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Introduction by Greg Donaghy

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Introduction by Greg Donaghy, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canada

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On 21 March 2014, just days after Russia's authoritarian President Vladimir Putin seized Crimea, Canada's Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper headed for an embattled Kiev. The first G-7 leader to visit Ukraine, Harper was soon standing shoulder-to-shoulder with Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, forcefully denouncing Putin for resorting to "the law of the jungle."<sup>1</sup> He headed next to The Hague, where he pushed hard for tough G-7 sanctions designed to punish and isolate Putin. At home, Harper was echoed by his Foreign Minister, John Baird, who used the recent launch of his Department's historical series, *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, to reiterate the transcendent importance of fundamental democratic principles to Canadian foreign policy. "[S]ometimes you should be a referee and a rule-setter, but if you want to get a certain result, you have to be a player," Baird argued. "When it comes to promoting Canadian values and interests, we can't afford to not be a player."<sup>2</sup>

The direct language and firm posture adopted by Harper and Baird are typical of the foreign policy pursued by their Conservative government. "It is exit stage right for Canada's friendly and 'nice' approach to foreign relations," commented Professor Grant Dawson of Aberystwyth University.<sup>3</sup> Since taking power in 2006, Prime Minister Harper's government has clearly abandoned the liberal internationalism that had so often characterized Ottawa's approach to world affairs, replacing it with a new emphasis on realist notions of national interest, enhanced capabilities, and Western democratic values. Not surprisingly, this shift in emphasis and tone has attracted notice and debate.

Patrick James's new book, *Canada and Conflict*, an examination of Canadian security policy since 9/11, represents an early effort to assess that shift in detail. *Canada and Conflict*, our three reviewers agree, is short, punchy, and boldly argumentative. "A marvelous teaching tool," writes David Haglund, that "can be counted upon to stimulate discussion." James invites engagement, and the reviewers oblige, taking sharply different perspectives on the central question surrounding Harper's foreign policy: to what extent has Canada abandoned the über-liberalism of the 1990s for a realist national security policy. Jean-Christophe Boucher firmly sides with James, and thinks it obvious that there has been a shift to "a more pragmatic and assertive foreign policy centered on national interest."

Greg Anderson and Haglund are more sceptical and cautious. Anderson suggests that national fatigue after the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. pivot to Asia, growing budgetary

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<sup>1</sup> Cited in Steve Chase, "Harper signals he wants Russia out of G8 during trip to Kiev," *The Globe and Mail*, 22 March 2014.

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/speeches-discours/2014/03/27a.aspx?lang=eng>  
Accessed 1 April 2014.04.01

<sup>3</sup> Grant Dawson, "Canada's new foreign policy is a response to a changing world," *Ottawa Citizen*, 27 March 2014.

pressures, and a series of procurement problems may well encourage Prime Minister Harper to moderate his foreign policy. Haglund even wonders if the shift was ever as dramatic or as profound as James contends. His review bluntly reminds readers that James has overlooked important elements of continuity between the liberal 1990s and the 2000s, notably Canada's participation in the First Iraq War in 1991 and the bombing of Kosovo in 1999. Indeed, Haglund's broad historical perspective, stretching onward from the seventeenth century, encourages readers to consider just how significant the decade since 9/11 really is.

The three reviewers tackle other, more specific issues raised by James. Boucher, who established his reputation for keen political analysis in the 2000s with his work on Canadian public opinion and the war in Afghanistan<sup>4</sup>, raises two questions. First, he asks readers to reflect on the importance of the shifting of elite opinion in Canada, which edged westward to Alberta after 2000, in determining Canada's move towards a more realist-based foreign policy. Perhaps, he suggests, the source for recent changes in Canadian policy lies within Canada itself. Second, Boucher insists that we must be careful in asking if 9/11 was a "necessary condition" for a tougher Canadian foreign policy. He offers instead a compelling counterfactual argument that the U.S. reaction to 9/11 (and not 9/11 itself) was key, underlining the profoundly asymmetrical imbalance in the Canada-U.S. relationship. This is a point echoed by Anderson, who challenges the emphasis that James places on Canadian agency, especially on the question of border security. The asymmetrical nature of Canada-U.S. relations means that the U.S. acts, while Canada reacts.

Haglund's review tackles another set of issues. He justifiably challenges James on the role that *Canada and Conflict* assigns to anti-Americanism as a value shaping Canadian security policy. And he probes the emphasis that James's study places on Canada-U.S. friction in the Arctic. In raising both these points, Haglund casts Canada-U.S. relations against its larger global backdrop, quietly reiterating the importance of earlier, pre-9/11, traditions and events in shaping the dynamics of this key bilateral relationship.

*Canada and Conflict* brings together several strands of Canadian security policy over the last decade into one bold narrative thread, courageously advancing the case that the last decade has been one of transformative change for Canada's foreign policy. Its three reviewers have responded no less vigorously.

### Participants:

**Patrick James** received his Ph.D in Government and Politics at the University of Maryland.

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<sup>4</sup> See, for example, Jean-Christophe Boucher, "Selling Afghanistan. A Discourse Analysis of Canada's Military Intervention, 2001-08," *International Journal*, vol. 64, no 3 (Summer 2009): 717-33; "The Cost of Bandwagoning : Canada-US Defence and Security Relations after 9/11," *International Journal*, vol. 67, no 4, (Winter 2012-13): 895-914; and "Evaluating the 'Trenton Effect': Canadian Public Opinion and Military Casualties in Afghanistan (2006-2010)," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, vol. 40, no 2, (June 2010): 237-258.

James is the Dornsife Dean's Professor of International Relations and Director of the Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California and is the author or editor of 23 books and over 120 articles and book chapters. His most recent books include *Canada and Conflict* (Oxford, 2012); *The International Relations of Middle-earth* (Michigan, 2012); and co-editor with Jonathan Paquin of *Game Changer: The Impact of 9/11 on North American Security* (2014). One of his current projects focuses on the use of systems analysis to assess scientific progress in diverse fields of study within International Relations.

**Greg Donaghy** is Head of the Historical Section, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. He is the General Editor of its series, *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, and author of *Tolerant Allies: Canada and the United States, 1963-1968*. Most recently, he edited (with Michael Carroll), *In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1909-2009* (Calgary: University of Calgary UP, 2011). The views expressed here are his alone and do not reflect the views of his Department or the Government of Canada.

**Greg Anderson** received a Ph.D. from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University (Johns Hopkins/SAIS) and is currently Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Alberta. His publications include "NAFTA on the Brain: Why Creeping Integration Has Always Worked Better," *American Review of Canadian Studies* 42, no. 4 (2012): 450-459; "Did Canada Kill Fast Track," *Diplomatic History*, 36, no. 3 (June 2012): 583-624; (with co-editor Christopher Sands) *Forgotten Partnership Redux: Canada-U.S. Relations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, (Cambria Press: Amherst, NY, 2011) and "Negotiating North America: The Security and Prosperity Partnership," *Hudson Institute White Paper* (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2007); and (with co-editor Brian Bow) *Building Without Architecture*. (New York: Routledge, 2014).

**Jean-Christophe Boucher** is an Assistant Professor at MacEwan University, Fellow at the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI), Research Fellow at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies (CFPS) and Senior Fellow at the *Centre interuniversitaire de recherche sur les relations internationales du Canada et du Québec*.

**David G. Haglund** is a Professor of Political Studies at Queen's University (Kingston, Ontario, Canada). His research focuses on transatlantic security, and on Canadian and American international security policy. Among his books are *Latin America and the Transformation of U.S. Strategic Thought, 1936-1940* (1984), and *Over Here and Over There: Canada-US Defence Cooperation in an Era of Interoperability* (2001). His current research project is on ethnic diasporas in North America and their impact upon security relations between the United States and Canada.

## Is Canada (really) Important?

The past decade has seen the revival of a cottage industry of declinist literature about American foreign policy. Each of the enterprising authors writing in this vein offers renewed predictions about why America is about to head over the cliff, and become like Rome or Britain in having their empires spoken of in the past tense.<sup>1</sup> Literature in this tradition periodically appears in the midst of imperial overstretch, unpopular foreign escapades, or relative economic decline.

Hence, since the 'Colossus' itself frequently enters periods of self-doubt, others can probably be forgiven for being a little angst-ridden over their own place in the world. Yet, for Canada, the sense of place and importance in global affairs might mean even more since living right next door to the Colossus inevitably means being overshadowed by it. As a result, being noticed internationally, but especially by the Colossus itself, becomes a serious matter of national pride of place. In his September 20, 2001 speech to a joint session of Congress, President George Bush said "America had no truer friend than Great Britain."<sup>2</sup> The sense of wounded national pride in Canada thereafter was palpable. Wasn't it Canada that enjoyed a 'special relationship' with the United States? Yet, just two years later, some of that pride was restored when in 2003 a cover of *The Economist* depicted a moose wearing sunglasses, suggesting Canada had become cool.

Yet, this angst over Canada's place in the world regularly finds its way into the broad swath of popular commentary and academic scholarship on Canadian foreign policy. It does so in the form of extensive detailing of every twist and turn in Canada's relationship with the United States, so much so that it tends toward the myopic, frequently losing sight of the larger picture.

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<sup>1</sup> The classics in this vein are: Edward Gibbon, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (New York: Penguin Books, 1985); William Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*, 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Edition, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011) and Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987). The recent additions focused on U.S. hegemony include: Patrick Buchanan, *The Death of the West* (New York: St. Martin's Griffin 2002); Robert Bork, *Slouching Toward Gomorrah* (New York: HarperCollins, 1996); Byron Dorgan, *Take This Job and Ship It* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2006); Cullen Murphy, *Are We Rome: The Fall of an Empire and the Fate of America* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2007), Fareed Zakaria, *The Post-American World* (New York: Norton, 2009); Martin Jacques, *When China Rules the World* (New York: Penguin Books, 2009), Stephen Cohen and Bradford DeLong, *The End of Influence: What Happens When Other Countries Have the Money* (New York: Basic Books, 2010); Earl Fry, *Lament for America: Decline of a Superpower, Plan for Renewal* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010); Daniel Hannan, *The New Road to Serfdom* (New York: HarperCollins, 2010); Chalmers Johnson, *Dismantling the Empire: America's Last Best Hope* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010); Clyde Prestowitz, *The Betrayal of American Prosperity* (New York: Free Press, 2010).

<sup>2</sup> George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of the 107<sup>th</sup> Congress, United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., September 20, 2001.

Is Canada cool? Sure. Is Canada important? Sort of.<sup>3</sup> President Bush's expressed preference for Britain as America's greatest friend was, for many Canadians, a stick in the eye. Yet, the angst among Canadians has continued even as Canada's contribution to Afghanistan grew, betrayed by the repeated questions directed at U.S. officials about the value of Canada's contribution to the effort. However, it is not hard to envision a rather uniform set of suggested talking points for American officials as they engaged the press corps from allied countries.

'We appreciate the valuable contribution (insert country name here) is making to the security and development effort in Afghanistan. The bravery and commitment of (insert country name here) forces to peace and stability for the Afghan people has been essential to the allied effort.'

In fact, an argument could be made that on many issues Canada is no more important internationally, or to the vast U.S. foreign policy agenda, than Belgium.

### **Canada Resurgent?**

There is much to commend about Patrick James's *Canada and Conflict*. It is a short, but richly detailed, account of the impact of a tumultuous decade on Canadian security relations at home and abroad and will occupy space on my shelf as a go-to guide for Canadian security policy for the 2000s. Like *The Economist* in 2003, *Canada in Conflict* paints a picture of a Canada with renewed purpose and a place in international affairs. Indeed, in several areas detailed by James, Canada seems to matter a great deal, particularly where the U.S. foreign policy agenda is concerned. My only real critiques of this volume involve two questions: How much does Canada really matter? And will anything other than robust border security actually last?

Throughout the volume, we read that Canada was unprepared for Afghanistan, and needed a time out from combat operations that precluded participation in the U.S. invasion of Iraq. We read that Canada's military found new purpose, received a new infusion of cash, and is now poised for a much more robust and respected future as a seasoned experienced fighting force. The Conservative government of Stephen Harper has put forward a new *Canada First* defense policy, complete with an expensive shopping list of new equipment that includes dozens of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, new icebreakers, and a robust, permanent presence for the Canadian Forces (CF) in the far North all driven by a renewed emphasis on national security.

In the spring 2003 edition of *The National Interest*, Stephen Rosen expressed doubts about

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<sup>3</sup> See Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, "Special, But Not Especially Important," in Greg Anderson and Christopher Sands eds., *Forgotten Partnership Redux: Canada U.S. Relations in the 21st Century*, (Amhurst, NY: Cambria Press, 2001), 149-168.

America as an imperial power with the rhetorical title “An Empire, If You Can Keep It.”<sup>4</sup> Applied to Canada’s recent experience, and reflective of my broad reaction James’s book, it might read “national security policy, if you can keep it.” Canada’s contribution to the mission in Afghanistan has been impressive and costly in terms of materiel and lives lost. Many of the lessons learned there will be felt for many years, possibly decades, to come. Some of the most important lessons learned from NATO’s Afghan mission may come in terms of global approaches to state building and international development. The Afghan mission significantly challenged older models of development that were comprised mainly of money, earnest civilian development experts, and perhaps a few United Nations (UN) blue helmets for added security. Instead, the Afghan mission seems to have solidified a new model of development (perhaps first begun in Kosovo in the 1990s) whereby development is conducted at the point of a bayonet. State building increasingly commences as soon as hostilities cease, with the soldiers who were fighting on Monday asked to ‘win hearts and minds’ on Tuesday. Canada’s experimentation with provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) comprised of both military and civilian personnel became the NATO standard. Yet, with the last NATO (really U.S.) troops poised to exit Afghanistan at the end of 2014, and the results of NATO efforts in Afghanistan very much up for debate, what remains of this approach to development going forward is also open to debate.

One of James’s major arguments is that Canada has replaced the human security agenda of the 1990s with a robust national security agenda. The Harper Government’s folding of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) into the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (and now Development) (DFATD) in 2013 certainly signals a reduced emphasis on the pursuit of international development. Yet, given the Afghan mission’s emphasis on development as a strong part of the rationale for being there at all, are we really sure the human security agenda has faded from view? The experience of the Afghan mission suggests that it will be the Canadian Forces (CF), not DFATD, who will be the tip of the development spear in the years ahead.

The larger question to be asked of Canada’s newfound muscular foreign policy presence is whether any of it can last. With the Afghan mission at a close, Canada arguably now confronts many of the same dilemmas that informed the emphasis on human security in the first place; namely, what now for the CF?

As James notes, the early 1990s were not pleasant for the Canadian Forces, or for Canada’s international presence. A combination of severe federal budget cuts at home, a vigorous debate about the post-Cold War future of NATO, and a series of scandals within the CF itself all conspired to dramatically shrink Canada’s footprint internationally. Critics scoffed when Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy began calling Canada a moral superpower in pushing a new agenda of human security. To some, it was foreign policy on the cheap— a

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<sup>4</sup> Stephen Rosen, “An Empire, If You Can Keep It,” *The National Interest* 71 (Spring 2003): 51-61.

smarmy, moralizing approach to policy objectives far in excess of Canada's capabilities.<sup>5</sup> Yet, for others, Axworthy's expansive human security agenda did away with national security as the frame of reference, but in fact saved the Canadian military by dramatically expanding the range of commitments Canada might be asked to contribute to in pursuit of that agenda.<sup>6</sup> Are we not there once again?

As we enter 2014, Canada seems to be facing some of the same dilemmas where the Canadian Forces are concerned. Afghanistan has tapped the willingness of most NATO countries to engage in expeditionary actions. Moreover, coupled with the Barack Obama Administration's 'pivot to Asia,' NATO must again wrestle with the perception that it's an outdated relic of the Cold War. After a decade of war and development spending, Canada's budgets are again under pressure, putting in jeopardy large chunks of Prime Minister Harper's *Canada First* agenda. The bungled procurement of the Joint Strike Fighter has dogged the government, icebreakers have been delayed or cancelled, no significant 'boots on the ground' presence has permanently made its way to the Arctic, and the used British submarines Canada purchased have been plagued by operational readiness problems. In the absence of a clear mission and budgetary justification for an expanding CF, one wonders how much of Harper's national security agenda will survive.

Indeed, the Canadian Forces may be in need of a new intellectual case, like the old human security agenda, for the robustness it currently enjoys. The CF's image in the minds of many Canadians has improved dramatically in recent years, especially in those few cities where significant numbers of the CF are based. However, that is indeed restricted to a very few cities as most CF bases are located away from large population centers. Being out of sight and out of mind for most Canadians is likely to result in a decreased commitment to fund the CF, especially as the memory of Afghanistan begins to fade.

James quite rightly makes the case that the Canadian military has recovered a degree of respect. It has been funded and newly equipped at levels not seen since the Cold War. Yet, for all the improvement, there isn't really much to celebrate here since nearly any level of cash infusion to the CF would have been a marked improvement. Much like the human security agenda before it, the contemporary emphasis on national security seems to have been made by a political leadership unaware of the military's ill-preparedness to carry it out. For example, James recounts Canada's efforts to extract Canadian citizens from Libya in early 2011 at which time two C-130 and two C-17 cargo planes stood ready to begin the evacuation of about 200 people (112-113).

Yet, even this limited airlift capacity had only been added a few short years earlier (2007),

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<sup>5</sup> Fen Osler Hampson and Dean F. Oliver, "Pulpit Diplomacy: A Critical Assessment of the Axworthy Doctrine," *International Journal* 53 (Summer 1998): 379-406 ; Kim Nossal, "Foreign Policy for Wimps," *Ottawa Citizen*, 23, April 1989.

<sup>6</sup> Joe Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, "Lloyd Axworthy's Legacy," *International Journal* 56 (Winter 2001): 1-18.

in part, due to the embarrassment of having to rely on the United States to fly the Canadian Forces around. Assuming some new intellectual case can be made for continuing to fund the CF at levels seen during the height of the Afghanistan conflict, it would still be a stretch to remove Canada from the list of free riders on the American security umbrella. In 2011, for example, Canada only spent 1.3% of GDP on its military. That same year, Belgium spent 1.1%.

Defense Spending as % of GDP<sup>7</sup>

	1988	1994	1996	1998	2011
Canada	2.0	1.7	1.4	1.3	1.3
Belgium	2.6	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.1

**The Tyranny of Asymmetry**

For those of us who have followed the last decade of trilateral relations in North America, border security has become a full-time obsession. Whereas the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) seemed to herald an era in which borders would be more and more meaningless in economic terms, 9/11 rather bluntly transformed an agenda focused on economic openness into one obsessed with security. Borders have never been more salient features of the North American economic space than they are today. *Canada and Conflict* nicely summarizes many of these changes, even including some of the proposed measures considered under the Canada-U.S. *Beyond the Border* process formally launched in late 2011.

James rightly includes all of this bilateral cooperation as part of Canada’s broader reorientation of security policy. Moreover, the changes Canada has implemented along the U.S. frontier can easily be read as part of the broad shift from human to national security. The closure of the U.S. border in the days after 9/11 represented an existential threat to a Canadian economy. It was a point driven home to Canadian officials as the border closure disrupted just-in-time production and closed a number of assembly lines on both sides of the border. When nearly 70% of an economy is tied to international trade, and nearly 80% of its exports and 50% of its imports are dependent on access to a single market, keeping the supply chains moving becomes an inherent part of national security.<sup>8</sup>

An underemphasized dimension of James’s assessment of post-9/11 security is the central role played by asymmetry in Canada-U.S. relations. A quite different read of all the post-9/11 security measures Canada has put in place treats nearly all of them as reactionary measures designed to mollify American officials worried about the porousness of the border. The genesis of the current *Beyond the Border* process is the December 2001 *Smart*

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<sup>7</sup> Source: World Bank. In 2011, the United States spent 4.2% of GDP on defense.

<sup>8</sup> Source: World Bank, CIA World Fact Book. See also, Greg Anderson, “Securitization and Sovereignty in Post-9/11 North America,” *Review of International Political Economy* 19 no. 5 (Spring 2012): 711-741.

*Border Accord*, a hastily cobbled together set of proposals from Canada designed to convince the U.S. it was serious about border management. From there have flowed changes to Canada's immigration system, a reorganization of the federal bureaucracy (Public Safety) to mirror the creation of DHS, the integration of customs and border patrol activities in ways unimaginable pre-9/11, and the sharing of Canadian entry data with American officials as they implement their own immigration tracking system. Where border security is concerned, America has more often than not acted while Canada has reacted.

The point here is that although many of these proposals have come from Ottawa, they are invariably driven by the asymmetries of power that flow through a relationship in which the U.S. pre-occupation with security has put it in driver's seat. Canadian security policy with respect to borders has been defensive and reactionary. Is it all in pursuit of Canada's national interest? Absolutely. But is it the byproduct of a spontaneous reassessment of Canada's interests? No. In most instances, there has been no other option.

Accepting a stronger role for asymmetrical power in Canada-U.S. relations, and border policy in particular, doesn't change James's overall thesis about Canada's shift toward a foreign policy more heavily informed by national security. Yet, the rationale and choice of implements in Canada's shift would be seen as different.

### **Middle Power Mythology**

This reaction to *Canada and Conflict* concludes with a question. If James is correct and Canada has entered a period of foreign policy oriented around national security interests, what can be said about Canada's broader foreign policy orientation toward middle power internationalism? Adam Chapnick's exploration of the origins, construction, and re-construction of Canada's middle power internationalism suggests the concept could be tailored to fit nearly any situation.<sup>9</sup> Where does that last decade of Canadian foreign policy fit? The myth of middle power internationalism suggests it represents yet another iteration of this mythology, a tougher, more robust, even morally self-righteous, but still highly selective middle power.

In short, Canada looks poised to continue picking and choosing. But what sort of approach to foreign policy is this? Is it just a recipe for inconsistency and confusion sowed among friends, as James's retelling of Canada's decisions on Iraq and missile defence made clear? Under what circumstances will Canada's more muscular presence at home and abroad be deployed? Will that presence be accompanied by equal measures of diplomacy and development? Will the selectivity of Canada's choices again leave it contemplating niche foreign policy?

Middle power status, regardless of its fluidity in the service of Canadian foreign policy, has

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<sup>9</sup> Adam Chapnick, "The Canadian Middle Power Myth," *International Journal* 55 (Spring 2000): 188-206.

never seemed to confer much of a sense of confidence about Canada's place in the world. It is unclear whether Canada's more muscular approach to security policy really is translating into a stronger sense of place in the world. There are indications that Canadians have a renewed sense of pride in the Canadian military, in part driven by the skill and bravery demonstrated in Afghanistan. Yet, public opinion about the CF had already begun to recover from disastrous episodes like Somalia as they were called upon for domestic disaster relief (ie. the 1997 Red River Floods, or the 1998 Ice Storm).

Much also depends on the future of NATO. James notes a number of the cleavages and uncertainties swirling around NATO's future. While some have argued that the Afghan conflict gave renewed impetus for NATO's existence, much as Kosovo did in the 1990s, one might also argue that Afghanistan deepened the cracks in the Alliance's reason for being. All of the extra defense spending and 'learning by doing' NATO gained from the shared effort may have been undone by restrictive and varied rules of engagement and public opinion in NATO countries about the Afghan campaign that soured in lockstep with the lack of progress. For Canada, the Afghan campaign seemed to signal a robust reengagement with NATO after 1990s budget cuts prompted withdraw of Canadian Forces personnel from European bases. A major component of Canadian middle power internationalism has been its membership in and support of multilateral institutions. Indeed, Canada has strongly pursued its interests through membership in such organizations since they provide access and influence in proportions greater than can be achieved on its own. However, as NATO once again confronts its reason for being, will Canada's rationale for membership change? Or, will Canada use its hard won credibility in Afghanistan to argue for a revitalized NATO?

To be fair, James addresses some of the above criticisms of Canadian foreign policy toward the end of *Canada and Conflict*. He isn't entirely dismissive of them, but does suggest they are dated, and tend to underappreciate the important shift that has taken place. As this reaction suggests, I am skeptical about its longevity, but genuinely hope James is right. A philosophical return to the national interest as the operating paradigm of Canadian policy, coupled with restored capabilities, would continue rebuilding the prestige and influence Canada lost in the early post-Cold War years. That would be a welcome outcome, indeed.

In *Canada and Conflict*, Patrick James examines the evolution of Canadian defence and security policies in the last decade. The author's objectives are ambitious, seeking to answer questions such as: "Is Canadian security policy different from before? If so, how? Do Canadians have an accurate sense of their place on the international stage? Is Canada performing well in terms of decision making, and in what ways can it do better? In what way is Canada unique? What is Canada's likely future direction in security policy?" (1-2). In many ways, the author is contributing to a broader discussion within foreign policy analysis circles on the nature and scope of Canada's international behaviour, especially since 9/11. There is a growing literature suggesting that Canada's foreign policy has dramatically changed in the last decade, shedding its honest broker, peacekeeping, multilateralist, almost idealist identity for a more militarist, interested foreign policy. Patrick James's book clearly adheres to this hypothesis, arguing that "[...] the decade since 9/11 has *transformed* Canadian security policy" (author's emphasis, 118). Although such an assertion is quite common in the literature, what sets the author's argument apart from competing narratives is its particularly clever and subtle qualification of the transformation of Canada's foreign policy in the last decade. With regards to means, James maintains – quite rightly so – that Canada's defence and security apparatus changed in kind since 9/11, and not just in degree. 9/11 essentially served as a 'first' cause, setting a path dependent movement that ultimately 'forced' Canada to massively increase security and military expenditures. Conversely, with respect to ends, James argues that Canada's security policy changed in degrees, but not in kind. Much like a pendulum, Canada's foreign policy has moved along the Liberalist-Realist spectrum from the Axworthian era of liberalism of the 1990s to a more pragmatic and assertive foreign policy centered on national interest.

*Canada and Conflict* is divided into six chapters. The first three chapters aim to understand how Canada's participation in the international mission in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014 changed the Canadian military and, ultimately, helped develop a new identity. The first chapter analyzes the pre-war era where, after decades of significant budgetary cuts, the Canadian military was left unprepared to face the challenges of the deployment in Afghanistan. In the second chapter, the author analyses Canada's Afghan experience both at home and abroad from 2001 to 2014. James's examination of Canada's multiple and diverse deployments in Afghanistan is particularly interesting and the author ultimately succeeds in making sense of a Canadian contribution that lasted more than a decade. In his exposition of the domestic experience of the Afghan mission however, the author under delivers. The author tends to over-rely on some sources, most notably Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang<sup>1</sup> and ignores the extensive and important literature examining the relationship between public opinion and the Afghan deployment, the role of bipartisanship and political parties in depoliticizing the mission, or the bureaucratic politics of civil-military relations in Canada. The third and final chapter of the 'Afghanistan arc' of *Canada*

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<sup>1</sup> Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War. Canada in Kandahar* (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2007).

*and Conflict* considers the consequences of Canada's engagement in Afghanistan. According to James, the Afghan experience had two important consequences. On the one hand, it ultimately permitted Canada to reinvest in its military arm, substantially increasing defence budgets. On the other hand, it encouraged Canadian foreign policy to move along the liberal-realist spectrum. As the author argues, rightly so in my mind: "As for identity, it is impossible to say whether the momentum will be sustained, but the pendulum swung away from liberal sensibilities regarding human security and toward a realist emphasis on government security through the pursuit of national interests" (65). In hindsight, 9/11 was directly responsible for Canada's involvement in Afghanistan.

The next two chapters (5 and 6) attempt to capture the influence of the Canadian-U.S. relationship, especially its fundamental asymmetry in terms of Canada's defence and security policy. In what are perhaps the strongest chapters of the book, James successfully assesses the relative influence of 9/11 on Canadian-U.S. relations by analyzing a series of 'issues' such as border management, the Arctic, ballistic missile defence, the Iraq War, and the Libyan intervention in 2011. Chapter 5 considers the historical development of Canadian-U.S. security relations where the author quite rightly argues that successive Canadian governments have always tried to maintain a balance between Ottawa's dependence on the United States for security and prosperity and Canada's aspiration to maintain some form of autonomy within a fundamentally lopsided relationship. As the author himself argues: "[...] policy in the national interest must be tempered, given public sensibilities, by maintaining a degree of distance from the US. Thus, Canadian governments are fated to an inherently difficult balancing act" (67).

With the context of Canadian-U.S. particularities in mind, the author then examines the role of 9/11 in Canadian defence and security policies. In this, James's conclusion remains prudent and nuanced. The author essentially argues that the influence of 9/11 really depends on the issue: "The 9/11 attacks stands as an immediate trigger of some significant developments and a more indirect cause for others" (85). Regarding border security management, 9/11 had a direct and important impact on Canadian policies. As Canadian prosperity effectively depends on a free access to U.S. markets, Washington's reaction after 9/11, especially the tightening of border security, was considered a major setback to Canadian interests. Hence, successive governments of Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin, and Stephen Harper, deployed important resources, both financial and in terms of political capital, to reassure U.S. security concerns. On the Arctic and ballistic missile defence (BMD), the author notes that 9/11 had little influence on policy decision-making where Ottawa responds to deeper, more engrained imperatives such as Canadian domestic sensibilities and ideational foundations. Finally, considering the Iraq War and intervention in Libya, James argues that 9/11 was not a proximate cause of Canadian decision-making. Nevertheless, the author interestingly suggests that 9/11 acted as a 'first cause' that sets a path dependent causal process that enabled both the Iraq War and Libyan intervention. As James notes:

[...] 9/11 looks like a huge domino that sets in motion many others following after it. Consider, in that sense, the following process: in response to 9/11, Canada entered the Afghan war but had to pause its involvement because of a lack of both troops and war

material. Ottawa then greatly increased its military capabilities and resumed combat role at a much higher level through the deployment to Kandahar. Thus the CF had military resources available – at levels far beyond anything seen in decades – to make possible and even indirectly encourage a role in an intervention such as Libya (83).

I find this idea of 9/11 as a ‘fickle cause’ a clever analysis and one that resists a monocausal interpretation of Canadian defence and security political decision-making. I take issue however, with the author’s treatment of the Iraq War 2003. It is not at all clear that 9/11 had any effect on Canada’s decision not to participate to the U.S.-led intervention. We can understand how 9/11 opened the door to a more ‘proactive’ militarist U.S. foreign policy, and thus acted as an indirect cause to the war, but with respect to Canada’s foreign policy, 9/11 was never really a factor in Ottawa’s decision. James remains vague on how exactly 9/11 can be traced causally to Canada’s decision with regards to the Iraq War 2003.

Chapter 6 tries to assess more directly the intricate influence of 9/11 on Canadian-U.S. relations, analyzing the evolution of Canadian defence and security policies since 2001. In this, James quite convincingly shows that 9/11 had two consequences on the Canadian-U.S. relationship. On the one hand, through border management, the strengthening of NORAD, and Afghanistan and Libyan deployments, we can see an increase in policy integration between the two countries. As the author summarizes: “Obvious in this narrative on Can/Am security relations, by now, is an overall trend toward integration in spite of specific disagreements” (104). On the other hand, James perceives a significant shift in Canadian foreign policy from a pre-9/11 emphasis on human security and more ‘liberal’ inclinations to a post-9/11 focus on national security and a more ‘realist’ or material interpretation of Canada’s interests. As the author notes in a particularly insightful comment: “Perhaps the more militarily capable and experienced Canada that emerged from the last decade may be viewed as more assertive with its U.S. neighbor even as it became increasingly interdependent in terms of security” (117). In other words, although Canada is willing to bandwagon when dealing with North American security integrations, we can perceive on numerous issues, such as the Arctic, the Iraq War 2003, and BMD in 2005, a tendency from the Canadian government to actually resist US influence and, in many ways, adopt a soft-balancing strategy. James, with such a broad understanding of Canadian-US relations, is able to grasp the convoluted and sometimes contradicting nature of Canada’s relationship with Washington.

Finally, the last chapter looks into the notion of Canada as a “model Citizen” of the international system and rightly suggests that Canada has moved on, focusing its foreign policy on more “realist” interests such as security and economic prosperity. According to James, 9/11 essentially transformed Canada’s defence and security policy. First, since 2001, Canada has reinvested massively in its security apparatus, first in boosting domestic security budgets right after 9/11 and, then, increasing military expenditures from 2004 to 2011. For James, this is particularly important: “[...] the *means* of security policy changed in kind, not just degree. At both psychological and material levels, the position of the military had changed. [...] The institutional buildup of the preceding decade is noteworthy in terms of both breadth and depth” (129). Second, with respect to ends, Ottawa has systematically expressed a desire to orient its foreign policy along material interests defined by security

and economic imperatives and, ultimately, relinquished its obsession with human security that had characterized its foreign policy in the 1990s. To be sure, Canadian foreign policy always moved along a continuum between liberal ideals and realist imperatives. Thus, it is not a change 'in kind' that occurred since 9/11 but really a change of degree with Ottawa aligning its policy on realist interests. James ultimately concludes that this realignment is positive. As the author would argue: "Canadians today, as a result of experiences over the last 10 years, seem more in balance and accurate about their country's role on the world stage" (130).

*Canada and Conflict* is an engaging book and offers a provocative argument. When boiled down to its substantive core, the book contends that an external event (in this context the 9/11 terrorist attacks) was a necessary condition for the transformation of Canadian defence and security policy in the last decade. There are several ways with which someone could critically approach this interpretation of Canadian foreign policy since 2001. First, one could take issue with the causal mechanism of James's argument and point out that the effective cause of Canada's defence policy since 2001 is not the tragic event of 9/11 in itself, but really the United States' response to these attacks (border management, Afghanistan, War on Terror, Iraq War 2003). A simple and quick counterfactual argument highlights this argument. Let us assume a possible world where the events on September 11, 2001 happened, but where the United States reacted differently. The result would be a comprehensive border management that would not target the Canadian-U.S. borders (since none of the terrorists that conducted the attacks on 9/11 came from Canada or passed through Canada), limited intervention in Afghanistan with no reconstruction efforts beyond 2002, and no Iraq War 2003. In such a possible world, it is difficult to see how 9/11 would have had the same transformative consequences on Canadian defence and security policies such as those argued by James in *Canada and Conflict*. Conversely, we can also imagine a possible world where the 9/11 attacks would not have materialized, but where the U.S. would still have followed the same policy choices, tightening border controls, probably not intervening in Afghanistan, and employing a U.S. foreign policy willing (either following neo-conservative or offensive liberalism rationales) to use force and intervene in conflicts around the world, quite possibly a war in Iraq in 2003. In such a world, it is feasible to foresee how Canada would need to adapt to these new conditions imposed by a more aggressive, unilateral United States and implement the kind of policies that we have seen in the last decade. In retrospect, these counterfactuals weaken James's contention that 9/11 influenced a transformation of Canadian defence policy and refocus the argument on the real operative cause, i.e. U.S. responses and reaction to these events.

Second, one could also contend that James's understanding of Canadian defence policy exaggerates the influence of external factors, such as U.S. relations or 9/11, and ultimately fails to seriously consider the domestic, internal imperative of Canadian foreign policy decision-making. James's main conclusion is that because of 9/11, the means of Canadian defence policy have dramatically improved and the foreign policy rationale has moved along the realist-liberalist spectrum centering on national (i.e. material) interests. An alternative interpretation would instead argue that the internal dynamics of Canada's power structure have evolved since 2003-2004, producing the same transformation identified by James. Indeed, since 2003, we have slowly perceived an erosion of the

Laurentian elites' (progressive, multicultural Canadian elites living between Toronto and Montreal) grasp on Canada's political power levers. This particular group was (and still is) a strong proponent of an activist 'liberal' Canadian foreign policy; one that would focus on human security, human rights, and the notion of Canada as a postmodern, global citizen which endorses cosmopolitan ideals. The Laurentian elite was replaced by more Conservative elements of the Canadian population, first with the center-right Liberals of Paul Martin in 2003 and then by Stephen Harper's Conservative party in 2006 onward. The power base of these elites is to be found in Western Canada and suburban Ontario where populations share a more 'material' understanding of Canada's national interest with a focus on prosperity and security. A neoclassical realist would argue that Canada's perception of the international system, shifting from a liberal mindset to a more realist interpretation, has changed because the elites controlling Canada's foreign policy are different and are answering to more Conservative elements within the Canadian population. To be sure, the Laurentian elites are still around, lamenting the transformation of Canada's foreign policy and hoping for better days, which may come in the future. Public opinion polls dealing with a wide range of foreign policy issues systematically show a heterogeneous Canadian society regionally divided and stuck between progressive, liberal Quebec and conservative, realist Alberta.

In conclusion, I enjoyed James's book. *Canada and Conflict* is a courageous work that makes a strong argument and isn't afraid to take a position and develop the best case for it. In *Canada and Conflict*, the author forces readers to think and critically engage with the argument. Whether or not we agree with James's interpretation of Canada's defence and security policy since 2001, this is the mark of a successful intellectual endeavor.

Reading this concise and punchy analysis of contemporary Canada's security and defence policy brought to mind a long-dead and reasonably obscure poet, who if he is remembered today for anything, is probably because of a song he wrote in 1899, which got published as a poem two decades or so later, under the title, "Antigonish." Now, those who are familiar with Canadian realities might think I cite this poet, William Hughes Mearns, because I intend to make a point somehow dependent upon reference to a university town in Nova Scotia, which presumably inspired Mearns's titling of his poem. But that is not the link that connects the poet, the poem, and the thesis of Patrick James's monograph. Instead, what I find apposite in this poem is its opening quatrain:

Yesterday upon the stair  
I met a man who wasn't there  
He wasn't there again today  
I wish, I wish he'd go away

On reading Patrick James, I get the strong sensation that he has met a decade that wasn't there, and has used it as a convenient foil to advance his very powerful argument that 9/11 so fundamentally altered the path of Canadian grand strategy (my term, not his) as to constitute, to refer to the title of his just-published book (co-edited with Jonathan Paquin) on North American security, a veritable "game changer."<sup>1</sup> Nothing that went before that fateful September morning was going to be of much significance to Canada's security and defence policies henceforth. From now on, the pendulum would shift, and do so in a dramatic fashion, resulting in Canada's grand strategy being drawn back from the outer reaches of idealism (if not utopianism), to which he says it had been getting distressingly attracted, toward the more salubrious pole of realism. In short, Canadians' strategic options became radically altered by 9/11, and perhaps even Canada's 'identity' did, too, with ultimate implications James adjudges to be beneficial for Canadian security policy, and especially for its all-important relationship with the United States (save on the contentious Arctic file, about which I will have more to say below).

Given the impressive, to some even breath-taking, claim about 9/11 constituting such a geostrategic caesura for Canada, it follows that the reader is hardly going to be invited, maybe not even to be permitted, to ponder whether there might be some important elements of continuity between the old (pre-9/11) era and the new one. It is not just that James tells us (118), in what he confesses is a "big assertion," that there has *never* been a decade in the existence of Canada of greater consequence for the country's security interests than the first decade of the twenty-first century. This he certainly does say, leading some skeptics to ask themselves whether it could actually be so, given the import of, say, years such as the 1910s (the First World War) and the 1940s (the Second World

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<sup>1</sup> *Game Changer: The Impact of 9/11 on North American Security*, ed. Patrick James and Jonathan Paquin (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014).

War), to say nothing of the 1860s (Confederation), 1810s (the War of 1812), 1760s (the fall of New France), or perhaps even the 1690s (the beginning of the long era of intercolonial warfare between French Canada and English North America).

But more eyebrow-raising than is his assertion about the *über*-importance of the years 2001-2011 is James's deft application of the airbrush to two key events of the 1990s, which leads me to believe that the decade that 'wasn't there' simply had to be made to 'go away' from his narrative. The two events bracket the decade chronologically and logically, and if they were to have been conceded more significance in the story he tells, they would necessarily have undercut the centrality of the book's argument. Those events, of course, are the U.S.-led coalition's war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1991, and the Kosovo war launched by NATO against Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic in 1999. Let's take them in turn, and examine what James has to say about each episode.

In respect of what we usually in the West call the 'first Gulf war' (though the Iranians might beg to differ), James makes two claims that seem to stand in contradiction to each other. One claim comes on page 80: "Canada therefore endorsed Operation Desert Storm, which quickly and decisively evicted Iraq from Kuwait – but it did not participate in the first war against Iraq." Yet a mere five pages later, he tells us something different: "Canada supported its principal ally and acted in tandem with other states in the effort to evict Saddam Hussein from Kuwait." Indeed Canada did, deploying at the height of its engagement some 2700 military personnel to the Persian Gulf theatre, in a mainly naval commitment known as Operation Friction, but one that was supported by army and air force assets, with Canadian fighter-bombers taking part in more than 50 bombing sorties. One might quibble whether Canada did 'enough' in the war against the Iraqi regime, but it cannot be maintained that Canada was absent from the fray.

With Kosovo, James focuses on something else – two things really. First, on page 6, he minimizes Canada's military involvement. Not to do so would vitiate his argument that prior to the Afghan commitment starting in late 2001, Canada had had "no significant combat experience since the Korean War." If by that statement he means to suggest that Canada's *ground forces* had little direct involvement in war, then he is on solid ground. But to deny that Kosovo was a "significant" combat event is to put too fine a point on matters. It is, of course, true that the 78-day air war resulted in no NATO combat fatalities, and if one judges significance to be in part dependent upon one's own side taking casualties, then Kosovo could be said to be rather small beer as these things go. Still, it *was* a war, and more importantly, Canada *was* an active participant in it, much more so than most other NATO allies, including and especially Germany.

Further in the book (111), we are told that Canadian involvement in the Libya air offensive of 2011 could simply not have been possible prior to 9/11 and the changes it wrought in Canadian grand strategy, and this not only because of an altered identity but because assets developed to reflect the new strategic orientation (to say again, in a more 'realist' direction) would not have been available for any Canadian Libyan combat in the absence of 9/11. As James puts it, "the Canada that existed prior to the post-9/11 buildup of the CF could not have participated in the Libyan intervention in the militarily effective way that it

ultimately did.” Is this so? I suspect most experts who have looked at the two aerial campaigns will have little difficulty concluding that the Canadian contribution to the first (i.e., Kosovo) was more operationally relevant than to the second (Libya). Why was this the case? In large part because during the 1990s Canada’s CF-18s had been modernized so as to enable them to launch precision guided munitions (PGMs) against targets in Serbia, and it was this capability that enabled the CF to punch, if not above its own ‘weight,’ then certainly above that of all other allies in the air offensive save for the U.S., France, and the UK. Along with those three countries and two other allied air forces, those of Spain and the Netherlands, Canada – because it had the required assets – could play a militarily significant role in a *real* war.

There are other bits of evidence one could muster to demonstrate my own argument about the desirability of making the 1990s vanish (e.g., the imputation on page . 122 that “interoperability” only became an important buzzword by 2004, when in reality the mantra was an important theme in the Chrétien government’s ‘Strategy 2020’ musings, pre-9/11). However, in the interest of space, let me turn to a few more items that, to put it mildly, captured my attention. Some of these are the sort of minor solecisms that all of us are wont, from time to time, to make when we hit the keyboard (e.g., the comment to the effect that in 2003 “Ottawa, in contrast to Bonn and some other NATO capitals” (29) was not attaching so-called caveats to the operations of its forces – a comment that is correct in spirit but not in the letter, given that it was *Berlin* not Bonn that was Germany’s capital by 2003). Some are inaccuracies that are widely believed but that nevertheless are not true, as for instance James’s claim about the border being “closed” (19, repeated on 81) after the attacks on New York and Washington: the border assuredly did become more difficult and time-consuming to cross on and after 9/11, and while U.S. airspace was closed to incoming passenger planes, the land border never did close, not even briefly.

More importantly are two other contentions, one concerning Canada’s ‘anti-Americanism,’ and the other concerning Canada-U.S. friction in the Arctic. These are actually peas in the same pod, and the only thing I would say here is that I do believe James overstates the degree to which this ‘value’ called anti-Americanism really does condition Canadian grand strategy. One could debate this point all day, I suppose, but it might put things in better perspective to refer to the obvious (at least to me) ontological dilemma Canada faces on the North American continent as expressing itself more in terms of ‘non-Americanism’ than of ‘anti-Americanism.’ When we think of ‘anti-Americans,’ we think of rulers (perhaps even populations) in places like North Korea, or Venezuela, or Russia, or China; we do not think of countries that are America’s closest allies. And this leads to my last critical observation: James overstates the degree to which Canadian ‘sovereignty’ concerns in the Arctic are focused upon the U.S. As everyone knows, the two countries will not see eye-to-eye on the status of the Northwest Passage (Canadian ‘internal waters’ or ‘international strait’?). But since 1988 there has been a reasonably tolerable *modus vivendi* in place allowing each side to finesse the issue in such a manner as to minimize discord. Moreover, they have been cooperating fruitfully on some other Arctic bones of contention, e.g., the matter of delineating the boundaries of their respective continental shelves under Arctic waters. Where Canada has really been taking, of late, a hard line with military implications concerns Russia, a country that James virtually ignores when he depicts the Arctic as a site

of 'realist' contestation. Canada scrambles CF-18s when Russian Bear bombers enter its air-defence identification zone; it does not track the whereabouts of American nuclear-propelled (and possibly nuclear-armed) submarines in the Arctic. The difference is a telling one.

In closing, I want to emphasize that this book makes a marvelous teaching tool, notwithstanding some of the contentious points I have flagged in my review. Precisely because Patrick James takes such a bold stance throughout, and argues a thesis that some might find to be ideologically 'off-message' in a country that seems to have forgotten its martial past (this is not a criticism I would choose to make of the book), it can be counted upon to stimulate discussion. Illustratively, I assigned it this past week to students in a seminar on North American security that I have been teaching this winter quarter at Dartmouth College, in New Hampshire. Without exception, the students thoroughly enjoyed the book, finding it to be a source of wonderful insights and a fount of knowledge about contemporary Canadian security and defence policy. And so it is.

Author's Response by Patrick James, University of Southern California

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I am grateful to the reviewers for their careful reading and constructive commentary on *Canada and Conflict*. Professors Greg Anderson, Jean-Christophe Boucher and David Haglund are accomplished scholars and thoughtful critics.<sup>1</sup> I agree with much of what they have passed along in their respective reviews and will concentrate on points of clarification and debate. The subjects to be addressed are (a) the identification of nuances regarding continuity and change; (b) relative versus absolute views about Canada's contribution to Western security; (c) human security; (d) the decade of security policy since 9/11 in historical perspective; (e) the character of security policy and resource deployment in the decade leading up to 9/11; (f) the likely persistence of change; and (g) causal factors and counterfactual analysis.

Let me begin with a nod to Boucher for identifying the nuances of the book regarding continuity and change. He points out that *Canada and Conflict* argues that the *means* of Canadian security policy "changed in kind since 9/11, and not just in degree." At the same time, Boucher observes that, according to *Canada and Conflict*, the *ends* changed in degree rather than in kind. He is right on both points regarding what I intended to argue and I appreciate seeing the message in bold relief. Thus the book identifies both change and continuity in Canadian security policy in the years after 9/11 – a point that will recur below.

Absolute versus relative contributions by Canada to Western security provide a point of departure for responding to the critics. According to Anderson, "Canada's contribution to the mission in Afghanistan has been impressive and costly in terms of materiel and lives lost." This observation is accurate but only in a certain context – how Canadians might see themselves. No disrespect is intended, but the cost in terms of human life and material loss for Canada in Afghanistan is quite minor by world standards. (Ask, for instance, the Vietnamese how they might look at their own experiences in just one decade – perhaps the 1960s – as a point of comparison.) Anderson's assertion is revealing because, from a contemporary Canadian standpoint, Afghanistan stood out as a *major* contribution to Western security, in spite of the relatively small force and light casualties involved in comparison to historical military engagements such as World Wars I and II and the Korean War.

Yet inter-personal or interstate comparisons of joy and pain are not what count in such matters; instead, the exercise is inherently subjective and individualized, whether the individual is a person or political unit. The key and revealing point is that Afghanistan stands out as a major sacrifice by *Canadian* standards. The fact

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<sup>1</sup> Each of the commentators read the book with great attentiveness and I also appreciate their clarification of its vagueness and identification of its errors. For example, Haglund is right that the border did not close on 9/11; I should have written that transit became slow enough to approximate that outcome from a commercial point of view.

that Afghanistan could seem that way to Canadians, in light of the much greater objective level of suffering elsewhere, says a lot about where things stood before 9/11. This observation about the Canadian context intensifies against the backdrop of what had occurred in the years leading up to 9/11, a point to which I return below.

With regard to relatively modest military expenditures in the decade after 9/11, by world standards, Anderson asserts that “there isn’t really much to celebrate here since nearly any level of cash infusion to the Canadian forces (CF) would have been a marked improvement.” This point, however, returns to Boucher’s observation about means that changed in kind rather than mere degree. Anderson correctly points out that Canada looks pretty similar to Belgium, for instance, in charting defense spending as a percentage of GDP, even a full decade beyond 9/11. Yet the Canadian story after Afghanistan is not one told in mere numbers. By participating in full-fledged combat in a war far from home, Canada affirmed that it would not become Costa Rica in a military sense, that is, a state with no capability and completely beholden to the U.S. for security. Change in kind is what matters here; Canada used real military capability – not its combination in the previous decade of rhetoric and post-conflict peacekeeping – to fight the Taliban. To call a spade a spade, Canada abandoned what had been in place in the years leading up to 9/11 – not even peacekeeping, but instead largely talking about it – in favor of a more traditional use of military capabilities in prosecuting a war.

What about human security, the idea-based Canadian context prior to 9/11? In looking back on the last decade, Anderson asks “are we really sure that the human security agenda has faded from view?” The answer is ‘no’, but change by degree is evident. Use of the human security concept as a tactic to avoid expenditure on, or use of, real military capabilities is at least in abeyance. I acknowledge some degree of continuity regarding human security in *Canada and Conflict*. The CF fought the Taliban both directly and through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). “State building”, Anderson observes, “increasingly commences as soon as hostilities cease.” He could have gone one step further with respect to Afghanistan, where PRT efforts took place in tandem with the challenge to the CF of securing surrounding territory. In light of the Canadian experience, PRT might even be designated as the human security battlefield within the war against the Taliban.

Consider all of these events in historical perspective: “where”, as Anderson asks, “does the last decade of Canadian foreign policy fit?” The answer implied by *Canada and Conflict* is a re-balancing back to many years ago. In that context, it is useful to compare Prime Ministers Lester Pearson versus Jean Chrétien in terms of their impact on U.S. presidential decision-making. Chrétien, in his autobiography, expresses disappointment about the U.S. decision to go to war against Iraq in 2003.<sup>2</sup> The Prime Minister had opposed the war every step of the way. Implied throughout

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<sup>2</sup> Jean Chrétien, *My Years as Prime Minister* (Toronto: Vintage, 2007), 287-319.

Chrétien's chapter on Iraq is a follow-up question: 'Why wouldn't the president listen to me?' An underlying answer can be obtained through comparison with a successful Canadian role in dampening conflict at another time.

Consider the role of Pearson in the Suez Crisis of 1956. Pearson, at the time a diplomat and not yet Prime Minister, scored a major success in persuading the parties concerned to de-escalate a very dangerous conflict in the Middle East. His idea of interposing a UN force won the day and also a Nobel Prize for him. Canada at that time, with its military accomplishments in World War II and even more recent contributions to the UN force in the Korean War, continued to play a more traditional military role within NATO. Put simply, this military commitment may have created credibility with the U.S. From Washington's point of view, a relatively small and even strategically irrelevant military commitment carried with it the right to an opinion about essential matters.<sup>3</sup> While it is impossible to be certain whether the Canadian military profile at the time facilitated Pearson's historic intervention – and it is possible that the power of his ideas alone fully explains the outcome – it also is feasible to argue that a different Canada existed at that time in terms of likely U.S. receptiveness to ideas originating from the north.

From the standpoint of the U.S. a half century later, Canada might be seen as an interloper on any given decision to use military force. Washington had reason to perceive Ottawa as a purveyor of sanctimony and platitudes rather than a contributor of meaningful resources. Herein lies the irony: Chrétien may well have been right in urging President George W. Bush to back away from a war to overthrow Saddam Hussein, but lacked empathy with his U.S. peer and exerted no influence. From Washington's point of view, why listen to the leader of a country drifting into a Costa Rican military profile? A more militarily capable Canada might have been able to give effective pause to deadly escalation, as it so prominently did with Suez many years earlier. While this point is speculative, at least, one thing is known for sure: Bush did ignore Chrétien and it is hard to imagine, from a Canadian point of view, a more unfortunate outcome than a war fought by its closest ally primarily on grounds that never could be confirmed. In sum, the decline of Canada's traditional military capability in the decade before 9/11 may have muted Ottawa as a voice regarded as worth heeding by Washington.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> What follows is not a claim regarding an observed causal mechanism, i.e., that President Dwight Eisenhower consciously reacted to Pearson in the manner implied. Instead, the assessment concerns the likely hypothetical disposition of a leader when offered advice from someone associated with contribution versus free-riding. The outcome also is over-determined in the sense that Eisenhower preferred a resolution in which Britain, France and Israel backed away from war against Egypt. Thus Pearson's intervention stood in harmony with the direction in which the President hoped to move events.

<sup>4</sup> Former Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier offers an account of the uniformly skeptical views among US leadership, notably the military, with regard to the CF's training and likely

After Afghanistan, however, Canada could not be dismissed as a free rider on U.S. military expenditures – a highly critical phrase that might have been applied in response to prior self-designation as a moral superpower. But is the preceding assessment of the Chrétien era appropriate? Is it possible that *Canada and Conflict* goes over the line in its critique of the 1990s as an effectively lost decade from the standpoint of security policy? Consider the poetic critique of Haglund, who offers the following lines from “Antigonish”, by Hughes Mearns:

Yesterday upon the stair  
I met a man who wasn't there  
He wasn't there again today  
I wish, I wish he'd go away

Haglund's intended reference in the lines above is obvious: Chrétien is the man not upon the stairs; his government's record in security policy, with all details in place, looks different than *Canada and Conflict* would suggest. Thus Haglund asserts that I have “met a decade that wasn't there”. Instead, he claims, there is more continuity before and after 9/11 than *Canada and Conflict* would recognize. With apologies to Mearns and poets everywhere, here is the beginning of my response to the continuity thesis:

A decade ago upon the stair  
I saw a man assuredly there  
While Jean may be back in Shawinigan  
I recall his security policy once again.

The man at the top of the stairs, as described in *Canada and Conflict*, indeed is former Prime Minister Chrétien. I offer two challenges to what might be designated as the continuity thesis – the idea that Canada had not lapsed into a pacific slumber during the 1990s.

First, the evidence offered in favor of the continuity thesis indirectly confirms the crucial aspects about inter-decade change identified in *Canada and Conflict*. Haglund observes that Canada participated in military operations for the first Gulf War and Kosovo. Yet he acknowledges that Canadian ground forces “had little direct involvement in war.” This is what matters because, without ground forces in combat, contemporary military deployments by advanced states against those much weaker are likely to entail minimal casualties.<sup>5</sup> As Haglund notes, deployment in the

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operational value. See Hillier, *A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War* (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers, 2010).

<sup>5</sup> Air campaigns, for instance, are likely to produce significant casualties between evenly matched adversaries, as opposed to one-sided engagements such as Kosovo. On the World War II

Gulf War primarily took the form of a naval commitment, and the NATO bombing campaign over Kosovo had *no* casualties.

With these observations in mind, compare the activities of Canadian and German military units in Afghanistan. The former took on a real combat role and incurred battle-related casualties as a result; due to national caveats, the latter did not. The difference is literally a matter of life and death. Put simply, there was a major shift after 9/11 regarding Canadian deployment of military force and the most graphic comparison would be with the essentially cost-free 1990s.

With respect to the continuity thesis, a second, ideationally oriented critique concerns the views of the Prime Minister himself. Chrétien epitomized what Boucher refers to as the “Laurentian elites”, with a foreign policy disposed toward the idea (if not the implementation) of peacekeeping and away from use of military force. Laurentianism also entails a healthy dose of anti-Americanism, which Haglund sees as more properly associated with sworn enemies of the U.S. Readers of Chrétien’s autobiography, however, will see plenty of anti-American statements, most notably attacks upon conservatives in the U.S. whom he tends to associate with his critics in Canada.<sup>6</sup>

None of this, of course, is intended as a criticism of the former Prime Minister as a brilliantly successful politician: how many others have won three consecutive majority governments? And Chrétien did so by running for some things and against others, in the process putting forward the rather dim view of the U.S. favored by the Laurentian elites. The relevant point here is to confirm that, as would be expected for a center-left leader of the Liberal Party, Chrétien played up to anti-American nationalism when it worked to his advantage.<sup>7</sup> The contrast between Chrétien and Stephen Harper in terms of a ‘default position’ vis-à-vis cooperation with the U.S. is clear to see and traceable at least in part to 9/11 and its aftermath. This change carried over quite naturally to a combat role in Afghanistan even before Harper arrived, as opposed to the preceding rhetoric about peacekeeping and possibly some limited provision of it. Chrétien’s choice of policy options, after 9/11 and the U.S. war against the Taliban, no longer included straightforward refusal to cooperate with Washington.

Carrying the debate a bit further, what if the continuity thesis is wrong, but the point

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era, as a point of contrast, see Richard Overy, *The Bombing War: Europe 1939-1945* (New York: Penguin Books, 2013).

<sup>6</sup> See Chrétien, *My Years as Prime Minister*, 315, 332.

<sup>7</sup> However, to his credit, Chrétien refused to pander to such feelings among the public when it might put at risk the overall relationship with the U.S. and thereby damage Canadian interests. A prominent example is Chrétien’s refusal to exploit anger after Bush failed to name Canada among the list of allies he thanked soon after 9/11. See Chrétien, *My Years as Prime Minister*, 299.

is moot because there is no staying power to the presumed changes? Anderson, with regard to Canada's shift in emphasis to a more military-oriented foreign policy, asks "whether any of it can last" and wonders "how much of Harper's national security agenda will survive."

Boucher's assessment of change in degree and kind regarding means and ends comes back into play once more. Material change in terms of the CF is limited and current economic challenges make it unlikely, for example, that Canada will live up to a fully assertive role in the Arctic any time soon. However, as Boucher implies, the key change in capabilities is in *kind*. Canada has returned to its roots in terms of supporting, at least to some degree, a military understood in traditional terms prior to the Chrétien period when Lloyd Axworthy was Minister of Foreign Affairs. With regard to ideas, by contrast, it is a matter of *degree*. Canadians, as a result of their experience with Afghanistan, did not renounce human security. However, continuing interest in helping those in plight became re-connected to the idea that force sometimes must be used. National security precedes human security.<sup>8</sup> Thus the Canadian contribution in Afghanistan took a hybrid form, blending together a renewed conventional military emphasis with PRTs.

One challenge to the preceding argument might focus on its underpinnings in terms of the crucial effects from 9/11, most notably, the U.S. war against the Taliban. Boucher argues that the "transformational consequences" put forward in *Canada and Conflict* can be undermined by a counterfactual analysis: What if the U.S. had reacted differently to 9/11? In principle, Boucher is right because we do not get to see how that would have played out. Yet I tend to see very little contingency in the effects of 9/11 on U.S. behavior. The series of major events from 9/11 onward, which include two wars, would seem quite path-dependent. We can equally consider the remarkable counterfactual analysis of Frank P. Harvey regarding a Gore Administration – a quite believable alternative scenario – and how the U.S. still would have gone to war against Iraq because of forces transcending the identity of the president.<sup>9</sup> I see Afghanistan in much the same way; alternate scenarios for the main response from the U.S. are not convincing and, in turn, Canadian involvement would follow as it did.

Once again, I thank H-Diplo and my critics for the opportunity to participate in this forum. I am so pleased that *Canada and Conflict* could stimulate such a panoramic and interesting discussion among leading experts in the field.

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<sup>8</sup> On the tradeoff and logical relationship involving order and justice in International Relations, see Abigail E. Ruane and Patrick James, *The International Relations of Middle-earth: Learning from the Lord of the Rings* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012).

<sup>9</sup> Frank P. Harvey, *Explaining the Iraq War: Counterfactual Theory, Logic and Evidence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

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