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On 11 November 1965, the day when Ian Smith unilaterally declared the independence of Rhodesia from Great Britain, the wife of the Zambian ambassador to the United States, Hosea Soko, gave birth in Washington to the couple’s last born child. As a testament to the incredible impact that he believed Smith’s illegal action (known as UDI) would have on his home nation of Zambia, Ambassador Soko decided to name his daughter “Udie.” After his two-year tenure in Washington, Hosea Soko moved to Moscow and served as the Zambian ambassador to the Soviet Union. He remained one of the proudest spokespeople for the Zambian effort to simultaneously stand up against UDI while remaining non-aligned in the Cold War into the 1970s.¹ Udie Soko followed in her father’s footsteps and became a diplomat serving in the Zambian foreign ministry in the 1990s; then, after courageously battling cancer, she helped found the Zambian Cancer Society in 2007. The story of the Soko family exemplifies how much can be learned about the contributions of African diplomats to the international history of southern Africa by conducting research in Zambia or other countries in the region.

While in his new book Carl Peter Watts never mentioned Hosea Soko specifically, and perhaps did not pay quite enough attention to the impact of Smith’s UDI on neighboring nations such as Zambia in general, he has nonetheless made a very impressive and important contribution to the literature examining the international history of southern Africa during the height of the Cold War. All four reviewers in this roundtable offer considerable (and well-deserved) praise for *Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence*. Their review essays, which are fairly positive and will be briefly summarized below, raise some very good points that will be helpful for future authors writing about UDI, Zimbabwe, or the international history of southern Africa.

Jennifer DeMaio lauds Watts for his multi-archival research and his cross-disciplinary approach, and credits his book for clearly demonstrating how UDI could have been handled better, if communication between the United States and Great Britain had been closer. DeMaio contends convincingly that the book would have benefited from some comparative discussion of the struggles for independence of other British colonies, suggesting the case of Kenya as a good choice. She also believes that Watts could have made his book even more valuable by examining the ramifications of UDI in the tragic, recent history of Zimbabwe. She concludes that Watts should have considered questions such as what rights to land white settlers should have in Robert Mugabe’s nation today.

Jamie Miller commended Watts for his “impressive research in a wide range of Commonwealth archives” and characterized the book as a timely revision. In Miller’s view, if a historian only owns one book on UDI, then this should be the one; furthermore, he

particularly praised its usefulness for future scholars of Zimbabwe. On the negative side of the ledger, Miller wonders why Watts did not focus more on the role of South Africa or black-ruled states such as Zambia. He also questions Watt’s decision to use international relations theory.

Eliakim Sibanda judges Watt’s work as “brilliant” overall, and singles out the quality of research and insightful analysis. He points to the extensive and thorough bibliography as especially helpful for other scholars or students interested in Zimbabwe’s history. Like the other reviewers, however, Sibanda offers some criticism. He underscores the fact that Watts failed to incorporate post-colonial theories dealing with issues such as race or religion. He contends that *Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence* offers no new theory or explanation for the international reactions to Smith’s rebellion. In the end, though, Sibanda concludes that Watt’s work provides an “important challenge” to other historians.

The lengthiest essay in the roundtable is that of Tim Scarnecchia, who opens by congratulating Watts for his “very detailed and useful exploration” of British responses to UDI, especially in relation to the United States and the old Commonwealth nations such as New Zealand. He also applauds *Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence* for its fresh and insightful analysis of how internal British politics influenced the UK response to Smith’s defiance. Scarnecchia lauds Watt’s recreation of “lively” conversations among key players, something which can only be accomplished through “careful archival work.” He appreciates how Watt’s story can help other scholars build the case that Western inertia on African crises in the 1960s contributed to the rise of authoritarianism in many African nations. His final comment, with which I agree wholeheartedly, is that Watts has succeeded in making a “valuable contribution to the literature.”

Scarnecchia explained that in the interest of sparking discussion of the book and roundtable, he would offer considerable criticism, and he does so in a thoughtful and even-handed manner. He states correctly that in order to be a truly international history of UDI, Watt’s book should have paid more attention to the perspectives of key black African leaders such as Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda and Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere. He suggests that the regional aspects of the UDI crisis might have been better understood with a close examination of the Congo crisis, and wonders why there were not more voices from the Zimbabwean nationalist movement, or for that matter that the Rhodesian government. With all of this in mind, Scarnecchia sums up his critique by describing Watt’s book as being somewhat “Anglo-Centric.”

Carl Peter Watts, in his thoughtful response to the reviews, provides a sound explanation for the somewhat limited scope of his project and failure to conduct research in the rich archives of South Africa or Zambia. Quite simply, although he would have liked to have broadened the book’s focus and to have traveled to southern Africa to examine the primary sources there, practical realities of a contractual deadline made such a trip unfeasible.
Having been similarly criticized for not doing research in southern Africa for my first book, I certainly sympathize with his argument.2

As Watts and the reviewers would agree, a truly comprehensive international history of UDI and the subsequent history of Zimbabwe still must be written. Whoever takes up this challenge will certainly need to grapple carefully with the arguments made in Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence.

Participants:

Carl Peter Watts directs the History Faculty in the School of Education at Baker College, Michigan. He is a Research Fellow in the Centre for Imperial and Postcolonial Studies at the University of Southampton and a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society. He received his PhD in Modern History from the University of Birmingham. He is the author of Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence: An International History (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). He is currently researching the 1976 Kissinger initiative using sources in the Ford Presidential Library, the UK National Archives, and the National Archives of Canada.

Andy DeRoche teaches the History of U.S. Foreign Relations at Front Range Community College, and is a lecturer in International Affairs with a focus on Africa at the University of Colorado. His major publications include a biography of Andrew Young, and he is about to start revising and editing his manuscript on Zambia/USA relations that is under contract with Kent State University Press.

Jennifer De Maio is an Associate Professor in the Political Science Department at California State University, Northridge. She has a PhD from the University of California, Los Angeles, an MSc from The London School of Economics, and a BA from Georgetown University. Her first book Confronting Ethnic Conflict: The Role of Third Parties in Managing Africa’s Civil Wars was published in 2009. Dr. De Maio has also published and presented papers on ethnic politics, civil wars and conflict management in Africa, including a recent article on the problem of exclusivity in peace processes which appeared in the journal Civil Wars, a chapter on the role of youth people in African Politics in the book Civic Youth Work: Co-Creating Democratic Youth Spaces, an article on the transnationalization of conflict in Darfur for African Studies Quarterly, and a piece on preventive diplomacy published in World Affairs. Her current work focuses on the political economy of spatial design in contested cities as well as the role of social media in political and social transformations in Africa. She teaches courses on International Relations and Comparative Politics in sub-Saharan Africa.

Jamie Miller is a PhD candidate at the University of Cambridge as well as a visiting Fox International Fellow at Yale University. His dissertation looks at the strategies used by

2 Andrew DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome: The United States and Zimbabwe, 1953-1998 (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2001). In spite of the limited scope of my research for this book, many scholars (including Watts) still seem to find it somewhat valuable.
South Africa to preserve its apartheid regime in the early years of the Cold War in Southern Africa (1974-1980). He won the Saki Ruth Dockrill Memorial Prize for best paper at the University of California, Santa Barbara - London School of Economics - George Washington University International Graduate Conference on the Cold War (2011) and has articles in Cold War History (2012) and the Journal of Cold War Studies (forthcoming).

Eliakim M. Sibanda is a professor of history and chair of the department at the University of Winnipeg. He researches and publishes on immigration, social movements, liberation movements, biographies and human rights, topics on which he is a renowned speaker around the world. Sibanda is the author of a widely read book on liberation movements, The Zimbabwe African People’s Union, 1961-87: A Political History of Insurgency in Southern Rhodesia, 2004.

Going it alone?: A consideration of the impact of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence on questions of Zimbabwean national identity

Rhodesia goes it alone" read the front page of the Rhodesia News on November 12, 1965, the day after the country signed the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) which formally separated the nation from Britain. This declaration marked an important shift in British-Rhodesian relations. It also had a significant immediate and long-term impact on the political, military, and economic stability of newly independent African nations throughout the region. Could the issue of Rhodesian independence been managed more effectively? Could the British and their Commonwealth, American, and United Nations partners have prevented the UDI from occurring?

It is these puzzles that Carl Peter Watts addresses in Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence. By applying international relations theories to the international historical analysis of Rhodesia, Watts makes an important contribution to the literature on alliances and negotiation. He utilizes a multi-archival approach and draws on written and oral sources from American, New Zealand, and British archives to better understand Anglo-American relations in the context of the Cold War in Southern Africa. Watts effectively bridges the fields of International Relations and International History and, in doing so, reminds us how inexorably linked the two disciplines are.

Watts highlights the misperception and miscommunication between Washington and London that were legacies of structural problems that had not been corrected since the 1956 Suez and 1962 Skybolt crises. According to Watts, the United States urged the British government to take a firmer approach to the question of Rhodesian independence. British ministers, however, believed that the Lyndon B. Johnson administration saw the issue as a British problem and wanted to disengage. Watts argues that the UDI was not the inevitable outcome of relations between Rhodesia, and Britain, the Commonwealth, and the United States. There were alternative course of action, he writes, that were either dismissed or were underexplored by the various actors involved. Moreover, there were historical, ideological, and structural weaknesses in the machinery of government that complicated the management of the Rhodesian crisis. Watts explores these dynamics and considers the domestic and international challenges confronted by the different parties.

Watts acknowledges that there are some inherent limitations to theory-building based on a single case study. The relevance of his analysis could be strengthened by the inclusion of comparative international histories. By evaluating the Rhodesian crisis in a comparative framework that includes other cases of African independence, we could perhaps better understand the decisions made in Rhodesia. What impact, for example, did the struggle for independence and nationalism in Kenya have on calculations made by the players in the Rhodesian case? The goal of this proposed comparative historical analysis should be to select a set of cases that share a number of basic historical, socio-economic, cultural, and
other characteristics yet have very different outcomes in terms of how independence was pursued and accomplished. This comparative analysis would expand and extend Watts’s arguments about the domestic and international factors which are relevant to Anglo-American-African relations during the Cold War.

In addition, Watts looks at his single case in a specific moment in the nation’s history. Much of the book is devoted to the examination of the historical record of negotiations that resulted in the UDI. In his concluding chapter, Watts offers some reflections on the Rhodesian crisis and suggests that we cannot understand the situation in Zimbabwe today without referencing the country’s history. As a political scientist and as a scholar of political and economic development in Africa, I am particularly interested in the connections we can draw between the UDI and the crises of nationalism and identity that we see in Zimbabwe today. I am also interested in examining the policy implications of the historical analysis. One of the greatest contributions that careful international history can make is to help us develop a more sophisticated and nuanced understanding of the patterns and dynamics that shape intra- and inter-state relations. This contribution is especially relevant in present-day Zimbabwe where questions of national identity and citizenship rights, the changing structure of the political economy, and the regional and international contours of the country’s history are being debated at the national and local levels. Rhodesia in the aftermath of the UDI was characterized by a thriving economy and substantial economic diversification, despite UN sanctions that had been imposed. That picture of an economically viable and healthy Rhodesia contrasts sharply with the reality of inflation, debt, unemployment, and crisis in Zimbabwe today. How did a country that emerged from independence with so many natural resources and markets for its products decline so drastically in its forty-eight year history? What impact did the negotiations during the UDI have on the state’s economic and political decline?

National identity is one issue that has been affected by the UDI process. Like other African nations, Zimbabwe struggles with forging a national identity that takes primacy over ethnic, racial, and regional identities. During the UDI and in its aftermath, the contours of cultural pluralism and questions of identity and belonging became increasingly relevant as confrontations and contestations erupted over land and property rights. The rise of civil society and trade unions contributed to tensions alongside debates about human rights and constitutional questions. The country found itself torn between Pan-Africanist, anti-imperialist, and nationalist struggles and trying to manage competing claims to what it means to be Zimbabwean. The critical question is what rights, if any, do the settlers who demanded and achieved independence from the British have to the state and land in Zimbabwe? As the crisis in Zimbabwe has developed, a version of the historical record has emerged that shapes current competition for labor, resources, and government positions. How Zimbabwe will reconcile questions of identity, nationalism and patriotism with struggles over land ownership and distribution and the realities of politico-economic decline remains the challenge for the country’s near future.
n 11 November 1965, Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front Government made a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) from the British Crown. The act was from the outset inherently contradictory. UDI was at once a direct repudiation of London’s policies in the age of decolonisation and a keen embrace of British imperial identity and values. The declaration of UDI on Armistice Day, one of the most hallowed days in Empire culture, was a clear indication of this. Similarly, UDI was presented by Salisbury as the expression of the will of the Rhodesian people, with more than a nod to an incipient (white) Rhodesian nationalism as a basis for the new state. Yet UDI was enacted in the face of internal government reports and foreign warnings that such an action would yield Rhodesia no legitimacy and an insecure future (as transpired). Finally, UDI was transparently a rejection of Britain’s insistence that Salisbury provide for an eventual transition to majority rule. Yet through the rest of Rhodesia’s existence, Salisbury would increasingly be trapped between insisting that its constitutional limits on extensive African political participation were necessary for ‘responsible governance’, while simultaneously denying that its government structures were based on a fundamental racism that, in effect if not in law, restricted social, political, and economic opportunities based on the colour of a Rhodesian’s skin.

The contradictions and complexities of UDI on the international scene were also substantial. Not only London, but also Washington, Canberra, Ottawa, and Wellington, found that UDI presented an intractable foreign policy problem. At a stroke, UDI forced a reassessment of established views on democracy, good governance, decolonisation, imperial values, the changing international order, the future of the Commonwealth, the role of race in Third World interests, and anti-communism. Through impressive research in a wide range of Commonwealth archives, Carl Peter Watts explores how these reassessments took place in *Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence: An International History*. Much of the literature on UDI (and the Smith regime generally) was written long ago. The time is certainly ripe for a revisiting of the fascinating events surrounding it.

Each chapter looks at the international response to UDI in a different context: U.S. foreign policy in Africa, the ‘old’ Commonwealth, bilateral Rhodesia-UK relations, and the United Nations. Implicitly, though not explicitly, the conception of this study builds upon a substantial corpus of work emerging over the last fifteen years which underscores that the era of decolonisation featured an astonishing intersection of different historical vectors. As decolonisation scholars at the crux of the “global turn” are illustrating, much of historical value is to be explored by positioning one’s scholarly avatar at that nexus and pointing the historical lens in different directions simultaneously.

Watts shows how the Wilson Government insisted on only granting independence based on a constitution acceptable to Rhodesia’s population as a whole. But encountering a stubborn Smith, London then repeatedly assumed that Salisbury was eager to negotiate a settlement and refused to bolster its initial position with substantive action, such as military force. Ultimately, this meant that London received little credit internationally for what was – in
the context of the times and Labour’s tentative hold on power – a strong stance on inclusive rule as a prerequisite for a transfer of power. Instead, the UK was left looking weak as it waited for the Rhodesian Prime Minister to realise the necessity of a deal. But Smith was an exceptionally obstreperous and stubborn man; my own research in his private papers suggests a serious degree of simple-mindedness, lack of vision, and general intellectual inadequacy to boot. The UK utterly misjudged its man and consequently ended up in a political quagmire.

Watts then moves on to show how UDI reverberated in different diplomatic forums. He does so with rigour, convincingly exploring an impressive range of archives and literatures. If your bookcase contains only one book on UDI, this should be it. The book could not be expected to cover all the international angles, although Watts’s failure to discuss the critical attitude of apartheid South Africa is a puzzling omission. As Sue Onslow’s article “A Question of Timing”\(^1\) illustrates, much would have been gained from a reassessment of South Africa’s evolving policy towards UDI in the context of its complex relations with the UK, competing white nationalisms in Southern Africa, the historical relationship between Rhodesia and South Africa on both the governmental and societal levels, and the displacement of English-speaking power (and values) in Pretoria by the Afrikaner National Party. Much the same goes for the attitude of black Africa, which is explored only insofar as it relates to other states’ policies. Again, while it is hard to judge a book on what it does not do, rather than what it does, the lack of an African voice is a curious gap in the overall conception of the project. Surely the attitudes to UDI in Lusaka, Dar es Salaam, and even Lisbon, given its colonies in Angola and Mozambique, are more important to the overall story than those in Wellington or Ottawa. Watts’s international community is one oddly devoid of African context.

Similarly striking is Watts’s decision to mobilise both international history and international relations theory as the conceptual engines of his thesis. He elucidates the relationship between the two in his Introduction and thereby seeks to illustrate that they can be fruitfully employed in tandem. This construction constitutes the major peg on which he hands his methodology. Yet I do not feel that there is a neglected symbiosis between the two disciplines that other scholars overlook, as Watts contends, but instead believe that the two are fundamentally different. International history seeks to use a wide range of sources to describe historical events that transcended national boundaries; international relations both develops and employs theories to provide a broader coherence to the observed events. To paraphrase John Gaddis, international historians writing monographs such as Watts’s will largely be ‘splitters,’ focused on specific historical inquiries within a delineated context, while international relations scholars will tend towards being ‘lumpers,’ trying to produce insights or principles of broad applicability.\(^2\)

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Watts’s decision to employ a two-track methodological approach, straddling the divide between IR and international history, proves as problematic in practice as it does in theory. Each of the chapters tries to alloy a conventional (and to my mind, persuasive) international history argument, mobilising impressive research to construct an essentially narrative-based thesis, with the application of theoretical models that add little to the overall picture. Watts’s book is a fine work of history and asks many of the right questions. Why these questions are embedded within a framework of citations from political scientists – some of which only end up supporting genuinely self-evident points - eludes me. For instance, to explain the London-Salisbury negotiations aimed at finding a post-UDI settlement, he cites John Ikle’s argument that in a negotiation parties must have “both common interests and issues of conflict. Without common interests there is nothing to negotiate for; without conflict there is nothing to negotiate about.”\(^3\) Perhaps Watts’s work actually serves to underscore the differences between international history and international relations theory and thereby proves the opposite methodological point from what he set out to show.

This is a fine and useful book that will provide great assistance to future researchers. UDI was a critical turning point in the history both of decolonisation and of the West’s understanding of the importance that emerging post-colonial nations placed on racial concerns in constructing their identities and shaping their foreign policies. *Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence* provides important insights on both fronts and constitutes a major advance on the limited historical literature on UDI as a whole.

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Carl Watts provides a very detailed and useful exploration of British and Commonwealth diplomatic efforts over the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) crisis of 1964 and 1965. The main questions for Watts concern what transpired after the British accepted that “UDI was highly likely,” and after they ruled out military intervention as well as turning the “Rhodesian problem over to the United Nations,” which then led to “an enormously complex contingency planning operation to deal with the huge range of domestic and foreign consequences associated with a UDI” (14). Watts explores each of these main themes, along with the lack of cooperation between “the Foreign Office (FO) and the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO), which reflected their differing interests and conceptions of how best to respond to UDI” (14). In addition, the book explores different points of view within the British Labour and Conservative parties, as well as between the Americans and the British, and the British and the Old Commonwealth countries—Canada, Australia and New Zealand. It is an impressive book both in terms coverage and what Watts has done in terms of scope and specificity.

In the spirit of a roundtable discussion, however, there are some areas I believe should have received further attention. Others will likely discuss Watts’s excellent coverage of the UDI crisis at the UN and diplomatic relations with South Africa and Portugal, but my main concern is African diplomatic involvement in the negotiations with the British and other Western powers. In order for the book to successfully make the claim to be “An International History” of Rhodesia’s UDI, it should have included more serious engagement with African stakeholders and their abilities to push their own agendas and influence the proceedings at the level of Anglo-American diplomatic efforts. There is certainly some attention given to President Kenneth Kaunda’s role in lobbying for continued economic support for Zambia during the crisis, and Watts rightly suggests that for both the U.S. and the UK, protecting access to Zambian copper was an important element in the negotiations and contingency planning. However, although there is mention of Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah and Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere making loud protests both at the UN and to the Commonwealth—and Chapter three on Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s handling of the Commonwealth President’s meetings during the crisis is informative and enlightening—I was still left feeling that the behind-the-scenes negotiating between Nkrumah, Nyerere, and Kaunda with the British, the Australians, the Canadians, and the Americans could have been more in the forefront.

In order for readers to better understand the roles of African presidents, and also the Nigerians and Kenyans, a larger discussion of the Congo crisis and how the Rhodesian crisis became a foil for the Congo crisis, both in terms of the UN military intervention to put down the Katanga succession but also the Belgian and American campaigns in Stanleyville was required. These were in the forefront of the news and diplomatic discussions in the period leading up to UDI. So when UDI occurred, and Nyerere and Nkrumah were vehement that something more needed to be done to stop it, the pressure was, I believe, greater than Watts’s book suggests. Perhaps this is my own bias, having looked more closely at the American sources than the British sources, but I still have a sense that not only at the UN,
but also in Commonwealth negotiations and bilateral discussions between London and the
diplomatic missions of key former British African colonies, the pressure from Africans did
have an impact, even if it was the unintended consequence of delaying action until the time
had passed for more meaningful negotiations. On the other hand, Watts’s treatment of
internal British politics, particularly the insider stories of Labour and Conservative party
conflicts, and conflicts within the Labour Party itself, offers very important new material
for understanding British views toward Rhodesian intransigence.

I also read Watts’s narrative closely for references to Zimbabwean nationalists, since that is
the main focus of my first book and my current book project.¹ I empathize in terms of the
difficulties of bringing out the African voice using Western archives, but I do not think it is
impossible to do. In this regard, the African diplomatic voice is not really present in this
book. Apart from the role of the Nigerians and others at the Commonwealth and UN level,
there is little to indicate a direct role of Zimbabwean nationalists in the diplomacy of the
Anglo and Old Commonwealth actors. There are some interesting references to Prime
Minister Wilson’s promises to African nationalists that he would never allow independence
without majority rule (24), and plans for Arthur Bottomley, Britain’s Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations, to meet with nationalist leaders Joshua Nkomo and Reverend
Ndabaningi Sithole in 1964 (25), which incensed Ian Smith, but there is little in the
narrative to explain the conditions of African nationalists in 1964 and 1965 that had
deteriorated drastically following the suppression of African nationalist politics in 1960.
Although the leaders themselves were imprisoned, they had ways of communicating, and
party representatives in Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, and London would have been in contact
with British, American, and Commonwealth officials on the issue of majority rule and UDI.

There is also not very much of a Rhodesian Front voice in this book, which seems
somewhat odd given that it, unlike the imprisoned African nationalist leaders, was directly
involved in negotiations. These absences suggest that this book is more Anglo-centric in
terms of an international history, and right from the beginning the distance is felt between
diplomats in the UK and events on the ground in Rhodesia. Introducing the first chapter,
Watts writes, “This chapter uses negotiation theory to explain why the search for a
settlement failed and argues that British efforts would have been better directed toward
using economic statecraft to preserve the status quo for a few years. This may have
facilitated a period of confidence building between the African and European communities
in Southern Rhodesia and would have allowed time for Africans to receive training in
government administration” (14).

The political situation in Rhodesia in 1964 and 1965 was so polarized, I would argue, in
terms of the suppression of civil liberties for those fighting for majority rule and their
commitment to not cooperate with the RF, that it is doubtful that a few more years of
training in government administration would have produced a significantly different
outcome in 1967.

¹ Timothy. Scarnecchia, The Urban Roots of Democracy and Political Violence in Zimbabwe: Harare and
Highfield, 1940-1964 (University of Rochester Press, 2008).
As a diplomatic history, there is little to criticize, since the book is certainly well documented and cited, with lively discussions of conflicts between various leaders that can only be brought to life by careful archival work. There is also a helpful discussion of individuals beyond the key characters, and personnel issues are taken seriously, such as British dismay over President Lyndon B. Johnson’s decision to pass over Roswell Gilpatric, favored by British PM Wilson, for William D. Rogers to head the Rhodesian crisis planning team in the State Department. (165) Watts shows how this sort of action undermined the cooperation between the British and the Americans at a key moment of crisis diplomacy. Watts also does a good job in showing how the Americans tended to be better informed about developments in Rhodesia than their British counterparts, and that American support for African nationalists in the early 1960s had paid some dividends. Explaining the American interpretation of a “bleak” situation in Rhodesia in 1964 (164), Watts emphasizes the lack of intelligence sharing about possible contingency planning between the British Embassy in Washington and the Americans. While Watts does a good job of detailing the areas where cooperation lagged or was intentionally limited, this breakdown in communication does not, in my view, explain the failure of diplomatic efforts to avoid UDI.  

One last minor issue for discussion is whether or not Watts’s use of Richard Neustadt’s alliance theory (177-182) is appropriate for shedding new light on the British and American response to UDI. Based on Richard Neustadt’s theory explaining Anglo-American political relations during the Suez and Skybolt crises, Watts describes the results as “a pattern of crisis behavior in Anglo-American relations that consisted of muddled perceptions, stifled communications, disappointed expectations, and paranoid reactions” (177). Watts then states, “Although the Rhodesian crisis was obviously not as serious as either Suez or Skybolt, Neustadt’s approach is nevertheless useful for analyzing Anglo-American relations during the Rhodesian crisis” (177). This statement raises the question of whether or not the ‘seriousness’ of the crisis itself alters the applicability of Neustadt’s alliance theory. It would seem that the relative seriousness of the crisis must be established before applying alliance theory. If one accepts that Rhodesia was always a side issue for both partners—and this is a very important point to make right from the

2 There is a slight contradiction on pages 164 and 165 in the American official position on which of the two rival nationalist parties they favored. On page 164, Americans explain the possibility of an electoral coalition with Whitehead, and a prospective timetable for African majority rule with the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole (ZANU)—based on a New Zealand diplomatic report in May 1964. And on page 165, which offers a description of a meeting with British Foreign Secretary Patrick Gordon Walker in October 1964, the Americans claim that in a response to a UDI the USG “would not recognize an illegal Rhodesian regime but it would continue to maintain its consulate in Salisbury. Although the US government would not recognize a government in exile, it was anxious that only one such government should be formed –by ZAPU—and was prepared to put pressure on Hastings Banda if it became clear that he was willing to allow ZANU to set up a rival government in Malawi.” I am not suggesting here that Watts is responsible for the inconsistency in the sources, but it raises an interesting question as to why American diplomats would suggest support for Sithole and ZANU in May 1964 and then make a point of being anti-ZANU in October. In any case, both Sithole and Nkomo would spend the next 10 years in prison or detention, so these possibilities were put on hold until the mid-1970s when the prospects of a Cold-War battle for Rhodesia forced the Americans to take sides once again.
beginning—then the appropriateness of various IR theories for explaining, or judging the Anglo-American alliance during the Rhodesia crisis seems to be in question. It could be argued that all the characteristics Neustadt identifies in the Suez crisis were present in the Rhodesian crisis but not for the same reasons. For example, all four of the characteristics identified by Neustadt could arguably be the products of inertia on the part of both partners, rather than their having actively promoted their own strategic interests.

The Rhodesian crises of 1964-65, of 1975-76, of 1978-80, and the Zimbabwean crises of 1983-87, 1999-2012, all have some common elements which Watts's book calls to mind and elucidates. Why then was Rhodesia and now Zimbabwe such a diplomatic nightmare? Watts's book goes a long way towards explaining the early reasons, and here I think his frustrations with failed diplomacy provide evidence of the diplomatic inertia evident in the mid-1960s and repeated every decade since. Watts's evidence tends to show that no singular political figure, political party, or nation felt compelled to act decisively on Rhodesia. Cumulatively, the costs of action were always too high domestically, so the British and Americans played a game of hot potato for most of the Cold War and continue to do so now with the EU and in their bilateral relations with Rhodesia and Zimbabwe. It became easier to maintain targeted sanctions since 2001 on Zimbabwe than to really tackle the problems directly. It was easier to turn the problem over to South African President Thabo Mbeki in the 2000s and let his quiet diplomacy help Mugabe and ZANU-PF come out on top after a stolen election in 2008.

Watts's book supports the argument that diplomatic inertia led to the crisis diplomacy and contingency planning that have helped to perpetuate the unique authoritarianism found in Rhodesia and Zimbabwe. Even though such contingency planning has often discussed military interventions or large payouts to the ruling party—or, as in the 1970s, payments to whites to emigrate or to purchase farms from whites at the Lancaster House talks—the result has always led to a lack of concern (or even following through on promises) once enough has been done to placate domestic critics. This book will help to further build the case that, paradoxically, it was Western inertia, inaction and lack of concern for Rhodesia or Zimbabwe that have helped to perpetuate authoritarian states, rather than the meddling of the Anglo-American coalitions in Rhodesian and Zimbabwean affairs. Watts has shown, by asking repeatedly in each very different chapter of his book why diplomacy failed to avert UDI, just how much this lack of interest in getting involved became the main unifying tactic in the Anglo-American strategy. As any historian who has waded into the boxes of files on UDI in the U.S. and UK archives knows, achieving very little diplomatic success left a very long paper trail. Watts has done an excellent job of making sense of the British and Commonwealth evidence in particular, and this is certainly a valuable contribution to the literature.
In his Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain, Ian Smith, the Prime Minister of Rhodesia, started his speech with the following firm and ominous words: “In the lives of most nations there comes a moment when a stand has to be made for principles, whatever the consequences. This moment has come to Rhodesia.” He strategically concluded with words that he believed would gain him sympathy from the West which championed the causes of Christianity and democracy, “we have struck a blow for the preservation of justice, civilization, and Christianity-and in the spirit of this belief we have thus assumed our sovereign independence.”¹ When Smith unilaterally declared independence from Britain on 11 November 1965, Rhodesia became the second colony to illegally and unilaterally declare Independence from Britain after the thirteen colonies became the United States in 1776. Little wonder that the declaration speech that Smith gave on that day was closely modeled after the U.S. declaration of independence of 1776. In a very telling manner of its belief in white supremacy and in sharp contrast to the US declaration, the Smith regime’s declaration of independence was bereft of equality clauses found in the U.S. declaration. It is important to note that the UDI did not come as just as a bolt from the blue; the idea of white independence had been percolating since 1923 when Rhodesia became an internal self-governing colony with Britain reserving all powers to amend or revoke certain sections of the constitution. So from that time on, and more intensely in the early 1950’s when Sir Godfrey Huggins was Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia to the time of Ian Smith the mid-1960’s, all Prime Ministers of Southern Rhodesia (except for Winston Field) invariably favored unilateralism and became more vociferous in demanding that Britain grant them independence and threatened revolt if they did not get their way. Huggins even threatened an American-style revolution if his country were not granted independence akin to that enjoyed by White Dominions like Australia, Canada and New Zealand. In a sense the notion of the independence of Southern Rhodesia was commonplace within the white political circles of the white population and as such it was thought by both the white and the British population in Southern Rhodesia that the country’s independence was a matter of time after its becoming an internal self-governing colony in 1923. Consequently, the declaration by Smith in 1965 came as a surprise as negotiations on independence had been going on for more than forty-years.

Thus, the UDI must be understood against several explanations and broader historical shifts of attitudes and events. While it is true that Britain in 1923 refused blacks state rights and only gave white settlers the powers of self-rule, its position changed after the Second World War to one of supporting the rights of black majority rule in Africa. This can be seen by its granting of independence to several African countries in the early 1960’s. This sentiment also included France, which granted independence to her own colonies in Africa as well. The white Rhodesians, particularly during the time of Smith, became incensed in response to these occurrences and wanted complete independence from Britain, of a kind

that would remove Britain’s residual constitutional powers, and thereby allowing the white population to exercise ‘untrammeled white supremacy.’ Despite protest by the British Labour Party led government, and after eighteen months of intense negotiations between Britain and its colony, Rhodesia, Prime Minister Smith illegally and unilaterally declared Rhodesia independent from its colonial power. A range of questions ensued and several explanations were advanced as to why Britain did not intervene by sending an army to stop what was seen as an insurrection, or arrest Ian Smith for his treasonous actions. The most widely asked question, especially by African leaders and nationalists and their allies, concerned the reasons as to why the governor of Rhodesia did not ban Smith from the country when he visited Britain immediately before he declared independence, an option that Watts too raises. Zimbabwean nationalists in particular subscribed to the belief that Britain encouraged Smith to declare independence by clearly stating that it would not use force if he did.\(^2\) Answers to these questions ranged from the fact that Britain not have a standing army anywhere in Southern Rhodesia to use to stop Smith from effecting the independence of Rhodesia to the suggestion that the Labour government simply did not have the desire or political will to go against its “kith and kin.” It is this debate that Carl Peter Watts’s brilliant six-chapter book joins.

Watts’ book is based on his updated doctoral dissertation on the UDI. Thus the book offers an analytic treatment of the UDI and is the first monograph of which I am aware that not only deals with the UDI but also does so in an intense and in-depth analytical study. The book examines why Britain, along with its international partners, did not prevent Smith from declaring a UDI or quickly end the crisis once it started to “unfold” (p.2). His book therefore addresses the situation in Rhodesia from approximately 1953 through to 1966. Watts essentially argues that the UDI was not inevitable and that with enough political will Britain could have stopped Smith from effecting it. Following from this premise, Watts presents this argument in six well researched and insightful chapters.

In the beginning of the book, Watts provides a very useful and must-read introduction where he offers a theoretical overview of interpretive methods of reading his book and history in general as well as a synopsis of his six chapters (1-11). He leads the reader from the beginning of the call for independence by white Rhodesians to its end, meticulously noting how each stage led to the other. In Chapter 1, he surveys British-Rhodesian relations in the years leading up to the UDI, including the establishment and collapse of the Central African Federation. Employing negotiation theory, Watts posits that the focus of negotiations was misplaced, and the British would have been wiser to employ economic means so as to maintain the status quo with Rhodesia for a few more years. In Chapter 2, Watts examines the viability of British military intervention in Rhodesia in 1964 and 1965. Watts argues that the British could have used force to prevent or end the UDI. He posits however that Wilson did not choose the military option largely because of two reasons: (1) He feared that by attacking his “kith and kin” (65) he might lose the support of his white electorate and consequently decrease Labour’s chances of winning by a larger majority in the next elections, as he had won by a very slim margin of less than five (5) seats in the

elections that put him into power; and (2.) Wilson was concerned with the negative political implications of the war if he were to declare one against Rhodesia. Finances were not looking good as the Conservative party had left him with a huge “balance of payments deficit of 800 pounds” (67). However, Watts notes that despite fears to the contrary, the remainder of the British Commonwealth did not disintegrate from 1964 to 1966. Watts in this chapter essentially argues that the lack of political will on the part of Wilson to impose a political settlement on Southern Rhodesia by force gave a lease of life to the crisis. In Chapter 3, Watts extensively discusses Britain's stressful relationship with other countries, particularly the newly independent African States, because of the Rhodesian situation and to a lesser extent UN member states. He notes however that British diplomacy won support from the “Old Commonwealth” (Canada, Australia and New Zealand) with Canada becoming increasingly less supportive.

Watts continues his examination of the role of the Commonwealth in Chapter 4. He describes Canada’s constructive and middle of the road approach to the Rhodesia crisis which he observes was met with limited support from Britain, Australia and New Zealand. The traditional mechanisms of the Commonwealth – including, for example, Rhodesia’s exclusion from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference – made multilateral diplomatic engagement impossible. In a very poignant way he describes how it was feared that the strains brought to bear on the Commonwealth would destroy the organization. However, in this chapter Watts omits a discussion of the postcolonial literature, which would have expanded his interpretive framework to include the roles played by religious bodies, race, African and Asian states, and the Soviet Union. While his direct or ‘semi-essentialist’ approach might be one of the strengths of his argument here, it is also one of his argument’s weakest points. The depth of his data and theoretical analysis might have been enriched by extensively utilizing this kind of literature. Watts himself admits that he presents a broad discussion in the book and recognizes that many details would go unexplored so that many connections would be left to the reader (7-9). His state-centric approach makes his book's approach a more traditional international history. In my view, Chapter four is vital to Watts’ thesis, particularly in demonstrating that “the Rhodesian's crisis was multifaceted and enormously complex” (207). It is amazing that Watts decided not to include such variables as would have highlighted the complexity of the crisis. However, despite these glaring deficits, the chapter potentially provides insights and new possibilities for theoretical or empirical work not examined by Watts.

In Chapter 5, Watts examines British-U.S. relations leading up to the UDI, which he characterizes as replete with miscommunication and misunderstandings on both sides. Finally, Chapter 6 addresses the support for Britain at the United Nations during the Rhodesian crisis. Watts suggests that Britain relied heavily on its Old Commonwealth partners and the U.S. to prevent the UDI crisis from escalating. Meanwhile, China and the USSR sought to benefit from the anger of many African nations about the perceived racism of British policy. In this chapter Watts also argues that the Rhodesian crisis fits the definition he provides of an international crisis, a point which his entire book implicitly suggests.
Watts’ book is well researched and its valuable bibliography includes primary sources, monographs, articles, unpublished documents, television and electronic sources as well as name and subject indices. The book brings together a wide range of primary sources on when the UDI crisis was unfolding, and also a vast amount of secondary literature that permits readers to follow the scholarly debate around the UDI and make an informed decision about what the sources show. Watt’s book is not intended for a neophyte reader of Rhodesian politics, for it assumes familiarity with broader literature as well as broader trends in Rhodesian history and politics of the time.

Unfortunately, as has already been noted, the methodology Watts adopts in his writing, the use of largely primary state documents from the archives as well as his employment of many theories stemming from International Relations studies, such as those on deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and alliance theory to the exclusion of postcolonial literature, renders his book bereft of any new theory. Nor does it advance the understanding of the crisis. These flaws do not detract, however, from the fact that Watts offers us an important challenge to revisit the UDI and read it with the fresh look of his text.
Author’s Response by Carl Peter Watts, Baker College

I am very grateful to Tom Maddux for bringing this roundtable review to fruition, and to Andy DeRoche for introducing the reviews by Jennifer De Maio, Jamie Miller, Timothy Scarnecchia, and Eliakim Sibanda. I am gratified by their praise for my book and their thoughtful and fair comments on my methodology, the focus of my analysis, and some of my specific arguments. When I began my research on Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) I felt that I was embarking upon a journey along a very lightly-trodden path. However, the farther I traveled the more apparent it became that many talented scholars are working on the international history of the UDI period, and it is a pleasure to continue my journey in their company.

Let me begin by responding to the reviewers’ points about what is in the book and what has been left out. As Miller observes, “it is hard to judge a book on what it does not do, rather than what it does”, but the reviewers have quite rightly wondered why the book does not engage a number of other dimensions more thoroughly, including: Rhodesian Front politics; Zimbabwean nationalist diplomacy; the role of regional actors such as Portugal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia; and issues of race, identity, and development in the postcolonial state. My first response – perhaps unsatisfactory but nonetheless true – is that the constraints imposed by a publishing contract inevitably limit the scope of a project. With that in mind I was careful to write in my conclusion that the book is “merely an international history of Rhodesia’s UDI, not the history” (207).

I do regret that I was unable to include a chapter that dealt with the regional perspectives in more detail for – as Miller and Scarnecchia both observe – these were a significant part of the UDI story. Indeed, the academic focus on the regional political relationships between South Africa, Portugal, and Rhodesia from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s has generated a growing body of scholarship, much of which has appeared within the last two years.\(^1\) Nevertheless, I did engage South Africa and the African Commonwealth at appropriate junctures in my book. For example, in chapter two I discuss the likelihood of a South African response to a British

military intervention (64-65), in which I referred to Sue Onslow’s article\(^2\) (which Miller thought was a “puzzling omission”); and in chapter six I was at pains to stress that the position of Britain and its international partners at the United Nations was determined more by a desire to avoid the imposition of sanctions against South Africa than by concerns about Soviet penetration of the region. As Scarnecchia concedes, I also deal with African Commonwealth perspectives – particularly the exposed economic position of Zambia – in several chapters. I am not persuaded by Miller’s contention that “the attitudes to UDI in Lusaka, Dar es Salaam, and even Lisbon, given its colonies in Angola and Mozambique, are more important to the overall story than those in Wellington or Ottawa.” The views of the Front Line states became far more important a decade after the UDI because the Portuguese withdrawal from their colonies and the escalating guerilla war transformed the strategic situation. However, in the period leading up to the UDI the views of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were “the only ones that count[ed],” as Ian Smith himself put it. (132) My decision to concentrate on the ‘Old Commonwealth’ while allocating less space to regional actors should therefore be evaluated with reference to a central argument of the book: “there were courses of action that were dismissed or remained underexplored – not only in Britain but also in the Commonwealth and the United States – which could have been pursued further and may have prevented a UDI.” (5) Whereas the documentary record suggests that those actors were capable of exercising some constructive influence, it also shows that the Rhodesian regime was utterly deaf to the indignant demands of the African Commonwealth and Zimbabwean nationalists.

This brings me to the domestic context of Rhodesian politics, which offers many possibilities for further research, especially in relation to the postcolonial perspectives highlighted by De Maio and Sibanda. When I finished writing the book I gave a summary presentation to the Department of History at the University of Southampton, which elicited one comment that the nature of my research seemed “very masculine”; I had mentioned only one woman in my presentation and that was Queen Elizabeth II. Until that point, while I could scarcely have avoided the central issue of race, I must admit that I had given very little thought to the significance of gender. As I reflected on this I recognized that there are some worthwhile avenues to explore. I recalled Ben Pimlott’s description of Harold Wilson’s eleventh hour visit to Salisbury in October 1965, when “the ultra-reactionary Rhodesian Cabinet regarded the British premier with macho scorn, while he treated them with headmasterly distaste.”\(^3\) Certainly I think that the reference to Rhodesian machismo is insightful and I do not doubt that this could be used as a lens to analyze Rhodesian attitudes towards and relations with the British in the postwar period. The image of the hardy, self-reliant Rhodesian farmer refusing to be cowed or cajoled by British career politicians and bureaucrats brings echoes, in my mind, of the relationship between Dominion soldiers and British officers in the First World War. Memoirs of life in Rhodesia during the UDI period, such as that of Alexandra Fuller, also


draw attention to the “masculine” qualities of women in the white community, not to mention their racism.⁴

I engage the politics of the Rhodesian Front only very lightly and mainly in terms of the anti-communism of the white community, which has been subject to a very fine analysis by Donal Lowry.⁵ I think that Scarnecchia is right when he points out that I did not give sufficient attention to the Congo crisis; it had a profound effect on Rhodesian Front thinking as well as that of Britain’s former African colonies. One avenue of research that I would like to explore further – and which grows naturally out of the book – is the way in which the Rhodesian Front used its anti-communist credentials for propaganda purposes. The Rhodesian Front possessed a sophisticated propaganda machine, which discharged its functions with considerable effect. It sought to justify domestically the continuation of white minority rule, by marginalizing the more liberal elements of white Rhodesian opinion as well as nullifying the African nationalist movement. Rhodesian propaganda was also successful in an external capacity: it played its part in defeating international calls for military intervention to end the rebellion; it also helped to undermine economic sanctions by mobilizing white communities abroad to undertake sanctions-busting. The limited success of Rhodesian Front quasi-diplomacy might be contrasted with the failure of the Zimbabwean nationalists to garner more support. One significant handicap for the nationalist movements was obviously that their leadership was – in the language of the Rhodesian Front – ‘under restriction’. Nevertheless, as Scarnecchia points out, there were party representatives in African capitals and beyond and indeed I considered some archival material relating to their activities. What has struck me thus far in my analysis is the rigidity of the diplomatic establishment in dealing with such non-state actors. This is evidenced, for example, by the reluctance of Australia and New Zealand to endorse Canadian proposals to offer education and training to Zimbabwean nationalists. (125-27)

Let me turn now to a couple of specific points that the reviewers have raised about my argument. Miller suggests that British policy-makers “repeatedly assumed that Salisbury was eager to negotiate a settlement.” I would like to emphasize that assessments varied over time and that the Labour government and the civil servants in the Commonwealth Relations Office and Foreign Office were really not quite sure what to make of Rhodesian intentions. I think that Harold Wilson in particular was baffled by Ian Smith and his ministers, which is revealed, for example, in his October 1965 report to President Lyndon B. Johnson that the Rhodesians were “collectively like a suicide on a windowsill waiting to jump” (173). His failure to understand why the Rhodesians felt it was necessary to jump was partly a consequence of the cultural divide discussed above in relation to Ben Pimlott’s comment.

⁴ Alexandra Fuller, Don’t Let’s Go to the Dogs Tonight: An African Childhood (New York: Random House, 2001)

In chapter one I argue that the focus of British negotiation was misplaced; there was an opportunity to maintain the status quo for an interim period which might have enabled Britain and the Old Commonwealth to build confidence through a program of aid and technical assistance. They could have engaged Rhodesian concerns about investment, and facilitated the training of African nationalists in government administration. Scarnecchia doubts that this would have been successful because the polarization in Rhodesian politics in the period preceding the UDI was so pronounced. Of course we are dealing here with a counterfactual proposition and Scarnecchia may well be right; indeed the same point was put to me by Elaine Windrich in correspondence before she sadly passed away in 2012.6 However, I believe that what I did argue in the book is grounded in the certainty of the archival evidence: (a) the Rhodesians repeatedly stated their concerns about the economy; (b) African nationalists recognized the Rhodesian Front would use the Africans’ lack of experience to deny them majority rule; (c) proposals for aid and technical assistance came from a variety of sources inside and outside Rhodesia but were never adequately addressed; and (d) the focus on constitutional arrangements without sufficient emphasis on transitional economic and administrative assistance was almost guaranteed to fail.

I will finish by engaging the reviewers’ comments on methodology. When I wrote the introduction to my book I thought it wise to anticipate certain methodological criticisms, and indeed these have come to pass in this roundtable. Sibanda offers praise for which I am grateful but also contends that the absence of postcolonial perspectives weakens the book because it renders it a “more traditional international history.” As Sibanda suggests and as I have acknowledged above and in the book (8), postcolonial theory undoubtedly enriches our historical understanding but this is no less true of a thorough state-centric approach that addresses multiple themes. I also think that Sibanda and De Maio may have slightly misunderstood what I tried to do in methodological terms. My objective was not to build new theory but rather to demonstrate how a single historical case study can be analyzed using multiple International Relations (IR) theories, which is an approach not often undertaken. (8-11) I do acknowledge De Maio’s point that the case of Rhodesian independence might usefully be examined alongside that of Kenya. Such an approach would also build on the recent comparative work on failed federations.7

As a political scientist De Maio is sympathetic to my use of theory, but I knew when I wrote the book that “Traditional diplomatic historians might suggest that attempts to construct explanations using IR theory are not necessary; the narrative is itself a sufficient method of explanation” (11). Miller’s criticism is of this type but he adopts a straw man approach in suggesting that the theoretical perspectives are unnecessary. The quotation from Fred Iklé was selected from the beginning of a critical analysis of Anglo-Rhodesian negotiations (39-45)

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6 Elaine Windrich was a research officer for the British Labour Party in the 1960s and a consultant to the Minister of Information and Foreign Affairs in Zimbabwe in the 1980s. She is the author of *Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence* (London: Croom Helm, 1978).

which becomes less ‘self-evident’ as it proceeds through discussion of the three stages of negotiation (decision to negotiate, adoption of a formula, and settlement of the details). My analysis of the problems associated with the five principles as a formula, and the significance of domestic resistance points in diminishing the prospects for a negotiated settlement do, I think, add something to the overall picture, as do the other theoretical perspectives employed in the book. I also think that Miller is perhaps overly reliant on John Gaddis’ characterization of IR theorists as ‘lumpers’ and historians as ‘splitters’, and would suggest that this rigidly nomothetic-ideographic disciplinary dichotomy be reconsidered in the light of the literature cited in the introduction to my book. (9-11)

For some years I have admired the detailed reviews in H-Diplo roundtables, which serve as an excellent source of analysis for academics and students alike. I feel privileged that my own book has now been discussed in this forum and I would once again like to thank the editors and participants for engaging with my work. The points that the reviewers have made regarding the strengths and weaknesses of my approach will undoubtedly help me as I move forward with my current research on Henry Kissinger’s 1976 ‘African safari.’