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In June 1967, Israel launched a devastating attack against the Egyptian and Syrian air forces, opening a six-day war that would reshape the political contours of the modern Middle East. In the course of the conflict, Israel took possession of the Sinai Peninsula, Jerusalem and the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights. While Israeli leaders vacated the Sinai, their government remains in de facto possession of these other territories against numerous calls for their return to Arab control. Today, Jerusalem and the West Bank sit at the very heart of the Arab-Israeli dispute, a conflict that many commentators identify as a central cause of political unrest in the wider region.

The orthodox narrative of the Arab-Israeli Conflict following the 1967 War reads something like this: after having defended itself from an imminent attack from the Arab states in the summer of 1967, Israel gained control of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula. Israeli leaders hoped to trade this territory for final and lasting guarantees of peace from its neighbors, but they were disappointed. Rather than willing partners in peace, Israel found only enemies among the surrounding Arab populations. In this version, Israel appeared as the reasonable party that sought nothing more than the chance to live in peace; the Arab states – along with the Palestinians – appeared as aggressive, irrational actors dedicated to the destruction of the Jewish state. Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban’s quip that ‘the Arabs never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity’ seemed to apply. Deprived of serious and responsible negotiating partners, Israel had no choice but to maintain control of the occupied territories.

Arab scholars have long challenged this version of events, but they were too often dismissed as partisans and their works rarely made a major impact in the English-speaking world. Area studies specialists also contested this interpretation, but their publications remained confined to academic circles. Beginning in the 1980s, a wave of revisionist historians emerged in Israel who also contested this orthodox narrative. The so-called New Historians reversed the conventional interpretation to argue that it was the Israelis who were most often the aggressors while the Arab states and the Palestinians sought peace, in some form or another. Israel’s wars had not been defensive in nature, rather, they had been aggressive and at times expansionist. Far from being an accident, the 46-year occupation of the West Bank and the ongoing construction of armed settlements represented an imperial project. If orthodox scholars had popular opinion on their side – at least in the United States – the revisionists had documents to support their claims. Israel’s record of invading neighboring states in 1956, 1967, 1978, 1982, and 2006, as well as the continuing occupation of the West Bank and Golan Heights, also seemed to support the revisionist interpretation. Not unlike their counterparts in U.S. foreign relations history, the New Historians tended to follow the 30 year rule in their research – tackling major topics and events three to four decades after their occurrence as they kept pace with the state of declassification.

In his new book, The Bride and the Dowry, Avi Raz ventures into the post-1967 period, offering a significant contribution to the revisionist literature. Based on extensive research
in Israeli archives, Raz presents a damning appraisal of Israeli policy in the aftermath of the June War: Israeli leaders never sought peace – rather, they sought control of the West Bank. Peace overtures to Jordan and the Palestinians were nothing more than an elaborate deception engineered to convince the U.S. government – which controlled the flow of military equipment to Israel – that Israeli leaders were sincere in their quest for peace with their neighbors. Raz thus concludes that, contrary to Eban’s observation, it was “the Israelis, who persistently and deliberately squandered every opportunity for a settlement” (284). This represents a damning critique of Israeli policy that turns the orthodox narrative of Israeli foreign relations on its head and helps to explain why, nearly a half-century after they first seized the West Bank, Israeli forces still control the disputed territory.

The reviews in this roundtable reflect the controversial nature of scholarship on Israeli-Arab relations. Charles Smith commends Raz for his “exhaustive research” in Israeli archives and offers a succinct précis of the book: “Essentially, the government of Levi Eshkol wanted to keep the ‘dowry,’ the West Bank which Israelis considered part of the land of Israel, but without the ‘bride,’ the Palestinians who inhabited that land.” To do this, the government of Israel employed “deceitful” and “duplicious” tactics in order to maintain its occupation of internationally recognized Arab territory “without antagonizing its protector, the United States.” Smith is persuaded by Raz’s interpretation: “I find his arguments convincing and he is to be congratulated for the depth and extent of his research, which opens a new and crucial window on Israeli policymaking in the aftermath of the 1967 War.”

Like Smith, Nigel Ashton considers Raz’s book to be rooted in “copious” research. By mining Israeli state archives, the author has written perhaps the best-documented account of Israeli policymaking in the wake of the 1967 War. “Anyone who still believes the myth that Israel sought peace in the aftermath of the 1967 war, but that there was no willing Arab partner with whom to negotiate,” he writes, “should read The Bride and the Dowry.” Ashton believes that Raz is right to find fault in Israeli decision-making. “Of course some readers may come to the conclusion that Raz is too critical of Israeli policy-makers,” he notes. “But to my mind at least, his conclusions are well grounded. Sometimes, a spade has to be called a spade.”

Craig Daigle, in contrast, is more critical of Raz’s book. “Although this is a substantial piece of scholarship based on a meticulous use of multi-archival sources...The Bride and the Dowry does not often come across as an objective piece of history. Rather, from the outset Raz appears angry and indignant over Israeli policy and at times acts as a prosecutor trying to hold Israeli leaders accountable for their failure to resolve the Palestinian issue during this period.” Daigle contends that, “at virtually no point in this book is Israeli decision-making presented as reasonable.” He judges the tone of the book to be “angry” and regrets that the author “sometimes resorts to accusations and heated rhetoric.” The book “should be read with some caution,” he warns, “in terms of the author’s accusatory tone when he writes on the nature of Israeli decision-making.” Nevertheless, Daigle concludes that The Bride and the Dowry is “a valuable piece of historical scholarship.”
Read alongside Raz’s book and Ashton and Smith’s reviews, Daigle’s criticisms raise an important question for historians working on the Arab-Israeli dispute or any politically contentious subject. How far must a scholar go to present a balanced picture of his or her topic? Certainly there exists a great deal of pressure on historians to present a ‘fair and balanced’ account of controversial subjects. But by employing this approach to writing history, do we risk forcing an artificial balance – a false equivalency – on our interpretations of the past? I am reminded of Thomas Haskell’s observation that objectivity and neutrality are not necessarily the same things. 1

To take one example from the same period, should a historian of South Africa strive to maintain strict neutrality on the issue of Apartheid? Certainly, one can today find far more defenders of the government of Israel than for the now dissolved Apartheid regime. But this was not always the case. Indeed, there existed a number parallels between the South African and Palestinian cases in the late 1960s: Palestinian and black South African activists found common cause as fellow national liberation movements and both groups were branded as “terrorists” by their opponents. History has of course treated the two struggles quite differently. The recently-deceased Nelson Mandela is now widely celebrated as the father of a nation while Yasir Arafat is still denounced as a terrorist in many circles. Thus, as time passes, politics change, and new scholarly perspectives emerge, the center of gravity in historical debates – and the notion of balance and objectivity – often shifts. Whether this is happening in the case of scholarship on Israel-Palestine remains to be seen but as more work emerges on post-1967 Israeli policy, and on the post-1967 Middle East in general, the center of scholarly debate is certain to move in one direction or another.

Ultimately, the discussion in this roundtable brings us back to the generations-old debate among historians over the role of neutrality, political commitment, and activism in the profession. These debates aside, The Bride and the Dowry is a fine example of multilingual, multiarchival scholarship that casts new light on a critical issue in international history and contemporary international relations. I am in full agreement with all the reviewers that Avi Raz has written a provocative book that will be essential reading for anyone working on the Arab-Israeli dispute in the aftermath of the 1967 War.

Participants:

Dr Avi Raz is a member of the Faculty of Oriental Studies of the University of Oxford, research associate at Oxford’s Centre for International Studies, and a research fellow at Wolfson College, Oxford. His main research interests are the Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly in the aftermath of the June 1967 War; Israel’s foreign policy; and the Palestinian national movement. Raz’s current research project deals with the “new refugees” of the 1967-1968 War, and the 1948 refugees living in Israel-occupied territories. He was formerly a journalist at a leading Israeli daily, where his assignments abroad included bureau chief in New York and Moscow.

1 Thomas Haskell, Objectivity is Not Neutrality (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).
Paul Thomas Chamberlin is Associate Professor of History at the University of Kentucky. His first book, *The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order* was published with Oxford University Press in 2012. He is now working on a history of the Cold War in the Third World tentatively titled, *The Cold War’s Killing Fields*.


Craig Daigle is an assistant professor of history at the City College of New York, where he teaches courses on American Foreign Relations, the Cold War, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. He is the author of *The Limits of Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973* (Yale University Press, 2012).

Charles D. Smith is professor emeritus of Middle East history, School of Middle East/North African Studies, University of Arizona, and former head of the Department of Near Eastern Studies at Arizona and at Wayne State University. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan in 1968. A former fellow of the Institute of Advanced Studies, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, he also served as president of the American Research Center in Egypt. Among his publications are *Islam and the Search for Social Order in Modern Egypt* and *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, now in its 8th edition. His current project deals with America’s approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict during and in the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
Anyone who still believes the myth that Israel sought peace in the aftermath of the 1967 war, but that there was no willing Arab partner with whom to negotiate, should read The Bride and the Dowry. In painstaking detail, Raz shows how, when faced with the choice of relinquishing land occupied in the war in exchange for peace, Israel chose to hold the land. Worse than that, the strategy adopted by Israel was aimed at deliberately undercutting the position of those potential Arab partners who sought peace, particularly King Hussein of Jordan and, to a lesser degree, various West Bank notables. The most threatening Arabs at this juncture for Israel were not those who sought war, but those who sought peace. As Prime Minister Levi Eshkol put it in private to his cabinet after hearing through covert channels that Hussein had resolved to make peace: “I fear the day when we have to sit face to face and conduct negotiations” (223).

Raz’s conclusions are securely grounded. His work is based on copious research in a multitude of official and private Israeli archival sources, together with a wide range of sources in Arabic and English. The Bride and the Dowry presents a particularly full picture of Israeli decision-making in the eighteen months following the war. The conclusions Raz draws are stark: “it was not the Arabs who never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity – as [the Israeli politician Abba] Eban’s often-cited quip suggests – but the Israelis, who persistently and deliberately squandered every opportunity for a settlement” (284). Israel’s strategy was one of deception, in which every tactical device was employed in pursuit of prevarication rather than peace. Nor does Raz see any fundamental difference between so called ‘doves,’ like Foreign Minister Eban, and ‘hawks,’ like Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. On the contrary, in Raz’s analysis Eban emerges as the master of takhsisanut, or deception. “This is not a learned analysis or a sophisticated interpretation”, he argues, “but the naked truth about Israeli foreign policy as articulated by Abba Eban – a self-proclaimed moderate” (274). Indeed, Raz addresses head-on the question of whether he has offered an ‘even-handed’ account in the conclusion to his book. “It should be borne in mind”, he argues, “that the parties to the conflict were unequal. There were the victorious occupiers on the one hand and the vanquished and the occupied on the other, and the former held all the cards. They were aware of international resentment but did not care” (284-5).

In terms of the existing historiography of Israeli diplomacy in the immediate post-war period, Raz seeks to differentiate his argument in the following respects. He takes issue with the work of Reuzen Pedatzur published in Hebrew as The Triumph of Bewilderment and summarised in English in a widely quoted article in the Middle East Journal, “Coming Back Full Circle: the Palestinian Option in 1967.”¹ In essence Pedatzur argued that in the aftermath of the 1967 war, Israeli leaders turned first to local community leaders in the

occupied West Bank to try to negotiate some form of autonomy agreement. This was the so called ‘Palestinian option.’ It was only when an agreement failed to materialise that the Israeli leadership turned back to King Hussein, with whom they had held a covert dialogue before the war, to try to negotiate a peace settlement. This was the so called ‘Jordanian option’. Raz shows that this argument is not supported by the evidence. Instead, the Israeli leadership pursued a twin-track strategy from the outset with negotiations conducted simultaneously with various West Bank notables and with Hussein, either directly, or through intermediaries. But crucially, the purpose of this twin-track was not to play off potential peace partners against one another so as to secure better terms for peace, a perfectly legitimate diplomatic tactic. It was, according to Raz, rather to obfuscate and prevaricate to avoid having to present concrete terms for peace to any party.

If Raz’s deduction is correct, it might be asked, for whom was this charade of covert negotiation being played out? Raz’s conclusion is that it was being played out for the United States. Israeli leaders saw American support for their position as crucial. If they could convince the Johnson Administration that they were engaged in a sincere process of contacts to explore the possibility of peace, the United States would continue to support them diplomatically, but, more importantly, would grant their requests for re-armament. The most important item on the Israeli shopping list was the provision of fifty advanced American F-4 Phantom aircraft to replace the losses Israel had suffered during the war. Raz returns time and again to the theme of the Phantoms as a crucial element in Israeli thinking (182, 189, 205, 227, 258, 260). Alongside this, Israeli leaders were aware that American diplomatic support was essential in avoiding any return to the United Nations after the passing of Security Council resolution 242 in November 1967, which might result in the framing of a resolution much less favorable to Israel. (227)

Raz in my view is rightly highly critical of the Johnson Administration’s approach during this period. While the bulk of his analysis focuses on the duplicity of the Israeli strategy, he acknowledges that with the exertion of appropriate pressure from Washington, things might have turned out differently. In an eloquent conclusion he states that “Israel desperately needed to be saved from itself in those heady days, and only the United States possessed the necessary levers of influence. However, Washington did not use these levers, despite its awareness of, and anger over, Israel’s maneuvering” (276). If this were so, the logical question is why? Raz offers several explanations: Israel packaged its position cleverly in Cold War terms, arguing that it was a bastion of Western influence against the Soviet-backed Arab states of Syria and Egypt; and the Johnson Administration was distracted by the Vietnam War. But the most important explanation concerns the role of key individuals, especially the President himself and, to a lesser degree, UN Ambassador Arthur Goldberg. As far as Raz is concerned, Israel relied on the fundamental sympathy of Lyndon B. Johnson for its position to deflect criticism of its approach from elsewhere in the Administration. Raz quotes candid criticism of Israel’s tactics by a succession of American officials from Secretary of State Dean Rusk through the special assistant for National Security affairs, Walt Rostow, and down through the ranks of the Administration. But, as he puts it, “harsh words indeed, but they were not followed by action.” [259] The buck in this respect stopped with the President, who never allowed the criticism of the Israeli approach to advance beyond words to action.
In this respect, I found it productive to cross-reference Raz’s work with my own research on this period. In fact, there is a difference of emphasis (although no fundamental disagreement) between our interpretations of the U.S. role. In an article recently published in *Diplomatic History*, I explore U.S. policy during this period through the prism of the career of the CIA Station Chief in Jordan, Jack O’Connell. O’Connell was a remarkably close confidant of King Hussein of Jordan and was not only privy to much of what transpired in the King’s covert contacts with the Israelis, he was also covertly involved in the diplomatic process. In essence, Raz sees King Hussein’s post-war covert contacts with various Israeli representatives as a continuation of his pre-war dialogue, only with the added imperative that the King was now desperate to make peace, and willing to do so on the basis of a return to slightly modified 4 June 1967 lines. I place the emphasis in terms of King Hussein’s approach rather differently. I argue that Hussein believed that no deal could be reached with the Israelis without American intervention. Therefore all of his efforts were devoted to trying to shape circumstances in which this might come about. This meant focusing his attention on the United States and President Johnson in particular. Raz cites Avi Shlaim’s statement that King Hussein entered the post-war dialogue out of a mixture of hope and fear: fear that extremists in Israel might seek to overthrow him and hope that Israel might make peace on the basis of the pre-war border. Raz suggests that while Shlaim highlights fear as Hussein’s key motivation, he sees the hope Hussein harboured that he might be able to reason with the Israelis as the decisive motivation. (254)

In my work I show that in fact Hussein entertained no such hopes that Israeli leaders would come round to an agreement of their own accord. Hussein’s approach in two key respects instead focused on Washington (much like that of the Israelis). First, during the negotiations leading to the framing of UNSCR 242, Hussein made it clear that the precise wording of any resolution was a secondary consideration as far as he was concerned. What mattered was how the United States interpreted the resolution and what it was prepared to do to enforce it. Second, in terms of the covert peace process, I argue that Hussein only entered into the negotiations during 1968 with Israel on the basis of a presidential commitment, delivered via O’Connell, that the United States would intervene if the negotiations became deadlocked. This was the reason why the King made sure that the Jordanian records of the covert negotiations were sent back via O’Connell to Washington, where they were summarised in memoranda prepared for the President by the Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms. So, both parties focused their ‘hopes’ on Washington, although Hussein’s hopes were for peace and those of Israeli leaders for prevarication and

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re-armament.

There is a further minor difference of emphasis between Raz's interpretation of the covert contacts between Hussein and Israeli leaders and my own. In my biography of King Hussein I discussed a covert attempt, brokered by James Angleton of the CIA, to bring together King Hussein and Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan for a covert meeting in Geneva in late July 1967. Raz discusses this episode and concedes that records of it are scant. However, he is inclined to be sceptical of my claim that the initiative for the contact had come from Dayan, who had approached Angleton arguing that he was concerned that various hawkish figures on the Israeli side wanted to annex the West Bank. This had to be prevented, in Dayan's view, or the conflict would become intractable. Raz notes that the sources I cite do not fully corroborate my account of the episode. In fact this was one of a number of places in my book where I was forced to cite 'private information' as one of the sources. This reflected the fact that the claim came from O'Connell and my agreement with him was not to name him as a source during his lifetime (he passed away in July 2010).

Of course, even naming O'Connell as the source for this claim does not necessarily verify it since the recollection of one individual cannot be taken as proof. But the bigger point about the link between Hussein and Dayan is the more important one. During a series of interviews with O'Connell that were conducted across a period of ten years, he came back time and again to the question of Hussein's relationship with Dayan. As far as he was concerned, Dayan was the key Israeli leader in this period with whom Hussein wanted to negotiate. O'Connell repeatedly asked me what further information I had found in the archives about this relationship since he was convinced that there was a long-running covert channel between the two men.

The claim remains unproven, of course, which was always the refrain of my reply when O'Connell posed this question. But evidence Raz presents in his own book suggests that circumstantially it is not so unlikely as it may seem. For instance, in December 1968, Dayan apparently attempted to use a captured Fatah fighter as an intermediary to try to open peace contacts with the Fatah leader, Yasser Arafat, which on the face of things was a much more unlikely channel than that to Hussein. Raz comments that there is no explanation for this seemingly irrational conduct. But Dayan was mercurial and vain-glorious. He would have liked nothing better than to have stolen the limelight and undercut his political foes, especially Prime Minister Eshkol, by grasping the peace process into his own hands, however improbable the channel chosen. He also refused to take part in what he saw as the charade of the official covert channel to Hussein during 1968 (256). So, while

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the claim regarding his personal link to Hussein remains unproven, I venture to suggest that it is no less improbable than some of Dayan’s other dealings during the period.

To sum up, then: Raz’s book is a key contribution to the scholarship regarding the Arab-Israeli peace process, Israeli foreign policy and the 1967 war. The picture he presents of dissembling diplomacy, a deadlocked peace process and a U.S. Administration which offered words not action in pursuit of a settlement also has considerable contemporary resonance. Of course some readers may come to the conclusion that Raz is too critical of Israeli policy-makers. But to my mind at least, his conclusions are well grounded. Sometimes, a spade has to be called a spade.
Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, which left Israel in control of the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and Jerusalem, the question of what to do with the occupied Arab territories quickly emerged as the central issue facing Israeli leaders. Should the land be settled by Jews, expanding well beyond the borders that the United Nations had allocated to the Jewish state in its resolution of November 1947, or should some or all of the land be returned to the Arabs in exchange for meaningful peace agreements? Would the Israelis annex the West Bank of the Jordan River, taking in great numbers of Arabs whose loyalties would be unpredictable? Or would they make the West Bank a ‘protected state’—neither Jordanian nor Israeli—managed by international authorities? Should the Golan Heights be returned to Syria, with the hope that its leaders would quell the violence along the border and recognize Israel’s sovereignty, or would Israel hold on to the land indefinitely to protect its citizens and natural resources in the north. Some Israelis, chiefly in the military, wanted to retain most of the territory they took for security purposes, while many of Israel’s top political leaders were prepared to leverage the land for a peace treaty that recognized the State of Israel.

Although few observers doubted that Israel would ever have withdrawn to the pre-June 4 lines, could Israel have returned some of the land in exchange for meaningful peace agreements with any of its Arab neighbors in the immediate aftermath of the war? That is the central question that Avi Raz, a former Israeli journalist and current fellow at Oxford, sets out to answer in his fascinating new book, *The Bride and the Dowry: Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians in the Aftermath of the June 1967 War*. For years, it has been almost accepted wisdom that Israel had no peace partners after the war. Still reeling from their humiliating defeat, the theory holds, the surrounding Arab states refused to meet Israel’s demands for direct negotiations, and instead supported, in August 1967, the infamous Khartoum Resolution (*no* peace with Israel, *no* recognition of Israel, *no* negotiations) confirming to many Israelis that the Arabs had learned nothing from the recent conflict and that there was little point to give back the land if they were unwilling to live in peace with Israel. But according to Raz, this version of events that has been perpetuated in Israel and the West for nearly four decades is simply a myth.

Just as Israel’s ‘New Historians’ debunked many of the long-held assertions of Arab unwillingness to discuss peace after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Raz attempts to open a gaping hole in the notion that Arab-Israeli peace was unattainable after 1967. Focusing on the twenty-one months following the Six-Day War (June 1967 to February 1969), what he calls the “first chapter” (3) of the post-1967 era, Raz argues that Israeli leaders missed a “historic opportunity” (2) to diffuse the Palestinian problem—the heart of the Arab-Zionist conflict—by rejecting peace overtures from moderate Arab leaders in the West Bank and Jordan. Even before the ceasefire ended hostilities among Israel and its Arab neighbors,

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Palestinian notables in the West Bank and Jerusalem offered Israel an opportunity to settle the conflict and remove any potential of a long and costly Israeli occupation. On June 10, Aziz Shehadeh, a 55-year old Christian lawyer from Ramallah, proposed to members of the Mossad a plan that envisioned an independent Palestinian state on the basis of the UN Partition Resolution of November 1947. A separate plan was offered by Sheikh Muhammad Ali Al-Ja’bari, mayor of Hebron, who called for a peace conference among Israelis, Palestinians, and Jordanians with the idea of a demilitarized Palestinian state federated with Israel as the basis for discussion. (26-33)

If the “Palestinian Option” was not appealing to Israeli leaders, which seems reasonable given that it was not clear if the Palestinian notables could deliver on such agreements, Raz demonstrates that there remained ample opportunity for Israeli officials to reach a settlement with Jordan’s King Hussein, who desperately wanted a peace agreement with Israel in order to retain the West Bank of his Kingdom. As early as July 2, three weeks after the end of the war, Hussein began holding secret conversations with Israeli leaders to discuss a political settlement. He again met with Israeli officials in November 1967 and another half dozen times in 1968, hoping to secure an agreement with the Israelis. But instead of accepting the Jordanian option, and relieving Israel of responsibility for the Palestinian issue, the government of Levi Eshkol “reacted evasively to Hussein’s peace overtures, banned political organization in the occupied territories, and did its best to neutralize West Bank leaders while attempting to ‘nurture’ pliant substitutes” (2). Thus, claims Raz, the Six-Day War left Israel with a rich ‘dowry’—the vast amount of land that provided Israel a much needed buffer from its Arab adversaries—but also left it stuck with the ‘unwanted bride’—the Palestinian inhabitants of the occupied territories—from which it was unable to divorce itself. (272)

By unearthing a wealth of secret contacts between Palestinian notables in the West Bank and Israeli officials, and establishing connections between Jordan and Israel that have often been overlooked, Raz offers an important corrective to the traditional narrative of the post-1967 era. He is to be commended for his exhaustive research in Israeli, British, and U.S. archives and for demonstrating the value of documentary evidence in forcing historians to rethink traditional narratives that oftentimes paint only a partial picture or a one-sided view of events. *The Bride and the Dowry*, then, reshapes not only our understanding of Israeli decision-making after the June War, but also sheds important light on why many Palestinians may have felt they had no choice but to turn to a more militant form of resistance by supporting (or joining) the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) with Yasser Arafat at its helm.

Although this is a substantial piece of scholarship based on a meticulous use of multi-archival sources, and one that should be taken seriously by scholars and students of the Arab-Israeli conflict, *The Bride and the Dowry* does not often come across as an objective piece of history. Rather, from the outset Raz appears angry and indignant over Israeli policy and at times acts as a prosecutor trying to hold Israeli leaders accountable for their failure to resolve the Palestinian issue during this period. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Eshkol, the Israeli government is described by Raz as “deceptive” (273), “irrational” (266), and “disingenuous” (272) when it came to negotiating with the Arabs. It
made crucial decisions “on a whim or a hunch,” and it “chronically suffered from the lack of long-range thinking, coherent strategy, and systematic decision making.” The “unavowed controlling consideration of the government,” he chastises, “was the desire to retain as many of the occupied lands as possible with as few Arab inhabitants as possible” (266).

These caustic and biting views about the Israeli leadership often lead Raz to dismiss alternative views of events. For example, Raz describes in detail the various ‘Palestinian options’ that were offered to the Israelis, and is critical of the Israeli leadership for not taking advantage of these generous proposals. But he does not leave room for the possibility that Israeli leaders may have determined that the Palestinian leadership in the West Bank was incapable of delivering on such agreements or that Israeli officials may not have been convinced these ‘notables’ actually spoke for the Palestinian people. Moreover, if, as Raz asserts, the Israelis were determined to retain as much Arab territory as possible, why does this only apply to the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem? The Israeli cabinet voted on June 19 to offer a withdrawal to the international border with Egypt, as well as to offer a withdrawal from the Golan Heights along the Syrian border in exchange for peace and security guarantees. But Raz dismisses this vote as mere window dressing: “In short the 19 June Resolution was not a generous offer at all but a diplomatic maneuver to win over the one international player that really mattered to Israel—the United States” (47).

Indeed, at virtually no point in this book is Israeli decision-making presented as reasonable. This is most vividly demonstrated in Raz’s discussion of the Israeli response to the Arab League summit at Khartoum in August 1967. Despite the fact that all of the Arab leaders in attendance, including King Hussein, endorsed a resolution there rejecting peace and negotiations with Israel, refused to recognize Israel’s right to live within secure and recognized boundaries, and called for “strengthening military preparation to face all eventualities,” Raz concludes that Israeli leaders, determined to retain possession of newly acquired territories, “refused to acknowledge the moderate tone” (136) that emerged from the summit and “hastened to exploit” the Khartoum resolution as “a pretext to further toughen its political stance” (138). In the wake of the summit, Raz cites as evidence that Israel began redrawing new maps of the West Bank, which no longer featured the armistice lines of 1949, started construction of illegal settlements around Jerusalem and in the West Bank, and “evaded” negotiations with King Hussein, who was the “driving force” behind the summit. (136)

This is certainly one way to read the Israeli response to Khartoum. But it is also fair to conclude that because the Arabs refused direct negotiations with Israel, a pre-condition for a peace settlement and recognition, or even conceded to something along the lines of the 1949 “Rhodes formula,” Israeli officials decided there was little point to withdraw from

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3 In February and March 1949, Israeli and Egyptian delegations met separately on the Greek island of Rhodes with UN mediator Ralph Bunche of the United States, where both indirect and direct negotiations took place. The parties met together with Bunche during the first session but thereafter broke into their own delegations, with Bunche shuttling from one delegation to another. This procedure satisfied the Arabs, who
the land. One of Israel’s great objectives after the war was to break the pattern of the previous two decades and to establish a new order in the region that would involve acceptance of the Israeli state and assurances for its security. Israeli leaders also wanted to avoid a situation similar to the aftermath of the 1956 Suez-Sinai war, when their forces withdrew within their boundaries with only paper guarantees that the Arabs would make peace. The Khartoum resolution, while on the surface committing the Arabs to a political and diplomatic settlement, fell far short of offering recognition or security guarantees, nor did it do anything to convince the Israelis that a new order would emerge with the Arab states accepting Israel’s position in the region. Thus, it was not as unreasonable as Raz suggests for Israeli leaders to view the summit as they did, nor was it was it unwise for them to leverage the occupied land for a more favorable peace settlement that compelled the Arab states to accept Israel’s existence and make guarantees for its security.

Raz admits in his preface that having fought in some of the Arab-Israeli wars, and having covered some as a journalist, has led him to “question the official Israeli line” that since its foundation in 1948 Israel has “indefatigably extended its hand at peace to the surrounding hostile neighbors but has always been rejected” (xiv). It is also highly likely that studying at Oxford with Avi Shlaim, whose groundbreaking *Collusion Across the Jordan* shattered one of the central myths of the 1948 War that held that Israel was surrounded by a monolithic Arab world bent on its destruction, and highlighted the importance of secret Zionist-Hashemite contacts, contributed to Raz’s desire to use archival evidence to challenge official Israeli claims. There is nothing necessarily wrong with this approach, and I find Raz’s willingness to engage with and challenge the official Israeli line admirable. But I wonder at times whether he is seeking to answer questions as to whether peace could have been achieved with the Arabs, or instead wishes to prove a point that Israeli leaders blew an opportunity and thus are responsible for the consequences of the occupation that have followed during the past forty-five years.

This is not to suggest that because of the angry tone of this book, and because of the fact that Raz sometimes resorts to accusations and heated rhetoric, *The Bride and the Dowry* is not a valuable piece of historical scholarship (it is). But it rather should be read with some caution in terms of the author’s accusatory tone when he writes on the nature of Israeli decision-making. In this way, Raz’s account is perhaps similar to some studies on U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War written by American academics or journalists who either covered the war or whose lives were in some ways shaped by the events in Southeast Asia. David Halberstam’s *The Best and the Brightest* remains, in my view, one of the best accounts of America’s descent into the Vietnam War (even without the availability of much archival evidence), but one that is full of overblown rhetoric and certainly reflects the years Halberstam spent covering the war in South Vietnam for the *New York Times* where he favored physical separation between themselves and the Israelis with a mediator shuttling back and forth, while also giving the Israelis the chance to sit down with the Arabs.

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witnessed the failures of the American and South Vietnamese armies and the often arrogant and uninformed decision making process that led to those failures.5

Beyond the general tone of the book, The Bride and the Dowry also raises questions as to why the Israelis even engaged with Palestinians in the West Bank and Jerusalem or with King Hussein if they had no intentions of withdrawing from the occupied territories. For Raz, the answer is quite simple: the simultaneous contacts that Israel had with the Palestinians and Hussein were aimed mainly at “fending off American pressure” to negotiate with Jordan and to remain in Washington’s good graces in order to keep the supply of weapons open to Israel. (2) Negotiations, therefore, were simply a ruse to demonstrate Israel’s commitment to peace while establishing facts on the ground that made peace impossible. But this contention is difficult to support. Even though U.S. officials were upset at Israel for the 8 June attack on the USS Liberty during the war, and did not want to encourage an arms race by quickly replenishing Israeli arsenals, they never put significant pressure on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories and did not have any grand expectations that a settlement would emerge from the negotiations with either the Palestinians or the Jordanians.

Indeed, as early as June 19, less than two weeks after the war ended, and on the same day the Israeli Cabinet voted to annex the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem, President Johnson made it clear to Soviet Premier Alexi Kosygin during a meeting at Glassboro, New Jersey that it was not enough for the Arabs and the Soviets to say “remove the troops;” the Arabs were going to have to demonstrate their commitment to peace.6 The CIA similarly concluded that “while the Arabs may reluctantly enter into some more formal armistice arrangements, the chances remain slight that any significant Arab leader will undertake to associate himself with the kind of binding agreements that Israel wants and feels it must have.”7 When it came to Jordan, moreover, U.S. officials had little expectation that an agreement could be reached. In a memo to President Johnson on June 27, Acting Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach concluded that “the odds are against” King Hussein accepting a package that included the West Bank under the sovereignty of Jordan, subject to boundary adjustments and a “special agreement” about Jerusalem.8

These disagreements, however, should not take away from the major contribution Raz has made with The Bride and the Dowry. No other book so fully takes advantage of archival evidence to explain the origins of Israel’s occupation policies and the crucial decisions that were made during this twenty-one-month period. It sheds much needed light on the fact

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that there were legitimate alternatives to the PLO in the wake of the Six-Day War which were willing to reach a political settlement with Israel. And it adds nuance to Israel’s relations with Jordan and the long history of secret Zionist-Hashemite contacts. As a result, I believe that this will not only become required reading for students of the Arab-Israeli conflict and Middle East studies, but will take its rightful place alongside many of Israel’s most prestigious works of 'new history' in reshaping how we view Israel's relations with its Arab neighbors.
Avi Raz’s exhaustively-researched study covers in time fourteen months, from June 1967 to the end of October 1968. In depth, however, it carefully examines Israeli policies toward West Bank and Gaza Palestinians, especially the former, and with respect to Jordan, again with a focus on the future of the West Bank that Israel conquered in the Six-Day War. Essentially, the government of Levi Eshkol wanted to keep the ‘dowry,’ the West Bank which Israelis considered part of the land of Israel, but without the ‘bride,’ the Palestinians who inhabited that land. Various military officials destroyed Palestinian villages and expelled their inhabitants with the goal of solidifying Israel’s control of the territory but had their actions countermanded by those who feared international retribution. As I will note in detail below, and Raz deals with this briefly, the Lyndon Johnson administration had few illusions about Israeli goals but officials were constrained by Johnson’s own personal sympathy for Israel and his fear of the domestic political implications of open opposition to Israeli actions.

Raz traces in intricate detail, relying on personal interviews and the private papers of many Israeli politicians and military officials of the time, the maneuvers taken by Israel to forestall any decision on the territories it had newly acquired. Raz depicts these tactics as “deceitful”, “duplicitous” and as “prevarication,” where Israel sought a justifiable means of retaining the lands without antagonizing its protector, the United States. (274, 275, 4) At the same time, relying on Arabic sources and memoirs as well as American diplomatic reports, he outlines the steps Jordan’s King Hussein took to try to reach a peace accord with Israel, and Israel’s interaction with various Palestinian factions in the West Bank. Indeed, Israeli officials played off various Palestinian interlocutors against both their opponents within the West Bank and against King Hussein who viewed such encounters as aimed at denying his claim to the West Bank and to East Jerusalem. Israel had incorporated the latter into Israel shortly after the war and declared it non-negotiable. To be sure, one reason for the Israeli determination to not engage in serious discussion with King Hussein was the deeply-divided cabinet that Eshkol oversaw; no consensus was possible. But Raz is convincing in his portrayal of Eshkol himself as eager to retain the West Bank while being unable and unwilling to transform that desire into a policy that would satisfy his political opponents and outside observers. Hence, as Raz notes, the talks conducted between Israeli officials and King Hussein were essentially stalling tactics on the part of Israel as opposed to sincere efforts by Hussein to reach a peace accord with Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser’s backing.

Of particular interest to Raz, and the subject of his recent article in Diplomatic History,¹ is the June 19, 1967 Israeli peace offer that was supposedly made to Arab states via Washington. Raz argues convincingly in his book, and in far greater detail in his article, that this document was aimed at the Johnson administration and was never passed on to Arab

diplomats or heads of state. This reviewer is also concerned with the ‘peace offer’ because it coincided with Lyndon Johnson’s official statement of the same day, June 19, 1967 that enabled the United States to disavow its supposed commitment of May 23RD, made by Johnson, that it would support the ‘territorial integrity’ of all the states in the region. Johnson reversed himself under intense pressure from Israel and its supporters in Washington as I note in my “The United States and the 1967 War,” a source which Raz apparently did not have a chance to consult before his book was published.2

I should stress that Raz is not directly concerned with U.S. policy during this period, although he has consulted State Department files and Johnson library materials online. I raise this question: is it a coincidence that Israel and the United States should issue such statements on the same day? Furthermore, Raz mentions Johnson’s speech of June 19TH (116), but argues that its main point dealt with the Palestinian refugees. In fact, mention of the refugee question had been a staple of U.S. declarations on Middle East peace since Israeli independence, although, as Raz notes, Johnson referred to those Palestinians now created homeless by this latest war. Still, the key point in Johnson’s speech is the fifth. There Johnson referred to the question of territorial integrity he had mentioned on May 23RD, but he said that it would now have to be established by the parties to the conflict themselves, and he specifically rejected the idea of a return to the boundaries existing on June 4.

Johnson gave this speech in response to pressures from advisers who themselves had close ties to Israel, such as Abe Fortas. As Tom Segev noted, the Israeli embassy had code names for its sources within and outside the White House, and the then second-highest ranking official in the embassy, Eppie Evron, also acknowledged in 1992 that the embassy had several channels to the White House during the crisis.3 The fear for Israel and its backers was that Johnson would adopt the policies used by the Eisenhower administration after the 1956 Suez crisis when the U.S. demanded Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, a point driven home to Johnson from June 7 onward.

Johnson’s willingness to heed this advice reflected his own personal views, not just political pressure. He took great pride in recalling that as Senate majority leader he had opposed President Eisenhower’s insistence on Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai in 1957. As a result, Johnson’s insistence that there be ‘recognized boundaries’ permitting all nations to live in ‘peace and security,’ goals that would have to be achieved by the leaders of Middle East countries, met Israeli demands. Johnson’s Point 5 would become the foundation of Security


Council Resolutions 242, passed in November, 1967, but not without continued pressure from Israeli diplomats who repeatedly called attention to Johnson's June 19th declaration when it appeared that Washington might sign on to United Nations' resolutions calling for full withdrawal from territories. As Evron told National Security Adviser (NSA) Walt Rostow in late August,

The heart of the Israeli objection to the joint U.S.-Soviet resolution is its implication that Israel must return to boundaries occupied on June 4. Even in exchange for a peace treaty, Israel is not prepared for a simple return to the June 4 boundaries. What Israel will seek by agreement with the Arabs are “secure” boundaries in addition to maintaining the unity of the city of Jerusalem.4

White House National Security staffers knew that any role the U.S. might play in a prospective Arab-Israeli settlement depended on “how hard LBJ was willing to lean on Israel.”5 Johnson was unwilling. His personal views, which were sympathetic to Israel, mirrored public opinion. Given growing opposition to his Vietnam policies, his advisers told him that allowing Israel to remain in place in its newly occupied lands could well turn create more sympathy for his expansion of the U.S. commitment in Vietnam.

All of the above, other than my differing from Raz on the salient clauses of Johnson’s June 19th speech, reinforce the points he makes in his book. The charge of 'prevarication' is particularly apt with respect to Raz's treatment of Israeli talks with Jordan’s King Hussein, a judgement that matches American reports as well. What Raz does not mention, as beyond his brief, is that the United States saw itself as having a role in seeking to facilitate these discussions. State Department officials titled the project 'SANDSTORM,' ninety per cent of whose files are still withheld from public examination; Raz has footnotes citing U.S. diplomatic cables with that heading but does not mention it in his text. These cables conclude generally that King Hussein was eager to reach an agreement, that would include East Jerusalem, in return for an accord but his Israeli counterparts, who included Foreign Minister Abba Eban at times, always represented themselves as seeking Hussein’s views without being authorized to discuss terms. Raz’s treatment of these exchanges, which is based on numerous Israeli and some Arab sources, suggests that enough is now known about SANDSTORM that the State Department should open SANDSTORM files for researchers, especially when we note also the discussions by Nigel Ashton and Avi Shlaim in their respective biographies of King Hussein.6


One final question relates to Raz’s statement in his article that “in international diplomacy every exchange is recorded,” including information imparted “on a personal basis” or “in strict confidence.” He concludes from this that the alleged Israeli peace offer of June 19, 1967 was never conveyed to Egypt or Syria. I agree. But as he does elsewhere in the article, when comparing varying versions of what occurred, he refers to Yitzhak Rabin’s remark that the June 19 resolution “was to be communicated solely to the United States.” The question is to whom was it communicated, the White House, or Secretary of State Dean Rusk? Raz’s own sources from Israeli cabinet documents suggest that Eshkol aimed the resolution at President Johnson and the special committee on the crisis headed by McGeorge Bundy, with Eshkol stating that “They [the Americans] need to know what they would support” (91); Johnson had appointed Bundy, National Security Adviser for President John F. Kennedy, as chair of the committee of the National Security Council that would handle all communications pertaining to the 1967 War; he assumed the post on June 7th.

This remark takes on added significance if we realize that Bundy’s special committee had met on June 13 with both Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, bemoaning the dilemma the U.S. faced because of Johnson’s guarantee of territorial integrity on May 23rd; as Johnson asked in the meeting, “how do we get out of this predicament?” Johnson’s June 19th speech calling on parties to the conflict to resolve the question in a manner that would guarantee the security of all parties was the answer. Israeli could use this, as Raz shows in his article, to argue that secure boundaries demanded the retention of some territory, a stance accepted by the U.S. though its leaders believed that such territorial modifications would be minor.

In this light, having supposedly sincere Israeli assurances that Israel sought a peace agreement, Johnson could give his own June 19th talk presuming Israeli commitment to future negotiations with Arab leaders. Significantly, the Israeli plan declared its willingness to seek peace treaties with Egypt and Syria but stated that it would “defer the discussion of the position regarding Jordan,” the one country recognized as eager to sign a treaty.

Can one prove in light of existing documentation that the Israeli resolution and Johnson’s speech of June 19th were linked? There is no such evidence, only coincidence, but I am not as confident as Raz that all exchanges, even on a personal basis, are recorded. Johnson was fond of transmitting messages to Prime Minister Eshkol by private emissaries, notably

2008): 281-311. U.S. records for SANDSTORM remain heavily sanitized: see NSF, CF [Country File], Box 113, LBJL.

7 Raz, “the Generous Peace Offer,” 94.


9 See the text of Israeli resolution 563 of June 19th in Raz, “The Generous Peace Offer,” 86.
Arthur Krim and Abe Feinberg, both Democratic Party stalwarts who were close to the Israeli establishment. Feinberg in particular called the White House when planning trips to Israel and private meetings would be arranged with Johnson; records of the calls and dates of meetings are available at the Johnson library but I have found no records of the conversations themselves. More conclusive proof is more likely to be found in Israeli than American archives.

As for the State Department, the evidence suggests that Secretary of State Rusk was not informed of key developments such as Johnson’s expectation as of the evening of June 2nd that Israel would soon attack, information he imparted to British Prime Minister Harold Wilson at a dinner held in Wilson’s honor. Johnson had been given this information in separate memos sent to him that day by CIA director Richard Helms and General Earle Wheeler, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In short, not all information was shared with key officials within the administration, and the State Department was to a certain extent left out of the loop. This situation continued into the Nixon administration, where tensions between Secretary of State William Rogers and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger rose to a degree that each told his staffers not to discuss any matters with their counterparts. Available records do not necessarily indicate how policy was made or what information served as its basis.

One final question for Avi Raz pertains to the Israeli dismantling of Israel’s June 19th peace proposal on October 31, 1968 (258-61). This decision followed closely on Johnson’s decision two weeks earlier to officially approve the sale of Phantom jets to Israel, a goal Israel had sought for over a year. Were these two developments linked? Did Israel now feel sufficiently secure in its reliance on the U.S. as its main military supplier to defy it politically? Israel had been seeking to make Washington its main military supplier for years. As Zach Levy has shown, Israel viewed the American decision to sell Israel Skyhawk jets in February 1966 as a major triumph. Abba Eban cabled Eshkol that the agreement was “of tremendous political value,” that “enabled Israel to strive for a continued intensification of the existing U.S. commitments and the creation of sui generis strategic relations.”

None of these comments challenges the substance of Avi Raz’s two publications under review. I find his arguments convincing and he is to be congratulated for the depth and extent of his research, which opens a new and crucial window on Israeli policymaking in the aftermath of the 1967 War. The fact that his studies have raised so many questions for


11 “Interview with Harold Saunders,” by Thomas Stern, November 24, 1993, p. 20. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, accessed at www.adst.org/Oral_History.htm. Saunders was the National Security Council staff person at the White House during the crisis. These oral histories of Foreign Service officers often give insight into situations they experienced firsthand, in addition to the personal backgrounds they contain.

this reviewer with respect to American policies during the period studied is itself an indication of the importance of his book and article.
Different people see different things when they read the same text. For example, Charles Smith says that my book discusses the first fourteen months following the Six Day War, “from June 1967 to the end of October 1968,” while Nigel Ashton, referring to the same period, writes that The Bride and the Dowry deals with eighteen months, and Craig Daigle states that my study covers twenty-one months. The three reviewers also differ in their focus on other issues. Ashton dwells on the secret postwar contacts between Jordan’s King Hussein and the Israelis by relying on his own work.1 Smith is concerned with the United States Middle East policy during the 1967 crisis, which is the subject of his recent study.2 Daigle’s main thrust is the alleged “angry tone” of my book. Yet the trio unanimously heap praise on my work, for which I am obviously grateful, although in Daigle’s case I find his acclaim rather puzzling in view of his critical comments.

Before addressing the various points raised in the three reviews, it may help to outline the principle arguments of my book. Contrary to the Israeli claim that there was no partner for peace on the Arab side in the aftermath of the June 1967 War, from the start of the occupation both the West Bank leadership and King Hussein of Jordan communicated to Israel their desire for a peaceful accommodation. The Americans, who felt a sense of duty toward the pro-Western Hussein, pressured Israel to negotiate a peace settlement with their Jordanian ally, based on the prewar lines with minor, reciprocal modifications. But the Israelis, unwilling to relinquish their war acquisitions – particularly Arab Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip – resorted to a foreign policy of deception whose aim was to deceive Washington into thinking that they were weighing their peace options: the so-called “Jordanian option” versus the so-called “Palestinian option.” Thus, they were playing for time by holding a one-way dialogue with the West Bankers and establishing futile contacts with Hussein, while creating faits accomplis in the occupied territories.

The Israeli approach reflected a metaphor coined by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol immediately after the military victory in June. In the metaphor, Israel’s territorial conquests were a “dowry” and the Arab population a “bride.” “The trouble is that the dowry is followed by a bride whom we don’t want,” Eshkol repeatedly lamented (3). My study shows that the Eshkol government effectively translated the metaphor into a policy whose aim was to appropriate the dowry and divorce the bride. The latter, i.e. the Israeli efforts “to divorce the bride” – either by driving out the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip or by denying their return to their homes in the occupied territories – is essential to the understanding of Israel’s ambition. It is thus disappointing that all three reviewers completely disregard chapter 4


("The Right of No Return") of *The Bride and the Dowry* and the discussions of the Israeli attitude vis-à-vis the "bride" elsewhere in the book (Smith mentions *en passant* the destruction of West Bank villages and the expulsion of their inhabitants, but the Israeli efforts to get rid of the "bride" were far more comprehensive). As I shall show later, Daigle's oversight of the "bride" is particularly crucial, resulting in his misrepresentation of my work.

Although the primary focus of my study is the foreign policy of Israel, an exploration of Washington's side of the story is vital. As Israel's main supporter in the diplomatic arena and supplier of armaments, the United States possessed the necessary levers to exert influence on its government. Yet America did not use them, despite its awareness of Israel's duplicity. In my view, the reason for Washington's indulgence was President Lyndon Johnson's personal sympathy toward the Jewish state. Charles Smith, who specializes in U.S. Middle East policy, endorses this conclusion as well.

In his review, Smith focuses on two events that took place on 19 June 1967. One is President Johnson's address in which he set out five principles of Middle East peace, and the other is a resolution adopted by the Israeli government which seemingly offered Egypt and Syria the territories they had lost in the war in return for contractual peace. As I show in *The Bride and the Dowry* (43-47) and more elaborately in a recent journal article, the Israeli "generous peace offer" was nothing but a diplomatic maneuver to win over the Johnson administration, and was never meant to reach the Arabs. Smith wonders whether it was a coincidence that Israel and the U.S. "should issue such statements on the same day." But they did not: the Israeli Cabinet resolution was kept a closely guarded secret for many years. The Americans, for whom it was intended, learned about its substance two days later, on 21 June, when Abba Eban, the foreign minister of Israel, met Secretary of State Dean Rusk in New York. Smith is thus incorrect in arguing that the Israeli Cabinet resolution was aimed at Johnson and his Special Consultant McGeorge Bundy alone. In fact, article 2(c) of the resolution authorized Eban to relate the Israeli position "[i]n secret talks with representatives of the United States" without specifying any name.

From late July 1967 the Israeli government gradually retreated from the 19 June resolution by making a series of decisions departing from the original text that culminated in its complete annulment on 31 October 1968. There is nothing in the historical record to suggest that the adoption of the 31 October resolution was in any way linked to President Johnson's decision to supply Israel the much-desired fifty F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers earlier that month. Furthermore, Johnson's decision was followed by weeks-long U.S.-Israel negotiations over the terms of the sale, so the Israelis had every reason to refrain from rocking the boat before the Phantom deal was finalized. Indeed, the 31 October resolution was adopted in defiance of Washington's policy, but so had been so many other Israeli moves since the war: the annexation of Arab Jerusalem, the denial of new refugees' return to their homes in the West

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Bank; Jewish settlement building in the occupied territories; the raid on the Jordanian town of Karameh – to name just a few.

Returning to Johnson's 19 June speech, the President stated that "[t]he first and the greatest principle is that every nation in the [Middle East] has a fundamental right to live, and to have this right respected by its neighbors." Smith, however, considers the fifth principle, which emphasizes the importance of political independence and territorial integrity of all Middle Eastern states, as the most significant one. Thus, he also disagrees with my alleged argument that the main principle is the second, which deals with the refugee problem. The fifth principle may well be the most crucial among the five; I have never ranked them. All I say in the book is: "... when US President Lyndon Johnson set out the five principles of peace in the Middle East, 'justice for the refugees' was listed second" (116). More significantly, Smith's assertion that Johnson "specifically rejected the idea of a return to the boundaries existing on June 4" is wrong. What Johnson rejected was the idea of a return to the prewar no-war-no-peace condition: "There are some who have urged, as a single, simple solution, an immediate return to the situation as it was on June 4. ... [T]his is not a prescription for peace but for renewed hostilities." In other words, Johnson accepted the Israeli demand that the armistice agreements in effect since 1949 should be replaced by peace settlements with its neighboring Arab states. Yet he believed that Israel's final borders should not be different from the 1949 Armistice lines. Smith himself says so in his 2012 article.

As noted, immediately after the war King Hussein conveyed to Israel his desire to trade land for peace, and Washington encouraged the Israelis to enter into negotiations with him. Many of the American dispatches regarding the attempts to bring about a Hussein-Israel dialogue during the second half of 1967 are designated “SANDSTORM.” Smith suggests that “SANDSTORM” is the title given by State Department officials to a project whose aim was to facilitate the Hussein-Israel discussions. What I have learned during my research at the U.S. National Archives in College Park, Maryland, and the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, Texas, is that archivists have not found what exactly “SANDSTORM” meant. But a footnote in the relevant volume of Foreign Relations of the United States indicates that the term was a State Department designation for sensitive communications regarding the Hussein-Israel contacts. The footnote was added by the volume's editor to a cable Rusk sent to Eban in mid-July 1967, urging Israel to respond positively to Hussein's peace overture (more on this below). It cites another telegram which stated that “all cable traffic relating to [Rusk


\[6\] Ibid. (emphasis added).

\[7\] Smith, “The United States and the 1967 War,” 184-85. Foreign Minister Eban told a parliamentary committee that during the initial months of the occupation Washington's position had been “complete withdrawal for complete peace”; only around October-November 1967 the Americans agreed to minimal territorial modifications. Eban's comments in minutes, Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, 23 December 1969, G/16707/3, Israel State Archives (ISA).
cable to Eban] should be designated ... Sandstorm, because the [State] Department wished to give it maximum security." In addition to “SANDSTORM,” the State Department applied another designation, “WHIRLWIND,” presumably for private communications with Egypt’s President Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser.

The clandestine Hussein-Israel contacts are at the center of Nigel Ashton’s review. Ashton dealt with these contacts in his own work. His main source was a series of interviews with Jack O’Connell, the CIA station chief in Amman between 1963 and 1971, and King Hussein’s confidant and adviser in later years as well. O’Connell was born in 1921 and died in 2010 at the age of eighty-nine. His memoir, King’s Counsel – written when O’Connell was in his late eighties and published posthumously – is a fascinating read. But the book is also not always accurate. It includes minor slips and more significant mistakes. For instance, O’Connell presents the Israeli official Ya’acov Herzog as deputy director general of the Foreign Ministry; in fact, Herzog was the director general of the Prime Minister’s Office and Premier Levi Eshkol’s most trusted adviser; he handled the confidential channel of communication with King Hussein on the Prime Minister’s behalf. Another example is O’Connell’s comment on a secret meeting between U.S. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger and Egypt’s President Anwar al-Sadat that allegedly took place in Sharm al-Sheikh a few weeks before the 1973 Yom Kippur War; but Sharm al-Sheikh, under Israeli occupation since 1967, was not returned to Egypt until 1982.

King’s Counsel is rich with stories that leave the reader wondering how reliable they are,” observes Shimon Shamir, a professor of modern Middle East history and Israel’s former ambassador to Egypt and Jordan. In Shamir’s expert opinion, O’Connell’s secondhand accounts are far less credible than his firsthand narrative.

This point is illustrated by O’Connell’s story about Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan’s initiative to arrange a CIA-brokered meeting with King Hussein immediately after the June 1967 War. According to what O’Connell related in his interviews with Ashton during the ninth decade of his life, Dayan privately contacted the CIA’s James Angleton, expressing fear that General Ariel Sharon, among others, wanted formally to annex the West Bank, thereby preventing future resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Dayan thus proposed that a meeting

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10Ibid., 87.

11Ibid., 124.


13Ibid., 162.
with Hussein should be arranged without delay in order to bring about a covert peace process which might provide a way out of the situation.\footnote{Ashton, \textit{King Hussein of Jordan}, 125; idem, “For King and Country,” 902. Without indicating a source, Charles Smith repeats this story in his 2012 article. Smith, “The United States and the 1967 War,” 187.} In O’Connell’s memoir, however, the plot is somewhat different: here Dayan did not mention Sharon but warned that some of his fellow cabinet members were planning to keep the West Bank.\footnote{O’Connell, \textit{King’s Counsel}, 56.} In both versions O’Connell says that Angleton brought the matter to James Critchfield, chief of the CIA’s Near East Division, and together they advised the CIA Director Richard Helms to set a Dayan-Hussein meeting in Geneva.

And there are two additional versions of this episode, of which Ashton seems unaware. One is James Critchfield’s and the other is Richard Helms’. In 1989 James Critchfield told the American journalist Seymour Hersh that “Dayan and Zvi Zamir, then head of Mossad, joined forces with him and James Angleton at the end of the Six-Day War in a brief and ill-fated attempt to stop the abuse in the West Bank and elsewhere.”\footnote{Seymour M. Hersh, \textit{The Samson Option: Israel, America and the Bomb} (London; Boston: Faber and Faber, 1991), 185.} Critchfield was referring to the Israeli destruction spree in Arab Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, carried out “in an obvious attempt to drive Palestinians and other Arabs off their land and into Jordan and Syria”\footnote{\textit{Ibid}, 184.} (as described in great detail in chapter 4 of \textit{The Bride and the Dowry}). The goal, Critchfield said, was to prevent faits accomplis in the occupied territories in the shape of Jewish settlements by starting negotiations between Israel and Hussein with the aim of trading land for peace.\footnote{\textit{Ibid}, 185.}

Critchfield’s testimony, then, does not corroborate O’Connell’s secondhand assertion that the CIA’s involvement was initiated by Dayan, nor does it prove that it was the Israelis who raised the idea of embarking on direct peace negotiations with Hussein. In Critchfield’s telling, Dayan and the Mossad chief “joined forces” with Angleton and himself, and it was not fear of undesirable annexation that motivated them but the wish to stop the destruction of houses in the occupied territories and the expulsion of Arab inhabitants. Yet Critchfield’s version is also problematic. In the first place, the then head of the Mossad was Meir Amit; Zamir, Israel’s military attaché to London in 1967, succeeded Amit a year later. Second, Defense Minister Dayan did not need the CIA’s help “to stop the abuse in the West Bank and elsewhere”; a direct order to the army’s high command would have been enough. Moreover, neither the demolition of Arab houses nor the expulsion of Arab inhabitants troubled Dayan much. On 7 June 1967, the third day of the Six Day War, Dayan told Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin, the chief of the General Staff, that the aim was to empty the West Bank of its inhabitants (3, 104). A day later – some forty-eight hours after the West Bank town of Qalqilyah had been taken by
Israeli forces – Dayan instructed Rabin “to lay into the houses of Qalqilyah” (105); consequently, more than 40 percent of Qalqilyah’s dwellings – 850 houses – had been demolished by Israeli troops and many more had been badly damaged before the devastation was stopped by political intervention as a result of international outcry (107).

Richard Helms’ narrative deviates even more from O’Connell’s story.19 In his memoir, published in 2003, the former director of the CIA writes that immediately after the end of the war Critchfield and Angleton came to his office with “an imaginative proposal they had roughed out.” At the time, Helms goes on, “our reporting led us to believe that Moshe Dayan … was anxious to ‘undo the damage’ caused by Jordan’s intervention on the side of Egypt and Syria, and thought it much in Israel’s interest to reestablish a stable relationship with Jordan. He also seemed to believe that an exchange with King Hussein in the existing circumstances might produce an accord of lasting value.” Dayan, speculates Helms, “might have recognized an opportunity to build an anti-Soviet alliance of Israel and the conservative Arab states of Jordan and Saudi Arabia.” Critchfield suggested that the CIA pass “this informal observation” to the White House and the State department. Helms agreed. However, Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach and the President’s Special Consultant McGeorge Bundy, with whom Critchfield and Angleton met on the following morning, felt that “King Hussein was not prepared politically or legally for any such meeting.” They said that the CIA should refrain from any follow-up discussions regarding this matter.20

There are many discrepancies between Richard Helms’ version and the others. First, Dayan did not contact the CIA requesting to arrange for him a personal meeting with Hussein, but it was the CIA’s reporting that led the agency to conclude that Dayan wished an Israel-Hussein exchange. Second, Dayan was motivated not by fear of undesirable annexation of the West Bank or by his alleged desire to stop the destruction and expulsions there, but by apprehension of deepening Soviet penetration into the Middle East. Finally, no meeting between Hussein and Dayan or any other Israeli official was set in Geneva or elsewhere; according to the CIA director, the proposal to arrange such a rendezvous was killed within a day.

The fact that the four versions of the retired CIA men are mutually incompatible casts doubts on their reliability. Most important in the context of O’Connell’s first version which appears in Ashton’s King Hussein of Jordan, everything Dayan said in the aftermath of the Six Day War, either publically or in confidential forums, betrayed his resolve to retain the West Bank. As the minister in charge of the occupied territories between 1967 and 1974, he translated his words into action. In a television interview on 9 June 1967 Dayan asserted that Israel should keep

20 Ibid.
major portions of the conquered lands, including the West Bank (42).21 “I’ve never thought that the West Bank should be returned to Jordan,” he said a few months before his death in 1981.22 A CIA analysis memorandum described Dayan in mid-July 1967 as “hardliner.”23 In short, the notion that Dayan would approach the CIA in order to prevent the annexation of the West Bank by Israel is preposterous. It is also highly unlikely that Dayan would have tried to meet King Hussein behind the Prime Minister’s back. Immediately after the war Eshkol decided that he alone should handle the covert contacts with the Arabs, notably King Hussein and the West Bank political elite. Dayan despised Eshkol, but at the same time he respected the hierarchy; such underhand dealings would have been out of character.

In The Bride and the Dowry I dismiss O’Connell’s first version. In an endnote I point out that Ariel Sharon, a junior general in 1967, was in no position to bring about the annexation of the West Bank (310-11, n. 93). But what conclusively demonstrates the error of O’Connell’s two versions as well as Critchfield’s and Helms’ are the Israeli documents listed in that endnote. These records reveal that the CIA was engaged in an effort to arrange a meeting between King Hussein and a high-level representative of the Israeli cabinet – not specifically Dayan – in Switzerland in late July, and that the rendezvous was eventually scuttled by the State Department (71-72). The records also show that the Mossad – whose chief answers directly to the Prime Minister – was involved in this effort, probably as a channel of communication with the CIA. The full story must await declassification of the pertinent American and Israeli records.

There are two overarching methodological conclusions that emerge from an extended discussion of this issue. One is that oral history testimonies should be handled with the greatest of care, let alone testimonies which are not firsthand accounts such as O’Connell’s. The second conclusion is the necessity of using all accessible records of all parties involved and in all relevant languages.

Immediately after the war, and without CIA mediation, King Hussein and Israel resumed a secret face-to-face dialogue that the King had initiated in 1963. The first postwar encounter took place as early as 2 July 1967, three weeks after the hostilities had ended, when Hussein and Ya’acov Herzog met in London. During the period covered by my book (June 1967–February 1969) there were eighteen more meetings between the King or his confidants and senior Israeli officials, including Cabinet Ministers.24 The Israelis persistently refrained from disclosing their (nonexistent) peace terms. When they finally succumbed to American pressure and ostensibly talked substance, they presented the disingenuous Allon Plan which


23 FRUS 19, document 361.

24 For the full list see Avi Shlaim, Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace (London: Allen Lane, 2007), 652.
had not been approved by the Cabinet and which Hussein had already rejected as “totally unacceptable.” According to O’Connell, from May 1968 onward he received Jordanian notes detailing Hussein’s discussions with Israeli envoys; he forwarded them to the director of the CIA who in turn summarized the reports for the President. None of these papers is accessible, but Israeli records are available. They include blow-by-blow accounts composed by Herzog who was present at all the meetings, and in some cases transcripts of the secretly-recorded exchanges. These papers show that in no way could the Hussein-Israel contacts be defined as negotiations. The term “negotiations” used by Ashton to describe the Hussein-Israel dialogue is incorrect. In the words of Foreign Minister Eban, Israel was conducting “a futile discussion” with Jordan “which should last weeks and months” (247-48) so as to avoid bona fide negotiations.

Craig Daigle’s review cites my relevant argument as follows: “Israeli leaders missed a ‘historic opportunity’ to diffuse the Palestinian problem ... by rejecting peace overtures from moderate Arab leaders in the West Bank and Jordan” (my emphasis). This is not what I argue. My argument is that the Israelis “persistently and deliberately squandered every opportunity for a settlement” (284) because they refused to pay the territorial price for peace. Daigle’s misrepresentation of my argument is just one indication of the careless way he read my book, and by no means the most significant one. Moreover, Daigle’s review itself contains contradictory statements. For example, three paragraphs after praising The Bride and the Dowry for “[reshaping] our understanding of Israeli decision-making after the June War,” he scolds: “[A]t virtually no point in this book is Israeli decision-making presented as reasonable.”

A telling example of Daigle’s selective reading is his treatment of my discussion of the Khartoum Arab Summit (29 August–1 September 1967). He mentions (twice) the “infamous” three “no’s” included in the resolutions (no peace [sulh; i.e. reconciliation] with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel), but ignores the most important part of the Khartoum resolutions: for the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arab leaders – who before the war had called for “the final liquidation of Israel” – decided to employ political and diplomatic means rather than military ones in order to regain their lost lands (137). “Raz concludes that Israeli leaders ‘refused to acknowledge the moderate tone’ that emerged from the summit,” Daigle writes without mentioning that my “conclusion” was in fact the view of U.S. President Lyndon Johnson, British Foreign Secretary George Brown, and many other contemporary world leaders who believed in the genuineness of the new mood of moderation displayed by the Arabs at Khartoum (137). Even Ya’acov Herzog, Eshkol’s closest adviser (and a staunch supporter of settlement building in the occupied territories), “maintained that whatever the Israeli public interpretation of the Khartoum resolutions might be, they marked Arab progress toward peace” (138). For Daigle, who strives to show that my book is biased against Israel, the only relevant aspect of the Khartoum Summit is the three “no’s.” It is thus worth noting that the three “no’s” are implicitly included in UN Security

25 O’Connell, King’s Counsel, 87-88; Ashton, “For King and Country,” 903-4.
Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 which Israel accepted – as pointed out by Yitzhak Rabin when he was ambassador to Washington.26

The three “no”s were used by Israel as a pretext to toughen its political position. In addition to two government decisions expressing the new uncompromising stance, the Cabinet agreed that henceforth Israel’s official maps should include the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank, whose combined size was more than three times the state’s prewar area, and without featuring the prewar lines (139). Oddly, Daigle describes this move as “redrawing new maps of the West Bank.” Another, more significant Israeli step in the wake of Khartoum was the launch of the illegal Jewish settlement project in the West Bank (in the Golan Heights, the first settlement had been established barely one month after the war). Nevertheless, Daigle suggests that because the Arabs refused to negotiate peace with Israel, “ Israeli officials [may have] decided [that] there was little point to withdraw from the land.” This speculative interpretation lacks a basis in the evidence. First, no one expected Israel to withdraw unilaterally, save the Arabs (with the exception of Jordan) and their supporters. Second, even before Khartoum the Israeli policy makers were unwilling the give up their territorial spoils of war (as mentioned above, the Israeli so-called “generous peace offer” to Egypt and Syria of 19 June was merely a diplomatic maneuver to win over the Americans; more on this below). Third, King Hussein of Jordan was eager to negotiate peace with Israel.

Hussein made his first peace overture on 12 July 1967, one month after the war had ended. He was talking about a peace settlement with Israel which would include exchange of diplomatic representatives. Through the Americans and the British, Hussein asked Israel for its peace terms. Secretary of State Rusk viewed Hussein’s move as “a major act of courage” that “offers the first important breakthrough toward peace ...” (68).27 But Israel responded evasively, thereby compelling Hussein to shelve his peace initiative (65-73). There is not a single word about the affair in Daigle’s review. Instead, Daigle heralds three quotations from President Johnson (June 1967), Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach (late June 1967), and a CIA memorandum (13 July 1967), to argue that Washington “did not have any grand expectations that a settlement would emerge from the negotiations with either the Palestinians or the Jordanians.”

The passage relating to Johnson is particularly instructive. Daigle writes:

[On] June 19, ... on the same day the Israeli Cabinet voted to annex the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem, President Johnson made it clear to Soviet Premier Alexi Kosygin during a meeting at Glassboro, New Jersey that it was not enough for the Arabs and the Soviets to say “remove the troops;” the Arabs were going to have to demonstrate their commitment to peace.

26 Rabin’s comments in minutes, Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, 29 June 1970, G/16707/8, ISA.

27 FRUS 19, document 360.
As we have just seen, King Hussein did demonstrate his commitment to peace. Second, the
decision to annex the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem was made by the Israeli Cabinet on 11
June (53), not the 19th. Third, the Johnson-Kosygin exchange at Glassboro took place on 25
June, not the 19th – as clearly indicated in the first line of Daigle’s source. These errors speak
to the haphazard nature of Daigle’s review.

In the concluding chapter of The Bride and the Dowry I assert that “[t]he unavowed controlling
consideration of the [Israeli] government was the desire to retain as many of the occupied
lands as possible with as few Arab inhabitants as possible” (266). This assertion is robustly
based on the historical evidence. Daigle, however, regards it as “chastisement,” although he
does not explain what is wrong about this statement. Is it not true? If not, what was the
purpose of Jewish settlement building in the occupied territories? And what was the reason
for facilitating the exodus of some 200,000 Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip during the June War and immediately afterwards, encouraging Arab emigration in the
months and years that followed, and denying the return of the displaced Arabs to their
homes? Chapter 4, which Daigle totally ignores, offers an explanation which corroborates the
“chastising” citation: “Israel’s decision makers, divided as they were on almost every issue,
subscribed to one shared guideline: it would be most advantageous to have as few Arab
inhabitants as possible in the occupied territories in general and in the Gaza Strip ... in
particular” (124). As the reference reveals (330, n. 134), these are the words of Major General
(ret.) Shlomo Gazit, who handled the occupied territories on behalf of Dayan between 1967
and 1974. In December 1967 Eshkol’s private secretary informed the Israeli ambassador in
Washington that within the Cabinet the viewpoint had been growing stronger over time that
retaining as much of the occupied territories as possible was imperative on historical and
security grounds (184). Were General Gazit and the Prime Minister’s private secretary also
chastisers?

Similarly, Daigle objects to my critical characterization of Israeli decision-making. I describe
the Eshkol government and the Prime Minister himself as indecisive; “Israel,” I argue,
“chronically suffered from the lack of long-range thinking, coherent strategy, and systematic
decision making; crucial decisions were often taken on a whim or a hunch” (266). In this
respect Israel has not changed much since the late 1960s. As indicated in the book, this was
the conclusion of Israel’s State Comptroller whose Annual Report for 2002 included 105-page-
long “scathing analysis of the government’s decision-making process over the years” (347, n.
58). Abba Eban, who was a member of the Eshkol and Meir governments, conceded in a
published interview (ibid) that criticism of the Israeli Cabinet’s decision-making was
justified.28 For Daigle, however, this well-founded characterization of the Eshkol government
and its poor decision-making mechanism is a result of my “caustic and biting views” that
“often lead [me] to dismiss alternative views of events.”

interview in 1977, Major General (ret.) Aharon Yariv, former Military Intelligence chief (1964-1972) and Cabinet
Minister (1974-1975), called for a major reform in the Israeli government’s decision-making system. “Everything
we do here is improvisation,” he said. Quoted in Amos Gilboa, Mar Modi’in: Aharaleh, Aluf Aharon Yariv, Head of
Aman [Hebrew: Mr. Intelligence: Aharaleh, General Aharon Yariv, Head of Military Intelligence] (Tel Aviv: Yediot
Ahronot – Sifrei Hemed, 2013), 691.
Daigle provides two examples to make his case regarding the latter point. The first deals with the Israeli attitude toward the “Palestinian option.” He writes:

[Raz] does not leave room for the possibility that Israeli leaders may have determined that the Palestinian leadership in the West Bank was incapable of delivering on such agreements or that Israeli officials may not have been convinced these ‘notables’ actually spoke for the Palestinian people.

But here is what I say in chapter 1 of *The Bride and the Dowry*:

A student of the Arab-Israeli conflict may wonder whether the Palestinian leadership in the West Bank was capable of delivering on its intentions. ... [T]he Israelis had every reason to ask this question before entering into any negotiations with the Palestinians under their rule. But there was a more burning question to be answered by Israel first: did it really want the Palestinians to deliver? The answer was far from unequivocal. (37)

Ensuing chapters show that the Israeli policy makers did not want the West Bank leadership to deliver. The Israelis never seriously considered the “Palestinian option,” and this fact alone renders Daigle’s comment irrelevant. Moreover, following the unilateral annexation of Arab Jerusalem in late June 1967, the majority of the West Bank political elite abandoned the idea of a separate settlement with Israel, and advocated instead a Jordanian-Israeli accord – the “Jordanian option” – something that the Israelis equally loathed.

Daigle’s second example deals with Israel’s “generous peace offer” of 19 June 1967 that was never offered. Here Daigle raises a valid question: “if ... the Israelis were determined to retain as much Arab territory as possible, why does this only apply to the West Bank, Gaza, and [Arab] Jerusalem?” The answer is that quite a few among the Cabinet members – notably Menachem Begin – felt a religiously-motivated and emotional attachment to what they considered part of the Promised Land. Psychologically, they were unable to allow the adoption of a resolution suggesting the return of parts of *Eretz Yisrael*, or the Land of Israel, to Arab rule, even if this was merely a political exercise. Prime Minister Eshkol had difficulty explaining why he harbored a “great desire” to keep the Gaza Strip. “[P]erhaps because of Samson and Delilah,” he said in a party forum during the war.29 Furthermore, Israel’s ostensible largess toward Egypt and Syria was not so generous. The Cabinet resolution of 19 June states that peace treaties should be “based on the international border and the security needs of Israel” – a formulation intended to allow Israel to keep parts of the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights (45).30 The discussion of the 19 June resolution affair occupies four and a half pages in the book, and it is the subject of my 12,300-word-long article to which Daigle refers in a footnote. Both the book and the article provide evidence that the substance of the


30 Raz, “The Generous Peace Offer that was Never Offered,” 88.
resolution was meant for Washington’s ears alone. They also provide evidence that the “generous peace offer” was never conveyed to Cairo and Damascus. Daigle mentions none of this. Without saying so explicitly, he clearly does not accept that the resolution was adopted as a diplomatic maneuver to win over the Johnson administration. If so, why is it that the Israeli “generous peace offer” was never offered to Egypt and Syria?

In this speculative vein, Daigle attempts to explain what motivated my investigation of Israel’s foreign policy in the immediate aftermath of the June 1967 War and “to challenge official Israeli claims.” His illusory comments in this regard do not merit a response. Generally speaking, however, the central questions in assessing the quality of a historical work are whether the narrative is solidly and accurately founded on all the available sources, and whether the author’s conclusions are supported by the narrative, i.e. the evidence. Daigle does not challenge my narrative; on the contrary, he says that *The Bride and the Dowry* “is a substantial piece of scholarship based on a meticulous use of multi-archival sources.” Yet he is dissatisfied with some of my interpretations and conclusions. As I have tried to show in this response, Daigle’s alternative reading does not hold water.

It is for the reader to decide whether the tone of my book is “angry” or whether “sometimes” I resort to “heated rhetoric,” as Daigle insists. But I cannot accept the contention that “at times [I act] as a prosecutor.” If anything, I act as a judge: *The Bride and the Dowry* is my verdict. I reached the verdict after years of collecting evidence and carefully weighing the sources. It is undoubtedly a harsh verdict, but one that is in accordance with my findings. These findings show that Israel rebuffed the internationally-accepted land-for-peace principle, evaded peace negotiations with King Hussein and the Palestinian leadership in the West Bank, and applied a foreign policy of deception in order to stay put in the occupied territories indefinitely. While tightening its grip on these territories, Israel committed numerous war crimes – including destruction of villages and houses, expulsion of Arab inhabitants, killing “new refugees” trying to return “illegally” to their homes from across the River Jordan, and building Jewish settlements on occupied Arab lands. If I sound “indignant over Israeli policy,” it is not without reason.

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31 I am of course aware that the analogy of the judge to describe the historian’s marshalling, weighing and interpreting evidence is figurative and morphological rather than literal. On this issue see, for example, Carlo Ginzburg, “Checking the Evidence: The Judge and the Historian,” *Critical Inquiry* 18, No. 1 (Autumn 1991), 79-92; idem, *The Judge and the Historian: Marginal Notes on a Late-Twentieth-Century Miscarriage of Justice*, trans. Antony Shugaar (London; New York: Verso, 1999).