts to the influences of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) in Africa, the war on terror, and other new forms of foreign intervention, it is all the more important for students to be assigned this book in order to provide a sound grasp of how foreign interventions have shaped modern Africa.
Whereas the study of foreign intervention in Africa occupied an academic backwater in the last three decades of the twentieth century, the twenty-first century has seen published research on this topic expand considerably. Historians have produced quality work assessing Africa’s role in the cold war, while international relations colleagues have turned their attention to the continent’s position vis-à-vis current global security concerns. This new vigour in analysing past and present international intervention is most welcome. Seminal works of the past have been updated and challenged, while new evidence and interpretations have been introduced. *Foreign Intervention in Africa* contributes to this subject’s new wave of academic publishing, but I will argue in this review that Elizabeth Schmidt’s book is perhaps an opportunity lost.

Although this volume conveys good knowledge of its subject, and is eminently readable, I am unsure of the author’s goal. The book falls between several stools. *Foreign Intervention in Africa* could have worked well as an opportunity to sum up the present standing of the literature, in the wake of this new publishing. Alternatively, Schmidt might have used the case study evidence to draw broader and more comprehensive conceptual or theoretical conclusions about foreign intervention. There is similarly a place for a new textbook addressing this subject. This review suggests that *Foreign Intervention in Africa*, although partially playing each of these roles, falls short of satisfactorily fulfilling any of them. What readers are left with are unadorned narratives of history that have already been recounted elsewhere.

*Foreign Intervention in Africa* makes no claim of introducing new evidence to its subject. At the core of the book are seven case studies, and each of these is produced on a foundation of secondary sources. The author’s knowledge of this secondary literature is evidently comprehensive, and this knowledge is successfully conveyed throughout the text, giving confidence of accuracy, but no new data is brought to the table. This lack of analysis of primary sources in itself is not a problem, but it does restrict the book’s potential.

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Consequently, the value of this volume is limited to an interpretative or summarative role, or maybe to serve as a textbook.

Schmidt’s use of five geographical case studies and two thematic studies is impressive. A good deal of evidence has been considered, even if the focus is somewhat United-States biased. The book communicates an understanding of what happened by way of foreign intervention across the continent and across time (1945-2010). The broader conclusions drawn from these case studies, however, are extremely limited. Four points are made. Each is given just one or two paragraphs in the conclusion. These points are: the (at times) conflicting colonial and Cold-War interests of the United States and its European NATO allies; the withdrawal of patronage at the end of the Cold War contributing to state collapse in several cases; the suggestion that increasing public pressure for humanitarian intervention has changed the demands on decision makers in recent time; and foreign intervention in Africa in the period under consideration “generally did more harm than good” (229). Each of these points needed to be discussed in much more detail within the case studies, or, at a minimum, the author needed to provide a substantial concluding chapter, and not just the four pages published. As a consequence, each of these points remains unsubstantiated. A book focussed on these four points had the potential to offer original theoretical or conceptual interpretations of foreign intervention in Africa. As presented, however, these points come across more as an afterthought.

If Foreign Intervention in Africa is limited in what it provides in terms of new data and new interpretation, the book could have worked well as a summary of the literature to date. We could have learnt about who said what, and when. The development of this academic subject could have been charted using the comprehensive secondary literature analysis that the author has undertaken. This possibility, however, was sacrificed instead to producing short histories of the case study conflicts. The book makes use of a very limited number of footnotes. The reader cannot ascertain where the evidence comes from. Indeed, it is impossible to follow up on points made because of this lack of referencing. If one wanted to investigate further the claims that British intelligence joined a plot to assassinate Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser (41), or that President Lyndon Johnson was less concerned than his predecessor about African opinion (70), one has nowhere to go. With such a volume of information needing to be conveyed, feeding seven case studies spanning half a century, it is understandable that not all claims can be evidenced directly, but it was frustrating that footnotes were not provided that would have permitted the reader to check, or follow up, on claims made. One can refer to the comprehensive recommended reading section at the end of each chapter, but these works are introduced thematically, and it is impossible to ascertain which claim came from which source. The book does not engage directly its foundation of secondary literature.

This leaves Foreign Intervention in Africa probably best characterised as a textbook. It provides an introduction to each of the case study conflicts. A reader could pick up the basics of the causes of the conflict, and the nature of the foreign intervention involved. Then, using the recommended reading, readers could access the more specialist books in order to receive a more nuanced understanding of these conflicts and a deeper level of analysis.
Overall, *Foreign Intervention in Africa* functions as a useful reminder of what has been written about this subject before. It does fail, however, to be more than the sum of its parts. For detailed histories of the selected conflicts, readers would be better served by specialist texts based on primary research. For continent-wide assessments of the nature of foreign intervention, the reader should access sources that provide dedicated theoretical, conceptual or comparative analysis. For a textbook, again, bespoke examples exist. Even if one is after a case-study approach, Peter Schraeder’s 1994 *United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa* would be a more rewarding choice, because of the analysis offered alongside the description.² All publications helping relocate the international relations of Africa from its former academic backwater, offering this subject the attention and respect it deserves, should be welcomed. In this respect, *Foreign Intervention in Africa* works best is an aide memoire of the historical events involved, or as a stepping stone into this subject.

Before responding to the reviewers’ assessments of my book, I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Thomas Maddux for initiating this H-Diplo roundtable, and to Professors Newbury, Noer, Scarnecchia, and Thomson for their thoughtful comments. I am honored that my book was selected for scrutiny by such esteemed scholars.

As noted in the book’s front matter, Cambridge’s *New Approaches to African History* series “is designed to introduce students to current findings and new ideas in history.... Each volume summarizes the state of knowledge on a particular subject for a student who is new to the field” (iii). While the books may “introduce debates on historiographical or substantive issues and may argue for a particular point of view,” their purpose is not to introduce new primary research or to advance new theories that might be of more interest to specialists in the field. Their format, which includes a minimum of footnotes and theoretical language, “allows the studies to be used as modules in general courses on African history and world history.” The reviews by Newbury, Scarnecchia, and Noer acknowledge the objectives of the series and demonstrate an understanding of the limitations imposed by purpose and audience. Thomson offers a thoughtful critique, but one that is more appropriate to a book with a different purpose and intended for a different audience.

Newbury succinctly encapsulates my purpose when he notes that the book’s “two principal themes...do not represent an original argument, but in today’s world the histories so apparent a generation ago need to be rediscovered and restated if we are to make sense of current African political structures.” His more specific comments highlight the difficulties inherent in writing a book that is complex yet accessible, and concise but not simplistic. Studies that focus on the higher echelons of foreign policy making risk treating people at the grassroots as monolithic—or worse, as victims rather than agents of history. Important detail can be lost when generalizations are made to convey the lay of the land. A case in point is the Congo chapter. Newbury notes a missed opportunity in the failure to explore the differences between the objectives of national elites and the attitudes of rural peasantries, as such an investigation might have illuminated the connections between foreign intervention and internal repression. Moreover, he affirms that “while all people in the Congo suffered under colonial rule, different class and regional fractions suffered differently.” Indeed, greater attention to ethnicity, region, and socioeconomic class in all of the case studies would have led to a more nuanced treatment of each and a more intricate understanding of how the past has influenced the present. Similarly, he points out that the treatment of Algeria, Egypt, and the Portuguese colonies might have investigated the ways in which imperial intervention had “significant effects in the ‘metropolitan’ power as well as on the ‘target states’ in Africa.” He rightly asserts that African resistance influenced the colonial and Cold War states in ways that were frequently unacknowledged by more powerful countries. The challenge of presenting a strong clear argument supported by concise case studies resulted in a great deal of anguishing over what to include and what to
omit. I would be the first to admit that the necessary streamlining left much that is important on the cutting room floor.

Scarnecchia picks up on the theme of local, regional, and international causation. When teaching African history to students in North America, he writes, he is frequently compelled "to sort out who is to ‘blame’ for many of the problems that continue to confront many African states." This process involves a concerted attempt "to balance the local, regional, and international forces" that interacted during the periods of decolonization and the Cold War. Concluding that my book "goes a very long way to sorting out questions of international and regional causation," he implicitly acknowledges that the local dimension is left for other historical studies. The strength of the book lies not in its attention to historical dynamics at the local level, but rather, in its "scope and breadth." It is precisely the book’s broad coverage and readability that render “the complexity of African post-World-War-Two politics understandable for undergraduate and graduate students.”

Scarnecchia concludes that “the real test of the book’s efficacy is the vastly improved coherence and, more importantly, solid arguments of my students’ essays and exams after they have read this book.”

Scarnecchia suggests that a regularly updated bibliography should be posted on the publisher’s webpage. Although the webpage for the first book in the series includes an updated bibliography, Cambridge abandoned this practice for subsequent books. Spurred by Scarnecchia’s suggestion, I asked if Cambridge might renew its past practice and received a positive response. The first update will include several books that were published in 2013.

Finally, in regard to Scarnecchia’s intimation that the Reagan administration supported antigovernment insurgents in both Angola and Mozambique, I wish to clarify that the U.S. government did not officially support RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance) in Mozambique, although the rebel movement found quiet support in the American intelligence community and among rightwing constituencies in the United States—and the Reagan administration did not punish South Africa for supporting the movement (see 131).

Noer agrees that the book successfully meets the objectives outlined in the New Approaches to African History series: “each chapter provides an overview that is detailed enough to show the complexity of the issue but brief enough to avoid losing students in a mass of names, groups, and events.” Like Newbury, he observes that because the book was designed for students, “there is no major new archival research or stunning new interpretations.” He, too, suggests that some aspects of the discussion would have benefited from further analysis. Noer wishes the book had devoted greater attention to Cuba’s decision to send troops to Africa. The crucial roles of those troops in the Angolan independence struggle and in the Somali-Ethiopian War are cases in point. He asks whether Cuba was motivated by idealism, a desire to assert its independence from other communist powers, or to retaliate for U.S. intervention in Cuba. While he might desire a more detailed case-by-case treatment of these issues, Chapter 1 does note that “Fidel Castro and his associates believed that Cuba could serve as an example to oppressed peoples in Latin America and Africa…. Although Cuba’s African focus stemmed from the

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belief, shared by all the Cold War powers, that decolonization provided a new arena for the
struggle between socialism and capitalism, this was not the whole story. Like African
Americans in the United States, Cuba also had an emotional link to Africa. Approximately
one-third of all Cubans could boast some African blood. Many were inspired by the desire
to liberate their African brothers and sisters from colonialism and imperialism and to share
the fruits of the Cuban revolution with them. In consequence, tens of thousands of Cuban
health, education, and construction workers, and tens of thousands of Cuban soldiers,
served in more than a dozen African countries during the periods of decolonization and the
Cold War—all expenses paid by the Cuban government” (29).

Noer also wishes “for more clarity as to which groups, individuals, and organizations
benefited from European, American, Soviet, Chinese, Cuban, and United Nations’
tervention.” Such an elaboration would, I am sure, have been beneficial and dovetails
with Newbury’s request for a more detailed class and regional analysis. Again, local level
analysis has sometimes been sacrificed for the broader objective of presenting a concise
assessment of the whole.

Echoing Newbury, who observes that “much is omitted, as is inevitable in dealing with a
continent of such vast proportions and such diverse histories,” Noer suggests that an
important case study is missing, one that illuminated the role of foreign intervention in the
Biafra crisis of 1967-1970. That France was the main source of weapons for the Biafran
secessionists is mentioned in Chapter 7. So, too, is the fact that France and its francophone
African protégés supported the secessionists in order to weaken to anglophone Nigeria,
which had become a dominant force in West Africa, a region long regarded by France as its
protected sphere of influence. Nonetheless, Noer is correct that the Biafra crisis was a
complex affair that “led to military and humanitarian involvement by a number of nations
and ... would serve as a clear illustration to students of the human costs of political rivalry,
cultural conflict, and the ultimate tragedy that characterizes much of the history of post-
colonial Africa.” I gave serious consideration to including a Biafra chapter, but ultimately
abandoned the idea, primarily because of space limitations. Recognizing that this response
is a relatively weak one, I hope that readers will heed Newbury’s judgment that “this work
is not intended as a complete catalogue of intervention; its comprehensive character is
shown not in the work’s geographic inclusiveness but in its analytic depth.”

Finally, two comments require clarification. Noer refers to my assessment that “the most
consequential foreign intervention during this period was intracontinental. African
governments, sometimes assisted by extracontinental powers, supported warlords,
dictators, and dissent movements in neighboring countries and fought for control of their
neighbors’ resources.” He fails to mention that this reference was to the post-Cold War
period of state collapse (1991-2001), in contrast to the periods of decolonization and the
Cold War, when extracontinental powers were the dominant forces of intervention.
Elsewhere, he notes that “the final chapter offers a revealing look at the impact of the post
9/11 war on terror on Africa. With the collapse of the bi-polar Cold War perspective, the
war on terror became the defining factor in American perceptions of Africa ..... Schmidt uses
Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and Zaire to illustrate her thesis and is convincing in showing the
devastating human cost of Washington’s global battle against terrorism.” It should be
emphasized that while all of these cases pertain to the post-Cold War period, some focus on events prior to September 11, 2001, and the war on terror is not a central feature in all of the country studies.

Thomson refers to “an opportunity lost.” He notes that the book had “an opportunity to sum up the present standing of the literature,” or alternatively, “to draw broader and more comprehensive conceptual or theoretical conclusions about foreign intervention.” In the end, he concludes, the book partially fulfills each of these roles, but “falls short of satisfactorily fulfilling any of them. What readers are left with are unadorned narratives of history that have already been recounted elsewhere.” In terms of shortcomings, the book “makes no claim of introducing new evidence to its subject.” Moreover, “a summary of the literature to date,” in which readers could have learned which scholar “said what, and when...was sacrificed instead to producing short histories of the case study conflicts.” Thomson concludes that the book is “best characterised as a textbook,” although even there, he finds it wanting due to the dearth of “theoretical, conceptual or comparative analysis.”

Thomson’s criticisms are well-taken. As noted by the other reviewers and reiterated at the beginning of my response, this study was designed to fit the objectives of Cambridge’s New Approaches to African Studies series. It was not intended to advance new theories, present the results of new primary research, or provide a detailed survey of new literature. Indeed, the target audience is undergraduate students and general readers, and hence, the book might well be characterized as a textbook.

Thomson is also correct in his observation that “the book makes use of a very limited number of footnotes. The reader cannot ascertain where the evidence comes from. Indeed, it is impossible to follow up on points made because of this lack of referencing.” As a scholar whose earlier books on Zimbabwe and Guinea are heavily footnoted and based on primary research, I can understand Thomson’s frustration with the lack of source citations. However, because the New Approaches to African History series intends for its books to be used in “general courses on African history and world history,” it has prescribed a style that includes a minimum of footnotes and instead directs students to suggested readings appended to each chapter. As unsatisfactory as this approach might be for scholars and other specialists, it is an asset for students, who can follow the outlines of the argument without the distraction of footnotes and yet benefit from the direction of bibliographic essays.